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AUTOMATION ET AUTORITE AUTOGESTION ET AUTARCHISME

La présente communication comporte trois développements:

- I. Automation et autogestion (problématique générale)
- II. Autorité et autogestion dans les entreprises automatisées.
- III. De l'autogestion localisée à l'autarchisme généralisé.

I

AUTOMATION ET AUTOGESTION

Le problème à étudier est le suivant: Toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, l'automation rend-elle l'autogestion **plus** ou **moins** crédible?

A) SOCIOLOGIE DES IDEOLOGIES: THESES ANTINOMIQUES EN PRESENCE

1. Pour les uns, l'autogestion est une méthode de démarrage politique et économique dans les pays en voie de développement, une sorte d'école pratique qui dégage une **élite** administrative et technique; de la sorte, l'autogestion engendrera son contraire puisqu'elle prépare de nouvelles possibilités de fonctionnement hiérarchique du corps social. Ce phénomène a été observé par Albert Meister, dans la seconde édition de son étude sur la Yougoslavie et par Catherine Levy dans sa thèse sur les entreprises autogérées en Algérie.

2. Pour d'autres, au contraire, par exemple, en France, Serge Mallet, la critique du système hiérarchique serait surtout vive dans les entreprises les plus automatisées. L'élévation du niveau technologique de l'ensemble des ouvriers les rendrait aptes à de nouvelles formes de gestion.

En réalité, les deux positions qui viennent d'être schématisées sont moins antinomiques que différentes et, de ce fait, difficilement comparables. Beaucoup de facteurs de différenciation interviennent et il est impossible de dégager des corrélations significatives entre phénomènes hétérogènes. En particulier, le concept de pays (Yougoslavie ou Algérie) n'est pas opératoire pour l'étude qui nous occupe. Dans un pays inégalement développé comme la Yougoslavie on observe des phénomènes très différents: ce qui se produit dans des secteurs agricoles ou artisanaux n'a rien à voir avec ce qui peut s'observer dans d'autres où la production est organisée selon les techniques les plus avancées des pays industrialisés. Ainsi une comparaison plus fine devrait être instituée entre usines de technologies semblables dans des pays différents et entre entreprises de technologies différentes dans un même pays. On peut admettre que, dans un pays arriéré, l'autogestion accélère effectivement la formation d'une élite technique et politique dans les secteurs peu développés. Cela ne saurait empêcher que, dans un stade ultérieur ou dans une autre région, cette **élite** ne soit mise en question par un progrès dans la formation de l'ensemble des travailleurs de l'entreprise. Il convient

donc de négliger les prises de positions globales pour étudier concrètement les incidences de l'introduction de l'informatique sur les structures industrielles. C'est ce que nous tenterons de faire dans la seconde partie de cet exposé. Auparavant, il convient de développer la problématique du sujet.

B) CORRELATIONS CONCEPTUELLES

Le passage à la limite des rapports entre les deux notions d'autogestion et d'automatisme fait successivement apparaître les problèmes suivants:

1. Poussée à la limite, l'automatisation est souvent interprétée comme excluant l'autogestion. On peut en effet concevoir une cybernétique absolue, un mécanisme autorégulé d'où l'homme serait totalement absent, tant sous forme d'un chef qui commande que sous celle d'un exécutant. Cette anticipation technologique a trouvé par avance son expression philosophique dans l'inhumanisme affiché de l'idéologie structuraliste avec ses plages de sable où la trace se perd des pas de l'homme. Il découle de cette rêverie techniciste que l'autogestion pose en principe l'introduction aléatoire de l'arbitraire humain et donc d'un arbitrage non rationnellement prévisible, d'un **clinamen** qui est à l'origine de l'histoire et qui distingue la société humaine de celle des fourmis ou des termites. L'autogestion ne supprime pas le choix libre, elle en rend au contraire capable l'ensemble du corps social en tant que tel. L'autogestion n'est pas l'automatisation inhumaine, elle est l'exercice social de la liberté, alors que les systèmes actuels, s'ils ne sont pas automatisés d'une façon inhumaine, sont des hétérogestions où est socialement efficace la seule volonté libre d'une minorité, aristocratique, bourgeoise ou bureaucratique.

2. Si (nous venons de le voir) l'automatisation peut se concevoir sans autogestion, en est-il de même en sens inverse? Certes, en sa signification étymologique, l'autogestion peut se concevoir au niveau artisanal et même concerner Robinson.

Mais le sens réel, c'est-à-dire sociologiquement attesté, du mot autogestion comporte une **organisation régie par un conseil** rassemblant un certain nombre d'hommes qui prennent en main leurs affaires.

Dans la mesure où le groupe reste petit aucune automatisation n'est nécessaire. Platon et Rousseau en avaient conclu que les groupes autogérés (qu'ils appelaient démocratiques) ne devaient pas dépasser certaines dimensions. Concrètement, dans les assemblées générales, chacun des membres du groupe devait pouvoir rester à portée de voix d'un orateur. C'est précisément cette limite qui est aujourd'hui indéfiniment reculée par l'informatique. Au niveau des grands ensembles sociaux, voire de l'humanité entière, l'autogestion est rendue possible - en principe - par la technologie moderne. Ainsi les rapports entre les deux termes se modifient historiquement. Par la médiation électronique des images et des sons, l'universalité d'un consensus pourra faire l'objet de vérifications multivariées. Ce qui n'était chez Kant qu'un principe abstrait, devient une tâche pratique qui ne pose que des problèmes théoriquement solubles de mise en oeuvre des moyens audio-visuels. Si une telle mise en oeuvre n'est pas effective, ce n'est pas par impossibilité technique, mais parce que les minorités dirigeantes la refusent et la redoutent. A partir de l'universalité apodictique de Kant, de l'Esprit hégélien, ou du «**prolétariat universel**» de Marx, on voit dès lors que la **réalisation** de la philosophie est désormais possible. C'est cette réalisation que nous appellerons l'**autarchisme**.

Mais si, de la sorte, l'autogestion dans les sociétés industrialisées est rendue possible par l'automatisme, il faut voir que l'automatisation — loin de devenir la mécanisation inhumaine précédemment évoquée (en B, 1) — rend, au contraire, nécessaire, avec la mise en cause de l'autorité, l'exercice effectif de la créativité de tous les acteurs du corps social. Il faut donc voir plus précisément ce qui se passe dans les entreprises au fur et à mesure de leur automatisation.

AUTORITE ET AUTOGESTION DANS LES ENTREPRISES AUTOMATISEES

Il s'agit ici d'une description sociologique des conséquences de l'introduction de l'informatique dans l'administration et dans la gestion de la production. Toutefois, il convient auparavant de rendre compte des spéculations idéologiques secrétées par cette mutation technologique.

A) LA PERCEPTION IDÉOLOGIQUE DU RÔLE DES ORDINATEURS

Il semblerait que l'introduction de l'informatique dans une entreprise — en permettant une centralisation immédiate des informations — doive renforcer le pouvoir de la direction. C'est sans doute avec cet espoir que nombre de »**directions**« ont introduit les ordinateurs notamment dans leurs services administratifs. L'état des stocks, le volume des commandes, les travaux en cours en leurs diverses étapes sont immédiatement visibles, comparables et il semblerait que »**Les Chefs**« aient tous les éléments pour se déterminer en connaissance de cause. Nous verrons que les choses sont beaucoup plus complexes. D'ores et déjà on a pu faire les observations suivantes:

1. Les ordinateurs et les informaticiens sont l'objet d'une perception **quasi-magique**; quand les »**dirigeants**« ne comprennent pas concrètement les moyens de calculs mis en oeuvre, ils n'ont aucun contrôle effectif sur les résultats qui leur sont fournis et ils doivent »faire confiance« à leurs »subordonnés«. **Mutatis mutandis** les ordinateurs fonctionnent comme »le principe anhypothétique« de Platon, un mystère divin par quoi tout s'explique mais qu'on ne comprend pas, dont on saisit la fonction mais pas le fonctionnement. D'où toutes les attitudes secondes de suspicion, de rejet ou de respect.¹

2. Mais les ordinateurs servent de prétexte à une idéologie plus subtile. Ils sont souvent présentés comme les détecteurs de »la rationalité objective«. Dès lors l'administration de l'entreprise par le patronnat apparaît — non comme un arbitraire de classe — mais comme la mise en oeuvre la plus économique et la plus efficace (le meilleur des mondes mathématiquement possible) dans l'intérêt de tous (patrons et ouvriers). Par là, on laisse dans l'ombre: — le caractère purement **instrumental** des ordinateurs qui, en tant que tels, ne décident rien. Ils restent des **moyens**, des instruments de mesure au service d'une politique. Tout au plus peut-on en attendre une rationalisation de l'exploitation (aux deux sens du terme). A ce propos, **l'illusion du pouvoir** de l'ordinateur résulte de son **efficacité** technique. De ce que l'ordinateur fait en quelques secondes le travail intellectuel de plusieurs cerveaux, il passe pour un surhomme. La puissance des **moyens** peut éclairer non déterminer la **fin**. Loin de dispenser de décider, elle accroît la responsabilité du décideur en multipliant les conséquences. L'augmentation **quantitative** de l'efficacité de **l'instrumentalité**, ne peut au passage **qualitatif** dans le domaine de la finalité. — Le caractère **arbitraire des modèles construits**. On croit parfois que l'ordinateur fonctionne comme un moulin à café, or, il ne suffit pas de le »remplir« de données brutes et d'appuyer sur un bouton pour attendre le résultat. Le programmeur doit **construire un système** rationnel qui »interroge« l'ordinateur et il construit ce système en relation avec ce que le PDG ou le »chercheur« veulent mesurer. Seuls ces derniers — même lorsqu'ils ignorent le fonctionnement de la »quincaillerie« — **savent ce qu'ils chechent**. L'ordinateur par lui-même ne trouve rien parce qu'il n'est pas en mesure d'être conscient d'un objectif; c'est un com-

¹ Voir sur ces questions l'article de Manuel Janco: »Informatique et idéologie«, in: **Les Temps Modernes**, oct. 1971.

ptable aux ordres. Dès lors il n'intervient aucunement au niveau de buts visés, ni à celui des hypothèses émises et il est dans l'incapacité de diminuer en quoi que ce soit l'orientation idéologique éventuelle d'une recherche. On sait qu'au niveau même des mathématiques tout le développement logique de la démonstration des théorèmes est »suspendu« à l'axiomatique fondamentale dont les propositions ont été l'objet d'un choix réel, simplement limité par l'impératif de la compatibilité. De même l'ordinateur n'est en rien **responsable** des résultats, il fait uniquement apparaître, avec rapidité et précision, les conséquences des options prises par les utilisateurs de l'appareil. Ces résultats découlent de la mise en marche de dispositifs électriques, électroniques, magnétiques et mécaniques qui constituent la partie »dure« de l'appareil (hardware). Déjà au niveau des programmes »tout-faits«, des »routines« codées, l'intervention des besoins de l'utilisateur transparait. Il faut donc abandonner la conception naïve d'une innocence rationnelle des calculs des ordinateurs, et voir plus concrètement ses modes d'utilisation.

B) ANALYSES CONCRETES DES MODES D'UTILISATION DE L'INFORMATIQUE DANS LES ENTREPRISES

1. **Les nouveaux métiers.** Si on en reste aux approximations, on ne distingue, dans les entreprises automatisées, que trois niveaux:

- Les dirigeants
- Les informaticiens
- Les exécutants.

Les informaticiens notamment apparaissent comme un groupe homogène. Il semble, en effet, que le haut degré technologique nécessité par la manipulation des ordinateurs crée une nouvelle main d'oeuvre homogénéisée par le même savoir approprié. De ce fait, on peut imaginer non seulement un resserrement de l'éventail hiérarchique, mais sa fermeture par suite de la circulation d'une information captable et manipulable par tous les informaticiens. La réalité n'est pas si simple; les approximations résultent, ici, de ce que l'on considère le fonctionnement de l'ensemble automatisé, sans se préoccuper de la mise en automation. Si on considère la marche effective d'un système cybernétique autorégulé par les processus du feed-back, il ne se pose, bien sûr, aucun problème, mais comment en est-on arrivé à mettre en train une telle machine? A ce propos, il convient de distinguer: — le »**projeteur**« qui veut vérifier des hypothèses ou produire un objet. Il doit s'adresser

- à un **analyste** qui étudie les possibilités de l'étude, compte tenu des limites des appareils dont il dispose;
- le **programmeur** décompose ensuite la totalité en éléments qu'il reconstruit selon un code.
- Intervient, ensuite, le travail purement matériel de la **perforatrice**;
- la réalisation de la recherche est alors reprise, dans un second temps, par le programmeur;
- de nouveau apparaît un travail matériel, non plus simple, comme celui de la perforatrice, mais instrumentalement complexe qui est celui de l'**opérateur**.
- en cas de non-fonctionnement ou de fonctionnement défectueux, l'opérateur doit être capable d'un certain dépannage, mais à la moindre difficulté il faut faire venir les réparateurs agréés par le constructeur des ordinateurs.
- une fois sorti, le programme est examiné par le programmeur, par l'analyste et par le projeteur pour vérifier s'il répond aux questions posées.

S'il en est ainsi, on comprend que les relations effectives entre ces divers métiers soient complexes et que persistent des situations de subordination, voire d'aliénation. Le cas de la perforatrice est particulièrement significatif à cet égard. Une dactylo peut comprendre ce qu'elle tape, veiller à l'orthographe, soigner sa mise en page, etc . . . , alors que la perforatrice² tape un signe après l'autre sans savoir ce qu'elle fait. On le voit, la mise en service des ordinateurs, dans l'état actuel de la technologie, n'ont pas créé une main d'oeuvre homogène. Toutefois, sauf le cas de la perforatrice, l'ordinateur exige des ouvriers hautement qualifiés, ce qui ne pourra manquer à la longue de modifier les rapports entre direction et exécution.

2. Les modifications structurales dans les entreprises automatisées.

a) Certains changements **quantitatifs** provoquent des mutations **qualitatives**: grâce à l'informatique, un certain nombre de tâches de pure comptabilité ou de simple exécution (toutes les routines) sont désormais effectuées très vite et sans erreur. Le nombre de ces tâches n'a pas diminué, au contraire il peut-être considérablement augmenté, mais les résultats de tous ces travaux sont obtenus en un temps considérablement plus bref. De ce fait, les »décideurs« sont sollicités à un rythme bien plus rapide et de divers côtés à la fois. De l'automatisation de l'exécution, il résulte que **l'entreprise consomme davantage de décisions**. Pour faire face à ce besoin accru, il faut »surmener« ou multiplier les décideurs. Dans un premier temps, ce fut la première »solution« qui fut pratiquée, la littérature et le cinéma ont popularisé l'image du PDG sollicité par tout un essaim de téléphones, signant des papiers tout en surveillant un telex, ou un écran. Plus sérieusement les indices statistiques de mortalité rapprochent la courbe des patrons de celles des ouvriers. De toute façon, l'activisme même forcené des décideurs a des limites vite atteintes. C'est pourquoi on s'oriente maintenant vers la seconde solution: la multiplication et la dispersion des décideurs.

b) **La dissémination de l'autorité**. Pour bien comprendre cette dissémination; il faut préciser davantage les conditions qui la rendent inévitable.³ Il faut d'abord saisir l'importance de **la rupture des équilibres temporels traditionnels**: avant la mise en service des ordinateurs de gestion, le temps pris par l'exécution manuelle des décisions laissait aux cadres le temps de réfléchir et même d'intervenir pour modifier les instructions en cours d'exécution. Il n'en est plus de même après l'introduction de l'informatique:

- Les corrections en cours d'exécution étaient souvent suggérées par les exécutants qui, d'ailleurs, et le plus souvent, adaptaient silencieusement les directives pour les rendre opérationnelles. On sait que la preuve de cette initiative invisible des prétendus exécutants est apportée par les diverses modalités des »grèves du zèle« qui consistent à appliquer mécaniquement et à la lettre les ordres et les directives »d'en haut«.
- En second lieu, jusqu'ici, les »chefs« avec une bonne foi variable, essayaient de dissimuler les dysfonctions de leurs directives en les attribuant à l'incompréhension des intermédiaires ou à la maladresse des exécutants. A cette occasion une »bonne colère« pouvait masquer l'erreur du chef et sauver son »autorité«. Les échappatoires de ce type ne sont plus possibles.

En effet, l'ordinateur »déroule« immédiatement et avec une logique implacable les conséquences des décisions prises. Il fait apparaître:

² Il est, de plus, significatif que ce métier de »perforation« ait une désinence féminine; on a là une nouvelle preuve de la persistance des superstructures et des stéréotypes à travers les modifications technologiques.

³ Voir, à ce sujet, par exemple: Max ROUQUEROL. — *Ordinateur et décentralisation des décisions*, Paris, Entreprises modernes d'édition, 1968, 157 p, et Pierre LEBRETON. — *Eléments de réflexion sur l'évolution de la profession bancaire* (Congrès du syndicat général des cadres des banques CFDT, le 12 et 13 mars 1971).

- les fautes d'inattention (tel élément auquel on se réfère n'existe pas, n'existe plus, est saturé etc...)
- les lacunes de l'information;
- et, plus grave, les fautes de raisonnement déterminent des impossibilités voire des stupidités qui apparaissent à tous, assez ridicules lorsque les conséquences en sont développées.

Ainsi, les négligences, l'incompétence, et l'incohérence du «chef» sont mises à nu. Il en résulte une perte considérable du prestige du décideur fondé précédemment le plus souvent, sur le caractère nébuleux de décisions dont les conséquences illogiques n'étaient pas immédiatement visible et dont les incohérences étaient attribuées aux exécutants lorsqu'elles n'étaient pas «rat-trapées» par eux. Maintenant l'ordinateur rend transparente la responsabilité du décideur. Il dissipe ainsi les fondements imprécis du prestige qui résulte du mystère soigneusement entretenu qui entoure, chez les décideurs, la connexion des causes. Le pur fait de se réserver le secret des informations «confidentielles» pouvait passer pour une supériorité de compréhension. Il est vrai qu'en se réservant les informations les plus importantes on met les autres dans une position subalterne; s'ils veulent agir sans savoir, ils le feront au hasard et le plus souvent se tromperont; ils sont donc obligés de s'en remettre aux ordres des chefs sur le mode non du savoir mais de la foi. La réussite de celui qui sait, passera dès lors pour un trait de génie aux yeux de ceux qui n'ont pas ses éléments d'information. Rouquerol, à ce propos, écrit assez naïvement: «Certains ont l'impression d'abdiquer leur autorité lorsqu'ils exposent les éléments rationnels de leur choix». Ils n'ont pas tort, contrairement à ce que laisse entendre Rouquerol. Eux-mêmes ne manquent pas de justifier leur «autorité» par des arguments «irrationnels» quand il se réfèrent à «leur expérience», à leur «sens des affaires», à leur «intuition infaillible» de la valeur des hommes, etc. S'il leur arrive de réussir par hasard, ils savent bien s'en attribuer le mérite, tout comme lorsque le succès vient de ce qu'on a pas compris ou suivi leurs ordres.

C'est surtout au niveau politique que les dirigeants entretiennent sciemment le mystère allant jusqu'à faire dire: «Le président a pris sa décision mais il ne la divulgera que dans huit jours». On parlera par énigme, on s'attachera à susciter le jeu des hypothèses ne serait-ce que pour profiter de l'ingéniosité des commentateurs et on présentera ce qui a été suggéré comme une décision antérieure longuement mûrie et dont la publication avait été simplement «retardée» pour des motifs qu'on ne dévoile pas. On peut, à cette occasion se souvenir de ce que Bachelard disait un jour de Kierkegaard: il voulait faire croire qu'il avait un secret mais son secret est qu'il n'avait pas de secret.

Ce n'est pas le contenu qui motive le secret mais son absence. Le contenu est banal et n'acquiert d'intérêt que par sa non-communication. Cette retenue de l'information, comme un barrage sur un fleuve, accumule de la puissance au profit du pouvoir; le «suspense», aurolé du mystère de l'inconnu maintient les subordonnés dans l'inquiétude et renforce le caractère irrationnel de la domination. Le dirigeant incertain de l'emporter sur autrui au niveau de la compréhension, met les autres dans l'impossibilité matérielle de rivaliser avec lui. Peu assuré de sa compétence technique, il veut passer pour un chef charismatique qui domine moins par ses mérites que par la grâce. L'ordinateur sur le plan des entreprises automatisées, démystifie cette prétention en faisant apparaître le caractère lacunaire des informations du chef, les distractions, les incohérences de ses raisonnements et la vanité de son expérience. L'évolution du savoir est telle que cette fameuse «expérience» est plus souvent un handicap qu'un secours lorsqu'elle n'est pas contemporaine de la science

⁴ Op. Cit., p. 144.

actuelle. D'où, dans les secteurs productifs, le besoin d'un perpétuel rajeunissement des cadres, la dévaluation des diplômes de jeunesse. L'informatique révèle les anomalies et les absurdités qui résultant de décisions erronées ou d'une absence de décision. Le chef ne pourra plus être ce «génie» incompetent qui joue ou improvise et qui tente de se «rattraper» par une «dialectique» verbale et de mauvaise foi: il prétendait, après l'échec, n'avoir pas donné l'ordre contesté, ou, en cas des succès imprévus, avoir prescrit ce qu'il avait rejeté. Ces jongleries n'ont plus cours. La perte de prestige des décideurs traditionnels est telle qu'il arrive qu'on mette au rancard l'ordinateur installé à grand fracas publicitaire.

Toutefois, on le laisse en place pour ne pas perdre la face, mais il n'est plus utilisé.⁵ Comme on le voit, les dirigeants traditionnels ne peuvent coexister avec l'ordinateur. Le patron d'autrefois croyait se décider d'après ce qu'il savait ou observait directement, du moins par ce qu'il pouvait lui-même vérifier. Aujourd'hui le maniement des ordinateurs ne lui est pas souvent familier; de ce fait, apparaît, dans la chaîne de ses raisons, un élément d'information qu'il est obligé de croire; il s'en remet à ses services sans pouvoir contrôler par lui-même. Sa décision finale se fait par la prise en compte de résultats de calculs qui restent pour mystérieux; ainsi est mise en question la pertinence de son savoir et donc partiellement son autorité, au moment où les informaticiens bénéficient du prestige de la science ou, au moins, de la haute technicité. A cela on peut ajouter que un patron traditionnel, la peur de la panne de l'ordinateur ou de son dérèglement occulte sont plus angoissant que la résistance ouvrière ou les grèves. Le dirigeant avait confiance en ses moyens de «meneur d'hommes»; il espérait qu'il serait toujours capable de convaincre les ouvriers, de les allécher, de les terroriser, en un mot de les manipuler; en revanche, devant la machine compliquée, ou soupçonnée de caprices, inerte, il se sent démuné. Pourtant, à la longue, les entreprises modernes qui veulent soutenir la concurrence internationale, choisissent plutôt de se séparer de leurs dirigeants «géniaux» que de l'informatique et c'est toute la structure des usines qui va commencer à se transformer.

En particulier, la dissémination de l'autorité prend la forme d'une multiplication des décideurs et de leur répartition, non plus seulement au «sommets» mais dans tout l'organigramme. Ce n'est pas que la centralisation de toutes les informations au «Centre» poserait des problèmes techniques. Cette centralisation serait facilement réalisable, mais les cerveaux des décideurs traditionnels «au sommet» ne sont pas en mesure d'absorber ni surtout de «traiter» une telle quantité d'informations, d'autant moins qu'une prise de décision en connaissance de cause nécessite une connaissance approfondie du poste et des postes voisins que seuls peuvent avoir ceux qui sont «sur le tas». La nécessité d'une étude sur place que ne peuvent assurer les dirigeants du centre, car les voyages mêmes rapides ne réalisent pas l'ubiquité, impose la décentralisation. Cinquante situations simples qui peuvent chacune être facilement traitées par un cerveau, constituent un imbroglio si elles doivent être étudiées et résolues en même temps par une seule personne, au centre, incapable de vérifier, de consulter sur place les exécutants et qui n'a pas le temps de faire faire une enquête complémentaire, car, nous l'avons vu, la rapidité du traitement des informations détermine un grand besoin de décisions rapides. La situation ne peut être ainsi dominée que par une dissémination très grande des décideurs qui assure en même temps, la proximité entre décision et exécution, la restauration du lien entre le regard et la main, la consubstantialité de l'esprit et du corps.

⁵ Il est de ce fait difficile de savoir dans quelles entreprises fonctionnent effectivement des ordinateurs; les fichiers de vente ou de location ne donnent pas, à ce sujet, d'indications utilisables.

c) L'égalité des postes

Depuis quelques dizaines d'années, l'expérience a montré l'erreur du taylorisme. Il n'est pas rentable de gaspiller la créativité des hommes dans des tâches élémentaires indéfiniment répétées. Gaspillages, désobéissances occultes, désintérêt, inattention, accidents, absentéisme ont été souvent décrits.⁶ Au niveau de l'informatique les raisons sont bien plus prégnantes encore d'abandonner la philosophie élitiste qui voulait servir de fondement à la division du travail tayloriste. En effet, les tâches les plus élémentaires (fournir les éléments d'information aux ordinateurs) deviennent capitales. Sur la chaîne de l'usine traditionnelle, une opération mal effectuée ou omise était tout de suite décelée par l'impossibilité de continuer les opérations prévues. En informatique, au contraire, une erreur (inattention ou malveillance) change les données de base de calcul et peut perturber tout le système de commandement ou de contrôle. Il y a donc nécessité pour les «chefs» d'intéresser les exécutants à leur travail d'où tous les thèmes actuels antitayloristes de la participation et de la co-gestion qui n'ont qu'une apparence d'humanisme et qui se fondent en réalité sur des calculs de rentabilité et davantage sur la perception de la condition **sine qua non** du fonctionnement du système. Même si l'idéologie de la participation est un effort désespéré pour sauver le rôle des chefs, elle n'en est pas moins révélatrice de l'impossibilité d'une direction centralisée. La «découverte» des nécessités du dialogue, de la circulation ininterrompue des informations dans les deux sens inclut une certaine égalité des deux pôles. Dès lors, il ne s'agit plus d'une simple multiplication des centres de décisions qui resteraient subordonnés mais d'une interaction réciproque d'où résulte que **le centre est partout**. De ce fait, c'est **l'ensemble de l'entreprise qui tend à devenir un système de décision** ou, comme dit Rouquerol: «il ne s'agit pas de centraliser les décisions mais de préparer le cadre dans lequel elles pourront être prises par l'ensemble du personnel».⁷ Cette formule définit parfaitement l'autogestion. Elle dépasse même la théorie de «l'usine du plan» de Chaulieu⁸ puisque c'est toute l'usine et toutes les usines qui doivent devenir conscientes du «plan de l'usine».

Toutefois suffit-il que les mécanismes internes d'une usine soient auto-gérés pour qu'une telle usine ait véritablement en main son destin? Quelle est la forme politique nationale ou internationale qui rend l'autogestion possible?

C'est pour montrer la nécessité d'aller au-delà des problèmes locaux de la gestion, qu'il est peut-être opportun d'introduire une terminologie nouvelle.

III

DE L'AUTOGESTION LOCALISEE A L'AUTARCHISME POLITIQUE GENERALISE

A) PROBLEMES DE TERMINOLOGIE

Il s'agit tout d'abord d'expliquer et par là de tenter de justifier le recours à une dénomination inusitée.

1. **Autogestion et autarchisme.** Malgré toutes les précautions prises, le mot d'autogestion n'a aucune sonorité politique. Le terme de «gestion» n'évoque que des questions d'économie ou d'administration. Il a été introduit en France il y a tout juste une dizaine d'années pour désigner le système yougo-

⁶ Voir, en particulier, l'ouvrage «classique» de Georges Friedmann: **le travail en miettes** et nos analyses dans la **Délivrance de Prométhée**, chap. IV.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 140.

⁸ Socialisme ou Barbarie, No 22.

slave où il signifie très précisément »la gestion d'une entreprise par le personnel«. Mais, en Yougoslavie (pas plus qu'en Algérie à l'époque de Ben Bella) il n'est question d'autogérer L'Etat. Le pouvoir central (qui s'appuie sur le Parti, l'armée, la police, ou apparemment sur quelques assemblées d'élus, voire surtout sur un chef charismatique) a pour ainsi dire »octroyé« l'auto-gestion aux entreprises. L'Etat n'est aucunement la résultante d'une coordination quelconque des conseils. Au contraire, il délimite le champ d'application et les pouvoirs des conseils locaux de gestion, aussi bien dans l'agriculture que dans l'industrie et souvent un »directeur« nommé par le pouvoir central a coexisté avec »le président« du conseil local de gestion. Dès lors, dans ces pays qui se proclament »autogérés«, on observe au mieux diverses formes de co-gestion ou de participation comme on a pu en observer un temps en Pologne ou actuellement en Allemagne fédérale. Il en résulte que le mot »autogestion« est désormais historiquement marqué et ne peut désigner une organisation politique originale qui assurerait la coordination du corps social sans, pour autant, créer de coupure entre dirigeants et exécutants. Le mot d'**autarchisme** peut-il remplir cette fonction?

2. **Autarchie et autarcie.** On sait⁹ que, vers la fin du dix-huitième siècle, le terme d'autarcie figurait dans le **Dictionnaire de Médecine** de Lavoisier (1793) et, selon son étymologie (**autos**, soi-même et **arkein** se suffire) signifiait le »sentiment de satisfaction intérieur«, »euphorie« et »frugalité«. Le sens s'est ensuite¹⁰ élargi à l'économie nationale et marque actuellement la »situation d'un pays qui se suffit ou veut se suffire à lui-même, sans importations étrangères«. Mais, toujours à la fin du dix-huitième siècle, apparaissait, avec un autre sens, la graphie: **autarchie** que l'amiral Réveillère définissait comme le »**gouvernement des citoyens par eux-mêmes**«. Il ne s'agit pas, comme les dictionnaires le laissent entendre, d'une variante purement graphique; l'étymologie est différente, il ne s'agit plus du verbe **arkein** (se suffire) mais de **arkhein** qui signifie »commencer«, »prendre l'initiative« et donc »commander«, c'est cette racine qui détermine le sens de monarchie (commandement par un seul). Le mot **autarchie** signifie donc très exactement l'auto-initiative d'un individu ou d'un corps social. C'est ce second sens que nous voudrions retenir étant donné que notre langue dispose déjà d'un autre mot pour qualifier l'auto-initiative de l'individu.

3. **Autocratie et autarchie.** L'autocrate est despote qui »gouverne par lui-même«, sans que son autorité soit limitée ou contrôlée par qui que se soit. C'est le monarque absolu. Le mot grec **kratein** signifie »être fort« et même »le plus fort« d'où »dominer«. L'anistocratie est ainsi la domination des »meilleurs«, la démocratie, la domination du peuple. De la sorte l'autocratie ne saurait désigner l'organisation d'un groupe homogène, puisqu'elle inclut la **domination** d'un individu, d'un groupe, d'une classe sur d'autres. Cette difficulté n'existe pas avec le mot autarchie, car on peut concevoir une initiative sociale et collective sans domination de quelques individus (seraient-ils la majorité) sur d'autres. Ainsi l'autarchisme peut légitimement caractériser l'organisation spontanée la société à la fin de la lutte des classes, quand, par exemple, dans la perspective marxienne, le prolétariat est devenu »la classe universelle« c'est-à-dire lorsqu'une société sans classes est réalisée. Ainsi, lorsque Marx écrit, à la fin de la seconde partie du **Manifeste communiste**; »L'Ancienne société bourgeoise, avec ses classes et ses conflits de classes, fait place à une association où le libre épanouissement de chacun est la condition du libre épanouissement de tous«, il définit parfaitement l'autarchisme qui désigne la compossibilité des spontanités dans une société homogénéisée.

⁹ Voir **Dict. étym.** de Dauzat et le **Robert**. Le **Dict. étymologique**, Wartburg et Bloch signale le mot »autarcie« dès 1845.

¹⁰ à la suite notamment des écrits de l'économiste suédois Kjellén (1911)

Toutefois si le concept de l'auto-gouvernement est clair, on n'en pourra pas moins contester l'opportunité d'introduire le vocable inusité d'autarchisme pour l'exprimer. Il faut donc s'assurer qu'aucun autre mot d'usage courant ne désigne correctement »le gouvernement des citoyens par eux-mêmes.«

4. Démocratie et autarchisme. Certes, en son sens originare, »démocratie« désigne bien le gouvernement du peuple, mais pas exactement l'autogouvernement du corps social. Dans l'expression, le mot **demos**, peuple, suppose à d'autres catégories; chez les grecs, le »peuple« ne comprenait ni les femmes, ni les esclaves. Plus tard, il est vrai, le régime démocratique a désigné »la volonté générale« chez Rousseau, le gouvernement de »l'immense majorité« chez Marx. Mais ces définitions théoriques n'ont jusqu'ici jamais été correctement pratiquées. De tout temps, d'ailleurs, la démocratie — parce qu'elle ne se souciait pas suffisamment de ses conditions d'exercice — s'est pervertie en démagogie, une minorité, qui s'intitulait »parti démocratique«, s'estimant investie de la science de ce qui est »bon pour le peuple« et de la tâche de le lui imposer par la flatterie, par la ruse, par des promesses fallacieuses etc. Ainsi, historiquement, la démocratie (»bourgeoise« autant de »socialiste«) est devenue démagogie, c'est-à-dire, manipulation du peuple. Dès lors, le mot de »démocratie« ne désigne plus qu'une autarchie formelle par le simulacre des élections. Il n'y a pas de véritable choix, les options ne sont pas faites en connaissance de cause, les élus de sont pas perpétuellement révocables. Si on voulait une preuve du vide actuel du mot: démocratie, on la trouverait dans le fait que cette démocratie formelle n'inclut même pas, en principe, l'autogestion des entreprises ni celle des localités. L'autarchisme, au contraire, n'est que la libre coordination politique des ensembles autogérés. En ce cas, n'est-elle pas simplement une absence de pouvoir, — le fédéralisme souple préconisé par les anarchistes?

5. Anarchie et autarchie. Il est facile de voir la différence radical des deux mots: le premier, l'anarchisme, est négatif; il signale l'absence de tout gouvernement ou la négation de toute dépendance (ni dieu, ni maître). Dès lors, à moins de préconiser le chaos, il faut postuler que la nature est naturellement ordonnée. La métaphysique préjudicielle de l'anarchisme est un optimisme ontologique.

Les gouvernement et vie en société ont perverti la nature (humaine) qui est bonne. Dès lors la tâche révolutionnaire est effectivement négative et devrait se réduire à l'action violente et brève de l'extermination des chefs. Il faut ajouter que la plupart des anarchistes ont aujourd'hui dépassé cette conception. Pour ne pas être de simples contemplatifs ou des révoltés incapables de révolution, les anarchistes politiques ont été amenés à prévoir une organisation de la société future et de ne pas se réduire à la tâche négative de la suppression des rois ou des princes. Dès lors, ils préfèrent se dire »libertaires« qu'anarchistes. Ce n'est donc »pas le moment« de reprendre le mot d'anarchisme abandonné par les anarchistes eux-mêmes. A quoi bon se mettre dans la situation d'avoir à préciser, à chaque instant: nous sommes des anarchistes mais pas dans les sens négatif ni en celui qui implique une action individuelle terroriste? Le sens historique d'un mot ne s'oublie pas facilement, la sémantique n'est pas fondée sur des déclarations d'intention. En ce cas, dira-t-on, pourquoi ne pas adopter l'appellation de »communisme libertaire«?

6. Communisme libertaire et autarchisme. Il faut d'abord observer que sous cette bannière du »libertarisme«, la plupart des groupes anarchistes se sont »rassemblés«, tout en restant divisés, voire antagonistes. Se dire »libertaire« équivalait donc à se »groupusculariser« d'une façon ambiguë et à se vouer à d'incessantes mises au point de chapelle. D'autre part, le libertarisme n'est pas un concept opératoire en politique. Il désigne plutôt une attitude philosophique, un but à atteindre qu'une méthode efficace d'organisation sociale. Il implique enfin l'idée d'une certaine volonté égoïste, voire désordonnée, de jouir,

sans que soient indiqués les moyens de compossibilité des libertés. Dès lors ne retournerait-on pas à la situation de la jungle, à la loi du plus fort et à ses conséquences lorsque les grenouilles demandent un roi? Depuis Rousseau et depuis Kant, ce libéralisme individualiste (et malgré naguère, la régression de l'existentialisme de Sartre) se »dépassé dialectiquement« dans, et par la notion d'**autonomie**. Dès lors, pourquoi ne pas s'en tenir à ce mot?

7. Autonomie et autarchie. L'autonomie indique bien, en effet, »le droit de se gouverner par ses propres lois«, c'est-à-dire d'être indépendant et libre tout en restant organisé sous un norme qu'on s'est proscrite à soi-même et, partant, sans s'aliéner. Mais, encore ici, le poids du sens donné aux mots par l'histoire est gênant: l'autonomie, l'autodétermination, l'indépendance, la souveraineté concernent surtout les relations internationales, la non-soumission d'un Etat à un autre, sans que l'**organisation interne** de ces Etats soit mise en question ni même considérée; l'Allemagne de Hitler se voulait indépendante. De ce fait, l'autonomie, l'indépendance, et la souveraineté peut être structuré et subordonné en classes hiérarchiques (et, de ce fait, qu'on le veuille ou non, toujours antagonistes) sans rien perdre ou même pour sauvegarder ou développer son indépendance nationale, sous la férule de divers chefs historiques, géniaux, héréditaires, élus ou charismatiques. De surcroît, le terme de souveraineté peut faire l'objet des mêmes critiques que la »cratie« (Kratein); par sa racine, il inclut la **supériorité** sur les autres, et s'oppose radicalement à l'autarchisme qui, nous l'avons noté, présuppose au contraire, une société homogène. Toutefois, remarquera-t-on encore, s'il s'agit ainsi d'administration politique pourquoi ne pas se contenter d'affecter le mot »gouvernement« du préfixe »auto«?

8. Autogouvernement et autarchisme. Ces deux termes paraissent synonymes, mais le mot usuel de gouvernement n'étonne pas à la différence de celui d'archie (et malgré le précédent de monarchie). D'autre part son équivalent en langue anglaise (Selfgovernment) est déjà bien répandu.

Sans insister sur le fait que le terme générique d'autogouvernementisme« ne serait pas non plus très plaisant, il faut remarquer que nous tombons, avec le mot gouvernement, dans l'extrême opposé par rapport à l'anarchisme. Dans l'anarchisme, l'organisation sociale était sociologiquement absente, avec gouvernement elle est trop présente, voire pesante. Les citoyens éprouvent depuis longtemps le degré d'hétéronomie et d'hétérogestion qu'introduit, depuis »toujours«, le simple fait du gouvernement et il ne semble pas que l'adjonction du simple préfixe »auto« puisse corriger efficacement cette impression ancestrale. En témoignerait, entre autres, s'il en était besoin, un dicton en langue occitane, entendu en Limousin, qui situe sur le même plan »le temps et le gouvernement« présentés comme les deux choses contre lesquelles il est vain de se rebeller. Pour nous qui cherchons un mot qui puisse suggérer l'auto-création sociale d'une organisation qui rende les libertés compossibles, on reconnaîtra que le marquage affectif de gouvernement ne le rend guère idoine. Certes, on pourrait tenter de retrouver le sens originnaire de gouvernement par un vocable proche de la cybernétique. Mais nous avons déjà précisé que l'organisation libre que nous visons n'a rien à voir avec l'inhumanité mécanique des ordinateurs qui doivent et ne peuvent que se cantonner dans un rôle instrumental.

B) LES BUTS DE L'AUTARCHIE

Au delà des précisions et des justifications de vocabulaire, il convient de déterminer d'une façon plus positive ce que nous entendons par autarchie, au moyen de distinctions comparatives avec les notions plus connues.

9. Socialisme et autarchisme. Il va de soi que l'autarchisme passe par le socialisme, entendu comme une organisation qui fait prévaloir l'itnérêt général

sur les intérêts des diverses minorités de »particuliers« privilégiés. Il est, de ce point de vue, naïf d'espérer, comme certains anarchistes classiques, que la simple conception et expression d'un système anti-autoritaire d'administration enfantera une société libre. Il ne s'agit pas davantage, en sens opposé, de se déclarer pour une perpétuelle lutte des classes, comme semblent le faire quelques »Stratèges« de la classe ouvrière dont c'est le gagne-pain. La lutte des classes n'est pas un bien en soi, c'est une étape à franchir dans la »préhistoire« de l'humanité. Toutefois, il convient de rappeler aux propagandistes intéressés de la participation harmonieuse entre les classes que **cette lutte existe** (comme entre certaines espèces animales) par le simple fait que l'une vit de l'exploitation de l'autre. Une des plus urgentes tâches des révolutionnaires est de montrer qu'une telle lutte (souvent dissimulée sous des paroles doucereuses, voire sous la bonne foi du paternalisme) est un **fait** économique et politique qui doit être rendu manifeste aux yeux de tous, non comme étant un fait de nature mais comme un effet de société auquel la Révolution sociale (éventuellement violente) peut et doit mettre fin.

Toutefois, le socialisme paraît bonné à la réalisation (indispensable) de cette étape préliminaire. Or cette perspective ne suffit plus, depuis que des régimes qui s'auto-proclament socialistes (et qui, effectivement, ont mis hors circuit les propriétaires bourgeois de moyens de production) n'ont, pour le moment, réussi qu'à construire un autre type de société hiérarchisée, dans lesquels une nouvelle minorité commande et utilise la plus-value sans contrôle effectif de ceux qui la produisent. Ainsi, l'autarchisme ne se borne pas à se donner pour objectif la destruction de la société des bourgeois capitalistes, il veut rendre impossible la prise de pouvoir par une nouvelle bourgeoisie non-propriétaire qui, dans un premier temps, se fait passer pour une classe politique (le parti) militairement centralisé dans un but libérateur. Comme elle l'avoue d'ailleurs, cette classe politique a pour tâche de »prendre le pouvoir« et les exécutants sociaux changent de maîtres. Il est vrai que la classe politique »libératrice«, présente sa prise de pouvoir comme provisoire, comme une étape inférieure mais nécessaire qui prépare l'avènement du communisme.

10. **Communisme et autarchisme.** Il y a maintenant homogénéité entre les deux termes semblablement »utopiques«, en ce sens qu'actuellement aucun régime ne prétend (sauf en style journalistique) incarner le communisme ou l'autarchisme. La comparaison ne peut donc se faire qu'au niveau des concepts. Sur ce plan, le communisme théorique se veut une sorte d'autarchie, rendue possible par l'abondance. Mais les remarques précédentes à propos du socialisme, gardent leur pertinence; le communisme conceptuel ne précise pas assez explicitement les moyens envisagés pour que l'expropriation des propriétaires bourgeois (qui réalise) une sorte d'égalité juridique entre les membres du corps social au niveau économique) produise aussi nécessairement une égalité réelle et immédiate au niveau politique et à celui des conditions de vie. A ce propos, la critique des anarchistes contre les communistes est correcte, d'autant plus que les réalisations des partis qui se proclament communistes ne rendent guère crédible la lointaine échéance du dépérissement de l'Etat dominateur.

Quelques mois avant la révolution russe de 1917, Lénine expliquait qu'après la prise de pouvoir par le prolétariat, **l'Etat devait commencer immédiatement à dépérir.** Un demi-siècle plus tard, aucun sociologue, aucun politologue même communiste n'est en mesure de rendre compte de moindre commencement de réalisation d'un tel dépérissement. Il est difficile de ne voir là qu'un retard conjoncturel, ili s'agit en fait d'une tare au niveau des principes. On en trouverait la racine dans **Que faire?** Si on commence par poser que, laissé à lui-même, le prolétariat ne peut pas se libérer, il en résulte nécessairement qu'il sera toujours à la merci de ses libérateurs. L'Autarchisme, au contraire, se fonde sur le principe de la capacité auto-émancipatrice des exploités. Tel est le

critère radical qui le distingue du «communisme» moderne. Toutefois, le terme de communisme garde un sens autarchique au niveau des petites communautés de vie, mais à leur propos se pose toujours la question des possibilités d'existence authentique (au delà d'un parasitisme marginal) dans une société qui n'a pas encore conduit la lutte des classes à son terme.

On le voit, en réalité, tous nos «arguments» se ramènent à un seul: pour nommer correctement l'autogestion politique, il faut un mot qui n'ait jamais désigné autre chose. Dès lors, quel que soit le choix, on ne peut échapper au sentiment d'étrangeté, de gratuité, voire de barbarie. Si l'autarchisme correspond à un concept qui caractérise un contenu perceptible et assimilable sociologiquement, alors les défauts de la nouveauté s'estomperont vite. S'ils ne correspondent pas à un tel besoin, il disparaîtra.

C. FONDAMENTS THEORIQUES DE L'AUTARCHISME

L'autarchisme s'inscrit dans le développement cohérent de l'histoire de la pensée philosophique et sociologique. On ne peut ici qu'évoquer allusivement quelques jalons.

De la pensée grecque à son sourire, on retient le renversement fondamental qui «fait descendre la philosophie du ciel sur la terre», libère la société d'un Destin soumis aux caprices redoutables des Figures énigmatiques et institue l'homme comme créateur de l'Histoire. De Descartes, le refus de «l'argument» d'autorité. De Rousseau, la formule problématique de l'autarchisme: «trouver une forme d'association qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant.»¹¹ De Kant, l'élucidation de la notion de liberté universelle par l'autonomie du sujet. De Hegel, la perception, par delà les «contradictions» de l'unité signifiante de l'histoire de l'humanité, et de Marx le dévoilement du conditionnement sous-jacent de l'existence apparemment indépendante des idéaux, religions, arts, spéculations diverses. Dès lors la science de cette histoire est le moyen pour les hommes de prendre en charge réellement leur destin.

11. Marxisme et autarchisme. Il faudra bien que les marxistets se résignent à admettre que la référence à Marx est équivoque. Dès régimes politiques différents, voire opposés, comme l'URSS, la Chine et la Yougoslavie par exemple, déclarent tous contradictoirement être les seuls vrais héritiers de Marx. Depuis plus longtemps encore sur le plan de l'interprétation, les disciples vulgarisateurs opposaient à ceux qui, tels Max Adler, Hilferding ou Lukács, estimaient que le contenu du marxisme n'avait pas simplement à être répété mais devait se renouveler par l'application de la méthode scientifique aux réalités économiques et sociologiques contemporaines. Les uns voyaient en Marx un révolutionnaire mû par des valeurs, préconisant parfois l'action violente, d'autres un savant analysant scientifiquement les contradictions d'un système voué à l'écroulement fatal. On peut vouloir saisir l'unité de la pensée et de l'action de Marx ou, au contraire, à la manière d'Althusser, privilégier une période de sa vie et couper ses écrits pour définir, chaque fois, un «vrai Marx», correspondant au découpage.

Quoi qu'on pense de cette diversité et quelque parti qu'on prenne, il reste que la référence à Marx (fort utile pour se distancier globalement de toutes les autres options) est trop ambiguë pour caractériser d'une façon opératoire un système précis d'organisation sociale. Certes, nous sommes personnellement

¹¹ Du contrat social, livre 1, chap. VI.

persuadé Marx, au mot près, a pensé l'autarchisme et qu'il n'a jamais renoncé à cette position.¹² Mais cette conviction n'a pas (encore) de consistance sociologique et, en tout cas, ne se présente que comme une interprétation parmi d'autres. En outre, du point de vue de l'autarchisme, l'ensemble de la vulgate marxiste n'a pas uniformément le même intérêt. Nous ne nous intéressons, par exemple, que médiocrement au «matérialisme dialectique» dans la lignée Engels-Lénine-Althusser et guère davantage (sauf pour la critiquer) à la théorie des Kautsky et de Lénine sur le parti-recteur de la classe ouvrière. L'analyse marxienne elle-même du capitalisme du dix-neuvième siècle doit être reprise et renouvelée, ne serait-ce pour minoriser considérablement le rôle attribué par Marx à la **propriété formelle** par les bourgeois des moyens de production. En revanche, le décryptage de l'accaparement invisible et silencieux de la plus-value par des minorités (bourgeoises ou bureaucratiques) reste le fondement explicatif de l'exploitation, de la domination et de l'aliénation d'une grande partie de la société par une minorité. Dans son principe, l'autarchie attaque à la racine toutes les minorités asservissantes que leur pouvoir cherche à la fonder sur dieu, sur la tradition, sur la fortune, sur l'élection-non-révocable, ou sur l'auto-proclamation d'un rôle **dirigeant**. De ce point de vue, tous les partis hiérarchiquement centralisés sont équivalents qu'ils se disent «marxistes» ou non.

Cartes, quelques uns, de ces «libérateurs» proclament de bonne foi le caractère **provisoire** de leur mission de guide du prolétariat. Nous avons déjà noté que l'histoire ne garde aucune trace d'un commencement de réalisation de telles bonnes intentions. Tout se passe comme si ces dirigeants pensaient: les ouvriers pourront sans doute un jour se passer d'hommes comme moi, mais après ma mort naturelle. Où et quand a-t-on observé le suicide spontané d'une classe dominante? Les partis politiques «marxistes» — sous prétexte d'être mieux armés pour lutter contre la bourgeoisie — perfectionnent sans cesse leur «organisation» centralisée afin d'asseoir un pouvoir qui élimine, pour ainsi dire «par principe» tout adversaire. Comment un tel pouvoir pourrait-il dépérir après une victoire qui supprimerait par le fait même toute possibilité de recours?

A ces remarques, on croit faire une objection décisive: sans parti révolutionnaire, militairement organisé, la société d'exploitation actuelle ne sera jamais détruite; dès lors critiquer les partis révolutionnaires, c'est servir le pouvoir en place...

Remarquons d'abord, sur un plan de discussion formelle, que, ce disant, on ne répond pas à nos critiques. Dès lors — comme cela s'est vu — le parti révolutionnaire pourra, en effet, remplacer la bourgeoisie en tant que minorité dominante. Est-ce un grand avantage de «cultiver la personnalité» de Staline plutôt que celle de la reine des Anglais? La critique du stalinisme n'a porté que sur les personnes non sur les vices du régime qui avait rendu ces excès possibles. Rien donc n'empêche leur retour puisque ce sont les conditions de base qui, pour une large part, déterminent les qualités et les défauts des acteurs. Cependant ce n'est pas là réponse principale, mais celle-ci: l'observation historique a montré que **ce ne sont pas les partis révolutionnaires qui font les révolutions**; tout au plus sont-ils capables de les «récupérer» quand elles se déclenchent.¹³ Dès lors l'accusation d'inefficacité tombe. Les voies et moyens de la révolution sont complexes et ne peuvent être décrits ici; elle résulte de conjonctions entre processus économiques et prise de conscience

¹² Voir notre étude: «Karl Marx et l'autogestion», in: *Autogestion et socialisme*, No 15.

¹³ Voir, par exemple, notre étude: «Le parti révolutionnaire et la spontanéité des masses», in: *Communisme et marxisme*, chap. Ier.

par les acteurs de l'histoire. Dans cette perspective, les partis peuvent avoir un rôle éducatif mais ils ne sont pas les seuls à l'assurer et leur prétention dépasse cet objectif. A supposer enfin que les partis révolutionnaires aient eu, par leurs organisation hiérarchique, leurs états-majors, et leurs secrets, une quelconque utilité dans le passé, en serait-il encore de même dans les pays industriels où se développe l'automatisme ?

12. Automatisme et autarchie. Cette dernière mise au point suppose la relecture, par une sorte d'esprit de l'escalier, des deux premières parties de cette étude dans la nouvelle perspective de l'autogestion généralisée sous le nom d'autarchie. Il se déduit logiquement que tout ce qui, dans l'évolution technologique et sociale, favorise l'extension de l'autogestion, accroît en même temps la crédibilité de l'autarchie. La minorisation du besoin d'autorité dans les usines automatisées, notamment par la dissémination des centres de décision, est, par le fait, une preuve sociologique d'un mouvement historique vers un nouveau type d'organisation rationnelle et transparente qui laisse prévoir la fin des coups de force arbitraires et humiliants des grands et petits chefs.

Toutefois, nombre de ceux qui admettent cette évolution au niveau des entreprises ne peuvent concevoir son extension à la société globale; conditionnés, dès l'enfance, par des instances décisives »supérieures«, ils éprouvent le besoin de démissionner sans cesse devant les figures familiales, divines ou politiques du père-qui-commande-et-qui-protège. Ils ne peuvent se représenter l'autogestion locale que comme une récréation dont la liberté surveillée a été organisée »d'en haut«. C'est pourquoi, s'ils comprennent intellectuellement les exposés démonstratifs des conditions de possibilité de l'autogestion généralisée,¹⁴ ils n'y adhèrent pas. Une crainte obscure les dissuade de ce parricide superstructural. C'est pourquoi la famille patriarcale — comme l'a vu W. Reich — est le fondement profond de toutes les sociétés hiérarchisées.

En ce sens, les expériences des petites communautés de vie peuvent réaliser, sur le plan affectif, une dissémination de l'autorité qui peut rejoindre celle qui résulte de l'automatisation de l'industrie. Ainsi, les schémas de l'**usine du plan** pourraient devenir politiquement crédibles. Davantage: le développement de l'informatique (dont les applications sont pourtant freinées par les »autorités« et au profit de leurs privilèges) permet déjà de dépasser quelques unes de difficultés de la première conception de Chaulieu, du temps de la revue **Socialisme ou Barbarie**. On pouvait assez légitimement craindre certaines dysfonctions de ce centre national de calcul, de prévision et de simulation. Assurément, sa destination était de rendre l'ensemble du corps social en état de se déterminer en connaissance de cause, mais cette »usine« électronique ne risquait-elle pas de paraître mystérieuse et de fonctionner d'une façon aliénante puisque le corps social, en général, n'aurait pas été en mesure de comprendre de contrôler la bonne marche des mécanismes de calcul. Dès lors n'aurait-il pas fallu se en remettre à la bonne foi, à la bonne volonté sociale de quelques experts? On pouvait craindre là le germe d'une nouvelle minorité savante et puissante de ce savoir. La dissémination des centres de décision que nous observons dans l'industrie ouvre d'autres perspectives et on peut envisager le **passage du mystère de l'usine de plan à la transparence du plan de l'usine**. Si quelqu'un observait, avec lassitude, que, ce disant, nous ne faisons guère que reprendre la vieille conception platonicienne (qui faisait de l'éducation la condition de la démocratie), c'est qu'il n'aurait pas remarqué une différence capitale: du temps de Platon et jusqu'à ces derniers temps, »l'éducation du peuple« était l'objet d'un vœux de certains

¹⁴ voir une description à ce sujet dans notre livre: **La Délivrance de Prométhée**, chap. V.

philosophes, d'un choix de gouvernants progressifs qui voulaient ainsi l'emporter sur d'autres par cette générosité démagogique. Avec le développement de l'informatique »l'instruction publique« est devenue une nécessité technologique. Ce qui relevait de la générosité des philosophes ou des habiletés de dirigeants résulte aujourd'hui des besoins fondamentaux du développement de la société industrielle. De la sorte, l'autarchisme n'est pas une construction théorique projetée dans l'avenir par un volontarisme utopique; il est le résultat d'une analyse sociologique des conditions de possibilité de l'accomplissement de l'histoire.

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COMMUNITY ACTION, PARTICIPATION AND THE WORKPLACE: TOWARDS A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE

The issue of participation in decision-making at various levels by citizens is and has been an issue concerning Canadians. At the macro-level there is a growing consciousness of the fact of economic domination by the United States and an increasing demand for returning control of the economy to Canadian interests. On the local level there has been an increasing awareness of powerlessness which appears to be the lot of local constituencies in issues which ultimately effect the quality of their social, physical and economic lives.

In the city of Toronto there is a struggle over the question of building and land development; a struggle which places governmental authorities between the power of private development corporations and irate citizen groups. Over the past several years there has been increasing organization by consumers of public services in response to the oppressive nature of many of the services that, while operating as welfare agencies, appear to exercise social control functions. The delivery of health services is another area for concern in terms of the relationship of the service to the community.

In general all of these phenomena are discussed and considered as part of what has come to be called citizen participation. In fact, much of the literature concerning citizen participation is problem oriented and recounts, describes and analyzes the activities of such groups. Schools of social work and urban affairs turn out what are, in effect, social action technicians. Governmental funds often institutionalize such efforts.

In addition to the increased emphasis on citizen action and participation there has been a continuing dialogue (primarily on the left) as to the necessity and effectiveness of extra parliamentary activity as a strategy for social change. The issue as to whether radical social change can be achieved via parliamentary processes or involves the action of worker and community groups against existing institutions focuses further attention on the nature of citizen action.

The organized trade union movement in Canada is much involved in parliamentary politics. The Canadian Labour Congress and most of its constituent organizations actively support, participate in, and influence the New Democratic Party (Social Democratic). This Party, while the smallest at the federal level, is now in control of the governments of three of Canada's ten provinces. Thus there is a commitment to electoral politics on the part of the trade union organizations.

Nevertheless, one can also point out the existence of extra Parliamentary activity — activity which rejects traditional institutions and operates outside parliamentary processes — within the labour movement. This has been especially true in Quebec and has tied in with the growing independence movement there.

The scope of this paper, while not directly concerned with the organized trade union movement, is to consider some aspects of a growing community action phenomena, the workplace, and the concept of extra parliamentary activity as elements in a strategy for change. It is the intent of this paper to explore how such a strategy might be conceived.

Approximately 60% of the Canadian work force is engaged in delivering services. These services cover a wide range of activity. There are many in the public sector: transportation, recreation, health, education, welfare, employment, etc. There are also many service industries which provide services for the industrial plant. Many of the workers within the service sector (bus drivers, truck drivers, hospital workers, telephone service men, etc.) set the image of blue collar workers. Yet within these services there is a growing number of professional and technical personnel who do not identify themselves, or are not identified, as workers. It is within this group that the definitions of working class appear to become inapplicable or at least debatable.

There has been a good deal of discussion over whether the definition of working class in terms of relation to the means of production is adequate for a consideration of those sectors in which people now work. The whole service sector provides work places in which people **work** at delivering services, either directly or indirectly. Yet they do not see the place from which they deliver the service as a **work place** nor do they identify themselves as **workers**. The concept and process of professionalization has moved them away from such considerations. The setting just happens to be the framework from which the service worker utilizes his skills and knowledge in relation to the service tasks. We have indicated the resulting emphasis on the **techniques** of service delivery and the de-emphasis of the **setting** from which services are delivered, i. e., the work place.

The argument can be extended if we consider that the »white collar proportion of the labour force in the industrialized world, specifically in the U.S. and Canada has steadily increased.«¹ These managers, salaried professionals, sales people and office workers are what Mills referred to as the »new middle class.«² These changes in the work force, insofar as the proliferation of the service workers is concerned, results in great part from developments in technology which have made producing industries less labour intensive and have thus encouraged a movement to service and distribution work accompanied by a vast expansion in government services.

It is in relation to this sector and primarily in contact with what might be called the human services that much of the activity which relates consumer dissatisfaction to service function and operation has taken place. It is in this area of the services that the possibility of extra parliamentary activity seems a very likely option. One can read frequent accounts of the teachers in Quebec stating through their union that they oppose the function of the educational system as a socializing agency for capitalism. This kind of political orientation and thrust assumes certain solidarity among the teachers as **workers** in the educational work place rather than as isolated professionals delivering a service to consumers. The action effects the system and is not specifically geared to parliamentary processes.

It seems that **all** service agencies; no matter how professionalized, operate as do the goods producing work places. They are organized according to a corporate model: policy and decision-making reside in boards of directors and upper echelon management. The line workers, even if professionals, have little to say **within** the work place even though they may have much

¹ Martin Oppenheimer, »White Collar Revisited: The Making of a New Working Class.« *Social Policy*, Volume 1 No. 2, July-August 1970, p. 28.

² Discussed by Oppenheimer, *ibid* in his article. See also C. Wright Mills, *White Collar*, 1951.

to say about such things as diagnosis, interviewing techniques, classroom techniques, etc. It is my contention that their lack of identification as **workers** does not change the fact that they are workers. This is a key consideration in formulating change strategies.

The question of alienation is also most important in providing a basis for our analysis. Marx has discussed alienation within three areas: 1) the alienation of the worker from the product of his labour; 2) the alienation of man from his fellow man; 3) the alienation of man from himself. It is the alienation which stems from the worker's separation from the product of his labour which needs to be considered when the product of one's labour is a service. The role that alienation plays is a second important consideration in our understanding.

Aronowitz has stated that: »... the human service workers — whose work has been highly bureaucratized and over-specialized feel deeply alienated from their work... and have come to expect a much fuller role than the rationalized bureaucracy allows them. This is a source of a good deal of their discontent. There is considerable discontinuity between their training and their job.«³

Although the possibilities of action by organized and unorganized workers within the productive sector of the economy has been seen as central to radical social change we have posed the service sector as another locus for extra parliamentary activity. It is within this area that the article focuses. It should be noted at the outset that the question of citizen action will be dealt with **in relation to the work place**. The organization of citizens groups alone cannot be seen as a viable form of extra parliamentary activity in view of this writer.

Before considering the role of the service work place in extra parliamentary formulations it may be helpful to consider some of the public reactions to the services.

There has been growing activity throughout Canada during recent years in the arena of what might be called citizen action. This action has concerned itself primarily with service structures. It is interesting that many of these structures have some relationship, either direct or indirect, to government.

REACTIONS TO THE SERVICES

One of the »movements« has been that composed of what are known as poor people. These groups have been organized in response to people's roles as consumers of services; consumers of services who happen to be poor. The groupings tend to fall into two major areas: welfare and housing. The initiation for such action groups lies with the nature of the bureaucratic structures which dispense the services. It is more in relation to grievances and indignities than payment levels that welfare recipients initially organize. It is against the oppressive rules of public housing authorities that tenants get together. They band together for a **redress of grievances** and formulate goals couched in terms of bureaucratic and legislative reform. For the most part such groups are engaged with buffer bureaucracies whose goal is system maintenance. Whatever action is taken, no matter how militant its overt form, there is no goal of re-structuring the social order. There are few exceptions to this.

³ Stanley Aronowitz, »Symposium — Strategies for Radical Social Change,« *Social Policy*, Volume 1, No. 4, November-December 1970, p. 11.

those institutions which directly oppress them. Radical labour unions bargain for better wages and working conditions even though these may not have been revolutionary demands. The great contrast between movements of workers **within** their work places and the movements of consumers is that the consumer (i. e. welfare, tenants) groups gear their action **against** a work place from outside and often the enemy was the worker dispensing the service. This dynamic worked in both directions with the service worker pitted against the citizens action group. One example in a city in Ontario in Canada exists of a union local of welfare workers who demanded bullet proof glass in the welfare office wicket and police protection from the welfare recipients. Here there was a deterioration of relationships between the workers in the agency and unemployed workers who were receiving assistance benefits and had organized to improve the conditions which existed within the welfare office in terms of the way they were treated.

In addition to the worker-consumer dynamic another interesting and significant aspect of these activities has emerged. Many of the consumer action groups in Canada have some relationship with what were called »professionals«. Formally these relationships ranged from actual membership by the professionals in the group to activity in the role of the resource person or consultant. The »poor« membership of these groups reacted to the professional presence in varying ways, but always with some ambivalence. The range of the reactions was from downright mistrust to great appreciation. One outlet for the alienation experienced by some professionals was this attempt to begin to do something about some of the oppressive features of the system with which they were in one way or another affiliated. Thus a dissident welfare worker might aid a welfare rights group by providing information or just bringing his »professional expertise« to bear on problems confronting the group.

Actually quite a wide spectrum of people working in the various services become involved with consumer groups. In my experience there were social workers, some teachers, and workers from the rehabilitation services. By and large they were drawn from the human service sector.

Thus, there were workers in the service sector who were becoming discouraged and disillusioned with the conditions of their work and the functions they saw themselves performing. Among them there were some who were ready to act. The area in which they chose to act was in support of clients action groups. In many cases the focus of the action which developed was levelled at the agencies which these social welfare activists represented. In effect they came involved in supporting the action of others; action directed at their own work places.

This is not surprising if one considers the ethos of professionalism. Most professional service workers see themselves as »enablers« of others. Although there has been a change in social work orientations toward a greater acceptance of social action methods it still places the professional in the role of encouraging and enabling others to carry out these actions. Even though the situation with many of these citizen action groups occurred outside the sponsorship of some agency the dissident professionals who supported them continued to act in professional roles. They saw themselves as enablers of people who were oppressed by conditions and institutions. They were angered at these conditions but were afraid to take direct action for fear of losing their jobs. If they saw themselves as oppressed on the job they did not generally connect it with the oppression experienced by those who receive their services.

This is interesting in the light of two major contradictions inherent in the functioning of most social service agencies in Canada and in North Ame-

rican for that matter. The first contradiction is between the expressed goal of such institutions as helping people in crisis and their institutional function of rationalizing the system by treating the casualties created by that system. The second contradiction is between their expressed commitment to democratic procedures and forms and the un-democratic, hierarchical nature of the agencies in which they work. The alienation experienced by workers in such agencies generally gets expressed through behaviour effecting the clients. Workers who are oppressed by these contradictions take it out on clients. They somehow see them as responsible for the heavy workloads they must carry and their (client) demands, if increased, tend to make the work even more oppressive. The organization of client groups tend to be seen as detrimental to what are unpleasant working conditions to begin with.

It is possible to extend this example to a range of service institutions. Hospital services operate in a hierarchical manner. Many of the workers are underpaid and work under very difficult conditions. The product of their labour is ultimately the service provided and it is the patient that bears the brunt of the workers alienation. The services are geared in terms of »efficiency« and oriented to the reigning professionals needs (in this case the medical doctors) rather than the patient's.

Schools likewise are structured most hierarchically with little in the way of decision-making for any one other than the principal (at the local level).

It is possible for the workers in an auto plant to respond to feelings of alienation and anger over conditions and their relation to the product by sabotaging the product; by undermining the kind of automobile that is produced through various kinds of sabotage. This is indeed happening in North America. While this may have a residual effect on the consumer, in the service sector it becomes much more complicated. The sabotage to the service, whether conscious or not, affects people immediately and directly. Often the people affected represent the more oppressed classes in the social order. This is so because services tend to be class oriented. The large public services deal with people in various conditions of crisis and breakdown.

When considered in this context those workers who get involved with the formation of clients' action groups were a step beyond those workers who directed their alienation at the client. Nevertheless, they did not direct their actions or efforts at their work place. The action was disassociated from the work place and the »outside« activity of the workers was damaging in that it was a misdirection of energy and misleading in terms of understanding the problem. There are some possible reasons for this.

The first has to do with the nature of the »professional« orientation. This orientation tends to pervade the service sector among all those who actually deal with giving service to people, regardless of training or educational level. Such people do not see themselves as workers nor do they see their agencies as their work place. The agency has been posed as a place in which the professional delivers his service and although some sanction is provided by the agency the professional sees himself as independent. This is often true in terms of decisions made regarding diagnostic or treatment considerations concerning a client but never true concerning management and policy decisions, concerning the structure and functioning of the work place. Since the concepts of professionalism are divorced from concepts of the work place or being the worker this situation is accepted.

COMMUNITY CONTROL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The organization of client or consumer groups in various communities has been utilized as a basis for consideration of such concepts as community control. There appears to be a good deal of anger and alienation on the part of citizens toward the service industries. The conclusions tend to move them towards a consideration of transferring control of these institutions to the community — to the recipient of service. Perhaps one of the best insights into the demand for community control can be found in the following quote from the December 1969 issue of the **Health Pact Bulletin** published in New York:

We live in an age of science. There are plans to move people, employ people, school people, serve people . . . and in every case people are the object of the plans, never the subject. We find out how we are to be moved, employed, schooled or served only through the generosity of the institutions who plan for us, and usually too late even to protest. Protesters more and more often take the form of demand for community control, for the right of people to make the decisions which affect their lives. The protest wells up out of the last impulses of dignity left in people who have been the passive objects of plans and non-plans, systems and non-systems long enough to know that the master plans are the master's plans . . .«

Stanley Aronowitz suggests that: »Community control is challenging the prerogative of the centralized bureaucracies to make basic policy determinations effecting local areas and represents a step in the on-going struggle to wrest power from bureaucratic and hierarchical institutions of government and industry. It attempts to redefine the democratic process by rejecting the efficacy of representative institutions such as national and local legislative bodies to reflect popular aspirations.«⁴

Although Aronowitz sees the demands for community control as re-defining the democratic process and implicitly rejecting the efficacy of parliamentary process to bring about change he also sees the potential for co-option within this kind of strategy. »There is no question that the ruling class has the possibility of co-opting limited forms of community control, consumer control, student control, etc. It can adjust inequities and prevent deep social change. The institutional struggles in each of the institutions will heighten consciousness, but not necessarily lead to shifts in power.«⁵

Thus it would appear that the strategy of community control, even though it may be extra parliamentary is not enough. It may be too limited in its thrust and goals so that it is easily co-opted.

Joan Kuyek provides a link between the community control concept, extra parliamentary activity and the work place, a link that we would see as essential to any consideration as a viable strategy. »To me, the word has never meant anything more, or less, than the right of persons to make the decisions which effect their lives. And because I am a Marxist, this has always included and been totally inseparable from the control by workers over the means of production and the control by the people over what is produced and how it is distributed. Community control cannot exist without these other things. Neither can community control exist without the abolition of private ownership of property.«⁶

⁴ Stanley Aronowitz, »The Dialectics of Community Control,« **Social Policy**, May-June 1970.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Joan Kuyek, »Community Control« in G. Hunnius (editor) **Participatory Democracy for Canada**, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1971.

Thus, the anger of consumers of services of various kinds led to demands for a transfer of power from the institutions to the community. Writers considering this phenomenon reflected that the demands for community control did not lead to radical social change. In some instances the thought was expressed that the kind of control demanded must be wide ranging and transforming if it is to avoid the co-optive response of institutions. It is not enough to transfer the power over an institution from manager or board to consumer. If change is to occur the institutional structure must be transformed in the process. This transformation would need to involve both structure and function. The corporate structure with its boards, management groups, and generally hierarchical professionalized decision-making would be one area for change. An agency which operated to rationalize an exploitive system would either need to await a change in that system in order to transform its function (or perhaps disappear) or else embark on an agitational role (i. e. pointing out the nature of the oppression in conjunction with the consumer). It has been suggested that community control is inseparable from the control of workers over what they produce. This view needs to be considered in terms of the effect of control demands made by the community on the workers within the service institutions being confronted. It is in this area that little seems to have been considered or done. What part will the workers play in those institutions over which the community demands control? We have suggested that rather than quietly supporting such groups, the workers of these institutions must begin to confront the inequities and contradictions in the work place. The service workers would come to identify themselves as workers and this would then allow them to recognize their common interests with the recipients of their services who are often themselves workers, rather than seeing them as the enemy and ending up protecting the institution against other workers.

This is a most important consideration. The service workers must come to see a relationship between the conditions of their work, the organization of their work place, and the complaints of the consumers. This relationship between their own alienating experience and the oppression experienced by the recipients of services allows for some sort of politicization and subsequent alliances.

ACTION ABOUT DEVELOPMENT

The community groups mentioned thus far have been defined in terms of their relationship to services, as consumers. Another major area of citizen action in the urban centres of Canada revolves around property. In some urban centres much citizen action has been focussed on the question of development. In fact in the city of Toronto it seems that much of the action has been moved from being focussed on the service system to that of the role of land and building developers.

These groups cut across class boundaries in terms of goals but not in terms of groupings. That is to say that one can see two main groupings defined in terms of relationship to property — residence and ratepayers associations (primarily property owners) and tenants groups which are often working-class groups. The action focusses around issues of zoning changes, approval of high rise construction in residential areas, etc.

This sort of action differs from that of the consumer group in that it seems to be more **institutionally directed** at development corporations and their power relations to government. At times a coalition of what are basi-

cally property based groups can merge around other major issues effecting land use and the quality of urban life. The movement to stop the Spadina Expressway in Toronto (an expressway that was to be built right down the centre of the city) is an example of this. It had roots in two camps — residents and ratepayers associations and a student-young peoples coalition.

In most instances the stage on which the action takes place is the parliamentary stage. It is in the arena of municipal, and sometimes provincial government that the struggle by citizens against the incursions of developers takes place. The fight takes place in committee hearings and council meetings of local government. Briefs are presented and witness is given. The implicit result of such action exposes the nature of the corporate-governmental relationship and a lack of responsiveness of local government to the people's wishes. It is the politicians that bear the brunt of the activity along with, from time to time, corporate businessmen. In some ways this sort of action seems radical insofar as they have the potential of directly exposing the nature of corporate control over political institutions and the failure of local representative democracy to indeed represent the interests of the constituency. From this writer's observations it seems that this kind of exposure has been the prime function of an interesting Alderman in the city of Toronto. He was a former community organizer in Toronto who was elected as a reform Alderman and was committed to honestly representing his constituency and to exposing the nature of the developer-government roles. This he has succeeded in doing during his term of office.

Nevertheless, exposure does not necessarily lead to change or transformation. At times it may slow down the destructive process somewhat (in this case development). However, to consider citizen action against an expressway for instance, even if successful, as changing institutional structures or power relationships is just not so. In fact, it is interesting to note that there are property owners on both sides of such issues. Neither side demands a change in property relationships. The most that is asked for are more enlightened priorities in planning and responsiveness to community needs.

Some comments may be made concerning urban development:

»The way our cities are planned, re-planned and unplanned has nothing whatsoever to do with creating decent living environments. It is done in the interests of higher assessment, vested interests of developers and speculators, tourist dollars or industrial expansion. No decent planning will even be done until land speculation is abolished, property taxes abolished and automobiles are replaced by public transportation. It is even more difficult than trying to change the schools while people still have to work in the existing job pattern. All community challenges to urban renewal, expressways and developers fail because they do not go to the root of the problem and the tactic is purely defensive. The real problem with defensive action in the urban development is that they are almost totally uncreative, they can only be fought over years of meetings, hearings and briefs.«

It is possible to provide other examples of citizen action related to various institutions and vested interests. Dissatisfaction with the school system appears to simmer beneath the surface in many communities in Canada and often breaks out into overt action and demands. In all these areas — development, urban issues, welfare rights, housing, etc. the action is seen as the »massing of citizens working for social change.« It is out of these efforts that many radical community organizers have anticipated the development of a politicizing process. Action against the bureaucracies is seen to expose how they operate. This exposure will, it is hoped, lead to a more critical ana-

ysis of the social order. Events in no way bear this out. Militant action is not tantamount to radical action. Radical action has as its goal basic structural change in property relationships and the profit system. If the goal is bureaucratic reform or more participatory planning, it is not radical. Thus when one considers extra parliamentary activity one must consider activity that is based on a view of the parliamentary processes as being controlled by the large corporate interests which in turn control the government. Recently the Minister of National Health and Welfare in Canada made this quite clear when he was reported to have indicated that it was the middle-class that would have to bear the tax burden of dealing with poverty. He indicated that it would not be possible to levy a heavier burden on business since that would destroy incentive and further deplete the job supply.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN

Is there an extra parliamentary opposition in Canada? I hardly think so. To talk of the extra parliamentary opposition as a reality is misleading if not presumptuous. However, to outline the direction of a process and necessary components is essential.

In summary: we have indicated the fact that the focus of any extra parliamentary activity needs to be tied to the work place. Within the goods producing sector this activity seems to begin either against the union hierarchy or against corporate control in terms of demands which escalate beyond those of wages and working conditions. The strikes of public service and other workers in Quebec is an example of extra parliamentary activity. The kinds of conditions leading to these activities in Quebec are not now present in the same measure in English Canada.

Another major area which tends to be viewed as extra parliamentary activity is the organization of citizens groups. These groups operate outside the usual lobbying arrangements and thus are seen as extra parliamentary. Since such groups usually are organized in terms of consumer roles it seems essential to take a look at that sector of the work place which delivers services and some of the dynamics involved.

As it happens, approximately 60% of the work force in Canada is employed in delivering services. This fact together with the fact that a good deal of community organization relates to service and necessitates some analysis. Our analysis can be summarized as follows: 1) consumer action groups, in all cases, appear to be reformist. They are reactive and deal with inequities and injustice in delivery of services — not with the roots of inequity; 2) such action groups direct their action at the work place from the outside. This action leads to enmity and division between the service workers and the consumers of these services. This is in marked contrast to action by industrial workers which takes place from within; 3) sympathetic service workers provide support for such consumer groups and thereby separate their action from the work place. This is due in part to their identity as »professionals« in agencies rather than as »workers« in »work places« geared to delivering services; 4) workers in service industries are alienated. Since the product of their labour is a service one must look to the internal contradictions within the work place for the roots of alienation. There are three: a) institutional function is to rationalize the social order; b) work places structured in a hierarchical manner; c) growing disparity between training and job.

These are contradictory with the expressed goals of the service system. 5) In goods producing industry alienated workers may sabotage the product, here it is the service which is sabotaged and the client bears the burden.

Since most such agencies are class oriented the struggle is drawn between two elements of the working-class. This in fact contains the struggle at that level and aids in protecting the established order.

How does this analysis relate to the question of extra parliamentary activity? We have indeed indicated at the outset that the need for radical social change cannot be fulfilled via the parliamentary structures.

In addition, this article focuses less on the issue of state power and more in terms of institutional transformation. Transfer of state power and state ownership of the means of production do not by themselves satisfy the human need for an equal and libertarian existence. The change in the structure of the social order demands the transformation in the institutions of that social order, not only a transfer of power at the top.

In order to achieve this an institutional strategy for change needs to be developed. Merely talking about grassroots organizing in the community cannot be seen as leading to this. It is my contention that such activity must do the following:

- 1) It must agitate against existing institutions in order that the contradictions under which they operate may be exposed to the community at large and the workers within these institutions.

- 2) Community activity, demands for community control or institutional restructuring cannot emanate from the consumer or citizen group. They must be tied to the work place. Then will it be possible for alliances and coalitions between consumers and workers in the service systems to take place.

- 3) Mere exposure of institutional contradictions is not sufficient. There must be the development of new forms that can transform the nature of these institutions. If seen in terms of their identity as work places, directions emerge. This does away with corporate structures in favour of management and control by workers and consumers.

- 4) The tie to the work place is essential in terms of the problem of developing consciousness on the part of service workers as workers. Such consciousness will allow for a politicizing process and direct action at the work place which is necessary if the agitational processes referred to can take place.

Thus we have dealt with two major areas —

STRATEGIC:

Consumer organizing by itself is almost always reformist. Even when it manifests radical inclinations it can easily be absorbed or co-opted by simply granting the demands it makes (e. g., more or better housing). The demands of workers (of all kinds) to control the means of production, to determine (with the consumer) the purposes and forms of service cannot be so easily co-opted; neither can it be granted without radical change in the corporate system of control and ownership.

SUBSTANTIVE:

The alienation experienced by the workers of the human services is as real as that for workers in goods producing sector. The nature of the human services is such that the worker is often in contact with victims of the social order. He or she does not see himself (herself) as a worker nor the agency as a work place. Further, the alienating nature of the work place is not seen as part and parcel of consumer oppression both by the agency and the social order.

Unless corporate and elitist control in the work place is transformed we cannot speak in any meaningful way of radical social change. Until that happens workers in the productive and service sectors will still be objects to be manipulated for the capitalist status quo (and at the expense of service recipients and consumers). It is this kind of conscious analysis which needs to develop and be linked with the proposed strategies.

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WORKERS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES: A HYPOTHETICAL CASE*

A system of workers councils has been fairly successful to date in Yugoslavia; what about having it in the United States? Clearly, it is a very different problem to have decentralized control of industry by workers councils in a country with the size and complexity and high level of development of the United States. Here we shall first try to envision what the system might look like in the United States. Then, we shall go over the arguments in its favor. Next, we shall examine the host of difficult problems into which it might run. Finally, we shall examine in more detail its relation to the one problem of political democracy.

THE SYSTEM

Suppose that in running for his second term President McGovern comes out in favor of a system of workers councils, and that he and his party are overwhelmingly elected. Under the U. S. constitution, firms would have to be taken over with due process and fair compensation in the national interest (by exercise of police powers). Assuming that it is upheld by the Supreme Court, whose composition might be changed in the meantime by McGovern appointees, then all of our major firms would be owned by the U. S. government. The basic idea of the workers councils is that their possession and control (but not ownership) would be immediately turned over to the workers within each firm — with some portion of control retained by the government.

The managers would be appointed by the workers councils. One issue to be discussed later would be the managers' tenure. Would a manager be appointed for five years, subject to recall, or would he be appointed, say, year by year? Would managers need to pass an examination?

The composition of the workers councils is also a difficult question. Should 40% or 50% or some other percentage be appointed by the U. S. government? Should these public members be appointed by the President or by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress? Or should the U. S. government appoint no one to them, and merely have veto power over certain actions? Should state and local governments be represented on them, or should they also have a veto power over certain actions?

How about new projects and enterprises? Should all of these be started by governments, then turned over to workers councils? Or should old enterprises be allowed and encouraged to build new ones? If so, who controls the new one? Can one enterprise still loan money to another, and does that

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mean that one workers council can get interest from another? Once a workers council has control of an enterprise, what are the limits of its control? Presumably, it should be able to do most anything with its assets except to sell or give them away completely.

Notice that in this type of socialism all of the ordinary everyday economic decisions are **not** made by a central planning agency, but are made by the firm manager as directed by the workers council. Presumably their goal is to maximize the wages plus profits of all the workers in the firm collectively. The manager thus works within a market context, produces what will sell as demanded by individual or enterprise consumers, and sets prices and outputs of each commodity to maximize according to that goal. From the total revenues after paying material costs, minimum wages, and taxes, the workers council can allocate the remainder as it wishes; some will go to bonuses to workers (according to their share in wages?), some to replacement investment, some to net investment, and some to collective welfare projects.

BENEFITS OF THE SYSTEM

In the eyes of its proponents the system of market socialism with each enterprise worker-controlled combines all the best aspects of capitalism and socialism. First, as under a pure and perfectly competitive capitalist system, a pure and perfectly competitive market socialist system achieves maximum efficiency in the allocation of resources, choice of technology, and choice of output mixture according to consumer preferences — and it will do this automatically without the problems of a bureaucratic central planning agency.

Second, and this is still in the hopeful world of its proponents, it will outdo even competitive capitalism in the amount of individual initiative. There is not merely initiative by one capitalist and disinterest by the workers; rather, there is initiative and material interest in maximization by every worker, since all receive part of the profits. Under centrally planned socialism, the profits go to all society, so an improvement affects each worker in the enterprise only minutely and to the same extent as every other citizen. In the worker controlled enterprise, the workers of that enterprise directly participate in the profits from every production improvement.

Third, there is a reduction in alienation. In capitalism the product is owned and the profits go to faceless capitalist owners of the giant corporation. In centrally planned socialism, the profits go off to be administered (for society presumably) by a gigantic faceless bureaucracy. In worker controlled firms each worker can influence decision-making, he owns part of the product, and receives part of the profit. Hence, he participates more and is less alienated.

Fourth, there is more equal distribution of both economic income and political power. As opposed to capitalism, there are no private fortunes and concentrations of capital ownership in a few hands. There is only a distribution of net income among all the workers in each enterprise according to their own labor contribution. As opposed to centrally planned socialism, control is not lodged in the hands of a few bureaucrats, but in the hands of the workers of each enterprise.

Fifth, as a consequence there is more democracy in two senses. First, there is local democracy in the administration of each plant by an elected council. Second, there is more nation-wide democracy because of the lack of concentration of economic power. There is no central power in the hands

of the party in control of the government as in centrally planned socialism. Nor is there control of the political process by huge concentrations of private wealth, as under capitalism.

PROBLEMS OF THE SYSTEM

First, even assuming that there is pure and perfect competition between the worker-controlled firms, there are still many external effects on society caused by the enterprises' activities that are not governed by their own private profit maximization. In other words, if an enterprise creates smog, this is a cost to society, an external effect of the enterprise not reflected in its profits and losses. Therefore, if enterprises merely try to maximize their net revenues for the workers councils, such external effects may still continue unabated. This raises the question of the potential conflict between the worker-controlled enterprise and the rest of society, a question we shall meet in many forms.

Furthermore, even assuming that they pay attention to all social externalities by some sort of external regulations on the firm, there are other areas in which it is hard to see how decentralized firms can be the optimal solution for society. What about various kinds of public goods, such as health and education or defense that require non-market criteria and that are largely consumed collectively? What about the need for regional or national planning in such areas as nationwide communications or transportation?

Second, in the present American structure of industry, we do not have pure and perfect competition, but a high degree of monopoly. To the extent that large size and integration is necessary for efficiency, that will continue to be the case with the addition of workers' councils. Thus, assuming that their present size is necessary, a firm such as General Motors under workers' control will continue to exercise monopoly power in the market. Thus, GM will continue to charge higher than competitive level prices, and all consumers will continue to pay those prices to GM. The fact that the profits now go to the workers of GM only means that those workers are exploiting all other workers and citizens in the society through the extra monopoly profits.

Moreover, other problems of the market economy have appeared in Yugoslavia, and probably would appear in American decentralized worker controlled industry. One problem is unemployment, which will always be present under conditions of completely decentralized investment, since the total investment need not equal the total saving of society. Another problem is inflation, since the worker-controlled enterprises will still have every interest in raising prices to maximize their profits. Since unemployment may result from lack of aggregate demand, while the inflation may be »cost-push,« resulting from the monopoly structure of industry, it is possible that such a system could have both unemployment and inflation. All of this assumes, of course, no central regulation or planning of investment.

Third, the system assumes that workers will fully participate in elections, decision-making, and initiatives to improve production. As to elections, we examine that point later in relation to democracy. But it is not at all clear that workers would have vast incentives to improve production even with their »own« control of the product. After all, the profits still may take some time to materialize, and they are still spread over all workers in the enterprise. If the enterprise is very large, such as General Motors, the reward to a single worker from a new innovation would not be large.

The participation of workers in the management process raises other questions. On the one side, if a manager is really under the thumb of the

workers' council, has only a brief tenure in office, and may be recalled at any time, then he will have a hard time establishing the necessary amount of industrial discipline. In other words, he will hesitate to penalize a lazy worker if that worker may vote to oust him next week. On the other side, in Yugoslav reality (and very likely in a similar U.S. system), since blue-collar workers do not participate in workers councils and elections to them to the degree that white-collar workers and administrative personnel do, it appears that the workers councils are dominated by the technical-administrative personnel and the manager. Even with full participation, this is always likely because of the degree of technical know-how necessary to make many decisions.

Given that blue-collar workers will be under-represented on the workers' councils, there may continue to be labor strife under such a system. In fact, there would continue to be a need for local unions to present the workers' grievances. If the unions were dominated by the same people dominating the workers councils, there would be wild-cat strikes by the workers against »their own« unions and councils — as apparently has been the case in one or two instances in Yugoslavia.

Fourth, although the system would reduce concentrations of economic power, it does not guarantee democracy. Within the enterprise, there are the problems of non-participation, social prestige of technicians and administrators, need for technical knowledge in decision-making, and other factors that will tend to give over-representation to top technicians and administrators. In particularly large firms, such as GM, there would surely be organized parties and factions fighting for control at some remove from the ordinary worker.

At the national level, power would still be needed to guide national interests, to control public goods, to have nationwide controls over problems such as smog, nationwide communications and transportation. At the nationwide level, we would then have to decide how much power and control to allot to the President or to Congress. What should be the power of state and local governments? What would be the role and social bases of political parties? Who controls the media, the Universities, both places where there are local «workers» but also public interest?

Congress now gives territorial representation. Should that be continued, or should local workers councils elect regional ones, which would elect the national Congress? If the present territorial divisions are continued for state and local and national government, then how are conflicts resolved between these governing units and the workers' councils of a particular area, or a workers council that cuts across the nation (such as one for an airline)? And should local, state, and national public interests be represented on the workers councils?

Fifth, all of this points to the sad fact that alienation would by no means be eliminated, though it might be greatly reduced. Inside the enterprise, to the degree that workers feel they really are in control (see points three and four above), they may feel much less alienated from their work. We are still supposing, however, that managers have enough power to punish and reward for bad or good work, so that that source of alienation remains to some degree. On the national scale, whether Congress is elected territorially or by a pyramid of workers councils, it is still a long way from the ordinary worker up to the government leadership and bureaucracy. And since that government would still require a great deal of power to handle the nationwide issues, the worker would still feel helpless to have much affect on this important maker of decisions in the country, so this source of alienation would also still remain to some extent.

ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

Having outlined some of the questions and problems involved with a workers' council system, we will, in the remainder of the paper, concentrate on one of special interest: what are the implications of workers councils for effective democracy? To answer this question, a working definition of democracy is needed. Despite the many and varied definitions of democracy, most center upon equality of influence. We will define a system as **fully** democratic if all adult citizens have equal influence on policy outcomes. Clearly no political system of any size meets this definition and, perhaps, complete equality of influence is an unattainable ideal. The definition, does, however, provide a criterion — and with it we can talk about the degree of democracy. We will attempt to ascertain the extent to which various political systems are likely to meet this criterion.

First, we will specify the conditions which must be met if equality of influence is to be approached. (1) Each individual must possess the information that a decision or decisions are to be made. (2) He must have — to an equal degree with all other citizens — sufficient information to enable him to ascertain whether and to what extent the decision is of importance to him and to ascertain what the likely effects of the various alternatives are. (3) He must have equal access to the decision making forum as a voting member. Or, at minimum, he must have equal influence in choosing the decision makers and equal access to them during their term of office. In either case, the equality of access must not only be formal, that is, legally specified and guaranteed, but also actual. There must be sufficient equality of resources, time and money for example, to allow each individual to exercise his formal access. (4) Each individual must possess — to an equal degree with all other citizens — sufficient expertise on the matter to be decided to enable him to submit alternatives if none suggested by others seem adequate to him and to allow him to argue as persuasively as anyone else. (5) Finally, he must possess — to an equal degree with all other citizens — information on the implementation of decisions and sufficient resources and access to allow him to protest effectively if the decisions reached are not carried out as intended. The conditions could be further elaborated, but, as they already specify a system far beyond any actually existing one, they are sufficient as evaluative criteria. If these conditions are met, there would still be no guarantee that all individuals would actually exercise equal influence. The opportunity would, however, be provided.

We will now construct two simple extreme models — a completely centralized system and a completely decentralized system — and ascertain the chances of meeting these conditions within each. The results will then provide guidelines for evaluating a particular mixed system — that of workers councils. Throughout, we assume that the systems are nominally democratic — that civil liberties are guaranteed and that political decision makers with whom ultimate authority rests, when not composed of the entire adult population, are elected in free, majority elections.

CENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

The completely centralized model assumes a President popularly elected for a limited term. All decisions — both political and economic — are made centrally by the President and by officials appointed by and responsible to him.

A citizen may have an impact on policy outcomes in two ways — through his influence on the selection of the primary decision maker and through interceding in the decision making process. If the political system is of any size, one individual's vote will have little impact on the selection of the President. Assume that each candidate specifies a program in considerable detail. Would this then give the voter an impact on policy? Such a program for a national election would have to cover a large number of topics and would be exceedingly complex. Understanding such a complex program would be difficult for many. The citizen must vote for a candidate even if there are parts of the program he dislikes. Thus, the mandate the winning candidate receives would be far from clear.

The citizen's problems in influencing outcomes through interceding in the decision making process, e. g. by lobbying, are also major. If all decisions are made centrally, the sheer number of decisions will be such that many citizens will not know a particular problem is on the agenda. They are likely to be faced with a **fait accompli**. The major policy decisions, those made by the most visible public officials, will be both broad and complex. Their impact on the individual will often be difficult to ascertain. The details of policy will be worked out in the bureaucracy. These decision makers and those who implement the decisions are difficult to locate and thus to influence and hold responsible.

In such a system, actual access depends heavily on resources — on having the political skills, money and time necessary to contact the decision makers. Given the complexity of the decisions, a high level of technical expertise is also a prerequisite. Clearly, organized interests with considerable resources would have a disproportionate share of the influence. Their influence would be disproportional both in the decision making process and in the leadership selection process. A nationwide election campaign requires organization and money and it is the organized interests which have these to offer.

The individual who has no interest group to speak for him faces a government both inscrutable and impenetrable. Most of those who are represented by some group will still have little influence. It is those groups that are large or rich and that can act with a unity of purpose that will have the greatest impact. Rank and file members are not likely to have much influence within such groups.

The economic system, whether capitalist or socialist, would seem to make little difference as to the degree of political participation in the centralized society. As long as there are differences of interests, a completely centralized system will lead to an unequal distribution of influence with the strongest interest groups dominating. The interest basis of such groups would differ under capitalism and socialism — with sheer money power playing much less of a political role under socialism — as would the policy outcomes. But the extent to which each individual has an effective voice in decisions of importance to his life would seem to differ little.

DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

The completely decentralized model consists of a number of fairly small autonomous units. Each unit would have complete decision making power, both political and economic, within the constraints imposed by the environment. Complete atonomy means, of course, that there is no central government; that, in effect, each unit is an independent country. In such a system, information, expertise and access would be much less of a problem. The units

might be small enough to allow all adults to take direct part in the decision making process. If representation were necessary, individuals would at least be able to know personally their representative. There would be fewer major decisions to be made and these would be of narrower scope and thus less complex. Individuals would find it easier to obtain information on the decisions being made and to understand the possible alternatives. In most cases, first hand experience common to all rather than sophisticated technical expertise, would be sufficient. Access and influence would depend only to a minor, extent if at all, on resources distributed unequally in the population. The way in which decisions are implemented would be directly observable and the ease of access and influence would ensure responsibility on the part of the small administrative staff. Furthermore, given the relative simplicity of the decisions, professionalism would be unnecessary. Almost any citizen could fill the relatively few political positions which exist. Clearly the smaller the unit the more nearly the above statements hold.

It is, of course, the necessarily small size of the units which make such a system unfeasible, particularly in a developed country. For such a system to survive, one must assume that the units are self sufficient, that they in no way impinge upon one another, and that the environment is relatively benign. If these conditions are not met, immediate problems arise. Each unit has complete internal decision making power but the constraints of the environment, which includes other units, are such as to make this supposed autonomy nearly worthless. The individuals within one unit may have equal influence over the decisions made in that unit but they have no influence over decisions made in other units. Thus, they have no say over decisions that may seriously affect their lives. The water they drink and the air they breathe may be polluted without their having any recourse.

The small size, which allows for the possibility of truly equal influence, itself imposes penalties. A small unit's limited resources will make certain decisions unfeasible whatever the desires of the citizens. The provision of many public goods becomes impossible. Could a unit of several hundred thousand people maintain a safe water supply and adequate public health, not to mention a university?

Equality of influence is valued because it gives each individual a direct voice in the decisions which affect his life. When influence is equal but its scope is so circumscribed by environmental factors that the individual has little influence over many such decisions, it is of little value.

Centralization, thus, seems to preclude equality of influence; complete decentralization, by severely limiting the scope of decisions, negates the value of equality of influence. What, then, of a mixed system? Is it possible to construct a system in which the scope of influence is sufficient to avoid major externalities problems, and which still allows individuals to have an approximately equal voice in decisions which effect their lives?

MIXED SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY

Two questions arise. How shall decision making power be distributed between the national government and the component units? What shall the form of these component units be? One would like the units to be as small as possible so as to make equal influence possible, but large enough so that the units can make decisions significant to their members without imposing unacceptable costs on the members of other units. A rule which accomplishes the above to the greatest extent possible is as follows: the group or unit which has the power to make a given decision should consist of all individuals

who are affected by that decision. Thus, members of society relinquish their voice in some decisions, those which do not effect them. In return, their chances of an equal voice in decisions of importance to them is increased.

This rule, while logically unassailable and ethically appealing, raises a host of practical problems. How is the effected group to be determined? Decisions have long run as well as short run effects, indirect as well as direct effects. In a large, complex and highly interdependent society a strict application of the rule would result in all decisions being centrally made. Should, then, influence over a decision be distributed in proportion to the significance of the decision to various individuals? And, again, how is relative significance determined? If the affected group could be determined for each decision, one would find that there would be overlapping membership from one decision to another. How, then, are institutionalized decision structures to be set up?

Clearly, there are no easy answers. Equality and scope of influence seem to be inversely related. Neither workers councils nor any other presently existing system have resolved this problem. The effect of workers councils in the United States must be considered in the light of the conundrum. (The evaluation of other mixed systems is beyond the scope of this article.)

Some of the advantages of workers councils have already been mentioned, so not much need be said here. Workers councils do give the individual at least the opportunity of influencing decisions related to his work. Because of their immediate impact, most individuals consider such decisions of great if not overriding importance. Such participation should reduce the workers's alienation from his work. If the workers councils are also political units, alienation from the political system would also be reduced. In the present United States, the low participation and lack of political efficacy of most blue collar workers is due not only to a lack of time and money, but also to a lack of political skills. Few opportunities to obtain these skills exist, and the worker, realizing he cannot participate effectively without them sinks into apathy. Workers councils, by providing relatively non-threatening opportunities to obtain political skills (and, of course, by spreading income more equally), could result in a great increase of workers participation in the political process.

Nevertheless, whatever the advantage of lodging considerable decision making power in individual workers councils, considerable decision making power will have to remain at the national level. The complexity and interdependence of U.S. society and economy do not make a national government with minimal powers possible. Defense and foreign affairs obviously are national responsibilities. The national government is getting more and more involved in transportation, education, medical care and various sorts of regulation in the environmental and consumer protection area. These trends are not likely to be reversed. The increasing interdependence in a highly industrialized society will tend to increase the felt need for central decision making.

A CONGRESS OF WORKERS COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES

The problem, then, is to assure that decision making at the center is responsive to the wishes of the citizens. The only possibility is some form of representation. We will assume that national decision making power is vested in a Congress of workers council representatives. What sort of politics and what sort of policy outcomes would result?

Conflict is the basic element of politics and interest is the basis of conflict. To predict the nature of politics and policy outcomes, one must know

what the major lines of cleavage in a society are and what their interest basis is. But all interests are not equal. The structure of the system, the rules of the game at any given time, strongly influence which interests are most likely to be expressed and to be successful.

The interests which may form the basis for joint political action can be classified as follows:

- (1) Economic-class related interests center on income and benefit shares for large groups in the society.
- (2) Economic-work related interests center on an individual's or smaller group's salary and working conditions and may include the survival and prosperity of the employing firm or industry. For the owner (whether individual or workers council), the basis of survival and prosperity is the profits of the firm.
- (3) Reference or identity group related interests (racial, religious, ethnic or sexual «minority» groups) center upon membership in a group which is perceived as disadvantaged because of its identifying characteristic. Discrimination is seen as involving both economic and status matters.
- (4) Consumer and style of life interests center on the desire for certain public goods, including public regulations, that are seen as making life for everyone safer and more pleasant.

The first interest is, of course, the basis of the class struggle with the interests of the classes diametrically opposed. Decisions relating to redistribution have broad impact and do effect everyone. But except in periods of extreme crisis, governments in capitalist countries do not make extreme redistributive decisions. Most of the time, changes will be at the margins and, for many people such proposed changes will not be highly salient just because their impact will be slight. Thus, certainly in the United States, class interests tend to be diffuse in terms of political focus. They are only infrequently and usually indirectly the major motive force for political action.

To most people, work related economic interests are more salient than any of the other interests because decisions on such matters have the greatest direct impact on their lives. On some such matters, salaries for example, the interests of workers as a class and owners as a class are opposed. But on many matters, their interests, at least in part, coincide. Both are interested in the survival and prosperity of the industry and, thus, for example, in getting government defense contracts. To both, unfortunate externalities such as pollution are of secondary importance.

For the worker, his work related and class related economic interests may conflict. A cut in defense spending or the closing of tax loopholes benefiting his industry might allow for a betterment of his whole class. But even if he is aware of the conflict, the immediacy of work related decisions and the uncertainty and diffuse impact of favorable class related decisions results in the predominance of work related interests.

Identify group interests pit a group, usually a minority and, because of discrimination, weak and often poorly organized, against the rest of society. Society need not be hostile to the general aspirations of the group, but because of the demands made, conflict results. By demanding income or power redistribution, they may threaten capitalists and other elite groups. By demanding jobs, the group is seen as threatening workers' work related economic interests.

Those espousing consumer and style of life interests are opposed purely on the basis of other interests. No one is against clear air, pure food and effective drugs *per se*. But, as soon as governmental action in such areas is contemplated, opposition arises, based predominantly upon class related and

work related economic interests. While everyone does have a common interest in such matters, that interest, for most people, is subordinate to their other interests.

In the present United States each of these interests is the basis of numerous frequently conflicting political action groups. Conflict between the two types of economic interest on the one hand and style of life and reference group interest on the other are highly prevalent. Work related economic interests, those of the owners particularly but also those of the more prosperous workers, most frequently are successful but the other interests have also had limited successes.

Under a workers council system, these interests and these conflicts would not disappear. If there were no private ownership, there would, of course, be no class conflict between owners and employees. Another type of class conflict — between »rich« and »poor« workers is likely to take its place to some extent. The conflict between work related economic and other interests might, in fact, intensify. **If workers have a greater stake in the profits of their industry, they may well be even less inclined to admit disadvantaged groups or to submit to regulation for style of life purposes.**

POLICY OUTPUTS OF A CONGRESS OF WORKERS COUNCILS

What sort of policy output would one expect from a Congress of workers council representatives? What interests would they represent? It seems quite clear that work related economic interests would receive the greatest emphasis. The representatives would be elected by the workers in a particular plant or industry. These workers as individuals will have interests of other sorts. Some may be members of a minority group and be strongly interested in better treatment of their group. Others may feel strongly about consumer and style of life issues. Such interests will, however, tend to be unevenly distributed in the group and may provide the basis for divisive cleavages. The one interest they will all have in common is their work related economic interest. For most people, this does, under any circumstances, tend to be their primary interest — the one which, when threatened, is most likely to result in political action. If the unit of representation is such that all the component individuals have this interest in common, its predominance will be further increased. The task of the elected representative will be seen as protecting and enhancing this interest. The greater the control of the electors over the representative — through frequency of election, recall — the more the representative will be bound to this task.

Each representative in the Congress would, then, be expected to protect his workers' economic interests. On other matters the representative might have considerable discretion so long as his actions did not conflict with the primary task. But issues based on style of life and identity group interests would tend to conflict with work related economic interests for some representatives. Consumer protection and environmental legislative will be seen as having an adverse impact on some industries. Legislation to better the position of disadvantaged groups will have the same perceived effect. Clearly the impact of such measures will vary. Would it be possible to form winning coalitions to pass such programs from those not adversely affected? The answer is probably no. Each representative knows that at some point he will need allies if he is to accomplish his mandated task. He further knows that no natural majority on the basis of common interest is likely to exist on the matters of his primary interests. The measures in which he will be most interested are those that have a major impact on his specific firm or industry.

Only a minority of representatives are likely to be equally interested in the matter to be natural allies. If he is to attract sufficient allies it must be done through bargaining and the only resource he possesses is his vote.

The most likely outcome is a log rolling situation with a basically negative policy impact. As shared interest majorities would exist on few matters, the positive programs passed would be largely distributive — pork barrel — programs the benefits of which can be disaggregated so that everyone gets something. The major effect would be in terms of what the Congress would not do. The lack of natural majorities and the need to protect the work related economic interests of one's constituents would result in tacit bargaining of the form »I won't hurt you if you won't hurt me.« Broad positive programs in the style of life and minority group area would be impossible to pass. Such programs will be perceived as hurting someone. Those not adversely affected will be unwilling to do so, because of the fear of setting a precedent — of opening the flood gates. Such producer politics is, thus, likely to display a profoundly status quo oriented thrust.

What of the possibility of class based coalitions — of »rich« vs. »poor« workers? As we have seen, capitalist countries do not make major redistributive decisions except in times of crisis. As long as such decisions are marginal, class interests are not perceived as sufficiently salient to predominate over work related economic interests. Would a socialist government make nonmarginal redistributive decisions? After the revolutionary period, it is unlikely to do so frequently. Because of their broad impact, major redistributive decisions cannot be made frequently without completely disrupting the society and the economy. A workers council system would, of course, limit the extent of direct redistribution the national government could undertake. Thus class based interests will not by themselves provide a sufficient basis for the formation of two cohesive coalitions in the Congress.

WORKERS COUNCILS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

It would seem, then, that a system which does provide a real if indirect voice to most individuals in the national decision making process is likely to result in policy outcomes most of us would consider unsatisfactory. Is there a way out of the dilemma? Can workers councils be saved?

The major problem with the system outlined above is the overemphasis on producers interests. The work related economic basis of representation and the lack of organized channels for the representation of other interests are at fault. The unit of representation could be changed from workers councils to geographical, but this is unlikely to have a major effect. The larger workers councils in the geographical area would be predominant in the election of the representative who, in the Congress, would tend to act much like the representative discussed above. And, of course, the smaller the district and, thus, the more direct the representation, the greater the power of the workers councils. Having two chambers with different bases of representation — workers councils in one and perhaps large geographical units such as states in the other — would also provide no solution. The problem with producers politics is its inability to produce broad social programs. Adding another House to the legislature is only likely to increase the chances of stalemate.

Some organized structure through which other demands can be made is needed. It must be a national organization as interests other than work related economic ones tend to be more dispersed. Nationwide, they may have considerable strength even though they are predominant in no smaller area.

The organization must have sufficient continuity to allow for planning and sufficient resources to make influence possible. The political party seems to be the best suited organization to perform such tasks.

If a competitive party system existed, many of the problems of producers politics could at least be alleviated. A party, in order to win a majority of the seats, would have to make broad appeals. It could not be based simply upon interests specific to individual workers councils. Parties would, thus, provide a structure through which the whole range of interests could find expression. Undoubtedly specific producers interests would still be strong, but the need for broader appeals is likely to result in the differentiation of the parties along some sort of ideological lines. The ideology would provide a rough sort of social plan.

The extent to which a competitive party system would alleviate the problems of producers politics depends upon a number of factors. Perhaps the most important is the predominance for individuals of work related economic interests and this depends, to a considerable extent, upon the affluence of the society. The affluent can afford to give first to interests other than immediate economic gain. If, then, a structure for expressing such interests is available, a reasonably satisfactory balance in policy outcomes is more likely to result.

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THE VALUES AND PARTICIPATION: COMPARISON

ABSTRACT

The paper is using the data about values and participation in five East-European and North-American communities. As the principal tool of analysis is used the simple two dimensional typology of participant roles, constructed from **attitudinal** and **behavioral** variables. The results are suggesting that the statements of respondents about their values can have systematically different meaning in different subcultures, especially from the viewpoint of the participation. Weak relation between values and participation in American community may suggest that some generally accepted theoretical models of democratic participation may have not such a strong empirical support as is usually expected. The studies about participation in alternative social systems could be important for construction of theoretical model of meaningful participatory democracy.

The following paper was carried out as a partial study of the broader cross-national project »A. T. E.« dealing with the participation in community. The research was 1965—68. The field-work took place in the winter of 1968—69 and the research is in progress until recently. The national teams have taken part on all stages of projecting and the national institutions have financed the particular national studies. There were selected comparable industrial communities with the population between 5 and 10 thousand. The extensive interview was administered to the random sample of adult population (in Canada to the random sample of families) in St. Helens, Oregon; Bowmanville, Ontario; Trzic, Slovenia; Konjic, Bosnia and Horice, CSSR. Responsible for Canadian and U. S. A. part of the study was R. E. Agger, McMaster University Hamilton, Ontario, for Bosnian V. Sultanovic University of Sarajevo, for Slovenian Ana Cuk-Krajnc, University of Ljubljana and for CSSR the author of this paper.

The study of participation, especially at the community level, is a very old and traditional game in sociology — so old and so traditional that the rules of the game are usually taken for granted. One of those generally accepted rules is the belief that 'interest' is a necessary (and sometimes in the study of democratic political systems, also a sufficient) condition for participation.¹

Comparing aspects of participation in differing social systems, particularly where concepts of 'democracy' differ significantly (as they do between the United States and Czechoslovakia), the student of participation must answer some difficult questions:

- are the concepts 'interest' and 'participation' considered identical in Eastern European communities, as they are in North American ones?

- is it possible to expect that it is one and the same 'mechanism' which leads citizens (in U. S. A. and CSSR) to participate in civic activities?
- are popular expectations about the differences in participations between so-called 'democratic' and 'totalitarian' systems congruent with data about civic participation?

The following analysis attempts to suggest some very partial answers to such questions. At the same time, we are dealing mainly with some of the basic methodological problems of comparative studies.

Looking first at some of our marginals, in Table 1 we find that our data are at least partly reflective of traditional expectations.

The proportion of respondents with any interest averages in each community, three to six times higher than the proportion of respondents with any involvement. The data are basically in agreement with the model describing interest as a necessary condition for participation.

The situation becomes more complex if we look at all five communities in both dimensions. We can see there are substantial differences among the communities between proportions of interested respondents. The differences in proportion of involved respondents are much smaller. Table II compares average percentages of interested and participating respondents computed from responses in all eight areas (24 original items).

The difference between levels of interest and participation is distinctly more substantial in the United States and Bosnian communities, than in the Czechoslovakian and Slovenian samples. The lower degree of correspondence of interest to participation in the United States and Bosnian samples is evident in Table III showing Pearson's correlation coefficients for interest and participation in each of the eight areas.

We find that generally, the highest correlations between interest and participation are in the Czech and Slovene samples, and the lowest, in the United States and Bosnian communities. Correlations for the Canadian sample are mainly in between these two extreme groups.

How then, are we to explain the differences between these two groups of communities — differences which seem to be systematic in character? (Such differences have appeared in other data than are discussed here, from the same study.)

Basically, we can suggest two possibilities, or hypotheses:

- 1) descriptions of levels of interest have different meanings in two groups of communities: the Slovenians and the Czech respondents are more realistic or more conservative in describing their interests.
- 2) in the Slovene and Czech communities there exist better conditions for participation than in the United States and Bosnian communities.

Let us look first at the second hypothesis: it is quite possible to explain responses to some items in this manner. For instance, in the area of participation in the cultural sphere, conditions in the Czech community are far better than in the North American communities for involvement (more live theatre performances per month etc.). Conditions for participation in the cultural sphere are also better in the two Yugoslavian communities (but in both of them) than in the North American ones.

A similar explanation could be offered for the closer relationship between interest and participation, in the Czech community in the area of local politics. The Czech sample has, in this area, equally low percentages of respondents reporting interest and participation. This evidently reflects the fact that the area of local government decisionmaking in the CSSR is, compared with any other countries, much narrower, for example in the areas of educa-

tion and taxation and many others. Decision-making on the local level is a less important part of the citizen's daily life in the CSSR than in other countries.²

This same explanation is not however, applicable to other areas, like that of the local economy or that of urban problems, (involving public services, urban planning, zoning and public housing). In the Czech community interest in these areas is again, relatively low: participation in the local economy is however, higher than in the United States community, and in the area of urban problems, it is higher than in both North American communities.

The application of this hypothesis is not only unsuccessful in other areas than the local political sphere, but also inadequate in explaining the differences between the two Yugoslavian communities where all material, political, and legal conditions for participation in the areas mentioned are similar, with the exception of lower economic standards (lower family income) in the Bosnian community.

If we exclude for the moment, the possibility that differences in the relationship between interest and participation are simply a function of systematic bias in translation of the interview schedule,³ we may, on a preliminary basis, accept our first hypothesis: our Czech and Slovene respondents are more conservative, more skeptical in the subjective evaluation of their interests, than are respondents in other communities.

Our discussion up to this point, has been based on the expectation that interest (or at least expressed interest) is a necessary condition for participation. Have our data supported this expectation? Cannot an analysis of types of civic involvement in at least two dimensions (interest and participation) at the same time help us to a better understanding of differences among the communities?

Agger (1971 pp. 81 — 83) has suggested elsewhere the proper typology for this purpose. This typology, which has been applied by the author of this paper on other items of our comparative study is trying to classify the actor on community scene into one of the four two dimensional types of that what we term »political roles«.

The typology is using 4 types of political roles, based on degree of interest and degree of participation:

Interest	Participation	Role:
high	high	AUTHENTIC PARTICIPANT
low	low	APOLITICAL
high	low	QUASI PARTICIPANT
low	high	PSEUDO PARTICIPANT

First two types are congruent in both dimension. The »authentic« is an »ideal« participant, as the »apolitical« is »ideal« nonparticipant, as so far we are limiting our judgement on strongly reduced space of two dimensions. The other two types are more complicated. The person who has interests but is a »non-participant« we can term »quasi-participant«. Twofold meaning of this category we are discussing later. Most controversial is the last type »pseudo-participant«. Surprisingly we did find in our data the not insignificant proportion of respondents of this type, with low interest but with high participation.⁴ »Such a combination of participation with no interest may be thought of as a kind of routinized, ritualistic, mechanical, coerced, compulsory or »accidental« form of action in civic (or other) human affairs.«⁵

For purposes of the typology, we have dichotomized (on the basis of the median category computed for all five samples together) levels of interest and participation into 'high' and 'low' groups. We are stressing here the fact that the decision concerning dichotomization, and therefore concerning the construction of certain types, is an arbitrary one. The cutting points vary for different areas of community life, interests and participation. We believe that it is possible to do meaningful comparisons of the distributions of types across communities, within a particular area. The same type differs however, across areas, as do the areas themselves differ, and **mechanical** comparison across areas is therefore, impossible.

Table IV provides information about proportions of particular types of participant roles in selected areas of community life.

Our expectations about the incongruent relationships between interest and participation are confirmed here again. We can see in Table V that the same patterns emerge quite distinctly. Table V describes the average proportions of types, computed from data for all six areas in Table IV.

The highest proportion of respondents with low interest scores and high participation scores (pseudo participants) are found in the Czechoslovakian and Slovenian samples. The highest proportions of respondents with high interest levels and low participation levels (quasi participants) are found in the United States and Bosnian samples. The Canadian sample is again, between the two extremes. The proportions of participants (authentic or pseudo) are approximately equal in all five samples. The average proportion of participants is somewhat lower in the United States community than in the others. The same pattern can be seen in the distribution of types over six areas.⁶

Before we accept the data as confirming our expectations, we must discuss one very relevant alternative hypothesis, connected relatively firmly with popular (and sometimes professional) images of Eastern European political systems.

- civic participation in Eastern European countries is mostly compulsory creates the necessary citizens roles, and force participation through a system of sanctions or awards and political pressures: pseudo-participants presumably, reflect this involuntary participation.

We know that this explanation could be at least partly accurate for Czechoslovakia (and partially for certain historical periods and for certain activities, for Yugoslavia too). We know that the kinds of civic activities and the kinds of social sanctions that enforce them as parts of citizens roles, are different in Czechoslovakia applied to different sections of the population, than e. g. in U. S. A. or Canada. But we did not find consistent support for the above hypothesis, as the explanation for majority of our data.

If involuntary participation were the only explanation for the differences between our two groups of communities, then we would find increased proportions of pseudo participants in the Czech and Slovenian samples, and according to the hypothesis, the Bosnian sample as well. We did find somewhat higher percentages of pseudo participants in the Czech and Slovenian samples, but not in the Bosnian community. These higher proportions of pseudo participants would in turn mean that, *ceteris paribus*, the correlations between interest and participation for the Slovenian and Czech samples would be somewhat lower than in the other communities. We found, to the contrary, that in these two communities, the correlations were higher than those for the other samples. The last hypothesis does not then, offer a direct explanation for the lower proportions of quasi participants in the Czech and Slovenian samples.

A second argument against the last hypothesis is that the two Yugoslavian communities fall into different groups according to patterns of relationships between interest and participation. These two communities are at the same time, part of the same country, are governed by the same legislation, have the same type of local government, very similar patterns of daily life and political activities, and comparable structures and conditions for citizen participation. If pseudo participation is simply involuntary, enforced participation, then we must expect that it will be similar in both communities. This is not the case . . . the Slovenian sample is relatively close to the Czech community in patterns of participation and the Bosnian community is seemingly, very much like the community in Oregon.

Let us, for the moment suppose that the Slovenian pattern of participation can be explained by some particular psychological phenomena and that its similarity to the Czech pattern is a coincidence. We can then test the third hypothesis on the Czech sample alone. We know that at the time of heaviest administrative pressure on civic participation in Czechoslovakia (especially in the 1950's and now again) pressure was put mostly on political, ideological, and economic spheres. From Table IV we can see however, that the highest proportion of pseudoparticipants is in the area of culture (measured by levels of involvement in live theatre, music and libraries). At the time of the interviewing, when many of the principles of the Czechoslovakian spring of 1968 were very much alive, to expect involuntary participation would be absurd. On the contrary, not only are the percentages of pseudoparticipants lower in the Czech community, than in the Slovenian community in the areas of local politics and the local economy, but it is also clear that they are only a little higher than in other communities.⁷ On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that high levels of interest and involvement in the area of 'enlightenment' in the Czech community are due partly to a kind of escape into culture at a time of serious crisis. This 'escape' is of course, of a very general nature: culture, especially theatre and literature, became a very powerful tool of ideological struggle as it was more attractive when other, more official political platforms were becoming insensitive to real political problems and emotions. All other data at our disposal for secondary analysis give support to our thesis, since in the past as well, interest and participation in cultural activities in Czech communities, has been extremely high.

As an initial summary, we can say that we have found after analysis of participatory roles, no reason to reject the hypothesis that **differences between patterns of participation are a function of conservative selfevaluations on the parts of Czech and Slovene respondents.**⁸

One set of relevant questions remains open:

- Does this conservative mode of self-evaluation in Czech and Slovenian communities apply only to items dealing with interests, or does it apply to a wider selection of items in the interview schedule?
- Is the tendency toward exaggeration of United States and Bosnian respondents equally limited, or more widely applicable?
- How are these characteristics related to socio-economic status variables?
- How can we explain these differences in self-evaluation?
- What effect have these characteristics on our interpretation of data, and on our understanding of civic participation?

For another part of the same study, we have constructed nine complex indicators (arbitrary scales) including sets of variables selected for their

consistency in factor analysis. For purposes of this analysis, we are using only four of the nine scales.

- 1) Enlightenment Values: constructed with 13 variables, describing respondents levels of educational values, 8 variables describing recreational values and 7 variables describing cultural values.
- 2) Poleconurb Values: constructed with 7 variables describing respondents values in the area of local politics, 5 variables describing values in the area of local economy, and 4 variables describing values relating to urban problems.
- 3) Enlightenment Participation: constructed with 12 variables describing respondents involvement in regular and adult education, 3 variables describing involvement in culture, and 3 variables describing involvement in recreation.
- 4) Poleconurb Participation: constructed with 3 variables describing respondents involvement in local politics, 2 variables describing involvement in the local economy, and 2 variables describing involvement in the area of urban problems, and finally, 8 variables indicating active involvement in influential voluntary organizations (involvement as an official).

For this section of the analysis, we will also make use of a complex variable indicating 'satisfaction':

- 5) Satisfaction: constructed from 4 variables describing the respondent's satisfaction with his civic role, and 4 variables describing satisfaction in private and occupational roles.

If variables describing levels of interest were used even partially in the construction of new value indicators, they would contribute very little to our analysis. It is not likely that they are responsible fully or even partly for the relationship between the first part of this paper and the following section of the analysis.

The data from five indicators were dichotomized as before; in the High group are all those respondents who score as high as or higher than the arithmetic mean computed for the five pooled samples.¹⁰ We must not forget, as we have stressed previously, that our types have been constructed on the basis of arbitrary cutting points, and that mechanical comparison of types across scales is impossible.

Table VI shows that the proportion of respondents with high scores on the Enlightenment Values scale is clearly larger than the proportion of those with high scores on the Enlightenment Participation scale. The largest difference between the two proportions is moreover, in the United States community, as was expected.

The situation is also quite clear in the case of the Poleconurb variables. In all communities except the United States sample, greater proportions of respondents are in the high category on the Poleconurb Participation scale, than on the Poleconurb Values scale. The largest ratio of participation to values, are found in the Slovenian and Czech communities, 2:1 and 1.74:1 respectively. This analysis of new, more complex variables is, with the exception of the exchanged positions of Canadian and Slovenian samples on Enlightenment scales, in agreement with our expectations.

Let us now examine the relationship between values and participation. We shall use, again, the participatory role types. If our expectations about the different meanings of self-evaluation (not only in the area of interest, but also in the broader area of values) in the Slovenian and Czech communities are accurate, then we would expect to find in these two communities, the largest proportions of respondents at the same time in high categories on participation scales and low categories on values scales. In other words, we

would expect to find in these two communities, the largest proportions of pseudoparticipants. In the United States and Bosnian communities, we would then expect to find the highest proportions of quasi participants.

The distribution of participatory types in Tables VII and VIII concurs with our expectations. For the Enlightenment variables. The proportions of **quasi** participants are highest in the United States and Bosnian communities, and lowest in the Czech community. The Canadian and Slovenian communities have changed positions such that in the Canadian sample, the percentage of quasi participants is lower than in the Slovenian sample. The percentages of respondents in the pseudo participant categories for the enlightenment variables are highest in the Czech and Slovenian communities and lowest in the United States (approximately five times lower than in the CSSR) and in Bosnia.

For the Poleconurb variables, the proportions of quasi participants are 1.5 to 3 times lower in the Czech and Slovenian samples than in the other three. The proportions of pseudoparticipants are clearly higher in the Czech and Slovenian communities than in the other three.

If we reject the hypothesis about significantly high proportions of involuntary, enforced participation is used and Slovenian communities we can conclude **that in the Czech and Slovenian communities there are higher proportions than elsewhere of respondents having values coincident with their levels of participation.** We must also note that **in these communities, there are groups of respondents, larger than elsewhere, evaluating their commitments to certain values more modestly than their levels of participation.**¹¹

We now have at least a partial answer to one of our questions. Conservative self-evaluation in the Slovenian and Czech communities is not limited to interest, but applies also to the broader concepts of values, at least in the Enlightenment and Poleconurb areas. This finding is also in agreement with other analyses in our study.¹²

We are now approaching the more complex and difficult questions: what are the meanings and origins of these two distinctly different patterns of relationships between values and participation?

We believe that certain explanations will introduce a new complex variable to our analysis — that of satisfaction. Also this complex variable, described on p. was dishotomized in the same way, like other variables before. The distribution of dichotomized index of satisfaction is described in Table IX.

In this first encounter with the marginal distribution of the complex variable 'satisfaction' we can see nothing to support the hypothesis that levels of satisfaction reflect the same modesty in expression, at least in the case of Slovenian respondents, that we have found in the areas of interests and other values. The Czech sample is as we expected the least satisfied of all, surprisingly the next least satisfied being the Bosnian community. The Slovenian sample, il like the Canadian sample, most satisfied. We have **not** attempted to find any direct or causal relationship between satisfaction and participation and/or values. The correlation coefficients, we have found, are relatively low. (Table X).

We can nevertheless hypothesize a certain relationship between satisfaction and certain styles of life, (which involves the respondent's style of life within the community, as his position in the community). We believe that our participatory role types are at least partly reflective of respondents' positions in the community. We can expect that **authentic participants** with corresponding values and participation levels, will, more than other types, demonstrate similar correspondence in terms of other needs and satisfaction of those needs (perhaps because of their higher levels of education or influ-

ential positions etc.). We can then, expect that the proportion of satisfied respondents will be higher in the authentic participant groups than in other types.

Pseudo participants, or those in the area of 'compulsory' participation, are quite likely also directed and manipulated in other areas. They are powerless and they are aware mostly of this situation. We would therefore, expect a low proportion of satisfied respondents among the pseudo participants.

Similarly, we would expect that **quasi participants** are those who wish to participate and are not able to, and are similarly unable to realize their goals in other areas of civic life. They are, like pseudo participants, powerless, (and at least in our two broad areas, perceived as such) and their powerlessness will be associated with lower rather than higher levels of satisfaction.

The **apolitical** group is seemingly, a type similar to authentic participants in the correspondence of values to participation levels. We do not expect, nor do we believe that there is a causal relationship between satisfaction and participant role type, but that both may be results of a common cause. Respondents with low scores on the values scales and low participation levels are quite likely to be outsiders in other areas as well, and consequently, have no reason to be very satisfied.

We can also expect that as participation is more subjectively important to the respondent, so will the relationship between satisfaction and participant role types, be closer to the scheme we have just described.

The relation between satisfaction and types of participation we shall find in Tables XI and XII.

The proportions of respondents in satisfied and unsatisfied groups differ widely across communities. To facilitate our analysis we have prepared Table XII describing the distribution of satisfied and unsatisfied respondents by participant role types.

We can begin with analysis of those respondents with high scores on both values and participation scales, the **authentic** participants. According to our expectations, the authentic participants should be more satisfied than are other groups. For Enlightenment variables, authentic participants are more often satisfied than not, as can be seen in Table XI. This finding applies to the United States, Canadian and Slovenian samples, but not to the Czech and Bosnian communities. The same pattern can be seen in the Poleconurb variables. For the Bosnian community, the proportion of satisfied respondents is higher in the authentic participant group than in any of the others. In the Czech community, the highest proportion of satisfied respondents is in the pseudo participant group (an important finding, to which we will return in the discussion of pseudo-participants). We must not forget here that the Bosnian and Czech communities have the highest proportions of unsatisfied respondents generally. Table XII is useful here, as we can see that among satisfied respondents, in the area of Enlightenment variables, authentic participants are the largest groups (63% in the Bosnian sample and 58% in the Czech sample) over all five communities. The situation is different for the Poleconurb variables; for the Czech community, the largest group of satisfied respondents are the pseudoparticipants, while authentic participants are in 'second place'. We can conclude that generally, authentic participants are the more satisfied of the four groups. In the area of Enlightenment variables, this same conclusion can be better demonstrated in the Bosnian community than in the Czech sample. The lowest proportion of satisfied authentic participants in the area of Enlightenment variables, is in the Slovenian sample. In the Poleconurb variables, the highest proportion of satisfied authentic participants is in the Bosnian sample. Both of these two have however, high proportions of satisfied pseudo participants.

We can see then, that authentic participants are generally more satisfied than other groups, with the exception of the Czech and Slovenian samples, particularly in the area of Poleconurb variables.

We can now discuss the **pseudoparticipant** group. These are, theoretically, the respondents who participate under some form of pressure and not as a result of their own interests and values. We can expect that such presumably, involuntary and in a sense, enforced participation will be related to lower levels of satisfaction. **We expect that pseudo and quasi participants will be the least satisfied groups. This is true however, only for the United States and Bosnian communities.** In these communities, in which we expected conservative self-evaluation, the Czech and Slovenian communities, and in the Canadian sample as well, relatively large proportions of pseudo participants are 'satisfied'. This is however, in agreement with our previous findings. Pseudo participants in the United States and Bosnian communities, where they are relatively small percentages of the total samples, are generally truly unsatisfied; in the other three communities, **particularly the Czech and Slovenian samples, large parts of the pseudoparticipant groups are in fact authentic participants who have described the levels of their values conservatively.**

The third group, the **quasi participants**, are those respondents with unsatisfied needs to participate and they are expected to be a generally unsatisfied group. We can see that this is clearly the case in three communities, the Czech sample, and surprisingly, the Bosnian sample, and to a lesser extent, the United States sample. In the other two communities, there is a tendency toward dissatisfaction among quasi participants, but the differences are not so startling as in the Czech and Bosnian communities, (ratios of satisfied to unsatisfied respondents range from 1:3 to 1:9). We have never suggested that the relationship between participation and satisfaction is a causal one, nor have we suggested that this is a close relationship (the coefficients of correlation were, before dichotomization under .360 in our 'pessimistic' communities, and lower in other communities). All of our data are supportive of our expectations, but the findings in the Czech and especially in the Bosnian communities are surprising. We will pursue further explanations following analysis of the apolitical group.

Because »**apolitical**« respondents are characterized by low levels of participation and low scores on values scales, there is no reason to expect that they will be unsatisfied. This is, of course, a naive expectation. In our data, no one type is so clearly dissatisfied as this one, and this is not surprising. Respondents who are **deprived** in the area of interest, as in the area of participation, will very probably also be deprived in other areas of life, both public and private, and this is the reason for dissatisfaction. What is more surprising is that the differences between satisfied and unsatisfied respondents are greater in the Bosnian and Czech communities, (ratios of satisfied to unsatisfied respondents or 1:9 and 1:5 respectively) than in other samples. For the Czech community, the explanation is a simple one. We know from our previous analysis that Czech respondents tend to underestimate their interests and values and we can expect that at least **part of the Czech apolitical »group is in reality, quasi participant in nature.**« We also know that in the Czech sample, quasi participants are more often **real** quasi participants than is true a other samples, and they are therefore, more unsatisfied. Why then, did we not find similar results in the Slovenian sample? What explanation can we offer for the distinct dissatisfaction of the Bosnian apolitical group, and especially of Bosnian quasi participants?

First, we offer one unformulated suspicion, that Bosnians, like Americans, simply exaggerate in self-evaluation of their interests and values. The accompanying image of the 'good citizen' role resting on other than real

interests or commitment to values, is that makes the explanation inaccurate for Bosnia. We can now suggest that Bosnian respondents are generally quite realistic in describing their interests and values. We have found considerable support for this in our data: We have mentioned previously that with the exception of a lower standard of living and a somewhat less developed economy, the Bosnian community does not differ from the Slovenian one in terms of conditions for participation. The differences then, between the two communities must have historical and psychological explanations. The Bosnian community is rapidly changing from a poor, exploited agricultural region to a modern more highly educated, self-managed small city, with a very different standard of living than every previously experienced. All areas of participation are still relatively new, unspoiled and very attractive. Conditions which are sufficient for the historically more well-educated, more experienced, industrial society of Slovenia, where participation is not such a novelty, are not sufficient for the Bosnian community. The Bosnians socio-cultural needs are much greater than those of the Slovenians.

A second interesting finding is that if participation did not have a greater impact on satisfaction in the Bosnian and Czech communities than in other countries, then, non-participation in these two communities must be related to much higher percentages or unsatisfied respondents than in other samples. For this moment we let this problem remain open. In summary, we can suggest that:

- Bosnian respondents are mostly quite realistic in self-evaluation of their interests and values, more so in fact, than we had expected: their needs are extraordinarily high and therefore, unsatisfied, particularly, if their participation levels are high and conditions for participation are similar to those in the other communities, if not better than in other communities (especially the North American ones).
- Czechs and Slovenes (and to a lesser extent, Canadians) are reserved and skeptical about their own values and interests.
- Respondents in the United States community are not so modest as other groups. In their self-evaluation of interests and values, we can expect a higher proportion of exaggeration, and self-stylization in their images of the 'good' active citizen participant.

In the vocabulary of our typology, we can expect that types of participatory roles approximate reality in the Bosnian community. In the Czech and Slovenian communities, and to some degree in the Canadian community, it would be necessary to **increase** the proportions of authentic and quasi participants in order to closer approximate reality (not so much in the Slovenian as in the Czech community), and to **lower** the proportions of apolitical and especially of pseudo participants.

For a more realistic description of the United States community it would be necessary to **increase** the proportion of apoliticals (and perhaps also the proportion of pseudo participants) and to **lower** the proportion of authentic and especially of quasi participants.

Up to this point in the analysis, we have worked with total samples for each community. This could very well reduce the accuracy of our analysis, because we know that there is some inconsistency across samples on socio-economic-status variables, particularly that of education (the United States respondents are more highly educated than Czech or Slovenian respondents). We know too, from other analysis of our data that education is one of the most important variables to be considered, as it is strongly related to participation, values, and interests. It could be then, that our findings to

now, are a function of different distributions on the education variable, in the Czech and Slovenian communities.

Table XIII describes the distribution of high values and participation scores in the Enlightenment and Poleconurb variables, according to levels of education.¹³ In order that the table may be more easily and clearly interpreted, we have included the third row of figures, high participation levels as a percentage of high values scores.

We can see that as education levels increase, so do values scores and levels of participation. Participation moreover, increases by **greater percentages** with increases in level of education. **than does strenght of committment to values.** In the area of Enlightenment variables, the disproportion of participation to values, (values scores are generally high here due to cutting points selected) is greatest in the low education group. As education increases, differences become smaller. For the Poleconurb variables, we can see again, there is often a larger percentage of high participation than of high values scale scores. The data follow the same pattern as for Enlightenment — **as level of education increanses, participation levels are higher than values scores.**

Our suggestions about the possibility of different meanings of these values to Czech, Slovane and some Canadian respondents, still hold. **The rations of participation to values are almost always higher in this group of communities than in the United or Bosnian samples, for all levels of education.**¹⁴

Table XIII also provides us with the following information: Level of education has different effects on the participation to values ratio-least in the Czech sample, especially in the area of Enlightenment, and most in the United States (we must exclude Slovenia because of extremely low cell sizes in the Medium-High and High education groups). In the United States sample, we also find the greatest difference in levels of participation between low and high education groups, for both Enlightenment and Poleconurb variables. **Education would appear to be most important for participation in the United States,** and of least importance in the Czech and Canadian communities.

It is interesting to note the proportion of high participation in the five communities: **with only one exception,** (high education, — Poleconurb variables) **the United States cample includes the lowest percentage of high participation of all five communities.** Table XIV can provide us with more complex information about the data, describing the distributions of participatory role types in Enlightenment and Poleconurb areas, according to education levels.

Two of the four types, authentic and apolitical, are quite clearly related to education levels. The incidence of authentic participation increases with education levels, while that of apoliticals decreases as education levels rise. The relationship between education and the remaining two participant types are complex and we will return to these later.

We can now test whether or not the relationship between values and participation in the Czech and Slovenian, and Canadian communities is a function of differing distributions of respondents over levels of education. If the differences between these three communities and the other two are not participation in the Czech and Slovenian, and Canadian communities is a simply a function of level of education, the we can expect to find the **lowest percentage of pseudoparticipants and the highest percentage of quasiparticipants** in the United States and Bosnian communities. This expectation is supported by the data from the United States sample. In the Bosnian community it is important to note that for the Poleconurb variables in the Medium-High education group, there are no pseudo participants or apoliticals.

It would appear that our hypothesis of exaggeration on the part of United States respondents is confirmed and that our data support the hypothesized existence of substantial and unsatisfied needs in the Bosnian community, particularly for the less well-educated groups.

On the basis of these data, we can offer another suggested explanation. We can see in Tables XIII and XIV that education levels polarize respondents in the United States community, more so than in any other community. The dividing point is between medium and Medium-High categories. Since we know that education is a very important variable as part of social status, we can expect that channels to participation in the context of practical daily life, politics and the economy, are more closed to the less well-educated groups than to the highly educated. Our data are in support of this expectation even in comparison with the Canadian community where we could expect an even greater obstacle to participation in the form of traditional British elitism. The more well-educated respondents in the United States community have objectively, greater opportunities for participation than do their less well-educated neighbours. At the same time, the percentage of pseudo participants is not as low in the United States community as in the two highly educated groups in the other communities. For the Enlightenment variables, this percentage is, in the United States, even higher than in other countries. It is quite possible that **respondents in the Medium-High and High categories are that part of the United States sample that exaggerates** — the satisfied quasi participants of Tables X to XII. It may also be that the quasi participants of the two less well-educated groups represent the only respondents with real, unsatisfied needs — similar to the Czech and Bosnian quasi participants.

(We can find partial support for this hypothesis in Table XV. In no other than the United States sample is there such a high percentage of satisfied quasi participants among the two highly educated groups. These differences are not statistically significant.)

The data we have collected in our study does not offer sufficient material for explanation, why the statements of respondents about their values seems to have systematically different meaning in different communities. We can offer here only our understanding to those data.

The conservative, sceptical evaluation of own interests and values with the Czech respondents is not only related with some general traits of national character, but more important is, in our feeling the conflict between very strong democratic tradition of the nation¹⁵ and brutal suppression of most elements of democracy at least for two periods of time in modern history. This conflict has created very effective protective mechanisms like the art of double-talk, the ability to decode the real meaning of official messages but at the same time the apriori scepticism to any ideological declaration. Very strong cultural traditions¹⁶ have helped to minimize the effects of indoctrination, and were one of the reasons of its boomerang effect. We have some reasons to believe that the (in certain periods of time compulsory) indoctrination has increased the ability of political analysis on a very broad strata of the society. The other factor may be the relatively low standards of living, affecting general dissatisfaction and pessimism of the respondents.¹⁷ Next factors seems to be related to the significant changes in social stratification in the last 20 years of the history of the country, documented also in extensive empirical study (Machonin 1969). Also if distribution of power is incomparable with the model of socialistic society,¹⁸ some other components of the status are gradual. That is, in particular clear for income differentiation and partially also for »life style»¹⁹ (what is important from our viewpoint). The inequality in distribution of the power is distinctly **perceived** by the majority of population especially in the society, where the other components of the status are

more consistent than in many other countries. The experience with political democracy, democratic tradition in culture makes the people to this inequality more sensitive. It creates generally pessimistic and skeptical set of attitudes. The mentioned may work also in another way: democratic traditions in culture, nivelization of standards of life, less differences in life style, and in some components of status and the official politic zeroed or many years against intelligentsia has changed the attractivity of some traditional social roles. From all the mentioned reasons we can speak about **dissimulation** of some roles is the role of intelligentsia, the role of good citizens, interesting into the politics etc. From other data from our study not discussed in this paper, we have good reason to believe also in the **simulation** of political cynicisms etc.

According to the traditional expectation we have to predict the lowest participation for this community — where nearly all elements of traditional democracy were minimalized, though we did find a realitively high degree of general participation. We have again not enough data for cohesive empirical explanation and we can suggest some preliminary description of our understanding to that situation. As we mentioned before, we do not believe that the compulsory participation would play any significant role here. More important are other factors. Even when some traditional channels of communal participation has lost its meaning, there were created some **new channels**, giving the relatively broad groups of population to participate at least on the level of the suggestions in the areas which are closed to direct political impact e. g. in U. S. A. or Canada. (Here we are speaking about such areas like local economy, local business and services, housing, transportation etc.) Without any doubt important role belongs to the existence of incompatible good network of **institutions** of cultural and educational participation, that is true also for both our Yugoslavian communities. These institutions were receiving strong governmental **economical support**. This together with nivelization of incomes has minimalized the impact of **economical barriers** of participation. The democratic tradition (especially in culture) and changes in social stratification has diminished the impact of **barriers of status**.²⁰ (This is of course not true for the participation in power). Very important in our feeling is the fact that CSSR is **not yet** in the stage of postindustrial society with more **privatized consumption style of life**. An additional factor we believe is necessary to include into the future analysis: It is possible to suppose, that if participation in some areas is impossible or meaningless — and decisive is here the **perception** of the potential participant — under certain conditions can be **substituted** by participation in different areas. It could be also for the explanation for the generally highest participation of Czech sample in nonutilitarian areas.²¹

For the Bosnian community we did try to explain the pattern »values-Participation« at least partially before. We believe that the high values here are due to the new experience with the culture completely new to the population of the community which was in the past (dating 25 years before) without any kind of democratic experience, economically and culturally, strongly underdeveloped under strong impact of Mohammedan religion. The economical progress of the community in comparison with the zero point of the history after World War II, was tremendous and therefore is strongly perceived. The degree of democracy-described also in traditional terms, is much higher than in the Czech community. All this has increased the attractivity of offered values on the broad scale of the community participation, to such a degree that the offered possibilities (also good in comparison with the rest of the communities) are not to be sufficient. This, in our feeling is the reason of lower correlation between values and participation. The participation in most fields of community life is high here also, in comparison with any of our communities, but really surprisingly higher under the conditions of community

without deeper democratic and cultural traditions. We believe that with exception of strong needs to participate we did just describe is necessarily to find additional explanatory factors. It is not only the good network of channels of participations and institutions and broad economical and social openness of them. We can suppose, that it was just the Yugoslavian system of self-management that has helped to overcome the lack of democratic tradition. We are not stressing the system of self-management on the community level, but we believe that far more important is the **diffusion from self-managerial systems on economical levels of factories etc., what is decisive for creation of democratic patterns** in values and behavior. Again, like in CSSR important role belongs here to the nonexistence of the life style of postindustrial society in this community which has in comparison with other the lowest standards of living.

It is difficult to explain the differences between both our Yugoslavian communities. In Slovenia we found average participation (but still distinctly higher than in U. S. A.) and very low values. How to explain, that values and interests are described here in the same conservative, pessimistic mode like in Czech community? In the contemporary political experience is uncomparably better than in Czech sample the older experience of suppression of civic freedoms in times of the old Austrian monarchy and during the last war is a common denominator. Extremely hard experience of World War II, was the additional school for political scepticism. Slovenia, belonging traditionally to the most industrial parts of Yugoslavia, has much stronger cultural traditions than Bosnia and we can not expect hence the same fascination with the changes in culture, politics and structure of the economy. But the economy is the decisive factor for the explanation of the differences between both Yugoslavian communities. The Slovenia is just experiencing the greatest economic »boom« in its history and we can observe here many elements of cultural patterns of a consumer-society. As the social system differs from those of other post-industrial societies, and since the experience has as yet been of short duration, there has not yet developed the stereotypes of societies more experienced in the conditions of wealth. The seemingly cynical evaluation of less utilitarian values may be just the lack of stereotypes describing the same values in more experienced societies.

Theoretically most confusing and most interesting situation we find in our data from U.S.A. community, where the extreme high scores in »interests« and »values« were related to the surprisingly low participation.

The high scores in attitudinal variables are not the surprise. They were founded in more comparative studies. (Let us mention at least Almond and Verba 1963). The same high scores, U.S.A. community we did find in the majority of indicators in our study measuring attitudes, general personal orientation² etc. Some illustrations are included in the Table XVII. (The data for this table were dichotomized. The cutpoint for dichotomization was computed as the arithmetical mean from all amalgamated samples.)

Less consistent with published literature is our finding about the low level of participation, the lowest in our set of communities in most areas. Especially our findings are in disagreement with popular models describing the classical type of formal western democracy as optimal for participation in the community. It may be that our results are due to the specific situations in our particular community; the design of our research, is, without any doubts very questionable from the viewpoint of the external validity. The other, and in our feeling correct explanation is that the Yugoslavian system is far more democratic than is admitted in North American political science. But this explanation is not sufficient for the high participation in the Czech sample.

But we gladly admit that the low scores are the function of the questions we used; Also in other data from our study, not yet discussed in this paper we find following systematic tendency:

- The U.S.A. sample tends to have a high score (in comparison to the other communities) in most attitudinal variables.
- As is more general the formulation of the question as higher is the the difference in scores in advantage of U.S.A. sample.
- The same is true also for the items related closer to the affective orientation.
- As is more concrete the wording of the question as lower is the difference.
- In the items related to the cognitive orientation and particularly to the behavioral are the scores in the U.S.A. sample tend to be lower than in the other communities.

Partially we can observe it in our Table XVII, where the U.S.A. sample has the high scores nearly on all our scales of general personal orientation. These scales were constructed mostly from items used in social-psychological studies. The last three scales were constructed from more concrete formulated questions, usually attached to the area of the behavior. In these scales, is the American sample in the third through the last position.

More distinctly we can observe this tendency on particular items. In this paper we shall use only one example of attitudes toward changes. Table XVIII describes the distribution of two variables related to the same phenomena changes. The first column »changes needed« is based on the answers on 24 which has been put for 24 areas of community life: »In order to satisfy the needs of the people of this town, do you feel that any of the following areas need important changes?« The data in the second column are based on one of our general personal orientation scales, where we used the items like: »I always prefer to try something new when the opportunity arises.« »I really feel more comfortable when things stay the same rather than change«. The differences in the results are surprisingly high.

Also the analysis of other variables from our study led us to similar conclusions. The confirmation of the pattern we suggested, we did find in the data of at least one other comparative study. Also in Almond and Verbe we can distinctly observe that the position of the U.S.A. sample is the highest in items related to the affective orientation; in cognitive and evaluational similar in items related towards behavior the differences disappear or are replaced by the higher position of one other sample. (Compare e. g. the tables on pages 97, 146, 151, 169, 191, 248 and 256 with the tables on pp. 94, Table 9, 96, 97, 302, 342 and 343).

Hence we can suppose that the conflict between the values and participation reflects at least partially the American reality, and that we can expect at least some degree of generality.

If it really exists systematically the larger gap between values and participation in U.S.A. that in other countries it could be suggested that the necessity of new interpretation of some comparative studies, as more as that most research instruments were traditionally constructed by American scientists and the items used are more often from »ideological« than from the behavioral area. (The understandable ethnocentrism of these scientists is reflected also in the behavioral area. For example the myth about the American supremacy in democratic participation (e. g. Rose 1954, p. 52) is based at least partially on the data about the membership in voluntary organizations. The high numbers of American membership are than usually due to the membership

in such types of organization which are specifically for American society only, as fraternal and also religious organization (Almond and Verba p. 302; Hyman and Whight 1958 and 1971).

We believe, that for purposes of **meaningful** participation is it necessary to analyze carefully the objective of the particular type of participation as the subjective meaning for the particular participant.

The concept of »political culture« (Almond and Verba) could be a useful tool for this purpose; its traditional operationalization can be very dangerous comparison. If the operationalization is done mostly on the level of attitudes (and if our findings about special American relation between attitudes and activities are generalized) than we doubt that high political culture found in U.S.A. is really »supportive of a stable democratic process (Almond and Verba p. vii). Even we believe, that in such a way operationalized »political culture« is closely related to the political naivety, conformity, lack of criticisms, lack of real interests in politics, conservatism toward real changes (all that what is possible to rescribe like the ideology of the »silent majority«.

This all has the common roots like we believe — with the exaggeration of description of values in our sample: the happy nation living for generations without any dangerous political crisis, powerful nation its sovereignty was never in history endangered from outside, the nation with the highest standard of living and longest history of formal democracy in the world easily can accept very naive evaluation of political values.

But why the participation is under this condition so low in comparison with other communities. Whatever is our definition of democracy we must admit that in U.S.A. exist some important channels of participation not existing in any of our European communities, as e. g. the possibility to create new voluntary organization etc. Why these channels did not have stronger positive impact on participation? One of the reasons is unofficially **economical closeness** of some of these channels. In the crosstabulation of participation with education, income and occupation we found the highest differences just in our U.S.A. community. This suggested also the certain social closeness of some kinds of participation. The additional factor may be the **nonexistence** of some publically sponsored institutions of cultural participation, existing broadly in our European communities. At last but not least we must expect in the oldest postindustrial society strong patterns of life style of consum-society, draining the activities from public to the private areas.

Very few we are able to suggest for the explanation of patterns of values and participation in Canadian community. In this stage of analysis we are not yet able to eliminate the effect of the different sampling. (The sample was drawn here from the population of families, not individuals and we have the strong overrepresentation of male heads of families. We are afraid that this has unproportionally increased the level of participation). Preliminary we can suggest that basically American model is moderated here by following factors: The Canadian society is not yet so rich, not yet completely attached to the patterns of life style of consumsociety. British traditions and strong immigration (in our community is strong Dutch minority) has brought more European modesty into the description of values. As far as we can believe to our data, the impact of education on participation is much weaker than in U.S.A. and also the commercialization is not yet so strong. Also the public support to some cultural and educational institution is little bit stronger than in American community. We believe that also after the correction for different sampling we will find here the higher participation.

The goal of this paper was not any empirical proof about the relations between values and participation, also not for the microcosmos of our five

communities. Rather we wanted to use the collected data and mainly our understanding to those data for the consideration of alternative potential ways for the future survey in this area. We sincerely believe that this paper has opened more questions than it was able to answer. We also believe that the research in this area is important though, if for the slight hope, that the better knowledge could help the »not yet participatory democracy« in something really meaningful.

SUMMARY

The values the respondents are assigning to certain areas are corresponding to the participation in the same area in different degree. This difference between values and participation looks to have the systematic character: e. g. in Czech and in Slovenian community the respondents are describing the values very conservatively and in the U.S.A. community are extremely high scores related with very low participation. Similar high scores in U.S.A. sample we find also in the majority of items dealing with attitudes in our study. The supremacy of these scores was as higher, as more general was the wording of the question, and as closer was the item related to the »affective« orientation. As more concrete was the wording, as more closer was the item to the »cognitive orientation« as were the differences in comparison to the other communities lower; in items attached to the behavioral area we usually find higher scores in other communities. Similar tendencies we did find also in the data from the sooner published comparative study.

Except of notorically known necessity of caution in comparison on the attitudinal level, these findings are suggesting also the caution in application of the concept of »political culture« (in traditional operationalization) for comparative studies. They are also questioning the function ascribed to this concept in the model of democratic society.

The participation measured for the main formal channels of the community life did not confirm expected higher participation in communities with traditional democratic system. We believe that for the better understanding to the mechanism of the participation will be necessary to study alternative models of democracy, particularly the diffusion of the impact of the self-management from the area of production into the other areas of the participation. We believe also in the usefulness of the study of participation in very undemocratic conditions. From the methodological viewpoint we believe that many difficulties related to the explanation of the process of participation are due to the very narrow conceptualization. It would be very useful for future study include in to the analysis the respondents understanding to the meaning of the participation and to extend strongly the concept of communal participation beyond the formal channels.

FOOTNOTES

1. See e. g. Horton and Hunt as the illustration, how the relation between interests and involvement is interpreted on the level of one of the most popular textbooks. Classical formulation of this relation we can find e. g. in Newcomb p. 288.
2. Field work was carried out in the spring of 1969 . . . we must then, expect that a substantial portion of citizens interest in local politics in the

Czech community was 'drained' to more important areas than the local level, related to the dramatic events of the fall of 1968, and their consequences.

3. The interview schedule was prepared by a team of scholars from all participating countries, originally in English, and then in translation to each of the other national languages, and then, by different translators, into English a second time. This process was repeated with corrections, until there was reached a high degree of correspondence between the original text and the translations.
4. Similar phenomena of ritualistic high participation connected with low degree of interests has described Van Loon 1970, pp. 393-394. We do not agree with the key-role of final interviewing variable« he is (consistently with much of the American literature) ascribing to the concept of »interest«.
5. Agger 1970, p. 81.
6. For purposes of this analysis, we are excluding areas of 'health' and 'social welfare' since the areas so differ in meaning and content between North America and Eastern Europe, that comparison would be virtually useless.
7. We have also constructed similar types of participatory roles for each of 24 items in eight areas of community life, in order to try to explain differences in degrees of interest. We chose different cutting points for dichotomization of levels of interest in the Slovenian and Czech samples, lower cutting points than in other communities. The association between interest and participation is still higher in Slovenia and Czechoslovakia, but differences are less substantial. This analysis gave us a better understanding of the meaning of pseudoparticipation. Pseudoparticipants were more evenly divided among all five communities. We found however, a very interesting concentration of quasiparticipants on certain items, such as sports, live theatre, music and libraries. We believe that there exists a small percentage of real pseudoparticipation which is not just a function of modesty in self-evaluation of interests. After cross-tabulation with socioeconomic-status variables, it appears that part of this real pseudoparticipation may be for example, that of wives attending sports events with their husbands, or mothers bringing library books for children.
8. It is still possible to suggest that respondents in all five communities were equally realistic about their interests, and that Czech and Slovenian respondents in the high interest levels were exaggerating in describing their levels of participation. It could also be suggested that United States and Bosnian respondents with high levels of interest were too modest in describing their levels of participation. The data on participation (measured through simple questions about frequency of participation) are however, closely coincident with all data from the communities that were available to us for secondary analysis.
9. The technique used in scale construction we did describe elsewhere: KRAJNC-DISMAN-AGGER 1972.
10. In the case of Enlightenment values, the mean fell at a point on the continuum adjacent to a category containing a large proportion of the sample. It was necessary therefore, to move the cutting point higher or lower, and we have chosen the latter alternative.
11. This group was also discovered previously, in relation to interest. It has of course, substantially reduced the correlations between interest and

- participation. Without this group, correlation coefficients on page 3 would be substantially higher for the Czech and Slovenian samples and differences, in terms of our hypothesis, would then be much stronger.
12. Slovenian and Czech respondents have also scored lower on items measuring general personal orientations variables, for example, optimism, socialiability, trust etc. These scores were sometimes in very sharp disagreement with the in-field experiences of the research team. (General Personal Orientations variables and pretest results have been discussed elsewhere: Agger, 1970). In some cases, where it is possible to compare self-evaluation with more objective data, we have found relative consistency. We compared respondents' actual incomes with their evaluations of their incomes as compared with others in the community: lower income groups, particularly in the United States sample, tended to overestimate their incomes in comparison with others, while Bosnian, Czech and Slovenian samples tended to underestimate.
 13. Low education complete elementary or less, Medium education some secondary education, Medium-High education complete secondary and High education any post-secondary education.
 14. Some of the inconsistencies in these data may be due to small cell sizes, note asterisks in Tables XIII and XIV.
 15. Not only that Czechoslovakia has belonged among the high democracies in prewar Europe, but the democratic tradition (especially in the culture are much older for instance the culture has very strong democratic traditions in comparison with any of European countries. The revival of Czech national culture in XVIII and XIX century is possible to identify with broad popular movement. The Czech inteligentsia in last hundred years is in its social background related to farmers and blue-collar workers more that in any of middle-European countries etc. See I. A. Blaha (1937).
 16. Some other published studies are suggesting too that the cultural participation in CSSR is relatively very broad for all social strata. Surprisingly broad is interest in broader are of nonutilitarian knowledge. (Hrdy, 1969; Bezovski, 1963; Disman, 1961 and 1966, Vyuziti casu 1961, Machonin 1969).
 17. Additional factors having impact on degree of segmignus is without any doubt the fact that the fieldwork in Czech community have been done in Spring 1969, when some elements of Dubak's period were but most respondents were able to predict early return to the political past.
 18. Machonin pp. 81-167 and Brokl (in Machonin pp. 235-263).
 19. Linhart (in Machonin pp. 211-234)
 20. Also our data about voluntary organization membership and officialship are showing that the SES variables has significantly lower effect on participation in all our three European communities.
 21. In CSSR, there is the relation between income and education weaker than in other communities (at least in minds of our respondents), we did find relatively low participation in adult education connected to the occupation, the participation in general, nonutilitarian adult education was the highest.
 22. Agger-Disman, 1970.

TABLE I

Percentage of respondents with at least the lowest degree of interests and participation.¹

	USA		CANADA		CSSR		SLOVENIA		BOSNIA	
	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part	Int. Part
Education	95	15	80	14	55	16	69	18	85	15
Culture	74	16	74	24	70	37	61	24	88	22
Health	91	15	85	25	60	18	68	17	91	16
Social Welfare	95	11	90	14	47	11	68	17	95	19
Local Politics	91	25	88	22	48	12	67	24	86	30
Local Economy	93	14	91	18	65	16	70	23	95	19
Urban Problems	88	7	87	9	65	15	70	22	94	20
Recreation	89	20	87	33	66	23	60	18	88	29
N =	270		319		267		298		280	

¹ Table I describes responses to three items in each of eight areas of interest in and involvement in community life. The percentages are averages for the three items in each area of respondents reporting any degree of interest or involvement. The used questions: »We would like to know whether you are interested in these . . . matters and if so, how much. How interested are you in . . .« (Answers: »very«, »somewhat«, »only a little«, »not at all«. »We would like to know if you have been involved in any of the following activities during the last year, and if so to what extent were you involved. How often were you involved in . . . (Answers: »about every week«, »about once a month«, »less«, »not involved«.)

TABLE II

Percentages of Respondents Interested, and Participating Averaged for all Eight Areas

Community	% of respondents with any positive degree of interest	% of respondents with any positive degree of participation
USA	89.5	15.4
CANADA	85.2	19.9
CSSR	59.5	18.5
SLOVENIA	66.6	20.4
BOSNIA	90.3	21.3

TABLE III
**Pearsons Correlation Coefficients of Interest and Participation for
 Eight Areas of Community Life.**

	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
Education	.318	.295	.433	.403	.235
Culture	.378	.437	.395	.616	.247
Social Welfare	.240	.235	.556	.335	.237
Health	.194	.334	.456	.416	.185
Local Politics	.309	.325	.513	.547	.434
Local Economy	.184	.195	.321	.510	.153
Urban Problems	.198	.146	.335	.393	.135
Recreation	.259	.371	.497	.571	.296

TABLE IV
**Proportions of Types of Participation in 6 Areas of Community
 Life**

Area and Type	(in % of samples)		CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
	USA %	CANADA %			
Education					
Authentic participant	11	9	8	9	8
Pseudo participant	0	1	7	5	2
Quasi participant	64	48	14	22	59
Apolitical	25	42	73	64	31
	100	100	100	100	100
Culture					
Authentic participant	9	16	19	15	16
Pseudo participant	1	3	16	6	3
Quasi participant	44	36	22	17	61
Apolitical	46	45	43	62	20
	100	100	100	100	100
Local Politics					
Authentic participant	25	18	8	17	25
Pseudo participant	1	2	2	6	2
Quasi participant	57	60	18	21	54
Apolitical	17	20	72	56	19
	100	100	100	100	100
Local Economy					
Authentic participant	9	9	5	11	8
Pseudo participant	1	1	3	6	1
Quasi participant	72	64	18	26	75
Apolitical	18	26	74	57	16
	100	100	100	100	100

Area and Type	(in % of samples)				
	USA %	CANADA %	CSSR %	SLOVENIA %	BOSNIA %
Urban Affairs					
Authentic participant	5	5	6	8	5
Pseudo participant	0	2	4	7	0
Quasi participant	54	52	30	25	72
Apolitical	41	41	60	60	23
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Recreation					
Authentic participant	15	25	18	11	22
Pseudo participant	2	3	5	5	4
Quasi participant	64	48	24	20	51
Apolitical	19	24	53	64	23
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
N =	294	322	268	300	297

TABLE V
Average Proportions of Types, for Six Areas.

Participant Types	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
	%	%	%	%	%
Authentic (high interest, high participation)	12.3	13.7	10.7	11.8	14.0
Pseudo participant (low interest, high participation)	0.8	2.0	6.2	5.8	2.0
Quasi participant (high interest, low participation)	59.2	51.3	21.0	21.8	62.0
Apolitical (low interest, low participation)	27.7	33.0	62.1	60.6	2.20
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
N =	294	322	268	300	297
% respondents high on participation score	13.1	15.7	16.9	17.6	16.0
% respondents high on interest score	71.5	65.0	31.7	33.6	76.0

TABLE VI

**Percentages of Respondents With High Values and Participation
Scale Scores**

	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
High Enlightenment Values	81.5	74.4	68.9	64.2	86.9
High Enlightenment Participation	38.0	50.7	55.2	38.4	49.2
High Enlightenment Participation as % of High Enlightenment Values	46.6	68.1	80.1	59.8	56.6
High Poleconurb Values	59.0	49.0	27.0	22.0	49.0
High Poleconurb Participation	51.0	57.0	47.0	44.0	57.0
High Poleconurb Participation as % of High Poleconurb Values	86.4	116.3	174.0	200.0	116.3
N =	294	322	268	300	297

TABLE VII

**Participatory Types for Enlightenment Variables, as Percentage
of Total Sample**

	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
Apolitical	17	21	19	30	10
Quasi participant	45	28	25	32	43
Pseudo participant	2	5	12	6	3
Authentic participant	36	46	44	32	44
	100	100	100	100	100
N =	294	322	268	300	297

TABLE VIII

**Participatory Types for Poleconurb Variables, as Percentage
of Total Sample**

	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
Apolitical	24	28	43	49	16
Quasi participant	25	15	10	7	24
Pseudo participant	17	23	30	29	11
Authentic	34	34	17	15	49
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100	100	100	100	100
N =	294	322	268	300	297

TABLE IX

**Distribution of Satisfied and Unsatisfied Respondents
as % of Total Sample**

	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
Unsatisfied	56	47	72	47	67
Satisfied	44	53	28	53	33
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100	100	100	100	100
N =	294	322	268	300	297

TABLE X

**Correlation Coefficients for Satisfaction with Values and
(computed before decolonization)**

	USA	CANADA	CSSR	SLOVENIA	BOSNIA
Poleconurb Values	.196	.194	-.011	.141	.246
Poleconurb Participation	.232	.191	.220	.199	.342
Enlightenment Values	.109	.113	-.003	.143	.200
Enlightenment Participation	.169	.157	.222	.124	.206

TABLE XI
Participant Role Types by Satisfaction, for Enlightenment
and Poleconurb Variables (in % of particular type).

	Enlightenment					Poleconurb				
	USA	CAN	CSSR	SLOV	BOS	USA	CAN	CSSR	SLOV	BOS
Apolitical										
Unsatisfied	69	70	84	59	90	63	68	86	57	88
Satisfied	31	30	16	41	10	37	32	14	43	12
Quasi participant	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Unsatisfied	59	46	88	47	76	68	47	90	48	79
Satisfied	41	54	12	53	24	32	53	10	52	21
Pseudo participant	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Unsatisfied	100	20	55	33	67	44	35	55	38	73
Satisfied	0	80	50	67	33	56	65	45	62	27
Authentic	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Unsatisfied	47	40	64	39	54	49	38	59	40	53
Satisfied	53	60	36	61	46	51	62	41	60	47
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE XII
Distribution of Satisfied and Unsatisfied Respondents by Participant
Role Types

	Unsatisfied					Satisfied				
	USA	CAN	CSSR	SLOV	BOS	USA	CAN	CSSR	SLOV	BOS
Enlightenment										
Apolitical	20.0	30.9	22.4	37.3	13.0	12.9	12.4	11.8	23.3	5.1
Quasi Participant	47.3	28.2	31.4	31.0	46.2	42.6	28.1	10.5	32.4	28.6
Pseudo Participant	3.0	1.3	8.3	4.9	3.0	0.8	7.0	19.8	7.0	3.0
Authentic	29.7	39.6	37.9	26.8	37.8	44.2	51.8	57.9	37.2	63.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Poleconurb										
Apolitical	26.7	39.5	51.6	57.6	21.5	20.2	17.6	22.4	40.5	5.1
Quasi Participant	30.2	15.1	12.5	7.1	28.7	17.8	15.3	3.9	7.6	16.4
Pseudo Participant	13.4	17.8	22.4	23.2	11.5	21.0	27.6	47.3	34.8	69.4
Authentic	29.7	27.6	13.5	12.1	38.3	41.0	39.5	26.4	17.1	69.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	165	152	192	142	199	129	170	76	158	98

TABLE XIII

**Values and Participation for Enlightenment and Poleconurb
Variables, by Level of Education**

Level of Education	Enlightenment				Poleconurb			
	L	M	M-H	H	L	M	M-H	H
USA								
% High Values	61	68	94	96	44	60	67	65
% High Participation	14	27	46	67	26	39	60	79
High Participation as % of High Values	23	40	49	70	59	65	89	121
N =	57	60	116	48	57	60	116	48
Canada								
% High Values	65	80	79	86	45	57	40	46
% High Participation	32	58	66	71	42	59	75	75
High Participation as % of High Values	49	73	83	84	93	103	187	163
N =	121	119	35	44	121	119	35	44
Czechoslovakia								
% High Values	49	74	83	89*	26	26	31	33*
% High Participation	39	56	72	77	32	47	64	66
High Participation as % of High Values	79	76	87	87	123	181	206	200
N =	70	117	64	9	70	117	64	9
Level of Education	Enlightenment				Poleconurb			
	L	M	M-H	H	L	M	M-H	H
Slovenia								
% High Values	56	75	100*	100*	19	25	60	60
% High Participation	27	49	100	100	33	56	100	100
High Participation as % of High Values	48	65	100	100	173	224	167	167
N =	171	117	5	5	171	117	5	5
Bosnia								
% High Values	80	92	86*	95	66	78	93	86
% High Participation	30	54	86	68	35	73	100	91
High Participation as % of High Values	38	59	100	72	53	94	107	106
N =	112	138	14	22	112	138	14	22

TABLE XIV

Distribution of Participatory Role Types by Education

Level of Education	Enlightenment				Poleconurb			
	L	M	M-H	H	L	M	M-H	H
United States								
Apolitical	39	30	4	2	46	28	16	6
Quasi Participant	47	43	50	31	28	33	24	15
Pseudo participant	0	2	2	2	10	12	17	29
Authentic	14	25	44	65	16	27	43	50
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	57	60	116	48	57	60	116	48
Canada								
Apolitical	33	14	11	9	40	23	14	20
Quasi participant	35	28	23	20	18	18	11	5
Pseudo participant	2	6	9	5	15	20	46	34
Authentic	30	52	57	66	27	39	29	41
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	121	119	35	44	121	119	35	44
Czechoslovakia								
Apolitical	38	16	8	0*	55	44	27	33
Quasi participant	26	28	20	22	13	9	9	0
Pseudo participant	13	10	9	11	19	30	42	33
Authentic	23	46	63	67	13	17	22	23
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	70	117	64	9*	70	117	64	9*
Slovenia								
Apolitical	38	21	0*	0*	58	38	0*	0*
Quasi participant	35	30	0	0	9*	6*	0	0
Pseudo participant	6	4	0	20	23	37	60	60
Authentic	21	45	100	88	10	19	40	40
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	171	117	5*	5*	171	117	5*	5*
Bosnia								
Apolitical	18	4	7*	5	26	10	0	0
Quasi participant	52	42	7	27	39	17	0	9
Pseudo participant	2	4	7	0	8	12	7	14
Authentic	28	50	79	68	27	61	93	77
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	112	138	14*	22	112	138	14*	22

TABLE XV

Distribution of Quasi Participants, by Education and Satisfaction

Education	Satisfaction	USA	CAN	CSSR	Slovenia	Bosnia
Low	Unsatisfied	67	47	94	52	76
	Satisfied	33	53	6	48	24
	N =	100	100	100	100	100
Medium	Unsatisfied	27	43	18	60	58
	Satisfied	63	48	91	39	74
	N =	37	52	9	61	26
Medium-High	Unsatisfied	100	100	100	100	100
	Satisfied	26	33	33	36	58
	N =	51	63	69	0	100
High	Unsatisfied	49	37	31	0	0
	Satisfied	100	100	100	0	100
	N =	58	8	13	0	1
	Unsatisfied	40	44	100	0	50
	Satisfied	60	56	0	0	50
	N =	100	100	100	0	100
	N =	15	9	2	0	6

TABLE XVII

% with the overaverage scores on scales:

	USA	CAN	SLOV	BOS	ESSR
Optimismus	78	66	20	40	43
Tolerance	79	66	28	31	55
Sociability	61	50	5	34	24
Trusting-Noncynical	74	66	20	41	31
Nonfatalistic	53	41	32	50	56
Soc. Competence	61	61	49	66	55
Mass-Orientation	51	43	16	36	57
Changes Orientation	52	54	23	56	69
*Perceived Influence	58	67	65	51	37
*Satisfaction Index	50	61	62	28	53
*Changes Needed	12	43	36	89	51

*Scales constructed from others than »G. P. O.« Items

TABLE XVIII

% of Respondents with the overaverage scores in »Changes Needed« and Orientation Toward Change«

	»Needed« %	»Orientation«
USA	12	52
CAN	43	54
SLOV	36	23
BOS	89	56
ESSR	51	69

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»CONSUMER« REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS:
»THE STRUCTURE OF REPRESENTATION«

INTRODUCTION

This paper will present a proposal for »consumer« or public representation on the boards of giant national public or private enterprises, especially in large and relatively affluent countries. But the proposal itself can be given adequate consideration only in the light of recent changes in the scope and organization of the consumers movement, its political significance, and the possible functions that consumer representation might serve as a supplement to worker self-management, the desirability of which I take for granted.

Recent developments in the United States have changed the focus of consumerism from the consumption of goods through consumer cooperatives to influencing decisionmaking by government and the major corporations. Some of the problems with which consumer organizations have been concerned recently include automobile safety, the pollution of the environment, the safety and effectiveness of drugs, the nutritional value of breakfast foods, the adequacy of nursing homes for the aged, the usefulness and price of numerous products, from shoes to household appliances (the latter being older concerns), and more broadly with the quality of life itself. Clearly, the consumer has become synonymous with the citizen. Demands have been made for stricter government controls over industry, and for structural changes which would allow consumer or public representation on the boards of major corporations, such as General Motors. The prominent leader of the new-styled consumer movement, Ralph Nader, has become something of a folk hero in spite of — or because of — his spirited attacks on big business, and many would relish seeing him as a presidential or vice-presidential candidate.¹

Robert Dahl is undoubtedly correct in his view that the representation of consumers and other interest groups on the boards of giant firms is much more consistent with American political culture than self-management (see Dahl, 1970: 138). He may also be correct in his view that such interest group representation, arrived at incrementally, »would probably be enough to deflate weak pressures for further change, (so) the idea of self-management would be moribund« (ibid.). But for the time being the only well-known movement in the United States toward democratizing the economy is through pressures for consumer and public representation. As this movement gains greater momentum, the question of worker representation on the boards of corporations will find a more favorable climate. Indeed, Campaign GM, a Nader-related effort directed at General Motors, demanded in 1971 that GM **employees**, as well as auto dealers and purchasers of new cars, as groups, each nominate a candidate for General Motor's board of directors (see Buckhorn, 1972: 117).

SOME EXISTING CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS

There are currently a variety of types of consumer organizations, in terms of their organizational structure, their functions, and their relationship to other organizations. I shall mention some of the more unusual of them briefly, and return later to a system of representation which might permit such organizations to play a role in conjunction with workers' self-management.

1. The essence of the **structure** of the Naderite consumer organization has been, until very recently, small semi-independent groups of project-oriented professionals assisted by a large number of co-opted volunteers, for the most part working out of the central offices. Prominent among the volunteers have been students (especially law students), and retired professionals of all sorts. Law school faculty on leave have also been recruited. The immediate **product** of each project is a competent research report (sometimes a book) on the problem at hand — for example, on tractor safety, on the food and drug industries, or on the Federal Trade Commission. The **strategy** from that point on is to disseminate the information, creating a stir through the mass media if possible; lobbying and encouraging others to lobby; and using legal weapons (suing in the courts) where the government or the corporations are alleged to be in gross violation of the public interest or the law.

2. More decentralized and perhaps more democratically controlled Naderite groups are currently being set up (in the fall of 1972) on numerous university campuses, although one need not be associated with a university to participate. The focus on research into selected problem areas is the same, but the financial base of support is local or regional. For example, the student government of Syracuse University has placed a three dollar assessment on each student for the support of the Syracuse chapter of the Central New York Public Interest Research Group (students may receive a refund only on request). It remains to be seen how decision-making power will be allocated among student governments, the volunteer workers, and the very small paid local staff. Hopefully the volunteers working on the eight projects will determine the basic policies and strategies of the Group. Such research may find a permanent home on university campuses—volunteer professors are already involved, and students may receive course credit for their work, if they wish it.² Whether such institutionalization is advisable, or the circumstances under which it might be, is worthy of discussion.

3. Some »consumers« are not in any obvious relationship to the producers of a product: for example, they simply enjoy visits to national parks or museums—which may be serviced by relatively few employees, and partly by volunteers. This is not in itself exceptional, but there is at least one large voluntary association, in Britain, with decision-making powers over such national resources vested in it by an Act of Parliament. This is 'The National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, which in the 1960's expanded its membership into the hundreds of thousands. The general membership elects half the members of the Trust's council, and half are appointed by various institutes, museums, and societies, and (in a few instances) by officials.³ The National Trust underwent some degree of politicization, with some evidence of internal factionalism, after its influx of members, although the extent of this should not be exaggerated.

4. Consumers may achieve a collective power in decision-making by negotiating a legally-binding contract, as well as by governmental action. In Chicago in the late 1960's, an organization of low income tenants set a precedent by achieving a collective contract with their landlords covering their rents, and the nature of the services with which they were to be provided. The concept

of the collective contract may be loosely applied to the negotiated terms between »consumer« organizations (including trade unions, professional associations, and fraternal orders) and service organizations (such as insurance companies, medical plans, and pharmacies) for favorable rates and coverage of members.

5. American trade unions, universities, mutual investment funds and other organizations have in recent years attempted to influence the major corporations through their sometimes substantial holdings of the stocks of these corporations. Such attempts have been coordinated primarily by Naderite organizations, as in the case of the demand for consumer representation on the board of General Motors (see Buckhorn, 1972: 118). However, many non-profit organizations holding the stock of corporations have voted against Naderite proposals at annual stockholders' meetings.⁴ At any rate, the total holdings of stock of nonprofit organizations in any one major corporation are likely to be too small to enable them to do more than make a fuss at stockholders' meetings. But pressure groups have gained representation for their point of view at stockholder's meetings, and they have been able to campaign for their views concerning the corporations inside some of the nonprofit stockholders — for example, inside some major universities. Such campaigns have been politically significant, partly because they have raised the question of who should be represented on the boards of large corporations.

6. The public might also be represented on the decision-making bodies of national professional associations, for example those related to the health professions. A newspaper of the American Psychological Association reported recently: »In what may turn out to be a precedent setting move, the APA Council of Representatives . . . voted to permit non-APA members to serve on the proposed Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility.«⁵ Such Board members will be chosen by the Association itself — there is no viable public constituency capable of being an electorate, even if the Association were willing to consider it. I shall return to the problem of the electorate shortly.

7. Mention should be made of public advocates and associations of public advocates — in Ralph Nader's term, full-time citizens. Legal aid societies for the indigent have had a long existence in the United States, and for the past few years the federal government has financed community lawyers who could initiate »class action« legal suits for groups or categories of disadvantaged people, as well as engage in the usual legal defense of such individuals. (There has been conservative opposition to the activities of such lawyers, and the funds supporting them may soon be discontinued.) But Ralph Nader has proposed something far more comprehensive, and perhaps unthinkable outside of an affluent and legalistically-oriented country such as the United States: a cadre of 40,000 people with the career role of full-time citizen. He advocates 5,000 public interest lawyers in Washington, D.C., alone to counter the activities of the corporation lawyers operating there — at least one public interest lawyer for every two corporation lawyers. The money would come from government, individual contributions, and large organizations such as trade unions, co-operatives and credit unions.⁶

The concept of the full-time citizen (or even the half-time citizen) is important because, in principle, it allows for a concentration and specialization in problem areas which very few amateurs can afford. If full-time citizens could maintain an adequate relationship to a constituency, some of the problems of democracy in a large, modern country could be alleviated.

PROBLEMS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

There are at least three broad kinds of advantages to having public representatives on the governing boards of large enterprises or industries, as a supplement to worker self-management.

Broader points of view which the workers might overlook or reject would be represented, as would different interests where pollution, public safety, and the nature of the products are concerned. Worker self-management alone can provide no guarantee of an optimum responsiveness to the needs of consumers, even granting a concern for the public interest.

2. Consumer representation may partially substitute for other external controls, especially those exerted directly by government. More specifically, the greater the proportion of consumer/public representatives on the boards of enterprises, the more likely a smaller proportion of government-appointed board members. The smaller the number and influence of government appointees in industrial policy-making positions, the better the chances for avoiding bureaucratic or state socialism. Thus, consumer/public representatives may partially displace the government in integrating the economy and symbolically representing the public.

3. Finally, consumer-public representation would tend to politicize the enterprise or industry internally, and deter a degeneration toward managerial/administrative oligarchy. It may be assumed that many public board members will represent organizations with political orientations and that some organizations may lean toward or even be political parties. Indeed, the entire concept of consumer or public representation on the boards of large enterprises makes little practical sense apart from the assumption of a society with the freedom to organize in the political as well as other spheres.

Let me briefly state a perspective on the dangers of undemocratic degeneration of self-management which politicization might counteract. By calling attention to these dangers, most of them flowing from the isolation, specialization, and hierarchical organization of production in a single enterprise, I am elaborating upon the previous point namely the politicizing value of consumer and public representation.

Democracy within a giant enterprise or industry requires not only the nominal legitimacy, but also the actuality of competition for leadership positions — especially those at the top. It also requires differences of opinion on policy matters capable of interesting a reasonably broad section of the workers, and of thus sustaining a competition between programs and between office-seekers. However, within any specialized and relatively homogeneous segment of society, the issues could easily appear inconsequential.

A depoliticization may also be contributed toward by a heavy emphasis on running the enterprise, with a premium being placed upon management and administration. This would tend to stifle internal politics, and conceivably ultimately the overt politics of the society. (The very term management seems to convey an apolitical orientation, in English at least.) An overemphasis on technical and administrative problems is of course common among modern technocrats and bureaucrats internationally, and there will probably be no simple antidote to this. Some socialists, including democratic socialists, have contributed toward the problem by projecting an image of a rather apolitical, work-oriented socialist society — one in which large political questions would seldom be raised.

A de-emphasis of politics may work to the advantage of technical and administrative personnel as a group, increasing their power and social status relative to that of other workers. This may not be easily noticed, initially, in a supposedly one-class society.

It has been argued that democracy in trade unions oriented primarily toward collective bargaining is usually hindered by the existence of a simple hierarchical structure. Democracy in large membership organizations, as in society, is more likely where there is a complex, articulated structure, and autonomous or semi-autonomous groups mediating between the individual and the leaders (see Lipset *et al.*, 1956: 69-82; Edelstein,⁷ 1967: 20, 31) Perhaps there could be more autonomy in the operation of the local workplace under worker self-management than there is in the operation of the local union, although it is by no means clear that this would be the case in a highly integrated industry. But the number of autonomous membership organizations under a system of self-management might easily be reduced to one — the trade union — and the independence of the union might be compromised by its absorption into the governance process. The **potential** for an active enterprise-wide democracy under self-management seems far greater than in a national trade union which limits itself to bargaining, since under self-management a much higher proportion of workers are likely to become deeply involved, and in a greater variety of ways. Nevertheless, if the penetration of the enterprise by the normal controversies of a democratic society is not facilitated, there is reason to expect a low level of enterprise-wide democracy.

Finally, there are the more obvious points, where obstacles to democracy are concerned, that it is difficult to make ordinary business meetings anything other than dull in most organizations; and that work itself may hold little interest for many workers (see Dahl, 1970: 134 - 136). But controversies over the broader issues which public representation might inject — that is, politicization — would tend to generate wider interest and, occasionally, wider involvement.

THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF »CONSUMER« REPRESENTATIVES

Ralph Nader has advocated that one-quarter of the board members of corporations of a certain size or dominant position in the market be public members, chosen by a national election (New York Times, *op. cit.*), however without suggestions as to how such elections might provide the electorate with meaningful choices. How many such corporations would there be? How many public enterprises and government bureaus? Even if the economy and society were consolidated into a dozen self-managed industries and several governmental agencies, how many single citizens could possibly be informed on the chemical industry, the mining, quarrying and metals industry, the food industry, transportation, etc, or even on just one of these outside their own sphere? The answer is obvious: the public would lack not only the basic technical background, but even knowledge of the issues and in most cases of the candidates.⁸ The most that could reasonably be expected would be for the voters to choose candidates overwhelmingly on the basis of political party or other organizational affiliation. If this were the voters' sole basis for their selections, how could they judge the performance of those elected?

The alternative of the direct selection of public or consumer representatives by consumer and other external membership organizations would usually lack legitimacy: leaving rhetoric aside, such organizations represent at best only their own members,⁹ and often not even these. How then can the public and its interests be represented?

THE PROPOSAL

The proposal for the structure of consumer/public representation on the boards of giant enterprises or industries will be presented in two steps: the nature of the electorate, and the manner of election.

THE CREATION OF A CONSTITUENCY

The essence of the proposal is the **creation** of reasonably well informed sections of the public, each to concentrate on a different enterprise or industry, and each to be representative of the public as a whole, with all of its different and conflicting interests. Each of these sections would then be the electorate — the immediate constituency — for the public representatives on the board of the enterprise or industry assigned to it. The members of each section — the voters — would be representative of the public because they would be chosen by lot (random sampling).

They would be motivated and assisted in becoming familiar with the problems of their assigned enterprise by time off with from regular employment and stipends if necessary, by the accessibility to them of the enterprise, its workers, and related organizations, and by much attention from political and other organizations and the mass media. In short, they would be motivated by resources and ego-involvement. They would receive information ordinarily outside their reach, and become the objects of much lobbying and electioneering. Precisely whom each representative section of the public might elect, and how, I shall deal with shortly.

I am indebted to Robert Dahl for being courageous enough to advocate the selection **by lot** of »advisory councils to every elected official of the giant polyarchy — mayors of large cities, state governors, members of the U.S. House and Senate, and even the president.«¹⁰ He was quite well aware that, as I have discovered, »a proposal to introduce selection by lot will almost certainly strike most readers as bizarre, anachronistic and . . . well, antidemocratic« (1970: 149). Dahl rejected the ideal that legislators should be chosen by lot, and he apparently did not consider the idea that a smaller but representative **electorate** might be chosen by lot.

The selection of a representative smaller electorate by lot is applicable, in principle, under capitalism as well as under worker self management. Picture a member of the American public receiving this telegram:

»You have been selected by computer as a special (non-profit) decision-making shareholder, for the period 1973—1975, in the General Motors Corporation. During this period you, along with 50,000 others, have the right to elect ten of the forty voting members of General Motors' Board of Directors. You will be sent regular reports of the company's situation from the current Directors, the trade unions concerned, various Government regulatory agencies, and such consumer or citizen groups (including the political parties) as may wish to communicate with you.

»In the three months prior to the election of the Board of Directors, there will be a series of one-hour television broadcasts to acquaint you with the issues and the candidates. There will also be a series of meetings within a reasonable travel time of your locality. In addition you may wish to communicate directly with any of the organizations or individuals involved in the operation of supervision of General Motors or in the election. You will be compensated for up to one week's loss of time from work each year, and for incidental expenses according to your location. You will be receiving further information.

»Please consider yourself and the other special decision-making shareholders of General Motors as trustees for the American public.«

Many practical questions might be raised concerning the operation of such a scheme. Should the number of electors be larger or smaller than 50,000? Should the terms as electors be longer, given the time, expense and effort in accumulating relevant background? Should not employees of the enterprise be excluded before the random sample is drawn (no doubt yet, under self management)? Certainly the number of other enterprises with similar elections of boards of directors should be taken into consideration. Whatever the answers, we have discovered another worthwhile objective along the way to politicizing the **internal** affairs of a self-managed enterprise: the education and politicization of a section of the public itself which, after all, may consist of worker self-managers in other enterprises. Thus the politics of public representation may penetrate the enterprise from the bottom of as well as the top.

THE ELECTION OF BOARD MEMBERS

The main considerations in selecting a voting system for our public-in-miniature should be to reflect the electorate's minority as well as majority views on the boards of directors, and to stimulate both voluntary associations, and occasional prominent unaffiliated individuals, to contest the elections. Both of these objectives would be well served by a system of proportional representation, particularly one such as the Hare system (used in the Irish Republic) under which each voter expresses his preferences among the individual candidates, whether or not these appear on the slates of political parties or groups. The possibility should not be excluded of a prominent expert or political figure standing for election, for example a noted scientist with an interest in environmental affairs.

I would expect competition between political parties to play some role, directly or indirectly, in elections for board of directors posts. However the direct role would be reduced to the extent that sections of the public had confidence in consumer organizations and in nonprofit research and technical institutes, including those associated with universities. There is an obvious advantage in a system of election which does not institutionalize representation for such organizations: these organizations would be required to prove their worth, and they would be less likely to become a part of an oligarchical power structure. (Proportional representation under the Hare system would also permit the rejection of some disliked candidates on the slate of a particular organization).

The competitive field for consumerist and public interest organizations might be vastly expanded without their memberships having to be any larger or more representative of the public than they are today; their influence could depend largely upon their support in the election. In addition, their endorsement of candidates for board positions would appear more relevant than in the typical elections of government officials.

On the whole, to paraphrase what Robert Dahl said in defense of his advisory councils drawn by lot, I see no problems that could not be met by the exercise of reasonable foresight before establishing »consumer« representation, and by profiting from later experiences. (1970: 150).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The new consumerism is, at its best, a new concern for the public interest and the quality of life. It could become an asset to self management in industry and government by linking itself structurally to the enterprise in such a way as to compensate for some of the deficiencies of self-management, especially its potential isolation and depoliticization. The public interest could inject itself into each major enterprise and industry, in a political fashion outside the control of government officials, through a system of public board members elected by a representative sample of the public small enough and motivated enough to become a concerned and educated constituency.

But it should be clear that this would have democratic advantages outside the workplace itself. A concern for the work of others as well as one's own, and for the welfare of the society as well as one's self, leads toward a breakdown of the vicious dichotomy between the individual as a still somewhat alienated worker and as a privatized member of a mass society. A meaningful participation of workers in the larger affairs of work **and** non-work could lead to a democratic control over society.

FOOTNOTES

1. A biographer of Nader has stated: »Since 1966, he has been responsible almost entirely through his efforts for the passage of seven major consumer-related laws — the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (1966), Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act (1968), Wholesale Meat Act (1967), Radiation Control Act (1968), Wholesale Poultry Products Act (1967), Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (1969), and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (1970) . . . Since 1966, he has testified before Congress almost forty times . . .« (Buckhorn, 1972: 226).

2. Reported in the **Daily Orange** (Syracuse, September 1, 1972.) Study projects are being planned on topics that include cable television; regional atomic energy plants; urban renewal; consumer credit; and environmental pollution.

3. See the **London Times**, October 7, 1969; Fedden, 1968; and The National Trust, 1968. Some of the organizations represented on the Trust's council include the Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves, the Youth Hostels Association (England and Wales), the Royal Institute of British Architects, the Royal Academy of Arts, and the County Councils Association.

4. For an example, see the June, 1972 **The Participant**, a newsletter published by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association.

5. **APA Monitor**, Jan.-Feb. 1972 (Vol. 3), p. 7. Some other professional organizations have had lay members, but the practice appears to be rare among those based on high-status professionals.

6. See the **New York Times**, January 24, 1971, Section 3, p. 1.

7. This article on democracy in national trade unions suggests aspects of internal formal organization which might promote and sustain electoral competition for top leadership posts, and union democracy in general. Much of it seems applicable to the formal organization of self-management in the large enterprise, but is outside the scope of this paper.

8. Laidler (1968: 714-715) argues that the wide dispersion or casual nature of the consumers of some services makes them »an unfit unit of democratic government.« He also reports an interesting controversy between an advocate of »universally« enrolling the consumers of public utilities in local societies »for the purpose of assisting in the administration of these services« (Leonard Woolf), and opponents who called this compulsory enrollment (Sindey and Beatrice Webb).

9. Dahl (1970: 138-139) has argued that »there is no democratic unit within which consumer representatives (and other external affected interests) . . . could be elected and held accountable. The delegates of the Affected Interests doubtless would all have to be appointed in one way or another by the federal government, by organized interest groups, by professional associations. There would be the ticklish problem of what interests were to be represented and in what proportions . . . « Dahl added that the representatives of external Affected Interests would »hardly be more than an advisory council« if they were in the minority, the implication being that minority representation is in itself something not worth while. Of course my own discussion of public representatives is on the assumption of a meaningful national election and the politicizing affect on the enterprise.

10. Each advisory council would have several hundred members who might meet for a total of several weeks during the year. Service would be mandatory, but economic losses would be compensated for. Council members would serve for one-year, non repeatable terms (149—153).

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ON THE POLITICAL THEORY OF DECENTRALIZED SOCIALISM

The decade of the 1960's witnessed the rapid growth in the number of Americans who, in one way or another, considered themselves democratic socialists. Parallel to this was mounting criticism that this label concealed lack of a convincing vision of an alternative society. The left, these critics argued, was only a »politics of style«, united in criticism of the prevailing social order but without a constructive program.¹ The mass media incorporated this criticism, characterizing the emergent left as a movement of »protest«, a movement **against**, symbolized by the refusal of Mrs. Parks to sit in the back of a Montgomery bus or by the anti-draft slogan, »Not With My Life You Don't!«. To the extent that programmatic demands emerged, these tended to be viewed as »negative« (stopping urban renewal, ending the war) or were variants of liberal demands compatible with capitalism (integration, better welfare benefits, daycare for children). Even within movements of the left, the failure to articulate a positive theory of socialist ends led to a glaring ideological weakness which was translated into inability to come to grips with strategies to achieve such ends.

The theory of socialism is not a frill or unnecessary appendage to the development of the potential of the political left; it is integral to that development. Kenneth Keniston, in his analysis of Vietnam Summer, observed that this ideological failure was central to disaffiliation from the left:

»More important, the inability of the student protest movement to define its own long-range objectives, coupled with its intransigent hostility to ideology and efficient organization, means that ad hoc protests are too rarely linked to the explicit intellectual, political, and social goals that alone can sustain prolonged efforts to change society. Without some shared sustaining vision of the society and world they are working to promote, and frustrated by the enormous obstacles that beset any social reformer, student activists would be likely to return to the library.«²

This conclusion by an academic observer had already been articulated in a 1965 Students for a Democratic Society convention working paper written by Dick Flacks: Rkp. str. 2.

¹ Irving Howe, »New Styles of Leftism«, *Dissent*, Summer 1965. Cf. a similar critique of the French student left (May, 1968) by Stanley Hoffman (book review of »The French Student Uprising, in *The Phoenix*, 2/9/1972, p. 5-10; Boston).

² Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals* (N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968); reprinted in Walter Anderson, ed., *The Age of Protest* (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1969), p. 245.

»Nevertheless, it does seem to me that one of the key problems at the moment is that people lack a sense of priorities, that there is a great deal of inarticulateness; and almost random behavior among students who want to do effective social action, or — the other side of the coin — some few people do have formulated strategies which in the absence of systematic discussion, get imposed on the rest all unnoticed, all unexamined . . .»³

Thus, the failure to articulate a theory of socialist ends has profound organizational and strategic significance. More directly, this failure facilitated the capture of SDS in 1969 by an organization with a well-articulated neo-Marxist ideology. Without clear views of their own, the »old« leadership of SDS crumbled before the onslaught of the Progressive Labor Party or went the way of the Weathermen.

Yet neither the Progressive Labor Party nor the Weathermen, for all their theories of how social transformation might occur, developed an articulate, appealing theory of end. Martin Buber's observation in *Paths in Utopia*, that revolution can only be successful when its vision has been clarified and tested in the years before the revolution, had its counterpart in the skepticism among potential recruits. Not only blue collar workers, but even students commonly doubted the capacity of left movements to construct a desirable socialist society, even were they to gain power. Buber has written, »the hour of revolution is not an hour of begetting but an hour of birth — provided there was a begetting beforehand.« For the left in the 1960's, there was little in the way of »begetting beforehand«, even in terms of socialist theory.

Ironically, though understandably, the vision of a decentralized socialism appropriate to the American situation began to be developed theoretically as the left declined and was eclipsed by liberal forms of politics around Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Nader, John Gardner, or George McGovern. The economic theory of decentralized socialism, dating back to Oskar Lange and beyond, has been developed elsewhere.⁴ Most criticism of this theory has, however, been on various political grounds (the system is said to tend toward elitism, parochialism, stagnation, inequity, re-emergence of capitalism, and the like) and it is the political theory of decentralized socialism that I wish to address in this paper.

While this topic must be approached in an abstract manner, it is possible not only to set forth basic socialist values and the political system which is thought to correspond to these values, but also to anticipate criticisms of the model thus developed and possible defenses against these criticisms. After examining socialist values and political structure briefly, five types of criticism are treated: 1) that decentralized socialism is undesirable; 2) that it has a tendency toward excess power accumulations at one point or another in the system; 3) that it has a tendency toward excess power diffusion; 4) that it inherently has other democratic distortions; or 5) is unstable.

³ Dick Flacks, »Some Problems, Issues, Proposals« (Kewadin, Mich : SDS convention paper, mimeo, 1965); reprinted in Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, *The New Radicals* (N. Y.: Random House, 1966), p. 165.

⁴ See, for example, Cambridge Institute, »Economic Theory of Decentralized Socialism« (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge Institute, Seminar on Decentralized Socialism, mimeo, 1969); Jaroslav Vanek, *The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970).

SOCIALIST VALUES AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

While there are many visions of decentralized socialism, it is not difficult to present a composite. A starting point might be the slogan of the French Revolution, »Liberté, égalité, fraternité,« a slogan which has been taken in both liberal and socialist directions. While the liberal regards freedom as the choice between candidates, between jobs, between schools, advocates of decentralized socialism generally argue that the essence of freedom is inextricably linked to the ability to democratically control not only candidates, but also jobs, schools, and other major areas of choice. In contrast, for liberals discussion of freedom has focussed not on democracy, but on the concept of pluralism.⁵

In terms of equality as a social value, to some extent liberals and socialists differ only in the degree to which each would redistribute the benefits of society. Yet beyond this, the liberal concept of pluralism, containing as it does the concept of the legitimacy of inequality, conditions the liberal to an entirely different perspective on equality as a social goal. Similarly, the liberal's acceptance of capitalism and its attendant inequities also widens the gulf that separates him from the socialist on this score.

Finally, the value of friendship plays a peculiarly important role in the set of fundamental socialist values. Where the liberal, through his commitment to capitalism, is necessarily committed to the dominant social values of that system (profit, competition, and self-interest), the radical socialist sees friendship as a crucial cultural component of his political system. As John Wilson has noted, the predominance of friendship as a social value is not only an end in itself, but is also essential to the weakening of social stratification differentials, which socialists seek in the name of equality.⁶

These basic values suggest certain elementary political principles:

1) the socialist concept of democracy raises the issue of employee self-management (workers' control) on the one hand and of community control on the other.

2) The principle of equality suggests that each person should have as equal influence as possible compared to the others, and that the economic surplus of the society must benefit all. This in turn leads to the proposition that decentralization best facilitates equality of influence, and that political system must redistribute wealth between classes, regions, and by other criteria (such as race, sex).

3) Friendship as a basic social value implies that the political system should operate to end the bias toward profit motivation and toward the political power of owners, managers, and the existence of an upper social class.

These principles reflect the tension between decentralization and equalization, a tension which may be treated in one of two ways: either it is assumed that voluntary agreements among units will result in redistribution, wealthier units conferring benefits on poorer units because of friendship — or one postulates a national state with ultimate power of redistribution. In this essay, it will be assumed that latter course is the basis of political structure, with the

⁵ These points are developed further in G. David Garson, »The Ideology of the New Student Left« in Foster and Long, eds., *Protest!: Student Activism in America* (N. Y.: Morrow, 1970).

⁶ John Wilson, »Towards a Society of Friends: Some Reflections on the Meaning of Democratic Socialism«, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3 No. 4 (Dec. 1970). For an interesting case, see Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: U. Of Chicago Pr., 1963), ch. 4. Blau shows how managerially — introduced competition undermined friendship, employees ceasing to eat together.

former becoming possible only at a later point in the development of socialist culture.⁷

A further implication of these principles is that democratic, self-managing local units — factory councils or neighborhood communes, for example — must be directly related to the political superstructure of the society. More generally, such groups must have direct representation on the bodies of state. This is because the liberal concept of representation (that a person or party in the middle best reflects all, whether a politician, a newscaster, or a college teacher) is rejected in favor of the radical version (that representativeness is achieved through multiple, direct representation).

This principle of direct, democratic representation extends as well to informal affinity groups, such as those based on race, religion, ethnicity, sex, and the like. Thus to political ladders based on labor and territory are added another based on culture.⁸

The concept of decentralization necessitates a rejection of command economy and a heavy emphasis upon the marketplace. The allocation of the economic surplus must be determined as much as possible at the lowest levels. Leaders should be held accountable to constituents, not only locally, but also regionally and nationally. Unlike pluralist fragmentation, decentralization preserves the capacity to act at higher levels when necessary. Rotation in jobs at all levels has been cited as an important way of retarding bureaucratization and elite formation.

THE CHARACTER OF DECENTRALIZED SOCIALIST POLITICS

Socialist political life is to be guided by the general principles of equalizing the distribution of benefits, expanding participation, and enhancing friendship. Beyond this, its goals are to equalize influence, facilitate self-fulfillment, minimize coercion, maximize decentralization, encourage innovation and experimentation, hold leaders accountable, and be effective in social (not narrowly economic) terms.

Socialist political structure will include three types of units: 1) territorial units (the commune/neighborhood, the urban area, the region, and the commonwealth); 2) productive units (work team, workers' council, industry council, commonwealth chamber); 3) special interest units (groups based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, politics, and other specialized interests, each organized at the various levels).

These institutions will be arranged in a democratic hierarchy; each level will be composed partly of direct elected representatives of lower-level groups and partly of representatives elected at large. Higher levels will have the authority to implement decisions, through coercion if necessary, but lower-level units will make most decisions, handle the most resources, and will control the higher levels through group representatives.

The national level will be composed of a unicameral⁹ legislature incorporating territorial, productive, and special interest representatives elected partly at large and partly by lower units. Unicameralism is dictated by the priority given to maximizing accountability and encouraging innovation and change. The legislature may be anticipated to have a high turnover due to compulsory

⁷ An argument for application of the voluntarist solution is contained in Edvard Kardelj, «Economic and Political Relationships in Self-Managing Socialist Society», *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 43 (April-June, 1971), pp. 10—52.

⁸ This principle is elaborated in Arthur Waskow, «The 1990 Draft Constitution» (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, xerox, September 1970).

⁹ On the dangers of multi-cameralism, as in the Yugoslav model see Vojin Handzistevic, «Workers' Democracy and Bureaucracy», *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 45 (October-December, 1971), pp. 23—41.

rotation in office. Among its central function will be the appointment of an economic commission to frame economic referenda, the most important being those on a) the proportion of the economic surplus to be consumed and b) the rate at which equalization is to proceed.

Other functions of the commonwealth or national level will consist in equalizing distribution of benefits between regions, framing national referenda, enforcing compliance with referenda outcomes, supervising national administrative bodies, guaranteeing human rights, pursuing international relations, and acting as a body of appeal from lower units.

Regional functions will include administration and coordination of heavy industry, marketing, and related investment as well as inter-locality and appellate legal administration. Further functions would include provision of technical assistance to localities and the regulation of local tendencies toward elite formation or capitalism.

Local functions will include administration of light industry, distribution of goods and services such as education, welfare, transportation, police, fire, recreation, sanitation, utilities.¹⁰

In the sphere of labor, the management of work will be democratically organized, though prices will be determined by a regional market and wage levels and income differentials and the nature of goods produced will be under the authority of the community board. The workers' councils will control grievances, health and safety standards, methods of introducing new technology, selection of foremen and higher supervisors (with joint workers' council community board selection to the enterprise head, with a veto by each group). Workers will also be organized at commonwealth, regional, and local unions for political purposes, but bargaining will be done on a local level (with the right to strike).

Finally, a metropolitan region will often be formed intermediate between the community and the region through the voluntary confederation of communities. The function of this body would include area-wide transportation, recreation, specialized educational services, and certain wholesaling functions as well as environmental undertakings.

Much more could be written by way of exposition of the political model envisioned by advocates of decentralized socialism, but more than enough has been set forth in this brief summary alone to elicit innumerable plausible objections to the theory. It is to such objections that I now turn.

PROBLEMS IN THE THEORY OF DECENTRALIZED SOCIALISM

Problems Involving the Question of the Desirability of Decentralized Socialism.

First it will be said, workers' control won't work. Since **this has been treated elsewhere¹¹ I will treat it only briefly here.** Critics of decentralized socialism are inclined to cast workers' control as a hoary and utopian nineteenth-century relic, repudiated by Lenin immediately after the Russian Revolution. This view is born of simple ignorance. There is no doubt that workers' control »works«: it has been established in various situations, has operated over long periods, and has proved to increase job satisfaction and productivity.¹² The real question about workers' control is, »Under what circumstances does it

¹⁰ This possible political division of labor is based primarily on New Cities Project, »Prospectus« (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Institute, mimeo, 1970); and Gar Alperovitz, »Notes Towards a Pluralist Commonwealth« (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Institute, xerox, 1971; forthcoming in Gar Alperovitz, *A Long Revolution*).

¹¹ See Gerry Hunnius, Dave Garson, and John Gase, eds., *Workers' Control: Toward Participatory Democracy in the United States and Canada* (N. Y.: Random House, forthcoming Feb. 1973).

¹² See G. David Garson, »The Politics of Workers' Control: A Review Essay«, *Labor History*, forthcoming approx. spring 1973. See also Paul Blumberg, *Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation* (N. Y.: Schocken Books, 1969); Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

operate best?« A reading of the case literature suggests the following favorable conditions: 1) when it is established from below rather than managerially; 2) where it is not a narrow economic function but is part of or linked to self-management in the community; 3) where its functions give workers' a stake in important decisions (in contrast to various »human relations« schemes under capitalism); 4) in enterprises or offices in the public sphere. That is, workers' control »works« now, and it works »best« under conditions found in the political economy of decentralized socialism.

Failing to dismiss the theory as an unworkable anachronism, critics will often back to an attack on the value premises of the socialist vision. Equality, it will be said, is both impossible and undesirable. Equality is unjust because greater effort deserves greater reward, because more responsible position deserves greater reward, because greater sacrifice deserves greater reward, and because a egalitarian society is bland and stultifying. With regard to the question of the impossibility of equality, a debate identified with the contrasting work of Wilbert Moore and Melvin Tumin¹³, is somewhat beside the point. After two decades of debate, two facts are clear: 1) stratification cannot be abolished, but 2) equality may be pressed to a very great degree indeed, and the theoretical limits are indeterminate. The theory of decentralized socialism need not claim complete realization of socialist values; it is sufficient that the feasibility of significant advance toward these values be demonstrable.

R. H. Tawney long ago gave the economic argument for equality, and more recent studies have shown the capacity of socialist organization to make significant strides toward this goal.¹⁴ Frank Parkin has contrasted liberal efforts toward this end:

»The Social Democrats have committed themselves to a political system which gives rights to the dominant class to prevent wherever possible the redistribution of class advantages. This commitment has proved at the expense of traditional socialist goals and principles relating to equality. As we have noted earlier, the efforts of Social Democratic governments to undermine the structure of privileges generated by the market and private property have not been impressive. This long-term stability in the reward structure of capitalist society must be understood, in large part, as a consequence of political pluralism. The experience of Social Democratic government has underlined the fact that the rules of classic democracy do not in fact confer political equality on all... It is, then against this background of chronic and persistent social inequality that we must judge the claims advanced on behalf of pluralist democracy in modern capitalist society.«¹⁵

As Bêteille has noted, the most important forms of inequality are functions or derivatives of the distribution of power.¹⁶ Thus the argument about the possibility of equality is properly deflected into questions of political power to be discussed below.

The related question of the moral desirability of equality is partly a personal and subjective one, but it may be noted that apologists for inequality often argue from insecure philosophic foundations. For example, Bertrand de Jouvenal uses the welfare economics of Pigou and Lerner to argue 1) if, as the latter authors argue, egalitarian redistribution maximizes the sum of individual satisfactions; 2) if equalitarian income structure reflected through

¹³ See Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, »Some Principles of Stratification«, and Melvin Tumin »Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis«, reprinted in Paul Blumberg, ed., *The Impact of Social Class* (N. Y.: Thomas Growell, 1972), chs. 8 and 9.

¹⁴ R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London: Allen and Unwin, 4th ed., 1952); Melvin Tumin, *Social Stratification* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), ch. 12.

¹⁵ Frank Parkin, *Glass, Inequality and Political Order* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1971), pp. 184—5.

¹⁶ A. Bêteille, »The Decline of Social Inequality?«, ch. 18 in A. Bêteille, ed., *Social Inequality* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), p. 369.

the market sacrifices desirable values (such as quality, culture) supported by the wealthy; then 3) state support of such values requires the anti-equalitarian principle of taking away from the forms of satisfaction of the many to support the forms (such as art) desired by the few.¹⁷ Hence, according to de Jouvenal, equalitarian redistribution is either an undesirable attack on quality or rests on self-contradicting principles.

To cite de Jouvenal in support of inequality, however, involves many problems. First, it will be noted that de Jouvenal's critique of welfare economics' justification of equality neither precludes other justifications (such as the subjective value judgment) nor is itself a defense of inequality *per se*. Decentralized socialists neither accept the premise that the market satisfactorily reflects need-satisfactions (cf. the critique of commodity fetishism) nor that the individualist principles of Western welfare economics are valid.¹⁸ While it is certainly true that the forms of social spending under this form of socialism, even though made on a decentralized democratic basis, would affect various groups differentially, de Jouvenal errs in posing the alternatives between capitalist market inequality or an equalitarian State deciding what is good for everyone. Rather, the question in a **democratic** society is 1) whether most people wish to move in the direction of redistribution; 2) whether the forms of social spending to be effected on a democratic decentralized basis would likely be more equalitarian in nature than capitalist distribution of benefits broadly defined; and 3) if the answer to these questions is affirmative, is there a sacrifice in the quality of life, subjectively evaluated, that more than compensates for this gain in equality? De Jouvenal's arguments ignore serious treatment of these questions, instead relying on a straw-man dichotomy long abused by the conservative school of economics from Von Mises to Friedman.¹⁹

In addition to the arguments that workers' control is utopian or that equality is impossible / undesirable, a third critique of decentralized socialism at the level of values is that workers' control is inconsistent with normative property theory. A number of authors have argued that the worker, after all, is only one of many legitimate »stakeholders« in the enterprise, along with consumers, owners, suppliers, the government, etc.²⁰ While socialists have long acknowledged the right of a democratic government to set the basic parameters within which public and private enterprises operate, they have traditionally denied the validity of the moral basis of direct claimants to enterprise power apart from workers and the government.

This argument has been presented in detail by David Ellerman, who has called attention to the following parable.²¹

A man hires an automobile from a rental agent and hires several criminals as employees. They rob a bank and are caught. Both the car rental agent and the criminals plead innocent on the ground that they, as hired help, are not responsible for the product of their work. The judge finds the employer and the hired criminals guilty, but sets the rental agent free.

¹⁷ Bertrand de Jouvenal, »The Ethics of Redistribution«, pp. 6—13 in E. C. Budd, ed., *Inequality and Poverty* (N. Y.: W. W. Norton, 1967).

¹⁸ For example, see Herbert Gintis, »Neo-Classical Welfare Economics and Individual Development«, Occasional Papers of the Union for Radical Political Economics, No. 3, July 1970.

¹⁹ The argument of the Austrian school that systems must choose between centralized planning or pluralist markets is given in: L. von Mises, »Economic Calculation in a Socialist Commonwealth«, in F. A. Hayek, ed., *Collectivist Economic Planning* (London: Routledge, 1935); Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1914); Michael Polanyi, *The Logic of Liberty* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951); and Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), ch. 1.

²⁰ For this argument, see Eric Rhenman, *Industrial Democracy and Industrial Management* (London: Tavistock, 1968; orig. 1964); Ian Clegg, *A New Approach to Industrial Democracy* (London: Blackwell, 1961); Milton Derber, *The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865 — 1965* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois, 1970).

²¹ David Ellerman, »On Capitalism, Socialism, and Laborism« an »Introduction to Normative Property Theory« (Boston: BU, unpub. ms., 1972); D. Ellerman, »The Moral Basis of Workers' Control« in Hunnius et al., *op. cit.* See also P. Blumberg, *Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation* (NY: Schocken, 1969; orig. 1968), ch. 7.

Here Ellerman calls attention to the phenomenon of the capitalist legal system being very clear about assigning responsibility for the product to the workers (including the employer in his capacity as worker, though not in his capacity as employer) when the enterprise output is negative and other parties wish not to take responsibility for it. The capitalist legal system operates on an entirely moral basis, however, when the enterprise product is positive: there workers have **no** right to the product and the owner has **full** responsibility (entirely in his capacity as owner, and not at all in his capacity as one of the essential »employees« in the enterprise). Other claimants, such as the consumer of the service (such as those representing the robbed bank) may be said to have a right to **veto** the decision of the enterprise, but it can hardly be said that they have a moral right to **decide** on what other course of action the workers in the enterprise are to take. The moral right to decide (within parameters set by the government) is the right of workers and not of other »stakeholders«.²²

In addition to criticisms of liberty through workers' control and of the concept of equality, opponents of decentralized socialism have not failed to attack the idea that government can enhance so personal a thing as fraternity or friendship. Indeed, many socialists have accepted this criticism, dropping this line of argument altogether, even though friendship is a key cultural value reinforcing equalitarian social policy. It is perhaps characteristic of our society that studies of aggression far outnumber inquiries into the nature of friendship. Nevertheless, enough suggestive findings exist to indicate the plausibility of relating socialism and friendship.²³

We know, for example, that in pre-capitalist villages marked by peasant ownership and self-management »family and friendship channels of communication and informal group affiliation so completely bridge variations in status as to defy export on social class to draw class lines«,²⁴ in contrast to the stratification patterns of the more capitalist **hacienda** system. Not only can ownership patterns influence friendship patterns, which in turn strongly affect the class nature of society, but it also appears that an equalitarian value system enhances the self-concept of the individual²⁵ and this in turn facilitates friendship.²⁶

²² The philosophic argument for workers' control of the enterprise cannot be extended to support syndicalist control of government, however, although it supports self-management of particular public agencies (such as schools) within the context of legislative determinations and, for that matter, the democratic self-organization of the legislature. Ellerman's argument is divorced from the issue of who should constitute the »workers« in any given organization; hence it is a theory of organizational rights, not of social representation.

Arguments for at least partially basing legislative bodies on worker delegates include 1) counteracting the tendency for higher status candidates to prevail in geographic representation; 2) reinforcing the system of workers' control as the socialist basis of decentralization; and 3) providing needed input to the legislative process in supervision of the economy, its central task.

Arguments against even partial application of syndicalist legislative principles include 1) basing representation on criteria inclusive of all citizens, such as geographic criteria; 2) avoiding tendencies toward private trade-offs among economic interests (»log-rolling«) rather than general policy formation; 3) preserving the principle of »one-man-one-vote«.

Thus, the syndicalist argument points to the need for measures to 1) assure substantial working- and lower-class representation on legislatures, and 2) assure that workers' control machinery would retain enough power and autonomy to motivate workers to participate in it. These needs might be filled by 1) laws (as for Yugoslav workers' councils) requiring a certain proportion of delegates to be workers in direct production; 2) social understandings that workers' councils must retain broad powers in determining grievance settlements, work condition health and safety, election of enterprise officials, and control over some substantial proportion of enterprise surplus.

²³ See John Wilson, »Toward a Society of Friends«, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Charles Loomis et. al., »Social Status and Communication in Costa Rican Rural Communities«, pp. 183—203 in O. E. Leonard and C. P. Loomis, eds., *Readings in Latin American Social Organization and Institutions* (Michigan State College Press, Area Research Center, 1953), p. 187.

²⁵ On the relationship of the value systems of the larger society to self-concept generally, see A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Straus, *Social Psychology* (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 243. On the relation of equality to friendship particularly, see H. Triandis et al., »Social Status as a Determinant of Respect and Friendship Acceptance«, *Sociometry* V. 29, No. 4 (Dec. 1966), p. 403: »The data strikingly support the hypothesis that »friendship acceptance is highest where the difference in the status of the stimulus person and the subject making the response is smallest.«

²⁶ A number of studies bearing on this connection are cited in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (V. I) (Cambridge, Mass Addison-Wesley, 1954), esp. pp. 426—8, 432—5.

Moreover, if community and worker self-management can be presumed to 1) increase the opportunity to interact, and through promotion of an equalitarian culture 2) make hitherto low-valued members of the community seem to have more socially-valued attributes, and 3) increase the similarity of community members at least in terms of socioeconomic status — then it should be noted that these are precisely the conditions most correlated with a high degree of social choice (friendship).²⁷ Moreover, it is known that heightened interaction on the job and in the community, and heightened social participation generally, reduce prejudice.²⁸ Thus the second premise above is not an exhortation but is a likely outcome of transition to a participatory social system.

While the socialist system described in this essay rests primarily on self interest, friendship as a cultural value under decentralized socialism plays an important reinforcing role. Friendship affinity groups have a certain correspondence to workers' control groups.²⁹

Insofar as friendship may be presumed to correlate with cooperative rather than competitive work patterns, productivity is promoted.³⁰ Moreover, groups with high friendship levels have high cohesiveness, in turn leading to greater acceptance of group decisions.³¹ Friendship far from being some sort of variable independent from the sociopolitical process, is intimately bound up in it, especially so in the case of decentralized socialism. Similarly, Kurt Lewin has noted

»On the whole, research in democratic living indicates the deep interdependence of the various aspects of group life, such as ideology, leadership form, power distribution, productivity, and efficiency of the individual and group. It shows that the ideology of a group, the character of its members, and the distribution of power are so closely interwoven that no one of them can be changed without altering the others ...

There are definite indications that democracy is not only practicable, but superior in regard to character development, social relations, and efficiency if it is handled as a true democracy.«³²

The claim of critics of decentralized socialism, that friendship is a personal matter unrelated to social structure in general and a participatory policy in specific, is a claim inconsistent with the general direction of research findings in social psychology.

A fourth line of argument against socialist values (in addition to criticism of freedom through workers' control, equality through redistribution, and friendship through equalization and participation) has been that the equali-

²⁷ Paul Secord and Carl Backman, *Social Psychology* (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1964), nsp. pp. 243—7 («Correlates of Choice Status»). In the opposite vein, on the connection between passivity (non-participation) and loneliness (non-friendship), see Helena Z. Lopata, «Loneliness: Forms and Components», *Social Problems*, V. 17 No. 2 (Fall 1969), pp. 248—262.

²⁸ Richard Curtis, Diane Timbers and Elton Jackson, «Prejudice and Urban Participation», *American Journal of Sociology*, V. 73 No. 2 (Sept. 1967), pp. 235—244. T. F. Pettigrew, «Racially Separate or Together?», *Journal of Social Issues*, V. 25 (1969), pp. 43—69. Marcel Goldschmid, *Black Americans and White Racism* (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 263—4.

²⁹ L. D. Zeleny, «Sociometry of Morale», *American Soc. Review*, V. 4 (1939), pp. 799—808. Zeleny shows friendship levels can be increased by forming classroom groups along affinity lines. For the application in industry, see D. C. Miller and W. H. Form *Industrial Sociology* 2nd Ed. (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 715—723.

³⁰ L. K. Hammond and Morton Goldman, «Competition and Non-competition and Its Relationship to Individual and Group Productivity», *Sociometry*, V. 24 No. 1 (Mr. 1961), pp. 46—60. S. Schacter et al., «An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity», *Human Relations*, V. 4 (1951), pp. 229—38. L. Coch and J. R. French, «Overcoming Resistance to Change», *Human Relations*, V. 1 (1948), pp. 512—32.

³¹ Morton Deutsch and Robert Krauss, *Theories in Social Psychology* (N. Y.: Basic Books, 1965), p. 56.

³² Kurt Lewin, «The Practicality of Democracy», pp. 408—18 in S. H. Britt, ed., *Selected Readings in Social Psychology* (NY: Rinehart and Co., 1950), p. 418.

tarian policies advocated would lead to a drab society of »mass culture« diminishing the quality of life. As has been seen, this criticism is central to de Jovenal, but its foremost popularizer has undoubtedly been Ortega y Gasset. Gasset writes,

»The contemporary State and the mass coincide only in being anonymous. But the mass-man does in fact believe that he is the State, and he will more and more tend to set its machinery working on whatsoever pretext, to crush beneath it any creative minority which disturbs it . . . Society begins to be enslaved, to be unable to live except in the service of the State. The whole of life is bureaucratized.«³³

Here again we find an arbitrary polarization of alternatives between the centralized state, whether fascist or communist, and the pluralist capitalist society. (It is revealing to note how much of conservative political theory rests on this false dichotomy).

While Ortega and other liberal thinkers are essentially correct in their criticism of the cultural effects of extreme state centralism, these views are irrelevant to the discussion of socialism in its decentralized, participatory versions. In fact, socialists of this school insist that it is capitalism that distorts culture through a marketplace form of centralism (television networks, local monopolism in newspaper ownership for example) and elite-oriented forms of cultural subsidies, and, in general, the distortion of culture as refracted through class stratification and the commodity orientation of capitalism is seen as the basis for a critique of capitalism as a civilization, not just as an economic system.³⁴

Even if the socialist critique is not accepted in its entirety, however, strong arguments can still be made against the critics' predictions that decentralized socialism will lead to a bland and stagnant culture. First, decentralization will mean that cultural forms may take on a greater variety of contexts, not only in terms of audiences but also in terms of outlets. Second, participatory organization of media and other cultural organizations will diminish the power of »authorities«, whether rooted in cultural »expertise« or commercial economic position, with attendant greater input and diversity of views. Third, decentralized democratic communal decisions on allocation of cultural fund will transfer decisions from remote bureaucracies to neighborhood and workplace settings; culture as an experience rather than as a commodity becomes, through participation, concretized as a socialist objective. Fourth, social education for and economic facilitation of democratic work cooperatives will enable trade-offs between cultural commitments and economic values now impeded under capitalism.³⁵

The essential argument on this score remains the contention that 1) the development of culture depends upon its enhancement as an experience rather than a commodity; 2) that capitalist economy generates a culture marked by commodity fetishism; 3) that the development of culture is freed from these fetters only by a socioeconomic system that generates a culture oriented

³³ José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (N. Y.: W. W. Norton and Co., 1960; orig. publ. 1930), pp. 120—121.

³⁴ For a general critique of the forms of culture in modern America see Philip Olson, id., *America as a Mass Society* (N. Y.: Free Press, 1963). For a radical critique of capitalism as a civilization, see David Gross, »Toward a Radical Theory of Culture« and Jeremy Shapiro, »Notes on a Radical Theory of Culture«, pp. 1 — 14 and pp. 15 — 24 respectively in *Radical America*, Vol. 2 No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1968); George Lukacs, »Old Culture and New Culture«, pp. 21 — 30 in *Telos*, No. 5 (Spring 1970); and Guy de Bord, *Society of the Spectacle* (Detroit: Black and Red Press, 1970).

³⁵ For example, even under capitalism much of the most original forms of print, drama, and film are undertaken by democratic collectives of artists who form work cooperatives, tailoring their efforts to a limited »market« and in return earning less. Facilitation of such decentralized work cooperatives would seem a natural corollary of basic decentralized socialist principles.

toward self-fulfillment; 4) that this last form of culture requires a socioeconomic system in which citizens are called upon and enabled to actively decide upon their own fate (in contrast to the role of the consumer); 5) and the this system is one marked by decentralized, participatory control of work and community life.

A fifth form of argumentation at the level of values is related to this question of culture and the quality of life. Even if one is personally attracted to workers' control, equality, and goes along with the arguments about the role of friendship and culture under decentralized socialism, one may still argue that not everyone will — and by the very democratic nature of decentralized socialism, minority rights will be trampled, the »tyranny of the majority« will assume dimensions unknown under capitalism.

Certainly in the abstract there is an ineradicable contradiction between democracy and minority veto power (»rights«) which decentralized socialism cannot resolve. Nevertheless, advocates of this system can still argue that minorities will in practice fare better under decentralized socialism than under capitalism. The model of political relations outlined in the previous section suggests some of the reasons for this:

1. Much of the reason for current concern with »minority rights« is simply the liberal's rhetorical way of focussing on material class inequities; much of the basis for this concern will be eliminated by socialist equalization policies.

2. Decentralization to democratic units will give minorities greater control over their own institutions and resources; in fact, decentralized socialism is directly addressed to meeting the central programmatic demand of contemporary minority groups in precisely this way.

3. Direct representation of popular interest aggregations in legislative bodies will give minorities greater representation than exists in contemporary capitalist electoral systems; the presence of many such representatives is likely to lead to a pattern of mutual support (in order to increase the likely support of any given legislator's object in subsequent votes).

While Constitutional guarantees of basic human (minority) rights will occur under decentralized socialism as under capitalism, radicals have long noted that such rights rest on the nature of the prevailing governing culture. Socialists argue that a governing culture oriented toward equality, participation, and friendship is more likely to be supportive of minority status than is one oriented toward nurturance of capitalism through welfare liberalism.

A final argument against decentralized socialism at the level of values is that while »you and I« may desire equalization and participation, »most people« are not interested in either, especially the latter. For example, in discussing European works council experiments, Derek Bok and John Dunlop observe, »As for the workers themselves, they do not seem to have had sufficient interest in participation to insist on their full rights under the law... the American worker has given very little evidence that he cares at all about participating in the running of the business that gives him livelihood.«³⁶ While critics of socialism cite these observations to argue that democratic decentralism would have to be forced on workers and citizens, thereby becoming a parody of democracy, socialists have an altogether different interpretation.

First, it must be noted that, as Bok and Dunlop concede, in socialist situations there is considerably greater interest in worker participation compared to interest in the far-shallower liberal »human relations« experiments.

³⁶ Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, *Labor and the American Community* (N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 344—345.

Thus, for example, a study of auto workers by the author and Michael Mart revealed very little interest in liberal schemes like representation of the union on the company board of directors — although a majority of workers favored a more radical workers' control concept.³⁷ Similarly, in terms of community participation the manipulative aspect of such schemes in a capitalist context must be emphasized:

»In most cities studied to date, in both the case of urban renewal 'citizen participation' ideology and the community action ideology, the target groups do not appear to have benefitted extensively when they did participate, and in many cases gained if they fought the proponent bureaucracy and rejected their ideology, as one power bloc against another.«³⁸

Moreover, even such limited participation experiences can lead to increased activism and decreased isolation and anomie.³⁹ The concept of training for participation is one of proved feasibility,⁴⁰ resting on studies which show that differences in participation levels between workers and managers disappear when education is controlled for.⁴¹

The statement that »People don't want to participate« is a generalization as beside the mark as the statement »People don't want to be controlled«. Participation is a function of facilitating conditions linked to decentralized socialist structure: a normative system rewarding participation, social education and training for democratic action, a social payments system geared to viewing participation as part of work, more substantial decisions made in smaller units. As Carole Pateman argues, participation depends on a sense of efficacy, which, for the worker, depends on »whether his work situation allows him any scope to participate in decision-making.«⁴² Conversely, research suggests that contemporary apathy, and hence the seeming stability of the political system seem »to rest upon the absence of institutionalized channels through which discontent can be effectively expressed.«⁴³ It appears that job conditions which encourage personal contact with work colleagues and stimulate job satisfaction, as socialist work organization does, lead to »acceptance of work experience as a central life value«. identification with one's fellow workers as a class, and greater participation.⁴⁴

The nonparticipative nature of working-class and even middle-class life under capitalism breeds a culture of political withdrawal.⁴⁵ Such belief systems are self-reinforcing, yet even under the present system, as Paul Blumberg argues.

³⁷ G. David Garson, »Automobile Workers and the Radical Dream«, *Politics and Society* (forthcoming, summer or fall, 1972).

³⁸ E. A. Krause, »Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: Citizen Participation«, *Social Problems* V. 16 (Fall 1968), p. 142.

³⁹ L. A. Zurcher, Jr., »Poverty Board: Some Consequences of Maximum Feasible Participation«, *Journal of Social Issues* V. 26 (Summer 1970), pp. 104—5.

participation is one of proved feasibility⁴⁰, resting on studies which show that
⁴⁰ See symposium on »Training for Political Participation«, *Journal of Social Issues* V. 16 No. 4 (1960), pp. 1—84.

⁴¹ C. M. Bonjean, »Mass, Class, and Industrial Community: A Comparative Analysis of Managers, Businessmen and Workers«, *American Journal of Sociology* V. 72 (Sept. 1966), p. 156. R. Hagedorn and S. Labovitz, »Participation in Community Associations by Occupation« *American Sociological Review* V. 33 (April 1968), pp. 272—83, finds education »overwhelmingly« related to participation and the strongest correlate.

⁴² Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 53. Similarly, when the decisions involved are unimportant, participation has little effect. See J. R. F. French et al., »Experiment on Participation in a Norwegian Factory«, *Human Relations*, V. 13 No. 1 (1960), pp. 3 — 19.

⁴³ F. Templeton, »Alienation and Political Participation«, *Public Opinion Quarterly* V. 30 (summer 1966), p. 260.

⁴⁴ W. Spinrad, »Correlates of Trade Union Participation«, *American Sociological Review* V. 25 (April 1960), p. 237.

⁴⁵ Arthur Shostak, *Blue-Collar Life* (N. Y.: Random House, 1969), p. 2.

»The charge of worker apathy to participation is an unfounded assumption, largely refuted by research (reviewed in ch. 5) which indicates that workers are often eager to participate, if given the opportunity, and that job interest, commitment and satisfaction are all generally heightened by the introduction of various forms of participation.«⁴⁶

After citing a number of further studies supporting this conclusion, Blumberg notes that even were this all not true, if apathy were enough of a negative argument, then we should dismantle political democracy as well!

QUESTIONS INVOLVING AN ALLEGED TENDENCY TOWARD ELITISM

Critics of decentralized socialism, failing to demonstrate that the system is impossible or undesirable, may fall back to the lower-order criticism that it inherently tends toward excess power accumulation at some point in the polity, thereby undermining its democratic claims. For example, it may be argued that decentralism will fragment power, not equalize it, leading to the formation of local elites. These local hierarchs in each decentralized jurisdiction will eventually find informal ways to federate and work their interest inconsistent with formal democratic structure.⁴⁷

The argument that community control is tantamount to local elitism is generally cast in terms of contemporary problems in American politics. Community control of schools, for example, is faulted for its tendency to place racist elites in control in Southern, ethnic white, and other school districts. While it is possible to take issue with this line of argument on its own terms (it exaggerates the extent to which absence of community control overcomes local elitism; the benefit of community control in black areas is perceived by blacks to outweigh racism in white community control units; people should be allowed to make their own social mistakes), the more salient point is that the analogy to the politics of decentralized socialism is a poor one at best.

There are a number of aspects to the decentralized socialist model that militate against the alleged tendency toward local elitism. First, contrary to community control examples under present-day capitalism, one is talking about decentralization to democratic local units. The greater importance of decisions handled by these units and the more significant resources at their disposal will lead to greater public attention, competition for office, and accountability. Second, compulsory rotation in political office and guarantees of career lines for incumbents rotated out of office will undercut the possibility of and need for development of vested interest in office as the »property« of the incumbent.

Third, legislative representation of interest / cultural representatives as well as geographic deputies will increase the diversity of democratic representation on central political organs. This democratic control extends to jurisdiction over wage differentials, control of the media, and other political resources which form the basis of local elitism under capitalism. Finally, worker election of supervisors and rotation should prevent development of an inter-community federation of economic notables. Industry associations will become, under socialism, technical support, information exchange, and marketing groups of specialized workers, not societies of company presidents.

⁴⁶ Paul Blumberg, *Industrial Democracy*, op. cit., p. 133. Similar experience in the stratification system rather than independent attitudes seems the chief determinant of political ideology. See Wm. Form and Joan Huber, »Income, Race, and the Ideology of Political Efficacy«, *Univ. of Illinois Bulletin*, V. 69 No 42 (Nov. 1971), p. 68.

⁴⁷ Amitai Etzioni, »The Fallacy of Decentralization«, *The Nation* (Aug. 25, 1969), pp. 145—7; reprinted in T. E. Cook and P. M. Morgan, eds., *Participatory Democracy* (N. Y.: Canfield Press, 1971), p. 6.

This is not to say that some democratic local units may not seek to develop in directions of which other units disapprove. To some extent this is desirable: the greater pluralism and diversity of decentralized socialism compared to capitalism is one of its advantages. Equality does not mean similarity or conformity. Yet the socialist model does not depend upon the good sense of a democratic citizenry to avoid excess, as consideration of the following example suggests.

Community control of industry, even with regionalization of heavier industry, it might be argued, will place some communities in a monopolistic position relative to others or, alternatively, in a monopsonistic position. This is a fundamental criticism since, if true, the political incentive system of decentralized socialism would crumble and society would revert to a modified form of capitalism. Certainly individual communities will be strongly tempted to exploit others through arbitrary price raises on products with an inflexible demand curve not produced by other communities. What forces exist to counteract this possibility under socialism?

The initial consideration relates to strictly economic disincentives to community control monopolism. Regionalization of heavy industry and decentralization of light industry will increase the degree of competitiveness in the market generally, virtually assuring that the maximum monopoly price would be the going price plus transportation cost from the adjacent region. Second, monopolistic pricing would open the community to retaliatory measures, such as economic boycott, by other communities. Moreover, in many cases affected communities could substitute other products in the long run; fear of this erosion of markets would be a strong deterrent to cashing in on short-run possibilities of monopolistic gain.

Further disincentives appear at the political level. Affected communities could seek regional referenda or even national referenda bringing some form of sanction against the monopolistic community. Even within the monopolistic community political opposition might arise because of solidarity of special interest representatives (blacks, consumers, women, etc.) with their counterparts in the affected communities. Also, socialist culture will reject the benign view of »white collar crimes« fostered by capitalism and will view this kind of practice as thoroughly criminal, perhaps inducing would-be monopolistic legislators to act against their own interest and forego short-run benefits. Of these several disincentives, regional competition and referenda at higher levels will be the strongest deterrents to community control monopolism.

The idea of control by higher levels raises objections from the anarchists, who see this facet as undesirable, and from more liberal critics, who believe it to contradict other aspects of the socialist system. Anarchists believe that problems such as community control monopolism can be worked out entirely through voluntary negotiations among decentralized units and, indeed, this ideal has been pursued to considerable lengths in Yugoslav enterprise, Israeli kibbutzim, and the American producers' cooperative movement. While the author views this as a realistic ideal for a later stage in development of socialist culture, the present essay is directed to a model still assuming primary reliance on self-interest as an incentive, not socialist culture.

Liberal critics of socialism argue that it is impossible to have authority at higher levels and control at lower levels. In practice, it is argued, intervention by higher levels will be routinely invoked and the functions of lower levels gradually eroded. Moreover, the enforcement of higher-level referenda decisions will require the development of a federal bureaucracy right down to the community level, parallel to the decentralized democratic structure.

Socialists argue that authority and routine use of power can be separated by level, as illustrated even in contemporary capitalism in limited form, for example in the governance of some universities. Here, democratic departments make most decisions although a higher administrative level retains the power to intervene to implement system-wide policies. Hiring, firing, curriculum content, relations with non-university bodies, admissions and other functions are under control of local bodies who rarely if ever hear from a trustee. This, of course, is a distorted and highly limited example from a socialist viewpoint, but it illustrates that authority and control are separable.

In the decentralized socialist model, the problem is one of whether higher authority will be so routinely invoked that de facto control will reside there rather than at the community and workplace levels. The limited evidence, as from Yugoslavia and Israel, suggests that, if anything, centripetal forces (discussed in the next section) are more problematic than centrifugal forces toward centralisation. There are several reasons why this is so in the socialist model and why community units would be able to handle the broad functions projected without invoking higher authority on a routine basis.

First, the central contemporary reason for invoking higher levels — namely, lack of adequate resources at lower levels — would be drastically alleviated by socialist distribution structure. Control of production, distribution, and a far larger share of tax revenues as the communal level is central to this structure. Second, workers' control and socialist organization would end the class power of the present economic elite, another major contemporary factor in the need of local units to invoke higher authorities under private or state capitalism. Third, socialist education for participation and socialist culture would, in combination with democratic organizations with adequate resources, significantly reinforce the propensity to solve problems at the local level.

It is in local self-interest, moreover, to solve inter-community problems through, inter-community negotiations rather than through resort to higher authority (that is, in its role as authority — in its role as mutually-acceptable arbitrator higher authority is consistent with problem-solving through decentralized negotiations). This self-interest arises because communities would wish to retain maximum power and minimize the de facto functions of higher levels not under their control. Negotiations rather than appeals to higher authorities would be the likely predominant pattern.

For similar reasons, one would expect even inter-community matters adjudicated at higher levels to be administered at the local level, rather than through separate parallel federal and regional enforcement bodies. Precisely to avoid loss of power to such bureaucracies, it is in the interest of communities to accept and enforce higher-level determinations. Communities would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by this. Moreover, socialist culture and lack of federal and regional enforcement bureaucracies would motivate higher authorities to accept this form of administering higher-level decisions. The ultimate power of enforcement also present under capitalism — the threat to establish a higher-level enforcement mechanism and the ultimate threat of armed force — remain, of course, though the incentive system in the socialist model of the polity suggests their use would be quite rare. Even these ultimate checks are consistent with a democratic polity provided the relevant decisions are made through regional or national referenda or legislative bodies.

In addition to the questions of local elitism and separability of authority and control, a third problem related to alleged tendencies of the decen-

tralized socialist model toward elitism concerns the capacity of these legislative bodies. Looking toward the example of Great Britain, political analysts have commonly pointed to the tendency of powers of legislative oversight of administration to accumulate in the executive office, or not to be effectively used at all. The inference is that at all levels, including the local level, the chief executive and not democratic representatives will exercise the greatest degree of »real« control. While this would not be inconsistent with democratic politics, such a tendency would diminish the participatory nature of the socialist model.

With respect to this argument it must be noted first that the primary democratic emphasis in administration under decentralised socialism is through self-management, not through legislative oversight at all. Yet even to the extent that legislative oversight does play a significant role, it may be noted that its eclipse by the executive office is not »inevitable« but is rather a function of definable forces within capitalism and other hierarchical-oriented political cultures. The British model, for example, is hardly analogous to the political forms of decentralized socialism. In the British system, legislators are held in line by the prime minister's dominance over a centralized party. Deviant legislators can be and are punished at the polls for not supporting the prime minister.

The socialist model contains no such weapon usable by a legislature-elected chief executive. With most important distributional and other political questions decided on a decentralized basis, pressure of the strongest sort will exist for political parties, where they do form, to be local-oriented, with regional and national parties being federations of local parties. At the local level, democratic organization of the workplace and neighborhood will further diminish the salience of political parties and increase their multiplicity. Workers' control, rotation in office, community control of resources will greatly diminish the patronage basis of political parties, which, instead, will be forced to cohere primarily on a normative basis. To the extent the political party must rely on normative incentives, a democratic dynamic tends to eclipse and undermine executive dominance of a centralized organization.⁴⁶ This is reinforced in the socialist model of the legislature by following the parliamentary system in making the chief executive elected by the legislative body. This procedure acts in combination with other factors, such as those mentioned above, to prevent the chief executive from deriving power and legitimacy from a separate electoral base co-equal to that of the legislature. (This aspect is discussed further in the following section on questions concerning power diffusion).

A more general, last question raised by critics of decentralized socialism concerning an alleged tendency toward elitism is the well-worn argument of the industrial determinist. According to this philosophy, the rise of managerial elitism is an industrial tendency that transcends all political forms, including socialist forms. The nature of highly complex work assures that only those directly concerned and with specialized training will be able to direct the institutions of the modern era and understand the implications of policy decisions. Voters and political representatives, it is said, are inevitably dependent on such specialists, to whom power tends to accrue.

This is a common criticism of possible reforms in many types of political structures. Its plausibility is undermined, however, when the concept of »managerial elitism« is analysed into its components. The spectre of managerial elitism can take one of three forms:

⁴⁶ Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (N. Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 460-472.

- 1) it may mean that proposed change in structure will not weaken the class alliance of heads of enterprises.
- 2) it may mean that the proposed change, even though ending class alliances, will still allow each enterprise to act as a veto group within its own sphere.
- 3) or it may mean that the proposed change, while avoiding both of the above, will still leave decision-makers dependent upon technocrats for information and hence will open them to professional distortions of one sort or another.

None of these forms of the industrial determinist argument is a substantial criticism of the decentralized socialist model.

The question of whether decentralized socialism would destroy and prevent the reemergence of a class alliance of firm and enterprise heads has already been partially treated in the previous section on community control and local elitism (see pp. 26 ff.). In addition to worker self-management and job rotation mentioned in that connection, several additional factors militate against the rise of such an elite. These factors include 1) decentralization itself will, of course, greatly reduce both incentive and opportunities for managerial class action; 2) worker control of pay differentials, abolition of stock ownership and other non-wage payments to managers, and community oversight of enterprise budgeting will also minimize incentives of the enterprise head for mounting class actions; and 3) equalitarian education, income distribution, estate taxation, day care, etc., will also minimize intergenerational family accumulations of institutional power, a third common basis of elitism under capitalism.⁴⁹

Since the central purpose of a socialist revolution is to overthrow the class system of capitalism, it is not surprising that the first version of managerial determinism is untenable. The second version, emphasizing veto group managerial elitism rather than class action, may seem more compelling to some. In this version it is argued that while the class power of managers may be effectively overcome, the group power of self-managing enterprises as collective entities will be sufficient to thwart democratic determinations at higher levels. Again, this has already been treated partially in the previous section on community control monopolism. While constituting an effective argument against anarchism and syndicalism, given the absence of democratic controls from higher geographic-based political units in these systems, the veto-group argument reduces either to the question of community control monopolism or the question of power diffusion discussed in the following section. That is, can one reasonably expect higher-level authority to retain sufficient power to enforce democratic determinations in a system in which de facto local control constitutes the routine pattern?

Similarly, the third version of the industrial determinist argument — that decision-makers will become dependent on information controlled by managerial specialists — also reduces to similar questions. Veto group elitism and information control elitism are part of the same possible pattern, the former raising formal aspects of power and the latter the informal aspects. On the formal level it is possible to separate authority and control, as discussed earlier. The real question is whether informal processes will undermine the formal division of powers (as between higher and lower levels, between community and workers' councils, between ultimate authority and routine control). For example, will manipulation of information be used to

⁴⁹ On the continuing importance of family in contemporary capitalism, Gabriel Kolko has concluded, «Contrary to common opinion, inherited wealth and large capital accumulations have not been seriously affected by existing tax laws». See *Wealth and Power in America* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1962), p. 43.

obscure issues or mislead decision-makers, leaving the enterprise with de facto ultimate authority as well as routine control? Will community councils be motivated and capable of everseeing the highly policy-laden, technical aspects of enterprise policy? The sweepingly criticism built around an alleged inevitable trend toward managerial elitism reduces to the question of how legislative bodies may oversee complex organizations — problem which also appears under capitalism.

In decentralized socialism the question is not whether enterprises will run their own affairs on a democratic basis, rather than implementing decisions made elsewhere — this pattern is intentional and desired. Rather the question is whether, in those exceptional circumstances when local self-management is abrogated in favor of democratic decisions at a higher level, as with worker councils decisions abrogated by the community council, the higher level will retain the capacity to act effectively.

Effective legislative oversight in non-routine circumstances can be promoted partly through means presently available, such as giving legislators and legislative committees large, expert staffs power to subpoena records and witnesses, and the like. To a more significant extent, however, oversight is enhanced by means brought about by decentralized socialism:

- 1) abolition of private ownership and property rights in the enterprise will allow complete inspection of records by legislators, workers, and the press; legitimation of oversight will be vastly enhanced in socialist political culture.
- 2) democratic organization of the workplace will give the legislature multiple sources of information about the enterprise;
- 3) decentralization will allow independent feedback from similar enterprises in other jurisdictions for legislative comparison and control purposes;
- 4) decentralization will reduce the complexity of many issues;
- 5) direct representation of interest / cultural groups on legislative bodies (discussed in a later section) with funding and access to enterprise information will constitute another self-motivating source of control information for legislative purposes;
- 6) ombudsmen systems will be more effective legislative aids due to changed property laws, socialist education and culture, and increased motivation of legislatures to fund this and other oversight devices.

Keeping in mind that the oversight required is not the staggering burden assumed by state capitalism and central planing, but rather that needed for exceptional situations, the means to legislative oversight seem feasible. The question becomes whether socialist councils will be motivated to meet this potential.

The problem of motivation illustrates the emptiness of the industrial determinist argument; motivation is based on the common grounds of self-interest (reinforced, to be sure, by socialist education and culture). The power of the community council, for example, and the welfare of the community itself depends upon successful oversight of the means of production. Where under capitalism the firm would, as often as not, extract surplus value from the community for export to larger urban centers of finance and trade, under socialism much of the surplus would be distributed within the community. In fact, this surplus rather than taxation, would provide the main funding for the activities of the community council and hence motivation would be of the most direct kind. In this sense, the incentive system of decentralized socialism, while

relying primarily on self-management, also enhances representative government in its essential role. Under decentralized socialism this role is neither planning, as in statist models, nor even detailed policy formation as in the (unfulfilled) model of »responsible« government under capitalist parliamentarism — it is instead determination of those very broad limits beyond which it is thought intolerable to let democratic self-managing units »make their own mistakes«. Decentralized socialism places less burden on legislative oversight while greatly **increasing** the capacity for it. If the standard is not utopian perfection, but rather a significant improvement in democratic practice compared with state or private capitalist parliamentarism, the decentralized socialism seem fully defensible in this regard.

QUESTIONS INVOLVING AN ALLEGED TENDENCY TOWARD FRAGMENTATION

The decentralized socialist model has been criticised not only for alleged tendencies toward power concentrations it was intended to avoid, but also for the opposite tendency toward excess power diffusion. Decentralization, it is said, leads to fragmentation of power, compromise, stalemate, and stagnation. A centralized state and a strong chief executive, long a liberal ideal, are seen as essential vehicles of expression of the democratic will. Without them collective decision is impossible, no one can mobilize enough power to effect change, and democratic forms are rendered meaningless in the reality of failure to overcome fragmentation of power.

In its most elementary form this argument is identical in substance to the problem of local elitism and legislative oversight discussed above. It is based on a confusion between **fragmentation**, in which local power units have both routine control and de facto ultimate authority, and **decentralization**, in which higher levels retain the capacity to effect exceptional democratic decisions made at those levels. In fact, fragmentation of power is a central problem and characteristic of capitalist polities.⁵⁰ The socialist model, in contrast, although relying on decentralized self-management, preserves a democratic hierarchy of decision-making levels with clear mechanisms of accountability. Decentralized self-management will routinely avoid invoking these levels for reasons already cited and others (equalitarian income and services distribution, for example, will reduce the general level of conflict and hence also the necessary degree of legislative oversight; that is, socialism will reduce class conflict), but the structural and motivational basis for higher level decision-making will remain. For stagnation to result, stalemate in the local self-managing enterprise would have to be repeated at communal, regional, and national level legislative bodies. Even then, referenda would enable a majority to express its will in spite of veto groups in a given legislature.

A more complex version of the tendency-to-fragmentation argument concerns politics within legislatures. Without popularly-elected mayors, governors, and presidents (since these would be elected by and accountable to legislative bodies), power will diffuse into the legislative committee system. Citizens will be unable to understand who is or is not blocking a given legislative action; the power of committees, already excessive under capitalism, will grow further in alliance with their respective special interests. In sum, the socialist model will enable »buck-passing« on a vast scale and accountability, a prerequisite of meaningful democracy, will be lost.

⁵⁰ See James Petras, »Ideology and United States Political Scientists«; Shin'ya Ono, »The Limits of Bourgeois Pluralism«; and Todd Gitlin, »Local Pluralism as Theory and Ideology« — all reprinted in Charles McCoy and John Playford, eds., **Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism** (N. Y.: Thomas Crowell Co., 1967), pp. 76 — 145.

Like many others, this criticism arises from concerns prevalent within contemporary, non-socialist politics. The present pressure for strong mayors, governors, and presidents derives from the need to overcome the fragmentation and diffusion of responsibility inherent in the establishment of multiple political bodies, each with their own overlapping functions and own electoral base at each level. Under the decentralized socialist model, in contrast, there is a single decision-making body with ultimate authority over all functions at its level, and which is in turn under the authority of a single, similar higher body. »the buck« cannot be passed between a city council, a mayor, and a school committee as under the present system. Instead, the school would have routine, self-management control and the community council ultimate authority at that level. Again, if the standard is not perfection but rather significant improvement in democratic practice compared to the present system, decentralized socialism seems defensible in this regard as well.

Whether it would be possible to pass »the buck« among committees of the legislative body is a lesser question, resolvable in significant part at the level of rules of legislative procedure: enabling small numbers of legislators to bring a bill to the floor regardless of committee action, requiring open sessions of committee and plenary meetings, requiring votes for the record, access to minutes and records of committees, and the like. It has been difficult at best to effect these reforms under capitalist politics because of the centralization of »important decisions« and the self-interest (economic or political) of legislators in these decisions, causing them to value committee autonomy highly. In the decentralized socialist model, distributive issues which bear most on self-interest would be resolved primarily either within local self-managing units or, if dealt with at the legislative level, would involve broad questions such as the progressivity rate of equalization) redistribution taxes between units. Socialist political economy does not envision the detailed determination of distributive trade-offs between groups as in the state planning or capitalist pluralism/incrementalism models. In this sense the decentralized socialist model has many of the advantages of the conservative model advocated by Milton Friedman, cited earlier, albeit with the crucial difference of decentralization to self-managing units rather than to unregulated, hierarchical private firms and the difference of retaining a gross equalization function for higher political organs.

In addition to structural reforms within legislative bodies and the greatly diminished self-interest in committee autonomy, »buck-passing« among legislative committees is greatly diminished in the socialist model in a number of other ways compared with present capitalist polities:

- 1) Rotation in office will eliminate the seniority basis of committee autonomy, a central feature of excess power diffusion in the present political system.

- 2) Workers' control, direct representation of cultural) interest groups, and other facets of enhancement of participation under decentralized socialism will increase the heterogeneity of legislative bodies and erode the class basis of committee autonomy in the present system.

- 3) Socialist education and training for participation will increase the capacity of citizens to hold their representatives accountable, while at the same time decentralization will give added motivation.

- 4) Representation on a cultural/interest basis as well as a geographic basis in the legislature will mean legislators will have overlapping constituencies; constituents will therefore have, in addition

to usual competition for office (heightened by increased efficacy and socialisation of campaign costs under socialism), multiple sources of feedback from the legislative level.

5) The diminished salience of party, discussed earlier, and the associated increased importance of normative commitment to political groupings will also heighten accountability.

6) In addition, structural reforms within the electoral process (such as government distribution of voting records augmented by commentaries political groupings within the legislature) can heighten accountability.

These and other mechanisms of the decentralized socialist model again suggest the political incentive system implicit in it gravitates toward greater democratic accountability even on a structural and self-interest basis, even before the augmenting effect of socialist culture is considered. As throughout, the plausibility of the model does not depend on the prior creation of a »new socialist man«.⁵¹

QUESTIONS INVOLVING OTHER POSSIBLE DEMOCRATIC DISTORTIONS

Beyond the confusions over industrial determinism, local elitism, and legislative distortions, lie several more substantial criticisms of decentralized socialism. The most important of these concerns the value of democracy which, in our society, is largely equated with representative democracy. Self-management, one may argue, undermines »true« democracy by thwarting the will of democratically-elected legislators and giving power to less representative groups. For example, one may argue that the elected school committee **should exercise** control as well as authority — and that workers' and community councils lack the legitimacy to do so.

While this criticism is often founded on confusion between fragmentation and decentralization, ignoring the democratic functions of higher level, it is nonetheless true that decentralized socialism envisions a sharp reduction in the policy-making powers de facto exercised by higher-level, inclusive representative bodies. Is this therefore undemocratic?

To answer this question, we must ask what criteria are applicable. Radicals have long argued that the formal-descriptive criteria (elections, competition for office, civil liberties) of the behavioralist social scientists were superficial.⁵² Beyond the forms, a democratic system requires 1) that policy outcomes be in general accord with popular desires; 2) that popular desires be made manifest through some mobilization process; 3) that this process hold administrators accountable for effecting policies; and 4) that system facilitate diversity of input into these processes.

While representative democracy meets these criteria in a limited way, severe problems arise. The system of periodic elections is conducive to inter-election apathy, and the nexus between the electorate and the administrator is thin at best. Administrators are remote from the public, whose mobilization is rarely sought save in the superficial process of elections. This form of politics degenerates into what has been called »symbolic action«, a ritualization of democratic process.⁵³ While representative democracy, like the politics

⁵¹ See Wm. Carey, *New Man or No Man* (Bolton, Mass.: New Bearings Press, 1969).

⁵² For a critical review of the behavioralist approach to democracy, see Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

⁵³ Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971).

of decentralized socialism with respect to higher levels of government, sets broad limits on policy beyond which bureaucratic action cannot go with impunity, there is a crucial difference. That difference is that under representative democracy, policy within these very broad limits is within the domain of administrative discretion and interest group pressure, rather than the domain of democratic self-management. That is, **most** of the politics of administration takes place without 1) structural guarantees of concern for popular policy desires, 2) mobilization of democratic discussion and participation, 3) accountability to democratic bodies, or 4) maximum diversity of input. Only in the **exceptional** case is administrative politics directly affected by the processes of representative democracy.

It is for these reasons that one finds duly-elected representative school boards, for example, overseeing educational bureaucracies with minimal democratic relation to the «electorate». As urbanization and the proliferation of government activities has proceeded, concern for bureaucracy has increased — precisely because representative democracy is perceived as highly limited in its relevance. While it seems more democratic to some to elect, say a school board for a whole city — because the «whole electorate democratically participates» — in fact this process is not particularly democratic. It is not sufficiently democratic because the quality of that «participation» is incapable of holding administrators accountable except in extremely broad terms. Hence **most** decisions by «duly-elected» centralized representative bodies and their respective bureaucracies cannot, in any meaningful sense be said to bear democratic legitimation.

This would all be utopian criticism, in reality beside the point, were it not for the fact that a more democratic system is possible. Democratic socialism in its decentralized form does structurally guarantee concern for popular policy desires, mobilize participation, hold administrative heads accountable to democratic bodies, and increase the diversity of input (through direct worker and community representation). Under this system, a far larger domain of the politics of government is directly affected by democratic process than under representative government.

A variant of the argument about possible democratic distortions under such a system concerns the proposal for direct representation of interests such as racial in addition to geographic representation in legislative bodies at various levels. One may argue that the special interest system of representation exaggerates one of the worst features of present politics, and would be arbitrary in nature given the problem of deciding which interests are to be represented and which not. Indeed, this form of interest representation is akin to the fascist model of the corporate state, with delegates representing social centers of power.

Certainly the fascist model and other contemporary schemes, common in advisory bodies under capitalist politics, which select from above favored interests for special political position are undemocratic. But the selection need not be made on a «from above» basis at all. Nor is the idea of multiple representation a problem: even under the present system many citizens elect, for example, both a school committeeman and a mayor, both of whom bargain with each other legitimated by the same electoral base. The citizen's role as a resident of a geographic territory is only one of his roles, and not necessarily the most important in terms of mobilizing him for political activity.

In fact, there are several workable, non-arbitrary mechanisms for selecting special interest/cultural representatives without control «from above». For example, a procedure could be established allowing five percent of those within a political unit to authorize a special interest group's candidate to represent them in the unit's legislative body, a system enabling up to twenty such special representatives. As with democratic union authorization cam-

paigns, one might stipulate that no citizen could authorize more than one special representative. With technological improvements in election machinery, special representatives could be chosen on a wholly democratic, voluntary, non-arbitrary manner as workable as other forms of authorization elections. Nor would this system consolidate power in any section of the legislature, which would not be involved with the selection process at all. These democratically-based interests, needless to say, are in no way equivalent to what is meant by »interest group« pressure on legislators under the prevailing system.

A third criticism having to do with possible democratic distortions concerns referenda. The charge is raised that this, too, is a mechanism popular under fascism. A nation cannot be run like a town meeting; democracy requires dialogue, discussion, and deliberation — not just voting — and this is possible only in small groups or in representative bodies, not in the mass electorate of a referendum.

While technological change has enabled frequent national or regional referenda, this criticism raises serious questions of a political nature. Like the question of tendencies toward centralization, decentralized socialism is an advance over representative democracy to the extent that lower-level units find it possible to solve problems through self-management and inter-unit negotiations rather than resort to higher levels. Only a few questions of a policy nature would filter up, and most of these would be handled in the legislative body. Referenda would be few in number, dealing with matters such as rate of consumption/investment in society, and other basic issues.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the meaningfulness of referenda would be enhanced under the socialist model:

1) governments at all levels, motivated by desire to influence their constituents and by desire to fulfill the normative standards of office under socialist culture, would devote more resources toward promoting discussions;

2) democratic control of the media and abolition of the profit motive would enable the media to serve better as agencies of democratic discussion;

3) similar factors in worker-controlled settings to devote more released time and resources to referenda-oriented discussions;

4) one of the central functions of regional and federal legislative bodies would be the framing and publicising of such referenda; committee and staff interests would be institutionalized in promotion of referenda.

5) special representation on legislatures at all levels will intensify agitation and discussion of referenda issues;

6) socialist education will better prepare citizens for understanding referenda, and the experience of participation in the community and workplace will heighten levels of efficacy and interest.

The role of government in referenda raises the related issue of whether legislative authority over self-managing media, educational, and referenda-related institutions would bias the content of publicity and the type of discussion promoted. One might expect parochial biases to be particularly increased, each community slanting presentations of referenda in its own interest to manipulate voters.

To some extent this is a lower-order criticism, dealing with possible abuses in a democratic system, calling attention to the need for higher levels to sponsor ombudsmen and other devices as democratic controls. In particular terms, however, the tendency toward parochialism would not be as great as might seem without consideration. Among the reasons are 1) publicity on

a given issue would emanate from regional or national agencies as well as from those of the community; 2) given the multiple basis of representation in legislative bodies, it would be difficult for the norm of multiple-sided presentation of issues to be violated; 3) selfmanagement would limit the possibilities of manipulation; 4) many community-worker controlled media would presumably still circulate across political units, adding to diversity of views. Parochialism would be able to overcome these forces only on issues which superceded class-occupational lines, special interests, and political grouping differences — cases in which it is unlikely that biased presentation would be necessary to mobilize solid community support in any event.

A final democratic distortion that is sometimes raised⁵⁴ concerns the speed of decisionmaking. In the fast-changing modern world, it is said, there is often no time for discussion and collective decision. While this criticism has a strong element of validity, those who employ it rarely understand that it is a general problem of all types of decision-making. For example, in a system governed primarily through central planning, urgent decisions suffer in social rationality because large sectors of the planning process must be bypassed due to time constraints. The decision reverts from an inclusive planning apparatus with its feedback mechanisms back to the hands of a small number of decision-makers. Similarly, in a system governed primarily by pluralist bargaining and influence processes, urgent decisions suffer in social rationality because many influences are excluded from the pluralist bargaining process due to time constraints. Again, decision reverts to a small number. So too under participatory democracy urgent decisions must bypass much of that system's intended framework and decision is made by only a subset of decision-makers. Under any system, decisions of an urgent or crisis nature undermine the rationality of the system. Under any system, reversion of decision to a subset of participants must be legitimate in urgent situations — whatever mechanisms of later accountability may be employed. But the problem of urgent decisions is quite different from the question of which decision-making system is to form the social-political basis of society. Moreover, a participatory system inculcates a sense of efficacy and responsibility consistent with flexible, on-the-spot responses to changing circumstances, without resort to feeding information up a hierarchy as in both planning and bargaining models.

THE PROBLEM OF STABILITY

Some have gone along with the preceding case for decentralized socialism, yet concluded that it would be «a knife-edge solution», desirable in itself but inherently unstable. This argument may take two forms, one based on economic interest considerations and the other on political interest.

In economic interest terms, it may be argued that the equalization function of higher levels constitutes too powerful a mandate. Its implementation would generate either the revolt of wealthier units on the one hand, or would emasculate their power and motivation for socialist participation on the other. Like most areas of political theory and practice, this is a matter of striking a balance, similar to the issue of leaving workers' councils with enough power and resources to provide meaningful participation and motivation, yet allow the central decision making structure (the legislatures) to have ultimate authority over social priorities.

Striking the balance becomes a problem of the maximum socially-acceptable rate of taxation, the specific rate being determined by the particularistic

⁵⁴ For example, see Ichak Adizes, *Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style* (N. Y.: The Free Press, 1971).

factors of any given social system. The proportion of surplus extracted from wealthier units would 1) involve a system of progressive taxation; 2) the impact of equalization might be lessened by defining equalization as a range, such as thirty percent either way of the mean; an 3) equalization might proceed over a period of years rather than all at once. While it might be that in a particular society equalization might proceed faster or slower than in some other society, the political forms of decentralized socialism allow the ideal of equality to be approached as much as the culture of that society permits. Moreover, socialist education and culture might over time heighten the permitted level.

A more specific economic argument concerning stability concerns an alleged tendency toward reversion to hierarchic organization. Frank Roosevelt, drawing on work by Daniel Bell and others, has argued that 1) participation is less efficient than hierarchic organization of the firm, hence 2) given reliance on a market, decision by any hierarchic firm to forego participation will face all other firms in that industry with the eventual choice of also foregoing participation in favor of hierarchic efficiency or being driven out of business.⁵⁵ Hence, even if a participatory social system were established, given its inclusion of the market as a central feature it would degenerate toward traditional non-participatory organization.

There are severe problems with steps in this argument. First, participation seems, if anything, to lead to greater efficiency and productivity rather than the reverse. Partly this is reflected in the fact that the empirical evidence cited by Roosevelt is grossly misinterpreted,⁵⁶ and in fact leads to contrary conclusions from those stated by Bell and Roosevelt. Various surveys of available studies have routinely found participation to increase productivity. Blumberg refers to »the almost unanimous evidence on the favorable effects of participation in general and in industrial settings in particular«, noting that contrary findings are »sparse and often inaccurate«.⁵⁷ Pateman concludes, »the evidence shows no obvious, serious impediments to economic efficiency that would call into question the whole idea of industrial democracy.«⁵⁸ Katz and Kahn also support these findings, further noting that hierarchic blockage of rising democratic aspirations (which the authors perceive as a trend in contemporary America) can lead to alienation, conformity, and diffuse ferment — all subversive of efficiency.⁵⁹ Increased interest in limited participation schemes by capitalist managers reflects the problems of hierarchic organization, the incentive system of which works best under conditions of job scar-

⁵⁵ Frank Roosevelt, »Market Socialism: A Humane Economy?« *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. 2 No. 2 (summer 1970), pp. 37—8.

⁵⁶ Uncritically drawing from Daniel Bell's essay on »Work and Its Discontents«, Roosevelt cites a study by Morse and Riemer which he purports to be evidence against the efficiency of participatory system — the only such a case cited (See Nancy Morse and Everett Riemer, »The Experimental Change of a Major Organizational Variable«, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 52 (Jan. 1965), pp. 120—9). A reading of the Morse and Riemer study reveals several clear implications opposite to the interpretation in Bell and Roosevelt: 1) the article starts by citing several studies supporting the hypothesis that participation increases satisfaction and productivity; 2) the Morse-Riemer study involved a special group: non-job oriented (ie, oriented toward marriage rather than continued employment) women clerks; 3) the job environment was one in which production volume was determined from above, hence »increased productivity can only be achieved by outplacement of clerks or by foregoing replacement of clerks who leave;« (p. 121); 4) the democratic groups lacked decisionmaking power over staff size and salary, hence power and motivation in the main area relevant to productivity increase as measured by Morse and Riemer were absent (the democratic groups had power only over recesses, overtime, discipline, and the like); 5) both democratic and hierarchic groups increased in productivity, the latter slightly more so; in addition to experimenter effect in both groups, increase in the hierarchic group reflected a cut in staff size while in the democratic group it reflected increased satisfaction; 6) hence the authors conclude their study supports the superiority of the democratic system, provide it is implemented with a more radical degree of decisionmaking so power and incentives exist relevant to central areas affecting productivity.

⁵⁷ Blumberg, *Industrial Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 129, 131. Chs. 2 and 3 also refute the fallacious interpretation of the Hawthorne studies advanced by Bell and Roosevelt.

⁵⁸ Pateman, *Participation*, op. cit., p. 108.

⁵⁹ Katz and Kahn, *Social Psychology*, op. cit., chs. 12, 14; p. 470.

city. In more prosperous times, its efficiency is brought severely into question — while the evidence for participation being at least as efficient as hierarchy seems demensible.

Second, even if a participatory system is less efficient in some circumstance, a decentralized socialist model is not thrown into a disintegrative tailspin as the critics imply. First, selfmanagement as opposed to voluntarism is a social system with a definite legal structure consistent with socialist values and norms. While the exact nature of decisions in a self-managing local unit is not determined from above, higher jurisdictions do play a significant role. One aspect of this role is acting as a protector of the democratic nature of the system; reversion to hierarchic decisionmaking patterns on a routine basis in a given unit would be illegal and negatively sanctioned. Moreover, apart from this formal aspect, market pressures in favor of exceptional firms which are more hierarchical and more efficient can be equalized through taxation and subsidy arrangements.

So many factors affect efficiency other than the degree of hierarchy or democracy that in any given industry there will be a range of firms with varying relative efficiencies, a range with little correlation to the degree of hierarchic organization. This is particularly so since self-management seems to reinforce a significant number of factors affecting productivity: receptivity to change, rate of innovation, flexibility of routine operations, motivation, team — rather than job — description orientation to the work group, etc. In the exceptional circumstance of a more hierarchic, more efficient firm whose competitive effect subversive of self-management in other firms cannot be equalized through state economic policy and whose illegal organization cannot be overthrown, in this unusual circumstance the self-managing firm can still choose to increase its relative productivity through emphasis on one of the many relevant factors other than power structure of the firm.

A final argument against decentralized socialism concerning its alleged tendency toward instability and collapse involves the relation between workers' councils and community councils. Pointing to the fiasco of New York City school decentralization, in which community control groups were pitted against the teachers' union, critics forecast that such disjunction of interest is inevitable and the resultant conflict would be an endemic feature of decentralized socialism, eventually dissolving its social fabric.

While decentralized socialism would diminish class conflict, as discussed earlier, democratization involves acceptance of an increase in articulated conflict in the aggregate. But beyond acceptance of this as a dynamic, innovation-facilitating aspect of the socialist model, the argument about inevitable conflict of worker and community groups is greatly exaggerated. One could cite examples from Yugoslavia and Israel which suggest the reverse — that workers' control is enhanced by close relation to meaningful community control — but reconsideration of the New York school decentralization case is more relevant to the American reader. The central issue on the union side was fear that gains won through collective bargaining over time would be lost, the union fragmented multiple small districts, and new hierarchies (albeit community-controlled) without necessary sympathy to labor would become institutionalized. From the community side it appeared that the union's centralized organization was a vested interest inconsistent with democratic local control; instead it appeared more appropriate to work with informal groups and individual teachers many of them union members — on a local basis under their control.

The decentralized socialist model is quite different from this. First, rather than fragmentation of power to local control units the model calls for decentralization with continued possibility of decisionmaking at higher levels.

Second and more important, at the local level the model involves organs structurally appropriate for worker-community cooperation in contrast to the New York example. Thus, for example, a workers' council of teachers and staff might control hiring and firing, elect the school principle, determine curriculum and the like. This council might be augmented by inclusion of teacher aides from the community and other community representative. Far from being utopian, teacher councils (often called »faculty senates«) are part of some present-day union contracts, and some of these councils include community teacher aides and seek significant powers. This feature of the model enables both community and worker groups to democratically decide upon the particular nature of their school. While worker and community differences may arise they do so on a basis which forces face-to-face interaction in a context where decision is possible, resources to effect decisions are present, and appeal to higher authority is possible.

Community control with worker self-management retains the hierarchic problems of dictating policy to those who must implement it. Similarly, workers' control without democratic check from the community can lead to distortions rooted in occupational interest. While each group might wish in the abstract for a form in which it would control and the other be quiescent, that desire is unrealistic. The question is rather whether community and worker interest are best reconciled through negotiations between a centralized community group and a centralized worker group — or whether the democratic will of both is best realized through the forms of democratic self-management of local units. Far from being a form based on the instability of inherently warring interests of workplace and community, self-management provides the most feasible structure for reconciling what differences may emerge.

This essay has briefly examined some of the criticisms raised against decentralized socialism as a way of illuminating the nature of that model. While any given point might well be expanded into an essay itself, I believe this sketchy overview of the political case for decentralized socialism shows the plausibility and strength of the argument. Provided one does not establish a straw-man standard of perfection or resolution of conflict or elimination of exceptions, but instead asks whether decentralized socialism would not significantly advance democratic practice over existing models — then **this** model deserves far more attention than it has thus far been accorded, even among radical theorists. Democracy is more than a form of government — it is a policy, an economy, a culture, a social system. Concretized in the vision of decentralized socialism is a possible future, a more democratic world, advancing liberty, equality, and fraternity. If these ideals seem utopian today, this reflects the bankruptcy of the prevailing political culture, rather than the possibilities of decentralized socialism.

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BUDGET CONTROL AND THE AUTONOMY OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS

BUDGET CONTROL IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND IN YUGOSLAVIA

Financial planning and control is an essential process for the survival of any organization, whatever its size, goals, or power structure. Organizations resolve their needs for financial planning and control in various ways, either formally or informally; and some do it more effectively than others. The less effective ones, however, are risking sooner or later to fall into trouble. In this paper we are concerned with certain conditions for effective financial planning and control.

In the U. S. and Western European business literature we mostly speak in this context of budget (or budgetary) control. The annual master budget within which other budgets are coordinated, corresponds to the annual plan in the Yugoslav enterprise under workers' self-management. Under both the western capitalist and the Yugoslav system, the budget is supposed to fulfill at least four functions at the same time:

- it **authorizes** the use of funds for certain purposes
- it **forecasts** events which will affect the financial future
- it **plans**, that is, it co-ordinates resources and assigns tasks to people
- it is a basis for **measurement**, to determine how well the assigned tasks were performed

In this way, budget control should be one of the main formal tools by which those in power in an organization can affect what happens.

In the western literature, the focus has long been on the formal, technical aspects of budget control, whereas the information on how the systems really worked belonged to the area of »business folklore«, which was seldom written down. Only in recent years have budget control systems been studied integrally, that is, attention has been paid to both their formal as well as to their informal, sometimes unintended aspects. My own ideas are based upon such an integral study, carried out in the Netherlands in 1964 and 1965 in five manufacturing companies¹, and developed further in later research in a number of countries.

One negative fact which is clear from this type of research is, that the practice of budget control in western countries is often considerably behind the theory. Effective systems are rarer than the innocent reader of the business books would believe. A positive fact, however, is that basically budgeting is not only desirable from an economical, but also from a psycho-

¹ G. H. Hofstede, *The Game of Budget Control*, Van Gorcum, Assen/Tavistock, London, second printing 1969.

logical point of view. Budgets serve, psychologically, to translate the far-away overall goals of the organization into the close-by targets of every department or small unit; they enable people to establish aspiration levels, which are a condition for feelings of success and satisfaction. Budgets are an important element in the motivation of the organization's members towards the overall goals. If they do not achieve this motivation, it is not because the idea of budgeting is wrong, but because it is wrongly applied.

A budget system which does not motivate, is unable to fulfill its functions of **planning** and **measuring**. In the western countries, this happens typically when the system is so primitive or receives so little support from higher management that it remains irrelevant to most of the organizations' members; or, when it is applied as a pressure device which generates unintended effects. There are various kinds of dysfunctional effects that should be avoided: such as the manipulation of measurement data to look better; looking for excuses or blaming others if goals are not met after all; applying one's ingenuity to obtain easy standards, rather than to perform as well as possible; or achieving the goals that were set at the expense of other goals, such as meeting a production quantity at the expense of quality.

From Yugoslavia, there is a description by Adizes' of the annual plan preparation in two textile manufacturing companies in Serbia, which he studied in 1966 and 1967. In one of the companies, the planning process functioned as intended; in the other, however, there was considerable trouble in obtaining the necessary coordination between the Economic Units, which were very independent. The result was that the budget for 1966 which should have become effective in January, was only submitted to the Workers' Council in August (1966). In fact, the company had been working without an approved plan for seven months. Whatever else may be said about the system, this situation cannot be considered to supply much budget motivation either.

COORDINATION VERSUS AUTONOMY

This example shows a basic problem in designing an effective budget control system: which decisions are taken centrally, which are decentralized? The issue is particularly relevant to the Yugoslav situation, where a considerable independence of the Economic Units within the enterprise is one of the basic elements of the self-management system. Adizes' example shows, that unless some central decision-making is accepted, a coordinated budget system may be difficult to obtain. In the other company which he described, where the planning process did function well, it was more centralized and structured. The company's director played a more important role in the total process, and this role appeared to be accepted by the vast majority of the workers.

In the western literature on budget control the issue of coordination versus autonomy is covered in the discussion of the desired level of participation of the managers and members of separate units in the setting of their budgetary standards. Decentralization and participation are defended as providing the best possible information from people who know the details; they are also defended from a motivation point of view, because people will not easily be motivated by budgetary standards which they see as imposed upon them arbitrarily from somewhere above. It is therefore generally recommended to consult the lower levels of the organization in the setting of the

² I. Adizes, *Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style*. The Free Press. New York/Collier-Macmillan, London, 1971, Chapt. 5

standards. This means a bottom-up process in standard setting, rather than a top-down process. Unfortunately, however, the bottom-up process rarely meets the needs of overall coordination. It is very likely to lead to a sub-optimal solution which, from the overall organizational point of view, is wasteful. In practice, then, either this wasteful solution is accepted, or the needs of reaching the overall optimum lead to a return to topdown methods which, while achieving the coordination goals, may at the same time defeat the motivation goals. In the end, such a budget which looks good on paper, may not be met for lack of motivation of those who would have to fulfill it; or its goals may be reached at the expense of lasting damage to people's commitment to the organization; it may lead to considerable frustrations, tensions and anxiety of individuals, a loss of job satisfaction, and valuable members leaving the organization.

The conclusion from both the Yugoslav and the Western situation is, that whatever the structure of the enterprise, an effective budget control system presupposes a balance between a certain amount of central coordination and a certain amount of department autonomy.

Three elements determine whether and at which level of autonomy such an acceptable balance between coordination and autonomy can be found: the environment, the leadership, and the membership of the organization.

THE ENVIRONMENT

In commenting on a paper by Kamušič dealing with »Efficiency and Selfmanagement«, Tinbergen³ argues that: » . . . the degree of decentralization that should be applied depends on the nature of the production process; alongside processes where a high degree of decentralization is optimal there are others where it is sub-optimal to such an extent that, with all the psychological advantages (in the form of self-management or participation) decisions **have nevertheless to be made at higher levels**, up to even international levels . . . «

This argument fully applies to our case of the setting of budgetary goals. Other environmental factors that should be taken into account are market requirements; the need for flexibility and swift decisions; the degree of external uncertainty which the organization is facing; the occurrence of crises, etc.

LEADERSHIP

Some theorists of selfmanagement have interpreted Marx in such a way, that self-management would eliminate the need for Central leadership — this would, in fact, wither away. From all I hear and see, this expectation has not come true. I would even venture the proposition that **self-management can only succeed under strong leadership** — an apparent paradox. This is in agreement with Tannenbaum's⁴ well-known conclusion that the total amount of control in an organization is not a constant: there are cases where there is a positive correlation between the control of those at top and those at the lower levels of the organization. In the study of budget control systems

³ J. Tinbergen, Does Self-management Approach the Optimum Order? in M. J. Broesmeyer (ed.), Yugoslav Workers' Self-Management, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970, p. 123

⁴ A. S. Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations: Individual Adjustment and Organizational Performance, Administrative Science Quarterly Ithaca, 1962, 2, 236-257

in five manufacturing companies in the Netherlands in which I was involved, the main conclusion was that the success of a budget control system is a matter of leadership. I found, in fact, strong parallels between the motivation of people in a budget system and the motivation of players in a game: whether the game spirit could be created under which people were optimally motivated, depended on the leadership. Some writers about Yugoslav self-management complain that leadership is difficult to exercise because managers have insufficient formal authority. Formal authority of a bureaucratic nature does not necessarily, however, produce the kind of leadership which is essential to make budget control succeed.

MEMBERSHIP

It is meaningless to speak of leadership without simultaneously to consider membership: leadership is a dynamic situation which exists only as long as the members of the organization support it. We have seen that the success of a budget control system depend on a certain autonomy, but also on the acceptance of constraints; a willingness to live with a compromise. Research data which I collected⁵ indicate that this ability to accept freedom within constraints demands a certain organizational maturity. People in low-status, low-education jobs, and people in traditional, hierarchical societies, are less likely to possess this maturity. They either do not aspire to autonomy at all, or they switch to the other extreme of demanding complete autonomy; psychologically speaking, they are polarized between dependence and counter-dependence. For a successful budget control system, and probably more generally for the success of any complex organization, it is necessary that people can handle inter-dependence — something half-way between full dependence and full autonomy. This is what I call organizational maturity.

It has been said by many students of Yugoslav workers' self-management that the system is a huge educational experience for all involved. One of its outcomes should be an increase in this organizational maturity which will enable the Yugoslav workers to handle the interdependence without which no complex organization can survive.

PICTURE OF A BALANCED SOLUTION

A solution where central coordination and departmental autonomy are optimally balanced, will look about as follows:

At the beginning of the planning process the central authority determines the constraints, which are essential to achieve the minimal coordination. This may involve issues like the choice of markets, product lines, maximum and minimum sales volumes, impacts of major investments, consequences of government requirements, overall goals for cost reduction. These constraints are communicated and explained to the organizational units very clearly.

The next step is, to go down the organizational structure to the lowest level which has information to contribute to the plan. Again, at every level, the constraints should be stated clearly. Contrary to what is often assumed, for maximum motivation it is neither necessary nor desirable that goals at lower level are entirely self-set. Under the pressure of outside facts, tighter goals

⁵ P. J. Sadler and G. H. Hofstede, *Leadership Styles, Mens en Onderneming*, Leiden, 26 (1972), 1, 43-63.

will be accepted and better performances will result than if goal-setting is purely self-initiated. Competition on a market may, for example, be such an outside fact which stimulates people to willingly accept performance goals which they would otherwise have considered as impossible. The essential condition is, that the outside facts are considered relevant to their own situation. Van Doorn⁶ has introduced the term goal **finding** rather than goal **setting**.

The downward movement is followed by an upward movement which will mean coordination and consolidation, and a certain amount of bargaining. My research in the Netherlands showed that many people enjoy this bargaining element, which contributes to the game of budgeting. This enjoyment, however, is only present if the power of the bargaining partners is not too unequal — not, if one side has all the power. It is therefore essential to be very honest about the constraints again — what is open bargaining, and what not.

Before the ultimate coordination is achieved, the budget may have to go through several iterations of downward and upward movements. It is in this process that often bad feelings and negative motivation occur: people become committed to the goals they have bargained for, and in later iterations they find them taken away from them. If iterations are necessary, it is essential to provide each time honest and clear information on the reasons why. For those who know the background, decisions are rational; for those who do not, they often look arbitrary or worse.

Finally, a budget control system should not necessarily aim at **maximum** efficiency. The humanity in the system is best served by a »planned inefficiency«, as long as the overall constraints are met.

⁶ J.A.A. Van Doorn et al., Normstelling, De Ingenieur, Den Haag, 1964, 50/51, A 761—782.

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DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION*

I. AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

Development has precipitated a participation crisis. The fundamental question is age old: how can individuals meaningfully participate in systems of over increasing size and scale, or conversely, how can systems of large size respond to each and every individual? With increasing size and complexity the individual becomes submerged in numbers and confusion. The obvious alternative of reducing the scale of the system by breaking it up into small, autonomous local political units also reduces the issues of participation to triviality.

To remedy the paradoxical implications of scale and participation, a variety of institutional changes have been proposed: creating city-states; institutionalizing technological devices for individual-system interaction, such as computer processing of opinions, extending participation to previously non-participatory institutions, such as factories; expanding the scope of participatory issues for particular institutions by making institutions responsible for more activities touching the individual, such as increasing decentralization. There are also recommendations to prepare people for more effective participation under the general rubric of education.

The fact remains and will become more apparent as systems increase in scale, that is, develop; the institutional linkages between individuals and the system will become more tenuous, in the extreme case, as Dahl notes, being reduced to casting a 'ballot.' At the other extreme, the satisfaction an individual can derive from his participation in small units will pale in comparison to the importance of the issues of participation in systems of large scale complexity.

The thesis of this paper is that development determines the modes of participation — the participatory structures of the system and the way in which individuals relate to them. From a macro-historical perspective, the relationship between development and institutional structures is the source of a participation crises in developed countries, and no amount of wise re-structuring of those institutions will transform each individual into an effective legislator for a complex system. Ineed, the scale of a system at a certain point will be so great that the individual-institutional-system linkages will break and recede into ritualistic remnants of participation. These changes will be accompanied by more and more direct individual participation in the system. Just as the emergence of indirect, representative institutions required a certain level of scale and complexity and as systems became more complex, greater institutional differentiation became possible, so development is destroying

* A version of this paper was given at the first international meeting of the Research Committee on Comparative Studies on Local Government and Politics, September, 1972, Taormina, Italy.

those institutions, making possible a new mode of participation. Indeed, nothing short of stopping development will be able to abort this developmental change.

Because this developmental process is already underway, it is possible to predict and observe it with contemporary data and in part, to confirm whether, where, and under what conditions changes in participation are taking place. The specific shape of these changes, derived from a partially constructed developmental theory, can be clearly formulated, modified, and explicated with research. With such a knowledge man ought to be able to control the directions of these changes, minimize some of the inevitable costs of change, and make it possible to deal with these changes rather than, as has almost always been the case historically, to be victimized by them.

II. A MACRO-DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON PARTICIPATION

A macro developmental conception of participation involves the following:

- 1) a component system relationship, which in this case will be the individual and the system,
- 2) a long historical perspective so that changes in participation can be interpreted in the context of developmental dynamics and
- 3) an explication of development and its processes.²

The first of these defines participation in its broadest possible sense: any behavior that is linked to a social system, and thus to other components of the system. In this sense any element of human behavior, any basic movement of the individual, can be participation, if it either changes the system or averts other changes. The focus is change rather than maintenance.

The historical dimension requires viewing participation in a context of system change, or absence of it. These changes, because they are often not easily perceptible in the context of conflicting trends must be assessed in the long run, centuries rather than decades. Participation results in changes; these changes in turn produce changes in the nature of participation. To observe this process, it is necessary to take a long term view.

Development provides the general context that defines participation. Comparative research on participation has demonstrated the importance of knowing the specific institutional context in order to identify »participatory act«. In the contemporary world this institutional context is almost entirely circumscribed by the national political system. Without such knowledge, it is impossible, for example, to know the meaning of elections or voting in them. A developmental view, however, puts these national political and other institutions into a more general framework; it explains why these institutions rather than others. In this sense development provides a comprehensive perspective on participation.

Such an approach to participation can be contrasted with existing discussion and research. Much of the research takes the individual as the point of departure and sees participation as an individual choice in a given situation rather than asking why the individual is in such a situation and why there are choices.³ In some instances system level participation characteristics are expressed as some aggregative characteristic of individuals, such as the total number of people voting, the class distribution of voting, or party membership, and used to determine system changes, such as, the policy outcome or the policy bent of the political system— who it favors.⁴ In still others there is a macro-historical view, much of it descriptive, such as the evolution of the

universal franchise, or the historical acts that resulted in a near total inclusion of all people in the voting population.⁵ Often the dynamics by which such changes took place are formulated in terms of the special politics of the processes in particular countries, such as demands of certain groups, competition for new voters, or legislation adopted. The last of these is similar to the approach that will be used except for the level of generality and for an attempt to compare the present not only with the past but also a future point in time.

Participation has been directly linked to development in some literature and research. At the micro-level, participation is seen as more or less crucial for change—involvement of farmers in agricultural innovations, for example.⁶ Some decentralization-participation hypotheses seem to be borne out in some research. The critical factor seems to be individual involvement in change.

At the macro-level, participation is either taken as a critical component of political development, such as in mobilization studies-linking the individual to broader social and political systems — or as an independent factor, sometimes detrimental to development. The first of these sees participation as the linkage of the individual to more encompassing systems, generally, in the context of contribution rather than choice and consumption.⁷ The second sees participation as demand articulation, pressing against governmental fragility and incapacity.⁸ The first poses the question: can there be development without participation; the second, the question, can there be development with participation (simultaneously)?

The theoretical premises of this paper provide some guidelines for historical analysis. Among these is the applicability of concept of participation. In small scale systems, participation, as individual impact on the system, is meaningless. The key organizational principle is that of membership in the social system. The principle of membership is that of similarity. With increases in the scale of the system, the principle of similarity no longer suffices for participation. There are too many differences. These differences create an historical crisis resulting in either a strong central authority (to keep the differences emerging from threatening the collectivity with anarchy) or the growth of representative institutions for participation that recognize differences in class, religion, and other interests. Over time and to this day, these differences are responded to either by suppression or by creating differentiated institutions to absorb increasing diversity.

Historically, it is necessary to know how a particular nation responded to various developing diversities — whether these newly differentiated groups were provided with institutional linkages to the system. Most of these were economically based: the cities, the merchant class, the working class, the peasants and the like. The larger of these reflect cleavages that still exist in some systems and influence political participation, such as voting patterns, depending on how, whether, when, and how well these groups were linked to some participatory institutions.

This second historical phase, dominated by what will be called institutional participations, is reaching full maturity for highly developed systems, just as differentiated, representative institutions are being established in developing countries. Diversity, particularly, now individual diversity, is too great to be reduced and contained in a few participatory institutions. For developed countries popular institutional participation has perhaps never been as inclusive or as »participatory« as it is today, but for an increasing number of people these institutions are inadequate, as is reflected in the decline of strong identification with political parties among the young. For individuals, the law of upper limits has begun to take hold and cannot but mean dissatis-

faction for those who aspire to a »participatory« society. There is insufficient time, free time, to allocate to institutions — all must fail at being a good citizen, informed, attended, and leading. The institutions are managed by professionals, who no matter how well intentioned must manipulate the people. For institutions, differences are more and more difficult to embrace in a single collective action.

This discussion assumes certain general laws of social behavior. These laws become operative under certain conditions, which themselves are explainable by certain other laws. All systems and all individuals are subject to these social laws, even though they may by free choice have an infinite diversity of ways of following these laws. Rivers can be made to flow upstream, but in doing so the laws of gravity are not violated.⁹ Development has world wide implications and the relationship between development and participation in one area of the world has implications for other areas, even though some may decide to withdraw for a while. This discussion is slanted toward the developed parts of the world. For it is here that the developmental-participatory nexus is most clearly manifest and the participation crisis is most apparent.¹⁰

III. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK THE CONCEPT OF A SYSTEM

A social system is the unit of which development is a characteristic. A system is a logical idea referring to:

- 1) at least two elements, which may be defined,
- 2) at least one rule of interdependence, such that a change in one element leads to a change in the others, and
- 3) at least two points in time.

Any set of social objects, defined or undefined, may together have the property of a system, that is, interdependence, if it does, the elements of the set become components of a system. One use of the idea of a system in the social sciences is to define the units of analysis.¹¹ Most social systems will have some individual elements (one of the possible undefined units in the social sciences), some elements composed of individuals, many kinds of complex rules of interdependence, and many points in time. One protean form of a social system would be two people linked in such a way that a change in A leads to a change in B, over two points in time. This would be a closed, two component, deterministic, non-feedback system. Almost all social systems are more complicated than this example.

Once the elements of a set are linked over time, they become components of a system, which then is defined both in terms of the components and their linkages. All systems share a number of general characteristics: the number of components, the number of characteristics of those components, the strength of the linkages among the components, and the nature of those linkages — whether they are direct, from one component to another, or indirect, linking all components but not directly, whether each component has a feedback linkage, etc. For example, systems in which every component is linked with a feedback loop could be defined as democratic systems in contrast to those with no feedback loops, authoritarian systems.

DEVELOPMENT

Development refers to the *scale* of social systems. Scale refers to the *interdependence and complexity of the system's components*. Scale is thus based both on relational characteristics of the components and their linkages. The property of interdependence that constitutes scale is *integration*. Two synonymous definitions of scale are organized complexity and integrated diversity.¹² By definition the level of development of a system is its scale at any point in time. By definition, *developmental change is any increase in a system's scale over two or more points in time*.

These two dimensions of scale, integration and diversity, should be equally weighted in the assessment of any system's development. It is possible to have, therefore, systems of high integration and low complexity or high complexity and low integration. Further any social system can be assessed in terms of its development and ranked in terms of its development *vis a vis* other system of the same class.¹³ Despite this variation, and the consequent typology based on the two dimensions of scale, there are limits to how much either dimension can vary independently. A systems with too little integration for its diversity may collapse. A system with too much integration for its diversity may stagnate. The first of these is reflected in many contemporary underdeveloped countries; the second in systems with tight central control despite sizeable diversity. The first of these calls for a reduction of diversity to enhance integration, or, conversely, an intensification of integration through centralized, coercive institutions. »Balanced« social development is increasing integration and complexity in tandem.

The degree to which any social system is integrated is based on three specific, independent dimensions of integration.¹⁴ Taken together, these three dimensions can be expressed as a single »probability« for any system. First, although *ex definendum* of the system all components are interdependent to some minimal degree by virtue of their membership in the system, there is still variance in the degree to which all the components will be affected by changes—the degree to which they are »in or out« of the interdependence linkages.¹⁵ The extent to which every component has an equal probability, without regard to the strength of that probability, of changing and/or being changed by other components refers to the *inclusiveness* of integration.

The second dimension of integration refers to how many domains or classes of characteristics of the components are interdependent. Thus a system whose components are interdependent with respect to only one or a few domains, such as the economy, is less integrated than one in which all properties of the components are linked. This is the *extensiveness* of integration.

Thirdly, there is the probability that a change in one component leads to a change in the state of the system or to changes in other components or both. This involves the degree of certainty of changes predicting other changes and is the dimension of *strength* of integration.

The integration of any system is a combination of these three dimensions, for purposes of this discussion weighted equally. In statistical language, the first refers to the *variance* among the individual components in terms of how much each is interdependent, the second refers to the proportion of properties of the components that are affected, and the third to the average or mean individual component interdependence probabilities. A totally integrated system would be one in which every characteristic of every component would change with an equal probability as a result of any change in any component with certainty. Such a system would be a deterministic, mechani-

cal system. Such a system is presented here as a measurement standard against which the degree of integration of any social system can be assessed.

Social systems are relatively poorly integrated, not matching the integration of either mechanical or biological systems. On the average a reasonably well integrated national political system would have in some domains less than »3« strength, if some social research findings are taken seriously.¹⁶ A massive increase in the integration of social system would mean better predictions across more sectors (e. g. a political act would better predict economic behavior) and any change in any part of the system would have repercussions throughout the system. Developmentally, systems are more integrated to the extent that behavior in one sector or part predicts behavior in all other sectors and parts (e. g. regions). In turn, less developed systems will have lower level predictions, predictions that are particularistic to sectors and limited to regions or social strata. For less developed systems there is greater difficulty in generalizing about the whole system or in predicting change than in more developed systems: generalization and prediction becomes easier with development.¹⁷

There are two basic ways in which one component can affect or change another component. The first is interaction, in which one component directly affects another component, in some cases in a one way direction.¹⁸ Although interaction is often defined in terms of face-to-face relationships, the critical question is whether or not behavior is targeted to some other specific persons or components. A second kind of interdependence is indirect, in which the behavior of a component contributes to change the state of the system, its total characteristics, and, thus, indirectly to change other components of the system. The first of these is personal, often unequal, and sometimes coercive or components. A second kind of interdependence is indirect, in which the

The *diversity* of the components of a system is assessed by comparing each component to every other: in how many ways and the degree to which in each way the properties of the components are similar or different. Whereas integration is a property of the dynamics of a system; diversity is a structural characteristic. The components of the system can be either defined (institutions, groups, regions) or undefined (individuals or some specific item of behavior). For any specific system or set of systems, the components must have observable empirical referents.

Every component of the system has x properties that are similar to the properties of other components or every other component and y ($N - x$) properties that are dissimilar to the properties of other components or every other component.¹⁹ The key to understanding complexity is the shift in the *levels* of similarities and differences. A basic law of developmental dynamics is that any increase in the number of properties of any component increases the probability that the component will have a property similar to that of other components and simultaneously increases the probability of that component as a whole being different from every other component.²⁰ The first probability increases arithmetically; the second, exponentially. The scale of a system thus decisively depends on the number of properties of its components; and the similarity and differences among components are the structural requisites for interdependence. Without integration of the differences, however, there is no scale, but random differences.

This definition of scale, provides a precise distancation between size and scale. Size refers to the *number of components* of a system that can autonomously change or be changed, that is, can differ from others. Scale, in contrast, refers to the *diversity of the components* regardless of number. Thus national political systems that have large populations and low development have large size

but small scale. Individuals in small scale systems cannot autonomously change or be changed; rather groups or categories change or are changed.

Even though the size of any unit may increase arithmetically, the scale of the system will, after a certain point, increase exponentially. This fact renders per capita measures, which express size rather than scale, more and more meaningless as development proceeds. If size is not distinguished from scale, then any individual's participatory contribution is diminished as a function of the size of the system; if scale is considered, the importance of the issues for participation will increase more rapidly than size. Size therefore need not necessarily diminish the importance of the individual's participation.²¹

Although size and scale are conceptually distinct, they are related. Size is a limit on scale — an upper limit to scale. This upper limit is dependent on the number of characteristics that any component can possess. Thus, if every component is »loaded« with properties that is, cannot absorb any more, the only way that the scale of the system can be increased (assuming that interdependence is high) is to increase the number of components of the system and thus the system's degrees of freedom for diversity. The size-scale limits and the relationship between them are clearly seen in organizations where the diversity of operations is too great for the size of the organization. The components are overloaded, such as is often the case with a small faculty attempting to cover the full range of disciplinary diversity. The organizational solution to this problem is either to increase its size or reduce its diversity. However, in the case of most national political units the size limit on diversity will not be operative for some time, and then, diversity can still be increased by opening the system and linking it to the diversity of other systems.²²

PARTICIPATION

Participation refers to a broad class of systemic phenomena. The phenomena are the behavior of the components of a social system that result in changes in other components, the state of the system, or both. Thus, participation is system specific. Structurally, it refers to the linkages between the components and the system; behaviorally, it refers to component behavior that results in system level change, directly or indirectly. This is a general definition. What constitutes participation for any particular system must be stated in terms of the properties of that system.

The identification of the components of a system depends on the nature of the system. As social systems have several levels of component aggregation — individuals, groups, institutions, local political units, etc. — the appropriate level of component aggregation will depend on the specific domain of system behavior that is to be explained as well as on the the nature of the system. Although a system's level of development will determine whether, to what extent, and in what regard, the individual is an autonomous component of the system, the anchor for the remainder of this discussion will be the individual.

The importance of the systemic context of participation can be illustrated by the behavior of making a check on a piece of paper. When this is done at home, it is not participation; the same act, however, in a voting booth is participation, but only for a specific system and a specific set of institutions. A participatory act performed in Canada is not participation in another political system, despite international implications.

The system contexts of participation can be expressed very specifically the particular national political institutions, they can be generalised across systems, the democratic nature of the systems. One of the most general and pervasive of all such system characteristics is development.

There are three qualitatively different structures of participation, with consequences for individual activity, which emerge as development (a quantitatively defined concept) increases: symbolic, institutional, and systemic participation. These modes of participation are present in all »empirical« social systems; but one or another is the dominant mode. The developmental context thus defines what is participation and what kinds of participation are possible. The brief description of each will be overdrawn to highlight differences.

Historically, developed countries are dominated by institutional participation with shifts to systemic participation already visible. This shift in part explains a »participation« crisis. The less developed countries are in transition to institutional participation — the development of differentiated, representative, participatory institutions, and of the linkages of individuals to them. For the developed world, the issues center around the meaninglessness of institutional participation in the face of ever increasing complexity and interdependence. For less developed countries, the issues of participation center on the formalism of participatory institutions—their manipulation by elites and their inability to respond to existing differences in a representative fashion — and the potential threats that participation poses in the expression of demands that the government respond to the total needs of individuals, a characteristic of symbolic participation.

PARTICIPATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW DEVELOPMENT: SYMBOLIC PARTICIPATION

As the scale of the system is low, there is little diversity and low interdependence. Although there is »role« differentiation, the primary principle of the social system is similarity. Participation is the repetitive re-affirmation of those few similarities which exist. Participation thus involves individual and group affective expression of these similarities. Indeed, there is little individual differentiation, and thus, the idea of autonomous individual impact on the system is meaningless. Further, as there is little system change, participation defined as purposeful, change oriented behavior, is rendered meaningless. Because there are few differences, decisions can be expressed by a spokesman; when decisions are made collectively, the emphasis will be on unanimity.

All existing social systems have some aspects of this kind of participation, but it is frequent and dominant in systems of small scale, regardless of size, such as in villages, nomadic tribes, and states that have low level of development or are threatened by increasing diversity.

PARTICIPATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF SOME DEVELOPMENT: INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

With differentiation, symbolic participation gives way to the growth of a few institutions that reflect dominant patterns of diversity. The individual is partially linked to institutions, and the institutions, in turn affect the system. As individual differentiation is not extensive, those differences that exist can be grouped into classes, parties, and other such segments.²³ The function of

the institutions is to represent the existing diversity. Indeed, the legitimacy of the institutions is determined by how well they reflect the existing diversity. Participation is indirect; the relationship among individuals often one way rather than reciprocal or equal. Further, the higher the level of development, the more these institutions become differentiated and the more diverse within, to a point where they become ineffective in reflecting the diversity of their membership.

Institutional participation is the dominant mode of participation in most of the more developed countries today. In the past some of the most salient of these institutions were the church, the locality, the ethnic group; today they are political parties, trade unions, and economic organizations.

PARTICIPATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF HIGH DEVELOPMENT: SYSTEMIC PARTICIPATION

Systemic participation involves the direct linkage of the individual to the system. The participatory act is based on autonomous individuals who act consciously to change the state of the system directly rather than other components. Diversity and interdependence make it likely that every act of the individual will have system level consequences. Further, rather than segmented, free time, specialized activities, every act, every type of behavior, becomes relevant for the system, and thus politicized — from purchasing consumer goods to job performance. There is no distinct set of participatory behavior, reduced in its diversity and channeled through institutions. The individual under conditions of maximal development becomes directly meshed with the system. There is no behavior which is non-systemic or non-participatory.

Although there are some emerging aspects of systemic participation in highly developed societies, no society is at present dominated by this mode. Some examples of elements of this mode are the politicization of individual consumer purchases to improve the environment; the tendency of large scale business organizations to substitute temporary, focused task groups for hierarchical, permanent departments; and the willingness of some people to assume responsibility for what was done by their national decision-makers.

IV. THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE AND SHIFTS IN THE MODES OF PARTICIPATION

The dynamics of developmental change — why diversity and integration come about, interact, and create additional diversity and integration — involve several factors, some of which are conflicting. The core component of developmental change that affects participation more than any other is structural change.

Structural change is of two related, general types. The first refers to changes in the nature (whether or not something is present) and the properties of the structure of interdependence, such as whether there are feedback loops and the inclusiveness of those feedback loops. The second refers to relational properties among the components. The former involves the behavior of components and of the system; the latter, the structural potential for linking components to the system. Changes in structural potential for interdependence require both system and component level dynamics. This will

be the focus of this discussion on developmental change — general structural changes in the predominant structures of participation. In other words, most of this analysis will be limited to the dynamics of aggregative structural change.

There are several kinds of relational properties. Two such are relational properties proper, such as father and leader, and relational properties that are derived from a comparison of the properties of two or more objects, such as equality. The latter are aggregative relational properties. For developmental change and changes in individual-system relationships, the critical class of such derived relational properties is the similarity and difference among the properties of the components. Two types of such derived relational properties can be distinguished: characteristics of individuals, such as skills, attitudes, etc.; and items, a relationship of the individual to an object or set of objects, such as owning land or having exclusive rights of usage of land. Although this distinction is important, as well as others for explaining different aspects of developmental dynamics, such as exchange vs. conflict vs. cooperation, they will be grouped for this analysis into a single category, called properties.


The fundamental dynamic of structural change in terms of similarity and differences, related to both the complexity dimension of development and the structure of participation, derives from probability logic and is asserted to be true of social systems under specified conditions. The issue of how properties are assigned or acquired by individuals will be set aside for the moment as well as the issue of size, the number of components, in the system. Further, one additional distinction is required: that between the *variety* of properties and the *total number* of properties. The relational structural component properties of a system are the sum of the properties of the components.²⁴ The total number of such the properties is one characteristic of the system; the number of different kinds of properties is the system characteristic of variety.

The laws of aggregative complexity and of inclusive similarity, taken from the logic of probability, states that the greater the number of total properties of the system *and* the greater the number of properties of each component, the greater the probability that each component will be similar to the others in at least one way *and* different as a whole. What is critical are two levels of similarity and difference — the probability of any single property in any set being similar to another set and the probability of the two sets being similar in their totality. This distinction in levels means that as the total number of properties and the variety of properties of the system are increased and as the number of properties in each sub-set increase, the probability of similarity between any property of any component increases *linearly* and the probability of diversity or uniqueness between the total set of properties of any component increases *exponentially*.

A set of any properties, of which some are similar and some different, will explicate this law (e. g., A, A.; B, B, B; C, C, C; ...). Two probabilistic implications are true. First once these properties are assigned to objects, the equivalent of taking a random (or any) sub-set of the set of these properties, the probability that any sub-set will contain a property that is similar to that in any other subset, is a linear function of the number of total properties in the set, the number of different properties in the set, and the number of properties in each sub-set. Secondly, the probability that any two sub-sets will be identical in every regard is again a function of the total number of properties in the set and the variety of those properties, and the number of properties in each sub-set. But this function is exponential. The total num-

ber of combinational possibilities in any set is 2^n , including the null set.²⁵ The relationship between these two laws provides a basis for calculating the probabilities of the number of ways any two components will be similar and the probability that each will be unique. This relationship is displayed below.

One law of developmental dynamics is that of component diversity and similarity. At the level of components development is both diversity and similarity; at the level of the system, development is both the variety and total number of properties.



What must be demonstrated to explain and predict the shifts in the modes of participation that emanate from development are:

- 1) that as the total number and variety of a system's properties increase, they will be distributed more and more equally among individuals, and
- 2) that as the number and variety of individual level properties increase, individuals will shift to or be absorbed by levels in the system of greater and greater complexity, to a point where the individual will be directly involved with that level of system of maximal complexity, the system itself. The former is the process of inclusion, yielding higher and higher levels of system integration, as it has been defined; the latter is the process by which individuals shift their behavior to the level of the system.

The structural requisite for interdependence or integration are some similarity (if only to communicate) and some differences (for example, for exchange) among the components. The general proposition is that the greater both the similarity and diversity among the components of the system, the greater their interdependence (other things being held constant). For individuals, the greater their similarities and differences, the greater their integration into the system, and thus their participation in the system.²⁶ Participation is crucially determined, therefore, by the *distribution* of the system's properties among individuals; individuals will participate to the extent that they share properties with others and are complementary by virtue of their differences. These similarities and differences depend both on the total number and variety of the system's properties and on the total number of properties of each individual. Thus, the greater the number of pro-

perties of an individual, other things being equal, the greater his participation in the system. But the sheer number of any individual's properties is not enough. The individual's interdependence, and thus, his participation is also determined by the distribution of properties among others.

A hypothetical example of distributing properties across a number of components will illustrate the differences among maximizing equality (the number or properties), maximizing diversity, and maximizing both diversity and similarity. Take a set of 100 individuals, two types of properties, »a« and »b« (variety = 2), and 75 properties of »variety« »a« and 25 of variety »b« (total number of properties = 100). To distribute the properties equally would be simple: each of the 100 individuals would be allocated one of the 100 properties. To maximize the number of *individuals* in the set that are properties: 1 of »a«, none of »b«; 1 of »a« and 1 of »b«; 2 of »a« and 1 of »b«, *etc.* To maximize the number of individuals that would be similar in one way, that is, have one »a«, and different in others, would require allocating at least one »a«, then the remaining »a«'s and »b«'s, in various combinations of unique frequency: there would be no »b« s without at least one »a«. Individuals would be excluded under either of the latter two principles, that is, have no properties. The relationships among the number of cases, limited properties, and limited variety in part explains social stratification in terms of development: to the extent to which both the variety and the total number of properties are limited for a number of components, the greater the stratification.

The problem is to show why that as the variety and total number of properties of a system increase, they must be more equally allocated both in terms of frequency and variety. Two assumptions will be introduced, one of which can be explained by developmental processes, in particular the rate of innovation (and fusion of existing combinatorial possibilities), and the other by theories of individual psychology, in particular the process of cognitive congruence. The first of these is that as the level of development increases, the rate of development increases, (not per capita growth) and, specifically, the rate of innovation. Innovation introduces variety (which may also be imported and/or imitated). Each additional item of variety, doubles the combinatorial possibilities for complexity, exponentially. Secondly, any individual at any point in time can cope with only so much variety, although he may also have a »history« of variety, depending on the turnover of his characteristics (some of which will be taken over by the »system«).⁷ The consequence of this upper limit on individual variety and exponential increase in system variety, which is limited only by size or the number of individuals in the system, is allocation of properties.

If a system is to develop, that is, increase its integration of complexity, beyond a certain point (given the size limitation on system diversity which is derived from the limit on individual variety), the system must either increase its size, keeping the same proportions in the distribution of properties among individuals, or allocate the properties to the approximate upper limit of each individual's capacity for variety, or both. If the system distributes to the upper limit of each individual, there will be near equality in the number of properties within tolerances of individual differences. It can be shown, however, that a rapidly developing system (some determinable rate for each system depending on its level of development) will increase its combinatorial capacity far faster than it can increase its size by population growth over the long run. There are the options of either importing numbers or opening the systems to others of equivalent or greater development²³. The system can, in short, import size or export its diversity or both. This network of relationships between

variety, distribution, size, etc. can be used to explain, again in part, the observed patterns of relationships among economic trade flows, population growth, migration, income distribution, and economic development.

The need to allocate properties to individuals in order to continue or increase the rate of development results in the process of inclusion. If a stratum with limited diversity and only a few properties obtains more properties, its contribution to the system correspondingly increases, depending, of course, on the level of development of the system. Individuals with education, housing, etc. become producers and when they become producers, they take part in, participate in, other system structures with increasing frequency. This inclusion enhances both the complexity of the system by taking advantage of the combinatorial possibilities, and the level of system integration by increasing the gross base of the system's similarity. This in turn accelerates (again assuming other things are held constant) the rate of increase in variety, its distribution, etc. and thus the level of participation of individuals in the system.

Developing systems generally are also able to absorb more variety by transforming an item of variety which contributes to diversity into a property of similarity, and by so doing to remove it from the set of properties that constitutes any individual's variety. This is achieved through the familiar developmental processes of standardization, routinization, and mechanization. The result is increased similarity and further system integrative potential without over loading individuals with variety; indeed it frees the system to distribute additional properties and frees the individual to change his constellation of properties, thus adding to total complexity of the system. To sketch this dynamic, a pyramidal frequency distribution of a system's variety will be assumed, such that a few individuals have some of the system's variety, and nearly all of the individuals others. When a property is universally distributed, then it no longer functions as a property that produces diversity among the components. The item becomes »automatic« for everyone; it no longer consumes an individual's capacity for variety. In most cases this process of transfer to the system involves items that can be mechanized, such as electrical power. Once a property becomes systemically universal, it remains a property of the system's variety in comparison to other systems, but not of individual diversity. One dynamic characteristic of developing systems is the rate at which variety can be turned over into a property of systemic similarity. As this is accomplished, the total number of individual properties is increased by an additional item of similarity, and thus also the individual's integration into the system (again, other conditions also being present).

The second major consequence of development for participation occurring at the same time as the distribution of properties is a shift of individual activity from systems of less complexity to systems of greater complexity. From symbolic participation to institutional participation, there is a shift from the level of the system as a whole, with some similarity and limited diversity, to institutions of greater diversity and specificity. From institutional participation to systemic participation, the individual shifts away from those institutions that do not express or incorporate his increased and increasing complexity to systems that do to higher and higher levels of system aggregation, each with greater variety.

The law of requisite variety states that any sub-system has less variety than the system of which it is a part (at least one property of less variety). If this were not the case, then presumably the sub-system would detach itself, or be detached, from the system.²⁹ This law is implied in the definition of system and sub-system. For systems with a number of levels — institutions, local political units, etc. — the development of the system and consequent increase in the variety and complexity of individuals within it will stimulate a slow,

but sometimes rapid, shift of individuals to units of greater complexity. This movement will in turn decrease the complexity of lower levels, thus accelerating this movement to levels of greater complexity.

This shift of individual activity has several implications. One is that the system is increasingly able to respond to the total complexity rather than to some specific aspect of the individual, such as his political preference or occupational attitudes. Individuals with complexity become »cosmopolitan« requiring a system of sufficient scale to utilize for the expression of their uniqueness; they participate directly rather than through institutional intermediaries, which will be increasingly relatively less complex than the individual.

The reason that with development any institution will tend to have less and less complexity than individuals is that institutions are based on modal similarities and small variance around that modal similarity.

The speed of this process depends on the rate of development of the system and the distribution of properties to individuals. In general it will happen in a differentiated way, with a few individuals increasing their complexity, shifting their level of activity, with more and more individuals following. This process explains, albeit partially, why some local »elites« circulate at the national level, and why national elites become international elites, a process that contributes to the integration of political systems.³⁰

V. CHANGES IN PARTICIPATION³¹

Because participation and development are inextricably linked, and development, as it has been defined, is perhaps the most general property of social systems, to state what the different kinds of participation mean for the individual is to state almost all of the co-variants, causes, and effects of development. This can be done analytically and generally by stating general relationships (the greater the development, the greater the equality among individuals), or descriptively by extrapolating a general relationships to concrete historical phenomena. The latter will be done here selectively to highlight some difference in participation. If such an extrapolation is descriptive rather than analytical, the result is the familiar Weberian language of phenomenologically expressed ideal types, which may or may not be reflected in specific cases.

The consequences of development for participation are in part derived from the definition of development and in part on the dynamic of diversity and similarity. For example, the number of alternatives available to the individual is vastly increased with development. A large number of alternatives means that any choice is not critical. The consequences of choice are reduced, although the importance of those choices to the individual become more important in terms of opportunity costs. This and other developmental consequences will be used to explicate the nature of participation under different levels of development.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF PARTICIPATION

In symbolic participation, there is little consciousness of any act of participation, including symbolic re-affirmation. In institutional participation consciousness of participation is limited to a few acts. Indeed, participation is segregated into specific spheres of activity. In those spheres, consciousness is largely based on particularistic self-interest. The institutions of participation are designed to express similarity of individual interest or similarity of

self interest, group interest. The legitimacy of participation is expressed in terms of what the system does for the individual and what the individual does for the system — as input-output measures of system performance. Systemic participation, however, requires that the individual be conscious of the outcome of this activity on the system as a whole. He knows that he can act to move the state of the system to be in conformity with his preferences or morality.

Whereas in institutional participation, participation is segregated from non-participatory acts, and, accordingly, there is a clean distinction between political and non-political behavior, in systemic participation there is no such distinction. Every act of the individual, because it takes place in a context of high interdependence, becomes politicized. Thus what is taught in the classroom, what is purchased at the market, whether one marries, will be considered in terms of systemic consequences. The importance of individual acts for the system follows from the sensitivity of the system to small aggregative shifts, a consequence of development. In a fragmented local market, choices in groceries will make little systemic impact. But in a nationally integrated market, slight shifts, especially based on the consciousness of others, will effect the price of food.

Consciousness will be based on a relatively high level of knowledge about the system and how it operates. Both immediate and longterm consequences will be considered.

Whereas in institutional participation the foci are specific, direct consequences; in systemic participation the multiple, macro, and long term consequences will be increasingly part of the consciousness of any choice.

The distinction between public and private will disappear. Private activity in institutional participation is clearly distinguished from public. But if every act is politicized, if every choice is considered in terms of its implications, and if the individual in his complexity will be dealing more and more with complex rather than simple sub-systems, then little, if anything, will be private. Indeed individuals will want to express their full diversity so that their potential for interactions and exchange will be realized.

In systemic participation a great deal of time and effort will be spent in searching for information, in becoming informed about complexity. As there is a premium on individual autonomy and independence, much of this search will be directed to autonomously collected and analyzed information rather than information which is institutionally filtered.

To cope with complexity, the individual will be forced to deal with generalities. To maintain an individually based autonomous linkage to all of the complexity of the system, generalization-abstract knowledge-will become critically important. Generalization will not imply uniformity or regularity. The combination of general facts into specific instances is necessary for predicting and coping with diversity.

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

In systemic participation, there will be few, if any, constraining social relationships. In symbolic participation, the emphasis is on conformity, and for non-conformity there are sanctions and exclusion. In institutional participation there are power-authority relationships among people, allowing for sanctions. In systemic participation there will be no social sanctions, meaning that no individual can reduce the variety and interdependence of other individuals by taking something away or by blocking someone from the broadest possible networks of interdependence. Whereas in institutional partici-

pation the focus is on groups or institutions in controlling and influencing others; in systemic participation the focus is on individual influence on the state of the system and on others indirectly via changes in the system.

With the shift to systemic participation, the system becomes more and more self-regulating — regulated by direct, conscious acts of individuals rather than by power, sanctions, and authority. Regulation reduces variety or interdependence or both. In a self-regulating system, variety, diversity, interdependence will be valued, and increasing variety will be the prevailing norm governing the relationships of individuals to the system and to others. For a variety of reasons, governments, as a separate set of governing and controlling institutions, will recede in importance as they cannot cope with the size and the scale of the system. And because when they do act, they detract from the value of variety in favor of similarity and uniformity.

Affective relationships, in so far as they involve repetitive behavior, will be seen as reducing variety. The relationships of individuals to each other will be valued less for the reward of repetition and more for their contribution to mutual development, that is, increasing and changing the variety of individuals.

The nature of conflicts will change with development. In symbolic participation conflicts cannot be tolerated. They are few in number, but when they occur, they are intense. Any conflict spills over into all aspects of life; there are few alternatives for individuals to remove themselves from conflictive situations, and thus conflicts are intense. In institutional participation conflicts are frequent, but become progressively less intense. Conflicts are based on differences among interests competing to get the system to move in conformity with their desire and in non-conformity with the desires of others. The institutions attempt to balance these conflicting interests, but from time to time the issues become exclusionary and divisive, resulting in intense conflict. Although the system makes »zero sum« decisions with increasing diversity over time, more »positive-sum« decisions (something for everyone) become possible, and the intensity of conflicts correspondingly goes down.³²

In systemic participation, there always are alternatives for the individual. There is enough complexity to satisfy any individual some place in the system. The individual always has the option of withdrawal from conflictive situations and thus the intensity of any conflict is mitigated. Conflicts may be numerous, but rarely intense. They are numerous because the individual is always interacting with the system as a whole. They are not intense because the individual can never lose.

Equality among individuals, as has been discussed, will increase under systemic participation, but not equality in the mechanical sense of similarity. Individuals will have more and more in common and yet be different. These differences will mean that there will be differences in the way in which individuals participate but fewer and fewer differences in the impact of the individual on the system. Each will be included in the individual-system meshing that will occur in the systemic mode of participation.

VI. AN EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL POLITICAL UNITS

The theory of development that has been partially discussed could be applied to almost any set of specific social systems. It is applicable to economic institutions, universities, governmental agencies, at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the question would be what changes can be

predicted form an institution in the context of a larger system with a certain level of development and rate of developmental change. At the micro level, the question would be what predictions can be made about the consequences of an increase in the specific unit's complexity. Both questions need to be asked as the answer to the first question will, of course, contain elements of the answer to the second: the place of the institution or sub-system in a larger system will determine its diversity and autonomy. Further, a developmental theory provides a context for interpreting time, and thus can be oriented to the past, present, or future.

One fruitful area of application of the theory of development and participation are local political units. They are more or less firmly fixed, at least formally, in systems of greater complexity; they are more or less universal in contemporary national political systems; they are, for most countries, a focal point of participation; and they vary both within and across systems in terms of their level and rate of change in both development and participation.

If this theory is applied to a specific area, a set of predictions follow for specific units of local government. These predictions if they are clearly tied to the theory, become the empirical foundation for generating further predictions, for specifying additional conditions under which the predictions hold true, and for modifying and elaborating the theory. Local political units, no matter how extensively researched, are however, only one possible area that can contribute to the »truth« value of the theory. It is, nonetheless, an almost inexhaustible domain of data for testing a theory.

MACRO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES

As has been discussed- whether and the extent to which, there are multiple levels in the system is a direct consequence of development. It is an empirical question whether any particular point of aggregation or level constitutes a system or sub-system. Whether or not it does will depend on the extent to which variance for some specified variable or sets of variables is substantially and significantly explained at that level in comparison to higher or lower levels, more or less inclusive points of aggregation.

At low levels of development, there are no or few differentiated levels of systems within the system. Rather, there is the single or total system. With some development there is more and more differentiation among levels within the system and among particular kinds of variables or sectors that are differentially influenced by these different levels. With the relative »maturity« of institutional participation, there is more sub-system autonomy and specialization of particular level.³⁶ Thus, for example, small local units may explain political or voting behavior, even smaller ones social attitudes or kinship patterns, and higher levels, such as a region, economic behavior or cultural preferences. There is, with the growth of institutional participation, a continuous unfolding, changing, and shifting set of levels within the system, requiring one to seek out which level of »analysis« is most appropriate for specific sets of characteristics or behavior.

As institutional participation peaks, giving way to systemic participation, there is a continual upward shift to levels of greater complexity. In time, all levels within the system will be by-passed in favor of direct individual system linkages. What will remain local will be geographical points distributing the population in such a way that physical space and system linkages are facilitated. People will remain »local«; social, political and economic behavior will be absorbed into other systems. One implication of this general prediction is that the most appropriate systems for the study of behavior in

a local context are developing systems — systems moving to the maturity of institutional participation — rather than systems of either low or high development.

The reasons for the shift from local levels to higher levels of the system are twofold. The one that has been discussed is derived from the law of requisite variety which states that any system has more variety than any of its components. As individuals obtain more variety they will shift their activity, their conscious participation, to higher levels. Another concerns the changes that have occurred with economic development — the reduction in the importance of the time-cost-distance functions. A local political unit reflects, or is justifiable, in terms of time — distance — cost functions.

Movement of goods and people however, has become progressively less a linear function of distance and more a constant cost in terms of encoding (packing) and decoding (unpacking). Further, with modern information technology, distance is now almost a negligible factor in the movement of messages.

Two general phenomenological manifestations of development (also defined phenomenologically rather than theoretically, as rising output per capita or other versions of economic growth) illustrate this process: urbanization and education³¹. Education will be used as a phenomenological indicator of individual variety and urbanization as an indicator of how accessible a country's diversity is to people. It is clear that the most developed countries compared to the least developed countries, discounting for some mixed patterns of development, are distinguished by the population living in cities. It is also clear empirically that the most educated (most complex) individuals in the society live in cities (have access to diversity). It is redundantly clear from a variety of studies that the most cosmopolitan individuals focus their activity and attention on events outside of the locality — on the nation or in a limited number of cases on international affairs. It is clear, furthermore, with some exceptions such as the Philippines, that participation in formal participatory institutions is higher in the cities and higher among the more highly educated groups³². Predictions from our theory of development account for these consistently observed phenomenological findings concerning the relationships among education, urbanization, cosmopolitanism and participation.

What this means for the study of local social and political units is that in systems of small scale, the local unit is largely self-contained and levels of higher aggregation are just that, aggregations, and not systems. With development, levels evolve; later, to recede. Regions will absorb the variance of cities in terms of employment rates or consumer prices; characteristics of metropolitan areas will explain more variance than characteristics of local units within them. With further development, even regional differences will disappear in terms of national fluctuations in employment.

What and how much is local, both in participation and other activity, is determined by development. It is probably true that variance, along several dimensions of U. S. cities, is better explained in terms of their membership in major economic regions than in terms of their purely local peculiarities. Further it is highly probable that as the country develops and the variety of individuals with cities increase, regional variations will give way to national factors. There is evidence to support this for U. S. cities. Some comparative research has shown that how much behavior is locally proscribed or determined is a function of development. Local level variables, for example, explain more local variance in India than in the U. S. Again, other factors must be held constant.³⁶

MICRO-IMPLICATIONS

Although the macro-system implications of development are decisive for local political units, local units themselves manifest the impact of developmental processes on participation. Two such lines of implications will be extracted for discussion: opening up alternatives for individuals and the diffusion of local political power. This discussion is primarily illustrative of systems that are moving into a stage of high institutional participation.

With increase in development at the local level, there is increased variety and thus combinatorial possibilities for diversity. With increased diversity, there are more alternatives for the individual. When there are more alternatives and a greater probability of satisfying any preference, the incentives to participate increase. Thus, with greater variety the gross level of individual participation should correspondingly increase.

With increases in alternatives and thus individual freedom of choice, the intensity of particular conflicts will diminish. This decrease is a result of the availability of alternatives to any particular outcome. An individual's freedom of choice, a function of his variety, increases his mobility, physically, socially, and psychologically. He can find some place outside of his locality, shift his organizational or institutional activities, or orient himself to systems of greater scale. With increases in general mobility there is a reduction in the ability of local institutions, to sanction individuals informally or formally, (with choice, the duration of the sanction can be obliterated by leaving the community). As the weight of probable negative consequences of participation are reduced, individuals are more willing to »risk« participation. Thus, the relationships between alternatives, individual choice, mobility, sanctions, lead to greater inclusion of individuals, and, thus, the intensity of their participation in the institutions within the local unit.

Further with increases in individual variety and the prospects for mobility, those with the most variety will tend to gravitate to systems of greater complexity. Thus, with the development of the local unit individuals with relatively greater variety will leave (or want to leave) and their participation will be increasingly oriented to systems of greater complexity (cosmopolitanization).

With alternatives, institutional power or control of local governments over individuals not only is reduced, but is also more equally distributed among individuals and institutions in the local unit³⁷. First there are more competing local institutions to which individuals can attach themselves, each of which have some impact on the state of the local system. Secondly, the local governmental institutions, capacity to sanction will diminish. The importance of formal decision-making institutions will accordingly be obscured. In response to this, the formal institutions will become more responsive and representative, even though more and more individuals become more involved with specialized institutions that better meet their needs. As a result, there will be more turnover among local elected leadership, more diversity among those selected, and at the same time less and less to do. Events will become increasingly determined by other institutions within the local unit as well as by those outside of it.³⁸

With a shift from institutional participation to systemic participation, local units will gradually become points of physical aggregation of individuals for the delivery and dispersion of goods and services generated by the macro-system. Political leaders will become symbolic residuals of a previously prevailing order of development and participation.

APPENDIX:

Development and the Three Modes of Participation:

The following chart is a partial illustrative statement of the developmental factors which affect shifts in the modes of participation. The specific items are illustrative and suggestive rather than comprehensive. They are formulated in the Weberian language of ideal types, indicating that empirically there are no such clear instances. Each existing system is assumed to have some aspects of each mode with one dominating. Because of the Weberian language, the expressions are phenomenological, that is, point to descriptive manifestations rather than project values of general variables.

Development as it has been defined, yields a single, quantitative measure for any social system although such a measure is composed of several dimensions. Different levels of development have social structural and dynamic consequences for participation. These are referred to in the chart as the *developmental context*. The three types of participation, however, are »qualitatively« different from one another and come about as a result of quantitative changes in the level of development. Each of these factors are intrrelated.

DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT OF PARTICIPATION

Dimension	Low	Level of Development Medium	High
1. Basis of social organization	Individual similarities (uniformity)	Group differences, individual similarities (pluralism)	Individual similarity and diversity (total diversity)
2. Character of social structure	Rigid	Flexible	Fluid
3. Basis of »Political« organization	Authority	Power	Influence
4. Levels of spatial sub-systems	A single, limited territorial unit	Multiple levels	Global nonterritorial system
5. (In-) Equality	Set roles	Social and material inequality	Equality of individual diversity
6. Freedom of Choice	Limited alternatives and determined choices	Many alternatives and limited choice	Many alternatives and unlimited choice
7. Conflict	Few, but intense	Many, not intense	Few, not intense
8. Nature of associations	Restricted within, indiscriminate, and casual	Particularistic, categorical, and durable	Continuous, but transitional, selective, inclusive, purposeful, and temporary
9. Social norms	Customary-sacred	Positive law	Secular, moral responsibility (norms)
10. Mechanisms of social control	Exclusion - sanction	Incentives/sanctions	Self regulating

Dimension	Low	Level of Development Medium	High
11. Physical mobility	Bounded to locality	Limited, but increasing	No permanent location
12. Social (horizontal, vertical) mobility	Categorically circumscribed	Limited, but increasing	Irrelevant
13. Utilization of human resources	Irrelevant	Under-utilized	Fully utilized

THREE MODES OF PARTICIPATION

Dimension	Symbolic	Institutional	Systemic
1. Function of participation	Maintenance of cohesion	Representation of interest	Development of individual and system
2. Level of participatory focus	Total (small scale) society	Institutions, organizations	Global system
3. Scope of individual properties considered relevant	All of a few possible	A few of many possible	All of many possible
4. Nature of participatory behavior	Submerged in uniform, casual activities	Secondary to the main (occupational) activity	Primary activity of the individual
5. Purpose of participatory behavior	Not explicit	Participation instrumental to particular objectives, values	Individual pursuit of freedom
6. Substance of participatory behavior	Expression of uniformity	Particular (kind of) issue (s)	General criteria
7. Consciousness of role and responsibility	Unaware	Awareness of self-interest, limited responsibility	Awareness of and responsibility for the system
8. Repetitive — creative	Generally repetitive	Repetitive and innovative	Innovative, creative
9. Passive-active roles	Passive. no choice	Choice of various passive roles (audiences)	Unlimited choice of active
10. Contributive vs. consumptive	No (limited) exchange	Clear distinction: sacrifice vs. benefit	Fused

Dimension	Symbolic	Institutional	Systemic
11. Time span perspective of participation	Past, present: predominant concern — immediacy, past	Short term: Present-Future (some) concern about future	Long-term: past present future
12. Decision-making Agents	Single authoritative body (individual)	Groups, institutions, organizations	Individual
13. Division between private (informal) and public participation	No public sphere	Recognized and valued	Fusion, no private

FOOTNOTES

¹ R. A. Dahl. »The City in the Future of Democracy«, *The American Political Science Review*, vol 61, (Dec. 1967).

² This is being done in our »The Dynamics of Developmental Change«, (in progress).

³ This has been the basis of criticisms of studies of voting behavior using survey analysis.

⁴ This question is being dealt with in the comparative study of participation by S. Verba and his associates, where the system property of participation is conceptualized and assessed as the distribution of individual participation across classes. For a report on a part of this research, see S. Verba, N. Nie and J. Kim, *The Modes of Democratic Participation*, *Comparative Politics Series*, vol 2, (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971).

⁵ There are several historical studies pointing to this inclusionary process, which was gradual and peaceful in some countries and violent in others.

⁶ Much of the research on diffusion of innovation in rural development deals with individual involvement in the process of change. See for example, E. M. Rogers, *Communication of Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

⁷ Studies of social or political mobilization take this view. For a discussion, see D. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965).

⁸ See S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

⁹ The presence of lawful relationships does not preclude choice or diversity. Indeed predicting consequences of choice is essential to the choice itself. Most social laws take on an »if then« form; some of these conditions can be easily manipulated, others only at great cost, and some, at the present time at least, not at all. Although we share the views of others that development involves complexity, we do not think all systems will develop; only that if they do, certain consequences probably follow.

¹⁰ This bias makes this paper less relevant to the developing countries. However, much contemporary developmental literature is »biased« toward less developed countries. As a result, perhaps, this literature is also biased in terms of the past of developed countries, rather than in terms of their future. as a »structure« for a theory.

¹¹ This is only one use of a system paradigm. There are others, such as a logic for simulation or as a »structure« for a theory.

¹² These terms are, of course, not original, although the latter is not popular. For such a view of political systems, see J. Bruner and G. Brewer, *Organized Complexity*, (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

¹³ Development could also be applied to non-social systems.

¹⁴ For an elaboration of this in the context of political systems, see H. Teune, »Integration of Political Systems«, (paper delivered at the International Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1971).

¹⁵ This poses a problem of a near-tautology in research in that variance on those properties that are related to integration cannot vary to zero. No System can have, by definition, »0« integration.

¹⁶ This is only a rough estimate of the correlations across individuals, local units, etc. for several domains, e. g. predicting economic from political variance; or social characteristics from political attitudes. Such correlations, if they were a sample of all »correlations«, across all sectors levels could serve as a relatively precise indicator of a system's integration.

¹⁷ The higher the level of development and thus interdependence, the »better« the statistical relationships. Thus, with development, econometric and other models of prediction become possible, and, over time, better models of predictions.

¹⁸ The conceptual literature on power deals with this. A has power over B, if, when A acts, B does something he would not otherwise do. But A acts (or-re-acts) to B, etc.

¹⁹ Degrees of difference on specific dimensions are ignored here in favor of a binary measurement language: it is similar or it is not. Any refinement of the measurement language would strengthen the points being made.

²⁰ This is a logical statement that under specified conditions is hypothesized to be true empirically. Also, the fact that one object changes in two or more different ways at the same time as a resulting of changing in only one way, involves the logic of levels, although it often expressed as contradictions or dialectics, more frequently seen in the social world than perhaps any other.

²¹ See R. A. Dahl, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of size meaningful deliberation, and impact on meaningful decisions.

²² See, our »Svilupo dei sistemi e apertura dei confini« »Development and Openness of Systems), Prospettive di efficienza, *Numeri Unici di Sociologia*, Anno 12, No. 3 (Trento, 1972).

²³ Literature on political development speaks of the development of differentiated political institutions. See G. Almond and G. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

²⁴ There are relational properties »proper«, such as elite, (elitemass), leader (leader-follower), which can never be properties of any single object or individual. These involve another kind of analysis. The discussion here is on properties that are »allocatable« to single individuals. And thus »aggregatable«.

²⁵ The full presentation is not given here. The exponential function would have to be modified according to assumptions of replacement, excluding the null set, etc.

²⁶ Education, depending on some contextual factors, is one of the best indicators of an individual's variety.

²⁷ The history of any two individuals facing the same situation may result in adding to the differences between them, despite the similar experience. Taking into account learning multiplies the potential for human diversity.

²⁸ See our predictions concerning system exchange and development, in our »Development and the Openness of Systems«.

²⁹ W. Ashby is credited with this in his, *Introduction to Cybernetics* (New York: Wiley, 1956).

³⁰ This in part explains the circulation of elites that has been studied as a »pre-condition« of political integration. See K. Deutch, et al., *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).

³¹ See appendix for a more representative elaboration.

³² Z. Mlinar, Les conflits sociaux et le development social en Yougoslavie, *Revue de l'Est*, Volume 3, no. 2, Paris 1972.

³³ Almond and Powell (*op. cit.*) speak of sub-system autonomy increasing with development. Sub-system autonomy, however, in our view increases with shifts to institutional participation, and then is reduced.

³⁴ There are a variety of cross-national aggregative data studies on which these conclusions are based. See, for example F. Harbison, J. Maruhnic, J. Resnick, *Quantitative Analyses of Modernization and Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, 1970).

³⁵ The ecological characteristics and the individual inferences from them are somewhat problematical. For example, in the Phillipines, it is relatively clear that educated groups in cities withdraw from the political system.

³⁶ See, ISVIP, *Values and the Active Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

³⁷ See the research by Janez Jerovšek on decision-making in »developed« and »under-developed« communes in Slovenia, Yugoslavia; Janez Jerovšek, »The Structure of Influence in the Yugoslav Commune, *The New Atlantis*, Vol. 1 (winter 1970).

³⁸ The amount of actual discretion for public officials, legislators, executives, local authorities in the annual budget has been a point of debate in the U. S. It is clear, however, that in any given year, monies over which decisions can be made are a small proportion of the total, most of which has been committed. Any major re-allocations would have to be effectuated over a number of years.

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DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF DECISION MAKING ON PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF THE COMPANY

During a number of years an intensive interest of the scientists is felt in the sphere of the self-management efficiency, or more exactly in possible influences of participation in the self-management bodies on a number of sociological variables. These researches can be roughly grouped in two categories: first- the investigations of the humanistic variables, i.e. the consequences of the participation for the workers' behaviour as reflected in their job attitudes, job satisfaction, chances for social promotion, feelings of alienation and similar, while the second group treats the power distribution in the company and its relations to some characteristics of the company.

The first group of research resulted in some interesting outcomes. Some previous research performed by the author (J. Obradović, 1967) did not reveal any positive influence of participation in self-management organs on job attitudes. Out of a number of variables the only two favourably affected by the participation were satisfaction with the salary (regardless of the technical level of production) (J. Obradović, 1971.) and satisfaction with the physical working conditions. Also a total lack of any difference between workers-participants and workers non-participants in their feelings of personal influence in self-managerial processes (especially on the handicraft level of production) was obtained. The workers-participants are generally more satisfied with work, but at the same time they are also more alienated — in the Marx's sense. They are alienated and more satisfied — in spite of it. (Obradović, 1968, 1970).

Such inconsistent and interesting results may be explained by the experience individuals accumulated during their participation activity, as well as by the aspirations they had when starting this activity. It can be supposed that too high a level of aspirations had frustrating effects on the real life experiences, resulting in a higher alienation than the absence of such aspirations might have.

These results do not encourage much hope for the work humanization by means of participation. But there are two reasons why it is difficult to generalize the results: the model of participation which we can find in contemporary Yugoslav companies most probably will be different in the future. The other reason is that in our research we have taken formal, not actual participation as the independent variable. Some authors assign the lack of positive effects mainly to this second reason.

The second major group of research in the field treats the power distribution in the company. The investigation in 20 companies in Slovenia (Jetrovšek, Možina 1969) aimed at revealing the factors discriminating between the efficient and non-efficient companies showed very similar pattern, in both groups: the power decreases with the decrease in the hierarchical level,

regardless of the degree of the economic efficiency attained by the company. The research performed by J. Županov (1971) pointed to the oligarchic structure of the power distribution in Yugoslav companies, the similar results being evidenced in some other investigations with different samples. I. Šiber obtained similar results and compared the perception of the power distribution in Yugoslav companies with that obtained by A. Tannenbaum (1968) in American ones.

The most extensive research in this field was performed by B. Kavčič (1968) in 92 companies in Slovenia. His results show not only the oligarchic structure of the power distribution, but also that the respondents do not expect that it should be different. The same author (1968) tried to assess the differences between the companies with high and low salaries, but did not find any.

In our opinion, it is possible to draw a general conclusion that power distribution in Yugoslav companies is autocratic. Here we are not interested in what is the type of power distribution, but whether the actual participation of workers is carried out. If the power distribution is autocratic, we could conclude that the workers' participation is of such a kind as to allow this type of power distribution. Namely, we could consider the power distribution as depending on participation in the activity of the self-managerial bodies, and as the power distribution in Yugoslav companies is autocratic, the democratic participation of the maximum number of participants is not carried out.

All the results mentioned so far, though interesting, logical and plausible, treat the power distribution variable only as the individual perceptions which are indubitably correlated with the actual participation, but we do not know in what degree, intensity of correlation probably depending on the sample. Because of the representativeness of the sample, majority of investigations allowed for a considerable number of workers without any qualifications, who were not fully informed about the power distribution, because of low educational level or the kind of work performed.

Further, in all research the questionnaire method was used for data collecting, which suffers from many deficiencies, the most important one being a lack of sincerity of respondents. The only method avoiding such deficiencies would be that of the systematic observation, as it yields more valid results and the data represent actual behaviour and not only the perceptions of it.

HYPOTHESIS

As the starting point the hypothesis may be stated that in the process of decision making on the central workers councils' meetings the more intensive participation is contributed by the individuals of higher educational level, experts and managers, while the other socio-professional groups participate much less intensively. Further, we claim that the distribution of participation varies according to the nature of the problem.

METHOD

As the self-management is primarily manifested in the process of decision making at the workers councils sessions, while the preparation of the proposals is the duty of the specialist services and the implementation of the decisions is the duty of the managers, we decided on observation of the

decision making process, more exactly, registering who is making proposals and whose proposals are accepted.

We started the observation in the Spring of 1966. in four companies of the Zagreb region. During the six months period, every session of the central workers' councils was observed by an observer who was familiar with the methodology of social sciences and who was at the same time employed by the company. It was necessary for the observers to belong to the company as to be able to recognize and identify the names and functions of the participants among a series of other characteristics. During this period each decision made was seriously scrutinized by all the observers together with the research team, in order to achieve maximum objectiveness when registering the data. After this period further improvement was not necessary. By the method we constructed it was possible to register the frequency and length of discussions, number of explanations or answers on questions posed, number of original proposals as possible solutions and the number of accepted proposals. Besides these dimensions of participation the observer had to register the name of the group participant who was backing interest, which arguments he used and which were his main arguments if he had several.

All the data were registered in the order they appeared during the discussion, so the complete course of a decision making process was registered, and the detailed picture of the participation in each particular field was obtained.

After six months of pilot study we started sampling of the companies for the final investigation, encountering grave problems. Statistically representative sample of the companies for the whole Yugoslavia would not allow employing the professional people (psychologists and sociologists) as the observers, and that would seriously impair the objectivity and validity of the results, as any other person appointed by the company would not most probably be truly motivated or free from bias. So we decided on the intentional sample: 24 companies were chosen in four republics — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, comprising the companies of different size, various technological level of production and industrial branches. In all the companies chosen an industrial psychologist or sociologist was employed for at least two years, and they obtained permission by the management to attend and register the course of each workers' council meeting.

We started with the final form of the investigation in the Autumn of 1966. and finished with observation in December of 1969, so the research lasted for three years. During this period four of the observers left their companies, and that left us with the data on twenty companies.

During three years in twenty companies in the process of decision making in the central workers' council meetings 1825 individuals participated with 16.941 discussions which lasted 52.812 minutes. Out of the total number of discussions, 2558 were presentations, explanations or answers to the posed questions, while rest of the discussions were questions or interactions among the members. Total of 4416 proposals was given, out of which 2736 were accepted and transformed in decisions.

After all data were collected, 8 specialists economists and psychologists classified them independently in 15 categories, and the last one representing the themes experts could not reach the common decision on.

The following categories were obtained:

1) Economic problems concerning the market

- relations to consumers, consignees and buyers
- selling policies (contracts, delivery, transport)

- problems of competitive power (assortment, prices, delivery dates, quality)
 - financial policy, obtaining credits, foreign currency)
 - assessing the basis for market planning
 - procuring of goods
- 2) Cooperation with other companies**
- (Economic, technical, technologico-organizational-investment cooperation)
- specialization of production, cooperation (in the current or new production)
 - creating of joint services (export, procuring of goods, import, selling, market research, services, scientific research, education for employees, joint business financing, joint investments)
 - integration
- 3) Total internal economic activity**
- 4) Distribution of personal income (wages)**
- job evaluation
 - norms
 - relations of wages of various worker categories
- 5) Technico-productive activity**
- technical research
 - development
 - construction
 - technical documentation
 - product inspection
 - means of production
 - technology of material
 - technology of process
 - procuring of the machines and instruments
- 6) Personnel problems**
- hiring
 - problems of employee qualifications
 - qualification structure and appointments of personnel
 - employee education
- 7) Human relations at the group level**
- Human relations — all the pertinent problems concerning the relations of social groups (workers-administrative staff, workers-managers, direct producers-nonproductive staff)
- conflicts between social groups
 - morale of social groups
- 8) Human relations at the individual level**
- complaints — regardless of content (because of the notice of dismissal, salaries, job evaluation and similar)

9) Standard of living and social welfare

- workers-travellers
- kindergartens
- new apartments
- social problems
- recreation in the company
- insuring the food in the company
- material aid to the workers and handicapped
- material aid to the workers' families
- compensation for the vacation expenses
- recreation outside of the company
- communal expenditure

10) Organization of the company

- defining and redefining of the organizational units
- defining and redefining the organizational units and their scope of work
- coordination of work in the organizational units
- defining the system of the working places

11) Work organization

- time and motion study
- physical conditions of work
- organization of the work flow

12) Inner and outside socio-political themes

- basic ideo-political themes
- Constitution and regulations
- relations of outside socio-political organizations to the organizations within the company and to the company itself
- socio-political organizations within the company

13) Legislative activity

- legal regulations within the company — enactments and changes
- all the standing orders and directories — enactments and changes

14) Formal activity of the self-management organs

- nomination of the commissions, president, secretary
- agenda and constituting

15) Miscellaneous

Owing to such a classification it was possible to register and analyze the participation of each socio-professional group on every theme and in all themes taken together. Here we are primarily interested in the participation in the scope of the first four themes — covering the economic problems in the most general sense. The first two themes represent the economic policy of the company toward the other companies, the third one covers total inner economic policy, while the fourth one is limited to the distribution of personal income, implying along with the economic themes some others too.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

It is difficult to state definitely what are independent and what are dependent variables, as it is often the case in social sciences, where many interactions are present in both directions. Nevertheless, the following variables are defined as the independent ones:

1. educational level-professional qualifications
2. membership in the League of Communists
3. membership in workers' councils
4. place in functional organization
5. place in the hierarchy of the company

The definition of the first three variables is very simple: they are nominal scales or categories, the data were obtained from the company administration, which guarantees some objectivity. Two last variables are classical dimensions of the company organization. The functional organization is the assignement of employees according to their functions or job, regardless of the qualification level among the members of the group. The operationalization of this variable yielded a nominal scale comprising 9 categories, each of a specific interests. The last variable, i.e. hierarchical place in the organization of the company is more complicated — comprising mainly the status of the managers in the hierarchic organization of the company.

But, as the non-managerial staff was included in the last category, the most convenient label for this variable seemed to be the hierarchical status in the organization of the company. Data for the two last variables were also obtained from the company administration, the categories were defined in advance and the group of 8 judges classified them independently one from another.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

After consulting the relevant literature (Encyclopedia — Leksikografski zavod, Zvonarević (1969), J. R. P. French (1948), (1961), the real participation was defined as the active contribution in decision making process at the sessions of the workers' councils. By this definition it was tried to discriminate a formal participation from the actual one, i.e. a mere presence at the session from the active interaction with the members of the group making a decision. This definition was operationalized, and all possible forms grouped into five categories:

- 1) frequency of discussion
- 2) length of discussion
- 3) number of presenting the problems, explanations or answers
- 4) number of original proposals offered as the possible solutions
- 5) number of the accepted proposals.

First two dimensions are quantitative, while the last three are qualitative aspects of the participation. Besides these, some others were proposed too, such as posing irrelevant or relevant questions, but the statistical analysis proved them to be insignificant. So, the dependent variable comprises five variables, which are in a certain degree mutually interdependent, as presented in Table 1.

T A B L E 1
Correlational matrix of dimensions of participation

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
PROBLEMS CONCERNING MARKET																				
1. Number of presentations	266																			
2. Number of proposals	.478	.857																		
3. Number of proposals accepted	.591	.396	.515																	
4. Frequency of discussions	.630	.086	.402	.454																
5. Length of discussion																				
COOPERATION WITH OTHER COMPANIES																				
6. Number of presentations	.406	.063	.258	.300	.608															
7. Number of proposals	.049	.639	.563	.164	.049	.168														
8. Number of proposals accepted	.017	.526	.590	.152	.048	.133	.797													
9. Frequency of discussions	.058	.051	.049	.106	.010	.101	.159	.142												
10. Length of discussion	.034	.196	.172	.117	.033	.079	.303	.314	.821											
INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS																				
11. Number of presentations	.360	.057	.177	.223	.400	.643	.108	.066	.043	.036										
12. Number of proposals	.045	.708	.663	.171	.048	.105	.669	.590	.076	.208	.326									
13. Number of proposals accepted	.035	.705	.733	.190	.053	.090	.601	.689	.068	.219	.272	.906								
14. Frequency of discussions	.107	.163	.159	.212	.017	.098	.202	.198	.309	.351	.331	.383	.326							
15. Length of discussion	.034	.196	.193	.093	.028	.052	.205	.239	.362	.509	.165	.326	.319	.637						
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME																				
16. Number of presentations	.388	.005	.207	.244	.631	.918	.008	.008	.303	.005	.635	.014	.013	.014	.002					
17. Number of proposals	.025	.765	.717	.144	.052	.070	.700	.614	.057	.201	.081	.789	.780	.186	.216	.030				
18. Number of proposals accepted	.021	.761	.756	.147	.054	.068	.675	.685	.058	.194	.061	.760	.820	.164	.213	.022	.943			
19. Frequency of discussions	.022	.156	.144	.108	.013	.039	.184	.178	.085	.106	.062	.223	.210	.232	.109	.043	.302	.273		
20. Length of discussion	.020	.318	.290	.121	.029	.043	.318	.303	.071	.179	.049	.360	.352	.171	.173	.033	.463	.434	.880	

Correlations over .194 are statistically significant at $P > .05$

Correlations over .254 are statistically significant at $P < .01$

N = 1825

Table 1. gives the intercorrelations between five dimensions of participation for each of the themes defined (first four) and also between five dimensions of each theme with all the others in all the themes. The order of the variables is: 1. number of presentations; 2) number of proposals; 3. number of proposals accepted; 4. frequency of discussion; 5. length of discussions.

This order is repeated for all four themes. The results in the table support the phenomenological breakdown into quantitative dimensions, as the correlation between the number of given and the number of accepted proposals (qualitative aspect) from the one hand and between the frequency and length of discussion (quantitative aspects) are rather high, while the correlation between the quantitative and qualitative aspects in all four themes are generally much lower. The only specificity is the number of presentations and explanations which is highly correlated with the quantitative dimensions. This is to be expected — as the frequent presentations results in longer participation. The intercorrelations point out, that a number of participants is very active, but not giving or having proposals accepted, while the second group gives frequent proposals and they are accepted in general. In the discussion of the results we shall define these two groups.

Finally, we shall concern ourselves with the methods of converting the results on a number of variables into a composite score. The method proposed by Pastuović (1971) to form the index by judges, did not seem convenient in our case, so we treated the dependent variable as a multidimensional one and used adequate statistical methods (multiple and canonic correlations, multiple classification analysis). Here only the multiple correlations were used to test the association between each particular independent variable and five dimensions of participation taken together. Other statistical instruments used are very simple.

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

It seems most convenient to present and interpret the results for each of the four themes separately.

PARTICIPATION OF PARTICULAR SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL GROUPS ON PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE MARKET

A) PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Table 2. gives the results on the distribution of participation among the individuals possessing various professional qualifications.

According to the results, the role of education is of utmost importance for taking the active part in discussing the questions pertaining to this type of business activity. It is quite understandable in light of the complexity of the questions relating to the market. As the pressure for achieving the economic efficiency is always present, it is understandable that the maximum participation is expected and allowed to the market specialists, so 50% of all proposals and time is used by the individuals of college qualifications. The group of highest qualifications dominates in quantitative aspects of participation, but this domination is shared with the individuals of the polytechnical high school qualifications in the qualitative aspects. If the participation of two highest qualification groups is compared to their percentage

TABLE 2

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the market by individuals with different professional qualifications

Dimensions of participation	Qualification levels								x ²	P	
	Faculty	Polytechnical high schools	Lower technical or administr.	Highly skilled blue collar workers	Semi-skilled blue collar workers	Without qualifications					
Frequency of discussion	50,2	33,2	1,2	9,2	5,2	1,0	0,0	341,601	<	0,01	
Length of discussion	73,6	17,8	0,7	3,9	3,6	0,4	0,0	454,259	<	0,01	
Number of presentations	68,4	20,3	7,6	1,3	2,5	0,0	0,0	51,515	<	0,01	
Number of proposals	49,7	41,0	4,0	1,3	2,0	2,0	0,0	38,891	>	0,05	
Number of proposals accepted	50,7	36,6	4,2	4,9	2,1	1,4	0,0	273,733	<	0,01	
Percentage employment	6,4	11,0	4,2	10,9	28,6	17,2	21,6				
	R = 0,651				P < 0,01						

employment, it is easy to detect their total dominance in that field. The given chi squares also point to this disproportion, and the obtained R clearly points out that in the sphere of the market, the intensity of participation is raising with the level of education.

B) MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS

TABLE 3

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the market by membership in the League of Communists

Dimensions of participation	Membership in the League of Communists				x ²	P
	Members	Non-members				
Frequency of discussion	73,0	27,0			53,255	< 0,01
Duration of discussions	72,2	27,8			238,252	< 0,01
Number of presentations	68,4	31,6			1,027	> 0,05
Number of proposals	72,8	27,2			0,003	> 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	69,7	30,3			1,084	> 0,05
Percentage employment	12,9	87,1				
	R = 0,366		P < 0,01			

It is evident from the Table 3. that the majority of the participants in the field are the members of the League of Communists. The comparison of the participation of the Communist League members with their percentage employment indicates their dominance in the decision making in the sphere of economic policy related to the market. Thus, the relatively low correlation between the membership and five dimensions of participation (Table 1) can not be explained in terms of insignificance of this variable for participation. It can be easily recognized as the statistical effect of correlating one variable of small dispersion with the other one highly dispersed.

What are possible explanations of the results obtained? The first one would imply the transmission of the policy from the Communist League bodies outside of the company and the second explanation would state the existence of such a transmission only in some most important instances, while in all the others the individuals only stand for the specific group they represent, their membership in the League of Communists being only a prerequisite for the participation. The greater validity of the second explanation is supported by the results given at the Table 6, which show evidently that the managers who probably stand for the interests of their organizational units are predominant in discussions. Majority of these managers are at the same time members of the League of Communists.

Participation of the workers' council members is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the market by membership in workers' councils

Dimensions of participation	Membership in Workers' councils				
	Chairman	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2	P
Frequency of discussion	27,6	26,2	46,2	6,647	> 0,05
Length of discussion	10,6	19,5	69,9	574,054	< 0,01
Number of presentations	7,6	21,5	70,9	26,7765	< 0,01
Number of proposals	28,5	19,9	51,7	4,765	> 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	30,2	14,1	55,6	15,448	> 0,05
Percentage employment		1,3	98,7		
	R = 0,469		P < 0,01		

The comparison with the Table 3 shows the opposite trends. It is doubtless that in solving the economic problems connected with the market, the nonmembers are predominant. They most frequently give presentations and explanations, most frequently propose and their proposals are usually accepted. If the chairman's participation is added to theirs, their dominance is even more evident. Such addition is justified, as the main duty of the chairman is to present the proposals made by the specialist services, and so the large percentage of acceptances (30,2%) of all the chairman's proposals is explainable. The multiple correlation is to be interpreted in the same manner (R = .469, P < .01) — meaning that the participation is more intensive if the individuals participating are not members of the workers councils.

Now we shall try to assess what is the intensity of participation in discussion on themes related to the market if the participants are classified according to their place in functional organization.

TABLE 5

**Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the market
by diferent groups representing functional organization**

Dimensions of participation	Functional organization										x ²	P
	Research	Management	Administration	Technology	Commerce dpt.	Workshop	Workshop administration	Technical adm. in the workshop	Head of the workshop			
Frequency of discussion	4,6	13,0	27,6	3,2	15,8	21,2	8,0	2,0	4,6	878,240	<	0,01
Lenght of discussion	3,2	32,1	26,4	3,5	1,5	10,0	2,9	1,3	3,6	1807,011	<	0,01
Number of presentations	1,3	17,7	41,8	5,1	21,5	10,1	0,0	0,0	2,5	90,926	<	0,01
Number of proposals	6,6	5,3	39,2	1,3	17,3	11,3	17,2	1,3	0,6	91,288	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	6,3	8,5	33,0	4,4	18,7	12,0	15,9	1,4	0,8	101,727	<	0,01
Percentage employment	3,3	0,2	10,5	5,8	9,1	66,6	2,8	1,5	0,2			
	R = 0,890					P < 0,01						

As shown by Table 5, the central expert services have a domineering position. The individuals belonging to the central administration contributed more than a third of all proposals and almost all of them were accepted. If the participation of all the central specialist services (the management also included) is summed, the dominance of the central services is evident, with workshop administration and technical staff of the workshop contributing also frequent and successful proposals. These results point to a certain decentralization of decision making process, reaching as far as workshop specialists. Participation of the individuals who according to the functional organization belong to the workshop is meagre in solving the problems connected with the market, and as the next statistical table shows, the majority of participants belonging to the workshop are executives, supervisors or heads of the organizational units in the workshop. Although the category »head of the workshop and his aids« does not belong to the functional organization in the strict sense, it was extracted from other workshop categories because of its specific interests which are possibly more similar to those voiced by the central administration.

The importance of the functional organization in the participation activity is evident from the chi square values, which are large and statistically significant, meaning that the results are not obtained by chance. Also, $R = .890$ indicates a high and positive correlation between the functional organization and participation. In other words, the intensity of participation in solving the problems of market is highly dependent on the status of the individual in the company's functional organization. It is more logical to expect that the direction of the relation is of the functional organization determining the intensity of participation, although there exists a certain possibility that the place of the individual in the company is also affected by his participating activity.

Of all the results obtained so far, the most interesting are given in Table 6.

TABLE 6

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the market by individuals with different hierarchical status in the company

Dimensions of participation	Hierarchical status in the company					x ²	P
	Higher managers-administration	Lower managers-administration	Higher managers-workshop	Lower managers-workshop	Nonmanagerial staff		
Frequency of discussion	40,8	8,4	17,2	9,2	24,4	415,074	< 0,01
Length of discussion	63,4	7,1	9,9	3,8	15,8	1177,871	< 0,01
Number of presentations	52,2	20,3	13,9	2,2	11,4	33,822	< 0,05
Number of proposals	39,1	11,9	21,8	4,0	23,2	37,607	< 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	33,7	10,6	22,5	5,6	27,5	26,199	> 0,05
Percentage employment	0,59	1,52	1,10	5,00	91,79		
	R = 0,750		P < 0,01				

They indicate that the most decisive role at the workers council sessions is taken by the managerial staff, when the problems of the market are discussed. Three fourths of discussions belong to the executives, they consume over 80% of total time spent in discussion, they provide 90% of all explanations and three fourths of proposals all of which are accepted. Among them the directors and heads of the sectors have a domineering role. Beside the executives from central administration, very important role is that of the executives from the workshop: heads of the work-shop or factories and economic units. They do not discuss too frequently, but they supply many proposals, which are very often accepted. Here also the decentralization had taken place as far as the heads of the workshop.

The multiple correlation obtained shows that the higher the hierarchical status of the individual in the company, the more intensive is his participation. High correlations between the functional organization and participation from the one hand and the hierarchical status in the organization and participation on the other show, that in solving the problems of the market these two variables are most predictive and most important, with the majority of participants being the members of the League of Communists. The role of the qualification levels is of much less importance.

PARTICIPATION OF SOCIOPROFESSIONAL GROUPS ON THEMES CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE COOPERATION WITH OTHER COMPANIES

The distribution of participation in solving economic problems related to cooperation when various qualification levels are considered, is given in Table 7.

TABLE 7

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the cooperation with other companies, by individuals with different professional qualifications

Dimensions of participation	Qualification levels								χ^2	P
	Faculty	Polytechnical high schools	Lower technical or administr.	Highly skilled blue collar workers	Skilled blue collar workers	Semi-skilled blue collar workers	Without qualifications			
Frequency of discussion	52,2	26,4	0,8	15,6	3,7	0,4	0,7	205,108	<	0,01
Length of discussion	59,1	28,8	0,4	8,1	2,1	0,1	1,4	757,353	<	0,01
Number of presentations	73,9	16,2	0,9	4,5	4,5	0,0	0,0	28,528	>	0,05
Number of proposals	62,0	26,4	0,6	6,1	3,1	1,2	0,6	19,591	>	0,05
Number of proposals accepted	52,9	37,0	0,8	2,5	4,2	1,7	0,8	27,572	<	0,05
Percentage employment	6,4	11,1	4,2	10,9	28,6	17,2	21,6			
	R = 0,490			P < 0,01						

Here again the individuals of highest qualifications have a major share in all the dimensions of participation. Almost over 90% of the activity belongs to two groups of highest educational level, while the rest to all other qualifications. The chi squares obtained do not support these findings, but they are computed from the absolute frequencies, and as the sessions were frequented by a number of individuals of highest qualifications not taking part in discussions, some chi squares computed by 2 x 7 model were not statistically significant. This is confirmed also by an $R = .490$, $P < .01$ which means that higher the qualifications more intensive the participation — in a degree. If we look at the Table 1, we see that the qualitative aspects of participation in the first sphere are rather highly correlated with the qualitative aspects of the participation in the second sphere. That means that the same individuals frequently present, propose and have their proposals accepted in both spheres. Yet, the results show that the education (qualification) is more important in the sphere of the problems related to the market, than in the sphere of cooperation with other companies. In the first case the independent and dependent variables have 42,25% of the common variance, while in the second, the common variance is only 24,01%. This difference between the multiple correlations can be explained by the social or political intervention which is present when solving the problems related to the cooperation — especially in cases of integration, while it is smaller when the problems of market are in question.

Table 8. shows the relationship between the distribution of participation and membership in the League of Communists, when the problems related to the cooperation are discussed. The results show that the participation of the members on all the dimensions of participation is very intensive. If the Tables 3 and 8 are compared, the more intensive participation is evident in the field of the economic problems related to the cooperation than to the market.

TABLE 8

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the cooperation with other companies, by membership in the League of Communists

Dimensions of participation	Membership in the League of Communists			
	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2	P
Frequency of discussion	77,6	22,4	76,361	< 0,01
Length of discussion	77,0	23,0	49,427	< 0,01
Number of presentations	73,0	27,0	1,593	> 0,05
Number of proposals	75,5	24,5	0,541	> 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	76,5	23,5	0,101	> 0,05
Percentage employment	12,9	87,1		
	R = 0,236		P < 0,01	

Although in both cases the members are predominant, the first field is reserved mainly to the specialists and experts, while the second field is rather politically dyed, and it seems that in this field the members assume a role of a transmitter from the higher bodies outside of the company.

Let us see now how the membership in the central workers' council is affecting the intensity of participation, when the problems of cooperation are concerned. The results are given in Table 9.

TABLE 9

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the cooperation with other companies by membership in workers' councils

Dimensions of participation	Membership in Workers' Councils				
	Chairman	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2	P
Frequency of discussion	22,9	35,9	41,1	286,139	< 0,01
Length of discussion	7,4	33,3	59,3	835,966	< 0,01
Number of presentations	13,5	16,2	70,3	46,049	< 0,01
Number of proposals	20,9	25,2	54,0	15,511	< 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	37,8	14,3	47,9	33,638	< 0,01
Percentage employment		1,3	98,7		
	R = 0,545		P < 0,01		

Similarly to the results in Table 4, here it is also evident that nonmembers propose most frequently and that their suggestions are most frequently accepted. It is highly probable that these persons are the specialists attending the session as the experts for the problems discussed. Majority of them belong to the managerial staff proposing and defending some line of action, or transforming into action some general plans created outside of the company.

The participation of the chairman follows the same lines. As evident from the results, he presents the problems rarely — this being a duty of the experts who are usually nonmembers, but he presents the proposals prepared in advance by the expert services. The services are in contact with the executives, who are in the majority of cases present at the session, and as shown in Table 11, do participate actively. The members of the central workers' council discuss relatively frequently, speak rather long meaning that it is not only questions they pose, but their proposals are rarely accepted. According to our opinion, the results indicate not only a dominance of the experts and executives — nonmembers, but also show that during the process of decision making some alternate groups appear, representing different interests. Because of their hierarchical status in the company, the executives and to a somewhat less degree — specialists, dominate the decision making process even in cases when the economic problems related to the cooperation with other companies are discussed. Table 10. brings the support to this.

TABLE 10

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the cooperation with other companies, by different groups representing functional organization

Dimensions of participation	Functional organization										x ²	P
	Research	Management	Administration	Technology	Commerce dpt.	Workshop	Workshop administration	Technical adm. in the workshop	Head of the workshop			
Frequency of discussion	3,4	20,7	20,1	9,3	10,9	21,6	7,4	1,2	5,4	1197,726	<	0,01
Length of discussion	3,0	36,2	28,3	9,1	6,7	10,1	2,3	0,8	3,7	2933,866	<	0,01
Number of presentations	4,5	24,3	30,6	11,7	9,9	9,9	1,8	0,0	7,2	64,982	<	0,01
Number of proposals	3,1	19,6	32,2	6,9	9,1	13,5	10,4	0,0	5,2	84,374	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	2,5	16,8	28,6	5,8	15,9	12,7	12,6	0,8	4,3	88,299	<	0,01
Percentage employment	3,3	0,2	10,5	5,8	9,1	66,6	2,8	1,5	0,2			
	R = 0,809					P < 0,01						

The results presented reveal the dominance of the company management — central administration, and in opposition to the Table 5, more intensive participation of the workshop heads and their aids.

The influence of the functional organization on the intensity of participation is clearly revealed by the statistical significance of the chi squares and even more by the multiple correlation $R = .809$, $P < .01$ showing a high degree of interrelationship between the functional organization and participation. If the particular coefficient of correlation between the independent variable and the dependent ones is compared to the correlation of other independent variables with the dependent one, the highest degree of correlation is obtained between the functional organization and participation, that means, if the individuals are the Communist League members, their place in functional organization is most predictive for the participation in this field.

Lastly, the results of the Table 11. show the influence of the hierarchical status in the company on the intensity of participation in the sphere of cooperation with other companies.

TABLE 11

Participation in discussion on economic problems related to the cooperation with other companies, by individuals with different hierarchical status in the company

Dimensions of participation	Hierarchical status in company organization					x ²	P
	Higher managers-administration	Lower managers administration	Higher managers-workshop	Lower managers-workshop	Nonmanagerial staff		
Frequency of discussion	36,5	10,0	16,5	7,9	29,1	462,331	< 0,01
Length of discussion	51,9	14,8	14,1	3,9	15,3	1458,973	< 0,01
Number of presentations	51,8	12,7	14,6	6,4	14,5	29,764	< 0,05
Number of proposals	42,9	16,0	20,2	8,0	12,9	58,574	< 0,01
Number of proposals accepted	33,0	10,2	27,1	6,8	22,9	35,736	< 0,01
Percentage employment	0,59	1,52	1,10	5,00	91,79		
	R = 0,620		P < 0,01				

The results show that the participation of lower and higher managers from the workshop is in this field higher than in the economic problems related to the market. The increase in participation of the workshop executives is obvious, while the participation of non-managerial staff is lessened, so generally the intensity of executives' participation regarding the qualitative dimensions is increased. More intensive participation of managers in this field can be explained in terms of political motives having role in this field together with the specialistic-technological ones. If we were interested only in the correlation between participation of the managerial or non-managerial staff, it would be certainly higher than in the case of the respective variables when the problems of the market are in question.

Multiple correlation coefficient $R = .620$ $P < .01$ points to the existence of association between the hierarchical status in the company and the intensity of participation, yet it is lower here than in the field of problems related to the market. This is so because of the fact that in the field of cooperation the workshop management takes an active part, while in relation to the market the company acts as a unity, rendering the role of the central administration more important. Generally, in both fields of participation the results show the place of functional organization and the hierarchical place in the company as most predictive for the intensity of participation.

PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIOPROFESSIONAL GROUPS IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS OF THE TOTAL INTERNAL ACTIVITY

In the fields that comprised the economic problems closely connected with other companies, the dominance of the specialist services was evident. The problems of the next field to be analyzed show some differences. The first two themes implied the relation of the company as a social-technical system toward other groups or companies, while the problems entering the third theme primarily concern the relations between the parts of the company itself, or between each particular part and the management, so it is logical to suppose some new patterns of the distribution of participation. It is probable that some other social groups will be more active as the field of participation is radically changed. This supposition is partially supported by the results of the Table 12.

TABLE 12

Participation in discussion on problems related to the total internal economic activity, by individuals with different professional qualifications

Dimensions of participation	Levels of professional qualifications								χ^2	P
	Faculty	Polytechnical high schools	Lower technical or administr.	Highly skilled blue collar workers	Skilled blue collar workers	Semi-skilled blue collar workers	Without qualifications			
Frequency of discussion	44,5	31,3	0,6	16,8	5,6	0,8	0,4	1099,905	<	0,01
Length of discussion	63,3	20,6	0,4	8,5	6,4	0,5	0,2	2744,980	<	0,01
Number of presentations	64,6	23,8	0,8	8,0	2,7	0,1	0,1	181,494	<	0,01
Number of proposals	49,1	33,1	0,5	11,6	3,9	1,3	0,7	47,523	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	45,6	39,7	0,1	9,1	3,2	1,8	0,4	70,608	<	0,01
Percentage employment	6,4	11,0	4,2	10,9	28,6	17,2	21,6			
	$R = 0,400$						$P < 0,01$			

The review of the results shows somewhat lessened dominance of the group with college education in comparison to the outer economic policy, while the middle administrative and technical qualifications are clearly more active here than in the previous field — the change that was to be expected.

The workshop autonomy is reflected in the relations between the workshops during the decision making process. A limited number of individuals belonging to the workshop specialist services and generally of the middle administrative or technical qualifications most intensively participate in solving inner economic problems, most probably standing for the interests of their workshop. Participation of other groups in this case is negligible, so that in this field of decision making, the existence of the total discrepancy between the actual participation and percentage employment is existing.

All the chi squares are statistically significant and the coefficient of multiple correlation $R = .400$, with $P < .01$ shows that in a certain degree the increase of the qualification level leads to the increase in the intensity of participation. This correlation is smaller than in the first two fields. Although the significance of these differences was not tested, it can be easily supposed that the company as a social group stimulates the activity of the individuals who are most competent in the professional sense when the problems of the competitive kind are in question, but when the inner relationships are concerned — the relations between particular workshops, some other criteria beside the professional competence, such as solidarity between some parts of the company take precedence.

The role of the Communists League members in the process of decision making when inner economic policy of the company is given in the Table 13.

TABLE 13

Participation in discussion on problems related to the total internal economic activity, by membership in the League of Communists

Dimensions of participation	Membership in the League of Communists			
	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2	P
Frequency of discussion	73,8	26,2	1097,049	< 0,01
Length of discussion	67,5	32,5	421,671	< 0,01
Number of presentations	64,1	35,9	47,104	< 0,01
Number of proposals	72,2	27,8	1,884	> 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	73,5	26,5	0,051	> 0,05
Percentage employment	12,9	87,1		

$R = 0,308$

$P < 0,01$

As in previous themes, in this one also the majority of participants are the Communist League members. They cover 75% of discussions and as many of the given and accepted proposals. When comparing the activity of the Communist League members in this field with the intensity of participation on previous themes, the differences are so negligible that it could be stated the dominance of the Communist League members in participation is evident. Multiple correlation $R = .308$ with $P < .01$ indicates low level of relationship, and it can be interpreted as earlier: because of the majority of participants being the members of the League of Communists, there is no dispersion of the values on that variable, influencing the degree of correlation. But this correlation together with the data of the Table 13, shows that the membership in the League of Communists is a prerequisite for participation in this field too.

What is the influence of the membership in the central workers' council on participation in problems concerning the inner economic policy shows Table 14.

TABLE 14

Participation in discussion on problems related to the total internal economic activity, by membership in workers' councils

Dimensions of participation	Membership in workers' councils					P
	Chairman	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2		
Frequency of discussion	24,0	35,9	40,1	124,507	<	0,01
Length of discussion	9,1	29,3	61,6	4834,321	<	0,01
Number of presentations	7,3	29,1	63,6	256,605	<	0,01
Number of proposals	21,9	31,8	46,3	22,678	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	37,8	14,3	47,9	66,853	<	0,01
Percentage employment		1,3	98,7			
	R = 0,343			P < 0,01		

As in the first two fields here also the active part is predominantly taken by non-members in the workers' council. They discuss, explain and propose most frequently and most frequently their proposals are accepted. When the participation of the members of workers' councils and the members of the League of Communists is compared, the opposing tendencies are evident: the majority of the participants are the members of the League of Communists but at the same time the majority of those participating do not belong to the members of the workers councils. Multiple correlation coefficient $R = .545$ with $P < .01$ together with the results of Table 14 would suggest greater probability of taking an active part in discussing the economic problems if the individual is not the workers' council member.

These results can be interpreted by the existence of the strong politico-expert force in the company, resulting either from the strong ties between the political people and company specialists, or from the identity of the political and professional characteristics united in the same individuals. This hypothesis is supported partially by the results given in the Table 15.

TABLE 15

Participation in discussion on problems related to the total internal economic activity, by the groups representing functional organization

Dimensions of participation	Functional organization									χ^2	P	
	Research	Management	Administration	Technology	Commerce dpt.	Workshop	Workshop administration	Technical adm. in the workshop	Head of the workshop			
Frequency of discussion	1,5	13,8	23,1	7,2	8,2	24,7	8,6	4,4	8,7	1987,434	<	0,01
Length of discussion	1,0	23,6	31,1	10,1	6,1	14,8	4,5	3,3	5,3	6304,636	<	0,01
Number of presentations	1,5	16,3	38,4	9,2	6,1	12,1	3,4	3,0	6,7	345,829	<	0,01
Number of proposals	1,2	12,5	30,0	8,2	6,9	17,7	12,9	4,9	5,7	233,511	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	0,7	8,7	34,0	7,0	9,9	14,6	17,7	4,1	3,4	405,706	<	0,01
Percentage employment	3,3	0,2	10,5	5,8	9,1	66,6	2,8	1,5	0,2			
	R = 0,783						P < 0,01					

The management of the company, central administration and workshop administration participate most intensely in the process of decision making. In relation to the percentage employment, the most intensive participation is that of the management, director general and his aids. Though the exact significances of differences were not computed, it seems by comparison of these groups on all themes so far analyzed that the intensity of participation of the workshop administration is stronger here than in the field of the outer economic relations, while between the activity of other groups there are no differences in that respect. This can be explained by the nature of the problems discussed: these are the problems reflecting the relationship between the workshops. Multiple correlation coefficient, $R = .783$ with $P \leq .01$ indicates a very strong association between the intensity of participation and the place in the functional organization, supporting in a sense earlier assumptions on existence of a politico-specialist ties. The specialist component is represented by multiple correlation, while the rest is shown in Tables 13 and 16.

TABLE 16

Participation in discussion on problems related to the total internal economic activity, by individuals with different hierarchical place in the company

Dimensions of participation	Hierarchical place in the company organization					χ^2	P
	Higher managers administration	Lower managers administration	Higher managers workshop	Lower managers workshop	Nonmanagerial staff		
Frequency of discussion	30,4	9,9	20,2	9,9	29,6	881,827	< 0,01
Length of discussion	47,7	10,6	14,5	6,9	20,3	3807,634	< 0,01
Number of presentations	42,5	15,9	14,5	5,3	21,4	166,246	< 0,01
Number of proposals	28,7	12,8	24,6	6,8	27,1	54,552	< 0,01
Number of proposals accepted	23,5	13,9	23,8	6,8	32,4	117,615	< 0,01
Percentage employment	0,59	1,52	1,10	5,00	91,79		
	R = 0,425					P < 0,01	

The table 16. shows the most intensive participation of the managers. This possibly invalidates the statements of some researchers (Pastuović 1972) that the inversion of roles of the managers and workers council members has taken place. The results presented evidently show that the process was not of inverting the roles, but of merging them — the managers being most active in the decision making where their influence should not be felt at all. Also the second group of hypotheses is opened to question, namely that the managers not possessing the power to actualize their proposals try to gain this end through activating others. Such a subtle kind of influence is possibly taking place in some cases. But the results show that executives most directly participate in making decisions, so their influence is consequently the strongest (as shown in the investigation performed by Županov (1969), Šiber at al. (1969). Their influence is felt in the activity of the workers' councils as well as in the process of preparing and implementing the decisions. In any case, the results of the Tables 6, 11 and 16 show that the executives directly present, propose and define their proposals and that in the majority

of cases their proposals are accepted. Also they indicate that the participation of the managers in various fields is not equally intensive: in solving inner economic problems they participate in a somewhat lower degree than in the field of the outer economic policy connected with the cooperation. These data are further discussed in the section on the role of functional organization. In the wide scope of the economic relations between the parts of the company, beside the managers an important part is played by the specialists of various workshops or sections, who probably stand for the interests of their work units. But the multiple correlation $R = .425$ with $P < .01$ is lower than previous ones due to the more proportional participation of the managers of various levels. For instance, in this field the participation of workshop executives on some dimensions is equal to that of the executives from the central administration.

PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIOPROFESSIONAL GROUPS ON THEMES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME

All the previous themes so far discussed could be treated as the professional-technical ones. Market research, advertising, technico-technologic cooperation in and outside of the company are the fields asking for the professional competence and strict specialization, so the results already presented are not quite unexpected. Some authors in this field (G. Friedman, P. Naville, 1965) even state that the actualization of the self-management model in that sphere is not attainable. So it is often maintained that the main field of participation is the distribution of personal income and wages. Participation in this field would in a sense guarantee a protection of the interests of the majority and it would probably affect the motivation, alienation, satisfaction and morale in a positive sense. (R. Likert, 1961). This is the main reason for taking out this field as a separate theme.

The results in this field, when the level of qualification is considered as an independent variable, are given in the Table 17.

TABLE 17

Participation in discussion on problems related to the distribution of personal income or wages by individuals with different professional qualifications

Dimensions of participation	Levels of professional qualifications							x ²	P	
	Faculty	Polytechnical high schools	Lower techn. and admin.	Highly skilled blue collar worker	Skilled blue collar worker	Semi-skilled blue collar worker	Without qualifications			
Frequency of discussion	48,0	26,2	0,5	18,9	4,3	1,5	0,5	427,915	<	0,01
Length of discussion	60,1	20,9	0,3	13,7	3,4	1,0	0,7	406,906	<	0,01
Number of presentations	67,7	17,4	0,0	7,2	5,8	1,2	0,7	29,900	>	0,05
Number of proposals	42,8	33,9	0,0	16,6	4,4	1,8	0,4	13,391	>	0,05
Number of proposals accepted	42,0	45,0	0,0	8,0	3,1	1,9	0,0	41,669	<	0,01
Percentage employment	6,4	11,0	4,2	10,9	28,6	17,2	21,6			
	R = 0,459							P < 0,01		

Here the most conspicuous feature is the existence of the dominance of the individuals holding the highest professional qualifications. In this field, that would by its nature be understandable to all different profiles and professional levels, we also find that the individuals of the first two highest qualification groups cover almost total participation activity — in the same manner as in the fields asking for the professional competence. Here is the only exception, that the college qualification, although proposing most frequently does not have as much proposals accepted as in earlier fields. All other groups, representing almost 70% of all employed, are barely present in the active process of solving problems. Multiple correlation $R = .459$ with $P < .01$ indicates a medium association between the education and participation, meaning that the participation in this field is also influenced by the professional level or education, as in others. This result indicates that the self-managing principle is not operating yet, but it does not mean that the participation is not possible. To investigate this possibility it should be necessary to test the consequence of the intensive participation of lower qualifications on a number of final variables such as productivity, production and workers' satisfaction. In case that the results point to the adverse effects of the low qualification structure of the participants on the final variables, then the question of the justifiability of such participation could be posed. In other words, the possibility of participation in this field is not only depending on the qualification, functional and hierarchical organization, but also on the specific goals of the company, which implies a certain system of values. The dominance of the highest qualifications in this case may be explained by the defending of the interests of the immediate interest group, even more clearly illustrated by some other tables.

The influence of the membership in the League of Communists on the intensity of participation is shown on Table 18. in the field of distribution of income and wages.

TABLE 18

Participation in discussion on problems related to the distribution of personal income or wages by membership in the League of Communists

Dimensions of participation	Member in the League of Communists			
	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2	P
Frequency of discussion	76,0	24,0	123,632	< 0,01
Length of discussion	74,4	25,6	35,591	< 0,01
Number of presentations	62,3	37,7	16,041	< 0,01
Number of proposals	79,7	20,3	2,674	> 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	80,9	19,1	2,452	> 0,05
Percentage employment	12,9	87,1		

$R = 0,258$

$P < 0,01$

In all themes discussed so far an active participation of the members of the League of Communists was evident, but in this field it is most intensive. These results may be interpreted in several different ways, so a clearcut explanation is missing. The first hypothetical explanation is that the League tries to control the distribution and its immediate consequences. The second possible explanation, partially coming from the Tables 20 and 21. regards the

membership in the League of Communists as one of the characteristics of the participants. It is very important until majority of participants are not the members. When the membership in the League of Communists is held constant, the individuals participating most intensively are discriminated mostly according to their place in the functional organization and the place in the hierarchy of the company. In other words, the members of the League of Communists are most active in this field because the majority of the executives are members, as well as many of the experts from the services, and when participating they probably were backing the interest of the groups they belonged to. This is partially supported by the data of the Table 19.

TABLE 19

Participation in discussion on problems related to the distribution of personal income or wages by membership in Workers' Councils

Dimensions of participation	Membership in Workers' Councils				
	Chairman	Members	Nonmembers	χ^2	P
Frequency of discussion	19,5	41,1	39,4	595,693	< 0,01
Length of discussion	11,3	33,9	54,8	624,460	< 0,01
Number of presentations	10,1	26,9	63,0	36,859	< 0,01
Number of proposals	27,7	35,1	37,3	15,793	> 0,05
Number of proposals accepted	43,8	14,8	41,4	89,198	< 0,01
Percentage employment		1,3	98,7		

R = 0,535

P < 0,01

This theme is the one where the chairman shows the most intensive activity. While in previous themes the most frequent proposals and acceptances were given and obtained by the specialists, in the field of the distribution of income and wages, although the non-members were most active in proposing, the most frequently accepted proposals had been coming from the chairman. That means probably that the chairman put forward such kind of proposals that were elaborated previously by the specialist services, so he probably acted here only as a transmitter. On the contrary, the other members proposed very often, but their proposals were rarely accepted. Multiple correlation $R = .535$ with $P < .01$ indicates a high relationship between the role of the individual in the workers' councils and the intensity of participation. The inspection of the results show, that the members of the workers councils are the least important in decision making.

The results given in Table 20. reveal the clear picture of the importance of the individuals' place in the functional organization for his participating activity. The individuals working in research, in a sense acting as the staff organization, are not active at all. At the same time a definite dominance is characteristic for the specialist services such as administration — central and workshop — proposing most frequently and having the largest number of the proposals accepted. In comparison with the percentage employment, the most dominant is the management, while the least active is the workshop, including the workshop management. Even the rough comparison between alternate fields-themes of participation shows the dominance of the same groups: management, services and workshop administration. The intensity of participation of other groups as for example commerce department varies according to the field and nature of the problems discussed.

TABLE 20

Participation in discussion on problems related to the distribution of personal income or wages by the groups representing functional organization on the company

Dimensions of participation	Functional organization									x ²	P	
	Research	Management	Administration	Technology	Commerce dpt.	Workshop	Workshop administration	Techn. adminis. in workshop	Head of the workshop			
Frequency of discussion	1,6	13,1	6,6	9,4	7,8	26,0	7,6	3,8	4,1	668,515	<	0,01
Length of discussion	1,2	18,6	33,5	9,6	6,3	18,6	4,2	3,3	4,7	891,315	<	0,01
Number of presentations	2,2	7,2	43,4	10,2	5,0	23,9	0,0	5,2	2,9	27,201	<	0,05
Number of proposals	1,1	7,8	25,7	8,6	5,9	26,5	16,7	3,3	4,4	70,152	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	0,0	6,2	29,5	6,8	9,9	16,7	25,9	3,1	1,9	96,219	<	0,01
Percentage employment	3,3	0,2	10,5	5,8	9,1	66,6	2,8	1,5	0,2			
	R = 0,725						P < 0,01					

Multiple correlation coefficients also indicate the participation of particular social groups. While the largest coefficient is obtained when the problems of market are treated, meaning that in that field the place in the functional organization of the company is most important, in the field of distribution of personal income it is lowest although rather high in absolute terms. The difference between multiple correlation coefficients in the first and the second theme of participation is statistically significant at the level of $P < 0,01$.

The role of the place in the hierarchy for the participation is given in Table 21.

TABLE 21

Participation in discussion on problems related to the distribution of personal income or wages by groups with different hierarchical place in the organization of the company

Dimensions of participation	Hierarchical place in the company organization					x ²	P	
	Higher managers-administration	Lower managers-administration	Higher managers-workshop	Lower managers-workshop	Nonmanagerial staff			
Frequency of discussion	27,3	15,1	16,8	13,0	27,8	668,515	<	0,01
Length of discussion	35,3	16,2	14,6	10,3	23,6	841,315	<	0,01
Number of presentations	38,4	11,6	12,3	6,5	31,2	27,201	<	0,05
Number of proposals	22,5	13,3	28,4	11,8	24,0	70,152	<	0,01
Number of proposals accepted	25,3	16,7	33,3	8,7	16,0	96,219	<	0,01
Percentage employment	0,59	1,59	1,10	5,00	91,79			
	R = 0,994					P < 0,01		

This table most clearly reveals the distribution of participation and the relationship between the intensity of participation and percentage employment. Approximately 75% of activity in all the dimensions of participation is covered by the executives while the last dimension — the number of proposals accepted shows even a more definite dominance. Out of the total number of the proposals accepted, 86% are the ones coming from the managers, while their percentage employment is only 8,1%. The analysis of the intensity of participation of particular groups of managers shows that the major part of the activity is covered by the higher executives from the administration, that means director general and his aids, and the heads of the sectors and workshops. Their percentage employment is 6,9%, while 58% of the proposals accepted were given by them. Such a clearcut evidence of the dominance of the highest company ranks has not been obtained on any theme analyzed so far. It is also supported by the multiple correlation coefficient $R = .994$ with $P < .01$, showing not only the maximum association between the participation and hierarchical status of the individual, but also that this variable is most predictive for participation. The correlation was several times tested, as it represents such a support to the notion that the managers decide on the distribution of personal income, the importance of their role being higher when their place in the company hierarchy is higher. They probably stand for more broader company goals and interests but possibly also for the interests of their immediate social groups, even the personal ones, contributing thus to creating more sharp a stratification in the companies, which is still waiting to be scientifically scrutinized.

Upon full presentation of the results obtained, we shall try to relate them to our starting hypothesis — if it is confirmed or rejected by them, and try to assess the theoretical value of the empirical data, what is their contribution to the theory of participation and their relevance for the humanization of work.

The research on power distribution in Yugoslav companies, some sort of which cited in the introduction, showed unquestionably that the power distribution is autocratic pointing indirectly to the quality of actualization of the model. This paper describes the first of direct attempts to show what is the actual distribution of participation as distinct from the power distribution treated in the cited works. Županov, Tannenbaum and others were exclusively interested in the global influence manifesting itself in various situations, while here we are interested in the behaviour of the individuals in that part of the decision making process which is legally reserved for participation. Here we were not interested for the behaviour of specific social groups in preparing the decisions and putting them to action, as these phases are not by legal prescriptions supposed to be open to participation. But nevertheless, it is not clear yet whether the participation and power distribution are actually one or two variables, as the present results do not confirm any of such hypotheses. It will be the aim of the future research to test the possible connection between the participation and the power distribution.

Now we shall limit the discussion to the participation.

Generally, the results obtained on all four themes of discussion show a total discrepancy between the prescribed and actualized participation. It is clear that some discrepancy between the theoretical model and its actualization is inevitable, but nevertheless this one is surpassing the expectations. Most unexpected was such a strong influence of the status in the company, that means such a dominance of the managerial staff. If we compare the participation of the individuals belonging to the working class in the strictest sense to the participation possibilities of the workers in other countries, it is undubitably more intensive.

In general, the results support the initial hypothesis. Also the analysis of participation according to the nature of the problems discussed is justified by the results which show that along with the dominance of one group representing elite, the participation of other groups varies according to the nature of the problem. In the sphere of economic activity related to the market, the most intensive participation is contributed by the specialists and functional organization, indicating most intensive activity of the group usually called technocracy. Solving the problems related to the cooperation with other companies with the elite usually participating is activating the specialists for some fields and the League of Communists, as many decisions related to the cooperation are determined by the political aims and motives. The results show that in all the fields, especially when the problems of cooperation with other companies and those of the distribution of income are treated, there is a close connection between the political and technocracy structures. This link is always present and in many cases even the fusion of the two structures is visible. It is also present, though in a less degree, when the problems of the inner economic policy are discussed, but here the activity of the specialist services from the workshop is pronounced, which solve economic relations between the workshops or parts of the company together with the central administration of the company.

It rests here to relate the results obtained to the general theory of participation. For the four fields so far discussed which should be similarly interesting to all the structures in the company, the participation of a large number of representing various profiles and levels is not achieved because of the specialist participation, based on the technical division of labour and a political one, reflected in the overrepresentation of the members of the Communist League. A number of theoreticians (G. Friedman, 1966, C. Durand, 1963) is sceptical about the possibility of actualizing the participation in the situation of modern industrial companies, basing their assumptions on high division of labour following the modernization.

The present results show that the social factors can also open some new problems and even have a decisive role in the self-management actualization.

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THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZED PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

From the above title we can see that the object of this paper is not non-organized participation which is based on a spontaneous and expressive activity. Our problem is not the meaning of activity, defined by H. Garfinkel in the following: »... it is my preference to start with familiar scenes and ask what to be done to make troubles... to produce disorganized interaction should tell us something about how everyday activity is ordinary routinely produced and maintained« (Garfinkel, 1967). We are not interested in the antisocial activity which would have Sartre's challenge function, the object of which would be the uncovering of the hidden nature of the institution or rather organized interaction. Though this function of antiinstitutional participation is valuable, it nevertheless in the end leads towards isolation, expressionism and the marginal status of its holders. Recent developments uphold the above statement. Wallerstein and Starr are probably right when they evaluated »youth chauvinism: Radicals have become too much on the outside of this country. In order to change it, they have to become part of it« (Wallerstein and Starr, 1971).

In the same way the starting points of our discussion are not the »widely accepted functional theories in political science and political sociology, which claim not only that it is unrealistic to expect broad citizen participation in politics as a prerequisite of democracy, but indeed, that apathy and nonparticipation contribute positively to the stability and maintainance of democratic systems« (John Walton, 1972).

The basic problem of Yugoslav selfgovernment and probably of contemporary society on the whole is how to bridge the growing contradiction among different movements of institutional systems. These movements are more and more frequent in the developing and the developed countries, and at the same time the organizational density of institutionalized systems is increasingly higher.

Just as the basic goal of the Yugoslav society is to try to integrate the revolutionary, populist and worker movement into the institutional system or rather to adapt the institutional system to the movement, so other societies try to institutionalize (not liquidate) populist, revolutionary, student, ethnic, religious and other movements. To paraphrase Nietzsche our ambitions go beyond the good and evil, beyond anarchy and functionalism, beyond the spontane expressive and organized instrumental activity, beyond non-institutionalized movement and the bureaucratized institution.

The problem of Yugoslav self government is similar to the one formulated by Joseph Gusfield in Contemporary Sociology: »How to be effective and moral through participation in the institutions of the society, while still pressing for effective political change« (Gusfield, 1972). This means that the starting goals are exceptionally ambiguous. But the process of realization of these

goals is intensively submitted to manipulation: The ambiguity of Yugoslav selfgovernment lies in the fact that we were not able to define it uniquely and sociologically, inspite of the twenty years of experience.

Thus a leading Yugoslav sociologist thinks that science will first have to decide whether our selfgoverning system is:

a) »a completely new form of organization of society or rather a completely new sociocultural system«;

b) »or a social movement of the workers for a reorganization of society«;

c) »or an« ideological project, therefore only a »value system which is institutionalized in the new society« (Zupanov, 1971).

A few years ago I already asked myself what the social function of Yugoslav selfgovernment was. Does selfgovernment mean the domination of a new institution of a revolutionary country over the revolutionary populist movement? Or does selfgovernment enable the revolutionary movement to dominate the institution? Or does it mean a kind of compromise between movement and the institutional formation. In the first case, selfgovernment would be the instrument of totalitarianism, while in the second it would mean the source of permanent revolution. If the Yugoslav society approaches the third case, the function of selfgovernment can be dual: it can create »a blocked movement« and it can become the source of constant dynamics of our society (Rus, 1964). Because of these ambiguities there arise different hypotheses regarding the social function of the Yugoslav selfgoverning system. Pierre Denis and Jean Madeuf list the following:

a) selfgovernment is a system of transition from the soviet type of socialism to a more liberal type of socialism,

b) selfgovernment is a means by which the League of Communists tried to maintain its hold on the people,

c) selfgovernment is a mobilization framework for the human masses,

d) selfgovernment is a bridge between the traditional handicraft workshop and the new industrial enterprise; Albert Meister also supports this theory (1970);

e) selfgovernment is only a unique managing technique; it is a collective method of surplus value production;

f) selfgovernment is an ideology of development (Denis et Madeuf, 1971).

In addition to the above possible alternatives I would like to add four other functions of selfgovernment which have so far more or less frequently applied in practice:

a) selfgovernment is a means of »enlightenment absolutism«; this means that it is an instrument by which the political elite can activate the pressure of the masses which is then applied to the resistant apparatus;

b) selfgovernment can also function as the alibi for the responsibility of the leaders; when decisionmaking is carried over to the masses and the power is still retained at the top, responsibility could be handed down, and a center of irresponsibility could be created at the top;

c) selfgovernment could bring about the automatization of the workers' class when the workers identify with the unique and special interests of their working organization and when they function as rivals in relations to other working organizations;

d) selfgovernment can become the instrument of »industrial peace«, which means an instrument of volunteer worker subordination to managers in enterprises (Rus, 1972).

Because of this heterogeneity it is difficult to say that selfgovernment has achieved its original goals. But I know it is still too early to say that Yugoslav selfgovernment was not successful. Even if it did not attain the primal goals, it did create a number of new, unexpected and »uncontrolled subeffects«, (Županov, 1971).

Because the subject of my exposition is organized and participations and not spontaneous participation, we must deal with the goals and methods of participation in connection with organizational and institutional models in the framework of which participation is carried out. A onesided description of the new models of participation in the frame of old institutions means a »par excellence« manipulation. Such a »par excellence« manipulation approach was brought about by the papal enciclica *Mater et Magistra* which says that: »the workers should be given and ensured an active role in the functioning of the enterprise either public or private, in which they are employed« *Mater et Magistra*, 1962).

Yugoslav selfgovernment is not manipulative in its intentions, since it supposes that the revolutionary goals of liberation of work will be realized only in the frame of new institutional structures. So that even if manipulation is present it is primarily because this extremely progressive experiment is being carried out in one of the least developed countries in Europe. There exists a wide gap between the new institutional norms and the prerequisites for their realization. This gap between norms and prerequisites form a constant system conflict, which can be solved in no other way than in taking a step back, in order to make two steps forward.

In connection with this the main function of theoretic contemplation is the uncovering of the actual limits of participative democracy. If we are able to determine the limits of participation in our society, we can prevent manipulation by eliminating them or by limiting participation.

The following chapters will deal with the analysis the limits of organized participation. My study will consider those which seem, at least on the surface, to be the most relevant.

THE TECHNIQUE AND TECHNOLOGY AS A LIMIT OF PARTICIPATION

Most of the researches until the mid sixties confirmed the general belief that technology is the independent variable which to a great extent determines the enterprise organization and the status of its employees. For instance, the research conducted by Woodward brought to light the linear relationship between a more complex technology, the number of hierarchical levels and the more complex technology and a greater proportion of managers in regard to the total number of the employed. Nonlinear relationships also pointed to a close relationship between technology and the social system. Especially these relations showed that the interrelations on the mechanized level are not as close as on the level of manual or automatized production. This means that the degree of formalization on the mechanized level is the greatest and the degree of flexibility the lowest etc. (Woodward, 1965).

Hage, Aiken and Blau came to the same conclusions when studying nonindustrial organizations. While Blau (1966) found that the number of managers and centralization of decisionmaking in small bureaucratic organizations grows along with a higher degree of division of labour, T. Hage and M. Aiken (1968) concluded that in medical organizations there exists a close relation between routine work, higher centralization of decision-making, higher formalization of work and a more instrumental orientation.

The survey carried out by Obradović in the Yugoslav enterprises also points out that the role of technology is an independent variable. On the basis of factor analysis he concluded that the worker at the handicraft level of production is not entirely satisfied with the physical conditions of work. Nevertheless work at this level of production enables a much greater affirmation and self-actualization as at the mechanized level. At this level the worker would like to enact a radical change in the working conditions and receive material compensation. At the automatized level the physical conditions of work are satisfactory, but the work is dull and does not allow for worker selfactualization. Because of this, the workers strive greater social affirmation and financial compensation (Obradović, 1971). Thus, Obradović gives the following hypothetical generality: hypothetically within societies with completely different social systems the functioning of the technical level of production is similar. In no system does a higher technical level allow for a selfactualization of worker plisonality within the process of works as in the narrow sense of the word.

The methods of production and organization of work which are defined by the technical level of production, function similarly in completely different environmental settings. If future surveys prove the above hypothesis then we can speak about technological determinism. In this case then technology would be a definite limit to the social organization as well as to participation of the employed.

The results of recent surveys show that the above is not true. Some of the results of the researches conducted by Obradović and Supek also show that technology is only one of the independent variables which influence the status of the employed and that there are other independent variables which also influence it.

But I would like to point out that the facts concerning technological determinism which Obradović established are true only for those workers who are not members of the workers' councils. The author gives a number of exceptions regarding members of the workers' councils. The members of the workers' councils who work at different tehnological levels have the same opinions and wishes regarding work satisfaction, the perception of possible promotion, the perception of the fact whether they share in the management of the enterprise. The members of workers' councils also hold the same view regarding participation aspiration, and aspiration for a more interesting type of work. But the opinions of the members of workers' councils who work at different technological levels differ in their opinion regard of the work in which they are involved, and the evaluation of the conditions at work. From this we can say that there exists a reciprocal relationship between technology and social organization. It is of course true that technology is an important factor in determining viewpoints, aspirations and behaviour of the employed, but only if other factors are not present. Activation of the employed in workers' councils shows that participation is just as an independent variable as technology. Participation does not change the conditions at the work; because the influence of technology here is a predominating factor. But participation influences the social status and employee aspiration; in this area its influence is even stronger than that of technology.

Therefore, the influence of technology is important but so at the same time limited. It is probable that it's influence dominates the task structure and conditions of work.

The above hypothesis can be supported by the results of Obradović's survey. Namely, Obradović established that the degree of worker alienation (alienation in Marx's meaning of the word) is high and that there are no essential differences regarding the degree of alienation among workers enga-

ged at different technological levels of production. This then means that all those determinants which are important for the social status of the employed or rather for the degree of their alienation do not, in general, depend on the technological factor.

The results attained by Rudi Supek (1971) also show that the influences of technology are quite heterogenous and probably limited to a narrow field of work. On the level of manual production Supek found a stronger degree of worker participation in the field of organization of work while on the level of mechanized and automatized production he found a greater degree of participation in the solving of social problems. In general, the degree of participation is greater at higher levels than at lower. We cannot find the reason for this phenomenon in technology but rather in the non-technological factors. It is also interesting to note that the workers at the higher technological levels identify more with the selfgoverning system and that they have greater aspirations for domination of workers and for staff control. So that, a more developed technology decreases neither the possibilities of participation nor participation aspiration.

We get different results if we compare handicraft workshops with industrial enterprises. The difference in the degree of participation between these two types of working organizations is big. The analysis of 7 industrial and 16 handicraft organizations showed that the workers employed in handicraft organizations essentially have greater possibilities for participation, that they are more active at meetings that they frequently collaborate in the organization of work and in discussions regarding wage distribution and that they give many more opinions regarding work improvement than those employed in industrial enterprises (Rus, 1963). These findings which speak in favour of handicraft enterprises seem to be in opposition to those given by Rudi Supek. But it is quite probable that they are not only a result of a different system of technology but also of a different organizational structure, different size and different environment. All these factors are probably more important for degree of participation than the technology of production itself. Because the new trends in industry are increasingly oriented towards a greater adaptation of organizational structures, the social needs are no longer directed towards the adaptation to technological needs. Because we are trying to avoid industrial enterprises with a maximal physical size and because the goals of industrial enterprises are more widely defined (Thorsrud, 1976) we think that the organizational models of industrial enterprises will increasingly favour employee participation. If we can also accept P. G. Herbst's hypothesis (1972) that a more developed technology will allow for a greater possibility for different organizational models, then we can conclude this chapter by saying that to date technology has not presented the basic limits for employee participation and that future technology will be even less able to limit this type of participation.

MANAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION

Contemporary societies are increasingly becoming democratic; we can see this in the greater degree of liberalization and increased participativeness of management. As a result, the nature of the problems changes. Now the basic problem is not how to limit authoritative leadership, but how to prevent participation management from giving a final blow to authentic employee participation. So, our question should be: »where are those boundaries where participative management changes into manipulation with employee participation?

Breed thinks that for the present situation the transition from an alienative into an inauthentic society is a characteristic phenomenon. In connection with this he says: »Post-modern society« inherited an alienating structure. Today this can be seen in industrialization and bureaucratization and workshop of »rational«, instrumental, impersonal materialism. To these alienating features, post modern society has added an increased capacity for manipulation . . .« (Breed, 1971).

Democratization of society did not eliminate alienation, but only increased manipulation with the resources and with people. As a result, instead of an alienated individual an inauthentic individual is taking his place. Breed describes the difference between these two types in the following way »the alienated man who is actively conscious of his situation senses that he is excluded whereas the man who is aware of his inauthentic condition feels manipulated and indeed is made to bless his captors.«

Albert Meister and Alain Touraine describe this change in contemporary society in a slightly different way. According to them »nous sortons d'une société de l'exploitation pour entrer dans une société de l'aliénation (Meister, 1972).

According to A. Meister contemporary society succeeded in establishing an ideological unity of all strata. All the strata accepted the idea of development or rather the idea of growth. By accepting this idea they have, so to speak, unknowingly agreed to alienation of contemporary society. The transition from a society of exploitation to an alienated society was brought about by »la participation — identification on participation dépendante«. By taking care of the morale at work, satisfaction at work and primarily by »participation dépendante« the employed are integrated into the existing social framework. This is the way an alienated society is formed, »L'aliénation est donc la réduction du conflit social par le moyen d'une participation dépendante«. The above mentioned views are not controversial to Gorz's findings that the worker becomes alienated only when he becomes »free« (Gorz, 1959).

As long as the worker (or rather the working class) was still a marginal subject of society he was exploited. But by becoming an integral link in contemporary society, and by joining it and actively participating in it, he became the alienated subject of contemporary society.

The basic problem of contemporary society, then, is not the inability to participate, but the danger of participative management, or rather the danger of inauthentic participation. This danger increases because in most of the developed and developing countries various forms of participation of the employed is introduced through laws and regulations.

The syndicates are not needlessly worried. They think that it is »not the function of the syndicate to participate. Its function is to protect and defend the interests of its members. The syndicate gains nothing by participating, but it can »compromise its own independence« (Sésil relations professionnelles, 1969).

Why are syndicate leaders worried? Is it because their control over the workers would decrease with participation, or because the worker would become increasingly dependent on managers through participative management?

The results of Mulders' experiments and experiences in countries which have had decades of selfgovernment show that not only is the power of the syndicates threatened but also the independence of the workers. Mulder concludes that participation does not necessarily lead to power equalization. If the power differences among the participants are great then they only increa-

se with participation. The more intensive the participation the greater the social distance (Mulder, 1971). Participation has a double edge: when the differences among the participants are small, they tend to be diminished by participation but when they are great, they are only increased by participation. Tannenbaum (1966) and Gouldner (1954) came to the same conclusions. They point out that through participation the control the managers have over the managed increases; in other words the stronger elements control the weaker elements.

Participation is therefore the source of democratization and humanization of work. But it can also be the source of manipulation and total control of the workers. When the first function of participation prevails and when the second function of participation prevails depends entirely on the social context within which they occur.

If we wish to decrease the manipulative effect of participation and if we wish to attain humanization and democratization of work through participation, then according to Mulder the following prerequisites should be fulfilled:

- a) participants should be motivated for active participation;
- b) differences in knowledge or rather power should not be too great;
- c) particularly the deprived should be protected;
- d) participation should center around the place of work and the professional field of the employed.

All of the above mentioned factors were taken into account in the case of Yugoslavia and also to some extent realized. Yugoslavia stiwed for a decrease of social distances. The main instruments were: socialization of the means of production, one system of selfgovernment, one ideology, deconcentration of decision-making in the fifties and decentralization of decision making in the sixties.

Deconcentration of decision-making was realized by establishing workers' councils and managing boards at the level of the enterprise.

By this taken, decision making left the narrow frame of top management and included the rest of the employed.

Already by 1956 the Yugoslav economic enterprises counted more than 150,000 members in then workers councils and around 40,000 members on their managing boards. If we add to this number all those who were members of committees of workers councils (the commitees are the consulting prodies, though they sometimes may have to power of decision-making, we can say that in each mandate period (first the mandate period lastized for one year, and was then extended to a two year period) at least a quarter of a million workers were drawn into the decision-making policy which dealt with various vital questions of the working organizations. But in spite of such a high degré of deconcentration of decision-making the results were quite different from what had been expected. Deconcentration of decision-making at the top did not only work in the direction of democratization of work but also in the direction of management deprofessionalization. The results were the following: democratization increased motivation of workers, while deprofessionalization decreased management effectiveness. Decreased production results were to a great extent lost because of increased entropy which resulted from management the deprofessionalization of management on order to decrease the negative effects of concentration of decision making in the sixties a greater »professionalization« of workers' councils and managing boards was hought about: while in 1960 more than 3/4 of the members of workers' councils came from the ranks the blue-color workers, i.e. workers from production the proportion deapped to 2/3 by 1970; and while in 1960

2/3 of the members of managerial boards were production workers this ratio dropped to less than a 2/2 by 1970 (Županov, 1971).

The influence of managers increased with professionalization though it already was quite high before. Obradović (1972) found that the leaders in 20 industrial enterprises which were surveyed over a period of three years proposed 15% of all decisions which were accepted by the workers' councils and which dealt with price politics. In relation to the internal organization of enterprises the leaders proposed 68% of all the accepted proposals, while in connection with personal income distribution the leaders proposed 84% of all the accepted proposals. This then means that the leaders have a predominating influence in the workers' councils. They are not only influential in the creation of the business policy but also in the sphere of social policy (this comprises also distribution of incomes). Therefore Obradović thinks that in the Yugoslav enterprises an elite group still predominates in all activities, including those which should be controlled by the workers themselves.

Because deconcentration did not bring about that degree of »power equalization«, which was expected when the self-governing system was introduced in the beginning of the fifties, an intensive decentralization of decisionmaking was introduced in the sixties. Here the object was not only to include in decision making a greater number of people at the level of the enterprise, but also to carry decision-making to the lower levels of the working organization: to the level of plants or even to the basic organizational units.

In connection with this workers' councils, economic units (later working units) were established at the level of plants and departments, while the assembly of workers was set up at the level of the basic organizational units. With the new constitutional amendments the processes of decentralization will be legalized; working organizations will have to establish the basic organization of associated work. These then will be the original holder of self-governing rights and other rights, while the enterprises will function as the federation of the basic organization of associated work. Workers councils will then be only concerned with those matters delegated by the self-governing organs of the basic organization of associated work (Constitutional amendment articles, No. XXI and XXII).


From the above it is evident that the processes of decentralization, are conceptualized at least from the point of view of legislation, as perpetual and radical processes. Nevertheless, these efforts have not influenced power redistribution in the Yugoslav enterprises. All surveys dealing with power, show that the top management is the most influential group. (Bogdan Kavčič, 1968; Rus, 1970; Jerovšek and Možina, 1971). Though a comparative study of Yugoslav, Italian, Austrian, American enterprises and the Kibbutzes has uncovered a somewhat smaller power distance in Yugoslav enterprises, it is still true that the top and middle managements have a greater influence than the workers (Kavčič, Tannenbaum and others, 1972).

From the above mentioned surveys it is clear that decentralization stopped somewhere half way. The top management in Yugoslav enterprises has much less influence than in enterprises in other countries, but the middle management has an equal (and in smaller enterprises even greater) amount of power as the top management. In comparison with other countries the Yugoslav workers do have a greater degree of influence which points to a positive effect of decentralization, but it is still not as great as the power and influence of the middle managements, or top managements.

Therefore decentralization did not bring about a democratic distribution of power but rather a fragmented one. In large enterprises power distribution became policentric, while in smaller enterprises mezocentric. Particu-

larly the latter is inconvenient, both from the point of view of democratization as well as from the point of view of effectiveness of the working organizations. Because power is concentrated in the hands of the middle management, it can then block both the initiative coming from the top as well as the one coming from the bottom in organizations (see figure 1).

Figure 1



If we compare the results of the Yugoslav surveys with Mulders' experiments we can arrive at similar conclusions. Even though participation in the Yugoslav enterprises did function in the direction which would decrease social distance, this social distance is still so great that the effects of participative democracy are vague. We think that on the one hand participation increased the control of workers over their managers, but on the other hand it also increased the control the leaders over the workers; in other words: manipulative effects of participation have probably been growing concomitantly with the democratization of working organizations.

This hypothesis is supported by empirical data. For instance Obradović established that the members of the workers' councils are more satisfied than the other workers with their work, incomes, conditions of work and work control, but that they are more alienated than the workers who are not members of workers' council (Obradović, 1970).

In my survey of seven industrial and 16 handicraft enterprises I obtained somewhat different results. In handicraft enterprises the participation of the members is basically larger and the degree of alienation smaller than of those employed in industrial enterprises. In industrial enterprises the correlation between participation and alienation is sometimes negative and sometimes insignificant. We found a significant connection between a smaller degree of alienation and a greater degree of participation in organization of work in the basic organizational units in the half of the industrial enterprises which were surveyed. But only in one enterprise did we find a significant relationship between a smaller alienation and greater participation in discussions and meeting dealing with income distribution (Rus, 1963).

I don't attribute the difference between my results and those attained by Obradović to the use of a different methodology or indexes. I think that the effects of participation in workers councils at the level of the enterprise are essentially different from participative effects within the basic organizational unit. I think that participation in the organization of work labour within the basic organizational unit is less frustrating than participation in the business policy at the level of the enterprise.

The international study conducted by Kavčič and Tanenbaum gives a more complex comparison between participation and alienation (1972). The comparison of large enterprises shows us that participation of Yugoslav workers is greater than in any other country included in the survey (Italy, Austria, USA). And at the same time it tells us that worker alienation (measured by Blauneis indexes) is greater only in Italy. That worker alienation is greater in Italy is understandable because participation of the employed is rather small in this country; but that the degree of alienation in Yugoslavia is greater than in the United States, and Austria (where worker participation is quite small) can only be explained by the ambiguous effects of participation in the Yugoslav enterprises. The degree of participation of the employed in comparison with the Yugoslav enterprises is greater only in the Kibbutzes (the Kibbutzes are included in the study only in regard to smaller enterprises). The degree of alienation is greater only in the Italian enterprises, where the lowest degree of worker participation is found. There are probably many reasons for this unusual deviation of Yugoslav enterprises. An important reason for this relation between participation and alienation of Yugoslav workers is probably because participative management in Yugoslav enterprises is still relatively undeveloped.

Participative management (Participativeness, supportiveness of the managerial staff) is in the smaller as well as larger Yugoslav enterprises smaller than in the Kibbutzes, and the american or austrian enterprises.

If we ranked the enterprises from all the surveyed countries, according to the index of participative management and to the index of the degree of alienation we would then get a perfect rank correlation both in small and large enterprises. One of the possible answers for this unusual relationship between alienation and participation of Yugoslav workers is probably in the fact that in Yugoslav enterprises there exists a high degree of worker participation and a low degree of participative management. This contrast between participation of the employed and the nonparticipative behaviour of the managers probably intensifies workers' frustration. At the same time we can conclude that manipulative elements of participation or rather »elements« of non-authentic participation do exist.

PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT OR MANAGED PARTICIPATION

If empirical data and compiled information about Yugoslav selfgovernment were to be enlarged by adding those which show intensive multidimensional connections among all levels of participation and all aspects of responsibility (Rus, 1972) and those which show that the fulfilment of responsibility and control among the workers in Yugoslav enterprises is more intensive than in any other country (Tanneunbaum, Kavčić, and others, 1972) then we could say that:

- (a) participation is effective in Yugoslav enterprises because it realizes the economic goals, and increases work motivation and responsibility;
- (b) participation in Yugoslav enterprises is only partially effective in attaining social and political goals, because it only partially influenced power redistribution which would lead to a greater power equilibrium;
- (c) that Yugoslav selfgovernment is now entirely ineffective in attaining ethical, or rather humanistic goals, because participation in general does not decrease alienation of participation.

The results are the complete reverse of the starting goals of selfgovernment. The declared goals and the original intentions of selfgovernment were primarily humanistic and only partially political and entirely non-economic. The goals were liberation of work which would be attained by selfgovernment; and the goal was not a greater work motivation, better quality of work or alleviation and decrease of conflicts. The whole structural model as well as the selfgoverning concept was to be consistent and non-manipulative. It foresaw worker participation also in the formulation of enterprise goals and not only participation in the realization of them. It also foresaw a system of self-determination and not a system of co-determination. This then means that the entire system was in essence oriented towards a radical and non-manipulative solution.

If such a great degree of deviation between the goals and results does exist, then we are forced to admit that in the Yugoslav experiment a number of uncontrolled variables which have a far-reaching influence on the entire activity are present. It is important to define these variables because the deviation between the results and goals is not only quantitative but qualitative.

It is not only important that the goals in general were unattained but that the planned goals were also not realized. Though strangely enough certain »non-planned goals« were realized. On the basis of these results we can conclude that nonparticipative management is for the Yugoslav enterprises

an important obstacle but not the only one regarding worker alienation. In connection with this we are faced with the following alternative: should development go in the direction of further management democratization or should it go in the direction of direct worker participation. Political organizations favour the second radical alternative; they strive for a gradual elimination of professional top management positions and groups. The economic circles are opposed to this idea. They say that the effectiveness of economic and non-economic organizations depends more on a capable management and not so much on the degree of participation of the employed. If the problem is one of the degree of effectiveness, then the enterprise emphasizes the need for a quick manager training and the need for an increased role importance of managers. But if relations as such undergo a crisis then a more authentic degree of worker participation is asked for.

Selfgovernment which is based on goal formation and selfdetermination demands a radical but progressive transition from participative management to a managed participation, or rather organized participation. This is the only way we can avoid constant power manipulation and inauthentic participation. But here we find many more obstacles than those found by Mulder.

One of the obstacles to the development of authentic participation is the structure of influence of the managers. From the already mentioned survey conducted by Obradović (1972) and from my own work (Rus, 1968) it is evident that the managers have an intensive influence in different areas of activities. The influence of the managers is not only great concerning business problems such as the market, price of investments and technology but also in areas dealing with personal politics and income distribution. This then means that the managers have an intensive and widespread influence. This relationship between the intensity and sphere of influence is more characteristic for a totalitarian status than for the status of professionals. They themselves have an intensive influence in a very narrow field of activity. The formation of a differentiated structure of influence could enable other groups to have a greater degree of power and a greater amount of tolerance for these other groups, as well as greater degree of effectiveness of the managers in specific areas of activities. A greater professionalization of leaders will bring about a structure of influence which will have a narrow scope but greater intensity. A greater degree of differentiated participation of the employed should follow a more differentiated influence of the leaders. Participation of the employed cannot be introduced in all areas because it leads to the utmost use of energy and time. It should limit itself to »differentiated participation« which is oriented towards the »core task of profession« (Alluto, 1972).

Professionalization of management, social property public property and selfgovernment demand a structural reorganization of conditions found in the general and special management. These relationships are becoming obsolete even in the classical ownership enterprises.

Tofler (1970) thinks that the division of managers into: line and staff, the managers and the professionals, the managers and the managed, the people who do the planning and the ones who are planned, is a reflection of the old bureaucratic forms of organizing. The reproduction of this composite in the Yugoslav enterprises creates the classical splitting of management into the elite and the apparatus. It allows for a system of »organized irresponsibility« which is based on the play of the irresponsible (elite) and the non-responsible (apparatus). Yugoslav sociologists hought up this problem (Brekič), but to date they have not yet given a clear answer. Therefore the question is: should a greater equilibrium of power between line and staff management be created; or should the line management substitute staff management; or should the functions of the line management in general be taken over by the selfgo-

verning organs in the enterprise? Judging by worker aspiration the last alternative could progressively be realized. The workers think that the control functions of the leaders should wither away (the control over the discipline at work, of the quantity and amount of work done, of and of the quality of work etc.). The professional functions on the other hand should gain in strength (instruction, coordination of work, etc., Rus, 1972). To date E. Thorsrude (1972) conducted the most interesting and successful experiments in connection with the socialization of leadership. The importance of these experiments lies in the transition from participative management to managed participation which can be carried out by educating the so called »contract persons«. The functions of the lower rank managers are carried over and transmitted to these contact persons. At the same time the top management and middle management tops to find a new definition of their roles; the managers should not carry out inner control and coordination but should care for the so called »boundary conditions«. This means the care for the regulation of all the processes transpiring between their own organizational unit and other units. Inner control should therefore be replaced by self-control and the managers should carry out the functions of a »liaison officer«.

An important factor if not the key factor played in the transition from participative management to managed participation is the continuous or non continuous way of functioning. The fact that the managers function without interruption, that is, everyday, while the selfgoverning organs are active only from time to time (at monthly or even bimonthly meetings) handicaps the work much more than a lower educational background of the members of the self the introduction of a more continuous pattern of work of the self-governing governing organs. Therefore, the »profesionalization« of the self governing organs is for the future of socialization of management less important than organs. The experiences of corporation management by shareholders companies also uphold this hypothesis. Northrop Parkinson (1958) with his law of increasing finances and point of decreasing interests shows that the functioning of the representative organs of the shareholders is equal to the one which we find in the work of our selfgoverning organs. The only differences being that the educational structure of the former is relatively higher.

Therefore, if conditions of work are similar to those of the selfgoverning organs then the reason for this insufficiency must be in the discontinuity of work of these organs and not the low level of the educational structure. An important factor if not the main factor in the transition from participative management to managed participation is the degree of continuity in the functioning process.

At the present we do not yet know what the continuous functions of the selfgoverning organs should be. Yugoslavia has found no other solution to this problem than the extension of the mandate of the members of the workers' councils from a one year period to a two year period.

Just as managing is a complete system which comprises various fields of activities and different levels in the system of organization, managed participation will also have to be a complete system in itself. It will have to synchronize participation at different levels. Interlevel synchronization of participation of the employed will be difficult if decentralization which accompanies participative democracy increases. But on the other hand, it will become increasingly essential because the managers and professionals from all levels participate in the formation of all the strategic decisions (Carter, 1971).

Experiences with the process of decentralization of decisionmaking in the Yugoslav enterprises have shown that this process can in no way be linear. If it is to be effective, it will not be able to limit itself solely to the transmission of the processes of decisionmaking from higher levels to the

lower levels. This type of transmission can be guaranteed neither by a greater influence the employed have over decision making nor does it ensure a unity of actions. Linear transmission of decisions from the higher to the lower levels will probably have to replace the principle of bifurcation of the participation of members. The principle of bifurcation means an intensification of immediate decision making at the level of the basic organizational units and an intensification of control over the work of professionals at the higher levels of the organization.

Bifurcation of participation also solves the standing dilemma of the contemporary workers' movement, which, oscillates between the demand for worker control of the managers and direct management in the enterprise (Hockers, 1971). Because it forsees control at the higher levels and participation at the lower levels of the organization.

Also the aspirations of the Yugoslav workers are congruent with the model of bifurcation of participation. If we wish to be precise we should say that the idea of participation bifurcation was formed on the basis of empirically found the aspirations of the employed in the employed in the Yugoslav enterprises (Možina, 1971).

It is characteristic for the aspirations of the employed that they are oriented towards the intensification of »active decision-making« in the basic organizational units and towards the intensification of passive decision-making at the level of the enterprise.

An insufficient number of managers limits the process of transition from participative management to managed participation, a tendency for a radical democratization of managers has prevented the professionalization of the leading personnel, so that Yugoslavia is one of the few countries which has so far established no managerial schools. It has only recently become apparent that professionalization is not a handicap but rather a prerequisite for management socialization. With professionalization and specialization the power of managers will lie in its professionalization. It will be based on expert rather than on coercive power. It will be narrower in span and greater in intensity and the professional self control and the feeling of responsibility which has as its source professional ethics will also increase.

Surveys of worker aspiration show us that the relationship between professionalization of the leaders and power distribution in enterprises is a very close one. We found that the workers who wish to have a poliarchic power structure more often wish for a professionally capable foreman than for an autocratic or a humanistic oriented foreman (Rus, 1964). These aspirations are in fact a reflection of an interesting relationship between professionalization of the foreman and the structure of communication of the employed. The workers who favorably evaluate the professional capabilities of their foreman, are more willing to accept instructions from other people (different sides) and they claim interestingly enough that these instructions do not contradict each other.

From the above we can assume the following hypothesis: the better qualification the managers have, the more open is their system of communication. The only question here is: are contemporary enterprises systems which enable an open type of management? In relation to this we can ask ourselves the following: are contemporary working organizations capable of developing a poliarchic power distribution? If they are, open management is possible, and then a satisfactory organizational framework is given for the progressive socialization of management, or rather a progressive transition from participative management to managed participation.

In the next chapter I will try to select a few moments on the basis of which I could answer the question.

System and participation

System and authentic participation are at least on the surface in mutual contradiction. Authentic participation emerges spontaneously and integrates itself inductively.

The live systems which also comprise the social systems are a highly integrated whole (Gestalt; Bartalanffy, 1968). Because of this a »high coefficient of interaction« exists among the subsystems. Because of differentiation which is characteristic for all cycles of development, the autonomy of subsystems increases at times and this is dangerous for the system as a whole.

It brings it close to sumative relationships which means a deterioration of a live system into a mechanical system.

The system is basically conditioned by the environment, and its basic function is to survive by adapting to the environment (Rhenman, 1970).

The goals cannot be therefore attained through inductive methods, but rather through deductive.

First the general goals must be decided upon. They should enable survival of a system in a given environment. From these then individual and specific goals can be deduced in the form of group interests or in individual carrier pattern. The classical conceptions of democracy arise from the idea of participation as an authentic, spontaneous and expressive activity.

If this should remain authentic then the inductive method of integration or rather freedom of concerning, should be guaranteed. Therefore the local autonomy of individual parts (Marx, 1968) and the federative nature of the organization as a whole are necessary. Not only do anarchists believe in the federative nature of the whole, but also some contemporary theoreticians of organization (Drucker, 1959).

The questions arising from these controversial starting points are: can a contemporary enterprise be a federation?

Does the environment which surrounds it enable its existence, as a federation? If the environment is unfavorable can we expect authentic participation of members within the activities of the system? Is it possible to avoid that type of participation of members which is called programmed activity and which is characteristic for a totalitarian system through goal formation? We can say that it is possible for the contemporary enterprise to have a federative organization. The results of empirical researches show that there are no inner organizational obstacles which stand in the way of the formation of a poliarchic type of power distribution; or in the way of the emergence of a power distribution which enables a relatively high degree of autonomy of parts and a relatively high degree of integration of these parts into the whole. The following data uphold the theory that there are no intraorganizational barriers to the emergence of a poliarchic distribution of influence:

1. In our preliminary surveys of two enterprises producing machines we discovered a positive correlation between the quantity of the emitted and the quantity of received influence. The greater the influence an individual has on the environment the greater is the reciprocal influence exerted by the environment upon the individual. Furthermore the individual who has a higher influence upon the managers is also subjected to a higher influence from the managers. The individual who has a higher influence over his peers, is subjected at the same time to a higher influence exerted by them.
2. In the same preliminary survey we found an intensive degree of correlation between the amount of influence different groups have over the individual in a working organization: the employee who is su-

jected to higher influence of the direct supervisor is also subjected to the higher influence of other managers, and also to the higher influence of their peers (Rus, 1968).

3. Jerovšek (1971) found somewhat different relationships in studying the distribution of power. When he separately dealt with ten economically efficient and ten economically inefficient enterprises. He found that the amount of emitted influence in almost all the organizational groups within the successful enterprises coincides with the amount of control. (Therefore the received influence), while the reverse is true for the unsuccessful enterprises: the greater the degree of emitted influence by an individual group in the organization, the smaller is the degree of control exercised over these groups.

The above shows us that the division of labour within contemporary organizations no longer produces as a rule that distribution of power which is so significant for the entire political history and which was marked by a constant struggle between autonomy and authority or as we today would say: which occurred by the rule of the »zero sum game«.

Contemporary division of labour establishes a reciprocal functional dependency among individuals as well as among organizational groups. An individual or group no longer has a onesided dependency status. One individual or group no longer has only the status of dependency (an individual or group does not only have to be the party which is dependent on another). This enables the formation of a poliarchic distribution of power. Therefore if poliarchy is utopia for the political and distributive systems, then it can exist in the working systems.

We can arrive at the same hypothesis by considering factors and conclusions dealing with communication and responsibility. The most important are the following:

1. In the survey dealing with 15 yugoslav enterprises we found a positive correlation between the amount of vertical and the amount of horizontal communication: the greater degree of contact an employee has with the managers the greater degree of contact the employee has with his peers (Rus, 1971).
2. In the same survey we also found an intensive positive correlation among the so called directions of responsibility: the employed who feel a greater degree of responsibility for their work to their feel more responsible also to their managers, selfgoverning organs and the public. The feeling of responsibility to one group does not eliminate the feeling of responsibility to other groups (Rus, 1972).

If we combine the empirical results with the theoretical premise that the essence of every organization as a system is the correlation between power (Stinckombe, 1968) and if we consider that both communication and power are in a positive correlation with participation, then we can conclude the following: the above mentioned results have to be highly relevant in judging the possibility of transition from participative management to managed participation.

The relationships of interdependency with which we have dealt so far probably exist in the subsystem which is based on the division of labour. If the poliarchic distribution of power is not realized within the enterprise as a whole then this probably means that certain other factors and not only the division of labour influence the other subsystems within the organization. We think that for instance the subsystems of maintainance, provision of adap-

tation and coordination are influenced more by the environment within which the working organizations are located than solely by the division of labour, technology and other interorganizational factors. On account of this hypothesis we shall have to focus our attention on the second question: Does the environment enable the enterprise to survive as a federation? And because we know that the distribution of power is oligarchic we can then ask ourselves: why does it not allow for a poliarchic distribution of power in the Yugoslav and other working organizations?

If we try to answer this then we must first deal with the two basic and general characteristics of the environment which is met by almost all working organizations: the first characteristic will be called the instability of the environment while the second will be called the heterogeneity of the environment.

Instability is a result of increasing changes in the environment. This phenomenon is so widespread that P. Drucker speaks, about a new period, the so called »age of discontinuity« (P. Drucker).

A. Tofler (1970) also sees the basic characteristics of the post-industrial society in instability and thinks that increasing changes bring about a collective shock; in the future an increasing amount of change will mean the basic source of deprivation, or rather alienation of people. Because organizations must adapt to this instability, they are forced to change their organizational structures. Not only must they develop their own independent adaptive subsystems, but they must also change the entire structure of the organization, active cooperation. A flexible structure of the employed will have to replace rigid structures and passive submission of the members. »Selfrenewal activity« (Tofler, 1970) which will enable a spontaneous reconstruction of organized activity will have to replace the hierarchical submission. The above described trends are, however, already in existence, and have been empirically proven. Lorsh and Lawrence (1968) found that relations and means of integration change as the rate of instability of environment increases. Organizations which function in more or less stable environments still maintain among their members pooled relations, while they are able to keep the integrity of their activities through rigid regulations. Enterprises in less stable environments are introducing reciprocal relations. A plan is the general means of integration. Enterprises with a generally unstable environment try to introduce reciprocal relations among its members, and team work as a form of integration of its activities. Therefore an unstable environment does not prevent the expansion of reciprocal relations from the production sub-system to other subsystems. Another characteristic phenomenon the contemporary organization meets with is a increasing heterogeneity of the environment. This is actually the result of the enterprises growing dependency upon its environment, which should be considered as a »system with infinite heterogeneity« (Peršič, 1972). Because the individual enterprises are more and more dependent upon their environments they are directed towards an increasing interorganizational differentiation, because it enables a higher absorption of the »variety of environment«. According to Peršič the process of differentiation is forced upon the organizations from the outside. This process is brought about by the so called selfreinforced cycle. »This means that the organizations must intensify the absorption of variety of environment because of an increasing need to react to the environment. This then increases uncertainty and gives new impulses for further differentiation and integration of the organization.

The degree of differentiation intensity is a result of two premises: environmental pressure and possibilities within the organization. If input is insufficient the organization will aim for a dedifferentiation (Peršič, 1972). But if a dedifferentiation is impossible in spite of insufficient input then spon-

taneous processes of segmentation, factioning and disassociation will emerge (Emery, 1967). All these defense mechanisms lead to a disengagement of individuals, groups or even entire organizations. This can well be seen in the case of the developing nations where differentiation often becomes an fragmentation of power and marginalization of various strata because of a lack of the means for integration (Lambert, 1971).

Therefore both characteristics make it possible for more open systems to exist. Differentiation increases space openness and discontinuity of time openness. Increased openness has its interorganizational consequences. The first and for us the most important is the change of relationships among the subsystems in an organization. The more the system is open as a whole, the more direct are the ties between the subsystems and the environment. The openness of the entire system could bring about a much closer interpenetration of individual subsystems with the environment (that is with the segments of this environment-sub-environments) than with the other subsystems. This of course means that the autonomy of the subsystems is relatively high and their integration into the entire system non-hierarchical.

Two other factors increase the autonomy of the subsystems and a non-hierarchical integration of the subsystems into the whole: technology of communication and professional ethics. The opinions of contemporary professionals still vary regarding the social implications of communicational and particularly informational technology. I think that the reason for this lies in the heterogeneous effects it produces. Nevertheless, it is increasingly apparent that informational technology influences more the organizational structure than the »task structure« or organizational behavior of the members.

Influence on the organizational structure aim at dedifferentiation and simplification. Introduction of modern technology in the sphere of information enables the following (Whistler, 1970):

1. a decrease in the number of department in an enterprise
2. a decrease of the number of hierarchical levels,
3. a decrease of direct control,
4. centralization of control and lateral shifting.

The above factors evidently contradict each other: on the one hand, the number of hierarchical levels is decreasing, while on the other centralization of control is increasing. We can understand these seemingly contradictory effects if we consider them as a transition from a fragmental personal control of the management to an integrated impersonal control (Woodward, 1969). Integrated and impersonal control is not necessarily hierarchical. Conversely: the more the system of communication and information is uniform the more power can be deconcentrated and decentralized within working organizations.

So that a similar process evolves as in the technology of work: a greater standardization of elements bring about a greater diversification of its composite parts. If the elements of organizational activity are made uniform by a unique selection, codification, distribution and reassembling of information, a high degree of standardization of organizational activity is introduced. On account of this, organizations can afford a high structural differentiation, which would not cause a fragmentation or rather segmentation among the parts of the system.

Another factor which enables a greater autonomy among the various subsystems and a greater openness, of the entire system is the continuous growth of professionalization of labour power. This increase of professionalization and professional ethics come up against the old bureaucratic orga-

nization and hierarchical control and set off fragment conflicts (Corwin, 1970). Professional ethics reorients the motivation of the employed: now the employed do not want so much autonomy of work or prestige in the working organization.

Identification with professional colleagues and with work increases, while the importance of hierarchical control decreases (Rus, 1972). The professional is more closely connected with the task itself and not with the job, they relate to professional norms and not to their superordinate. In short: the contemporary professional man is no longer the »good company man« (Bennis, 1965). On the basis of these changes Tobler (1970) thinks that the era of the »organizational man« has passed, and that a new type of employee called the »associative man« has evolved.

This new man is no longer committed to the position he holds, and he is no longer committed to organization. He no longer does routine jobs, takes up work responsibilities and does not aim for a higher status or greater prestige within the working organization.

It seems that the introduction of the associative man marks the end of the classical model of the working organization called the enterprise which is considered as the instrumental system of the bureaucratic type.

If this type still remains in existence it will lead to more chaotic organizations.

Chaos is not inevitable. A smaller degree of identification with the organization can be the source of deterioration or a source of democratization. Breed (1971) thinks that widespread participation is a necessary prerequisite for an »active and responsible society«, but that democracy cannot function if »all members are committed intensely in all issues«. According to him consensus is not possible if all the members of the organization are »overcommitted«. It is normal, that they are active in some areas and that they are »mobilized« when the context in other areas is destroyed.

The conflict between business and professional ethics and the deterioration of the working organizations therefore is not the result of a greater professionalization but the result of redundant and obsolete organizational models.

On the contrary: there are many cases of the so called »bidimensionalisation« or rather cases of double identification: with the professional ethics and at the same time with the organization (Durand, 1972).

We think that bidimensionalism is all the more frequent if the organization or the enterprise fall into the open type category. The open system makes it possible for mutual adaptation of professional and business norms, professional reputation and the organizational status etc.

If we take into account the development of informatics and professionalization with all the consequences which follow these two processes then the following formula will hold true in not too far future: democratic socialism = informatics + selfgovernment (Meister, 1972).

CONCLUSION:

Neither the characteristics of the environment nor the development of professionalism and informatics hamper the emergence and realization (within all the other subsystems of the working organization) of those types of reciprocal relations which are found in the subsystem of production.

THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE WORKING ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTICIPATION

The environment characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity and discontinuity is labeled by Emery (1967) as a turbulent environment. The classical bureaucratic organizations are not flexible enough nor responsive enough to be able to outlive it: fragmentation of power and disengagement of its members are signs which show us that they are on the way out.

The solution for this conflict lies in the following dual change:

1. to abolish the hierarchical organization or rather to debureaucratize it;
2. to stabilize and homogenize the environment.

The first process occurs so to speak spontaneously as a result of organizations' responsiveness to the new environment. The second change cannot occur spontaneously but can only be the result of the institutional change.

Debureaucratization is taking unexpected turns. The democratic and participative organization is not the element which is bringing about the abolishment of hierarchy, but rather this is done by the greater degree of openness towards the environment. With a greater degree of openness the responsiveness of the organization increases. Nevertheless responsiveness is not the only consequence of the opening process; another effect which is less desirable is that now the organizations are becoming also more vulnerable. Vulnerability can reach a critical point if the identification of the members with their organization is not high enough and if the environment is turbulent.

For the Yugoslav organizations it is characteristic that they are changing from closed hierarchical organizations to open and responsive systems. But the process of opening is taking place in an environment which is competitive and institutionally unsuitable. Ineffectiveness of inductive planning, short term and frequent legislative government intervention and a greater intensity of competitiveness which are characteristic for the present situation represents maximum of uncertainty, for the organization of the open type.

They cannot alleviate the uncertainty, which is the result of a specific social environment, by closing up but rather by increasing the value coorientation of its members. The intensification of common values enables the self-regulating activity of the employed. It also makes it possible for its members to adapt better to changes (Emery, 1967). If this change does not occur then the organizations can exist only strengthening the mechanisms control, by increasing centralization of power and by reducing management to tactics and it can form the type of management described by Emery as the immanent intraorganizational consequence of the non-structured and random environment (Emery, 1964).

Researches show that in Yugoslavia the more centralized enterprises are economically more successful, and that the most successful directors are as a rule »autocrats«. Because of a high degree of instability these »autocrats« are given public support of the employed though they do not work with the self governing organs, (Tannenbaum, Kavčić, Rus, 1971; Rus, 1972).

The conflict between competitive environment and the model of self government cannot, be solved by intensifying value coorientation but by power centralization and autocratic leadership.

I can say that this hypothesis has amply been proven by many researches. They found an increasing degree of interest particularization of the employed and the domination of economic values over the social values.

All empirical researches have shown that in the hierarchy of the motivational factors personal income ranks first, while collaboration in decision-

making ranked last (Jezernik, 1964; Kavčič, 1969; Arzenšek, 1970). Some sociologists have tried to explain the fact the need for decision making at the bottom of the hierarchy of motivational factors because this need is saturated with the system of self government, and the wish for a higher personal incomes at the top, because the level of personal income is relatively low.

Nevertheless of the top of the hierarchical structure this interpretation cannot be justified because the survey conducted by Jezernik shows that the economic aspirations grow concomitantly with greater personal incomes. A similar phenomenon was found by Arzenšek. His research shows that the aspirations for decisionmaking are greater in the case of the members of the working councils than in the case of the other workers. The ratio between the degree of activation and saturation of these two needs is therefore negative and not positive.

The existing hierarchy of the motivational factors, which shows an expressive domination of the economic values cannot be explained with the relative degree of deprivation but only by a smaller degree of activation of those needs which are at the bottom of the rank scale.

Economization and particularization of interests of the employed is the result of the domination of the competitive system and the result of the domination of the ideology of development and consumption. All these factors have been reducing the need for participation in selfgovernment and have been increasing the power of the leading groups in the enterprises. Therefore a closed circle (circulus vitiosus) with the reinforcement effects was formed: utilitarian value orientation is evolving with the exchange as the dominant form of integration. Competitiveness as the dynamic factor in the realization of the entire complex of relations, which are based on the exchange, leads to the particularization of interests.

For the hierarchical system which has as its base the fetishism of the state and the coercive power which is considered as the basic form of power collective liberalization is considered to be an important step forward. Nevertheless this liberalism does not mean a democratization where participated management would change to managed participation. It only means a greater autonomy of the enterprises and the leading groups within the enterprises in regard to the state and party hierarchy.

Collective liberalism and relations of competitiveness among working organizations do not allow for a »worker unity« which as the source of power for the working classes, because the interests of workers are negatively correlated. And at the same time it also does not allow for relations of cooperation among the employed within the enterprise because they are important to the other worker as a means and not as the final goal. No society which emphasizes the importance of material affluency can avoid the instrumental practice (Breed, 1971).

This has been proven by empirical researches: workers who are economically oriented want to work under an authoritative foreman (Rus, 1963). The greatest handicap in the change from participative management to managed participation is not the power distance among the different strata of the Yugoslav society. The power distance is comparison with other enterprises from other countries relatively small, the personal income range is also small and the cultural distance is even smaller as a result of the new mass culture and the deterioration of the traditional culture. The greatest handicap for the development of managed participation is the conflict between the highly differentiated heterogeneous and unstable environment and the system of market liberalization. The former has already formed functionally differentiated organizations which aim at an intensive cooperation, while the latter is still maintaining competitive relations which are suitable for the functionally non-

differentiated organizations. On the one hand, this conflict increases instability of the environment, causes fragmentation of power in the organizations and disengages employees while on the other hand, it forces the managers into autocratic management. Critical situations force the leaders to use coercive power at the expense of the other types of power (Mulder, 1971). Only through this can we hypothetically explain the fact that in the Yugoslav enterprises the authority of management is greater than in any other enterprises, in spite of decentralization and a smaller power distance (Kavčič, Tannenbaum, 1972).

The second barrier to the development of a more participated management within the Yugoslav working organizations, and which merits an individual and detailed explanation, is the institutional coalition between the economic subsystems and other subsystems in the Yugoslav society. While the economic subsystems are dominated by liberal values, the other subsystems are dominated by socialist values. The above mentioned coalition between the subsystems can be seen in the fact that the degree of power of managers inside the economic subsystem is very high while it is very small outside its boundaries. Yugoslav managers are a marginal group when considered from the point of view of society as a whole, but are the dominant group when considered in relation to the enterprise (Pantič, 1969). Because of this they are forced to seek a personal union with the political elite. In this way a symbiosis situation between the political and economic elite is formed: one possesses power within the frame of the economic subsystem, the other represents the values of the global society. With the symbiosis of the two types of elites there arises an entirely new formation which has all the characteristics of meritocracy (Rus, 1966). Meritocracy increases the dependency of the managers upon politics and decreases their dependency upon the worker. So there arise new difficulties for the Yugoslav self-governing system.

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**BUREAUCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT
IN ORGANIZATIONS:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPARATIVE
MEASUREMENT**

The aim of this paper is to place the discussion of workers' participation in management, and more particularly the problems of the self-managing enterprise in the context of comparative organizational analysis. The topic of workers' participation has been discussed in many a »resounding phrase« (Walker, 1970:

1). The treatment accorded by sociologists, economists, industrial relations specialists, and others has hitherto been on the whole qualitative. Even at this level, a great part of the discussion has been outside the concepts, let alone measurement tools, of students of organizational behaviour, with minor exceptions (see Adizes, 1971). Although some attempts have been made to set out dimensions of workers' participation amenable to measurement, at least by one scholar of the subject (Walker, 1970: 15), he was at that time only able to »build a youthful conceptual framework, identifying the major variables and indicating their general mode of operation.« (1970: 15). He went on to point out that a »specification of the relation between the variables and quantification of their operation« had to await a »great deal more research«.

In this paper we will argue that it is not only possible to relate the phenomena of the self-managing enterprise to broad comparative organizational analysis, but also to offer some hypotheses suggesting the relationships which might be found between relevant organizational variables in this type of organization as compared with other institutions which possess an elaborate, formal representative structure of an explicit kind. By this do we mean that the self-managing enterprise will resemble the occupational interest association (such as the trade union), rather than the capitalist non-self-managing enterprise of the conventional kind found in the West? On the basis of research carried out on the last two categories of organization, would we hypothesize that the self-managing enterprise (say of the variety found in Yugoslavia) would be more like a British trade union for example (albeit of comparable size) than its counterpart in the same industry in the United Kingdom with a conventional hierarchical organizational structure?

We shall attempt to answer these questions by referring to comparative organizational research carried out by the present writer, (see Warner and Donaldson, 1971) building on the work of colleagues and following the Aston approach to organizational analysis, then linking this with data drawn from secondary sources on self-managing enterprise. As the subject of this paper is to suggest ways of measuring the degree of industrial democracy in self-managing enterprises and to set up a straw-man hypothesis for further researchers to demolish, we therefore seek the indulgence of the reader in so far as no empirical data has been collected at first hand. We do however feel

that research on the self-managing enterprise may benefit from the discussion of conceptual and measurement problems in this case as the interpenetration of the administrative and representational rationales in self-managing enterprises at least suggests itself as closely analogous to that found in occupational interest associations, rather than organizations in general. As John Stuart Mill (1874: 393—394) observed of analogical reasoning: »Two things resemble each in one or more respects: a certain proposition is true of the one, therefore it is true the other . . . Every resemblance which can be shown to exist affords ground for expecting an indefinite number of other resemblances«. On the other hand, self-managing enterprises **ought** to obey general relationships between organizational structure and contextual variables, like size.

In order to identify and predict organizational structure in manufacturing and service organizations, the intention of the earlier comparative work on which the present analysis is based was to develop a methodology for the study of the features of these bodies, using a multivariate approach. This became known as the Aston approach, as it was developed by Pugh *et al* at the University of Aston in Birmingham, now being carried out at the Organizational Behaviour Research Group at London Graduate School of Business Studies.

Structural concepts originally derived from the theory of bureaucracy and management writings were operationalized to help to understand better the administrative features of organization. These were:

- (a) **Specialization**: the division of labour within the organization, the distribution of official duties among a number of positions.
- (b) **Standardization**: the extent to which procedures are governed by regulations.
- (c) **Formalization**: the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and communications are written.
- (d) **Centralization**: the locus of authority to make decisions affecting the organization.
- (e) **Configuration**: the 'shape' of the role structure.

The Aston researchers looked at the relationship between contextual variables such as **size**, and the five 'primary' structural variables listed above (**specialization, standardization, formalization, centralization, and configuration**). The earlier research empirically marked out a number of underlying dimensions of structure which were seen as independent. First, the 'structuring of activities' (specialization, standardization, formalization, and the number of hierarchical levels); second, 'concentration of authority' (centralization and lack of autonomy). As Hinings and Lee (1971 : 84) point out:

These dimensions were treated as variables, so the extent to which an organization scores high or low on them is a matter for empirical investigation. There is no **a priori** assumption that a high score on one dimension will automatically result in a similar score on another dimension. Each was developed into a continuous variable by means of cumulative scaling 'procedures.' (for details, see Hinings *et al.*, 1967, Inkson *et al.*, 1968, Levy and Pugh, 1969).

The aim was then to compare the scores achieved in the organizations studied by Pugh *et al.*, (manufacturing organizations etc.) with those collected in occupational interest associations on a comparable scale, that is, from a sample of unions and professional associations. (see for example Pugh *et al.*, 1968, and 1969).

The application of the Aston schema to self-managing enterprises is less problematic than in the case of occupational interest associations, because

se the former have the straightforward »workflow« as measured in the original studies, that is, if the enterprises concerned are manufacturing organisations. Indeed it would be interesting to see how a British firm like the well-known Glacier Metal Company, (Jacques, 1951) which does have a formal type of representation of sorts, would score in terms of the Aston measures, and whether it would be very different in its scores from a more conventional manufacturing firm. Central to the Aston paradigm for the comparison of organizations of widely differing functions, it must be remembered, is the schema developed by Bakke (1959), which isolates a main output and various supportive activities. A preliminary research task when we looked at trade unions was to settle the exact workflow (cycle of output activities) of these occupational interest associations (see Warner & Donaldson, 1971), but this need not concern us as problematic if trying to measure industrial democracy in manufacturing firms. In the earlier study, we made the assumption that when we look at the unions as work organizations, the actual output consisted of services to their clients, i. e. members, for which they were 'obliged to pay certain costs.' (Penceval, 1971: 180). We considered unions as organizations with certain work-flows which result in the output in question, the central being related to the collective bargaining activity variable. This hinged on the Webbs' definition of the union's basic purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their (members') working lives.' (Webbs, 1894: 1).

One of the main problems which face trade unions and professional associations is that, compared with other types of organizations such as firms, they are **relatively small in terms of the number of staff they employ**, and it is this set of problems as they relate to size which we will now consider. Careful analysis of the internal workings of the organizations investigated showed that administrative characteristics can be seen as a function of size. In the study attempted, we tried to look at the administrative characteristics of trade unions and professional associations in terms of the measures which had been developed from the study of business and other organizations. Summarizing the main approach as follows: we argued that occupational interest associations are sufficiently similar in their administrative activities to be compared with other work organisations — that they have an administrative superstructure (see Moore, 1957: 123), or what some people have loosely called a **bureaucracy**, albeit of a special kind as we shall see later in terms of being constrained by a system of 'self-government', or 'self-management' if one prefers the term.

We attempted to apply the methodology described earlier which breaks down the administrative features of organizations into **specialization, standardization, formalization, centralization, and configuration**, and which investigated the relationship between contextual variables such as size and the five above primary structural variables. In measuring these administrative characteristics for example, and relating them to the size of the staff (and also membership), we did **not** attempt to give one organization good marks or bad marks, but simply recorded the relationship between the variables one as they related one with another. (This ought also to be the intention of applying the Aston concepts and method to self-managing firms.) This was carried out in order to compare the scores achieved in business and other organisations studied by the previous research, that is manufacturing organisations etc., with an entirely, **ostensibly different** type of organization that is the occupational interest association, like the trade union.

The main findings (see the Appendices to this paper) suggested that the occupational interest associations **are** directly comparable with, say, business firms using these common measures and that the findings of the earlier study are replicated **although with certain qualifications to be described below**, (see Warner & Donaldson, 1971, and 1972). One interesting result was

that taking different types of trade union (craft, general, industrial, white collar) and a professional association, we found that the main relationships were related to the differences in the numbers of employees (paid and full-time) of these organizations, rather than stemming from the fact that they were different in terms of type of organization, that is say being a professional association as opposed to a craft union. The main differences were related to the fact of employing a very small number of people at head office and other centres, as opposed to having over 500 people on the pay-roll. Thus, the degree to which administrative procedures were formalized for example, and for that matter standardized and specialized, depended on whether the organisations were big or small within the range of total people employed. (the size of full-time paid staff correlated closely, in turn we must note, with the size of the membership of the unions). **We hypothesize that these relationships should hold for self-managing enterprises, as well as trade unions. In so far as the former deviate from what one would predict on the basis of size, (in terms of full-time employees), we can further hypothesize that the scores would tend to be in the same direction as the occupational interest associations.**

If indeed there was a relative degree of bureaucracy in terms of structuring of activity, we consider that this was a way of administering increasing size in the same way as it is a feature to be found as much in all kinds of organization, and not just trade unions and professional associations. Overall standardization was also slightly smaller for occupational interest associations as opposed to other kinds of organizations. The most dramatic change we note was on formalization where occupational interest associations as a whole have scored higher than say business firms. Differences on centralization were somewhat reduced, but trade unions and professional associations were distinctly higher. We conclude that trade unions and professional associations seem to be more centralized as noted earlier, more abundant in paper controls, manifest fewer rules and procedures, and are less specialized along functional lines than other types of organizations. We might interpret this as indicating that relative to organizations of the same size, occupational interest associations have more control exercised by their lay committees, which is affected directly by the appropriation of a large amount of their decision-making and more generally by a larger paper flow through which a pervasive control of the organization is maintained, (see Warner & Donaldson 1971 and 1972).

While these aspects of occupational interest association structure might be modified by consciously reducing paperwork in the interests of administrative efficiency, this may not necessarily work because of the representative rationale which is embedded in trade union and professional association government and relates to the fact that they are **democratic organisations**, that is 'self-managing'. This is not to say, however, that cost-benefit analysis cannot be applied to certain procedures so that one might investigate just how much membership control one might be sacrificing against an increase in so-called managerial efficiency, and the degree of trade-off possible between the two.

Having emphasized the relationship between these structural variables and **size** as measured by the number of paid fulltime employees of the organization, we may conclude that the limitation of applying modern management techniques may be limited by the upper limit encountered in the sample, that is that the biggest trade union that we looked at which was a general union, employed no more than 518 or so people (the smallest unions employing no more than 15). The two Yugoslav firms examined by Adizes (1971) were each four times as large. The other types of organizations looked at in the earlier Aston research employed from 241 to over 25,000 employees

in one study, and from 108 employees to 9,778 in another. It is clear that some of the business firms which were looked at in the earlier samples were smaller in the number of people employed than the largest union, but nonetheless it is probably likely that such refined techniques as strategic planning and manpower budgeting and so on were probably **not** used in these organizations. Given the number of staff employed in trade union and professional associations examined, one cannot infer that they performed any better or any worse than might have been expected in relation to their size, except in the sense that there was slightly more paperwork as we have described above which we think is probably related to the representative rationale, and the intended goal of membership participation and control which they **explicitly** pursue.

Having said all this, we can now venture to argue that the organization of occupational interest associations might be thought of as similar to the »self-management system« which makes a distinction between the »Administrative and Governing Function« as described in a recent study of Yugoslav industrial democracy, (Adizes, 1971 : 32—33). The two functions taken together we are told, constitute the management process, as the term »Management« **as such** it is alleged, does not exist in the Yugoslav languages. Adizes points out that »the distinction between the two types of power — power to govern and power to administer — constitute the basis of industrial democracy. The general membership governs, while the nominated or elected administrators administer«. (1971 : 33) Administrators suggest decisions and ultimately implement them if the representatives have made the decisions, (in trade union circumstances a familiar phenomenon.)

It is clear that the author here is referring to the distinction between non-apex and apex organisations where, in his own terms, a »bottom-up« rather than »top-down« authority system exists. He continues: — »An American Executive is free to act as he sees fit, within a »zone of indifference« of the interested parties and as long as he does not violate any laws and fulfils the request of the Board. In Yugoslavia, the Executive is **not free to act unless** the right for that action is rendered to him by the company's governing body, which is the general membership or its elected body.« (Adizes, 1971 : 33). We are continuing to assume that, contrary to a recent House of Lords Appeal judgement, trade unions are **not** »apex« organizations.

The »governing function« or what we would call representative rationale, consists of »several organizational bodies«. (Adizes, 1971 : 33). The largest of these is the 'total membership' of the self-managing enterprise, and the mechanism of government is by referenda or general assemblies. These need not necessarily be for the whole organization, but may consist of specific workshops or departments. The general membership as a whole elects the »Workers' Council«, and this votes for an Executive Committee called »the Governing Boards«. Finally, the Workers' Council nominates the head of the organization who is called the Director and he stands for re-election every four years as do all the top executives of the company it is claimed. Thus the structure of the self-managing enterprise does not seem unfamiliar to the student of (at least British) trade unions.

Indeed, the Basic Law enacted in 1950, provides for **at least** two bodies of Workers' Management in each enterprise, namely the Workers, Council and the Management Board, (Blumberg, 1968 : 198) not unlike the smaller Delegate Conferences and Executive Committees of many trade unions. »As stipulated by law, Workers Councils are composed of between fifteen and one hundred and twenty members, depending upon the size of the enterprise in which they are existing. Though there are councils in the country at both ends of this continuum, the average number of members is between twenty

and twenty-two. This average has remained quite constant since the inception of Workers' Management.« (Blumberg, 1968 : 198). This seems to be closer to the size of trade union Executive Committees, and this is a point which might be of some interest.

Representative bodies are usually fairly large by comparison with executive ones because they exist to cover a range of interests. We may briefly note in passing that research findings on the size of groups in general show that apparently the average size of **action taking** sub-groups is 6.5 members, whereas the average size of the **non-action taking** counter-part is 14. (Olson, 1965 : 54) But we cannot say what is the optimum size for either the Executive Committee of a Trade Union, or a Factory Workers' Council, as no research has been carried out that is, in the present writer's view, persuasive. It has been suggested in the literature that performance in groups of five is on the whole better than in groups of 12. And that 'small, centripetally organized groups usually call on and use all their energies, while in large groups forces remain much oftener potential'. (1965 : 54) However, the larger bodies seem to gain in representativeness, and the device of working parties is a useful device to obtain the benefits of the division of labour.

Another point to be noted is that in the research by Adizes, technology and size of plant (amongst other variables) were held constant, and the leadership style of the Director was employed as the independent variable (1971 : 262). **One question which we ought to ask is, given that technology is held constant what would be the difference in the degree of representation over a range of enterprise sizes.** From the Aston findings, we would expect to see the bigger organizations having a greater structuring of activities and a higher degree of decentralization. This would mean that there might be less participation in the sense of the individual having to be **indirectly** involved in the collectivity via his representative on the elected council, i. e. above the level of the Chief Executive, but possibly having compensating control at the work-shop level as a member of an autonomous workgroup. We would expect to find that there would be such structuring in large organizations so as to cater for the problems of size by initiating, for example plant level committees. As Vanek has indeed described: — »In enterprises of a certain size, similar self-management bodies are also formed at the level of the various production and administrative units, and the process of decentralization may be repeated again within larger firms. Three-tier, and even four-tier self-management structures are by no means uncommon. The Directors of the lower units are similarly appointed or elected by the work collectivity, or its self — management bodies, without any outside intervention. In a very large firm, several dozen self-management bodies of all kinds and levels, including specialized committees, may operate simultaneously and co-operate in the shaping of production and business activities.« (Vanek, 1972 : 86). Furthermore, we find that according to a Yugoslav survey carried out in 1966 (1972 : 86) that out of 516 organizations employing a thousand or more workers, 408 had a two-tier, 69 had a three-tier and five a four-tier self-management system, although no decentralized committees were found in 34 enterprises.

We can now see that self-managed enterprises seem to resemble more and more the trade unions described in the recent replication study, and Vanek (1972 : 88) in his presentation of qualitative evidence suggests that there is a higher degree of formalization and standardization in larger enterprises, as we would expect to find. However, many decisions seem to be taken above the level of Chief Executive with respect to things like price-lists, rates of travel allowance, renting of rights of Attorney and so on »moreover, no capital spending, investment, borrowing, changes in inventory, or any other unusual expenditure, (publicity, individual grants, etc.), not to speak of a reduction or increase in employment, can take place unless properly autho-

rized and agreed to by the Works Council or any other body as determined by the bye-laws. Extracts, minutes, or certified copies of relevant decisions form an essential part of documentation. Any request for an **ex post** validation of any unauthorised spending on other 'over-sight' can be a most painful exercise for a Director or Executive. The advance approval of such varied items (as indeed the consideration omission reports by the Workers Councils) may be time-consuming, yet there is no adequate alternative, save the setting up of an **ad hoc** committee.« (Vanek 1972 : 88). There is however no evidence to suggest that self-managed enterprises are less specialized (in Aston terms), although it is conceivable that the concentration of attention on certain items, like personnel matters for example, at the Workers' Council level, may correspondingly reduce the need for specialists, at least somewhat.

The degree to which participation in self-managing enterprises is real has been questioned by a Yugoslav researcher (Obradovic, 1972). It is suggested that although the structure of self-management in theory sets up the central Workers' Council as the governing body of the enterprise, in practice the results are different. Obradovic found that the General Director and/or professional people were in effect the most powerful members of the enterprise. Reporting data from 20 companies, employing 70,000 people, which is about 3% of the total Yugoslav working population, he suggested that in effect levels of education were positively associated with all dimensions of participation used and that among manual workers level of skill positively also correlated with these dimensions. Taking the level of organizational hierarchy, the groups participating most were (in rank order); first, supervisors and managers in general who in fact scored 80% on all dimension, and second, splitting levels; first, higher management, second, non-supervisory staff (by far the biggest percentage of the work force) and third, higher plant supervisors. He found that better educated personnel were relatively most active if salaries and wages were discussed (rather than the general economic problems of the firm) and that there was a very high positive correlation between hierarchical level and participation over wage-distribution issues. Earlier critical research findings are reported elsewhere (for example see Strauss and Rosentein, 1970). The thesis put forward in this article is that »(1) participation in many cases has been introduced from the top down as symbolic solutions to ideological contradictions; (2) its appeal is due in large part to its apparent consistency with both socialist and human relations theory; (3) in practice it has only spotty success chiefly in the personnel and welfare rather than in the production areas; nevertheless (4) its chief value may be that providing another forum for the resolution of conflict as well as another means by which management can induce compliance with its directives« (1970 : 198). Referring to Yugoslavia, they are sceptical (following the research of Kolaja, 1960 and 1966) that Workers' Councils are very interested in overall economic discussion about the firm, and consider that discussion only becomes lively when things such as premium pay are discussed, (1970: 206). They believe that managers in both Yugoslavia and Sweden use Workers' Councils as 'sounding boards') so that they can try out workers reactions to suggestions involving changes (1970; 207), they conclude that 'Participation seems to have broadened the scope of bargaining (and in Yugoslavia, according to Kolaja, it functions as a personnel appeals procedure). (1970; 212).

They think that participation has strengthened management and in Yugoslavia in particular, it has »helped indoctrinate present workers with industrial discipline and has also helped identify and train potential managerial talent« (1970: 212). They observe that there are even conflicts in Socialist

states, with management representing the interests of the broader society or at least the firm as a whole; contrasting with this are the workers with their »selfish« or individual work-group attitudes or interest. (1970 : 214).

While we may legitimately be sceptical of some of the claims of workers' control or self management, only specific and empirical research preferably involving measurement, can tell us the degree to which the formal representative machinery **actually operates as the focal point of decision making**. The work of Obradovic seems to be the most hopeful of those critical of self-management. However, we need further comparative studies to link it with a similar use of dimensions of participation in say a Western enterprise, such as the Glacier Metal Company in Britain.

One criticism which could be levelled against the application of the Aston methodology to the study of self-managing enterprises in say Yugoslavia, is that **it would only pick out the formal levels of decision making (and hence the degrees of participation) and not the »real« ones**. Certainly an adaptation of the Aston methodology and measures would be necessary, particularly to the somewhat special characteristics of the young Yugoslav self-managing enterprise, in the same way as the concepts and measures had to be modified to deal with the problem of examining occupational interest associations. While the criticism may be possibly valid that it does not pick out the »real« levels of decision-making, this might also be alleged for the western capitalist non-self-managing manufacturing enterprises that it studied, but this **need** not undermine its value for those cases, nor for the study of self-managing instances. Any research instrument will face comparable difficulties. If modified scales were produced not only would they be reasonably appropriate for comparing one self-managing enterprise with another in a standardized fashion, but would also improve the possibility of comparing self-managing enterprises with their conventionally run counterparts.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is worth noting, in conclusion, that an increase in the size of organizations seems to increase bureaucracy, or what we have called »structuring of activities«. This is as true of »democratic« organizations like unions, as for their conventional counterparts such as business enterprises. Self-government, in addition, seems to involve more bureaucracy, that is even greater »structuring of activities« for a given size, at least in terms of two of its three dimensions (more formalization and more standardization, but not specialization), and more centralization in Aston terms, as we have seen. Consequently, if what we have hypothesized is confirmed by empirical investigation in self-managing enterprises, if they wish to avoid bureaucratization, they should keep an eye on their size. On the other hand, for a given size, the price of self-government paid for in terms of more »structuring of activities« may not only be a necessary concomitant of democratic control (as in unions), but one considered to be worth paying considering the advantages it may seem to have over the conventional apex organization.

APPENDIX A

Scores on the Five Primary Dimensions of Organizational Structure for Occupational Interest Associations and Unions only

STRUCTURAL VARIABLE	RANGE	MEAN	S. D.	SAMPLE SIZE
Functional Specialization	0—5	3 2.17	1.722	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only
Overall Standardization	35—82	69.5 49.92	19.26	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only
Overall Formalization	12—36	30 23.50	9.77	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only
Overall Centralization	82—107	93 97.17	10.72	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only
*Autonomy	4—15	10 12.5	4.18	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only
Configuration				
Vertical Span	2—5	5 3.67	1.37	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only
Size	15—518.5	181 169.2	213.3	Professional Assn. 6 Unions only

* Autonomy is a subscale of overall centralization and measures the degree to which decisions are taken within rather than outside of the organization i.e. whether decisions are taken by officials or by such »higher« bodies as the Executive Council.

(Source Warner & Donaldson 1971 : 13)

APPENDIX B

Comparison of the Scores on the Five Primary Dimensions of Organizational Structure with the Aston and National Samples

Union = U; Professional Association = PA; Aston (Midlands) study = A; National Study = Nat; Smallest National Subsample = S.

STRUCTURAL VARIABLE	RANGE OBTAINED	MEAN	S. D.	SAMPLE	N
Functional Specialization	0—5	2.99	1.60	U & PA	7
	0—16	10.19	5.19	A	52
	2—16	10.29	3.37	Nat.	82
		6.69	3.04	S	13
Overall Standardization	35—82	52.71	19.07	U & PA	7
	30—131	83.88	22.71	A	52
	41—129	84.51	22.40	Nat.	82
		63.19	13.89	S	13
Overall Formalization	12—36	24.43	9.25	U & PA	7
	4—49	27.17	11.16	A	52
	3—44	26.77	9.00	Nat.	82
		19.46	8.17	S	13
Overall Centralization	82—107	96.57	9.91	U & PA	7
	51—116	77.48	13.47	A	52
	21—91	50.05	13.67	Nat.	82
		62.54	15.41	S	13
Autonomy	4—15	12.14	3.93	U & PA	7
	1—23	15.00	6.04	A	52
	9—23	20.5	2.75	Nat.	82

Vertical Span	2—5	3.86	1.35	U & PA	7
	4—11	6.71	1.42	A	52
	3—10	5.89	1.36	Nat.	82
		4.62	0.87	S	13
Size	15—518.5	170.9	196.2	U & PA	7
	241—25,052	3370	5313	A	52
	108— 9,778	1542	2115	Nat.	82
		150.7	25.9	S	13

(Source: Warner & Donaldson, 1971 : 15)

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AN EVALUATIVE MODEL FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT*

The ideal of worker participation in management has fired the imagination and raised the hopes of people all over the world. It is often seen as the solution to work alienation and dissatisfaction, and/or as a way to true socialism. In 1970 more than sixty countries sent representatives to an IIRA Geneva conference on worker participation in management and most of these delegates claimed that their countries were deeply interested in, and committed to, or experimenting with, various forms of worker participation in management.¹ Yet despite these hopes and the conviction about the economic, political, and psychological gains to be expected, the history of worker participation is replete with cases where organizations with worker participation in management have faced strains and problems failure or stagnation.

Even in Yugoslavia, where one finds the most complete and successful full participation of workers in management, there are serious strains and conflicts.² Despite the protection of worker self-management in the Federal constitution, where it is stated that factories MUST be managed by the workers, there is a tendency for Yugoslav factories to delegate decision-making power to the manager and other experts. This has been accentuated by the recent free market in Yugoslavia where factories have for the first time had to face full competition.³

Many factories in other areas which are worker self-managed have either failed, shown less efficiency, or been competitive for relatively short periods of time. In this category we would place the producers cooperatives and the French communities of work. Meister⁴ has noted that in such organizations there seems to be a natural history in which in the first stage of enthusiasm there is an almost sectarian commitment to the individual and to worker self-management, but that in later stages these organizations fail or transfer power to a manager.

Finally there are the many cases of partial worker control of the shop floor represented in various kinds of worker participation and consultation in American industry. In those cases which represent genuine attempts by management to include the worker in some decision-making (as contrasted to the many cases where it is simply an attempt to manipulate the worker), Blumberg⁵ reports that there is almost always an increase in morale and productivity.

What accounts for these differences? Searching for an answer one finds few good studies. Most of the literature is descriptive, anecdotal, and ideological. Successes are attributed to the intrinsic value of the idea, failures to repressive or unsympathetic environments. Only in the most limited kinds of

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programs, those represented in U.S. management's attempts at motivation through the job itself, is there even an approximation of objective data.

We need careful, objective, comparative studies. But, these must be preceded by an adequate theoretical model which identifies the major variables. The purpose of this paper is to present a first approximation to such a model.

DEFINITIONS

We begin by defining our principal terms: worker participation and management. Management we use to refer to what Wilfred Brown⁶ calls the executive system, which is the totality of the decisions affecting the work of the organization. They include such simple decisions as to whether the tolerances on a machine are correct, as well as decisions about marketing strategy. Anyone making any of these decisions is, according to Brown, part of the executive system. When management is defined in this way it can be seen that almost everyone in a firm is a part of management so that the question of worker participation in management is really one of the DEGREE to which they participate.

For the purposes of this paper we will simplify the degree of participation into three levels: that of the task, that of the shop, and that of the enterprise itself. While it is clearly impossible for any person or group to make all decisions affecting even a relatively minor task in modern complex enterprises, we can make the assumption that a worker can maximize the number of decisions he makes, or influences. We have three existing models for worker participation at these three levels. At the task level we have American management's attempts at job enlargement, job enrichment, and management by objectives. At the shop level, the Work Research Institutes in Norway have introduced shop floor control by workers into a number of Norwegian plants. Finally, we have in such cases as that of Yugoslavia, examples of worker control at the level of the enterprise itself.

It is our contention that one major difference between successful and unsuccessful participation schemes lies in the degree to which the scope, extent, and degree of worker participation are appropriate to: (a) the needs, capacities, and goals of the workers, (b) the technology of the enterprise, and (c) degree of economic development of the country in which the enterprise is located.

NEEDS, CAPACITIES AND GOALS

Our view of needs is that of A. H. Maslow⁷ who outlined a hierarchy of needs in which unsatisfied basic needs dominated human motivation but were replaced by higher needs once they were relatively satisfied. It is Maslow's scheme as interpreted by Douglas McGregor, which we shall use to classify different kinds and degrees of worker participation on the one hand, and of the economic and educational condition of the workers on the other. We shall argue that where the scheme of worker participation is inappropriate to the economic and educational level of the workers, it will change in such a way as to become appropriate, or it will fail. Since the available data is both crude and uneven, our classification of the levels of the schemes and of the workers must necessarily be equally crude and the criteria by which we judge success and failure will suffer from the same shortcomings.

McGregor⁸ classifies human needs into four levels: »(1) Physiological and Safety needs, which include food, shelter, rest, etc., for the first, and protection against danger, threat, and deprivation for the second; (2) Social Needs... which include needs for belonging, for association, for acceptance by his fellows, and for giving and receiving friendship and love. (3) Ego Needs, relating to needs of reputation, status, recognition, and appreciation, for self confidence, independence, achievement, and competence; and (4) Self-Fulfillment Needs, that is needs for realizing one's own potentialities, for continued self-development, for being creative in the broadest sense of that term«. McGregor then argues that only as the more primary needs become relatively satiated do the secondary needs become active as motivators. In simplest terms, a starving man seldom worries about his reputation, whereas a well-fed one usually does.

The classification of the need level of any group of workers can probably only be done in very crude terms, given the present level of information. We would suggest a distinction between low income workers with low job security, such as semi-skilled, unorganized workers in many small assembly and repair plants, middle income workers with good job security such as organized automobile workers, and high income workers with high job security, such as professional engineers or university professors.

The first group should be preoccupied with the elementary goals of wages and security, the second while giving much attention to both wages and security would be very interested in rights at work (i. e., in status considerations) while the last would be primarily motivated by self-esteem and self-actualization needs. Given these assumptions, which we feel to be crudely accurate, we suggest that what motivates the different groups of workers is the possibility of satisfying these different needs and that those forms of organizations which maximize the satisfaction of such needs will function most efficiently. Thus, it is known that scientists tend to be most productive where they have autonomy and a collegial (self-managed) setting; that affluent blue collar workers respond to managerial schemes which enhance status, and that poorly paid, unskilled and semi-skilled workers are primarily interested in wage increases. Similarly, as Herzberg⁹ and his colleagues have demonstrated, the satiation of any of these needs results in their extinction as motivators, with the consequence that further increases in efficiency can be made only through the prospect of rewards which meet higher needs.

For the purposes of this analysis we will, therefore, propose three broad groups of workers: (1) uneducated, semi or unskilled workers, who basically trade physical energy for income; (2) skilled workers or technicians with a secondary school education and who trade skill for income; (3) highly skilled, professional type workers with a college or equivalent education, who trade knowledge for income. To compensate for the effects of social mobility, we will also make the assumption that the workers in these groups have come from uneducated working class families, lower middle class educated families, and upper middle class highly educated families, respectively. The reader will recognize that in reality there is a gradient between and overlap among these groups. Nevertheless, the groups so purified can be distinguished.

There is evidence that the life styles, goals, and self-conceptions of these three groups differ considerably. We would like to suggest that these differences in demands crudely reflect both their needs and their potential contributions to the management of enterprises.

Unskilled, uneducated workers are often also poor and insecure. They are, therefore, in terms of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, preoccupied with meeting physiological and security needs, in other words, with income and job security. As long as they lack these things they probably have little inte-

rest in the social or psychological rewards of work or at least they would be unwilling to sacrifice income for such rewards. Of course, if they can have such rewards without diminishing their income, they would be appreciated. If such workers are functional illiterates (have less than six years of education) they are probably incapable of tasks involving the use of abstract symbols like planning, and they probably do not feel that they can contribute much to management beyond the strict limits of their job. In terms of needs and competence, these workers would be most satisfied with some very limited forms of participation like the Scanlon Plan, or simply with collective bargaining.

Skilled workers and technicians, with a secondary school or equivalent education and coming from the same type of families, will be relatively affluent, certainly in the possession of sufficient income to afford many luxuries, and therefore, free of the need of income and security. They are likely to define the good job as one in which they have a certain amount of freedom, autonomy and challenge. Since their social and ego needs will be active, and since they will have the competence to control their own jobs and probably much of the work in the shop, they will want the opportunity.¹⁰ They should thrive under a stage two worker participation program, in which they have almost full control over their own jobs and as a work group also control the work on the shop floor.

Finally, if we look at a group of PH.D Research Chemists working for a large company who have come from families of similar background, they should have never experienced want and not regard money as a central part of their job. In fact, they probably take it for granted that they will be well paid. They will expect to be in complete control over their own jobs, expect to be fully in charge of their own shop, and would like and could provide an effective voice in the running of the company. These would be workers certain of their own status, and defining a good job as one in which they would have independence, the chance to be creative and to engage in self-actualization.

The types of workers we have chosen are, of course, simply illustrative. But they represent gradations in the need level at which they are operating, the family and educational backgrounds they have, their level of managerial competence, and their demands and expectations. Considered so, it seems probable that stage three participation schemes would not be appropriate for unskilled workers, both because they would care more for money and security than status and creativity, and unless the firm they worked for was sufficiently affluent, their inept participation would be so costly that they would have to sacrifice income to have it. Similarly, the research chemists would be dissatisfied with stage one participation schemes, since they would feel that as a colleague group, they could run their own shop better than anyone else, and would resent other types of control.

It now becomes necessary to define what we mean by worker control and, of course, it is evident that this will be a function of the number of decisions which the worker makes with regard to his own work. It follows that with increases in the worker's span of control, there will be increases in his autonomy, and potential mobility. One might envision the span of control as radiating out from the desk or work bench of the worker and including the number of alternatives that he is presented with. Thus, if the work involves no decisions and the action is completely prescribed, the worker has no control. If that job is enriched so that, for example, he inspects his own work, his control is widened. If he joins with other workers in controlling the flow of work, and planning the work on the shop floor, or is involved in

consultative committees, control widens still further. Finally, if he is personally involved in the overall management of the plant, in hiring, investments, marketing, etc., then he may be thought of as having full control.

This simple idea of increases in the span of control must be amended to recognize that as the span increases, the worker must share decisions with others (workers, clerks, technicians, managers, etc.) and thereby he loses some control. This suggests, and it is a sensible suggestion, that the worker will have the greatest degree of control over his own job (and therefore, those things which he is most competent in), and less control as he shares decisions with more and more people. We can expect, therefore, that this will be true of each member of the organization, including the manager. This would represent a realistic adjustment of the management functions to the division of labour will produce differences in skills and competence. The is a certain natural wisdom in this, for people are comfortable in, and psychologically rewarded by, participating in decisions which they are competent to make. It is the feeling of the exercise of competence which is ego enhancing and growth producing. The system should be flexible enough to encourage people to increase their competence and with the increase in competence to increase their span of control. Of course, the growth in competence is not unlimited. Efficient organizations will always need a division of labour and the division of labour will produce differences in skills and competence. The span of control must be determined and restricted by the span of competence. Just as reducing control below the abilities of the man produces alienation and dissatisfaction, increasing them beyond his abilities will produce feelings of incompetence, foolishness, and finally boredom. Besides it can be terrifying to make decisions involving your own fate when you do not have the skills or information to do so.

Studies of Yugoslav factories where the worker's council manages the factory, have shown that: it is difficult for the workers to understand and decide about normal managerial problems like production scheduling, investments, marketing, etc. These studies consistently show that the worker council members are only interested in those questions which directly effect them and they can understand, like salaries, grievances, housing, and vacations.¹¹ Since attendance at workers council meetings seems to diminish with time, the experience must be punishing, probably because it gives the workers a sense of incompetence and futility. These strains are amplified by competition between units within the factory over scarce resources and by breakdowns in confidence between the workers and workers councils manifested in strikes. Increasingly there is evidence that the workers feel that by giving more power to the manager they will get greater efficiency and higher incomes.¹²

THE FORMS OF WORKER PARTICIPATION

The theory of self-management is based on the needs of the workers and following this lead we shall attempt to distinguish between forms of self-management in terms of the degree to which they meet certain kinds of needs as defined by Maslow's hierarchy. Our classification is based on the span of the worker's control over his own work.

The span of control is important because the psychological advantages of worker self-management seems linked to his feeling about how he controls what HE is doing. The span is narrowest when everything he does seems prescribed and there is no scope for his own decisions and widest when he has complete and autonomous control over what he does. Frederick Winslow

Taylor's completely rationalized and time and motion controlled production job, epitomizes the narrowest span, the independent craftsman entrepreneur the widest.

In the factory, increases in the span of control are illustrated **first** in the processes of job enrichment within which the worker comes to do more of the tasks connected with his job and including his own quality control. A second stage is reached when a work group controls parts or all of the shop floor, as reflected in the work of Einar Thorsrud and his associates in Norway; and finally, complete control, extending from the enriched job, through group control of the shop floor to management of the enterprise itself by workers' representatives. These represent different degrees of worker self-management, but the differences tend to be theoretical rather than empirical. It is frequently, of not usually, true that they are in fact used as separate kinds rather than degrees of self-management, in that some organizations provide control or influence at the top with little or no control over the shop floor or the job itself, as is the case in many Yugoslav factories, and in the German Coal and Steel communities. In other organizations some form of limited shop floor control, such as work councils and other joint decision-making or consultation bodies, exists, with no commensurate increase in control over the job itself.

In viewing these degrees or kinds of worker control, as the case may be, it is important to ask how can or do they effect the way in which the worker sees himself and his relationship to his job. Do they in fact give him the feeling that he has more control, that he has outlets for his creativity, for growth, for using his full abilities, etc?

We would argue that he is most likely to have such feelings when he can see direct ways in which he controls his own job, its quality, pace, planning, etc. Thorsrud's¹³ review of worker participation on the boards of directors of companies confirms the view that despite some control at that level, most of the workers do not have a feeling of control over their own work. This suggests that it fails to provide the psychological rewards which are the goals of worker participation schemes. Similarly, Obradovic's study of Yugoslav factories,¹⁴ (where as we believe, there is often full control at the top with almost no control at the bottom), showed that workers had patterns of alienation linked to technology similar to those found by Blauner in U.S. factories. This does not, of course, imply that control at the top does not add to the worker's sense of control (it certainly does increase their sense of security) but only that by itself, it cannot give the worker that sense of control over his own work life which seems essential to the psychological rewards expected from worker self-management.

It is the exercise of control in his daily work as this is reflected in his influence over the pace, quality, and planning of his own work, that we feel relates the worker to his work and gives him, as a worker, a rewarding place in the status system of the enterprise and consequently, provides both the involvement essential to productivity and the psychological rewards attributed to worker self-management. The increases in the span of control represented in the participation of the worker, first in direct control of his daily work, then in the control of the shop and finally, in the running of the enterprise, deepens his sense of control and importance and should increase the involvement and psychological rewards. The evidence from various studies of participation schemes in which the worker has influence at the top or in the middle, but not at the bottom of the enterprise, seems to indicate that to achieve the desired results from worker self-management, these steps must be seen as a kind of Guttman scale, wherein participation at the higher level is only effective if there has first been participation at the lower levels. The worker must first have a voice in, and control over, his daily work, then in the control of the shop, and only afterwards, at the top.

This seems obvious. Then why have so many participation schemes started at the top rather than the bottom? The answer will be found if one makes a rough review of different kinds of worker participation schemes and classifies them in terms of how they originated.

ORIGINS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

We propose a classification in terms of two ideal polar types which we call the ideological and the managerial.

IDEOLOGICAL schemes are those started by persons, governments, or organizations, because they believe that workers **should** control their own work. Here we would include all schemes originating as a part of national policy, for example, in Yugoslavia, Algeria, Germany and England; the schemes started by idealistic individuals such as the Scott Bader Commonwealth; and the communities of work like Boimondeau. Such schemes are marked by partial or complete control by workers at the top, and little or no control at the bottom, and by the feeling on the part of those in the enterprise that while workers should be in control of the enterprise, they are not really competent to do so. Frequently, this sense of the workers' incompetence is accompanied by an almost magical belief in technology which subordinates everyone to its imperatives. The technical line of command is considered sacred. Since the technological chain of command is usually identical to the managerial, the workers have little or no say over their daily jobs. Behind such ideological schemes is the belief that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between workers and managers in which the workers are exploited because the managers have the greater power. In terms of this belief, the installation of worker participation is made in the interests of social justice. All of this may in fact be quite true and we do not mean to imply criticism of this evaluation of society. Our purpose is simply to isolate this ideal type of self-management scheme and consider its consequences. The consequences are clear. Because what is wanted is worker power, the schemes aim at control at the top and neglect shop floor and job control. Because they neglect to give the workers control at these lower levels, they do not result in greater involvement or in psychological rewards. As **Strauss and Rosenstein**¹⁵ have shown, such schemes tend to be either impotent or full of tensions. They either fail or move in the direction of greater control by managers.

MANAGERIAL schemes are those started by management for purely economic reasons, usually because they think that participation in decisions will increase the loyalty and productivity of workers. In contrast to ideological schemes, managerial schemes seldom provide workers with any control or influence at top managerial levels, but often do give the worker substantially greater control over his daily work. Most of the North American modern management schemes for worker motivation, like those originating in the ideas of Rensis Likert, Douglas McGregor, etc., follow this direction. Such schemes would be those represented in the Scanlon Plan, job enlargement and job enrichment schemes, or management by objectives. All of these schemes operate on the idea that the worker has a great deal to contribute to management and that all you have to do is to persuade him to do so. They seldom, if ever, assume that the worker **should** contribute or that he should have more power, but only that he **can** contribute and that if he does, it will be good for the enterprise. Also in contrast with the ideological, the managerial schemes emphasize common rather than conflicting interests between workers and managers, and they seek to exploit these common interests. An extension of these schemes is sometimes made through various joint decision-making com-

mittees or committees in which workers share in the planning of technological change. Studies of all these schemes consistently indicate that they are subterfuge to manipulate workers by giving the appearance without the reality of added power, and some observers have suggested that the psychological assumption underlying them such as Maslow's hierarchy, are faulty. Again we do not want to either criticize or support such schemes, but only to describe their ideal attributes and their consequences.

Theoretically, it should be possible for either type of worker self-management scheme to provide worker control at any one or all of the three levels: the job, the shop, or the enterprise. However, it is not too likely.

The ideological approach is oriented to maximum power rather than maximum participation, and sees little power gain in increased control over the job itself. Since it emphasizes the conflict of interest between workers and managers, it becomes preoccupied with insuring that the workers are dominant. Emphasizing a change in the power structure, it is the usual choice of revolutionary movements and tends to be the form of control chosen by underdeveloped or partially industrialized countries where the workers are least able to be top managers. The inherent structural weakness of this approach is that worker control at the top without control on the job and the shop floor, does not give the bulk of the workers the psychological rewards attributed to participation, nor the economic gains they feel they need. Therefore, they become disillusioned, resentful, and apathetic.

The preceding discussion distinguished three categories of worker control at the top, for such control will be threatening to the professional competence and freedom of action of the managers who initiate the scheme. Thus, such schemes seem doomed to be stopped after they have reached the shop floor level unless the workers themselves, or their unions, can wrest control over the enterprise from the managers through economic or political action.

The preceding discussion distinguished three categories of worker control in terms of the span of control: control over the job, as exemplified by American schemes of worker participation, control over the shop floor, as exemplified in the firms of the Norwegians, and control over the entire enterprise as exemplified by the Yugoslavs. We have also noted that the level of control at which the scheme is actually introduced will depend on whether the approach is ideological or managerial.

At this point it is important to add that each of the three levels requires special competences and offers psychological rewards which differ. Control over the job itself is clearly within the competence of experienced literate workers in industrial countries. It may not be within the competence of inexperienced workers from non-industrial cultural backgrounds. Such workers probably need representation by a union which would provide both the leadership and the technical competence to bargain with management. As one moves from control over the job itself to control over the shop floor, workers must be able to use the abstract symbols necessary to complex planning.

ECONOMY

We mentioned earlier that fate of self-management schemes would be affected by three factors, but we have so far only considered worker needs and goals. It is now time to turn to the effects of the state of the economy and technology.

In the economy, the important contrast is that between scarcity oriented industrializing economies and affluent post-industrial economies. In indu-

ustrialized societies where there is a high division of labour, the tendency has been for decision-making to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands through a process of rationalization, thus reducing the level of participation. It is probable that such rationalization was functional to the low educational and skill levels of the majority of the workers and the primitive state of the communication and decision-making systems available in early industrialization. But the shift to the post-industrial society is accompanied by high levels of education and new effective communications systems based on computers which make the previous rationalization and centralization not only unnecessary, but also dysfunctional. In the post-industrial society, computerized control systems permit decentralization, and the higher educational and skill levels of the workers not only permit but actually reward much greater levels of participation by the workers. Thus, to view the economy as an important intervening variable we can see that in industrial societies, participation may be both dysfunctional and costly, while in post-industrial societies, it is often useful and necessary.

The state of the economy affects the needs and goals of the workers. We assume that they are closely interrelated, though not necessarily identical, for where the workers are poorly fed, clothed and sheltered, they most want a system in which these needs are met. Except for brief periods of social excitement, as in social movements or revolutions, they will not put their social and psychological needs above their physiological and safety needs. However, even when their income has risen to the point where they have some surpluses for luxuries, they may still continue to press for simple economic gains instead of social and psychological advantages. This is undoubtedly what sociologists Robert Dubin¹⁶ on the one hand, and Lockwood and Goldthorpe¹⁷ on the other, discovered in finding that the central life interest of most industrial workers was not in their work. Their findings probably reflect the persistence of economic needs in the absence of education and/or social purpose in their work. With increases in the skill and education required for a job, the occupants become increasingly devoted to their work, so that it is common place for the higher professional, such as doctors and lawyers, and for top executives, to live in their work often to the exclusion of satisfactions from other parts of their life experience.

It is, of course, true that work which requires higher levels of education and skill is also thought to be more socially valuable and thus has a different meaning to the workers. Nevertheless, whether it is increased education or the social meaning of the job, we can see that some workers do come to see their work as being central to their lives. We assume that where this is true, they will not be satisfied unless they have a reasonable degree of control over their work, control which is at least commensurate with what they feel that they can contribute.

Seen in this way, we propose a modification of the Maslow-McGregor hierarchy of prepotent needs. They saw this hierarchy as one in which higher needs automatically displaced lower needs as the lower needs approached satiation. We would argue that the replacement is not automatic and that the satiation of the lower needs only *permits* the emergence of higher needs. They become activated only when the individual has *learned* to want them.

Yet, whatever the reason for the emergence of higher needs, it should be possible to classify groups of workers in terms of the need levels at which they are operating. These needs should then appear in terms of their self-conceptions the demands they make on their jobs, and the goals which they set individually and collectively. We think that the Lockwood and Goldthorpe studies demonstrate that satiation of economic needs alone does not extinguish

them. We argue that they become extinguished only when the worker has learned to want satisfaction of higher needs, probably through increased education. However, we would also argue that when these higher needs are so activated and are being satisfied, that the worker will have a sense of fulfillment, but when they are frustrated, he may, because of greater hope, express even more intense dissatisfaction than when he finds lower needs frustrated.

The important point to be made in terms of the needs of hierarchy, is that schemes of work organizations which are incongruent with the felt needs of the workers will not motivate them. Thus, in scarcity economies of early industrialization, worker participation schemes may be inefficient as compared with centralized highly rationalized schemes and workers will probably reject them because the higher economic costs of the worker participation scheme actually increases their economic frustration.

Adizes in his study of Yugoslav factories suggests that a full worker self-management scheme involves such delays in decision-making and such extensive paper work that it adds five percent to the costs of production.¹⁸ Since Yugoslav workers are in a scarcity economy and do operate at the level of physiological and safety needs, it is not surprising that such an advanced participation scheme is subject to great strain and a tendency to return to centralized management control.

Where the kind of worker participation is limited to increased control over the job itself, and also contains a short feed back loop so that the workers can quickly see what economic gains they make from contributing, the scheme will probably work even with scarcity economy workers. The Scanlon Plan used by many firms in the U. S., is a scheme of this and has evidently been very successful in improving worker contributions, worker morale, and productivity.

In affluent economies characteristic of post-industrial societies, it may be possible to have limited participation schemes without cost to such workers, because the enterprise can afford the loss in economic efficiency to gain improvements in morale.

What is required is a realistic relationship between the capacities of the economy, the needs and qualifications of the workers and the level of worker participation in management. Where the economy permits it, and the workers expect it, a very advanced participation scheme may be essential for the efficient operation of the enterprise. Without it workers may so resent their jobs, that it interferes with productivity and increases absenteeism and turnover. The fact that in the U. S. there is now widespread experimentation with increased worker participation in management at the level of job, is an indication that the new highly educated workers in that labour force only respond to jobs which are organized in that way.

TECHNOLOGY

The third element in our evaluation model is the technology. We will use this term loosely to refer to the nature of the product and the form of production. Different studies strongly suggest that whether or not a particular form of organization is efficient will depend on the degree to which it is suitable for the technology.

Burns and Stalker discovered in their studies of electronic firms that those which survived had adopted an 'organic' rather than a mechanical

form of organization. The organic form being more loosely structured, egalitarian, and collegial than the mechanical. Evidently the electronic industry was marked by exceptionally rapid change in market and, therefore, in product, and firms with the organic form of organization were most adaptable and innovative. A recent study of a sample of European and American Steel firms by Miller¹⁹ supports the conclusions of Burns and Stalker.²⁰ Warren Bennis²¹ has reached much the same conclusion in his studies.

Joan Woodward's²² studies of English manufacturing firms showed that the optimum span of supervision for the foreman varied with the type of production. Among firms with unit or small batch production, the optimum span of supervision was between 21 and 30 workers, in large batch and mass production, it was between 41 and 60 workers, and in process production, it was between 11 and 20 workers. Unsuccessful firms in each category tended to have the foremen supervise either fewer or more workers than the optimum.

Woodward's findings are of particular importance for understanding the relevance of worker participation schemes, for they indicate that in some kinds of production the increased span of control of the workers (a corollary of the increased span of supervision of the foremen) may be inefficient ways of organizing certain forms of production.

CONCLUSION

The three elements in our evaluation model: worker needs and goals, the level of the economy, and the nature of the technology, are ordinarily interrelated and will strongly influence the degree to which a particular level of worker participation in management will be accepted by the workers, will persist, and will achieve the economic and psychological rewards expected by worker participation. Thus in scarcity level economies, using mass production methods, the workers will ordinarily be operating at the level of physiological and safety needs and only very limited participation schemes like the Scanlon Plan, have any chance of success. Shop floor or enterprise control schemes will probably result in decreased income for the workers and will be rejected by them.

On the other hand, in affluent economies, in enterprises devoted to the production of electronic components, the highly educated workers will be operating at the level of social and possibly self-actualizing needs and a very advanced participation scheme will be essential to the full motivation of the workers and maximum productivity.

Between these two, there are, of course, a wide range and variety of work settings and we would suggest that for them there must be devised an equal variety of ways and degrees of worker participation in management.

FOOTNOTES

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L'AUTOGESTION ET LA LUTTE DES CLASSES

— Plaidoyer pour une recherche dialectique inspirée par l'histoire de l'autogestion yougoslave —

I.

REMARQUES SUR LA METHODE

Les différentes interprétations des faits et les jugements contradictoires portés sur l'autogestion yougoslave proviennent de différences cruciales quant à la base de départ théorique, et aussi, souvent, de l'ambivalence de la méthode utilisée dans l'approche du phénomène. Il est certain que l'ambivalence du phénomène lui-même y contribue de son côté: sur le plan empirique, qui est la **résultante de tendances historiques différentes et divergentes**, il est effectivement impossible de dénouer les contradictions de la pensée scientifique.

En partant de l'ordre normatif officiel et des interprétations idéologiques correspondantes, le sociologue serait amené à chercher dans l'autogestion une caractéristique spécifique au système social yougoslave, à la structure sociale globale, à l'ordre économique et politique, à l'organisation sociale dans la sphère industrielle et dans d'autres domaines... Il étudierait alors l'autogestion comme une composante du système social; il débattrait ses qualités et ses fonctions et jugerait de ses valeurs sous l'angle de ce système, des caractéristiques qu'il présente et du rendement qu'il fournit. Il découvrirait l'incohérence du système, l'inconstance manifeste de ses éléments composants, le décalage fonctionnel de bien des phénomènes dans la réalité de l'autogestion, l'effacement — au sein du système — du contenu socio-économique, politique et culturel de l'autogestion auquel se réfèrent les prémisses idéologiques de l'ordre normatif... Il décelerait également dans les contenus idéologiques exerçant une influence certaine dans les réalités yougoslaves, des contradictions et des couches de provenance, d'origine diverse. Si l'on fait abstraction de l'apologétique sociologique vulgaire du système social en place — qui a perdu, pour l'essentiel, toute dignité et tout attrait — le débat sociologique mené exclusivement en termes de système social ne va guère au delà d'hypothèses bien minces et de jugements fort imprécis et vagues sur la vitalité présente et les perspectives d'avenir de l'autogestion yougoslave.

L'attitude que nous suggérons est celle qui consiste à affirmer qu'il est **impossible d'appréhender l'autogestion dans le cadre du système social, institutionnel et normatif où elle se manifeste actuellement**. Les recherches concrètes sur l'autogestion yougoslave révèlent que les faits les plus importants — les éléments authentiquement nouveaux dans l'économie, l'organisation du travail, le regroupement social, la structure des intérêts et les motivations

des acteurs sociaux, la pratique politique et la culture — se situent et se manifestent en dehors de ces cadres et expressions, si même ils ne leur sont pas opposés. Le caractère non fonctionnel des organisations, les conflits sociaux, les perturbations économiques et les convulsions politiques — phénomènes auxquels l'autogestion se trouve mêlée — laissent deviner la présence, dans les réalités humaines et sociales, d'un facteur agissant dont le **rang est supérieur à celui de la dynamique du système social**, d'un ferment de transformations sociales qu'il est impossible de réduire à cette dynamique, d'un agent du **mouvement historique** de la société **tendant à modifier radicalement les structures sociales qui déterminent foncièrement les systèmes sociaux en place et leur dynamique**. La méthode d'analyse fonctionnelle et systématique des phénomènes sociaux est insuffisante pour pénétrer les phénomènes de cet ordre. Elle permet, tout au plus, d'enregistrer l'apparition de forces motrices non conformes au système, »subversives«, et de leurs effets incontrôlés et mystérieux. L'observation empirique enregistre une foule de faits et de phénomènes dont les tendances opposées forment un conglomerat peu compréhensible...

Face aux réalités de l'autogestion yougoslave, le sociologue est violemment éjecté des lignes régulières de la navigation côtière sur la haute mer où il lui faut **reconceptualiser sa méthode**.

La méthode que nous nous proposons d'appliquer dans le présent texte s'inscrit dans le cadre général des efforts visant à mettre au point une **sociologie dialectique** dont le but est d'appréhender les processus sociaux sous l'angle des contradictions fondamentales de la totalité historique concrète de la société moderne, de l'ensemble des forces motrices, des possibilités et des alternatives pratiques qu'il est impossible de ramener aux éléments et attributs de l'existence sociale des hommes conditionnée par les structures (rapports de production, reproduction sociale), englobée et contrôlée par le système social en fonction des structures sociales. Nous sommes persuadés que la circulation internationale des théories, des idées, des investigations et des connaissances concrètes sur l'autogestion, n'est possible que dans le cadre de cette méthode.

Au cours de nos recherches sur l'expérience historique de l'autogestion yougoslave, nous avons abouti à la conclusion qu'il était impossible de traduire les catégories et conceptions générales de la théorie dialectique de la société dans la langue et la méthode sociologiques des investigations concrètes en concrétisant directement les causes de l'aliénation et de la désaliénation sous leur forme abstraite générale, **mais en recourant aux abstractions du travail salarié et de la pratique de la classe ouvrière où se manifestent la possibilité, la tendance, un effort collectif conscient pour abolir le salariat**.

Elaborées, du point de vue théorique, par Marx dans sa »Critique de l'économie politique«, les abstractions particulières du travail salarié reflètent la logique fondamentale de l'aliénation dans la société moderne et conservent leur actualité, comme base de départ pour les connaissances concrètes, dans la société que la révolution politique et la transformation des rapports de propriété ont engagée dans la voie du socialisme, mais qui n'a pas encore aboli, dans ce cheminement, les déterminismes de la production économique, en tant que production de plus-value, en contradiction avec l'épanouissement des capacités et des activités, des besoins et des liens sociaux des producteurs, de la personne et de la pratique créatrice autonome des participants à la production de la vie humaine. Bien que, dans l'histoire yougoslave, l'autogestion ait été amorcée institutionnellement sur les plans politique et idéologique comme antithèse à l'involution bureaucratique des débuts du socialisme (involution qui risquait d'anéantir l'individualité historique du mouvement yougoslave pour le socialisme), elle s'est implantée dans le processus social pour devenir effectivement le movens des transformations

sociales, dans la mesure où elle a confronté, dans les conditions réelles de la vie et dans un esprit critique, pratique et agissant, les producteurs avec les conditions sociales de leur existence salariale, dans la mesure aussi où elle a relancé leurs motivations, leurs intérêts, leurs liens sociaux et leurs activités sociales contre les **déterminismes du travail en tant que production de plus-value.**

Voilà pourquoi nous ferons partir notre étude de l'expérience historique et des possibilités de développement de l'autogestion, de la **dialectique du travail** (conçu comme activité aliénante, socialement antagonique, comme travail salarié dans la société moderne) et de la **pratique** (activité historique pratique, créatrice et autocréatrice, des hommes) dans le contexte historique concret de la société yougoslave d'aujourd'hui.

La modeste expérience yougoslave — dont nous devrions pas exagérer la portée au-delà des conditions historiques concrètes et spéciales qui sont les siennes — a tout de même laissé entrevoir à la fois la volonté et la possibilité d'une transformation révolutionnaire de la situation humaine dans la société contemporaine. Cette potentialité réside dans l'attitude des ouvriers face à leur propre être social aliéné, engendré par leur travail salarié. C'est dans ce comportement que les ouvriers cherchent, découvrent (ou ne découvrent pas) la possibilité de délivrer la production des déterminismes économiques antagoniques, et d'affranchir leur propre pratique (les besoins authentiques et les finalités motrices, le pouvoir de création et d'autodétermination, les liens sociaux directs, l'association et la puissance réelles, l'indépendance et l'autonomie des hommes associés) de son antipode — du travail salarié. La détermination fondamentale de l'autogestion se situe dans ce comportement révolutionnaire pratique et ses perspectives. C'est pourquoi nous voyons dans l'autogestion **contemporaine un moment historique de la dialectique du travail et de la pratique**, où l'aliénation séculaire de la pratique à travers le travail antagonique peut être transformée, retournée en activité révolutionnaire pratique, en négation et en abolition du travail aliéné par les sujets de la pratique **qui est d'abord et inévitablement la pratique libératrice du prolétariat dans la confrontation avec son propre être, un être aliéné, salarial.**

L'interprétation de l'autogestion par la dialectique du travail et de la pratique trouve son point culminant dans l'ensemble des problèmes touchant l'autogestion en regard des classes et de la lutte des classes. Il peut paraître au lecteur que si nous insistons tellement sur l'assise ouvrière, sur la base de classe et sur le contenu de classe de l'autogestion contemporaine, c'est parce que cela constitue un axiome dans les investigations dialectiques sur la société moderne. Or, il n'en est rien. Si nous y insistons, c'est parce que nous sommes instruits par l'expérience yougoslave. La science et la politique yougoslaves ont fait peu de cas, ces dernières années, de ce point-clé (illusion d'une «communauté de travailleurs», de l'autogestion — superstructure institutionnalisée de travail librement associé», de la dialectique des intérêts individuels, de groupe et généraux dans l'autogestion, sans passer par les intérêts de classe du prolétariat, etc.). Cette période a coïncidé avec une forte régression de l'autogestion, l'intensification des processus économiques générateurs de structures de classe, la montée des rapports, des forces sociales et politiques antagoniques, et des développements dans la culture qui ont remis en cause l'autogestion comme pratique libératrice.

LA DIALECTIQUE DU TRAVAIL ET DE LA PRATIQUE

1. Les jalons historiques de l'autogestion ouvrière: de la contestation ouvrière autonome du travail salarié à la transformation révolutionnaire pratique de la reproduction sociale

Les vingt années d'expérience yougoslave fournissent ne serait-ce que des éléments rudimentaires pour fixer les jalons successifs de la dialectique du travail et de la pratique dans le processus d'émancipation des producteurs. Au risque de verser dans le schématisme (en raison de la concision de notre exposé), nous suivrons la genèse historique de la pratique émancipée des producteurs à travers trois phases successives:

a) Les débuts de l'autogestion ouvrière en tant que contestation ouvrière **autonome** du travail salarié et de l'ensemble de ses conditions et conséquences sociales,

b) la maturation graduelle de la pratique ouvrière émancipée; l'évolution de l'autogestion de la contestation concrète des conditions sociales du travail antagonique vers la découverte et la consécration des possibilités latentes offertes par le processus social de travail **pour** une modification **autonome**, indépendante, de ces conditions tendant à abolir l'existence salariale,

c) la pratique révolutionnaire des producteurs autonomes qui **transforme radicalement la reproduction sociale**, les structures et le système de l'entité sociale.

L'autogestion yougoslave a fourni une abondante expérience pour la phase a); en raison notamment des possibilités de développement limitées dans le cadre de l'entité mondiale, elle a été marquée par des contradictions exacerbées à l'extrême, des flottements et des digressions au cours de la phase b); après plusieurs convulsions successives (économiques et politiques), provoquées par ces contradictions, on a vu apparaître une **possibilité** pratique de transformer radicalement la reproduction sociale (c) comme résultat des développements précédents, et aussi la **nécessité** de cette transformation pour sauvegarder l'intégrité de la société yougoslave, son individualité historique et son propre projet de développement.

2. La contestation ouvrière du travail salarié

Nous partons du fait qu'au cours des deux premières décennies de l'initiative yougoslave, l'autogestion ouvrière a coïncidé avec les débuts et la phase moyenne de l'industrialisation dont le moteur a été l'accumulation de la plus-value par l'Etat. L'autogestion entre en scène en même temps que se forme une classe ouvrière industrielle moderne qui devient le principal effectif productif dans une société hier encore essentiellement agraire. Cette classe ouvrière entre dans le processus de travail et s'inclut au milieu urbain, à la consommation moderne, à la formation professionnelle, etc., sous des conditions socio-économiques générales déterminées par l'accumulation et la distribution de la plus-value par l'Etat. De son côté, ceci détermine d'emblée les éléments de la condition salariale des ouvriers, leur participation suivant la logique du salariat par rapport à l'accumulation d'Etat et la consommation des non-producteurs; la structure de la main-d'oeuvre selon les nécessités de la division du travail salarié aux différentes phases de l'industrialisation; le marché de la main-d'oeuvre d'abord étatisé, puis libéralisé, avec les caractéristiques notoires dans les deux cas; l'organisation du travail assortie d'une hiérarchie linéaire et fonctionnelle qui fournit des résultats économiques (plan d'Etat, contributions à l'Etat et indispensables effets marchands) in-

dépendamment des besoins, des intérêts et des motivations de l'effectif ouvrier de base, en recourant à la concentration institutionnalisée ou non du pouvoir sur les conditions de travail et l'utilisation de la main-d'oeuvre; l'urbanisation et la culture correspondante avec des inégalités sociales manifestes touchant les conditions d'habitat, les services communaux, les horaires de travail, les congés, etc., le tout étant dû à la structure de la main-d'oeuvre et aux rapports salariaux...

De nombreux sociologues se hâtent de chercher dans ces faits des arguments pour la thèse affirmant que dans le «système d'autogestion» la position objective des ouvriers n'a pas changé. Or, ces faits ne se rapportent pas encore à l'autogestion, mais à la réalité sociale qui émane du développement universel de la société de classes modernes, de l'industrialisation et de l'urbanisation, de l'économie et de la culture adaptées aux besoins du capitalisme. Cette réalité, l'autogestion la trouve inévitablement comme un **objet** de la pratique émancipée des producteurs, d'une pratique qui commence par l'articulation du comportement autonome critique des ouvriers envers cette même réalité.

Le fait que dans l'histoire yougoslave, l'autogestion ouvrière commence pour ainsi dire en même temps que l'accumulation forcée de la plus-value par l'Etat et une expansion industrielle qui engendre, dans le contexte de ce rapport économique, des millions d'existences salariées — a eu une double incidence. Dans un sens, il a **prolongé la phase initiale de la pratique d'émancipation des producteurs** en l'étendant à toute la période d'industrialisation de base, imbriquant dans les formes premières de l'autogestion maints éléments de la conscience de classe, des intérêts, du mouvement et de l'organisation du prolétariat, qui accompagnent par ailleurs l'évolution du capitalisme. Dans un autre sens, en amorçant la pratique de l'émancipation des producteurs, on a mis en action, dès le début de cette période, l'antithèse historique pratique de la formation sociale fondée sur l'expansion du travail salarié (en l'occurrence étatisé). Les effets de ce facteur sont évidents sur les deux plans suivants: d'abord, en ce qui concerne la structure et le système de la société globale — il n'a cessé de contenir, d'empêcher la formation complète et durable du mouvement économique et politique et de l'idéologie prédominante qui eussent fixé les conditions de vie et de travail des producteurs dont nous venons de parler, pour les rendre permanentes et légitimes; ensuite, par rapport à la classe ouvrière elle-même — il a prévenu son adaptation au système d'exploitation, l'adaptation fonctionnelle de la conscience ouvrière, des intérêts et des aspirations, des modèles de culture et des formes d'organisation des ouvriers.

L'opposition ouvrière à l'exploitation (à toutes les privations et restrictions du travail salarié) — qui caractérise toute l'histoire du mouvement ouvrier — acquiert ab initio dans le cas yougoslave le **caractère d'une activité autonome, indépendante des ouvriers**, au sein du mouvement social et politique de masse qui devient le seul continuateur légitime de la révolution sociale, l'unique générateur du progrès historique de la société. Qui plus est, étant autonome et légitimée par le grand mouvement historique, et de **l'intérieur** — directement confrontée aux «entrailles ouvertes» de la production de la plus-value, l'opposition ouvrière tend à devenir radicale: au lieu d'être mue par des motivations archaïques (pré-industrielles) et adaptables au système d'exploitation (améliorations partielles ou illusives d'une condition qui demeure foncièrement inchangée) ou par des idéaux futuristes transcendants se situant au-delà du tournant historique souhaité, elle porte directement et explicitement sur la nature même du travail des ouvriers, du travail salarié, sur toutes les conditions concrètes et actuelles de ce travail, dans l'optique des **aspirations immédiates et pressantes, et dans celle des possibilités concrètes et précises d'opérer dans ce domaine une transformation radicale.**

Malgré les obstacles auxquels elle s'est heurtée pendant cette période de l'histoire yougoslave, l'autogestion n'a cessé d'accomplir une oeuvre importante de **démythification pratique**, de défétichisation du processus de travail et de l'existence ouvrière. Et ce non seulement en regard des fétiches bien connus comme ceux du marché, du travail et du capital, mais aussi et surtout en regard des formes spécifiques de mythification, de dissimulation politique et idéologique du processus de travail aux phases initiales du socialisme (le «travail socialiste», la «répartition selon le travail fourni» — comme abolition apparente du salariat; l'État — comme cadre et organe des rapports socialistes dans la production, l'échange, la répartition et la consommation; la hiérarchie politique chargée d'administrer la main-d'oeuvre, la reproduction économique et le comportement politique des hommes — comme apparence de l'indispensable division et de l'indispensable organisation du travail social, etc.)

3. La maturation de la pratique ouvrière émancipée

L'attitude négative des ouvriers industriels et des autres participants au travail social envers les conditions sociales de leur propre existence salariale présente, dans la pratique de l'autogestion yougoslave, des traits spécifiques.

Premièrement. On a de moins en moins la possibilité de mettre en veilleuse l'opposition des ouvriers aux conditions sociales de leur propre existence, de la refouler en la confinant dans le cadre global des rapports entre le capital, la propriété d'État et le travail salarié, par des conventions sur les conditions du travail salarié passées avec les syndicats ouvriers, la protection étatique de la condition ouvrière, la réglementation et, éventuellement, l'amélioration — toujours par l'État — du marché de la main-d'oeuvre et des autres conditions de l'existence ouvrière, sans modifier les éléments fondamentaux qui déterminent le travail salarié. Ce faisant, on réduit également le risque de voir, dans ce cadre économique, les ouvriers s'intégrer — du point de vue politique et culturel — à un système social dont la principale fonction consiste précisément à perpétuer le travail salarié.

Deuxièmement. L'importance relative de la défense médiate des intérêts de la classe ouvrière par rapport aux titulaires et aux représentants de la propriété capitaliste ou d'État, s'en trouve diminuée. Les collectivités autogérées sont en prise directe sur l'ensemble des conditions sociales de leur activité économique, de sorte que leurs initiatives, leurs décisions technologiques et économiques, leurs revendications motivées, leurs communications économiques et politiques conditionnent aussi la réalisation des intérêts élémentaires qui relèveraient autrement des rapports entre le capital (ou la propriété d'État) et le travail. **L'activité autonome élémentaire devient le préalable indispensable à l'existence** avant même d'avoir débordé le cadre du travail salarié. La position de chacun dépend directement de la manière dont la collectivité autogérée répond aux impératifs, impulsions et possibilités de l'ensemble des conditions sociales d'activité économique, ce qui peut engendrer les motivations individuelles nécessaires à l'action autonome, ne fut-ce qu'au niveau élémentaire dont nous avons parlé.

Troisièmement. L'opposition aux conditions sociales de l'existence salariale dépasse les limites de la contestation abstraite des conditions sociales et de la recherche concrète des améliorations individuelles de la position des ouvriers, pour évoluer vers la **contestation concrète des conditions sociales**. La pratique de l'autogestion — même si les ouvriers n'ont pas encore brisé les cadres sociaux de leur existence salariale — conduit à la prise de conscience **concrète de l'ensemble** des processus sociaux qui déterminent l'exi-

stence ouvrière, ainsi que de la possibilité et de la nécessité d'accomplir des changements partiels et globaux dans ces processus, dont dépend la position des participants. L'action autonome indispensable à l'existence élémentaire peut se muer en initiative pratique en vue de transformer les processus sociaux; elle peut évoluer dans ce sens si elle n'est pas systématiquement découragée par la rigidité des processus économiques et politiques globaux.

Quatrièmement. L'opposition est renforcée par l'institutionnalisation de l'autogestion dans le système juridique, politique et économique, et davantage encore par son affirmation idéologique. L'ordre normatif évolue graduellement vers le **droit de veto général des collectivités autogérées de base** sur toutes les décisions importantes touchant les rapports socio-économiques. Ce processus se heurte à celui du renforcement de la contrainte économique des collectivités autogérées (intégration plus poussée du marché yougoslave au marché international; désétatisation du marché de la main-d'œuvre et des ressources d'investissement), ainsi que des pressions exercées par la hiérarchie des administrateurs dans les grandes organisations (intégration technologique et économique, monopole de l'information et techniques de gestion). Malgré de fortes oscillations, les collectivités ouvrières ont pour la plupart des possibilités non seulement juridiques, mais aussi politiques, d'empêcher l'adoption ou l'exécution des décisions susceptibles de mettre leurs intérêts en danger.

Cinquièmement. D'où la possibilité ou plutôt la **tendance** à transformer l'opposition aux conditions sociales de l'existence salariale, renforcée sur les plans institutionnel et idéologique, moins médiate et plus autonome, moins abstraite et plus concrète, moins parcelaire et plus totale, tournée davantage vers les processus sociaux fondamentaux que vers les épiphénomènes — en une **modification autonome, consciente de ces conditions sociales visant à abolir l'existence salariale**. On passa ainsi de la contestation à la transformation révolutionnaire pratique des conditions sociales, du pouvoir défensif (veto) au pouvoir créateur autonome. Partout où elle agit, cette tendance témoigne de la modification qualitative des catégories fondamentales de la vie sociale à l'intérieur de la pratique de l'émancipation ouvrière. L'étude concrète de l'expérience yougoslave semble indiquer que ce bond implique la nécessité pour les individus, les collectivités et les grands groupes sociaux, de s'orienter résolument et pratiquement vers la **découverte et la consécration des possibilités latentes dans le processus de travail social** — possibilités concernant la production, la satisfaction des besoins — que dissimulent ou annulent les structures économiques en place et que l'on peut libérer par une transformation radicale de la reproduction sociale.

Partant d'une contestation radicale — autonome, concrétisée et tournée vers l'entité sociale de leur propre travail salarié, les participants à la pratique de l'autogestion ouvrière ont commencé, au début de la deuxième décennie de l'initiative yougoslave, à **introduire pratiquement une alternative positive dans l'organisation des ateliers et des entreprises, la répartition économique, la politique d'investissement, la planification de l'éducation et la politique des cadres et du personnel**. Les traits caractéristiques généraux de ces efforts peuvent être formulés grosso modo de la manière suivante:

— **L'initiative propre des collectivités ouvrières**: presque toutes les alternatives pratiques sont issues de l'expérience, des aspirations et des revendications de l'effectif ouvrier de base, dans les anciens centres industriels, mais aussi dans les centres de date toute récente,

— **L'expansion rapide de l'initiative ouvrière**: l'intérêt pour ainsi dire général que les masses ouvrières portent rapidement à tout ce qui laisse entrevoir une alternative pratique; les communications directes (et souvent non officielles) entre les collectivités ouvrières afin de prendre connaissance de

nouvelles formules et d'en vérifier la valeur; les nouvelles solutions à contenu révolutionnaire pratiquement mises en oeuvre dans certains milieux deviennent rapidement une aspiration massive des ouvriers d'autres milieux.

— **Le caractère réaliste des alternatives pratiques:** les ouvriers ne se font aucune illusion quant à la possibilité d'éliminer d'un seul coup les restrictions qui pèsent sur leur existence; ils amorcent des changements susceptibles de remédier immédiatement aux aspects les plus contraignants de leur existence salariale (salaires inférieurs au minimum vital, insécurité sociale et économique, organisation autoritaire et privilèges de la hiérarchie des administrateurs, affectation arbitraire aux emplois, accroissement des normes de travail à l'insu des ouvriers, etc.) et attachent une importance toujours plus grande aux changements à long terme dont ils attendent une transformation radicale de leur position économique et de leurs conditions de vie et de travail (politique de développement conforme aux besoins élémentaires des producteurs immédiats, droit de décision exclusif concernant l'utilisation du surplus de production à l'intérieur de l'organisation sociale où chaque collectivité de base est souveraine, tandis que les intérêts individuels sont garantis par les règles de l'autogestion).

— **La portée limitée des nouvelles formules, l'absence d'alternative globale:** l'initiative ouvrière ne dépasse généralement pas le niveau local; même lorsqu'elles passent rapidement d'un milieu ouvrier local à un autre, les nouvelles formules demeurent partielles, **n'embrassant pas toutes les conditions nécessaires pour accomplir avec succès des changements de fond;** les projets fragmentaires et locaux de transformations sociales ne se doublent pas d'un plan général, d'un effort institutionnalisé pour modifier l'orientation des courants économiques généraux, du système économique et politique; l'initiative ouvrière reste confinée dans des limites matérielles étroites (fonds des salaires, fonds d'amortissement tronqués et accumulation rudimentaire des entreprises, subordonnés essentiellement à la politique économique de l'Etat et fort incertains par suite des effets incontrôlés du marché);

— **La constance des ouvriers industriels et l'inconstance des autres groupes sociaux:** la polarisation des positions et des intérêts dans les entreprises pour et contre les nouvelles solutions pratiques selon la manière dont on conçoit les chances des différents groupes sociaux, et surtout de ceux qui jouissent de certains avantages dans l'organisation sociale de type bureaucratique et dans l'ordre économique fondé sur le salariat et la distribution hiérarchique de la plus-value et des primes liées aux fonctions de direction, l'indécision de la hiérarchie politique; l'obstruction de la hiérarchie des administrateurs, de l'administration publique et des services techno-économiques de toutes les instances (des ateliers aux instances suprêmes de l'administration d'Etat) lorsqu'il est indispensable d'élaborer de nouvelles formules techniques et organisationnelles; la réaction idéologique — l'initiative ouvrière est qualifiée de démocratie primitive, de mentalité semi-artisanale, de tradition paysanne; on prétend qu'elle est incompatible avec la technologie moderne, qu'elle n'est pas rationnelle du point de vue des normes sacro-saintes de l'économie, qu'elle est irréalisable sur le plan technique, etc.

— **L'initiative ouvrière découragée et mise en veilleuse** après les premiers succès des nouvelles formules, avant ces succès ou même avant leur mise en oeuvre; les ressources matérielles étant limitées, les nouvelles solutions sont annulées; les revirements dans la politique économique et les secousses sur le marché empêchent le fonctionnement normal du système socio-économique dans les entreprises; la hiérarchie des administrateurs et les groupes privilégiés créent une organisation du pouvoir et des décisions, qui pour être non institutionnalisée n'en est que plus efficace par suite de l'influence des processus globaux et de la volonté d'atteindre à la légitimité; les bailleurs de fonds imposent aux entreprises ployant sous les dettes un régime de décision

et de gestion qui exclut les formules émanant de l'initiative ouvrière; à la faveur des perturbations économiques globales, on voit se dégrader la condition matérielle d'une large fraction des ouvriers industriels dont la sécurité sociale et économique se trouve menacée.

Ces tentatives d'introduire les alternatives pratiques se sont succédées pendant plus d'une décennie (du début des années soixante au commencement des années soixante-dix). Leur succès relatif est venu montrer que les changements de fond ne pouvaient être accomplis dans le cadre d'une reproduction sociale globale qui consacre des rapports de production contraires à la pratique de l'émancipation des producteurs, et perpétue des forces sociales et politiques, des structures, des intérêts et une idéologie analogues aux structures et au système de la société de classes. Bien que les recherches de fond sur la conscience sociale fassent défaut, bien des faits incitent fortement à penser que cette expérience historique a débouché sur la prise de conscience de la nécessité d'accomplir des changements radicaux dans la reproduction sociale, et ce à toutes les instances et sous toutes les formes de la conscience sociale:

— les ouvriers ont pris conscience en masse — pour ne pas dire à l'unanimité — du fait que toute modification tant soit peu importante des rapports sociaux au sein des organisations de travail, à l'avantage de l'autogestion ouvrière et de la promotion des effectifs des producteurs de base, dépendait d'une refonte radicale de tout le processus de travail, de l'économie globale et de l'organisation de la société et que la clé de cette transformation à long terme se trouvait dans le mode d'accumulation et d'utilisation des ressources destinées au développement,

— au sein du mouvement pour le socialisme, la conscience politique se manifeste sous la forme d'une répétition obstinée de résolutions et de positions politiques toujours plus radicales,

— la législation sur la réforme dans le domaine de la reproduction sociale donne lieu à des luttes politiques de plus en plus serrées,

— on assiste, enfin, à la radicalisation de la théorie relative aux conditions sociales globales de l'autogestion ouvrière, de l'élaboration scientifique des possibilités d'opérer des changements de fond dans les sciences économiques et politiques, la sociologie et les sciences de l'organisation.

4. La transformation révolutionnaire pratique de la reproduction sociale

Si la tendance de l'autogestion ouvrière n'a pas donné de résultats plus substantiels et si elle n'a pas pleinement confirmé ses propres possibilités historiques objectives, c'est parce qu'elle a été **effacée par toute la reproduction sociale**. Les raisons en sont les suivantes: a) les rapports de production ne peuvent être modifiés comme rapports individuels isolés; or, la tendance de l'autogestion en est restée là, du moins pour l'essentiel; b) les rapports de production ne peuvent être modifiés dans la reproduction simple; il faut en effet introduire une orientation foncièrement nouvelle dans la reproduction élargie - or, la tendance de l'autogestion n'a guère débordé le cadre de la reproduction simple.

Nous pouvons étudier cette expérience historique en appliquant la méthode utilisée par Marx pour analyser la reproduction capitaliste.

Ce qui fait échec à l'autogestion ouvrière, c'est qu'enfermés dans des processus sociaux particuliers et isolés et ce dans le cadre de la reproduction simple des éléments de la production, les ouvriers tentent vainement d'accomplir des changements de fond dans les rapports de production. Leurs aspirations et leurs initiatives sont paralysées et annulées parce qu'ils se heurtent sans cesse, dans l'entité sociale, à des conditions de production et d'échange qui les contraignent à se comporter suivant la logique de la reproduction de

la propriété d'Etat ou du capital, ainsi qu' à des conditions de répartition et de consommation qui ravalent leur vie au rang de l'existence salariale.

Le déterminisme vivant, agissant du travail salarié et l'existence propre de l'ouvrier engendrent sans cesse des produits sociaux caractéristiques de la structure de classes de la société.

Le salariat implique une organisation autoritaire du travail, ceci étant l'indispensable agent autonome qui se substitue au propriétaire des moyens de production.

Suivant la logique du travail salarié, l'activité intellectuelle crée des groupes sociaux distincts qui s'incluent à la production motivés par leurs intérêts économiques et les privilèges que leur assurent, par rapport aux travailleurs manuels, les fonctionnaires et responsables de l'organisation autoritaire. Ceux-ci en exigent évidemment en retour, fidélité et attachement à cette organisation.

Le temps de travail déterminé par le rapport entre le salaire et la plus-value restreint les possibilités sociales de l'ouvrier, donnant du même coup — dans le commerce social, l'opinion publique, le processus politique et la culture institutionnalisée — la priorité aux groupes sociaux qui n'y sont pas assujettis.

Une partie de la plus-value alimente la base matérielle de l'existence privilégiée des couches non-ouvrières, tandis que l'autre s'accumule dans les fonds de reproduction qui, dans les rapports avec la main-d'oeuvre salariée, conservent leur caractère de capital aussi longtemps que l'on s'en tient aux critères d'économie du travail, de productivité de tous les facteurs du travail et de rentabilité des investissements visant à produire la plus-value (bénéfices de l'Etat qui sont une manière de dividendes, profit des entreprises, taux d'intérêt bancaires, »participation au revenu sur la base de l'investissement«, autofinancement fondé notamment sur l'amortissement rationnel en ce sens qu'il réduit les salaires au minimum, calculs économiques des innovations technologiques basés sur les économies aux dépens des »frais de main-d'oeuvre« et les profits extraordinaires sur le marché, et non sur les effets favorables que l'élévation de la productivité doit avoir pour la production et les producteurs, les calculs économiques concernant l'éducation qui apprécie la rationalité des plans d'éducation sous l'angle de la plus-value relative et non du point de vue de l'accroissement global du nouveau produit pour former des producteurs plus qualifiés, etc.). Lorsqu'ils prennent les caractéristiques du capital, les fonds de reproduction — ceux de l'Etat, des banques, des entreprises, etc. — cherchent des agents sociaux qui personnifient le capital-valeur et le capital-pouvoir social. Dans la société où le travail est divisé, on voit alors affluer de toutes parts les candidats à ces fonctions, qui ajoutent à la rationalité de celles-ci (économies de plus-value) leurs propres intérêts, leurs motivations rationnelles et irrationnelles en contradiction avec les besoins élémentaires des ouvriers.

La rationalité de la production de la plus-value — qui trouve ses protagonistes sociaux et ses défenseurs politiques — ne cesse d'imprégner la trame idéologique de la science, de la rationalité technique, de la formation professionnelle, de la réglementation juridique, de l'organisation administrative et de l'information publique. Dans tous ces secteurs, elle modèle l'idéologie, les intérêts particuliers, les finalités et les motivations des groupes sociaux qui sont déjà séparés, dans le processus de travail, de la masse des producteurs. Par les processus que nous avons mentionnés, ils s'érigent, du point de vue à la fois culturel et politique, en défenseurs de la rationalité de la production de la plus-value, en protagonistes de la pérennité d'une telle production, en adversaires de la pratique d'autogestion ouvrière.

Bref, le travail salarié engendre continuellement des groupes sociaux engagés de cent manières dans la plus-value et intéressés à la perpétuer. Leur

position sociale, leurs intérêts, leur mode d'organisation et de constitution du pouvoir social, leurs idées et valeurs sociales, leurs formes de consommation et leurs modèles de culture, leur vision historique et leur orientation pratique — tissent une trame de phénomènes sociaux qui **tendent** à la structure de classes. Mais tout cela se passe dans une société que la révolution politique et les profondes transformations socio-économiques déjà amorcées ont aiguillée sur la voie du socialisme et arrachée à l'orbite de la société de classes. C'est pourquoi cette tendance ne peut aboutir à la fixation d'un antipode de classes ni à la restauration complète des structures de classes, sans un cataclysme social. Ses pousses ne cessent dès lors de s'acomoder des débuts de la révolution sociale, de s'enrouler autour de l'organisation du mouvement ouvrier, de se nicher dans les institutions politiques et économiques issues de ce mouvement, de faire des symbioses profondément contradictoires dans les regroupements sociaux et la structuration des intérêts, de se greffer sur les traditions idéologiques du mouvement ouvrier et d'éroder peu à peu les forces sociales, les idées et l'oeuvre de la révolution sociale.

Si l'on veut accomplir un changement radical, il faut renverser le sens du processus social global dans le reproduction **élargie**. C'est là que le socialisme trouve les facteurs révolutionnaires potentiels et les oeuvres des forces historiques de la société (les forces de production dans le sens profond que leur donne Marx et non dans celui que leur attribuent les partisans du technicisme ou de l'économisme). Ces forces, la reproduction capitaliste doit nécessairement les assimiler; elle doit les neutraliser pour prévenir toute possibilité de modifier les rapports de production. En revanche, le socialisme se doit de les affirmer et d'en faire la base d'une refonte radicale du processus social. **Le résultat historique dépend de la manière dont les sujets de la pratique d'émancipation se comportent envers la reproduction élargie.**

A notre sens, les principaux points stratégiques de l'autogestion ouvrière sont a) la consommation globale des producteurs — la négation pratique de la logique de la production de main-d'oeuvre salariée, et l'amorce du processus conduisant aux capacités maxima des producteurs et au développement le plus large possible de leurs besoins en tant que ressorts de la production; b) le mode social d'accumulation — la négation pratique de l'appropriation et de l'utilisation de la plus-value là où les besoins des producteur se forment et se satisfont en fonction de la maximisation de la plus-value, et l'affectation de l'accumulation en fonction de la satisfaction maximale, présente et future, des besoins des producteurs suivant l'ordre de priorité mis au point dans leur propre communauté, et c) la répartition et la circulation du travail dans la société tout entière — le dépassement de la logique du marché de la main-d'oeuvre que l'on inclut, exclut, répartit et mute dans le processus de travail selon les nécessités changeantes du capital, et l'introduction dans la société entière d'une dynamique du travail tendant à la répartition et à la combinaison sociales des activités foncièrement productives en sens qu'elles assurent l'épanouissement maximum des facultés et la satisfaction optimale des besoins des producteurs.

L'expérience yougoslave montre que la réalisation de ce contenu essentiel de l'autogestion est indissociable de la lutte des classes.

III LA LUTTE DES CLASSES

1. La lutte des classes dans l'histoire de l'autogestion yougoslave

La contestation ouvrière du salaire et de l'organisation du travail salarié, articulée la première décennie de l'autogestion yougoslave, donna lieu à une ébauche embryonnaire des éléments économiques, organisationnels et politiques de l'association ouvrière. Cette ébauche devait devenir rapidement une revendication pratique et déboucher sur des initiatives, des tentatives de réalisation (dans le cadre et en dehors de l'ordre institutionnel). Mais, dans la première moitié des années soixante, ces revendications et tentatives échouèrent ou dégénérent par suite de l'action contraire des structures économiques globales, de l'opposition déclarée des protagonistes de la production de la plus-value (on se souvient des célèbres engagements au sujet du «calcul des frais de main-d'oeuvre» dans la législation, la science, la comptabilité sociale, la pratique économique et politique), des flottements et hésitations de la hiérarchie des administrateurs dans les entreprises, et de l'attitude équivoque adoptés par les états-majors des organisations politiques. C'est pourquoi on assista durant les années qui suivirent, à une modification de la forme que cette initiative ouvrière prenait pour se manifester.

L'expérience, les aspirations, les revendications et les réalisations de ce mouvement allaient servir de point de départ, de motivation et d'orientation pour les collectivités ouvrières en lutte contre les processus économiques opposés, la pérennité de l'organisation bureaucratique dans les entreprises, »l'autogestion des technocrates«, contre les effets désastreux du manque de contrôle sur le marché de la main-d'oeuvre et du capital. Cette opposition se manifestait à travers les institutions de l'autogestion, l'alternative organisée mais non institutionnalisée du pouvoir ouvrier dans les usines et les autres entreprises, les grèves et les protestations, ainsi que par la voix des porte-parole et représentants dans les instances syndicales, législative et politiques. Pendant plusieurs années, on rencontra dans tous les programmes et actes politiques importants l'écho de cette ébauche, de ce projet ouvrier embryonnaire d'organisation sociale de l'économie et du travail. Les courants de la vie économique et politique dérogèrent de temps à autre à cette initiative ouvrière, provoquant un mécontentement toujours plus vif chez les ouvriers industriels et les autres groupes sociaux qui y voyaient leur propre chance d'émancipation (une certaine fraction des cadres techniques, une bonne partie des responsables des Syndicates et de la Ligue des communistes, les permanents politiques proches des centres industriels, les ouvriers agricoles des grosses agglomérations, etc.).

Après la sérieuse aggravation de la crise économique et politique des années soixante et du début des années soixante-dix (provoquée par les entorses au programme d'autogestion, cette crise coïncida avec une dégradation de la situation de la classe ouvrière), le projet de transformation structurelle de la reproduction, du système économique et de l'organisation sociale du travail, issu dix ans auparavant de l'initiative ouvrière pour devenir ensuite la force motrice de l'opposition ouvrière, allait être l'assise idéologique et réglementaire de la réforme constitutionnelle et législative, d'une vaste réorganisation du système économique et des entreprises (et en dernière instance, du système d'assemblée et de l'ordre politique tout entier). Mais la réalisation de ce programme à long terme se heurta d'emblée à l'opposition directe ou indirecte d'éléments sociaux très puissants qui avaient fondé entretemps leur position privilégiée, leur pouvoir, leur autorité, leur monopole de l'information et leur influence idéologique, sur l'accumulation de la

plus-value, l'organisation autoritaire dans les entreprises, la variante technocratique de la rationalité dans la production de la plus-value, la concurrence antagonique dans les programmes d'investissement et sur le marché, les profits commerciaux et les avantages des banques devenues autonomes, la représentation politique des intérêts économiques et l'arbitrage politique entre ces mêmes intérêts. Il est évident que le sort de ce programme qui devrait jeter, au cours des années soixante-dix, les bases d'un système politique nettement modifié, dépend de la question de savoir si, dépassant les initiatives individuelles et les résistances collectives dans les situations locales, la classe ouvrière sera capable d'organiser dans toute la société la lutte des classes contre des opposants incontestablement forts très bien pourvus au point de vue financier, organisationnel, politique, scientifique et idéologique. Et si l'initiative ouvrière (la pratique embryonnaire tendant à l'association) sera reprise et développée pour devenir une formule globale, une pratique d'ensemble susceptible de résoudre les problèmes du développement économique et social dans le sens de la pratique révolutionnaire embrassant les éléments déterminants du processus de travail (reproduction économique, politique de développement). Ce dernier volet est contesté avec la plus grande obstination (tandis que la notion même de pratique révolutionnaire est tournée en ridicule) par les puissants adversaires de l'autogestion ouvrière qui ne tiennent pour réelles que les possibilités du développement social déjà tracées dans les sociétés modernes avancées par l'évolution de la production capitaliste et de celle qui est organisée par l'Etat.

Puisque les puissants acteurs sociaux qui s'opposent à la pratique révolutionnaire de l'autogestion, ne peuvent — après la crise que cette opposition a provoquée — maintenir les anciennes formes, et doivent compter avec la consécration idéologique et la légitimité politique de l'autogestion, on remarque une très nette tendance à vider l'autogestion de sa substance de classe, de son contenu ouvrier et révolutionnaire pratique. On se propose, en d'autres termes, d'incorporer les idées générales, les aspirations et les formules organisationnelles de l'autogestion — après en avoir extrait les «dards empoisonnés» des intérêts de classe et de l'émancipation ouvrière — dans un système social réformé qui permettrait une fois de plus de perpétuer la reproduction sociale fondée sur le travail salarié. Ce faisant, on inaugure le chapitre de **la lutte des classes pour l'essence, la substance sociale de l'autogestion.**

La lutte dont l'autogestion est l'enjeu pourrait être formulée brièvement par deux conceptions, deux positions opposées. La première est celle de l'autogestion ouvrière en tant que forme d'action à long terme du prolétariat, en tant que moyen d'amorcer la pratique propre de la classe ouvrière et en tant qu'organe de cette pratique. La deuxième est celle de la participation des ouvriers et des citoyens dans l'économie, les services publics et les unités politiques, en tant que moyen spécifique pour assurer l'adaptation sociale, politique et idéologique aux structures économiques et au noyau civilisateur de la société de classes moderne.

Dans le développement de l'autogestion yougoslave, la première orientation est soutenue par des forces sociales parfaitement définies: le prolétariat industriel yougoslave en premier lieu, puis en partie les intellectuels et le prolétariat agricole. Ces forces l'expriment dans leurs intérêts vitaux, élémentaires, leur option pratique qui transcende l'existence salariale, leur constitution politique, leur conscience critique pratique, leur conscience théorique développée, leurs conceptions idéologique et morales.

A l'autre extrême des tendances objectives et idéologiques dans le développement de l'autogestion yougoslave, on trouve la conception qui oriente l'autogestion dans les unités, les ensembles et les systèmes économiques,

dans les autres secteurs du travail social, les communautés d'intérêts et les formations politico-territoriales, vers une forme spécifique de système social dans le noyau duquel on cristallise (avec l'aide et sous la protection du système) des structures économiques et sociales analogues à celles de la société de classes moderne.

Ce noyau est constitué par le capitalisme d'Etat chargé de fonctions sociales, entremêlé avec le capital financier et corporatif qui, devenu impersonnel, a été doté d'une organisation bureaucratique et technocratique. Tous ces éléments se situent dans une économie de marché qui est en partie réglementée sur les plans politique et administratif, en partie contrôlée par de fortes corporations productrices de profit, et en partie impulsée et freinée à la fois par le jeu incontrôlé de la loi de la valeur, la concurrence commerciale et la confrontation politique de tous les acteurs que nous avons mentionnés.

A l'intérieur d'un tel système social — dont nous ne connaissons pour le moment que la tendance qui n'a pas prévalu — la participation des travailleurs et des citoyens donnerait lieu à de multiples fonctions. Une partie de ces fonctions émanerait des particularités de l'histoire yougoslave. Il s'agirait de neutraliser les fortes impulsions initiales vers le socialisme, de les ajuster au sein du système social qui correspond à la société de classes moderne. Il faudrait — nécessité tout aussi impérieuse — préserver les spécificités du système économique et de l'organisation socio-politique yougoslaves dans les relations internationales.

Le deuxième ensemble de fonctions de participation procéderait de la nécessité pour la société de classes moderne d'imbriquer dans son système de nouveaux rouages et de nouvelles formes touchant les responsabilités des cadres et experts économiques, l'intéressement et la cogestion d'une partie des salariés, la participation politique des citoyens dans leurs communautés d'intérêts, l'idéologie de la «nouvelle société» qui complète la vision déjà usée de l'Etat de bien-être et de la société d'abondance par l'illusion de la démocratie de participation.

Ces nécessités urgentes de la société de classes moderne surgissent au sein de son système pour deux raisons, par l'effet de deux défis.

Le premier défi jaillit des entrailles mêmes de la société de classes moderne. En effet, les formes initiales d'appropriation et d'administration sont historiquement dépassées, et — pour reprendre les paroles de Marx — on est allé fort loin dans l'abolition des formes de propriété et d'activité économique capitalistes. Mais on l'a fait dans le sens négatif puisqu'aussi bien le contenu capitaliste en a été conservé. La technocratie directement intéressée, autonome pour ne pas dire autogestionnaire, doit donc être le nouvel entrepreneur dans les organisations monopolistes.

Le second défi vient du prolétariat industriel et intellectuel qui trouve de nouvelles motivations pour se dresser contre les anciennes et les nouvelles formes d'aliénation au milieu des changements objectivement révolutionnaires amorcés dans des domaines comme le caractère du travail, la production des biens matériels et spirituels, les besoins, les aspirations ainsi que les nouveaux impératifs et les nouvelles possibilités de l'existence par rapport à l'ambiance naturelle et le substrat technique de la civilisation.

Le système de la société de classes moderne cherche dans la démocratie de participation la possibilité d'assimiler, de domestiquer et de subjuger ces nouvelles impulsions de la pratique révolutionnaire. Cette constatation vaut surtout pour le droit de décision des ouvriers dans les entreprises capitalistes. Cette nécessité s'explique, du moins en partie, par les changements objectifs subis par la fonction de la main-d'oeuvre et la forme de son incorporation sociale à la production de la plus-value. On peut espérer ainsi neutra-

liser les nouvelles possibilités de la lutte de classes des ouvriers qui acquièrent un pouvoir technologique sans précédent, une sorte de droit de veto sur la productivité, et qui formulent des revendications intéressantes désormais la division du travail salarié, la logique et la hiérarchie des salaires, le monopole capitaliste de la gestion, l'échelle des valeurs, des besoins et des finalités dont la forme a été engendrée par la consommation capitaliste.

Les circonstances aidant, la tendance du système social yougoslave, qui vise à perpétuer les structures économiques et de classes en place, pourrait reprendre certaines formules et réponses aux défis que doivent relever les systèmes sociaux du capitalisme contemporain — beaucoup plus développés sur le plan industriel et dans tous les autres domaines.

Quelle serait, dans un tel système social yougoslave, la fonction principale de la démocratie de participation industrielle, économique et politique?

Premièrement. L'économie de marché doit fonctionner sans propriétaires ni entrepreneurs privés et, éventuellement, sans capital par actions. Ils devraient être remplacés par d'autres substrats sociaux et un autre réseau d'institutions. Celui-ci devrait être constitué par les collectivités autogérées pourvues d'attributions juridico-économiques, et motivées par leurs propres intérêts. Cette tendance vise donc à orienter le développement de l'autogestion tout entière vers la fonctionnalisation de l'économie de marché, à le subordonner à cette dernière, à en faire une sorte de complément.

Deuxièmement. Dans cette économie de marché on voit persister les lois objectives de l'accumulation du capital-valeur, le marché de la main-d'œuvre et sa reproduction en contradiction avec l'accumulation du capital, les coûts de production et la répartition de la plus-value selon les différents capitaux. D'où d'inévitables contradictions entre tous les fonctions visant à faire fructifier le capital, d'une part, et la position, les intérêts et le comportement des producteurs, d'autre part. Le système peut à la rigueur atténuer ces contradictions par une sorte de communauté d'intérêts des ouvriers et du capital au sein des collectivités autogérées, mais il est évident que cela seul ne saurait être une base suffisante pour des fonctions économiques cohérentes et agissantes.

Ces fonctions appartiennent en premier lieu aux dirigeants et experts socialement organisés qui y sont directement intéressés, privilégiés et motivés puisqu'aussi bien ils se substituent aux propriétaires et aux entrepreneurs. Ce sont les tenants sociaux d'une autogestion déclassée. La participation des ouvriers dans les collectivités autogérées se présente dès lors comme une forme rationnelle de stimulation à l'élévation de la productivité, et comme un moyen de canaliser les conflits sociaux.

Troisièmement. Dans l'économie yougoslave, il faudra longtemps encore remédier à de fortes disparités, refouler les formes anachroniques et autarciques d'activité économique, et renforcer (du point de vue financier, des cadres, etc.) les pôles d'expansion d'une économie moderne, compétitive sur le marché international. D'où de grandes différences entre les unités économiques, les branches, etc., quant à la capacité d'accumulation et de reproduction. D'où également de très importantes disproportions dans la consommation ouvrière, dans la reproduction de la main-d'œuvre. On rajette sur les collectivités ouvrières le risque de ces formules, le risque de la reconversion technologiques et économique, le risque en fin de toute la gestion. Dans ce système potentiel, l'avantage de la participation ouvrière serait qu'elle permettrait de donner une grande souplesse aux salaires. En effet, on pourrait les maintenir, pendant de longs intervalles de temps, au-dessous de la valeur de la force de travail, tout en contenant ou en apaisant plus facilement les conflits sociaux.

Quatrièmement. Dans toute production de plus-value, la contrainte économique individuelle du propriétaire de la force de travail provoque une opposition de l'intérêt ouvrier à celui du propriétaire et de l'entrepreneur. Dans le système que nous sommes en train d'examiner, la contrainte économique individuelle du propriétaire de la force de travail est complétée par la contrainte économique collective des communautés autogérées, tandis qu'au sein de l'organisation autogérée on voit se former un intérêt de groupe adapté à la contrainte économique.

Cinquièmement. Ce mode d'organisation de l'économie de marché et plus encore ce mode de production, d'accumulation et d'utilisation de la plus-value, renouvelle ou approfondit inévitablement les principales inégalités sociales sur la base de la division du travail, de la hiérarchie dans la main-d'oeuvre salariée et de celle des salaires, et sur la base de l'appropriation en vertu d'une substitution des fonctions du capital (propriétaires, bailleurs de fonds, entrepreneurs, etc.) ou d'autres formes de privilèges. La fonction de la participation industrielle et économique consisterait dès lors à faire des catégories sociales au sein de ces différences sociales essentielles, une sorte de mosaïque des groupes d'intérêts qui se rencontrent dans la vie économique et politique en tant que sujets nominaux de l'autogestion, qui se concertent et s'entendent directement ou indirectement, mais qui le font toujours à l'ombre de rapports économiques tels qu'ils déterminent foncièrement leur condition. Ils peuvent ainsi éventuellement atténuer les inégalités de manière marginale, mais il est certain qu'ils émoussent considérablement la violence des conflits sociaux. Il s'agit là d'une forme d'intégration sociale qui contrarie fortement l'identification et la confrontation de classes.

Sixièmement. Au cours du passage de la phase moyenne à la phase supérieure de l'industrialisation, qui s'accompagne en Yougoslavie de fortes inégalités internes, le type d'économie dont nous venons de parler limite très nettement la consommation des masses de producteurs, alors que, d'autre part, il exige nécessairement une clientèle pour les marchandises produites en fonction des besoins prioritaires des travailleurs, mais en fonction des nécessités du marché, et des avantages qu'il procure.

D'où la pénurie individuelle et collective qui affecte les ouvriers: nourriture, logement, éducation, etc. D'où la misère des quartiers ouvriers et des banlieues prolétariennes avec des éléments trop marqués de la consommation de standing. D'où également l'imitation des modèles idéologiques (consommation, fausses aspirations et faux besoins) de la société capitaliste.

La fonction de la participation consisterait à permettre — à travers l'apparence de la «répartition selon les résultats inégaux du travail», c'est-à-dire en fait à travers un éventail de salaires largement ouvert, les formes de participation aux fonctions du capital (de bailleur de fonds, d'entrepreneur, etc.) et les autres formes de participation économique privilégiée — à une partie de la société d'atteindre à une consommation abusive, et, d'autre part, à orienter (la boucle est ainsi bouclée), par l'entremise de l'économie de marche, les collectivités autogérées vers une production de biens adaptée à cette structure de la consommation. Grâce au système social, ces deux éléments apparaissent comme économiquement justifiés et stimulants, d'une part, et comme idéologiquement légitimes, conformes à l'échelle de valeurs dans les rapports sociaux d'autogestion, d'autre part. Or, cela a des conséquences d'une grande portée pour les assises idéologiques d'un tel système social.

Il semble qu'il existe actuellement dans la société yougoslave une sorte d'équilibre entre la tendance à développer l'autogestion ouvrière — à modifier radicalement la reproduction sociale — et la tendance à ravalier l'autogestion au rang de la participation industrielle et économique au sein »d'une économie de marché moderne«, »d'un système industriel placé sous l'hégé-

monie des technostructures», etc. La première tendance s'assure un avantage certain en ce qui concerne la légitimité politique et l'ordre juridique. Elle confirme toujours plus concrètement sa légitimité pour ce qui est de la satisfaction des besoins prioritaires des masses de producteurs et de leurs aspirations idéologiques; elle s'avère également indispensable à la sauvegarde de l'indépendance totale et de l'organisation démocratique d'une communauté politique multinationale. La deuxième tendance puise essentiellement sa force dans les processus de l'économie mondiale, ainsi que dans les groupes sociaux qui constituent les piliers de ces processus économiques aussi longtemps que les ouvriers associés ne parviennent pas à établir leur contrôle sur la reproduction sociale. Leur rivalité donne lieu tantôt à une lutte ouverte et tantôt à des compromis que les structures politiques maintiennent dans la plus grande tension. A l'heure actuelle, les forces sont peut-être équilibrées. Mais il est évident que si cet équilibre se maintient c'est parce que l'on manque de force de part et d'autre, parce que l'on se trouve, des deux côtés, dans un état d'impuissance relative. La classe ouvrière se heurte à d'énormes difficultés (économiques, organisationnelles, de cadres) lors du passage de la contestation du travail salarié, des initiatives locales et du veto défensif, à la pratique créatrice et à la lutte des classes sur une grande échelle. Quant aux forces sociales qui s'opposent à sa pratique révolutionnaire, elles ne peuvent se constituer en classe, en mouvement et en organisation politique, en idéologie unique; elles sont limitées à tous les points de vue par les résultats historiques concrets de la révolution sociale et les impératifs liés à la défense de ces résultats. Par suite de »l'équilibre de l'impuissance relative«, la lutte des classes au sujet de l'autogestion est plus sourde que manifeste. Il n'est pas exclu de la voir éclater au grand jour, mais uniquement à l'heure de la décision finale.

2. La classe ouvrière — base et contenu de l'autogestion contemporaine

L'image du socialisme présenté comme une société dans laquelle la classe ouvrière s'est abolie elle-même comme classe en abolissant la propriété d'exploitation et le pouvoir politique des exploités, est encore vivace et influence dans la théorie. L'antipode n'existant pas, les ouvriers ne peuvent se constituer, penser et agir comme classe; le mouvement ouvrier engendre la pratique historique de l'entité sociale tendant à parachever l'émancipation de tous les hommes. Cette image pourrait être très réelle s'il n'y avait pas dans la société de la période de transition des forces sociales agissantes autres que les producteurs — sujets de la pratique libératrice — mus par la volonté d'abolir dans cette pratique leur propre aliénation dans le travail, la politique et la culture. Mais, et c'est le moins que l'on en puisse dire, une telle image est une illusion idéologique, dans la mesure où il ne s'agit pas d'un faux délibéré.

Dans le sac de l'illusion idéologique, il semble que l'erreur naisse dans la conception euphémiste de l'aliénation en cette période de l'histoire; elle consiste à croire qu'en modifiant la forme de la propriété et l'organisation politique on abolit le travail salarié — cette tumeur maligne qui, dans les métastases de la reproduction économique, gagne toute la société qu'elle divise en classes — tandis que l'aliénation »restante« (travail certes, mais pas travail salarié) ne provoquerait pas la division en classes, n'engendrerait pas de forces sociales intéressées et tendant à la perpétuer; quant aux inégalités et contradictions sociales, elles pourraient être aplanies sur la base de l'intérêt général des membres de la société, de l'entité sociale à l'émancipation définitive de la production et des producteurs. C'est justement la raison pour laquelle — comme antithèse à cette illusion idéologique — notre analyse des réalités de la société en marche vers le socialisme commence par dégager les

éléments déterminants du travail salarié, tandis que la méthode que nous utilisons pour étudier l'autogestion dans la dialectique de l'aliénation et de la désaliénation au sein des sociétés modernes ne retient pas les termes les plus généraux de l'aliénation (qu'il est possible d'étendre à l'infini, jusqu'aux contradictions les plus générales de l'existence humaine, pour estomper ainsi le faisceau actuel des contradictions implantées dans le travail salarié, dont on sait pourtant que ce n'est qu'en le dénouant que l'on pourra libérer la pratique historique que permettra aux hommes de régler toutes les contradictions connues et inconnues de la vie humaine.

Rendue possible par la lutte des classes, l'autogestion se réalisera comme forme suprême de cette lutte aussi longtemps que les producteurs souverains n'auront pas complètement éliminé les déterminismes de leur existence salariale, profondément ancrés dans la civilisation moderne, non seulement dans les rapports de propriété, mais aussi dans la division du travail, dans la durée du travail, dans le caractère de la science, de la technologie, de l'organisation de la production, de l'éducation, de la consommation, du développement accéléré des institutions politiques, dans la structure des valeurs sociales, dans tous les aspects de la culture spirituelle, dans les phénomènes socio-psychiques. L'autogestion ne peut abolir les déterminismes du travail salarié que comme **pratique révolutionnaire totale** s'étendant à tous les secteurs de la vie sociale où le travail salarié a plongé ses racines.

Moins la classe ouvrière est émancipée — dans son organisation productive et politique, ses intérêts et ses projets pratiques dans tous les secteurs de la pratique sociale — moins elle est capable de s'élever, dans sa pratique libératrice, au dessus de son être salarié, de le subordonner à cette pratique, plus grandes sont les chances de succès de la tendance à constituer son antipode de classe et à restaurer l'ordre social de classes. Ou bien — le cas est plus connu — on risque de voir s'établir un ordre hybride dans lequel les processus et les réalisations d'une révolution sociale inachevée sont gelées dans une symbiose avec les survivances du travail salarié, sous l'hégémonie équivoque des forces sociales qui personnifient cet état hermaphrodite de la société. Et inversement. Plus l'émancipation des ouvriers dans la pratique de l'autogestion aux prises avec les déterminismes du travail salarié est complète, plus restreintes sont les tendances de l'antipode de classe, et plus on rattachera à la pratique libératrice, pour les intégrer à elle, pour leur faire subir une transformation révolutionnaire — les groupes sociaux qui détachent le processus de travail de la masse des producteurs. Dans ce cas, les agents et les motifs de l'émancipation humaine peuvent s'éveiller et s'activer également chez ces groupes sociaux. Leurs capacités et besoins spécifiques, leurs intérêts, motivations, idées, aspirations et sources de pouvoir social peuvent alors être orientés vers la transformation radicale du processus social, de la politique et de la culture, vers la production humaine authentique dans laquelle ils interviennent eux-mêmes comme producteurs autonomes.

L'expérience historique confirme sans équivoque que sans la pratique émancipée (autogestion) de la classe ouvrière, sans le contrôle révolutionnaire pratique sur toutes les survivances sociales et culturelles du travail salarié, les groupes sociaux qui sont **historiquement** coupés de la classe ouvrière, ne pourront pas être aiguillés de manière durable et sûre dans la voie du socialisme. Dans le cas inverse, on est fondé à croire que la pratique émancipée de la classe ouvrière constitue le noyau génétique de la communauté des producteurs souverains, et qu'elle permet la participation **autonome** des autres fractions de la société à la création d'une telle communauté. L'intégration ambivalente de la classe ouvrière au système social hybride du socialisme non encore arrivé à maturité perpétue les déterminismes de la structuration de la société en classes, bien qu'en apparence elle apaise les conflits sociaux et dissimule les rapports de classes; l'émancipation de la classe ou-

rière, par contre, sa lutte de classes pour l'autogestion et sous la forme de l'autogestion supprime les assises de la division de la société en classes, et permet d'orienter toutes les parties de la société vers l'association sans classes.

Ces deux thèses (ou voies possibles pour le cheminement du socialisme de sa période initiale) sont tirées non seulement de l'abstraction théorique des tendances historiques générales, mais aussi de l'histoire yougoslave récente. Etant donné que l'histoire ne prescrit pas les abstractions théoriques, nous ne trouvons pas dans la réalité yougoslave les deux voies possibles à l'état pur. Néanmoins, nous considérons que cette réalité revêt une importance exceptionnelle pour avoir extériorisé les deux tendances d'une manière suffisamment lisible. En ce quart de siècle, cette réalité a été marquée par le flux et le reflux successifs de la révolution sociale. Parfois même les hautes et les bas se produisent simultanément, accumulant ainsi les preuves:

d'abord, que chaque essor de la pratique émancipée des producteurs (de l'autogestion) implique nécessairement l'initiative autonome et l'action (lutte) sociale continue des ouvriers contre les intérêts opposés, le pouvoir économique et politique dont les ouvriers sont pour le moment expropriés, contre les idéologies aliénées,

ensuite, que l'essor effectif de la pratique émancipée des producteurs refoule et extirpe la tendance à renouveler les regroupements et les antagonismes de classe, pour créer les formes embryonnaires de communautés humaines fondées sur la sociabilité associative, les intérêts réellement communs et l'autonomie associée (souveraineté, autonomie et liberté d'action réciproquement accordées) des participants à la production sociale qui, la pratique de l'autogestion aidant, brisent la carapace de leurs positions antagoniques fondées sur la répartition de classes des conditions de production et des produits, la division du travail, la hiérarchie politique et les constructions idéologiques du travail aliéné.

Toutes les formes de sociabilité associative que la pratique de l'autogestion laisse deviner dans la perspective historique sont en rapport avec les possibilités objectives de la **production directement socialisée pour les besoins authentiques et le développement propre des producteurs**. Ces lois, ces tendances de la production humaine nient l'économie de la plus-value (du processus de travail social fondé sur la contradiction entre le travail abstrait et le travail concret...). La pratique autonome des producteurs libère les tendances d'une telle production, dont elle anticipe les possibilités futures sous la forme de projets historiques émancipés et d'efforts pratiques des acteurs de l'autogestion.

Entretemps, pendant que la production de la plus-value engendre sans cesse la tendance à la scission antagonique, toutes les formes embryonnaires de la sociabilité associative — qui ne se sont pas encore définitivement implantées dans le mode social de production — continuent à dépendre foncièrement de l'émancipation et de la liberté d'action des masses de producteurs que les lois de la production de la plus-value cherchent inlassablement à ramener dans une position d'exploitation, dans une position subordonnée et humainement dépréciée. Voilà pourquoi la constitution et la pratique sociales émancipées de la classe ouvrière demeurent la condition, la force motrice et le pivot de toute la pratique de l'émancipation humaine, et de toutes les formes évolutives de l'association. **L'autogestion n'est une pratique historique authentique que comme mouvement ouvrier.**

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