

**WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!**



周恩来

[ SELECTED WORKS  
OF  
ZHOU ENLAI ]

Volume I

*color 192*

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
BEIJING


The present volume is the authorized English translation of the first Chinese edition of the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Volume I, published in December 1980 by the People's Publishing House, Beijing.

Published by the Foreign Languages Press  
24 Baiwanzhuang Road, Beijing, China

Printed by the Foreign Languages Printing House  
19 West Chegongzhuang Road, Beijing, China

Distributed by Guoji Shudian (China Publications Centre)  
P.O. Box 399, Beijing, China

*Printed in the People's Republic of China*



## PUBLICATION NOTE

Comrade Zhou Enlai was a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary and an outstanding leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China. Throughout the long course of China's democratic revolution, socialist revolution and socialist construction, he applied the universal truth of Marxism to solving China's practical problems in many fields, such as to building the Party, political power and the army, work in the enemy-occupied areas and in our own base areas, united front and diplomatic work, and economic and cultural work. He made brilliant contributions to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought.

To meet the needs of readers in their study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the history of the Chinese revolution, we have edited and are now publishing the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, which consist of two volumes. The first volume includes works before and the second those after the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Comrade Zhou Enlai wrote many articles, documents, letters and telegrams and made numerous important speeches. However, under the difficult conditions prevailing in wartime, many of these were lost. We have tried our best to collect those writings and speeches which are still extant. We include in these volumes the most important ones, many of which have not been published before.

Writings which were published during Comrade Zhou Enlai's lifetime or which exist in manuscript are reproduced here in their original form with a minimum of changes in language or of corrections of errors of fact. Records of speeches have been edited. To assist our readers, editorial and explanatory notes have been provided. Each editorial note is placed at the bottom of the page on which an article begins, while the explanatory notes come at the end of each volume.

Editorial Committee on Party  
Literature, Central Committee of the  
Communist Party of China

June 24, 1980

## CONTENTS

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE ( <i>December 11, 1926</i> )	13
ON TAKING PROMPT PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST CHIANG KAI-SHEK ( <i>April 1927</i> )	18
ON FIRMLY ELIMINATING NON-PROLETARIAN IDEOLOGY FROM THE PARTY ( <i>November 11, 1928</i> )	20
SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN HUNAN-HUBEI SOVIET AREA ( <i>March 17, 1929</i> )	26
HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATIONAL WORK UNDER THE WHITE TERROR ( <i>March 25, 1929</i> )	31
THE ARREST AND MURDER OF COMRADES PENG PAI, YANG YIN, YAN CHANGYI AND XING SHIZHEN ( <i>September 14, 1929</i> )	35
DIRECTIVE FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE FRONT COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH ARMY OF THE RED ARMY ( <i>September 28, 1929</i> )	41
The Present State of the Internecine Wars Among the Warlords	41
The Basic Tasks and Prospects of the Red Army	45
The Areas in Which the Red Army Should Operate and Its Strategy	46
The Red Army and the Masses	48
The Organization and Training of the Red Army	50
The Red Army's Supplies and the Economic Question	52
Party Work in the Red Army	53
The Question of the Red Army's Current Operations	55
ON THE CAUSES OF THE EMERGENCE OF A TROTSKYITE OPPOSITION FACTION IN CHINA AND ITS PROSPECTS ( <i>October 1929</i> )	57
ON THE WORK IN WUHAN ( <i>September 4, 1930</i> )	61
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE LI LISAN LINE ( <i>December 1, 1930</i> )	67
TELEGRAMS RELATING TO THE SMASHING OF THE FOURTH "ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION" CAMPAIGN ( <i>January-March 1933</i> )	72

I. Telegram of January 27	72
II. Telegram of January 30	75
III. Telegram of February 7	77
IV. Telegram of February 13	78
V. Telegram of February 15	79
VI. Telegram of March 2	81
VII. Telegram of March 4	81
VIII. Telegram of March 16	82
IX. Telegram of March 20	83
THREE TELEGRAMS RELATING TO THE XI'AN INCIDENT ( <i>December 1936</i> )	86
I. The Negotiations with T. V. Soong ( <i>December 23, 1936</i> )	86
II. The Results of the Negotiations with T. V. Soong and Soong Mei-ling ( <i>December 25, 1936</i> )	88
III. The Situation and Our Policy After the Peaceful Settlement of the Xi'an Incident ( <i>December 29, 1936</i> )	90
ANNOUNCEMENT OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ( <i>July 15, 1937</i> )	93
OPPOSE SEEKING PEACE THROUGH COMPROMISE, PERSIST IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN NORTH CHINA ( <i>November 13, 1937</i> )	96
THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND THE TASKS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUING THE WAR IN NORTH CHINA ( <i>November 16, 1937</i> )	99
I. The State of the War of Resistance and the Present Crisis	99
II. The Possibility of Persisting in the War of Resistance in North China and Its Prospects	102
III. The Tasks to Be Undertaken in Pursuing the War of Resistance in North China	104
THE NATURE OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS CURRENT TASKS ( <i>December 31, 1937</i> )	107
The Nature of the Youth Movement Today	107
The Tasks of the Youth Movement Today	108
POLITICAL WORK IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED FORCES ( <i>January 10, 1938</i> )	111
I. Revolutionary Political Work, the Lifeline of National Revolution	111

II. The Tasks and Content of Political Work in the Anti-Japanese Armed Forces	114
III. Organization and Methods of Political Work	118
THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY ( <i>March 1939</i> )	120
I. The Present Situation and the Environment of the New Fourth Army	120
II. The Growth of the New Fourth Army and the Way to Overcome Its Difficulties	122
III. The Strategy, Guiding Principles and Tasks of the New Fourth Army	124
ON BUILDING A STRONG AND MILITANT PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE SOUTHWEST ( <i>January 1942</i> )	128
ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE KUOMINTANG FROM 1924 TO 1926 ( <i>Spring 1943</i> )	130
GUIDELINES FOR MYSELF ( <i>March 18, 1943</i> )	144
MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO DR. DWARKANATH S. KOTNIS' FAMILY ( <i>March 22, 1943</i> )	145
HOW TO BE A GOOD LEADER ( <i>April 22, 1943</i> )	146
SPEECH AT A MEETING OF WELCOME IN YAN'AN ( <i>August 2, 1943</i> )	151
ON CHINESE FASCISM, THE NEW AUTOCRACY ( <i>August 16, 1943</i> )	160
I. Statement of the Problem	160
II. The Ideology of Chinese Fascism	163
III. The Historical Roots of Chinese Fascism	169
IV. The Political Programme and Tactics of Chinese Fascism	171
V. The Organization and Activities of Chinese Fascism	174
ON THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE PARTY ( <i>March 3 and 4, 1944</i> )	177
I. The Nature, Tasks and Prospects of the Chinese Revolution	177
II. The Motive Forces and Class Relations in the Chinese Revolution	183
III. The Experience and Lessons of the Great Revolution	189
IV. The Revolutionary Situation and the Party's Tactics	197
V. The Policies of the Party	202
VI. The Sixth Congress and Its Impact	206
ON RECTIFICATION AMONG CULTURAL WORKERS IN THE GREAT REAR AREA ( <i>January 18, 1945</i> )	211



ON THE UNITED FRONT ( <i>April 30, 1945</i> )	213
I. On the Anti-Japanese National United Front	213
II. On the Experience of the United Front and the Lessons to Be Drawn from It	231
PRESENT URGENT DEMANDS ( <i>August 1945</i> )	243
ACTIVELY PROPAGATE OPPOSITION TO CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP AND EXPOSE CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S DECEITFUL PLOT ( <i>August 16, 1945</i> )	247
LETTER OF CONSOLATION TO MADAME SHEN CUIZHEN, WIDOW OF ZOU TAOFEN ( <i>September 12, 1945</i> )	249
STATEMENT ON THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE SIXTH CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG ( <i>March 18, 1946</i> )	250
ETERNAL GLORY TO THE MARTYRS OF APRIL 8TH! ( <i>April 19, 1946</i> )	258
STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE SPREAD OF CIVIL WAR AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ( <i>July 17, 1946</i> )	262
TAKE BETTER CARE OF OUR PROGRESSIVE FRIENDS ( <i>July 25, 1946</i> )	264
IN MEMORY OF LI GONGPU AND WEN YIDUO ( <i>October 4, 1946</i> )	266
SPEECH AT THE SHANGHAI MEETING TO COMMEMORATE THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF LU XUN ( <i>October 19, 1946</i> )	267
STATEMENT ON THE KUOMINTANG'S CONVENING OF A "NATIONAL ASSEMBLY" ( <i>November 16, 1946</i> )	269
SPEECH IN CELEBRATION OF THE SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ZHU DE ( <i>November 30, 1946</i> )	273
SPEECH AT A MEETING HELD BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL WALKS OF LIFE IN YAN'AN IN COMMEMORATION OF THE DECEMBER 12TH INCIDENT ( <i>December 12, 1946</i> )	275
THE PAST YEAR'S NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS ( <i>December 18, 1946</i> )	280
I. The Past Year's Negotiations	280
II. The Lessons and Experience of the Negotiations of the Past Year and Their Prospects	290
ON MARSHALL'S STATEMENT ON LEAVING CHINA ( <i>January 10, 1947</i> )	293
TWO DOCUMENTS ON THE GUIDELINES FOR WORK AND THE TACTICS FOR STRUGGLE IN AREAS CONTROLLED BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK ( <i>February 28 and May 5, 1947</i> )	300

LAUNCH A MASSIVE NATIONWIDE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TO OVERTHROW CHIANG KAI-SHEK ( <i>September 28, 1947</i> )	304
OPINIONS ON OUR PRESENT WORK AMONG THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ( <i>January 1948</i> )	316
AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM CONCERNING THE LEADERS' STYLE OF WORK ( <i>February 5, 1948</i> )	321
AGRARIAN REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY IN THE OLD AND SEMI-OLD LIBERATED AREAS ( <i>February 22, 1948</i> )	322
TELEGRAM TO THE FUPING BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COM- MITTEE CONCERNING AGRARIAN REFORM AND CONSOLIDA- TION OF THE PARTY ( <i>February 23, 1948</i> )	332
THE POLICIES OF THE PARTY MUST BE MADE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC PROMPTLY ( <i>March 7, 1948</i> )	337
ON THE EXPERIMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF SOLDIERS' COM- MITTEES IN THE ARMY ( <i>March 8, 1948</i> )	339
NEW-DEMOCRATIC ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION ( <i>June 21, 1948</i> )	342
FRUSTRATE THE ENEMY'S SCHEME FOR A SHAM PEACE CAM- PAIGN ( <i>July 27, 1948</i> )	344
COOL-HEADEDNESS AND FLEXIBLE TACTICS — REQUIREMENTS OF THE STRUGGLE IN AREAS UNDER THE CHIANG REGIME ( <i>August 22, 1948</i> )	347
MESSAGE TO ZHENG DONGGUO ( <i>October 18, 1948</i> )	350
REPORT ON PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE PEACE TALKS ( <i>April 17, 1949</i> )	352
UNITE WITH THE BROAD MASSES TO ADVANCE TOGETHER ( <i>April 22, 1949</i> )	365
LEARN FROM MAO ZEDONG ( <i>May 7, 1949</i> )	370
POLITICAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF WORKERS IN LITERATURE AND ART ( <i>July 6, 1949</i> )	383
I. The Victories of the Three Years of the People's War of Liberation	384
II. Some Problems Concerning Literature and Art	389
RESTORE PRODUCTION, RECONSTRUCT CHINA ( <i>July 23, 1949</i> )	397
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DRAFT COMMON PROGRAMME OF THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE ( <i>Septem- ber 22, 1949</i> )	404
NOTES	410
NOTE ON SPELLING	483

# THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE

*December 11, 1926*

## I

Since we are firm in the belief that the present political struggle has only one goal — to overthrow the semi-feudal forces<sup>1</sup> and realize democracy — there are those who wonder why we need an active Communist Party in addition to the Kuomintang.<sup>2</sup> They assert that so long as there is an active Communist Party, there are bound to be conflicts and an eventual split with the Kuomintang.

Much has been said and written about this problem over the past three years. The following comments are necessary solely to further strengthen our present political struggle and to enhance the solidarity and mutual understanding of the revolutionaries.

1. The national revolution is the common way out for all the oppressed classes of China. Nevertheless, in the course of the revolution, each class has its own aims and, particularly when democracy is in the process of being realized, each has its own interests to pursue. Since interests differ, it is natural that the working class and the peasantry, being the most oppressed, should have the Communist Party, which works especially for their interests, to serve their cause and be their

---

In the winter of 1926, as successive victories were being won in the Northern Expedition and the worker-peasant movement was making rapid progress, the right-wing forces in the Kuomintang stepped up their counter-revolutionary activities and aroused sentiment against Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the worker-peasant movement. Right opportunists in the Chinese Communist Party, with Chen Duxiu as their leader, became frightened and, not daring to uphold leadership by the proletariat, began to yield and make concessions to the Kuomintang right-wingers. It was in these circumstances that this article was written and published in issue No. 37 of *The People's Weekly*, organ of the Guangdong-Guangxi Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

vanguard. A Communist Party serving the workers and peasants and guiding them onto the path of national revolution will in no way hinder the Kuomintang in its leadership of the various classes working for the revolution. On the contrary, both parties will benefit by complementing and supporting each other in their practical work.

2. Though the national revolution is the common aim of all the oppressed classes, the proletariat is the most uncompromising revolutionary class in the prolonged struggle, while the national bourgeoisie<sup>454</sup> is inclined to compromise and the petty bourgeoisie often vacillates. To achieve national liberation and democracy, the real goals of the national revolution, we must rely on the proletariat, together with the peasants and handicraft workers, to urge the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie forward in an uncompromising struggle against our enemies. Hence, the Communist Party, which serves the workers and peasants, works solely to lead their revolutionary forces in promoting the cause of national revolution and to guard against the adverse effects of the other classes' tendency to compromise. Such activities can only benefit the Kuomintang, which is now leading the national revolution, and enhance its revolutionary character; there is no danger whatsoever of conflicts or a split. For if there were conflicts, they would be conflicts between the masses of revolutionary workers and peasants and a bourgeoisie that was compromising with the imperialist enemies; if there were a split, it would be a split between an alliance of the revolutionary left wing of the Kuomintang and the Communists on the one hand and the right wing that was abandoning the revolution on the other. Since the Kuomintang is revolutionary and is in the leading position in the national revolution, it has no reason to worry about such conflicts or such a split. Moreover, facts prove that since the May 30th Movement,<sup>3</sup> the revolutionary workers and peasants, and especially the workers, have persisted in their anti-imperialist position and their strike tactics, and have time and again clashed with those members of the bourgeoisie who have attempted to compromise with the British imperialists. Following the assassination of Liao Zhongkai,<sup>4</sup> the left wing of the Kuomintang fought in alliance with the Communists against those involved in the assassination and those opposed to communism, the Soviet Union and the worker-peasant movement. Thereupon, many persons who had abandoned the revolution broke away from the Kuomintang's ranks. This was not at all harmful to the national revolution or the Kuomintang; on the contrary,

the revolutionary forces became more united, and the national revolution made the progress that we see today.

## II

Having said this, we must still make our position more concrete.

1. The aim of the Communist Party in leading the workers and peasants in the national revolution is to overthrow foreign imperialism and the semi-feudal forces in China, and its demands cannot go beyond the limits of democracy. But when the capitalists suppress the just demands of workers for some improvement in their standard of living, or when the landlords rally all the traditional forces to wreck the peasants' liberation movement, the Communists must stand with the workers and peasants and struggle to the end to emancipate them from their miseries. In striving for democracy, the Communists are on the side of the workers and peasants and naturally give greater urgency to their struggles and demands than others do. This is not overstepping the bounds of the national revolution, but promoting it.

2. As we know, the sole purpose of the national revolution is the liberation of present-day China; at the same time our revolution is a component of the world revolution. Therefore, while we agree that the revolutionary Kuomintang is the leading force in the national revolution and that members of the Chinese Communist Party must join the Kuomintang to carry on the common struggle, it does not follow that the Chinese Communist Party has lost its identity and should no longer have any independent views. The fact that the Kuomintang has established an alliance with the Communists and that members of the Communist Party have joined the Kuomintang shows the close relationship between the two parties and the leading position of the Kuomintang. Hence, the Communists, while supporting the Kuomintang and the National Government, should nevertheless put forward the political and economic demands of the workers and peasants, within the limits of democracy, and press the Kuomintang government to fulfil them one after another.

3. It has been our earnest hope that the Kuomintang might be a revolutionary party without left-right divisions, but things have not turned out as we wished. The national revolution is being carried out by an alliance of several classes, and their differences in character, as

reflected in the Kuomintang, naturally give rise to factions. The Kuomintang right wing has obviously been active in opposing the Communists, the Soviet Union and the workers and peasants and in collaborating with the forces of tradition, while its left wing has resolutely worked for the national revolution and the realization of democracy by pursuing the three revolutionary policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and support for the interests of the workers and peasants. Faced with these diverse tendencies ever since Dr. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Kuomintang, the Communists have consistently joined forces with the left wing in waging both ideological and practical struggles against the right. At the same time, the Communists have always hoped that the right-wingers would fully grasp the meaning of democracy and gradually turn to the left, and that loyal members of the Kuomintang would all become left-wingers. This being our position, we have never wanted to split the Kuomintang, still less to prevent it from becoming wholly revolutionary.

4. For the three reasons stated above — concern for the interests of the workers and peasants, the aim of the Communist Party in the political struggle and the hope placed on the Kuomintang — we must openly express our views. Marx said, “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims.”<sup>5</sup> Therefore, in the course of propagating communism, we must constantly make public our political views. Of course, under the Kuomintang government, our political views and criticisms are all well-intentioned; we hope that it will accept them, for they are fundamentally different from the hostile criticisms and disruptive propaganda of the imperialists, warlords and semi-feudal forces. Comrades in the Kuomintang may choose to equate such well-intentioned criticisms with the rumour-mongering and attempts to sow discord engaged in by the imperialists and reactionaries. Or, ignoring the facts, they may consider that those who protest the illegal acts of government officials and military officers and criticize erroneous measures taken by the Kuomintang government are libelling the entire Kuomintang and sabotaging the National Government. If so, they will be levelling arbitrary accusations against the innocent. For example, in recent months there have been several cases of government officials and military officers oppressing workers and sabotaging the peasant movement. When we criticized these law-breakers and when the workers and peasants made demands, it was in the hope that the Kuomintang government would punish the guilty parties so that

its own policy towards the peasants and workers might be upheld. Even the *National Weekly*, a publication of the left-wing comrades in the Kuomintang, has said, "Under the Kuomintang government no official should fail to assist the peasant-worker movement and to make it serve the revolution. Our party should certainly not have members who sabotage or underestimate the peasant-worker movement. The government under our party should exercise iron discipline in handling these cases. . . . It is our constant hope that the party will win the people's confidence and support, but unfortunately, all that these party members in power have done is to alienate them; how distressing this is!" ". . . We are concerned lest the party lose its popular backing or even be destroyed. This has been the constant worry of the 'defenders of the party'. A gradually awakening people cannot be pushed to act blindly in the name of revolution; still less can we be so hypocritical as to cheat an organized people with unrealistic promises. No, we cannot do that to them. At present, when there is an urgent need for the people to get to know our party, such acts of sabotage will not only alienate the people but help persons like Cheng Geng, whom you condemn, to come forward and gain popular support. And this will only damage the party. If you mean to kill all the Cheng Gengs, how are you going to do it? It would be an endless task. These are the facts, and they are very disturbing."<sup>6</sup> How can our criticisms be considered excessive compared to criticisms as severe as these? In the past three years all kinds of rumours, fabrications and disturbances having nothing to do with us have been attributed to Communist agitation and trouble-making. We have had our fill of that. Comrades in the left wing of the Kuomintang have also been the targets of many unjust accusations. What is the point of refuting them? So long as our revolutionary comrades in the Kuomintang understand the position from which we make our criticisms and so long as they continue to struggle, the national revolution will surely triumph in the end.

Finally, let us loudly proclaim:

All revolutionaries, unite!

All oppressed classes, unite!

## ON TAKING PROMPT PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST CHIANG KAI-SHEK

*April 1927*

Guo Moruo has come<sup>7</sup> and told us that the wrecking of Kuomintang party headquarters and of trade union offices in Jiujiang and Anqing and the slaughter of the people there<sup>8</sup> were directed by Chiang Kai-shek himself. There have been almost 400 casualties in the recent mass killings and individual arrests and executions of Communists in Ningbo, Hangzhou, Nanjing and Shanghai.<sup>9</sup> Chiang has closed Kuomintang party headquarters and trade union offices, dissolved a municipal government, forced workers to surrender their arms, made a deal with the imperialists and Chinese bankers to float a loan of ten million yuan, organized a gang of assassins consisting of hired thugs and agents from the foreign "concessions",<sup>455</sup> and set up scab unions. He is oppressing the workers, wooing the bourgeoisie, consolidating his political power and getting control of sources of revenue in order to be able to undermine the allegiance of impoverished left-leaning troops.

If, despite all his acts of betrayal, we continue to be indecisive, seeking to relax the tension by postponing struggle, Chiang will consolidate his regime in southeastern China and form even closer ties with the imperialists. Massacres have begun in Guangdong.<sup>10</sup> Chiang is receiving 15 million yuan from Guangdong and Shanghai regularly every month. He has expelled Xue Yue,<sup>11</sup> Yan Zhong<sup>12</sup> and other left-leaning officers and discharged or arrested all political personnel, thus causing increasing anxiety among left-leaning troops. Even if the Wuhan government continues the Northern Expedition and succeeds in capturing Beijing and Tianjin, Chiang will have consolidated his regime and many will follow his example; besides, who can be certain

---

A letter to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, also signed by Comrades Zhao Shiyuan, Luo Yinong, Chen Yannian, Li Lisan and others.



that the Japanese imperialists in north China will not provoke a direct clash with the National Government? On the other hand, if the government is resolute in taking punitive action and quickly directs its troops to march on Nanjing, then the 2nd Division of the 3rd Army in Anqing can pin down the 7th Army in Wuhu on the southern bank of the Changjiang River, and parts of the 2nd and 6th Armies, which are reported to have already withdrawn into Anhui, may be used for flank attacks. The 7th Army has no more than ten thousand men. Chen Tiaoyuan<sup>13</sup> has only four regiments, which are still at the front and cannot easily be recalled. If Wuhu fell, Nanjing would tremble. Only five divisions are at the direct disposal of Chiang Kai-shek. And since the dismissal of Xue and Yan the 1st and 21st Divisions have lost most of their combat effectiveness and are now stationed in Zhenjiang and Suzhou. Demoralized by repeated defeats, the 2nd Division is now in Kunshan. Only the 3rd and 14th Divisions remain in Nanjing; how would they be able to resist a force sent east against them? Half the 40th Army has crossed the Changjiang River, and it is by no means certain that all the remaining troops will help Chiang. The 17th Army was seriously defeated at Yangzhou while sacrificing itself for Chiang. The 14th and 26th Armies both desire to oppose Chiang. When Nanjing falls, Suzhou and Shanghai may be captured without fighting. Therefore, in view of the over-all situation, there should be no further political relaxation or compromise. A gross error has already been committed in Shanghai following the uprising. If we again fail to go forward, our power will be shaken in proportion as the enemy advances and we retreat, and political leadership will fall entirely into the hands of the right wing. That will not only dishearten the left wing, it will also inevitably lead to the total failure of the revolution.

Moreover, there must be a plan for the military work in the Southeast, designations for the army units, persons to take charge and arrangements for confidential communications, so that the left-wing officers will have confidence in the central government.<sup>14</sup> Please discuss these matters fully with comrades of the left wing and give us a reply.

## ON FIRMLY ELIMINATING NON-PROLETARIAN IDEOLOGY FROM THE PARTY

*November 11, 1928*

Comrades, the various incorrect ideas concerning the Party's political line are, of course, reflections of objective conditions. But their existence can also be attributed in large measure to the fact that the Party organization has not been Bolshevized and that much non-proletarian ideology still persists. The Communist Party of China was founded after the May 4th Movement<sup>456</sup> when there was no other revolutionary political party, the Kuomintang being merely a clique of bureaucrats and politicians. That was why many petty-bourgeois radicals and even some bourgeois people joined our Party. Especially in the period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, large numbers of petty-bourgeois elements joined. As a result, the moment the revolutionary situation changed, many Party members began to waver, became dispirited, or even betrayed the Party, surrendering to the enemy and giving away comrades. After the August 7th Meeting,<sup>15</sup> we raised the slogan "transform the Party", resolutely expelled all waverers from our ranks and reorganized the leading organs. These measures did bring about a steady strengthening of proletarian ideology in the Party, and that is how it can become Bolshevized. But to date, the Party organization still lacks a strong proletarian base, and much petty-bourgeois ideology still exists. Particularly because peasants constitute 75 per cent of the Party membership, there is fertile ground for the spread of petty-bourgeois ideology. To Bolshevize the Party, it is necessary, first of all, to strengthen the

---

The fourth part of the "Letter to All Comrades", published by the Central Committee of the Party for the purpose of implementing the resolutions of the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. This part was drafted by Comrade Zhou Enlai, who was then head of the Organization Department under the Central Committee.

proletarian base, while at the same time continuing to transform the Party organization and especially to combat resolutely petty-bourgeois ideology. So after reviewing our political line, we must make a thorough re-examination of mistakes in our organizational ideas.

First, the tendency towards ultra-democracy. In the past there was a "patriarchal" form of organization in which the rank and file mechanically obeyed orders from the Party and the lower Party organs mechanically obeyed orders from the higher ones, so that there was no life or vigour in Party activities. When the time came to transform the Party, in many places the pendulum swung the other way, to ultra-democracy. Party members would choose not to carry out the Party's decisions. Party branches would challenge superior Party organs if the latter issued leaflets without first submitting them to the branches for approval. Party members felt free to act without the permission of the Party. This petty-bourgeois conception of unrestrained freedom can bring about the disintegration of the Party organization or even its total collapse. There was also an incorrect conception of equality. Take money for instance. It had to be distributed with rigid equality, regardless of the circumstances or the importance of the work. Or take personnel. The same number of cadres had to be selected from each region. This was an even more glaring manifestation of the peasantry's egalitarian mentality, a mentality we must relentlessly eliminate.

Second, a mistaken understanding of the struggle against opportunism. The main thing in combating opportunism is to eliminate the opportunist political and organizational lines, but some comrades indulge in attacks on persons and neglect the criticism of ideas. They act as if opportunism could be eliminated by striking down a few individuals! They just don't realize how deep-rooted opportunism is or understand that you cannot eradicate it by expelling a few individuals. To be sure, in order to strengthen its own position the Party has no choice but to expel incorrigibles with systematic opportunistic ideas. But the main thing is still to criticize all opportunist ideas and ensure that all the comrades in the Party reach a clear understanding. Only then can the Party's political line find a correct orientation. As for seizing on someone's weaknesses and exaggerating them because you have a personal grudge against him, that is even worse: it is the tactic of a politician, absolutely out of place in a proletarian Party.

Third, disputes caused by personal animosities. Opposition to opportunism and putschism is extremely important politically, but as soon as opposition to a particular kind of politics is turned into a

personal attack, it becomes a muddled dispute involving personal feelings. To attack another person, or reject criticism from him, or speculate about his motives all because of personal feelings, without examining his work and his opinions from the standpoint of the Party, will create endless Party infighting and is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois ideology at its worst.

Fourth, the factional tendency. The numerous factions in the Party at present have been formed on the basis of either personal likes and dislikes or clan loyalties. A small minority who lust for power and aspire to high office make use of these factions to attack their peers or superiors, resorting to all the cheap, dirty methods of bourgeois politicians and bureaucrats. This disgusting tendency is damaging to the Party.

Fifth, the division between workers and intellectuals. It is wrong to turn the struggle against opportunism into a struggle against intellectuals. Quite a number of intellectuals stand on the side of the proletariat, even though many waver. And among the proletariat there are also quite a number who have lost their proletarian ideology and whose thinking has been tainted by petty-bourgeois ideology. Failing to understand this, many comrades relax their struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology and instead concentrate on opposing individuals of petty-bourgeois origin. This tends to divide the workers and the intellectuals and adds to the disputes within the Party. It reflects thinking that is still essentially petty-bourgeois.

Sixth, scepticism about the transformation of the Party. This manifests itself in a lack of enthusiasm for recruiting new activists, especially those from the working class. It also manifests itself in persistence in outdated conceptions of organization, so that the Party can never move beyond the "patriarchal" practice of making appointments by administrative command. In assigning jobs one trusts only the few persons with whom one is personally familiar and not the new activists who have emerged at the grass-roots level, especially worker comrades. The result of this sort of thinking will be that the Party organism will degenerate day by day, will never regain vitality and will never be able to eliminate petty-bourgeois ideology.

Seventh, formalism in transforming the Party. Taking in workers and peasants is an important way of transforming the Party. But in applying it many Party organizations fall into the error of formalism. They just seek out a few workers and bring them in without bothering to educate them, or they arbitrarily set a percentage figure for the

number of workers to be included in the leading organs. The only result of such practices will be that things will still be run by the same people, the intellectuals. Things have even gone to the absurd length of a secretary-general exercising exclusive power. This procedure for bringing in workers and peasants is completely meaningless.

Eighth, the mentality of an "employee" of the revolution. The Party needs only a small number of professional revolutionaries to take care of day-to-day Party affairs. As for members who work among the masses, they can have close ties with them only when they work for the Party without leaving their occupations. Yet there are some comrades who have a kind of "employee" mentality. They demand pay for their work; if no money is forthcoming, they won't do anything. Some Party workers in the branches demand subsidies too, so as to have an equal share of the income. This is a serious error.

Ninth, regarding the Party as a relief agency. There are many comrades who are poor and unemployed and have nobody to turn to. They look to the Party for a solution to their problem of survival. They don't understand that the Party is not a relief organization, that it works primarily among the masses and not in Party offices. It is simply impossible for everyone to be assigned a job in the Party office. Moreover, if comrades go on quitting jobs in society instead of seeking them, the Party will be cut off from the masses — how then will it organize them and give them leadership?

Tenth, passivity. Many comrades waver in their thinking, and when they can find no way out politically, or when they see inner-Party quarrels arising from personal animosities or dissensions created by factionalists who behave like politicians, they become disheartened and stop being active. This is petty-bourgeois pessimism in every sense of the term. Actually, the revolution is daily moving ahead. Once a Party worker goes deep among the masses to sound out their sentiments, he will have no trouble keeping up his spirits. As for the Party itself, it is already a party of the masses. So long as all the comrades are united in resolute struggle, a handful of scoundrels will never be able to undermine our organization. Passivity is a sign of deterioration.

Comrades, the petty-bourgeois ideology we have been talking about is constantly damaging the Party organization and hindering Party work. All comrades must strive to eliminate petty-bourgeois ideology.

As instructed by the Sixth National Congress of the Party,<sup>16</sup> the Central Committee will firmly carry out its resolutions, continue to actively combat such erroneous tendencies as opportunism and putschism

and, especially, will eradicate all petty-bourgeois ideology from the Party. As for disputes within the Party, the Central Committee is opposed to compromising them and papering them over. We must firmly eliminate non-proletarian ideology. Only thus can we ensure that all the comrades in the Party will unite and fight as one in the spirit of Bolshevism.

Comrades, the Central Committee is determined to go on transforming the Party organization. It will unhesitatingly combat the tendency of certain comrades to indulge in personal infighting, regardless of their standing in the Party or the quality of their work. It will not tolerate one jot of petty-bourgeois ideology in the Party. The Central Committee urges all comrades to take responsibility in this matter, fight in unity and complete the Party's Bolshevization.

The Central Committee puts forward the following guidelines for the united struggle of all comrades in the Party:

First, strengthen the proletarian base of the Party. It is necessary to expand its proletarian base organizationally before we can strengthen its proletarian ideology. The best way to Bolshevize the Party at present is to go among the industrial workers, set up strong Party branches in the factories, increase the percentage of workers in the membership, concentrate our attention on strengthening our organizations in the country's industrial regions and instil new vigour into the Party.

Second, encourage political discussion in the Party and raise the level of political understanding. Party organs at all levels should make every effort to discuss all the Party's political questions and to encourage all comrades to express their views freely on political issues. At the same time we should strengthen political education in the Party and raise its theoretical level. This is the positive and correct way to eliminate petty-bourgeois ideology.

Third, help Party members to find employment. The unemployed comrades should do what they can to find jobs. Party organs should help them in this. Those who have no occupational skills should learn them and make special efforts to get into factories and become workers. Comrades should help each other to find jobs. We should make Party members go deep among the people and broaden the Party's influence among them rather than let them depend on the Party for a living; at the same time they should keep it correctly informed of the opinions of the masses, thereby making it a real party of the masses.

---

Fourth, improve the activities of Party branches. Only Party branches can get deep among the masses, carry on political propaganda and agitation and organize the masses. Only Party branches can give flexible leadership in the day-to-day struggles. If the higher Party organs make general plans that are only bare outlines and issue propaganda documents while the Party branches do nothing, there will never come a time when the Party and masses are united. To be active in the Party does not mean merely to listen to political reports and pay membership dues. The most important thing is to discuss the political problems of a particular locality and the work to be done there. Every unit, no matter how small, whether it be a factory, a school, an army barracks, a village or a neighbourhood, has its own particular political setting and requires its own particular method of work. We must become familiar with the actual conditions in each unit before we can correctly apply Party policy. This is the task for every comrade as well as for every Party branch. We must fully carry out this task if the branches are to become the rallying points for the masses and the Party members the leaders of the masses.

## SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN HUNAN-HUBEI SOVIET AREA

*March 17, 1929*

When Comrade Lu Dongsheng<sup>17</sup> came at the end of last year, he brought us your report. We studied it immediately and wrote to inform you about the resolutions of the Sixth National Congress<sup>16</sup> on our Party's general political line, the present situation confronting the revolution and the main tasks of guerrilla warfare. By now you must have received the letter we sent back with Comrade Lu.

Your letter of January 17 has been received. We learn that, undaunted by difficulties and despite hunger and cold, you have led the officers and men in courageous armed struggle, mobilized the masses on a considerable scale, seized large quantities of enemy weapons and wiped out several contingents of the reactionary militia. You were quite right to do all this.

In reply to your letter, the Central Committee gives the following instructions.

1. Insurrections. An insurrection is a direct action taken by the armed masses at the peak of a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the reactionary class and seize political power. At present, an immediate revolutionary situation does not exist in the country as a whole. Therefore, armed insurrection by the workers, peasants, soldiers and the urban poor to seize power is only a propaganda slogan. Of course, it is not impossible for day-to-day struggles for survival to grow into armed struggles, or even into insurrections to overthrow the political power of the landlords and establish Soviet regimes in the

---

A letter drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to convey instructions to Comrade He Long and the Front Committee of the Western Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area.<sup>457</sup>



rural areas. There are cases in which this has happened. Although Soviet regimes in Haifeng and Lufeng, Qiongya, Wan'an, Huang'an and Liling have failed,<sup>18</sup> the progress of the agrarian revolution<sup>505</sup> in the countryside prompts the peasants to move from day-to-day struggles to armed insurrections. Therefore, instead of preventing the peasants from undertaking direct insurrectional actions, we should do our best to lead them in their spontaneous uprisings and to help them expand their armed struggle. In this way they will become increasingly clear about the idea of overthrowing landlord rule in the countryside and setting up rural Soviets and increasingly eager to make it a reality. We should see to it that their struggles are gradually co-ordinated with urban activities and are led from the cities. Only this kind of peasant insurrection will be a genuine creation of the masses and, as such, will be able to persist, mobilize the masses in increasing numbers, gain their support and establish Soviet political power through direct mass action.

Regarding the mass struggles under your leadership, if the landlords ruling the countryside have not yet been shaken and become panicky, but still have a large armed force with which to suppress you and if, on the other hand, the masses have not yet reached the point where they are demanding the confiscation of the landlords' land but are only asking for small improvements in their everyday life, if they have not even gone into action to resist usury, exorbitant rents and grain levies and if they have not yet been broadly mobilized, then such struggle, even in the form of armed conflict, would still be guerrilla warfare and not armed insurrection to establish rural peasants' regimes. You should be able to make this distinction.

2. Guerrilla warfare. We see from the battles of Jianshi and Hefeng<sup>19</sup> that you mobilized the masses, suppressed the despotic landlords and disarmed the reactionary militia and police. All this accords with the principles of guerrilla warfare and is correct. But guerrilla warfare above all requires tight organization and close ties with the masses. Certain undesirable tendencies that appeared in some places in earlier guerrilla warfare may recur and should be noted. First, the tendency towards isolation from the masses, so that the masses remain totally unaware of the fact that guerrilla wars are meant to mobilize them for agrarian revolution. Second, the tendency to destroy cities and to burn, kill and loot. This tendency reflects the psychology of the lumpen proletariat, and it can jeopardize the growth of the Party's influence among the masses in general and even among the workers. We must spare no efforts to eliminate this mentality in the

Party. Of course, the Party should give active leadership to the peasants' struggle to overthrow the landlords and the evil gentry and to weaken the counter-revolutionary forces. Third, the tendency towards looseness in organization. The main tasks of guerrilla warfare are to implement the slogans of the peasants' struggle, to wear down the strength of the reactionaries and to build up the Red Army. Of course you understand all this and are working for it. As for the confiscation of land, the Sixth National Congress has changed the slogan of confiscating all land to that of confiscating the land of landlords and giving it to the peasants. You must also take note of this in your work.

3. Party and mass organizations in the guerrilla areas. Wherever our guerrillas go, Party organizations must of course be set up and mass organizations expanded so as to promote the mass struggle and spread our propaganda. But in an exhilarating revolutionary atmosphere, it's very easy to make all our organizations public when some should still remain underground. Once the guerrillas leave, the organizations collapse. Sometimes, all the revolutionary people are sacrificed during the ensuing White terror when reactionary troops comb the countryside. It is as if we were informing against ourselves. This mistake has been made in guerrilla warfare in many places, so you must be on guard against it. Wherever they go, the guerrillas must tell the local Party organs and revolutionary mass organizations to keep their work secret and be prepared to continue it when the Red forces are being suppressed under the White terror.

4. Party organizations and Party training in the guerrilla forces. So long as you feel it facilitates work, it is all right for you to form a Party branch under the Front Committee to take charge of Party organizations in the army as a whole. Among the troops under Zhu De and Mao Zedong the Party takes the company as a unit. There is a Party branch in each company, with Party groups under it and regimental and battalion committees above it. With a Party organization in every company, there is Party guidance in times of both peace and combat. People who have come from the Zhu-Mao area say that they feel this form of organization is good. You may draw on their experience when you build up the Party in your own forces. Another thing you should bear in mind is that Party organizations in the Red Army must be kept secret. On the question of training, both Party training and Party discipline reinforce army discipline. Naturally, military training in the Red Army must not be the same as in the warlord armies, where discipline is mechanical and maintained by coercion. In our army, Party

members should win the support of the rank and file by setting good examples. To ensure this, Party training should be mainly educational, the Party organization should raise the political consciousness of its members, and comrades with greater understanding should help those with less, so that the ordinary run of comrades will observe discipline of their own accord. In training and educating its members, the Party should use simple theory and plain facts to enhance their class consciousness and revolutionary spirit, so that they will not only strictly observe military discipline themselves but also become models for the other soldiers. Regarding the case of Yang Weifan,<sup>20</sup> according to your report, Yang has made quite a number of mistakes, and your decision to expel him from the Party is correct. However, in training comrades in the future, special attention should be given to education.

5. The present political situation and the path you should follow. The conflicts which have been brewing among the different cliques within the reactionary ruling classes are heating up and are about to explode into a war between warlords. The Central Committee has issued two political circulars,<sup>21</sup> giving the details of the present political situation and our tactics for dealing with it; copies will be sent to you, so we will not dwell on this question here. Although the political situation offers you a good opportunity to expand operations, your forces are weak and the Party and mass organizations in the western parts of Hunan and Hubei are still inadequate, so it would be difficult for you to attempt much expansion at this time. You say in your letter that the Red Army plans to move to the lower reaches of the river, the future target being Changde in western Hunan or Yichang in western Hubei. This plan is still too ambitious and impractical. At present your attention should be focused not on capturing big cities but on mobilizing the masses in the countryside to deepen the agrarian revolution. Therefore your main task remains to expand the guerrilla areas and mobilize broader sections of the people. You should not attempt what is beyond your strength (you should especially bear in mind the strength of the masses, and not just the strength of the armed forces) by trying to take key industrial and commercial cities.

6. The question of where to expand. Not being fully clear about the actual conditions in the western parts of Hunan and Hubei, we cannot tell you specifically into what areas you should carry your operations. In principle, the best places for guerrilla warfare are those where rural class contradictions and struggles are the sharpest, where Party and mass organizations are fairly well organized and where

supplies are abundant and the terrain rugged. But it is not easy to find places with all these conditions; you must consider the actual circumstances and select the places that offer the greatest number of favourable features.

7. The question of dispatching military personnel. Knowing that you are short of qualified military personnel, we have long meant to send you a number of comrades proficient in military work. However, we have not managed to send anyone yet owing to difficulties in communications and the uncertainty of your whereabouts. Later, when it becomes possible, we will certainly do so.

## HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATIONAL WORK UNDER THE WHITE TERROR

*March 25, 1929*

In view of the changes that have taken place in Party organizations throughout the country, the Central Committee has recently made a decision concerning the Party organizations in Shanxi Province, which can be explained as follows:

1. During the year and a half since the meeting of August 7, 1927,<sup>15</sup> Party organizations in various provinces have again and again been destroyed and innumerable cadres have lost their lives under the White terror. Instances of Party members giving themselves up, informing against comrades and betraying the Party have gradually spread from south to north and to Party organs at higher levels throughout the country. As a result, the Party's working class foundation has been steadily eroded, Party organizations have become increasingly divorced from the masses and cut off from society, and many of those at higher levels are becoming mere empty shells. Therefore, Party organs from the Central Committee down to the Party branches, though still in existence, now function at very low efficiency. And in some cases, when Party organs above them are repeatedly destroyed, local Party organs have but one solution: they ask the Central Committee to send cadres to reconstitute them. In the past, the Central Committee did send people to the provinces for this purpose. But not only was it impossible to push the work forward and establish new contacts, even what had been achieved was gradually lost. When higher organizations were set up without a sound basis, they were very easy to detect before they had begun work, and so they were de-

---

A letter of instruction drafted for the Central Committee and addressed to the Party Committee of Shunzhi and to Comrade Waang Ming.<sup>22</sup>

stroyed time and again. Besides, the existence of these nominal Party organizations encouraged the erroneous tendency among comrades to depend on them and ignore mass work at the grass roots. The Central Committee has therefore decided that only after local organizations are in place and have made progress in the work in their areas can a higher organization be set up, and that this must be done by the local units themselves. From now on, wherever lower organizations have not begun work or have been destroyed, the main line to follow is that leading comrades should look for jobs in factories, in the countryside or in other places, carry on activities among the masses and then reconstitute old Party organizations or form new ones. It is only on this basis that Party organizations can be restored or established. If an organization at the higher level is first set up before the groundwork has been laid, it will have no solid foundation and will be able to do nothing but establish personal contacts with a few jobless and socially isolated comrades who are drawn around it. The greater the number of such people, the harder it is to restore and build a grass-roots foundation for the Party, and the more the organization is separated from the masses and cut off from society. Eventually it will exist in name only and be of no practical value.

2. If we apply this line to Party organs in the North, it becomes clear that a provincial Party committee for Shanxi is the last thing we need at present. If it is formed nonetheless, it will inevitably become an empty shell. In his letter, Comrade Waang Ming suggested dispatching a number of cadres to Taiyuan. The result of such a move would surely be what has been described above. A Party organ at the provincial level that was only an empty shell would gather around it many comrades who would cut themselves off from society, and this would seriously obstruct our work among the masses. Therefore, the Central Committee has decided that no Shanxi Provincial Party Committee will be established now, that local work should be resumed and progress made first and that work in Shanxi will proceed under the guidance of the Party Committee of Shunzhi.<sup>23</sup>

Local work should be consolidated first in the key areas, such as Taiyuan, Yangquan, Jiangzhou, Yuci and the counties in southern Shanxi east of the Huanghe River (relations with Datong are to be established by comrades in charge of the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway area). The first step is to look for comrades in those areas who have social ties and to establish a foundation for Party organizations. During the initial period after work has been resumed, you should not attempt

to seek out too many old contacts or new recruits, but should emphasize quality, making sure that each plays his role. The focus must still be on industrial workers; in areas where there are no such workers, you should try to recruit handicraft workers and farm labourers and impoverished peasants in the countryside. As for intellectuals, you must try to find socially active ones. Those who isolate themselves from society, are afraid of coming to grips with it and do not make serious efforts to find jobs will be of no use to the Party, even though they may have been comrades in the past. The more you admit these rootless persons, the likelier it is that Party organizations will remain restricted to a small circle cut off from society. If that happens, no social foundation — no class foundation — can be established for the Party.

If only a few comrades are found in places like Taiyuan and Yuci, they should begin their inner-Party activities in a Party branch. Naturally, you should carry out your main work in the light of the last letter from the Central Committee to Shanxi. You should concern yourselves with the sufferings of the masses in daily life, arouse their enthusiasm for everyday struggles, lead them into action and, at the same time, train our fighters in this arduous work. If in each place we have comrades who can conceal themselves well among the masses and lead them in their struggles, even though they are few in number and there are only one or two workers' Party branches, these branches will become the key organizations carrying out the work in Shanxi. A local Party committee at the county or municipal level can be set up only after several Party branches are consolidated in a given area. Such a committee should be established on the basis of several Party branches that have a mass following and social connections, and most leading posts at the county or municipal level should be held by comrades with regular jobs. Only thus can you ensure that the committees will not be isolated and ineffectual. Where several Party branches exist but no county or city committee has yet been set up, a comparatively strong Party branch may be designated as a special branch to direct the work of the others. Party committees of key counties and cities should give guidance to organizations in neighbouring counties.

3. From what has been said above, it follows that there is no need to concentrate in Taiyuan a part of the comrades already in Shanxi. Even in Taiyuan, all you can do is look for those comrades who have regular jobs or are determined to find them, and have them restore Party activities and establish a foundation for Party organizations.

The Party Committee of Shunzhi should act according to the instructions in this letter and should write to Comrade Waang Ming asking him to come to Tianjin for consultation. You should plan at once to send someone to make the rounds of the key areas and find comrades with regular jobs to resume Party work there. After seeing this letter, Comrade Waang Ming should proceed immediately to the Party Committee of Shunzhi for discussion.

You must not neglect the work in the seven counties east of the Huanghe River.<sup>24</sup> During the present spring famine, the main struggle is undoubtedly to expand the campaign to borrow and distribute the landlords' grain, but greater efforts should be made to direct that struggle against the landlords themselves. It is especially important that the struggle of the peasants should not stop with this campaign or with the refusal to pay debts, but that it should develop into a continuous struggle against the landlords. Only when the struggle is steadily widening in scope and minor victories are continually being won can the peasant movement go deeper and the agrarian revolution begin in the North. This is very important, and we hope you will bear it in mind in guiding the work in the seven counties.

As for the movement to win over soldiers from the enemy side and the work among bandits and the reactionary militia, we hope you will also give instructions to the Special Committee for those counties in accordance with the work plan of the Central Committee.



# THE ARREST AND MURDER OF COMRADES PENG PAI, YANG YIN, YAN CHANGYI AND XING SHIZHEN

*September 14, 1929*

The imperialists and the Kuomintang are always collaborating to suppress the masses of workers and peasants and massacre revolutionary leaders. Particularly in the sprawling, foreign-dominated metropolis of Shanghai, tens of thousands of lives have been crushed under the iron heel of the imperialist gangsters and Kuomintang warlords since the Incident of April 12, 1927.<sup>26</sup> At this very moment, thousands of workers, peasants and revolutionary fighters are serving life sentences in the prison in the foreign concessions, Caohejing Prison, the Public Security Bureau and the garrison headquarters.

With the increasing danger of world war, the continuing war between the warlords and the growing mass struggles, the imperialists and the Kuomintang have intensified their collaboration and are committing greater barbarities against the revolutionary masses and the Chinese Communist Party, their revolutionary vanguard. Peng, Yang and the other comrades murdered in a plot hatched jointly by the imperialists and the Kuomintang were the victims of one such barbarous attack.

Comrades Peng Pai, Yang Yin, Yan Changyi and Xing Shizhen were arrested around 4:00 p.m. on August 24, 1929.<sup>25</sup> As though dealing with some formidable enemy, armed policemen belonging to the imperialist forces and Chinese detectives from the Public Security Bureau drove several red armoured vehicles to the home of the traitors Bai Xin and his wife in the western part of Shanghai. After posting their men inside and outside the lane, they climbed the steps and made

---

An article published in *Red Flag Daily*, organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, August 30, 1930.

the arrests, proving that they were acting on precise information. They arrested five persons whose names they had on a list (Comrade Zhang Jichun<sup>27</sup> was also taken in along with Peng, Yang, Yan and Xing) but ignored Bai Xin and his wife. This done, they searched under Bai Xin's bed, where they found some revolutionary publications, such as *The Bolshevik*, the *Red Flag*,<sup>28</sup> and circulars of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The five comrades were at once pushed into the waiting vehicles by the police and detectives and driven straight to the Xinzha Police Station. Newspapers were forbidden to report the incident, so the masses knew nothing about the arrest of their leaders.

August 25th was a Sunday and the provisional court was not in session. When the court opened on the 26th, the judge, an imperialist lackey, and the representative of the Public Security Bureau put up a show of legal proceedings. The result was a decision to turn the prisoners over to the Chinese Public Security Bureau. At the hearing, only the five arrested comrades were present. Their photos had already been taken on the day of their arrest, and they were now called by name and questioned one by one. Obviously, the traitor Bai Xin had secretly provided evidence of their identity. They were removed to the Public Security Bureau in the city under guard and in armoured vehicles. Information concerning the hearing and the transfer of the five appeared in that day's evening papers, but their real names were not disclosed. Their identity was deliberately concealed by the ruling class in order to forestall strong, direct resistance by the masses.

The five comrades were interrogated that very evening at the Public Security Bureau, but to no avail. On the other hand, they immediately began spreading propaganda in the house of detention, which greatly impressed many of the security guards. On the afternoon of the 27th, interrogation was resumed and lasted four or five hours. When it came to Comrade Peng Pai, someone came forward to give evidence as to his identity, which Comrade Peng openly acknowledged. Asked to give his personal history, Comrade Peng spoke impassionedly for over an hour. He began with his work in the peasant movement in Haifeng and Lufeng before he joined the Party and continued until he had described the establishment of Soviets there. When he started talking about the punishment of counter-revolutionaries in Haifeng and Lufeng, Comrade Peng Pai addressed the interrogator personally in a loud voice, saying, "We wiped out countless counter-revolutionaries like you. There's no need to ask me any more questions. Take me out and shoot me." The interrogator was visibly moved. When Comrade Yang Yin

was questioned, he too openly admitted his personal record. On returning to the house of detention after the interrogation, the five comrades sang *The Internationale* together, showing their common hatred of the enemy and affecting all within earshot.

After the second interrogation, the Public Security Bureau was so afraid something might happen that it moved the prisoners to the garrison headquarters on the morning of the 28th. That very evening, an attempt was made on Chiang Kai-shek's life, and those of his guards who were under suspicion were taken to the headquarters. All the people there, from Xiong Shihui<sup>29</sup> at the top down to those in the Judicial Section, were in a hurry-scurry. The arrested guards were cruelly tortured, but though they were covered with blood and their bones were broken, no one revealed who was behind the attempt. Because of this incident, the five comrades were not questioned again for three days (from the 28th to the 30th). They were simply locked up under heavy guard in the house of detention, their hands and feet shackled in clanking chains. During these three days, they lost no opportunity to conduct propaganda among the other prisoners and the soldiers stationed at the headquarters. When Peng and Yang and the other comrades touched upon matters close to the soldiers' hearts, some of them beat their breasts, wept and swore that the Kuomintang warlords had to be wiped out. At stirring moments in their speeches, the comrades sang *The Internationale* and *The Song of the Young Pioneers*,<sup>30</sup> while the soldiers and prisoners shouted slogans in response, so that the gloom and despair of the prison were replaced by animation and militancy. Some prisoners who had turned to robbery out of poverty were so moved that they declared the only way out for poor people was to follow the Communist Party. Some persons who had been imprisoned as suspected revolutionaries became even firmer in their conviction that revolution was the only path. Other imprisoned comrades remarked that the five were true leaders of the Party and had set an example for them to follow. Some people who had long since heard of Peng Pai rushed to see him when they learned that he was there. And there were others who had known Peng Pai in the past and were proud of it.

Once they entered the garrison headquarters, the five comrades understood that they were to die. Accordingly, most of the letters they smuggled out of the prison were in fact testaments. They enjoined their comrades in the Party not to grieve over their arrest but to continue to work hard for the revolution. They urged important leading

the arrests, proving that they were acting on precise information. They arrested five persons whose names they had on a list (Comrade Zhang Jichun<sup>27</sup> was also taken in along with Peng, Yang, Yan and Xing) but ignored Bai Xin and his wife. This done, they searched under Bai Xin's bed, where they found some revolutionary publications, such as *The Bolshevik*, the *Red Flag*,<sup>28</sup> and circulars of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The five comrades were at once pushed into the waiting vehicles by the police and detectives and driven straight to the Xinzha Police Station. Newspapers were forbidden to report the incident, so the masses knew nothing about the arrest of their leaders.

August 25th was a Sunday and the provisional court was not in session. When the court opened on the 26th, the judge, an imperialist lackey, and the representative of the Public Security Bureau put up a show of legal proceedings. The result was a decision to turn the prisoners over to the Chinese Public Security Bureau. At the hearing, only the five arrested comrades were present. Their photos had already been taken on the day of their arrest, and they were now called by name and questioned one by one. Obviously, the traitor Bai Xin had secretly provided evidence of their identity. They were removed to the Public Security Bureau in the city under guard and in armoured vehicles. Information concerning the hearing and the transfer of the five appeared in that day's evening papers, but their real names were not disclosed. Their identity was deliberately concealed by the ruling class in order to forestall strong, direct resistance by the masses.

The five comrades were interrogated that very evening at the Public Security Bureau, but to no avail. On the other hand, they immediately began spreading propaganda in the house of detention, which greatly impressed many of the security guards. On the afternoon of the 27th, interrogation was resumed and lasted four or five hours. When it came to Comrade Peng Pai, someone came forward to give evidence as to his identity, which Comrade Peng openly acknowledged. Asked to give his personal history, Comrade Peng spoke impassionedly for over an hour. He began with his work in the peasant movement in Haifeng and Lufeng before he joined the Party and continued until he had described the establishment of Soviets there. When he started talking about the punishment of counter-revolutionaries in Haifeng and Lufeng, Comrade Peng Pai addressed the interrogator personally in a loud voice, saying, "We wiped out countless counter-revolutionaries like you. There's no need to ask me any more questions. Take me out and shoot me." The interrogator was visibly moved. When Comrade Yang Yin

was questioned, he too openly admitted his personal record. On returning to the house of detention after the interrogation, the five comrades sang *The Internationale* together, showing their common hatred of the enemy and affecting all within earshot.

After the second interrogation, the Public Security Bureau was so afraid something might happen that it moved the prisoners to the garrison headquarters on the morning of the 28th. That very evening, an attempt was made on Chiang Kai-shek's life, and those of his guards who were under suspicion were taken to the headquarters. All the people there, from Xiong Shihui<sup>29</sup> at the top down to those in the Judicial Section, were in a hurry-scurry. The arrested guards were cruelly tortured, but though they were covered with blood and their bones were broken, no one revealed who was behind the attempt. Because of this incident, the five comrades were not questioned again for three days (from the 28th to the 30th). They were simply locked up under heavy guard in the house of detention, their hands and feet shackled in clanking chains. During these three days, they lost no opportunity to conduct propaganda among the other prisoners and the soldiers stationed at the headquarters. When Peng and Yang and the other comrades touched upon matters close to the soldiers' hearts, some of them beat their breasts, wept and swore that the Kuomintang warlords had to be wiped out. At stirring moments in their speeches, the comrades sang *The Internationale* and *The Song of the Young Pioneers*,<sup>30</sup> while the soldiers and prisoners shouted slogans in response, so that the gloom and despair of the prison were replaced by animation and militancy. Some prisoners who had turned to robbery out of poverty were so moved that they declared the only way out for poor people was to follow the Communist Party. Some persons who had been imprisoned as suspected revolutionaries became even firmer in their conviction that revolution was the only path. Other imprisoned comrades remarked that the five were true leaders of the Party and had set an example for them to follow. Some people who had long since heard of Peng Pai rushed to see him when they learned that he was there. And there were others who had known Peng Pai in the past and were proud of it.

Once they entered the garrison headquarters, the five comrades understood that they were to die. Accordingly, most of the letters they smuggled out of the prison were in fact testaments. They enjoined their comrades in the Party not to grieve over their arrest but to continue to work hard for the revolution. They urged important leading

comrades to take care of themselves for the sake of the Party. They expressed the hope that the Party would pay more attention to education, conducting inner-Party struggles against the opposition faction<sup>31</sup> so as to teach the whole Party. They also discussed many political questions during their conversations together. Unfortunately, the content of their discussions never got beyond the prison walls. They all talked and laughed cheerfully as if nothing had happened. Comrade Yang Yin once said with a smile, "Having learned the right way to live at dawn, one is ready to face death at dusk."<sup>458</sup> Their last words to their wives were to encourage them to work hard for the Party.

On the 30th, the provisional court suddenly issued a formal subpoena ordering them to appear in court for review proceedings. To go through this formality, the five comrades were escorted under heavy guard from the headquarters to the court in the afternoon. Their escort consisted of a platoon of soldiers, a number of detectives from the Public Security Bureau, several headquarters adjutants and policemen from the foreign settlement carrying two sub-machine-guns. The court held a special session from which the public was excluded. The questions and answers were merely a repetition of those at the previous sitting. The statements of the judge and of the imperialist consul and the lawyer from the foreign settlement police station who were assisting him were all very vague. None of them indicated precisely what crimes Peng, Yang and the other comrades had committed. Although the lawyer for the defence said a few words, neither the judge nor the others paid any attention. When the final verdict was read out, it was not even possible to hear it. It was not until the four comrades had already been shot that an English-language newspaper in Shanghai published the verdict sentencing them to eight years' imprisonment. The judicial review was clearly nothing but a farcical masquerade staged jointly by the imperialist robbers and the Kuomintang warlords. They wanted to deceive the masses with legal procedures but were very much afraid that the masses might learn the truth. Actually, the revolutionary masses had long ago ceased to believe in their damnable laws! Who knows how many people the imperialists and the Kuomintang have assassinated or executed on trumped-up charges since the April 12th Incident in 1927? The rivers of blood from the massacres have already turned the workers and peasants Red. They have but one thought now: to answer the White terror with the power of mass struggle, and to hell with the laws!

After the trial by the provisional court, the five were immediately sent back to the garrison headquarters under armed escort. On the way from the courtroom to the prison van, Comrade Yan Changyi raised his fist and shouted, "Long Live the Communist Party!" The five comrades exchanged glances and smiled. Upon arriving at the garrison headquarters, they were first taken to the house of detention, where a meal with wine had been prepared for them. The five comrades knew that the time had come; not one would accept this wretched "charity". About an hour later, Comrades Peng Pai, Yang Yin, Yan Changyi and Xing Shizhen were led off to be executed. The four comrades gave a final impassioned speech to the soldiers and prisoners before going out of the prison door singing *The Internationale* and shouting slogans. The soldiers and prisoners were choked with tears and even the prison guards turned their faces away from the scene. The execution was carried out secretly right inside the garrison headquarters — an unprecedented event in Xiong Shihui's term of office. One can imagine how much importance the enemy attached to the case and how great was their fear. The shots which killed the four comrades were heard faintly by those inside the prison. One prisoner killed a chicken and offered it in sacrifice to the souls of the dead, so sincere and profound were his feelings. The four comrades intentionally left behind three articles of underclothing as mementoes. They are the sole remaining objects belonging to the deceased. After the execution, the headquarters had their bodies buried secretly so as to destroy the evidence. But even though the revolutionary masses are unable to see the remains of their heroic leaders, their valiant exploits will shine forever in the memory of the people, a light that can never be extinguished.

After the five comrades were arrested, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Nanjing received a report from the Shanghai Municipal Headquarters boasting of its success. The Committee's telegram in reply ordered Xiong Shihui to carry out the execution immediately. Since these lackeys were already fully occupied with the case of the attempted assassination of Chiang Kai-shek, the execution was carried out with even greater haste than usual.

In present-day China, where class struggle is so intense, innumerable revolutionary fighters and leaders have died under the enemy's overt and covert attacks. Of course this is inevitable in a revolution and it is the price we have to pay for success. It takes wave upon wave of advancing revolutionary fighters to open up the great road to victory. The death of each revolutionary, whether on the

battlefield or in the rear areas, has immense significance. The deaths of revolutionary leaders, in particular, are an imperishable contribution to the struggle. They inspire millions of hearts, generating a tremendous driving force and firing the enthusiasm of the entire oppressed people to sweep forward together towards the flames of revolution. Therefore, we should not shed tears of sorrow for our martyrs. Rather, we should carry out their behests with a greater determination born of our indignation and march straight ahead along the path of struggle crimson with their blood!

The death of the four martyrs, Peng, Yang, Yan and Xing, is a tremendous loss to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party. Revolutionary leaders emerge from the masses, tempered through innumerable struggles and victories. It takes only a few minutes for the enemy to destroy such revolutionary leaders, but we cannot train new leaders so fast. Therefore, when the enemy destroys us physically, it is the most cruel and vicious method of suppressing the revolution. The only way to counter it is to devote ourselves to intensifying mass struggle, so that we can eliminate the enemy's White terror and massacres, hastening victory in the revolution and the end of enemy rule. Only thus can we redeem today's losses! Only thus can we carry out the behests of the four martyrs! And only thus can we, the oppressed classes, fully avenge ourselves upon the hated enemy!

The Kuomintang and the imperialists resort to secret intrigues and underhand methods to attack the revolution and murder its leaders. Our reply, the reply of the revolutionary people, is different. It must always be open, undisguised class struggle. This is the weapon with which we will defeat the enemy. For it is precisely through open struggle that we will win over the masses. And it is precisely through the strength of the masses that we can destroy the enemy. The Kuomintang and the imperialist gangsters, with their intrigues and murders, will be wiped out — exterminated — through this open class struggle, once and for all.

Fellow workers, peasants, soldiers, toilers! Fellow revolutionary vanguard fighters! The revolutionary spirit of the martyrs will never die! Our efforts will never cease! Let us march forward along the path stained crimson with the blood of the martyrs! Forward! Forward, to final victory in the revolution!



DIRECTIVE FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY  
TO THE FRONT COMMITTEE OF  
THE FOURTH ARMY OF  
THE RED ARMY

*September 28, 1929*

To the Front Committee of the Fourth Army and comrades of the whole army:

Comrade Chen Yi has arrived<sup>32</sup> and given a detailed account of everything. After studying his oral and written reports, the Central Committee has decided to give the Front Committee the following instructions.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE INTERNECINE WARS  
AMONG THE WARLORDS

After the wars between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords and between Chiang and Feng Yuxiang,<sup>33</sup> it appeared that the Chiang clique's Nanjing government had emerged victorious and that the bourgeoisie's political influence had somewhat increased. In reality, however, the contradictions which led to the fighting are daily intensifying instead of being resolved. As a result, the conflict that was brewing between the other warlords and Chiang has now broken out again. The clash of interests among the imperialists has sharpened, as

---

A letter drafted by Comrade Chen Yi for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of several talks with Comrade Zhou Enlai and a Central Committee meeting. The letter was read and approved by Comrade Zhou Enlai. Some passages have been omitted from the letter.

witness the U.S. imperialists' aviation contract with China,<sup>34</sup> the British imperialists' naval agreement with China,<sup>35</sup> the Japanese imperialists' redoubled efforts to implement their Manchu-Mongolian plan,<sup>36</sup> and the imperialist powers' military deployments in China. The Chinese Eastern Railway issue<sup>37</sup> was a blatant manifestation of the imperialists' concerted plot against the Soviet Union; it was a problem they had to settle before plunging into war. The fierce clash among the imperialists is the main cause of the warlords' internecine wars. No real benefit was reaped by the bourgeoisie in the Chiang-Guangxi warlord and Chiang-Feng wars. Although the feudal forces on one side were weakened, those on the other came out stronger. That is the inevitable predicament of the bourgeoisie, which is so weak that it must curry favour with the feudal forces to consolidate itself. The attempt of the bourgeoisie to play one feudal force off against the other not only failed to resolve the contradiction between the two classes but became another cause of war among the warlords. Faced with the acceleration of China's drift towards economic bankruptcy and with the financial needs of their massive armies, the warlords, egged on by the imperialists, have to scramble for territory and money, and this has driven them towards war. These three contradictions are the causes of the warlords' internecine wars which cannot resolve them. On the contrary, each war only aggravates them. The present warlords' war against Chiang<sup>38</sup> is a continuation of those between him and the Guangxi warlords and Feng Yuxiang, and now that it has erupted, it will continue to expand. Without an insurrection by the workers, peasants and soldiers, there is no way to resolve the contradictions making the warlords fight among themselves. This we must clearly understand.

At present, the Chiang Kai-shek clique are holding counter-revolutionary political power in Nanjing. Recognized by the imperialists, they want to monopolize the "right" to sell out the national interests and, moreover, they want control of finances and of important munitions factories along the lower reaches of the Changjiang River. Naturally they bring on themselves attacks from all sides, and a nationwide anti-Chiang alliance of the other warlord cliques has come into being. Aside from Zhejiang Province, which is comparatively united under the Chiang clique, the other provinces all have anti-Chiang forces. Chiang's personal force nominally consists of nine divisions, of which some were formerly under other warlords. At the same time, members of the Reorganization Clique<sup>39</sup> have been active among Chiang's troops,

so there certainly are anti-Chiang elements among them. These are Chiang's weak points. But those opponents of Chiang who take the reformist theory<sup>40</sup> of the Wang Jingwei-Chen Gongbo clique as their banner do not have a power centre. Substantial anti-Chiang forces are scattered throughout the southern provinces, and apparently the Reorganization Clique could make use of them, but each has its own bagful of sinister designs. For instance, Zhang Fakui and Yu Zuobo both want to take Guangdong Province, but neither wishes to be the other's subordinate. The warlord cliques of Feng Yuxiang, Tang Shengzhi and Zhu Peide all want to take Nanjing and Wuhan, but their interests clash. In the North, the Yan Xishan and Zhang Xueliang cliques, recognizing that they cannot rule in Nanjing, have always wanted to establish the central political power in Beijing and are not, therefore, very enthusiastic about supporting the Reorganization Clique. Meanwhile, each clique has some members who have been bought over by Chiang; the fact that Yan organized his forces on an exclusive basis has something to do with Chiang's behaviour. Inside Zhang Xueliang's northeastern clique there is a struggle between the new and the old factions.<sup>41</sup> Since the deaths of Yang Yuting and Chang Yinhuai,<sup>42</sup> the new faction has been much weakened and Zhang Xueliang can no longer easily control the old faction, which is loyal to the Japanese imperialists. That is why Zhang is eager to move into areas south of the Great Wall. After the Chinese Eastern Railway Incident, he was openly at odds with Chiang. All these facts indicate that the warlords are incapable of coexisting in peace and are trying to squeeze each other out. The Zhang Fakui Incident<sup>38</sup> was obviously the opening shot in the Reorganization Clique's campaign against Chiang, and it is possible that the Wuhan war<sup>459</sup> and the Guangdong-Guangxi war against Chiang may expand and become national in scale. If Chiang wins temporarily, that will not bring an end to war, which will certainly continue. If the Reorganization Clique wins, the number of independent regimes under petty warlords will increase. When warlords fight each other, it can be for two purposes only: to win counter-revolutionary political power that will make it easier for them to sell out national independence and interests, and to seize territory so that they can intensify the exploitation of the workers and peasants. This is true of both sides, whether they are for or against Chiang. The Party should adopt a policy of working for the defeat of all the belligerents in the warlord wars. The mobilization of the masses against the warlords must be tied up with their day-to-day struggles. The correct way to

put an end to the fighting among warlords is through worker, peasant and soldier insurrections.

We should not attach too much significance to the wars among the warlords, indulging in vain dreams that we can take advantage of them to undertake large-scale operations and neglecting the many practical tasks in the day-to-day struggles of the masses. In particular, the Red Army should never forget the possibility that the enemy may launch "joint suppression campaigns" against us. Meeting such actions must be the constant concern of the Red Army, and we must not become slack and careless just because war has broken out among the warlords or worried when it comes to a temporary halt. We must understand that the warlords' "joint suppression campaigns" against the Red Army are bound to meet with difficulties, that they will often have to be abandoned, and that, if anything, they will offer us opportunities for growth. But we should not on this account ignore the possibility of a joint attack or be unprepared for a hard fight. Heretofore the Front Committee has judged the stability of the existing regime by the actions of the warlords in the neighbourhood of the Red Army. This method of analysis is not correct. The Front Committee must pay full attention to correcting the narrow view of those military comrades who think that in the revolution the Red Army is all that matters. To judge the entire revolutionary situation simply on the basis of the circumstances in which the Red Army finds itself is far from adequate and will certainly lead to mistakes. The three "joint suppression campaigns" carried out by the warlords against the Red Army so far all had a double significance: they were joint attacks on the revolutionary forces of course, but they were also preparations for their own internecine wars, because they had to get the Red Army out of the way in order to consolidate their rear. That was true of the joint attack on us by the Hunan-Jiangxi-Guangdong warlords and also of the recent attack by the Fujian-Jiangxi-Guangdong warlords. Of course, when Chiang sent Liu Heding to Fujian<sup>43</sup> not long ago, he did it in order to attack Zhu and Mao, but he also had in mind the elimination of Zhang Zhen.<sup>44</sup> So each faction of the Fujian army was on guard against the others, and each tried to shift the burden of attacking the Red Army onto the others. In face of the conflicts between Chen Mingshu and Chen Jitang<sup>45</sup> and between Chiang and the warlords of Guangdong and Guangxi, the Guangdong army is hastily pulling its troops out of Fujian. After Zhu Peide lost his territory in Jiangxi<sup>46</sup> and Wang Jun<sup>47</sup> was transferred to Bengbu, Jin Handing<sup>48</sup> found himself isolated in southern Jiangxi. He has now

joined the Reorganization Clique and for the last few months has been assuming a defensive posture towards the Red Army. This is the true picture of the "joint suppression campaign" against us by the warlords of the three provinces. The Red Army should maintain its spirit of determination, comprehend the situation of the enemy in its totality and unite with the broad masses to defeat the enemy's "suppression campaign". It should never hesitate or hang back merely to avoid losses.

The Red Army has come into being at a time when the reactionary regime is heading for collapse and the agrarian revolution is making progress; the vastness of China's territory is another condition in our favour, as your previous painful experience has proved. Now we have the Red Army in the countryside, and later we will have political power in the cities. This is the characteristic of the Chinese revolution. It is a product of the Chinese economic base. Whoever has doubts about the need for a Red Army does not understand the reality of the Chinese revolution and has liquidationist ideas. If liquidationism is latent in the Red Army, it will be particularly dangerous, and the Front Committee must be firm in struggling against it and eliminating it through education. As the present reactionary regime moves towards collapse and in anticipation of a nationwide revolutionary upsurge, it is correct for the Red Army to conduct guerrilla warfare mainly on the borders of Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. But we must pay attention to co-ordinating the Red forces of these four areas. The Red Army should try to win the support of the masses by actively helping them in their struggle. With the masses of the people rallied around it, the Red Army will find it easier to grow and to overcome all its difficulties.

### THE BASIC TASKS AND PROSPECTS OF THE RED ARMY

The basic tasks of the Red Army at present are mainly as follows:

(1) To mobilize the masses in struggle, accomplish the agrarian revolution and establish Soviet regimes.

(2) To carry on guerrilla warfare, arm the peasants and expand the Red Army.

(3) To extend guerrilla areas and our political influence throughout the country.

Were the Red Army incapable of performing these tasks, it would be no different from any other troops. In the last two years the Fourth Red Army has accomplished part of these tasks and has had great influence on political developments throughout the country. It has proved that the ruling class is weak in the countryside and that the revolutionary forces can survive and grow. The tremendous significance of the Fourth Army cannot be denied, and if it continues to work hard, it will undoubtedly become one of the motive forces of a national revolutionary upsurge. Comrades of the Fourth Red Army must understand the importance of their own work.

Whether or not the Red Army should try to hold on to independent enclaves in given areas is a question you are often confronted with. Until the political power of the ruling class has crumbled and a revolutionary upsurge has occurred, the Red Army should adopt the tactic of engaging in constant guerrilla warfare. To stay in one area or try to hold on to some district, seeking to maintain an independent regime there, is not only impossible but certain to result in defeat, as our experience of political power in the Luoxiao mountain range has taught us. The case will be different when our political power extends to the territory of one or more provinces. Then, of course, it will be possible to build a growing or at least a stable base because we will have an economic foundation adequate for self-support. To sum up, the political power or guerrilla force in the countryside should be a fighting unit spreading guerrilla warfare in every direction. Conservatism will end in failure. On the other hand, the decision to seize political power in all of Jiangxi Province in one year is also wrong.

### THE AREAS IN WHICH THE RED ARMY SHOULD OPERATE AND ITS STRATEGY

The Red Army should go wherever it is possible for the struggles of the masses to develop and should help promote such development, so that local revolutionary struggles may be deepened. If the army always stays in the border regions between provinces, regions where no struggle is going on, its political impact will be reduced. We should push guerrilla warfare where the enemy is weak militarily, or where White power reigns in the countryside, so as to drive out reactionary power and mobilize the masses to rise in struggle. Enemy forces that

are smaller than ours must be resolutely exterminated, or we will not be able to expand our forces or arm the masses. We must never tolerate the tendency to conserve strength by watching and waiting for something to happen. Of course, we should never pit a small force against a strong enemy in a life-and-death battle, in situations where we cannot be sure of winning without heavy casualties and the enemy can withdraw at his leisure without our getting his arms. This reckless approach to fighting is of no use in guerrilla warfare. But we should never waver in the belief that we must surround the enemy and capture his weapons to arm ourselves. The Red Army can never grow without tempering itself in struggle. If we try to avoid fighting, we will lose many good opportunities for growth. These are key points concerning the growth of the Red Army and we should always bear them in mind.

The question of whether to divide or concentrate our forces in war was once discussed by the Party organizations at various levels in the Fourth Army. Some erroneous ideas that emerged were that the Red Army should be divided, that after a division of forces there was no need to maintain contact and that concentrating our forces would present too large a target. Whether to divide or to concentrate forces is only a question of which is more advantageous at a particular time. The Fourth Army must definitely not be divided into several columns without any unified chain of command; that would be not to divide our forces but to disperse them. Neither should it be broken down into innumerable small, unconnected guerrilla bands. These are both liquidationist ideas arising from an incorrect evaluation of the political situation and from the fear that if the reactionary forces become stabilized, the Red Army will be wiped out. They reflect a Rightist inclination to make each unit a less conspicuous target and to leave it to look out for itself. This tendency is most detrimental to the development of the Red Army and to its political impact on the country. The main tasks of the Fourth Red Army in this period are both to engage in guerrilla warfare in order to expand its own forces and to concentrate its strength so as to implement the Party's political slogans and rally the masses in struggle. The division of forces to carry on guerrilla operations under centralized leadership is a principle that must not be changed. But when the troops are divided, they must maintain close contact and co-ordination and guard against being crushed by the enemy one by one. Over the past two years, the Fourth Red Army has concentrated its forces to carry on the struggle and has surmounted all kinds of crises. Such hard-won experience should

not be taken lightly by any of our comrades. Of course, if we keep the whole army concentrated for action, it becomes an unwieldy unit and there are difficulties in marching, camping, provisioning and so on. But these are mostly technical difficulties. We must never, on their account, give up centralized leadership, which is essential, or ignore the great political influence that a concentrated force has on the country as a whole.

As for the general question of tactics, those mentioned in the letter from your committee — advancing in waves, circling and harassing the enemy, and the tactics embodied in the sixteen-character formula<sup>460</sup> — should be applied according to concrete circumstances and should not be set down as principles. In its two years of struggle, the Front Committee has acquired much useful experience to draw on, and the Central Committee need not give rigid instructions.

## THE RED ARMY AND THE MASSES

In the past, the Front Committee has neglected the day-to-day struggles of the masses in the areas reached by the Red Army. The Red Army is the concentrated expression of our class strength. Landlords flee at the news of its approach. Under its military protection, the courage of the masses redoubles. Naturally, they are engaged in military or political activities, but the Party must never neglect the many unsolved problems of their daily life. However, the Party has overlooked this question in the Soviet areas. When passing through places where the masses have not yet been aroused, the Fourth Red Army should not only raise political slogans but also look closely into the daily needs of the masses, and then lead them through their everyday struggles for a better life to political and even armed struggle. The masses themselves need this kind of struggle, not just the mobilization of military strength or daring exploits by a few brave people. Such struggle will unite the broad masses around the Party. We should lay particular stress on this when helping in the work of the local Party organizations.

When the Red Army arrives in an area, it should not only make contact with the local Party organizations, but should also establish close relations with mass organizations, such as the trade unions and peasant associations, by holding meetings with them. It should consult



them and collaborate with them in political work, propaganda and actual struggles, and not act alone or simply issue orders. Only if it proceeds in this way can the Red Army spread its political influence among the workers and peasants and increase their confidence in their own organizations and the effectiveness of the latter. If the masses have not set up their worker and peasant organizations, it is especially important to help them do so.

The Red Army should help the masses to establish and develop Soviet regimes and to build the foundations of their own political power through all kinds of struggle. The authority of the peasant associations must be enhanced; all problems must be taken to them for solution so as to pave the way for setting up Soviets. For example, all political proclamations must be signed and issued jointly with the peasant associations. This will raise their prestige and strengthen the confidence of the masses in their own political power.

The Fourth Army has devoted much effort to mass work. However, we wish to draw special attention to the following important points. (1) Investigation must be undertaken in earnest. In the past, many of the data collected through investigation were left unused because there was no one to compile the statistics. That is a great pity. The Front Committee should assign someone especially to do this work. If well done, it will play an important part in helping us to understand life in China's countryside and to take tactical decisions in the agrarian revolution. (2) Every effort should be made to spread our propaganda. It should not be confined to the Red Army's guerrilla areas; we can send letters to the big cities to reach the masses and thereby exercise greater influence. (3) Organizations opposing imperialism or supporting the Soviet Union, farm labourers' unions and other provisional organizations that are generally helpful to the revolution are all very important, and every means should be used to establish them. (4) The suppression of counter-revolutionaries must be accomplished through mass organizations, so that the work will have mass significance. This work must be done more thoroughly. (5) As for the raising of funds, again the mass line must be followed. The Red Army should not undertake the task alone. Although at this point the mass organizations cannot shoulder the burden of supplying the Red Army, it will be helpful to raise funds through them. Sometimes, the Party and the Red Army may collect contributions from among the masses when circumstances require it. In particular, the Red Army should solicit supplies through extensive propaganda

among the masses, in order to spread its influence. In budgeting expenditures, we should give consideration to the mass organizations and consult them on the allocations. Most of the expenditure should be for mass work and certainly not for the Party apparatus, for that would breed corruption in the Party. (6) There are still many incorrect views in the Fourth Army regarding arming the workers and peasants, so this work has not been well done. Good guns are not issued to the local forces; all the bad ones are given to the peasants. This practice separates the masses and the Red Army into two categories, and it suggests a basic lack of faith in the strength of the masses. It must be understood that the Red Army and the worker-peasant armed forces should complement and not cancel each other. It is true that in some areas the masses have not yet risen, so it would be of little use to give them arms. Or if the Red Army does not have enough guns to go around, it is all right not to give the masses any for the time being. But when it is necessary to issue guns, we must correct the old wrong tendency. Also, it is important to send people to train the peasant army.

## THE ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE RED ARMY

1. The question of expanding the Red Army. The expansion of the Red Army is of the utmost importance to its survival. "Expand the Red Army" should be a widespread slogan deeply impressed upon the army and the masses. The line to take in its expansion should be to seek help from the masses in the course of their struggle. Wherever the Red Army goes, it should call meetings to publicize the importance of its expansion and encourage the masses of workers and peasants to volunteer. At the same time, if there is a chance to capture enemy arms, it shouldn't be allowed to slip by.

2. The class composition and source of the Red Army. The source of recruits for the Red Army is the vast impoverished peasantry. It is true that the impoverished peasants display a very pronounced non-proletarian ideology. But the only way to combat peasant ideology is to build up proletarian ideology and make it predominate. There is no point in cherishing the illusion that the peasant ideology in the Red Army can be changed by taking in a large number of workers right now.

3. Organization and internal structure. The Red Army is commanded by the Front Party Committee. The committee issues calls in the name of the army headquarters or the political departments. For the moment this is all right. But when the Soviet areas<sup>457</sup> are expanded, councils of representatives must be convened to establish Soviet regimes in the border regions of several provinces, and it should be made clear that the Red Army is under their command. This will remove the defect of its being just the army of the Party and make the masses look upon it as their own class army. We need not put this idea into practice immediately, to avoid producing an organization in form only. We should wait at least until work expands in western Fujian, southern Jiangxi and the area along the Dongjiang River, and joint conferences can be held. So far as the internal structure of the Red Army is concerned, the most important thing is that it should facilitate guerrilla activities. The units of command should not be too numerous, and military organizations and their names need not be restricted to a fixed form.

4. The Party representative system. The name "Party representative" should be immediately abolished and replaced by "political commissar". The commissar's responsibility is to supervise administrative work in the army, consolidate political leadership, countersign orders, and so on. The secretary of the Front Committee may act concurrently as political commissar in the army, but the political commissar does not have to be head of the political department.

5. The soldiers' committee. The Fourth Army's Soldiers' Committee has done good work and its organizational line is quite correct. Its job is to supervise army economy, take part in managing army life, educate the soldiers politically and work among the masses. Its relationship to the military organs is that it makes suggestions through reports but cannot intervene directly. In case of emergency, the political commissar has the right to disband the soldiers' committee. He can attend soldiers' committee meetings as an advisor. Although these rules give our soldiers' committees much greater power than was enjoyed by those in the Russian Red Army, they are suited to our own Red Army during the present period of guerrilla warfare. But it should be noted that there must be limits to democracy in the army, or it will be detrimental to military operations.

6. Political work. It is all right for corps and columns to have political departments and for the battalions and companies to have only political commissars. Their responsibility within the army is to

take charge of political education and, outside it, to conduct political propaganda, run local administrative affairs, mobilize the masses to struggle and help mass organizations.

7. Military training. We must pay special attention to the Red Army's military technique and must never yield to peasant ideology, which is incompatible with strict training and organization. The Red Army can enhance its combat effectiveness only if it has a high level of technique and strict training.

8. Democracy in the army. The Red Army is not an organization like a trade union or peasant association. It is a combat organization constantly locked in bloody fighting with the enemy. Its command must be centralized. It is true that we should encourage the soldiers through political education to act of their own accord, but the principle of centralized command must not be shaken. Democracy can exist in the army only under centralized leadership, the extent of democracy being determined by the circumstances. It should not be without limit, for that would hamper the consolidation of army discipline.

9. The question of admitting women into the Red Army. We should encourage revolutionary women to join rural struggles but not necessarily the Red Army. The Fourth Army has already solved this problem. At the same time, the army should support the rural women's movement.

10. Discipline and punishment in the Red Army. We should see to it that soldiers maintain discipline voluntarily. The power and influence of the masses should be used against violators of discipline. Corporal punishment must be resolutely abolished. The enforcement of routine military discipline is left to your discretion.

## THE RED ARMY'S SUPPLIES AND THE ECONOMIC QUESTION

1. Obtaining supplies. The chief way to obtain supplies for the Red Army is to confiscate the property of landlords, but in doing so we must always follow the mass line, even in times of great pressure.

2. Fund raising. The main thing is not to encroach on the interests of the workers, peasants and small proprietors. The Fourth Army has done very well in this regard and its methods can be adopted by other guerrilla troops.

3. Collecting contributions. This is one way to raise funds. The Fourth Army can organize a committee among the masses to collect contributions, especially from the rich peasants and the small and medium-scale merchants.

4. Attitude towards small and middling merchants and towards rich peasants. To carry out the Party's political programme, facilitate economic exchange between workers and peasants and further the interests of the urban poor, it is correct not to confiscate the property of small and middling merchants in the cities. But we must deprive them of their political influence. Contributions should be collected from rich peasants and from small and middling merchants, and care must be taken lest they turn reactionary.

5. Supplies and other necessities for the Red Army. It is correct to have abolished pay in the Red Army and to provide only pocket money and money for food. The problem of obtaining other necessities can gradually be solved by following the mass line. Of course it would be fine if the Red Army could manage to supply itself, but relations between the army and the people will be closer if the latter see to supplies and contributions.

6. Economic organization. Accounts for the Red Army's supplies may be audited by the soldiers' committees. Expenditures for special items do not have to be examined by the soldiers' committee, but in future they should be authorized and audited by the organs of people's political power.

## PARTY WORK IN THE RED ARMY

1. The Party can retain its present form of organization. The number of Front Committee members should not exceed nine, and there is no need to establish a military committee under it. Party organizations in the army should be kept secret. They can be put in the political departments. These organs should not have big staffs but should let the people in the mass organizations do as much of the work as possible. Generally speaking, battalion committees are not necessary. Party groups directly under the higher Party committee can be set up in the battalion headquarters. When a battalion operates independently, its Party branch can be entrusted to direct it. But that may be left to the Front Committee's discretion.

2. The Party's working line. Insofar as possible, the Party should try to command the army through the leading Party groups, and not directly. It should direct military affairs through the army headquarters and political work through the political department. Later, when higher-level organs of political power are established, leading Party groups will be formed to give them guidance. Clear distinctions must be made between the Party, the military and the political systems.

3. The problem of centralization. All power in the Party is centralized in the Front Committee as the leading organ. This policy is correct, and we must not deviate from it. The charge of "patriarchalism" must not be used indiscriminately to weaken the power of the leading organ and to serve as a cover for ultra-democracy. There is no doubt that in dealing with any question the Front Committee should first take a decision and then refer it to the subordinate organs for discussion. It will not do to take decisions only after soliciting agreement from subordinates or to delay decisions while waiting for their opinions. To do so would weaken the power of the leading organs at higher levels and have a bad influence on Party life at the lower levels. It would be the height of ultra-democracy. In the recent debate in the Party, your committee displayed this weakness. This was a shortcoming.

4. Communist Youth League groups. The Youth League should set up groups. The present practice of assigning adults to do youth work and to form Youth League groups is not good. In the Red Army, a distinction should be made between Party members and Youth League members. A Communist Youth League group should be set up in every company and be led by its Party branch. Youth sections should be established under the Front and Column Committees (nominally under the political departments) to plan and direct the work of the Communist Youth League groups among the young people. Moreover, wherever the Front Committee goes, it should help with the local League work.

5. Arguments over organizational matters. The slogan "Let the Party take charge of everything" is illogical in principle as well as in practice. The Party only exercises political leadership through the work of the leading Party group. The present system under which the Front Committee has command over the army headquarters and the political department is only provisional. The Front Committee should not concern itself with everyday administrative affairs, which should be handled by the administrative organs under the supervision of the

political commissar. Rather, it should concentrate on giving guidance to the Red Army's political, military and economic work and to mass struggles. The slogan "All work should come under the Party branch" is correct, but it means that all work should be done through, not by, the Party branch, and it does not conflict with the Party's democratic centralism.

6. Correcting wrong tendencies. These tendencies in the Red Army include Right deviationist ideas (such as liquidationism, the notion that the forces should be dispersed, the wish to desert and the desire to reduce the size of organizations), the belief in ultra-democracy, and the idea that the Red Army would not be able to survive if separated from production. All these ideas are wrong and result from our comrades' low level of theoretical understanding and the lack of educational work by the Party. If not eradicated, they pose great dangers to the future of the Red Army. The Front Committee must firmly weed them out.

7. The question of establishing a special Party committee for the border areas. When the work of the areas bordering on several provinces can be co-ordinated and jointly directed, a special Party committee can be organized. At present, there is still no need for it. If our work expands, the Front Committee can assume the responsibilities of a special committee, report to the Central Committee and ask it to make appointments. Or a meeting of representatives of the counties in the border area can be called to elect the special committee members.

8. The Front Committee should keep in close touch with the local Party organizations in areas through which the Red Army passes. It should hold meetings with them to decide on all local political questions. Where there is no Party organization, the Front Committee should do its utmost to help build one in the locality through mass struggle.

## THE QUESTION OF THE RED ARMY'S CURRENT OPERATIONS

Now that war has broken out among the warlords, the Red Army should commit all its forces to guerrilla operations for the purpose of launching mass struggle in areas between Fujian and Guangdong on

the upper reaches of the Hanjiang River. When war breaks out between Chiang and the warlords of Guangdong and Guangxi and the Dongjiang area is vacated by their troops, the Red Army can go into Meixian, Fengshun, Wuhua and Xingning to wage guerrilla warfare, mobilize the masses and help the Red areas to expand. At the same time, it should seize opportunities to surround the enemy, capture its weapons and assemble the Red Guards from these counties to build a Red Army. If the fighting between Chiang and the Guangdong and Guangxi warlords comes to a stalemate, or if it spreads to the rest of the country, the Red Army can conduct guerrilla warfare around Chaozhou and Shantou, set up Soviet regimes there and press on towards the environs of Huiyang. If the troops of the Chiang clique are defeated, the Red Army should place itself on either side of the major road between Guangdong and Jiangxi, or along any other of their paths of retreat, so as to capture their weapons. If the war among the warlords comes to a quick conclusion, or if the troops of the Chiang clique win, the Red Army should continue its guerrilla operations in the Guangdong-Fujian-Jiangxi border areas in order to mobilize the masses.

In all its operations the Red Army should avoid the purely military approach and maintain close contact with the struggle of the masses. The Front Committee must also pay attention to guerrilla activities in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian and keep in close touch with the Party organizations there, so that these activities can help the struggles of the Fourth Army and the Dongjiang area.

This is only an outline. We have had discussions with Comrade Chen Yi about details and specific measures, and he will orally relay them to the Front Committee and to the comrades of the whole army.

Revolutionary greetings!

The Central Committee



# ON THE CAUSES OF THE EMERGENCE OF A TROTSKYITE OPPOSITION FACTION IN CHINA AND ITS PROSPECTS

*October 1929*

The Central Committee's Circular No. 44 states:<sup>49</sup> It is true that we need not exaggerate the political and organizational influence of the opposition faction<sup>31</sup> inside the Chinese Communist Party, but we certainly must not ignore its activities and the fact that this anti-Party phenomenon has appeared.

The defeat of the Great Revolution<sup>461</sup> and the resurgence of a revolutionary tide were the main causes of the emergence of an opposition faction in China, while the backward petty-bourgeois "fellow travellers" who remained in the Party constituted the basis for its growth. Some people assert that it was the "returned students from Moscow" who were responsible for the emergence of the opposition. That is not so; they only served as a catalyst. Now we shall point out the major objective causes of this phenomenon.

First, in its early period, the Nanjing government tried hard to introduce the ideas of the Russian opposition faction to China in order to split the Chinese Communist Party. A Trotskyite faction is a "treasure" useful not only to the bourgeoisie in Europe but also to the ruling classes in China.<sup>50</sup> When the opposition faction in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union obstinately clung to its line, the European bourgeoisie kept a close watch, hoping to use it to split the Soviet Communist Party and undermine its correct line. In China, Hu Hanmin,<sup>51</sup> Dai Jitao<sup>52</sup> and Zhou Fohai<sup>53</sup> attempted to split the Communist Party by extolling the opposition faction, and the ruling classes were eager to seize hold of this instrument inside the Communist Party

---

A report made at a meeting of cadres of the Party branch directly under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

to annihilate the leadership of the Chinese revolution. Thus the Chinese political environment is favourable to the activities of an opposition faction. This is the first objective cause for the faction's emergence in China.

Second, the widespread defeatist sentiment ensuing upon the failure of a revolution inevitably gives rise to many disputes. That happened in Russia after 1905 and in Germany after the failure of its revolution, and it also happened in China after the failure of the Great Revolution.<sup>461</sup> After the August 7th Meeting,<sup>15</sup> the Chinese Party was fairly successful in overcoming opportunism at the organizational level, but the struggle on the theoretical and ideological levels was not completed, and it was not until the Sixth Congress<sup>16</sup> that a certain degree of success was achieved in those regards. However, the various harmful ideological trends inside the Party and the political trends that had emerged inside the Party after the failure of the Great Revolution — opportunist trends in particular — were only waiting for a chance to revive. This is the second cause of the emergence of the opposition faction in China and the root cause of the ideological and organizational collaboration between the opportunists and the opposition faction in the Party.

Third, even now, the inner-Party life of the Chinese Communist Party is not yet wholly satisfactory. Although we have eliminated opportunism organizationally and admitted more workers into the Party, we have not yet established sound practices in Party life at the branch level. Hence, in Party discussions there are often signs of vacillation. In some branches, the correct line of the Party has not been seriously discussed by all members, so that the Party's political line has not been fully established in the Party organizations themselves. Some branches are frequently unable to answer a given question according to the correct line, and this often leads to vacillation. In Shanghai, some key industrial branches are not consolidated, while others are not active enough politically. So these branches are active in times of victory but become demoralized or even collapse in times of defeat. This shows that the political line has not yet been fully established within the organization. Both the opposition faction and the opportunists can easily turn this defect to their advantage. This is the third objective cause.

Fourth, after the failure of the Great Revolution, some of those who had wavered during the period of co-operation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang abandoned their work, others

sank into parochialism, and still others clung to their mistakes. All this remains unsolved from the organizational point of view. These people always stir up quarrels over petty personal problems, and the opposition faction, seizing on their dissatisfaction with the Party line, exploits their unprincipled disputes to carry out anti-Party activities. This is the fourth objective cause.

Even though there had never been an active opposition faction before, these four factors made it inevitable that such a faction would temporarily become active in China. The immediate causes were, of course, the influence of the students who returned from abroad and the revival of opportunism.

Turning now to the tactical line followed by the Trotskyite opposition faction, we can see the following four aspects:

First, their inevitable collaboration with the ruling classes. Members of the opposition faction have already published articles in *New Life*.<sup>54</sup> In future they will be even more inclined to use the propaganda organs of the ruling classes to help the latter's anti-Communist activities. If they are defeated in their struggle inside the Party, they are bound to sell out completely to the ruling classes. This is their inevitable future.

Second, their anti-Party line as manifested in their propaganda and other activities relating to all current issues. In commemorating the May 30th Incident,<sup>3</sup> they called on comrades to struggle against the Party, asserting that this was more important than to struggle against imperialism. There is not the slightest doubt that objectively they rendered a service to the enemy. They regarded the August 1st demonstration<sup>55</sup> as putschism and displayed a great deal of defeatist sentiment. Their views revealed their pessimistic, ultra-Right liquidationism.

Third, their tactic of operating inside the Party branch by utilizing the imperfections in Party life in some branches. Staying in the Party branches, they try to undermine the confidence of the rank and file; they especially seek out branches that have suffered defeats in struggle and use those defeats as an excuse to attack the Party line. When times are hard, they may put forward ultra-"Left" slogans, such as "confiscate the factories", in an attempt to isolate the working class and to lure the workers away from significant current struggles by dangling before them the illusion of a future paradise. In dealing with practical problems, on the other hand, they propose ultra-Right tactics which will lead workers' Party branches to an impasse and demoralization.

Fourth, their collaboration with the Chinese opportunists. Obstinate clinging to their own line, the opportunists can neither go deep among the masses nor give up the search for a new political programme to cover up their mistakes. The political programme of the opposition faction is admirably suited to their purposes, for it helps cover up their past mistakes by putting forward "Left" slogans while in fact making Right appraisals of the revolutionary situation and laying down Right tactics. So the opportunists make use of this programme. Meanwhile, the opposition faction uses the opportunists to help its own anti-Party activities. Thus the opportunists and the opposition faction are united — birds of a feather.

In addition, the Trotskyite opposition faction takes advantage of disputes on trifling issues to invent false charges and engage in slander in an unprincipled attempt to undermine the comrades' confidence in the Party's leading organs. The only purpose this serves is to help the enemy defame the revolutionary leadership.

Opposition faction activities have been discovered in Shanghai, Hongkong and north China. The factionalists keep their organization secret from the Party. For this very reason it is all the more necessary to take the matter to the grass-roots units and to see to it that the comrades discuss the activities of the opportunists and the opposition faction and resolutely put an end to them. As some members of the opposition faction don't state their views openly, we don't know who they all are. Therefore, we must take this matter to the Party branches and use the opportunity to educate the comrades and to help strengthen the Party's correct line. We must ensure that every comrade understands the necessity of the struggle between the correct and incorrect lines so that the correct line will be consolidated in the Party. Hence, in addition to organizational sanctions, struggle in the ideological and theoretical spheres is absolutely necessary — it is a very important means of consolidating the Party at present.

## ON THE WORK IN WUHAN

*September 4, 1930*

First, in order to formulate a plan for the work in Wuhan we must know the objective conditions and the trends in the development of our present work (we no longer have any doubts or disputes on this matter) and, more important, the subjective conditions too. Your letters all prove that subjectively we are still very weak in Wuhan. The total number of Party, Youth League and Red trade union<sup>56</sup> members is less than 300, most of the Party or League branches are inactive, workers' organizations in the key industries are extremely weak, and the work of the Party organs at various levels is to a large degree uncoordinated. Even more serious is the fact that the leading organs cannot get information about the actual conditions of the masses at the grass-roots level. At a time when we have only hazy ideas about our subjective conditions, it is utterly impossible to work out a practical and concrete plan. That is why Jiang Jun<sup>57</sup> has written several times expressing great distress at being unable to learn anything about the conditions of the masses. The Central Committee wishes to emphasize the following: if you are ignorant of the actual situation of the masses, not only will it be impossible to work out a good plan, but the expansion of our po-

---

In June 1930, under the leadership of Comrade Li Lisan, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution entitled "The New Revolutionary High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces", which demanded that preparations be made throughout the country for immediate insurrections. The second "Left" line thus took shape. At meetings on August 1st and August 3rd, Comrade Li again called for insurrections in Nanjing and Wuhan and a general strike in Shanghai and proposed that the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions be merged into "action committees" at different levels. Comrade Zhou Enlai went abroad in April and returned to China in late August of the same year. In mid- and late September he attended the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee and was one of the presiding officers. The session put an end to the Li Lisan line. This is Part I of a directive which was drafted by Comrade Zhou Enlai before the Third Plenary Session and sent by the CPC Central Committee to its Changjiang Bureau.

litical influence and the upsurge in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses you speak of will still be a long way off because of the absence of the Party leadership and organizational strength without which the revolution cannot triumph.

Therefore, your first task is to gain a clear idea of the actual living conditions of the Wuhan workers and their demands (and not only the demands of the advanced elements; it is most important to take into account the general demands of the vast backward masses). You should not confine yourselves to listening to what a small number of activists and cadres are saying — that what we need now is not talk about wages but major actions, that the only useful thing at this point is armed struggle, and so on. It is more important to remember that the majority of the workers have no one to lead them in their struggles and have not yet become an organized force capable of action. Even if the majority of the masses want major actions and not minor ones, we still cannot say that since they feel this way the revolution will triumph. On the contrary, we must look at the problem in a different way. We must understand that while these sentiments on the part of the masses reflect their hatred of the monstrous White terror and their sympathy for the growing peasant wars, much arduous propaganda and organizational work still needs to be done to turn their hatred into resolute struggle and their sympathy into a determination to participate in and lead peasant wars. If the workers have the desire to engage in major actions but at the same time lack the necessary combat strength and organizational foundation and, in particular, lack strong leadership from the Party, major actions are absolutely impossible. To create the necessary combat strength and organizational foundation, it is not enough just to mobilize the workers by repeating the Party's political slogans, and especially the slogan calling for major actions, that is, for armed insurrections. The fact that a few people want armed insurrections is no indication that the masses are determined to undertake major action. The majority still "hope that the Red Army will come to Wuhan and all will be well", which shows they are weak-willed and rely mainly on the Red Army. The combat strength and organizational foundation must therefore be built up gradually through day-to-day struggles, strikes and demonstrations in line with the Party's political slogans. It is absolutely impossible for this combat strength and this organizational foundation to be created all of a sudden, without the workers having been steeled in the course of such struggles, strikes and demonstrations. It is absolutely impossible for the Party to consolidate its leadership

automatically, without constantly launching and leading such actions. This must be the fundamental consideration determining your tactics and work plans. It is our hope that you will bear it in mind.

Second, owing to subjective shortcomings (that you see only one side of the picture) and to the objective difficulties (that information about conditions at the lower levels is hard to come by), your statement of "major Party tactics among the workers at present" reads more like a list of general principles. You tend to concentrate on "preparing for an armed insurrection" instead of considering the practical application of tactics and working out concrete measures suited to the specific circumstances in Wuhan. So the measures you have decided upon are no different from those set forth in the circular of the Central Committee and are applicable anywhere. We shall now point out the shortcomings and mistakes in these measures.

Point one. You say: "Only through political mobilization will the Party be able to win over the masses of workers quickly and organize an armed insurrection." Obviously, this statement suggests a dichotomy between daily struggles and preparations for an armed insurrection. It overlooks the fact that tying up some of the masses' political and economic demands with the Party's political slogans is precisely the fundamental way to rally the masses in active preparation for armed insurrection.

Point two. You hold that the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions should work out a programme of demands and organize a strike of workers in all trades in Wuhan and elsewhere. This is definitely inadequate. A general strike cannot suddenly take place when the Party has only issued statements and carried on agitation based on a general programme, without leading the workers' daily struggles in various factories and trades and without organizing strikes and demonstrations by different sections of workers. Work among the unemployed is especially important. At present, particularly in Wuhan where their number is growing daily, the unemployed will become one of the principal motive forces in preparing for an armed insurrection. You should therefore attach more importance to this work.

Point three. You regard "joining yellow unions to win over the masses" as incompatible with the tactics of wiping out Kuomintang trade unions. This is not correct. When a Kuomintang trade union has a mass following, we should join it so as to win over the majority until it finally breaks down. If it didn't have mass support, there would be no need for us to join it. We must not think that because the yellow

unions are increasingly turning fascist and coming under Kuomintang control, our basic tactics towards them have changed. That would be unrealistic, and it might encourage the opportunist idea in ordinary Party members that the purpose of joining yellow unions in the past was other than to wipe them out.<sup>58</sup>

Point four. It is correct to take vigorous action to establish the Red Vanguard.<sup>59</sup> However, it will become nothing but a mercenary armed detachment if, completely divorced from the daily life and struggles of the workers and unconcerned with organizing the masses, it simply waits to take up arms for insurrection. It would then become just an isolated organization far removed from the masses and not their vanguard. There is evidence that this is happening in Shanghai.

In many of your letters you bring up the question of weapons. If the consolidation of the Red Vanguard is made to hinge upon our giving them weapons, it will reduce mass participation and weaken the determination to seize the enemy's arms for the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime. In this connection, you must understand the importance of the work among the labour force in ordnance factories. The fundamental approach to arming the workers must be to devise ways of seizing weapons from the enemy.

Points five and six. You refer to the expansion of the Party and the Youth League without ever tying it up with actual struggles. There is a potentially dangerous tendency here. At a time when the Party and the League are being energetically expanded in preparation for armed insurrection, some opportunists may indulge in empty "Left" deviationist talk of insurrection instead of leading the masses in their actual struggles. This tendency has already appeared in Shanghai. In Wuhan you must anticipate the danger and understand that if you merely talk about armed insurrection, call for major actions and ask for guns to drill your forces without leading the masses in their daily struggles — that is, in minor actions — opportunists will join together and promote "Left" deviationist views.

Point seven. You mention the work of the industrial committee. But it is important to remember that the industrial committee is only a provisional organization to bring together Party cadres engaged in the labour movement to organize Red industrial unions. As soon as these Red unions and their branches in various factories have been formally set up and have drawn in the masses, the industrial committee should be dissolved and turned into a leading Party group and should cease to exercise direct command, so that the unions at various levels will func-



tion as independent organizations. The industrial committee is merely an instrument for promoting the Red unions. Once they are formed, every effort must be made to help them function independently, and it is imperative that the Party's industrial committee should no longer be allowed to exercise command in place of the Red unions themselves. In Shanghai the organizational mistake has been made of relegating the Red unions to a powerless role, so we want to call your attention to this problem in advance.

Point eight. Your proposal to intensify the struggle against the Right deviation is correct. However, the danger of the "Left" deviation also keeps recurring in the Party. You should firmly reject the notion that "Left" deviations are better than Right deviations and that at the moment we need only worry about the Right, not the "Left". It must be understood that the "Left" deviation can obstruct and ruin the revolution just as the Right can. Of course, at present the Right deviation is still the main danger inside the Party, particularly among cadres of longer standing.<sup>60</sup>

Apart from the eight points you have set forth, there is also the question of the organization of action committees. The Party and the Youth League have been merged into the action committees and the League is no longer an independent organization. This is wrong. The League is a non-Party organization and must be allowed to have its own independent organization and tasks. The League organizations at each level join the Party action committees at the corresponding level in order to shoulder heavier political responsibilities and not to be merged with the Party. The League should retain its own organizational structure and system of work. You should correct your past practice in this regard. It is especially necessary to urge the League to pay more attention to work among the young people. Transfer of the League's staff members to other jobs should be reduced to a minimum.

One of the central problems of the work in Wuhan at present is to get things going at the branch level. You already know a great deal about how to do this. The Central Committee wishes to emphasize that in the recruitment and assignment of cadres you should pay special attention to the lower levels. Of the many cadres sent by the Central Committee you can assign the most capable to the branches. Even if they cannot immediately work in the factories, they should be advised to lay aside their long gowns and mingle with the workers to help the Party members among them organize branch activities. At the same time, you should rapidly recruit new Party members and new cadres

from workers active in the struggle and bring them into the leading organs. So while the Central Committee will continue to send you competent cadres as you have asked, the most important thing is for you to persist in recruiting new cadres from branches at lower levels.

Your opinions about demonstrations are correct. It is unwise for a few advanced elements to stage demonstrations by themselves, and it is necessary to prepare for mass demonstrations. It follows that it will be impossible to organize a general strike or demonstration merely by calling for an armed insurrection, without paying attention to the masses' daily struggles and their partial political and economic demands, without making efforts to expand the Red trade unions and Red Vanguard organizations through daily struggles and without tying up every partial demand with the general political demands.

In short, the central defect of all your work plans is that they are focused on the launching of an armed insurrection and fail to take into consideration the fact that to prepare for such an insurrection you must mobilize the greatest possible number of people, so that through struggle they will organize and steel themselves and come to recognize the Party's leadership and accept its slogans. Only in this way can you build the necessary strength and organizational foundation for mass struggles and create a strong Party leadership. As for the struggles themselves, they must move progressively from partial demands to general demands, from day-to-day struggles, strikes and demonstrations to a general strike. The leading role of the Party, particularly in the present situation, is to intensify these struggles and tie them up with general political demands and general actions in preparation for the final decisive battle.

In accordance with this principle, we request that you adopt the most practical plans and measures for your tasks in Wuhan and make every effort to get the essential work under way. We propose that in directing the work in Wuhan you concentrate on railway workers, sailors, ordnance factory workers, dockers, public service workers, textile workers and rickshaw-coolies.

## THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE LI LISAN LINE

*December 1, 1930*

In order to correct the mistakes of the Li Lisan line, we must thoroughly expose and criticize it and not just repeat the line of the Communist International.<sup>62</sup> It was no accident that the Li Lisan line came into being. Had there been no basis for the formation of this line within the Party, it would never have become dominant in the leading Party organ. We must therefore view its formation in the light of the following three circumstances:

(1) The historical condition was that certain fundamental questions were not properly clarified after the Sixth National Congress of the Party. (2) The proportion of Party members of proletarian origin was small while that of petty-bourgeois origin was very large; consequently there were "Left" or Right deviations in the Party line. (3) Li Lisan's thinking had met no strong opposition in discussions.

It was these three circumstances that enabled this line to become dominant in the leading organ.

At the same time, we must also understand the theoretical basis of the Li Lisan line.

1. Failure to make a correct appraisal of the balance of forces in the class struggle. The letter from the Communist International stated that the exponents of the Li Lisan line did not know how to analyse the objective situation and appraise the balance of forces in the class struggle. That is entirely correct. We have ample evidence in Comrade Li Lisan's articles and reports and in the June 11th Resolution which

---

Excerpt from a report criticizing the Li Lisan line, which was delivered at a meeting of cadres of departments under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>61</sup>

he drafted.<sup>63</sup> When analysing the enemy's forces, Comrade Li Lisan always paid attention only to the enemy's weaknesses and sometimes exaggerated them; when assessing our subjective forces, he saw only our strengths and overlooked our weaknesses. Thus, in its appraisal of the progress of the world revolution and the Chinese revolution, the June 11th Resolution held that imperialism and the ruling classes were impotent and on the verge of collapse, while in its appraisal of the revolutionary forces the resolution exaggerated the growth of the Red Army, and especially the struggles of the urban workers and their level of consciousness and sense of organization. Neither appraisal is in accord with reality. Taken together, they naturally led to an incorrect assessment of the revolutionary situation. Such is Comrade Li Lisan's non-Marxist-Leninist approach to the analysis of problems.

2. Denial of the uneven development of the revolution and an erroneous conception of revolutionary upsurges. This was apparent in his appraisal both of China's problems and of the world revolutionary situation. In the Central Committee's Circular No. 70,<sup>64</sup> there was a sentence which stated that the Chinese revolution was moving towards an even development. Superficially, there was nothing wrong with this statement. But it sowed the seeds of future mistakes. The report to the Communist International drafted by Comrade Li Lisan asserted that the development of the Chinese revolution was uneven in appearance but even in essence. This was a complete denial of the uneven development of the revolution. Therefore, he was totally wrong on this point when he argued with Chen Shaoyu<sup>65</sup> at the meeting of Central Committee cadres. Comrade Li Lisan held that the outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to the simultaneous outbreak of world revolution. On the Changsha Incident,<sup>66</sup> the Party's declaration stated that the outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably touch off armed insurrections all over the world. Comrade Li Lisan tried to deny the uneven development of the revolution by citing the characteristics of the world revolution in its third stage.<sup>67</sup> This was his view on both the world revolution and the Chinese revolution.

By denying the uneven development of the revolution, he interpreted a revolutionary upsurge as an immediate revolutionary situation. One of the resolutions of the Sixth National Congress of the Party<sup>16</sup> stated, "In anticipation of future upsurges it is all the more necessary for the Party to take as its present task the preparation for, and even the launching of, armed insurrections." This shows that between

an upsurge and an immediate revolutionary situation there is a process of development, although the two are not separated by a Great Wall. However, Circular No. 1, issued after Li's return from abroad, declared that with the advent of a new upsurge, the slogan of armed insurrection should be turned from a propaganda slogan into a call for action. This already obscured the distinction between a revolutionary upsurge and an immediate revolutionary situation. Last year the Chinese Party received the resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International,<sup>68</sup> which stated that a new upsurge had begun in China's revolutionary movement. At the Jiangsu Provincial Party Congress, I explained this matter and pointed out that a new upsurge was different from an immediate revolutionary situation and that although an upsurge had occurred, an immediate revolutionary situation had still not come into being. This question evoked no serious discussion in the Political Bureau at the time. Only minor revisions were made in the documents. This amply testifies to the fact that the Chinese Party was weak in theory, and this weakness was conducive to the formation of the Li Lisan line. Comrade Li Lisan said that the Russian word "подъём" should not be translated as "upsurge" and that a revolutionary upsurge and an immediate revolutionary situation were one and the same thing. If this were true, then the statement in the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress that "in a new general upsurge, revolutionary victory can be won first in one or more provinces" should be reworded to read, "In a general and immediate revolutionary situation, revolutionary victory can be won first in one or more provinces." However, if it were true that there was already a general and immediate revolutionary situation, why talk about winning revolutionary victory in one or more provinces first? Since Comrade Li sees things this way, there is nothing strange about his theory that victory can now be won in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, but that Wuhan must be taken first, and that victory in Wuhan would mark the beginning of a nationwide revolutionary victory. That was why he suggested that arrangements be made for Chinese residents in Siberia to return to China, that Mongolia send troops and join a Union of Chinese Soviets and that the Soviet Union dispatch troops to attack Japan. Of course, these proposals reflected not only the denial of the uneven development of the revolution, but also the advent of a sudden wave of putschism and commandism.

3. An incorrect conception of organization. In explaining organizational matters, Comrade Li Lisan frequently referred to the strength-

ening of subjective forces. But he did so from a purely opportunist point of view. In his report to the Congress of All the Soviet Areas,<sup>69</sup> he only analysed the objective conditions required for the development of the revolution and excluded the subjective forces. He said that once a revolutionary situation took shape, there would be no lack of subjective forces, and he mentioned the May 30th Incident<sup>3</sup> and the Wuhan period by way of example.<sup>479</sup> At the August 1st and August 3rd meetings<sup>70</sup> he suggested "strengthening our organization". But by this he meant that the revolutionary situation had generally matured and that the people would rise as soon as they were organized. Therefore, all we had to do was to issue a call for armed insurrections, including a fourth insurrection in Shanghai. This was a complete denial of the fact that organizational strength was one of the prerequisites for the maturing of a revolutionary situation. In reality, his view would inevitably lead to the liquidation of the organization. The General Action Committee would abolish not only the Youth League but in effect the Party as well.

4. Military opportunist and military adventurist views in the assessment of the struggle and in work assignments. Comrade Li Lisan has curious ideas about the organization and growth of the Red Army and peasant struggles. This is partly because he was misled by some random figures given him by people from the rural areas. But it was not the root cause. At the August 1st and August 3rd meetings he stated that when the Red Army attacked Wuhan, the workers would without question rise in insurrection. Another comrade in the Political Bureau wrote in *Red Flag* that we were opposed to relying on the Red Army alone to take Wuhan but that it would be wrong to think that if the Red Army drew near to the city, the workers would not rise, for they certainly would. Another of Comrade Li Lisan's views was based on an anticipated insurrection of the soldiers in Nanjing. He thought that once the soldiers rose in insurrection, they would surely be able to capture Nanjing in response to the situation in Wuhan and help to bring about a general strike in Shanghai. Therefore, he believed that when the Red Army pressed towards Wuhan, workers there would stage an insurrection, Nanjing would be captured, and an insurrection would break out in Shanghai. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek would be defeated in the warlord war along the Longhai Railway line and Feng Yuxiang<sup>71</sup> would also be defeated as a result of peasant uprisings in Henan. Then, as the northern troops moved south, northern defences would be weakened and the peasants in the North could also begin insurrections. Hence

his suggestion that Mongolia and the Soviet Union dispatch troops. To make decisions and arrangements for armed insurrections on the basis of such an analysis is an expression of military opportunism pure and simple — of the vain hope that victory can be won simply by manipulating the conflicts among warlords.

5. The use of Trotsky's theories to supplement his own theory of revolutionary transition. Comrade Li Lisan stated in the June 11th Resolution that the achievement of the first victories in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of a revolutionary transition. This, in fact, meant abandonment of the central tasks laid down in the political programme for the democratic revolution. As a result of his influence, the resolution on the land question adopted by the Congress of All the Soviet Areas prematurely stipulated measures for implementing a socialist political programme in the existing Soviet areas.<sup>457</sup>

# TELEGRAMS RELATING TO THE SMASHING OF THE FOURTH "ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION" CAMPAIGN

*January-March 1933*

## I. TELEGRAM OF JANUARY 27

A. Since the battle at Jinxi,<sup>73</sup> our troops have remained combat-ready, manoeuvring the enemy and gathering funds and supplies. It was also for these purposes that our 3rd Army Group moved towards Guixi. Responding to this, the enemy intends to use his troops near the Xinjiang River to lure us there and use other troops coming from Fuzhou to intercept us to the north of Jinxi. However, since he is in the dark about our dispositions and very much afraid of suffering more defeats, the troops from Fuzhou are advancing very slowly and staying well north. The three divisions under Wu, Luo and Zhou<sup>74</sup> are now still near the Xuwan-Liuligang-Lixu line. Our concentrated troops moved south and within a day reached a point southeast of Jinxi in a battle-ready posture to attract the enemy. However, having found out today through reconnaissance that our main forces are not to the north of Jinxi, the enemy has changed his plan and returned to his original offensive deployment. He is concentrating the two divisions under Wu and Zhou in the vicinity of Xuwan, withdrawing Luo's

---

In February and March 1933, Chiang Kai-shek assembled 400,000-500,000 troops to carry out a fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Revolutionary Base Area.<sup>72</sup> At that time, the third "Left" opportunist line with Wang Ming as its chief exponent already dominated the Central Committee. Wang Ming and others had formulated not only a "Left" opportunist political line but also an erroneous military line. When the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" began, Comrade Mao Zedong had already been forced out of the Red Army. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and other comrades were at the front directing operations. Through practice, they came to realize that it was an error for the Central Committee and its Soviet Area Bureau to have ordered the



division to Fuzhou, and continuing to move his 23rd Division west to Le'an.

B. We are determined to use these two days to mobilize our troops to move all the seven or eight hundred sick and wounded south of Jinxi to the Lichuan area, where they can be transferred to the rear. After the enemy's 23rd Division starts moving west tomorrow or the day after tomorrow (if Luo's division also moves west, things will be better still), we shall have part of our 11th Army carry out a guerrilla attack on Xuwan and another part feign an attack on Nancheng, so as to confuse and pin down the enemy. With the 12th Army pinning down his troops in Shaowu, our main forces will concentrate to cross the river, make straight for Nanfeng and prepare to wipe out the reinforcements west of the Fuhe River, so as to break through the encirclement along the river.

C. In view of the enemy's present circumstances — that is, given the fact that his two relatively strong "suppression" columns in the Fuhe River basin are not yet completely organized — our troops could join forces with the 11th Army on the east bank of the Fuhe River and try to wipe out the enemy's main force in mobile warfare. That would be better than surrounding and attacking Nanfeng, which would expose our intention of attacking the enemy's reinforcements. Moreover, the area east of the Fuhe River is large enough and the terrain is especially favourable. In particular, it is a good place to collect funds and supplies. The disadvantages are that it is far from the rear area, transport is not convenient and, more important, the work of Sovietization has not been done very well in Nanfeng, Guangchang, Jianning and Lichuan. But our advantages are also the enemy's disadvantages. More than once the enemy has sought to engage us in battle by using one of his wings on the east bank of the river to pin us down and another to intercept us. However, in all the three battles of Nanfeng, Nancheng and Jinxi,<sup>75</sup> we defeated the enemy by a sudden attack of concentrated forces,

---

Red Army to strike first and capture Nanfeng and Nancheng, two towns heavily guarded by the enemy. Comrade Zhou Enlai proposed to the Central Committee and its Soviet Area Bureau the principle of concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one in mobile warfare. Under the command of Comrades Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, victory was won in the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". The enemy's 52nd and 59th Divisions and its main force, the 11th Division, were successively wiped out, and more than ten thousand rifles were captured. The first eight telegrams here were sent by Comrade Zhou Enlai to the Central Committee and its Soviet Area Bureau; the ninth was an order jointly signed by Comrades Zhou Enlai and Zhu De.

routing or wiping out one of his wings. Therefore, the enemy will not dare to launch a fierce offensive on the east bank of the Fuhe River until the organization of his two strong "suppression" columns is completed. After the last victory at Lixizhao (near Nancheng), we waited in combat-readiness for a chance to attack at Lichuan, and after the recent victory at Jinxi we also stayed there hoping for further opportunities. But because the enemy did not dare to make a rash advance and held fast to the city defences, we were unable to wage consecutive battles in mobile warfare and have had to shift from one place to another. Hence our move from east of Nanfeng to east of Nancheng and then to east of Xuwan. Taking great pains to find out the enemy's precise situation, our troops have advanced steadily towards the enemy forces, trying to manoeuvre them and to win victory in mobile warfare. We have been well aware of the possibility of an enemy attack or interception. In our last attempt to move east to Shaowu to attract the enemy, we withdrew too early because we feared that other enemy troops might intercept us, and the two enemy divisions under Wu and Zhou withdrew after having come only half way to Xiaoshi. This shows that all our tactical decisions are related to the enemy's situation, the topography and our task. For example, if two strong enemy columns have been formed near the Fuhe River, we will have to change our tactics, or as the 3rd Army Group now approaching Guixi finds itself in an unfavourable position, we will also have to change our tactics. In the same way, when the 10th Army was crossing the river and Zeng, Shao and Tang<sup>76</sup> were asking that the 3rd Army Group also be sent across to attack Guixi, we immediately wired our disapproval.

D. Now that the enemy is making preparations for an offensive by organizing three "suppression" forces while "mopping-up" forces hold fast to city defences, we should take the initiative and quickly shift our area of operation, keeping the enemy on the move so as to disrupt his preparations. Our move west of the Fuhe River would be for this purpose. But it should be made clear that, since the campaigns in Yihuang and Le'an,<sup>77</sup> the enemy has clung to his city defences with greater determination. Although some of them are for abandoning this rigid attitude to city defence, they will do so only if we launch an attack elsewhere, successfully manoeuvring the enemy and annihilating his forces in field operations. It was our offensive and victories east of the Fuhe River that made it possible for our independent divisions to enter Chongren twice by sudden attacks. Therefore, once we

are west of the Fuhe River, we will not be able to get the enemy to move unless we attack a city, because Nanfeng, Nancheng, Yihuang and Fuzhou are all located on the west bank of the river and we cannot threaten and manoeuvre the enemy by approaching any of these cities as we can by approaching Fuzhou from the east bank. There are two disadvantages to attacking a town and annihilating the reinforcements on the west bank: first, disclosure of our intentions and, second, the possibility that we may be caught in a pincer attack. Consequently, we will not be as free as we have been on the east bank of the river. Therefore, if we cannot start mobile operations on the east bank at present, we should think carefully before deciding to cross the river. Please take note of this.

## II. TELEGRAM OF JANUARY 30

A. On the night of the 27th, we received reliable reports that the three divisions under Luo, Zhou and Wu, intending to take advantage of the fact that our forces were moving south to press us back as far as possible, had planned to set out for the Jinxi-Zuofang-Langju line on the 28th and for the Poxu-Huangshidu-Langju line on the 29th. On the 30th, Luo's division was to return to Nancheng via Lixizhao, while the two divisions under Zhou and Wu were to return to Xuwan. On learning this, our Front Army further concentrated its forces and prepared to wipe out Luo's division first when the three divisions separated. However, on the 28th the enemy forces had only reached the Xiaogongmiao-Xufang-Langju line when Chen Cheng<sup>78</sup> called off the chase on the ground that preparations for the "suppression" campaign had not yet been completed. Then on the 29th the enemy forces began to withdraw. Today the 11th Division returned to Xuwan and Dongguan, which is west of the river, to await orders, and the 14th and 90th Divisions assembled near Xuwan. The 23rd Division has already moved west to Le'an and the 5th Division has reached Guixi. The 83rd Division will arrive in Jiangxi Province after mid-February. As Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Nanchang on the 29th, he is likely to intensify and accelerate preparations for the offensive.

B. It has become quite obvious that before his dispositions are completed, the enemy does not wish to advance rashly or divide forces and risk losing strength. Right now Zhou Zhirou's division is anxiously

seeking replenishments; Wu Qiwei's division is heightening combat preparedness, and Wu himself has left to see Chiang Kai-shek. In view of the enemy's activities, continuous and bitter fighting seems imminent. If we move west of the Fuhe River immediately, we can get the enemy to move only by attacking the towns. In my earlier telegram I cited the disadvantages of attacking the towns: first, disclosure of our intentions and, second, the possibility that we would fall easy prey to a pincer attack. To these can be added the following: third, the likelihood of our sustaining heavy losses and casualties; fourth, the impossibility of raising funds; and fifth, waste of time. If we suffer these disadvantages on the eve of heavy fighting, fail to take the strongly fortified towns and then find that we have to fight three divisions of reinforcements advancing together, we will not only fail to disrupt the enemy's dispositions for the offensive but even make it easier for him to attack us. Hence, as long as we can engage the enemy and finish him off in consecutive mobile operations on the east bank of the Fuhe River before his deployments are completed, I am against crossing the river right now to attack the towns. Even if the enemy does not advance and attack us for the moment, we can always raise money (200,000 yuan in cash were obtained after the victory in Jinxi) to meet the expenses of the coming big battle, and we can step up the efforts of the 11th Army to Sovietize Jinxi and Zixi so as to tie down the enemy's 5th and 6th Divisions and prevent them from joining the "suppression" force. If, because of Chiang's presence and our being on the east bank of the Fuhe River, the enemy should immediately penetrate deep into the Soviet area<sup>457</sup> to try to intercept us, we would of course rapidly switch to the border of the Soviet area and, with our backs to it, engage him in a decisive battle.

C. Comrades Zhu and Wang are in general agreement with the above opinions.<sup>79</sup> But the Central Committee has repeatedly telegraphed, urging us to break down the defences of the towns. This is really at variance with the strategy I set forth in my two previous telegrams. And I still hold that wiping out the enemy forces, the main force in particular, is a prerequisite for capturing heavily fortified towns. Provided those forces are wiped out, even if the towns are strongly fortified, the enemy will not be able to encircle us, and we can move freely around the perimeter and make an assault from the rear. Otherwise, we will lose our main force and fail to break down the fortifications, which is exactly what the enemy wants. It is hoped that the comrades of the Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee will wire a brief

reply tomorrow as to whether they agree with the above opinions or not. After that date I will have to take it upon myself to make a decision, since present circumstances will brook no further delay. Even then, the Central Committee is still requested to give policy instructions.

### III. TELEGRAM OF FEBRUARY 7

A. The Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee has ordered an attack on Nanfeng. Our views with regard to the plan of attack are as follows:

(1) At this moment when the enemy's 8th Division has two regiments stationed at Xinfeng, one being short of the battalion which is now at Litaxu, we should seize the opportunity to send a part of our forces to assault Xinfeng, while the main force swoops down on Nanfeng, crossing the river downstream from Nanfeng to cut off the enemy's retreat from Xinfeng to Nanfeng. Since there are only four enemy regiments stationed inside and around the town, it may be possible for us to force our way in. While storming Nanfeng, we shall also dispose a part of our forces on the east bank of the river facing Nanfeng.

(2) The main force of the 11th Army will close in on Xuwan, while a smaller force engages in guerrilla warfare on the river bank opposite Nancheng to threaten and pin down the enemy. Meantime, a work team from the 11th Army will try to Sovietize Jinxi and Zixi. The 21st Army is to press in on Yongfeng. The 4th and 5th Independent Divisions are to manoeuvre south of Yihuang and Le'an.

(3) If the direct attack fails but the enemy troops are driven out of their defence works outside the city, we will begin digging tunnels while preparing to strike at enemy reinforcements.

(4) In case these reinforcements arrive before the troops in the outer defence works have been driven off, we must be ready to strike at them.

(5) In the event that our efforts to pin down the enemy forces are of no avail and three or four divisions of the enemy's reinforcements approach along the main roads, we will face the danger of getting caught in a pincer attack if we meet them head-on or of enabling the enemy forces inside the town and the enemy reinforcements to converge if we attempt a flank attack. In this case we must shift to other areas

and attack Yihuang and Le'an instead, so as to keep the enemy forces on the move and wipe them out in mobile warfare in mountainous areas. In the mountains it is easy to tie down one part of the enemy forces while annihilating another, whereas it is very difficult to do so when they are approaching simultaneously along the main roads.

B. The above dispositions are not rigid; they must be implemented flexibly when changes occur in the enemy situation or the terrain. If by chance a spring thaw should make it difficult to wade the river downstream from Nanfeng, obliging us to make the crossing upstream instead, our intention would easily be disclosed beforehand and it would be impossible to cut off the two regiments in Xinfeng. As a result, the Nanfeng garrison could be increased to six regiments and, furthermore, the enemy could move his 11th and 9th Divisions towards Nanfeng in advance to provide support. In that case, it would be still more difficult for us to effect a direct attack on Nanfeng, and we would have to change our plan and attack Yihuang or Le'an by passing through the Soviet area so as to get the enemy forces moving and destroy them in mobile warfare.

C. There is a discrepancy between the above dispositions and those originally outlined in the directive of the Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee. I understand that it is best to capture Nanfeng, but to take Yihuang and Le'an and wipe out the enemy's reinforcements in mobile warfare would allow us to follow up the victory by putting direct pressure on Fuzhou. Moreover, it would make it easier for us to manoeuvre even more flexibly. Do you agree? Or do you still insist that we should storm Nanfeng at whatever cost and engage the enemy in a decisive battle, even if three or four enemy divisions should be approaching along the main roads? Please wire your reply before 18:00 hours today so that we can go into action tomorrow.

D. The Central Committee is requested to take note that, given the enemy's present position and the terrain, it is impossible to assault Nancheng before attacking Nanfeng, Yihuang or Le'an.

#### IV. TELEGRAM OF FEBRUARY 13

A. Our reconnaissance of the blockhouses at Nanfeng continued yesterday, and it was found that only those outside the northwest gate

could be approached and stormed under cover of darkness. After dusk our army began the attack and engaged the enemy in fierce battle the whole night, capturing about a dozen important blockhouses, both large and small. But the enemy still controls some 20 blockhouses outside the city. They are strategically located and, moreover, have open ground behind them. The defence works already captured are far from the town perimeter and there are gun towers on the town wall too. The majority of the enemy blockhouses were guarded by a squad or a platoon, and the most important ones by no more than a company. Yet it took us a long time to capture them, and we had to besiege those which were strategically located. In the fierce fighting that lasted the whole night, we captured less than a battalion while losing 300 men. The 3rd Army Group was the main attacking force, and division commander Peng Ao<sup>80</sup> and two regimental commanders were killed in battle. Though it was raining during the assault, morale was very high.

B. On the 10th, our 11th Army pinned down a regiment of the enemy's 8th Division at Xinfeng, and on the 11th our 22nd Army reached out to Litaxu and cut off its retreat; so only five enemy regiments were at Nanfeng. Because a blockhouse on the east bank of the river was captured by our 12th Army during the night, the enemy regiment which was on the south bank of the river has withdrawn into Nanfeng today and cut the pontoon bridge to show its determination to hold the town and await reinforcements. Reinforcements seem to be advancing in three separate columns, two divisions from Nancheng, one from Yihuang and two from Le'an. The enemy's 11th Division has already started moving towards Yihuang.

C. Under the circumstances, we have changed the planned assault on Nanfeng to a feint attack instead and have decided to annihilate the reinforcements first. Our forces are presently massing west of Nanfeng and, after locating the enemy's route of march today and tomorrow, we shall try to clip one of its wings in the anticipated mobile encounters, destroying its forces one by one.

## V. TELEGRAM OF FEBRUARY 15

A. We have received a reliable report that while our troops have been in Lichuan, the enemy's deployment has been as follows: the central

attacking force led by Chen Cheng is being divided into three separate columns. The first column, under Luo Zhuoying, consists of the 11th, 52nd and 59th Divisions and is assembling at Yihuang and Tangyin; the second column, under Wu Qiwei, consists of the 10th, 14th and 90th Divisions and is assembling at Fuzhou and Longgudu; and the third column, under Zhao Guantao,<sup>81</sup> consists of the 5th, 6th, 9th and 79th Divisions and is assembling at Xuwan and Jinxi, with part of its troops moving to Zixi. The 43rd Division is assembling between Yihuang and Le'an as a reserve force. All these columns are ordered to complete their assembly before the 20th. The 4th and 83rd Divisions are to serve as a general reserve.

B. Since our troops had been attacking vigorously at Nanfeng, the enemy assembled his forces sooner than intended, the 11th Division moving to Yihuang and Tangyin on the 14th of the month and the 52nd and 59th Divisions starting towards Le'an in order to intercept us from Dongbei, Huangbei and Xinfengshi; at present, both these divisions are pushing on to Le'an. The second column is moving towards Nanfeng and the 90th Division reached Dongguan on the 14th. We have information that the 14th Division has also started to move, but the 10th Division has not moved yet. The time and place for assembly of the third column remain unchanged. The 43rd Division is moving towards Yihuang, where one of its regiments is already stationed, and it arrived at Gongbei on the 14th. The 27th Division is already assembled at Yongfeng and Xin'gan.

C. We are now replacing our storming tactic with feint attacks and are keeping watch on the enemy troops in Nanfeng with a view to eliminating any reinforcements. It is possible that the enemy may change his route of attack. Believing that our vigorous attacks on a strongly fortified town must cause us losses, tire our forces and pin down our troops, the enemy plans to send reinforcements to intercept us and mount continuous attacks. He has decided to start his "suppression" campaign on the 18th.

D. Our army is now assembling its forces in the area west of Nanfeng and Litaxu, with its back to the Soviet area. We are stepping up our feint attacks on Nanfeng so as to induce the enemy to carry out his "suppression" campaign along the route originally planned. Thus we will be able to meet his right wing head-on first and wipe it out.

E. In storming Nanfeng, our army suffered more than 400 casualties.



## VI. TELEGRAM OF MARCH 2

A. Our forces have been locked in fierce battle with the enemy for three days and nights. It would have been possible for us to go on and rout or wipe out the enemy's 11th Division on the third day had it not been for the mountainous terrain, which made it difficult for our forces to communicate with each other and with headquarters. After we had wiped out the 52nd Division and the greater part of the 59th Division on the second day, our troops were not in favourable positions for an attack on the reinforcements from the 11th Division, so the battle was not entirely ended yesterday and we continued to eliminate the remains of the 59th Division. Still, our victory is unprecedented. The three divisions of the enemy's second column started to move west yesterday to provide reinforcement, and they may reach Xinfengshi, Dongbei and Huangbei today, cutting off our retreat. Thus we might find ourselves encircled with the battlefield uncleared, the wounded not yet evacuated and piles of captured equipment stacked everywhere. We will therefore disengage from the victorious battle today and withdraw towards the Xiaobu, Nantuan, Dongshao, Shuikou area to regroup and prepare for further fighting.

B. Because of our victory, the enemy forces have started to shift their positions one after another. Besides the 11th and 28th Divisions, which have arrived at Hekou, the 9th Division is reaching Xingfang via Nancheng today, and the second column will move via Nanfeng, Litaxu and Xinfeng to the Yongxingqiao-Raofang line, approaching Dongbei and Huangbei tomorrow. A part of the third column took Xiaoshi on the 1st, and today the 5th Division is being shifted to Longgudu. The 6th and 79th Divisions have changed their original plan and will assemble at Nancheng west of the river.

## VII. TELEGRAM OF MARCH 4

A. In the past few days the enemy has completely lost the initiative. The three divisions of his second column had originally intended to move from Xinfengshi to intercept us and cut off our retreat. But when they learned that the 52nd and 59th Divisions had been wiped out, they switched to a march on Huangbei. Then, on hearing that

our forces had already left Huangbei, the 14th Division hastened to move north to Yankou from Dangkou and Raofang, the 10th and 90th Divisions stopped at Chongwudu, the 11th Division entered Huangbei and the 9th Division rushed to Hekou. Today none of them moved. The 5th Division of the third column was deployed at Longgudu, but today it has been ordered to return to Nancheng via Yuekou. The third column has already turned towards Nanfeng, and its advance guard will be there tomorrow.

B. Yesterday Liu Heding<sup>43</sup> led a brigade and a regiment of the enemy Fujian forces into the town of Taining. The 19th Route Army had Ou Shounian's division and Zhang Yan's brigade assemble at Yong'an on the 3rd to form the right wing while Shen Guanghan's and Zhang Zhen's divisions form the left wing. The right wing is scheduled to enter Liancheng on the 8th. This deployment was planned before the battle of Huangbei.

C. The route of the central attacking force commanded by Chen Cheng has changed. The third column has altered its course and is heading for Nanfeng. The first and second columns (consisting of only five divisions at present) may press in closer formation to Dongbei, Huangbei, or Xinfengshi to seek a decisive engagement with our main force around Dongshao and Hekou, while the third column moves through Guangchang to Toubei and Dongshanba to cut off our retreat.

D. After our forces are assembled (the 1st Army Group is carrying captured equipment and must pass through Zhaoxie, which is quite a distance away), we plan to take on one wing of the enemy forces and destroy it in mobile warfare.

## VIII. TELEGRAM OF MARCH 16

A. Two enemy columns from the north, each comprising three divisions, have drawn close together and are advancing southeast in waves and reconnoitring. Today, the 14th Division of the advance column has reached Xinfengshi, the 90th Division Houfang and the 10th Division Caotaigang. The rear column's 9th Division has reached Dongbei, the 5th Division Huangbei and the 11th Division Ancha and Jiaohu. As for the enemy's reserves, the 79th Division is in Yihuang with two regiments in Hekou, the 6th Division is in Fuzhou, the whole

of Xu Kexiang's division is in Nancheng and Liu Shaoxian's division is in Le'an and Chongren; the rest have not moved.

B. We have ordered the 11th Army to march. By the 18th it can reach a position northwest of Guangchang to co-ordinate with the independent divisions and regiments and the local armed forces in checking and tying down the enemy advance column, which is marching on Guangchang. Our main force is deployed in readiness to spring a flank attack on the enemy rear column and wipe out its rear guard while it is on the move, thereby making it easier for us to destroy the enemy forces one by one in consecutive operations.

C. Our Front Army began to move yesterday, but is still waiting for an opportunity to go into action because the two enemy columns are too close together. However, since this is the decisive battle in the fourth counter-campaign, we have mobilized and deployed our units to engage the three enemy divisions with the utmost determination and readiness for every sacrifice.

## IX. TELEGRAM OF MARCH 20

A. You will be briefed on the enemy's situation in another telegram.

Our 11th Army reached the vicinity of Guangchang on the 18th. Our plan is that, beginning on the 20th, it will lead the local armed forces in checking the enemy advance column which is moving towards Guangchang and use its main force to cover our right flank from the rear by preventing the enemy from turning back and sending out reinforcements.

B. We plan to launch a lightning attack on the enemy's 11th Division near Caotaigang and Xuzhuang at daybreak on the 21st, wiping it out at one stroke, and then to mount an assault at Dongbei and Wulipai.

C. Under the command of Dong and Zhu,<sup>82</sup> the right wing, consisting of the 5th Army Group, the 12th Army and the independent regiments of Yihuang, will attack the left flank of the enemy units at Caotaigang and Xuzhuang from the rear at daybreak on the 21st with its main force and will order part of its remaining forces to hold down the enemy at Dongbei from the Mount Yaolanzhai side. The planned manoeuvres are as follows:

(1) On the 20th, the 12th Army (with the two independent regiments of Yihuang attached to it) is to reach the vicinity of Xiefan by dusk. On the 21st it is to take a short-cut and ford the river at a suitable

spot upstream from Houfang, seize positions around Mount Linggeng and Mount Sanjiaozhai and launch a flank attack on the enemy at Houfang, Xuzhuang and Mount Leigongsheng. Meanwhile, it is to dispatch part of its forces to lead the old independent regiment of Yihuang to Shibe and Mount Yaolanzhai and engage the enemy forces at Dongbei in guerrilla warfare. The new independent regiment is to move to the area southwest of Xinfengshi, destroy the road running east-west (so as to prevent the enemy from turning back and sending in reinforcements) and guard our right flank from the rear.

(2) The 5th Army Group is to reach the vicinity of Duanxi on the 20th and dispatch a detachment in disguise to press close to Houfang and undertake guerrilla operations. At daybreak on the 21st it is to skirt Mount Luoma and Mount Pili and attack the enemy forces at Houfang, Xuzhuang and Mount Leigongsheng.

D. Under the command of Peng and Teng,<sup>83</sup> the left wing, consisting of the 3rd and the 1st Army Groups, the 21st Army and the 5th Independent Division, is to quickly wipe out the enemy forces around Caotaigang at daybreak on the 21st and then launch an assault on the enemy at Dongbei. Its scheduled manoeuvres are as follows:

(1) On the 20th, the 3rd Army Group is to have a covering force occupy the Jieshang-Mount Leimu line to provide protection, so that its main force can reach the vicinity of Dongbianling and Liangxi by dusk and, moving from southwest to northeast, attack the enemy at Caotaigang at daybreak on the 21st.

(2) On the 20th, the 1st Army Group is to have a covering force occupy positions round Sanxi to provide protection, so that its main force can reach the Daping-Xufang-Zhizhou line by dusk and, moving from west to east, launch an assault on the enemy forces around Tieshi'ao at daybreak on the 21st, thereby cutting off contact between the enemy units in Dongbei and Caotaigang.

(3) The 21st Army (under the direct command of Lin<sup>84</sup> and Nie<sup>85</sup>) is to have a covering force occupy positions around Wangdu and Shangbu to provide protection, so that its main force can reach the vicinity of Guwangkeng and Qiuping by dusk and, moving from west to east, start its offensive against the enemy at Dongbei at daybreak on the 21st.

(4) The 5th Independent Division (likewise under the direct command of Lin and Nie) will leave Wucheng for Mount Xiushan at dawn on the 21st and make a feint attack from north to south against the enemy forces at Wulipai, while guarding our left flank.

E. The demarcation line between the battle areas for the two wings runs along the right side of the road from Dongbianling to Dongbei (the road itself comes under the left wing).

F. The 22nd Army will serve as a general reserve. It will remain where it is on the 20th, and on the 21st it will advance on the left, following the 1st Army Group. When required, it is to be commanded directly by Lin and Nie.

G. The Medical Department of the 1st Army Group plans to set up a field hospital at Changluo. The Medical Department of the 3rd Army Group plans to set up a station in Xuzhuang and Yinshui. The rear liaison line remains as provided for in the plan of operations.

H. We plan to move our headquarters to a point near Liangxi tomorrow (the 21st).

## THREE TELEGRAMS RELATING TO THE XI'AN INCIDENT

*December 1936*

### I. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH T. V. SOONG

*December 23, 1936*

1. T. V. Soong, Soong Mei-ling and Jiang Dingwen<sup>86</sup> arrived in Xi'an yesterday. Chiang Kai-shek hinted to T. V. Soong that he would reshuffle the government, hold a national salvation conference three months from now, reorganize the Kuomintang and approve an alliance with Russia and co-operation with the Communist Party.

2. Zhang Xueliang,<sup>87</sup> Yang Hucheng<sup>88</sup> and I held negotiations with T. V. Soong today.

First, I put forward the six-point proposal of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army:

a. Stop fighting and withdraw the Kuomintang troops to east of Tongguan.

b. Reorganize the Nanjing government, expel the pro-Japanese faction and bring in people who are for resistance to Japan.

c. Release political prisoners and guarantee democratic rights.

d. Stop the suppression of Communists, unite with the Red Army to resist Japanese aggression and permit open activity by the Com-

---

At the critical juncture when the Japanese imperialists were trying to turn China into a colony, the Kuomintang Northeastern Army, headed by General Zhang Xueliang, and the Kuomintang 17th Route Army, headed by General Yang Hucheng, made the demand under the influence of the Red Army and the anti-Japanese people's movement that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and unite the country for resistance against Japan. Chiang refused. On December 12, 1936, Zhang and Yang arrested him in Xi'an. The pro-Japanese faction in the Kuomintang, headed by Wang Jingwei and He Yingqin, prepared to exploit this opportunity to launch a large-scale civil war, get rid of Chiang Kai-shek and take his place. The policy of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was to oppose a

munists. (The Red Army is to retain its independent organization and command. Pending the convocation of a democratic national assembly, the Soviet areas<sup>457</sup> should continue to function as usual, but the words "Anti-Japanese" or "National Salvation" may be added to their names.)

e. Convene a national salvation conference representing all parties, groups, sections of the population and armies.

f. Co-operate with all countries that sympathize with China's resistance to Japan.

We demanded that Chiang Kai-shek accept the above six-point proposal and ensure its implementation and promised that the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army would support him in unifying China to fight Japan. Soong expressed his personal agreement with these proposals and promised to relay them to Chiang.

Second, the measures proposed by Soong and the discussion that followed:

a. Soong proposed that a transitional government be set up first and reorganized into an anti-Japanese government three months later. For the present, He Yingqin, Zhang Qun, Zhang Jia'ao, Jiang Dingwen, Wu Dingchang and Chen Shaokuan<sup>89</sup> are to be dismissed from their posts. He recommended H. H. Kung for President of the Executive Yuan, himself for Vice-President and concurrently Finance Minister, Xu Xinliu or Yan Huiqing for Foreign Minister, Zhao Daiwen or Shao Lizi (Shao being recommended by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng) for Minister of the Interior, Yan Zhong<sup>12</sup> or Hu Zongnan for War Minister, Chen Jiliang or Shen Honglie for Minister of the Navy, Sun Fo or Zeng Yangfu for Minister of Railways, Zhu Jiahua or Yu Feipeng for Minister of Communications, Lu Zuofu for Minister of Industry and Zhang Boling or Wang Shijie for Minister of Education. We recommended Soong Ching Ling, Du Zhongyuan, Shen Junru and Zhang Naiqi<sup>90</sup> as members of the Executive Yuan. T. V. Soong stressed that he was only proposing a transitional government which would be

---

new civil war, settle the Xi'an Incident peacefully and force Chiang to resist Japan. The Party sent Comrades Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Ye Jianying to Xi'an as its representatives. Thanks to the arduous efforts of Zhou Enlai and the other comrades, the Xi'an Incident was settled peacefully. This marked a turning point in the general situation. The changed circumstances made internal co-operation possible, and the nationwide war of resistance against Japanese aggression soon got under way. These three telegrams were sent to the Central Committee of the CPC in the course of the negotiations. The last two were signed jointly by Comrades Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu.

completely reorganized after three months when resistance to Japan was made official. We agreed in principle, asked Soong to take responsibility for carrying out the agreement and said that Du Zhongyuan, Shen Junru and Zhang Naiqi might serve as Vice-Ministers.

b. Soong suggested that Chiang Kai-shek return to Nanjing as soon as he had issued the order for withdrawal of the troops and that the seven patriotic leaders<sup>91</sup> be released upon Chiang's arrival in Nanjing. We insisted that first the government troops be withdrawn and the patriotic leaders set free.

c. We proposed that during the period of the transitional government, a Northwestern Joint Army should be formed, that the Northeastern Army, the 17th Route Army and the Red Army should establish a joint committee under the leadership of Zhang Xueliang, that the committee should make preparations for resistance to Japan by seeing to it that troops were trained and army units brought up to full strength, and that Nanjing should be responsible for material assistance. Soong said that this proposal could be forwarded to Chiang.

d. We said that when Chiang had agreed to the above measures we would discuss the various problems (the six points mentioned earlier) with him directly. Soong replied that we should first meet with Soong Mei-ling. (T. V. Soong and Zhang Xueliang both said that she was strongly in favour of domestic peace and resistance to Japan.)

3. If you agree to the principles stated above, I will hold direct talks as a plenipotentiary with Chiang Kai-shek. But you must let me know your decision as to the conditions which have to be met before Chiang is allowed to leave for Nanjing. Please reply at once.

## II. THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH T. V. SOONG AND SOONG MEI-LING

*December 25, 1936*

1. The results of the negotiations with T. V. Soong and Soong Mei-ling:

a. H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong are to reorganize the Executive Yuan, and Soong is to take full responsibility for forming a government satisfactory to the people and for ridding it of the pro-Japanese faction.

b. The two Soongs are to take full responsibility for the withdrawal



of troops and the removal of the government armies under Hu Zongnan and others from the Northwest. Jiang Dingwen has already conveyed Chiang Kai-shek's written order to cease fire and withdraw troops (their front-line troops have already pulled back).

c. Chiang Kai-shek has promised to release the patriotic leaders after his return, and we may publish the news in advance. T. V. Soong is to take responsibility for the release.

d. For the time being, the Soviets and the Red Army can go on as usual. The two Soongs guaranteed that Chiang would stop suppressing Communists and would give us material assistance through Zhang Xueliang (T. V. Soong pledged to give the amounts that will be agreed on by Zhang Xueliang and ourselves). When the war of resistance starts in three months, the Red Army will change its designation, come under unified command and engage in joint operations.

e. T. V. Soong indicated that no national assembly would be convened but that Kuomintang meetings would be held first to broaden the government and then a national salvation conference of all parties and groups would be convoked. Chiang Kai-shek has indicated his readiness to reorganize the Kuomintang three months hence.

f. T. V. Soong has promised to release all the political prisoners by batches; he is to confer with Madame Sun Yat-sen on the measures to be taken.

g. The Communist Party can operate openly once the war of resistance is under way.

h. The government's foreign policy will be one of alliance with the Soviet Union and co-ordination with Britain, the United States and France.

i. Upon his return to Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek will issue a statement to the nation reproaching himself and will resign his post as President of the Executive Yuan.

j. T. V. Soong expressed the hope that we would back him up in his advocacy of resistance to Japan and in his struggle against the pro-Japanese faction. He asked that we station some person in Shanghai to maintain secret contact with him.

2. Chiang Kai-shek is ill. When I saw him, he indicated:

a. The suppression of Communists will stop, there will be an alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan, the unification of China will be brought about and the unified country will be under his leadership.

b. T. V. Soong, Soong Mei-ling and Zhang Xueliang have full powers to represent him in discussing the solution of all the problems with me (see above).

c. When he gets back to Nanjing, I can go there to negotiate directly with him.

3. T. V. Soong insisted that we trust him. He was willing to assume full responsibility for implementing the above terms. He requested that Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling be allowed to leave today. Zhang Xueliang had agreed and was ready to accompany Chiang personally. Yang Hucheng and we agreed to the terms. But we thought there should be a political document before their departure. We indicated that we did not agree to Chiang's departure today, nor did we agree that Zhang should go with him. But before our note reached Zhang, he had already left with Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Mei-ling and T. V. Soong on a flight to Luoyang.

4. Judging from what has happened, there was a real change in Chiang Kai-shek's attitude while he was here. He is sincere in delegating matters to T. V. Soong, and Soong is really determined to resist Japan and make arrangements for the reorganization of the Executive Yuan. Therefore, although it is regrettable that Chiang was allowed to leave and Zhang went with him, things have generally taken a turn for the better.

5. Our present military dispositions remain unchanged and our troops are on the alert.

(When he was about to leave, Chiang Kai-shek said to Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, "Up to today, you would have been responsible for the outbreak of civil war; henceforth, it is I who will take responsibility if it breaks out again. From now on I will never engage in the suppression of Communists. I admit my past mistakes, but you must also admit yours.")

### III. THE SITUATION AND OUR POLICY AFTER THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE XI'AN INCIDENT

*December 29, 1936*

We put forward the following for your consideration:

1. The peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident marks the beginning of a new stage in China's political life. It means:

- a. A halt in the attacks on the Red Army;
- b. An end to the policy of concession in external affairs;
- c. The formation of a preliminary national united front; and
- d. The immediate possibility that the two provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu can become anti-Japanese base areas.

2. The Xi'an Incident and its peaceful settlement signify a division and re-alignment of class forces and, in particular, a process of definitive division in the bourgeois camp. They are significant because they have rallied and consolidated the left wing in the bourgeois camp and discredited the notion that a middle course is possible. But the process of division is not yet complete, and generally speaking, there are still three groups — the anti-Japanese, the capitulationist and the middle. The new changes are as follows:

- a. The anti-Japanese forces have been strengthened and at least partially legalized;
- b. A fatal blow has been dealt to the pro-Japanese faction; and
- c. The middle-of-the-roaders are beginning to draw closer to the left wing (although haltingly and slowly as before, that is, still trying to retain their middle position).

Our policy should be to combat the pro-Japanese faction, strengthen the left wing with the Northwest as its centre, and influence and draw in the middle-of-the-roaders.

3. The government headed by H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong will be a transitional government. It will follow a relatively hard line on the question of China's relations with Japan — the fundamental question at present — and will probably take a small step forward on the question of democracy, but clearly it will continue the old course of action on many other issues. We should regard it as a transitional government; in other words, while not in the least relaxing our criticism of its weaknesses, we should encourage and support its anti-Japanese tendencies and try to bring about gradual, even if not major, democratic reforms. Like all transitional governments, it is bound to vacillate, and there are various possibilities as to its future. We should combat every instance of vacillation and push it to become an anti-Japanese government.

4. Given the circumstances, the movement for the convocation of an anti-Japanese national salvation conference is of great significance in terms of mobilizing, arousing and organizing the masses and of bringing about a more favourable turn of events. We should try to co-ordinate the demand that Nanjing convene a conference on internal

peace with the people's movement in favour of such peace. But the timing of the conference and its success depend on the growth of the popular movement. This is an important link in the chain of events, the key factor in strengthening the mass character of the anti-Japanese united front.

5. Another central link is the consolidation of the Northwest and its conversion into an anti-Japanese base area and a model united front area. To accomplish this we must:

a. Formulate and implement a common programme for co-operation among the three sides and a military plan for the Northwest;

b. Strengthen and transform the forces under Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng; allow the Red Army to rest and consolidate and to regularize itself on a new basis; and ensure co-operation and assistance among the three sides on the basis of mutual respect and interest;

c. Launch and expand mass movements and democratize and re-organize local governments; and

d. Solve the question of the Hui nationality in Ningxia, Qinghai, and western Gansu.

6. We should adhere to our position as the organizer and mobilizer of the nationwide movement of unity for resistance against Japan. On the one hand, provided there is agreement on resistance to Japan and struggle against the pro-Japanese elements, we should co-operate with the left-wingers in Nanjing and win the middle-of-the-roaders over to our side. On the other hand, we should unite with various groupings outside Nanjing and, with the Northwest as our centre and resistance to Japan as our precondition and objective, act as a force pushing Nanjing to the left.

7. We should transform all Party work, adapting it to the new circumstances, so that the Party becomes the leader in the political life of the country. We should:

a. Revive Party work in the big cities and, first of all, among the working class;

b. Turn the scattered guerrilla units in various places into peasant self-defence forces, so that they become seedbeds for the peasant movement;

c. Move the Central Committee of the Party to an area where it will be better able to give leadership to the political life of the entire country; and

d. Educate and re-educate the cadres.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF KUOMINTANG-  
COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION  
BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

*July 15, 1937*

Dear Fellow-Countrymen,

With the greatest enthusiasm, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announces to our elders, brothers and sisters all over the country that to save our motherland at a time when it is faced with a most serious crisis and its very fate is at stake, we have reached an understanding with the Kuomintang on the basis of peace, unification and united resistance to foreign aggression and have joined together with them to meet the crisis. This has enormous significance for the future of our great Chinese nation! For, as we all know, with our nation facing extreme peril today, it is only through internal unity that we can defeat Japanese imperialist aggression. Now that the foundation has been laid for national unity and the basis created for the independence, freedom and liberation of our nation, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party salutes the splendid future of our people.

However, we know that the task of turning bright promise into reality and creating a new China, independent, happy and free, will demand tenacious, dauntless struggle on the part of our countrymen and, indeed, of every patriotic descendant of our common ancestor, the Yellow Emperor Huangdi. On this occasion, the Communist Party of China would like to set forth to all our countrymen the general objectives of our struggle. They are the following:

---

This declaration was drafted on July 4, 1937. It was sent to the Kuomintang by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on July 15 but was not published by the Central News Agency of the Kuomintang until September 22.

1. To strive for the independence, freedom and liberation of the Chinese nation. First of all, it is necessary earnestly and speedily to prepare and launch a national revolutionary war of resistance, in order to recover our lost lands and restore our territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2. To put democracy into effect and convene a national assembly to frame and adopt a constitution and draw up a policy of national salvation.

3. To enable the Chinese people to lead a happy and prosperous life. Effective measures must first be taken to provide famine relief, ensure a stable livelihood, develop a defence economy, deliver the people from suffering and improve their living conditions.

These are China's urgent needs and they constitute the goal of our struggle. We are convinced that they will receive the warm support of all our countrymen. The Communist Party of China wishes to attain these general objectives by joint effort with all our countrymen.

The Chinese Communist Party is fully aware that in marching towards this lofty goal, we need to overcome many obstacles and difficulties, and that, first of all, we will encounter obstruction and sabotage by the Japanese imperialists. To strip the enemy of any pretext for his intrigues and to remove any misunderstanding among all well-intentioned doubters, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China finds it necessary to proclaim its sincere devotion to the cause of national liberation. Therefore, it once again solemnly declares to the whole nation:

(1) that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization;

(2) that we shall give up our policy of encouraging insurrection to overthrow the Kuomintang regime, call off the Sovietization movement and discontinue the policy of forcible confiscation of the land of the landlords;

(3) that we shall abolish the present Soviet governments and call for the practice of democracy in the hope that state power will be unified throughout the country; and

(4) that the Red Army will give up its present name and designation, that it will be reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army and placed under the Military Council of the National Government and that it will be ready for orders to march to the anti-Japanese front and do its duty.

Dear fellow-countrymen! Our Party has long since shown in word and deed before the whole country an open, selfless attitude and a readiness to compromise for the common good, which have won the commendation of all. Now, with a view to uniting with the Kuomintang in good faith, consolidating the peace and unity of the whole country and carrying out a national revolutionary war against Japan, we are ready to honour forthwith those of our promises which have not yet been formally carried out — for example, to abolish the Soviet areas and to redesignate the Red Army — so that the united strength of the entire country may be used to resist foreign aggression.

The Japanese aggressors have driven deep into our country and disaster is imminent. Fellow-countrymen, arise and unite as one! Our great, ancient Chinese nation is indomitable. Arise and fight for national unity! Fight to overthrow Japanese imperialist oppression! The Chinese nation will surely triumph.

For victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan!

For a new China, independent, happy and free!

The Central Committee of the Communist  
Party of China

## OPPOSE SEEKING PEACE THROUGH COMPROMISE, PERSIST IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN NORTH CHINA

*November 13, 1937*

A. Now that Taiyuan has been lost, the enemy is driving southward. The fighting in and around Shanghai has shifted to Songjiang, and the Pudong district has been lost. Britain and the United States have come forward as mediators. The Japanese stipulate four conditions: (1) the designation of the occupied parts of Shanghai as concession areas;<sup>455</sup> (2) the granting of autonomy to north China; (3) the granting of independence to Inner Mongolia; and (4) the abrogation of China's fishing rights. As a result, there has been a growing sense of defeat and a craven desire for peace in Shanghai and Nanjing. The situation in Shanxi is also critical. Yan Xishan<sup>92</sup> will not stir from his stronghold in the Lüliang Mountains. He stays in Shikou Township and Xixian County, massing his Officers' Training Corps, the "Daredevil" Corps and the Young Vanguard<sup>93</sup>. He will not come to Linfen. If he wins victories, he will expand the guerrilla war. If not, he will retreat west of the Huanghe River. He has left the direction of the entire operation to Huang Shaohong and Wei Lihuang.<sup>94</sup> Huang has already lost confidence. Wei verbally agrees to our position on protracted and guerrilla war, but his heart is no longer in Shanxi. The various armies are all planning to retreat across the river. Chiang Kai-shek does not seem to be as determined as before in ordering them to stand fast. As for Liu Xiang,<sup>95</sup> Yan Xishan hopes that he will not come to Shanxi to take command. So there is not much hope of stopping the enemy at Mount Hanxinling, Lingshi County. It is

---

A telegram sent from Linfen, Shanxi to Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and Ren Bishi.



now only a matter of time before the enemy reaches Fenglingdu in his push southward.

B. Therefore, I propose the following:

1. Oppose seeking peace through compromise and persist in the War of Resistance in north China. This should be taken as the central theme of all our mobilization efforts. We should point out that all those who want to retreat across the river are helping the Japanese aggressors gain control of north China.

2. Stress guerrilla warfare and try to influence and win over the friendly forces so that they will act in unison with us. The friendly forces may be divided into three groups: a) sympathizers, such as the "Daredevil" Corps and the Officers' Training Corps; b) those with whom we have connections, such as the brigade under Xu Quanzhong, the division under Zhao Shoushan and the army under Sun Weiru;<sup>96</sup> and c) those with whom we have some contact.

3. Promote extensive guerrilla warfare and train cadres so as to persist in the War of Resistance. a) The Red Army has already organized as many as 10,000 people in guerrilla units under its leadership; b) fourteen counties in Shanxi are known to have guerrilla units, with a total of over 4,000 people; c) the General Mobilization Committee has organized and is leading 1,000 people.<sup>97</sup> As far as the training of cadres for guerrilla warfare is concerned, each military district should organize its own training corps to absorb young students, workers and peasants from different regions.

4. Expand the Red Army so as to strengthen the decisive role of the regular forces (it is in this task that we have been least successful). Hu Fu has proposed that we increase the number of troops to 100,000 in three months.<sup>98</sup> I agree. I also suggest that we recruit 30,000 in north China, 5,000 in northern Shaanxi and 15,000 in the old Soviet areas.<sup>457</sup> Would Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and Ren Bishi please give orders regarding measures for recruiting the 30,000 men in north China? The local Party organizations and local governments are to co-operate.

5. Unhesitatingly take in enemy soldiers who have been routed and collect all guns and materials left by them. This work has just begun. Some results have been achieved on the eastern front, but difficulties have arisen on the western front due to lack of troops.

6. Strengthen our work in the various military districts. To accomplish this in southeastern Shanxi I suggest that Song Renqiong<sup>99</sup> and Peng Zhen<sup>100</sup> be sent to take charge there, with the 8,000 men in the "Daredevil" Corps as their basic force. In southern Shanxi, Peng

Xuefeng<sup>101</sup> should be given the leading role and made responsible for the work of the Party committees of the army and the government, so as to concentrate and co-ordinate the activities of the Party, government and army.

7. Democratize local government and then extend democratization to the provincial level.

8. Carry out the Party's policies for the war zones, organize the people and launch mass struggles.

9. Intensify the struggle against collaborators.

C. Hu Fu will wire the arrangements concerning Party work.

# THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND THE TASKS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUING THE WAR IN NORTH CHINA

*November 16, 1937*

## I. THE STATE OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND THE PRESENT CRISIS

With the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan, a new crisis in the War of Resistance is developing. The crisis has two aspects. First, we find ourselves in an interval between a war of resistance conducted by government forces, a war which is increasingly difficult to carry on, and a war of resistance conducted by the whole people, a war which has not yet come into being. Second, both internally and externally there is growing sentiment in favour of mediation. Let's make a concrete analysis.

A. The war situation. The Japanese aggressors have occupied Shanghai and broken through at Songjiang, and our line of defence has been pulled back to Jiashan, Suzhou, Kunshan and Liuhe. In north China, since the occupation of Taiyuan, the enemy forces have been pressing on a line linking Fenyang, Jiexiu and Zihong Township. And there are reports that they are also advancing along the Beiping-Hankou and the Tianjin-Pukou Railways. The Japanese aggressors' hope is, after a little regrouping, to compel our main force to withdraw south of the Huanghe River and then announce to the world that the war in north China has in the main come to an end and also that they have taken Shanghai. They would then go ahead with their plan of creating an "autonomous" north China and a "neutral" Shanghai, splitting off

---

A speech made at a mass meeting in Linfen, Shanxi. It was published in the Hankou weekly, *The Masses*, Vol. I, No. 2.

the Hui and Mongolian regions and harassing central and south China. This plan could be carried out under cover of talk of an armistice agreement so as to dupe the other powers and lure collaborators. It's much more diabolical than open aggression!

B. The international situation. The conference of the Nine-Power Treaty countries<sup>102</sup> has given evidence of the initiative of Britain and the United States and of the co-operation between them, but they still have mediation as their central motive. They are reluctant to consider sanctions, and therefore the tougher Japan is, the more helpless they become. The main purpose of their mediation is temporary relaxation — something which can be achieved only at the expense of China's national interests. Accordingly, the consular corps in Shanghai is openly engaged in a peace campaign, and Germany and Italy give full endorsement to Japan's claims. Besides refusing to take part in the conference of the Nine-Power Treaty countries, Japan has put forward its six demands.<sup>103</sup> Britain and the United States have stated that even if Japan takes a tough attitude and China persists in the war against aggression, they will keep the conference going and are prepared to seek out new opportunities for mediation. Such being the position of Britain and the United States, the Soviet Union naturally cannot act alone, although it has already given effective support to China both morally and practically.

C. The military situation. A considerable part of China's regular forces has already been used; at the same time, nothing has been done on a national scale to effect a general mobilization of the people, reform the armed forces, change strategy and tactics or improve work in the rear areas. And some of the officers and men are experiencing disappointment and demoralization due to setbacks in the war, losses suffered by the troops and the inadequacy of provisions. It will not do for us to rely on the existing regular forces to carry on a protracted war of resistance, for their confidence in victory has already been badly shaken.

D. Mobilization of the people. Over the last three to four months, the Kuomintang has not loosened its control either over the government or over the mobilization of the people. To this very day the Kuomintang party headquarters is sticking to the policy of control over the mobilization work. Control without mobilization is a universal phenomenon. As a result, in many big cities, popular movements are even less active than in the earlier period of partial war. The situation at the front is not evoking popular response, the rear areas are not getting

popular support, and it is impossible to organize people's armed forces. This is creating compliant subjects for the Japanese and opponents for ourselves. Defeats in battle are less to be feared than the low morale of the people! If we lose the people, the situation will be irretrievable.

Owing to these grave phenomena, the sentiment in favour of mediation is gradually increasing both internally and externally, which gives rise to the following dangers:

A. Collaborationist regimes are on the upswing. For example, the "Autonomous Administration of North China",<sup>104</sup> the "associations for the preservation of order"<sup>105</sup> in Shanghai and north China and the "independence movement" of Inner Mongolia<sup>106</sup> as well as individual collaborators are becoming more and more active.

B. Capitulationism is growing. Pro-Japanese elements are becoming active and are proposing direct negotiation with Japan. The pro-British and pro-U.S. forces are weak and lacking in self-confidence and are proposing to negotiate terms through Britain and the United States. Those who are disappointed with the Soviet Union propose bringing the war to an end. All these are different forms of capitulationism. But Wang Jingwei<sup>107</sup> has said that persons who advocate peace through conciliation are traitors, and Chiang Kai-shek has also said that he will see the War of Resistance through to the end and that whoever talks compromise now is a traitor. The government has also instructed the Chinese delegation that unless the Japanese troops are withdrawn from China, there is no room for mediation. This is a telling blow to capitulationism!

C. The idea of creating "special areas" is gaining ground.<sup>108</sup> The "Hebei-Chahar Special Area" continues to exert an influence on the minds of many people, inducing them to dream of a life of temporary ease in these areas. Is such a life possible? Absolutely not. On the contrary, such transitional political set-ups foster collaborators, demoralize the people and lead to the betrayal of justice. So it is absolutely necessary to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. Defeats cannot reduce the Chinese people to subjugation, but the special areas can doom the Chinese nation beyond redemption.

D. Defeatist sentiment is emerging. Military failures encourage the idea that all is lost, that the choice is either to stake everything on a throw of the dice and put up a last-ditch fight or else to retreat for self-preservation. Since there is no hope of victory in a last-ditch battle, the tendency is to favour withdrawing across the Huanghe River and self-preservation. But is it true that it is no longer possible to

put up a fight in north China? If so, then withdrawing across the Huanghe River won't save anyone's skin either. Therefore, withdrawing across the river without orders is equivalent to allowing the Japanese aggressors to take control of north China.

We must struggle to the finish to eliminate all these tendencies and overcome all these dangers. To this end we must persevere in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Only when the whole people rise to resist aggression can the war be continued, and only when we persevere in the war can we hope to get help from friendly countries, to resist any mediation efforts unfavourable to us and ultimately to defeat the enemy.

## II. THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSISTING IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN NORTH CHINA AND ITS PROSPECTS

There is a crisis in the War of Resistance and the Japanese invaders are making every effort to aggravate it. The core of their scheme is to compel our troops to withdraw across the Huanghe River quickly, leaving north China in their hands, and then to exploit the situation to the full. The attack on Shanghai was originally intended as a diversionary action on a secondary front, but to their surprise, the enemy troops suffered heavy losses in the Shanghai battle; they have closed in on Suzhou and are now advancing on Nanjing. But their strategic focus is north China and taking it is still their first priority. Therefore, if the resistance were allowed to end in north China, the crisis involving the whole war would become extremely grave. What's more, it would give the Japanese invaders a breathing spell prior to further action.

Therefore, if we are to persist in the War of Resistance, the central task must be to persist in the war in north China. If the war in north China can be protracted, the Japanese aggressors will have no way of realizing their whole scheme. Now that Taiyuan has fallen, can the war in north China be continued? Can it be continued for a long time? Our answer is, it certainly can.

First, the present crisis in the war in north China can be overcome and a successful counter-attack can be launched, if the central government can send competent, fresh troops here, if it can organize an offensive co-ordinating all the battle fronts, if it can change its purely defen-

sive strategy and tactics by dispatching fresh troops to operate in the enemy's rear area and if it can mobilize the masses of the people to join in the war!

Second, if the above measures cannot be adopted now and the enemy continues to advance and occupies Fenglingdu, our river port for crossing, in an attempt to control vital spots along the Huanghe River, we still have a way of carrying on a protracted war in north China including Shanxi. The conditions favourable to such a war are as follows:

A. Given its military strength, the enemy cannot control the whole of north China — not even all the cities, to say nothing of the villages. They can't control all the vital railways and main roads either. Therefore, they will have to use their Chinese collaborators' troops to hold many cities and towns, while concentrating their own troops and heavy weapons on defending important routes of communication and employing their main strength to fight our forces. That is very good. We can use guerrillas to wipe out the collaborators, arm the masses, use part of our lightly-equipped troops to raid and cut off the main enemy communication routes and to seize their supplies and ammunition, and use our main forces to seek and wipe out part of the enemy forces in the mountain areas. All this is entirely possible. Witness the Eighth Route Army's recovery of fourteen county seats in enemy rear areas, its burning of twenty-two enemy planes, its recent recapture of Nanhua and its defeat of many advancing enemy troops.<sup>109</sup>

B. Protracted warfare is also possible in terms of topography. The enemy troops are trained for operations along railways or main roads but not in mountain areas; moreover, they aren't familiar with the roads in our interior. The whole of Shanxi, the western part of Hebei and Chahar Provinces, and areas bordering on Rehe and Hebei Provinces are mountainous and eminently suitable for the survival, functioning and growth of our forces.

C. So far as climate is concerned, no foreigners are as well adapted as the Chinese; winter and spring are especially hard on the Japanese troops.

D. Popular support is fundamental. In their aggression against China, for all their deceptions and enticements the Japanese invaders are able to buy only a handful of collaborators, while the majority of the people are suffering materially. Thus, popular resistance is the primary condition for protracted war. The more the enemy is destructive, the more awakened the people become in their fight for national survival.

E. There has already been an initial expansion of the people's armed forces. Their extensive growth in the area bordering on Shanxi, Hebei and Chahar Provinces in particular will make that area a model for protracted warfare in north China.

F. The determination of government leaders and the armed forces constitutes a principal condition for carrying on a protracted war of resistance in north China. At present, Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan<sup>92</sup> and quite a few army units are strengthening their war efforts. We hope they will go a step further and carry out comprehensive planning.

G. Finally, the fact that the Eighth Route Army is staying on to fight in north China is also an important element favouring the prosecution of a protracted war there, because the Eighth Route Army is the Red Army under a new name and it has long experience in mobile and guerrilla warfare. It will turn this experience to good account, influence the friendly forces and organize and lead the masses in waging war.

All these favourable factors ensure great potential for a protracted war of resistance in north China. In the most difficult times, resistance will mainly take the form of guerrilla warfare in order to hold on. Though this will go on for some time, the situation will certainly be different from the one prevailing in the four northeastern provinces during the past six years. This protracted war will promote the nationwide War of Resistance and gain the time needed to organize new army units throughout the country. On the other hand, the nationwide War of Resistance will give support to the war in north China, making it impossible for Japan to conclude it and thus furthering the world campaign to aid China. Therefore, this guerrilla war gives us prospects for victory. Through a protracted war the guerrillas will gain strength, arm the masses, recover many cities and towns, disrupt the enemy's communication lines, wipe out part of his forces and, finally, with the participation of fresh forces from the whole country, we will launch a victorious counter-attack, recover the lost territories and drive the invading Japanese imperialists out of China.

### III. THE TASKS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUING THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN NORTH CHINA

How are we to persist in the War of Resistance in north China? This is the question we ought to discuss now. In other words, what



must we do to carry out a protracted war of resistance in north China? There are four main tasks:

1. Reform the armed forces. With the continuation of the war there are fewer and fewer regular armies left. Yet when we go into battle, we should have well-organized armies. Therefore, it becomes an urgent task to reform the old armies and organize new ones. The object in reforming an army is not to change its personnel but to reform its structure. Hereafter, army units fighting in north China should be reorganized to adapt to mobile and guerrilla warfare in mountain areas; a "triple system"<sup>110</sup> should be instituted with guerrilla units, light gear and supplies, and plenty of communications equipment. Next, a system of political work must be established and made the lifeline in consolidating the army. We should encourage the voluntary observance of discipline to ensure a close relationship between the soldiers and the people. Third, we must improve the life of our soldiers. There must be equality in their political life, the companies must keep open accounts, the living standards of the soldiers must be raised and unity must be established between officers and men. Fourth, commanders of the army units must be given the power to make independent decisions, so that they can operate independently in separate areas and have no fear of remaining behind enemy lines or of being cut off. Fifth, our strategy and tactics must be changed. We must understand that we are now carrying on field operations, mobile warfare, and guerrilla warfare and that the important thing is therefore men and not territory. Sixth, we must establish rear areas for the army units and ensure an uninterrupted flow of supplies from them, so that the troops can exist independently even under difficult conditions. Thus reformed, the army will be dynamic, close to the people and revolutionary. Its officers and men will be able to carry the War of Resistance in north China through to final victory!

2. Expand the base of the political authority. At present, the Republic of China has no unified political authority in the whole of north China; on the contrary, political power belongs to the Japanese aggressors and their collaborators. The autonomy peddled by the Japanese is a sham, and we should counter it with genuine autonomy, so as to mobilize the masses and expand the base of the political authority. At present, therefore, the political authority in north China should be a local political authority under the National Government. First of all, it should have a democratic structure; it should unite all the people in north China who resist Japanese aggression and should welcome

representatives of all political parties or groups and all military forces to join in the government and in the task of saving the country. Second, organizationally, local self-government and self-sufficiency should be practised at the county level to maintain the legitimate authority of the Republic of China and should then be extended to the provincial level. Third, in terms of policy, the programme of resistance to Japanese aggression should be carried out. We suggest that a policy of national salvation be pursued in the war zones according to the Ten-Point Programme proposed by the Communist Party.<sup>111</sup>

3. Give free rein to the people's movements. If this is not done in north China, the army won't be able to get new recruits or support when in battle, and there will be no way to organize people's resistance forces. The valiant will be massacred by the Japanese aggressors, the cowardly will submit, the crafty will become collaborators and unscrupulous businessmen and evil landlords will be the first to fly the Japanese flag and form "associations for the preservation of order". If we don't want to see this happen, we must unhesitatingly spread propaganda among the masses and mobilize, organize and arm them, so that together we may rise up and carry on protracted guerrilla warfare in north China. The first thing to do is to conduct extensive and deep-going propaganda work among the masses on resistance to Japanese aggression. Second, we must organize the masses in the trade unions, chambers of commerce, peasant associations and students' unions, and draw them into political organizations. Third, we must mobilize them to struggle for their own interests and to link these with the interests of the whole nation. Fourth, we must organize them to participate in military training, encourage them to join the people's self-defence forces, guerrilla units and volunteers, and draw them into the regular army.

4. Wipe out collaborators. We must resolutely oppose capitulationism, defeatism and the tendency to accept the establishment of "special areas". This is a prerequisite of protracted war. Only by opposing the collaborators can we unite the whole people and the whole army in north China, exert an influence on the whole country and even the world, persist in the protracted war in north China and win final victory.

# THE NATURE OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS CURRENT TASKS

*December 31, 1937*

## THE NATURE OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT TODAY

Let's talk about the situation facing young people during our war of resistance.

These are undoubtedly times of great change and struggle, unprecedented in history. The enemy hopes to turn all of us, and our children and grandchildren too, into slaves without a country. If we are to survive, we must fight a war of resistance and fight it to the end. These are fighting times. They cannot be compared to the era of the May 4th and May 30th<sup>3</sup> Movements or to the Great Revolution of 1925.<sup>461</sup> Whereas the struggles in the past were internal and limited political struggles, we are now fighting a total war of resistance against fascist aggression by an external enemy. Now is the time for the whole Chinese people — oppressed, ravished, slaughtered, the victims of aggression — to stand up and fight back. So the situation has completely changed. When the whole country is in a state of flux, the role of young people is most difficult and yet most important. Today our young people can no longer do as they did before — study, find a job, get married. . . . They can no longer follow the normal course of life. With the advent of war they can no longer peacefully pursue their studies. Of the centres of culture — Nanjing, Shanghai, Beiping, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Wuhan — four have already been lost. Most of the schools in the rear areas have already shut down. Hundreds of thousands of young people, and particularly our young friends from the Northeast, have no schools to attend, no homes to return to. They

---

The second and third parts of a speech delivered at the University of Wuhan. It was published in *Wartime Youth*, No. 1, Wuhan.

drift endlessly and taste the endless bitterness of life. There's a song called *The Songhua River*. To any listener who has known sorrow it is truly heartbreaking. And yet we should feel proud, very proud. As young people we should rejoice that we are living in these great and turbulent times. It is in such times that we make progress through learning and grow strong through tempering.

Not only does the present belong to our youth, they also have a bright future. They should think not only of their own lives but also of those of their children and grandchildren, of their descendants. The youth of today should ask not only how to win final victory in the War of Resistance, but also how to transform China into a free and democratic republic after victory is won.

Therefore, in our opinion, these are the best of times when looked at from a positive angle. They offer this generation of youth an opportunity to face the challenge and be great and to win a bright future. Such an opportunity is rare under normal circumstances.

## THE TASKS OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT TODAY

Our youth must not only save the nation in the present struggle for national survival, but also take up the responsibility of national reconstruction in the future. They have to build the nation as well as save it, and I think the saying, "The task is heavy and the road long," is very appropriate when applied to Chinese youth.

Where should we direct our efforts today? I would like to suggest four possibilities to our young friends:

First. Enlist in the army. This is the most effective way of saving the nation. The responsibility for establishing new military units and filling out the ranks of the old ones falls on the shoulders of our young friends. In my opinion, a person who cannot defend himself cannot be a real man. This is also true of a nation. Therefore, it is best to receive formal military training and be ready at any time to go to the battle front and fight the enemy.

Second. Take up work in the battle areas. In these areas the people lack organization. They wander about not knowing what to do. They want to defend themselves. They want to fight. But there is no one to give them guidance. We have to go in, organize them, arm them and lead them in fighting guerrilla war, in supporting

the operations of the regular forces, in blocking information, clearing the fields and sabotaging the enemy's vital lines of communication. . . . We should at least be able to bring about co-operation between the army and the people so as to hinder the activities of collaborators.

Third. Go down to the countryside. Although we have lost much territory, there are still large numbers of towns and villages in the rear areas where, to this day, many people do not know what resistance to Japan is all about. If we want to continue fighting and increase the combat effectiveness of the army, we must mobilize the masses to join the army. We have to reform those methods of mobilization which have proved inappropriate. Therefore, it is necessary that young people with ideals be organized to go directly to the countryside and mobilize the masses, so that able-bodied men will courageously volunteer to go to the front. In this work we must give preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting the Japanese aggressors. It will be best if we can get persons with money to contribute money and those with strength to contribute strength. We must see to it that persons in the countryside who have money but do not want to join the army provide for the families of anti-Japanese soldiers, so as to relieve them of anxiety about the people they leave behind. I believe that in this way we will be able greatly to reduce friction and achieve co-operation between the government and the people. Moreover, we can carry out work in the sphere of self-defence by the people, preparing them to co-ordinate their activities with the future operations of government forces.

Fourth. Go to the occupied areas. We must not let the enemy seize east and south China as easily as they did the four provinces of the Northeast.<sup>112</sup> Under the ruthless and brutal rule of the enemy we must arduously temper ourselves, expand our national salvation organizations in secret and covertly arm our oppressed compatriots in preparation for the counter-attack by our regular forces, so that we may work in co-ordination, one from within and the other from without.

If our young friends were to disperse themselves among the masses and spread out to every corner of the land, our strength would be invincible!

Work and study are inseparable. Today our work can develop smoothly only through constant study. I am convinced that as long as we are willing, it is possible for us to study anywhere. Each of us must find an appropriate place where we can study and work and make the most of our capabilities.

This doesn't mean casting aside what we have learned. It means, rather, adding to what we have already learned, which is the foundation, by bringing theory in line with reality and applying our knowledge.

The youth movement in China has a most glorious tradition. Faced with today's struggle for national liberation, our youth have a great mission to fulfil.

When we set ourselves to it, we will surmount all difficulties and dispel all doubts. We are courageous, resolute, hard-working and rich in understanding. We are the mainstay of the War of Resistance.

Our prospects are bright and full of promise.

Young friends, strive for final victory in the War of Resistance, for the advent of a new China, independent, happy and free!

# POLITICAL WORK IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

*January 10, 1938*

## I. REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL WORK, THE LIFELINE OF NATIONAL REVOLUTION

The lessons derived from two months of fighting in the nationwide War of Resistance have clearly and urgently placed the importance of reforming the armed forces to meet the needs of the war before the whole people and with particular acuteness before the Kuomintang.

The most important factor in reforming the armed forces is the establishment of a system for doing revolutionary political work. Only by setting up such a system among the resistance forces can we enhance our fighting spirit and unite officers and men, army and people as one man, with one heart and one mind, so that they will fight to the end for the freedom and independence of the nation!

In 1924, when the Kuomintang was reorganized in Guangzhou<sup>2</sup> and before the National Government was established, the old armed forces had not yet been reformed nor the revolutionary forces set up. That is why no decisive victory was won in the fierce battles with the forces of Chen Jiongming and others in the Dongjiang, Xijiang and Beijiang areas and in the south,<sup>413</sup> although we had more than 200,000 troops from Guangdong, Hunan, Yunnan, etc. taking part in the actions. But after the graduation of the first class of cadets from the Whampoa Military Academy<sup>414</sup> and the formation of two regiments of the new National Revolutionary Army,<sup>463</sup> a force with these two regiments as its central components in the Eastern Campaign<sup>415</sup> immediately won

---

An article published in Shanghai on January 10, 1938, in the pamphlet *A Programme for Political Work in the War of Resistance*. The exact date of composition is unknown.

the warm welcome and help of the people in the Dongjiang area and was able to capture Chaozhou and Shantou, drive straight through to the border of Fujian and swiftly annihilate Yang and Liu.<sup>116</sup> From a purely military point of view, was it not a miracle that the mere addition of two regiments, consisting of a few thousand men, should have been decisive in winning a total victory, while the more than 200,000 troops engaged in a bloody war over the previous twelve months had been unable to defeat Chen Jiongming? The reason was that these two regiments were new, revolutionary forces in which political work based on the revolutionary Three People's Principles had been carried out.<sup>162</sup> Politically, they were superior to the enemy, and this raised their combat effectiveness and guaranteed unity within the army and between the army and the people. It was because of this irrefutable fact that the Kuomintang decided to make revolutionary political work central to the continued expansion of the new, revolutionary armed forces and to the reform of the old armed forces. Only in this way was victory won in the Northern Expedition.<sup>117</sup>

The Soviet Red Army was able to unite the workers and peasants in the midst of ravages and privation and beat back the attacks of the White Guards and foreign aggressors; the Chinese Red Army was able, during the past ten years, to unite the people of the Soviet areas<sup>457</sup> in waging ruthless battles; the Spanish Republican Army was able to unite the people and engage in resolute and protracted struggle against the invading German and Italian fascist armies and Franco's rebel forces — these were all "miracles".<sup>118</sup> And to a large extent they were made possible by the effective revolutionary political work done in the revolutionary armed forces.

Therefore, we can affirm that political work based on dedication to the revolutionary cause is the life and soul of every revolutionary armed force.

Some people say that political work is all empty talk, like a salesman's pitch for a quack medicine. Others say that it just increases the friction between the higher and lower ranks in the army, making it more difficult for the officers to lead the men, and that if relations between the army and the people are "too good", it will be more difficult for the army to direct the people.

We must say frankly and honestly that these strictures on political work arise either from a failure to understand its true significance or from conscious opposition to it and reluctance to see the armed forces revolutionized. When political work turns into mere empty talk, the



fault does not lie with political work as such but with the particular political worker who is not carrying out true, revolutionary, political work. To talk idly about the revolutionary cause and the revolutionary political programme, while in many ways actually obstructing their implementation; to call on the army and the people in declarations, broadcasts and training programmes to participate in the all-out national war, while actually withholding from the people the right and opportunity to fight and hampering the relations between people and army at every turn, even to the point of forbidding the people to give comfort to the troops; to harangue the soldiers about the War of Resistance, calling on them to march bravely to the front, while in fact high-ranking officers hold back in the face of the enemy or even flee in civilian clothes — all this is at variance with the revolutionary cause, the revolutionary political programme and the behaviour of a revolutionary army. And this kind of political work is nothing but a frill, a joke, or mere claptrap. It is bound to be empty talk, a salesman's pitch for a quack medicine.

Political work aims to unite army and people, officers and men and to maintain links between them on the basis of the revolutionary cause and political programme. It will be impossible to forge unity inside and outside the army and to have efficient command over the army if there is no such supreme principle of uniting in resolute struggle and self-sacrifice for the country and the people, and if the "higher-ups" do not offer encouragement and play an exemplary role, but instead perpetuate the warlord system and the divisive practice of allowing officers to oppress the men and the army to oppress civilians. And there will be no hope of the army's becoming a true revolutionary vanguard for national liberation.

Some people ask: Isn't the National Revolutionary Army already carrying on the political work instituted in the period of the Great Revolution? To this question, we must once again answer frankly and honestly that the political organization and regulations that existed in the armed forces of that period no longer exist in the so-called Political Training Sections.<sup>119</sup> For a decade now Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies have not been the content of political work. Can political work without a revolutionary system or content meet the needs of a national revolutionary army? Over the ten years since 1927, only the Eighteenth Group Army, that is, the Red Army, has kept up and carried forward political work with the revolutionary system and content of the period of the Great Revolution.

## II. THE TASKS AND CONTENT OF POLITICAL WORK IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

The fundamental aim of political work in the revolutionary armed forces is to raise their fighting spirit, ensure victory and bring about unity within their ranks and between the army and the people.

The Chinese nation is at a critical juncture; it will either survive or be destroyed. It urgently needs the fighting spirit of the resistance forces, their will to carry the war to the end even at the cost of their lives. It urgently needs the unity of the army and the people in meeting the national crisis and winning final victory in the protracted War of Resistance. Today we must eliminate any factions still existing in our armed forces. We must get rid of the notion of preserving one's own strength and regarding one's own troops as a personal possession. We must do away with all aspects of the warlord system, under which the lower ranks are oppressed by the higher, the men by the officers and the people by the army. And we must wipe out the pathological fear of Japan that is manifested in hanging back, prevaricating, being reluctant to go to the aid of endangered friendly forces and fleeing at the mere sight of the enemy. The only way to eradicate all such shameful phenomena is to promote the same revolutionary political work as in the period of the Great Revolution, so that the armed forces of the whole country will become truly revolutionary and resolutely carry the fight for national liberation through to the end.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies must be revived to form the basis and core of the political work in our armed forces. Every commander, fighter and civilian must be made to understand and firmly believe that we are fighting the War of Resistance today for our country, our people, ourselves and our descendants, and for the three great aims of national liberation, the people's welfare and their democratic rights. They must be made to understand deeply the Three Great Policies of uniting with the Soviet Union, the Communist Party and the workers and peasants and to carry them out firmly as the only way to make the revolutionary Three People's Principles a reality. Only such political work, combined with the actual implementation of revolutionary policies, can ensure that the army and the people throughout the country will unite as one, firmly stand together and, confident of victory, determined to achieve national liberation, fearing no difficulties or setbacks, submit-

ting to neither threats nor blandishments and resisting any attempt to sow dissension, persist in the War of Resistance until final victory.

With the above aim and basis in mind, how should we carry out our political work? I think that it should be three-pronged, that is, directed at the army, the civilian populace and the enemy forces.

In the army, our urgent tasks are as follows:

1. We must carry out revolutionary political education among all officers and men in every unit, propagate the revolutionary Three People's Principles and link theory with practice. We must see to it that officers and men acquire a progressive, revolutionary world outlook and acquaint themselves with international trends, the domestic situation, the general state of affairs in Japan and the way to win final victory in the War of Resistance. We must help to greatly enhance their national consciousness and spirit of self-sacrifice. That is why political education in the army must be on a par with military training and must be conducted regularly. The teaching material must be revolutionary in content. To stimulate the interest of the soldiers in study, full-scale discussions must be set going between commanders and fighters, difficult points and misconceptions must be patiently cleared up and formalism and ritualism combated. Only thus will we be able to carry out political education in any profound sense.

2. We must strive to improve the treatment and living conditions of the rank and file. It must be admitted that the old armed forces did very poorly in both respects. If we do not strive to improve this situation as much as possible, we cannot break down the barrier between officers and men or arouse the fighters' enthusiasm for battle. It is imperative to prohibit corporal punishment and the cursing and striking of the men as well as the pocketing of their pay by officers. A formal directive should be issued to that effect, placing the supervision of all such matters under the political organs. We should set up the necessary organizations, such as War of Resistance exhibition centres and clubs, and organize entertainments in order to provide officers and men with appropriate recreation and sports activities and to promote literacy among the soldiers. Provisions for the troops must be guaranteed, the soldiers themselves should elect their mess committees and attention should be paid to improving their meals. Every effort should be made to distribute the gifts sent by the people principally to the lower-ranking officers and the rank and file, while people bearing gifts to the soldiers should be allowed to come into close contact with them. Only thus will the life of the officers and men

be happy and stimulating. If the work of our political organs is not closely linked with improvements in the life and treatment of the soldiers, it will indeed be like peddling quack medicine.

3. We must establish conscious revolutionary discipline within the armed forces. The discipline and consolidation of a national revolutionary army are founded upon political and national consciousness, not upon verbal abuse or flogging and other forms of corporal punishment. Unity between army and people is founded upon the love of the people and the protection of their interests by officers and men. It cannot be achieved by oppressing people, trampling them underfoot or commanding them to act against their will. Education and persuasion should be the chief methods of dealing with those who make a mistake or break discipline. Disciplinary regulations should not be applied except when absolutely necessary. This means that voluntary observance of discipline in a revolutionary army can be achieved only through adequate political education, mutual trust and understanding between officers and men and mutual care and consideration between the army and the people. To promote revolutionary discipline, the political organs must begin by strengthening political education and improving the treatment of the soldiers.

4. We must guarantee that orders of a military administrative nature issued by military commanders are carried out. Through the work of political organs, we must ensure that commanders can rely on the self-discipline and high level of national consciousness of the lower-ranking officers and the men, so that all orders they issue in the national interest with a view to furthering the War of Resistance and to expanding the role of the army and improving its organization will be executed. The political organs should wage earnest struggles against any tendency to disobey orders; they will thus educate all officers and men.

5. All political workers must play an exemplary role. By their deeds they should set an example ideologically and politically. They should influence all officers and men by their loyalty to the revolutionary cause, their indomitable will and their hard work and perseverance. They should unite all officers and men by their friendly and unassuming manner and patient persuasiveness. Only in this way can they heighten the esteem in which political work is held, help advance it and increase its effectiveness. All bad habits such as behaving arrogantly, seeking the limelight, indulging in empty talk and leading a life of graft and corruption must be overcome or eradicated.

In the localities, our urgent tasks are as follows:

1. We must protect the interests of the people, so that army and people become as one. Wherever the army goes, it is strictly forbidden to impress people into its service, requisition their carts, or impose levies on grain and fodder. Pay fairly for what you buy and do not harass the people or harm their interests. When it is necessary to get help from the people, meetings with their true representatives should be held to arouse and convince them so that they will voluntarily help the army.

Wherever the revolutionary armed forces go, they must not only ensure that they themselves do not harass or harm the people, but also help the people eradicate evils. The political organs of the army must resolutely protect the interests of the people and relieve their sufferings. Only thus will the people be able to see from their own experience that the army is their army, fighting in the national interest, and only thus will the people and the army become closely united.

2. We must organize and arm the people. Wherever the resistance forces go, the political organs must ensure the people's right to decide matters for themselves. They must conduct propaganda, mobilize the people and help and lead them in getting organized and armed. They must do their work well so that people from all walks of life will be ready to organize of their own accord associations for resisting Japan and saving the nation as well as armed forces to fight Japan. Existing organizations that are unsuited to mobilizing the masses for participation in the war and that restrict their actions should be reformed. Their mass base should be expanded so as to bring the initiative of the people into full play. Only thus can the strength of hundreds of thousands of people be co-ordinated with that of the armed forces and all the needs of the army be met by relying on the people.

3. We must mobilize the people to weed out collaborators. Japanese spy agencies are scattered throughout the country, and traitors are running wild. In order to consolidate our areas of military operations as well as our rear areas and to heighten the political vigilance of the troops and the people, the political organs of the anti-Japanese armed forces must pay attention to mobilizing the masses and co-operating with them in a movement to extirpate traitors. Being soft towards the Japanese aggressors and Chinese traitors is a crime against the nation. One of the main jobs of the political organs in safeguarding the war effort is to train the army and the people to stamp out the activities of spies and enemy agents by determined measures.

In dealing with the enemy forces, we should:

1. Carry out constant propaganda and agitation. We should seize every possible opportunity to demoralize the enemy forces and thereby lower their combat effectiveness.
2. Shout propaganda at the enemy troops and scatter leaflets to them across the firing line, even in the midst of battle. This will cause wavering in their ranks.
3. Spare no effort to prohibit the maltreatment of prisoners of war. Treat them well, educate them, explain matters to them and then release them immediately.

### III. ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF POLITICAL WORK

A rigorous system and a sound organization for doing revolutionary political work must be set up if it is to be carried out with satisfactory results. Here the first thing is to get rid of such incorrect attitudes as neglecting political work and regarding political organs as mere ornaments to be kept for the sake of appearances.

There must be an independent organizational system for doing political work at each level in the armed forces, from the highest General Political Department right down to the company political instructor. The commander at each level can give guidance to the political organs at that level, but the lower organs must obey the directions of the higher. If a political organ has objections to the instructions of the commanding officer at the same level, it has the right to appeal to the political organ at the next higher level. The military officers at the various levels must do everything possible to facilitate political work at their respective levels and should refrain from either interfering with or obstructing it. The officers of the political organs at each level have the right to impeach, before a political organ at a higher level, any military officer at the corresponding or lower levels who harms the revolutionary cause or violates the revolutionary political programme or revolutionary discipline. This is the only way to ensure that the political organs achieve their aims and fulfil their tasks.

Political workers must be selected and trained with care, because they have to face such serious tasks and inescapable responsibilities. To ensure success in political tasks, it is imperative to bring together

people from every part of the country who excel in doing political work, continuously train progressive young cadres and send them to work in political organs in the armed forces all over the country. Any notion that incompetent persons can be assigned to political work merely to make up the requisite numbers jeopardizes that work.

Again, because political organs and political workers have to shoulder such important responsibilities, they must also pay attention to the methods of political work. They should adopt a flexible approach, taking into account the different histories and organizations of army units, their different customs and composition, the relations between their officers and men and various complex factors such as the social, economic and political conditions and ethnic composition of each region. They must not set political affairs against military affairs and divorce themselves from reality or from the army and the people. They must win the trust of the officers and men and that of the people through patient persuasion and guidance and unite them in waging resolute struggles in conformity with the revolutionary goal and political programme.

It is imperative for all armed units fighting in the War of Resistance to act swiftly and with the utmost determination in carrying out revolutionary political work. Only thus can final victory be won. I wish to put my humble suggestions regarding this important and pressing question before the armed forces of the whole country.

# THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY

*March 1939*

## I. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY

The War of Resistance is now entering a new stage, and certain changes have come about in regard to the enemy, ourselves and the outside world.

1. Three features are obvious in the enemy's policy.

a. The enemy has determined that his central task is to conduct mopping-up operations in his rear areas. He is devoting his main strength — political, cultural, economic, and especially military — to these areas. Accordingly, there have been no enemy offensives or thrusts into the hinterland in the last four months.

b. The enemy is giving priority to political measures supplemented by military operations. By pursuing this policy, he hopes to exploit the human, material and financial resources in areas under his occupation.

c. Nevertheless, the enemy will continue the war. His giving priority to political measures does not mean the end of the war. The war will never stop until China wins victory or is subjugated. Nor will the enemy cease his offensives simply because he is conducting mopping-up operations in the rear.

2. In our own policy, we have shifted the focus of attention to the enemy's rear areas. In the new stage, the enemy's rear will be the focal point of the War of Resistance, and we shall wage guerrilla warfare, implement a new administrative programme and reorganize the

---

Excerpts from a speech delivered at a conference of cadres of the New Fourth Army Headquarters in southern Anhui.



local armed forces in the enemy-occupied areas, in order to contend with the enemy in the political, economic, cultural and military fields. In a resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of its Sixth Central Committee,<sup>120</sup> the Party summed up the experience of last year's resistance and outlined the work to be done behind enemy lines. When Wuhan was in peril,<sup>464</sup> we stressed that the army, the different political parties and the whole people should each recognize the importance of working behind enemy lines. All the anti-Japanese political parties are welcome to go and work with us in places where our Communist-led troops have the upper hand.

3. The outside world is paying great attention to what is going on in China.

a. It pays great attention to the areas occupied by the enemy and the policies he pursues there.

b. It pays great attention to the development of guerrilla warfare.

c. It pays great attention to the political power of the Chinese Communist Party in the guerrilla zones. Everybody wants to see whether the policies implemented by our Party will violate the interests of other countries, whether the troops led by the Party can persevere in the guerrilla zones till final victory, whether these troops can truly frustrate the enemy in his political, economic and cultural undertakings and whether they can grow into regular forces, engage the enemy on a larger scale and emerge victorious.

The situation with respect to the enemy, ourselves and the world shows that in the present new stage the focus of attention is the enemy-occupied areas, or east China, that is, the broad region lying east of the Huanghe River and the Beiping-Hankou and Guangzhou-Hankou Railways. This is so not only because the eastern part of China has been occupied by the enemy but also, and more important, because it is the richest and most populous area in the country and has convenient communications, fertile land, an advanced economy and a high level of culture. This region provides the best example of modernization in China. The western part of China is unquestionably not as well developed as the eastern, although the Northwest and Southwest can serve as our Great Rear Area. Should east China fall completely under enemy domination, west China will grow poorer and weaker and become more endangered with each passing day, and our difficulties will naturally be multiplied. Meanwhile, the enemy will be able to overcome his own difficulties by exploiting China's human, material and financial resources. We need to be aware of these cir-

cumstances. They are the environment in which the New Fourth Army finds itself. It is now operating in this same enemy-occupied eastern part of China. It is this objective reality that has further raised the status of the New Fourth Army and made the tasks before it all the more important.

## II. THE GROWTH OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY AND THE WAY TO OVERCOME ITS DIFFICULTIES

The above situation and environment will make it possible for our New Fourth Army to grow in future. How so?

1. The farther we go behind enemy lines, the more chances we will have to grow.

2. The more difficult the circumstances, the better we shall be able to display our capabilities and the better we shall be tempered. We do not seek to build our strength in comfortable places. Everybody wants to go there and can survive there. In the main, we should move into areas where conditions are hard. When an area is difficult and dangerous, it will be impossible for a large number of Kuomintang troops and personnel to endure and overcome the hardship, whereas our New Fourth Army can wage arduous struggles in defiance of difficulties.

3. The more deeply we go among the masses, the easier it will be for us to create base areas. If we plan to turn places where the New Fourth Army is operating into base areas, we must rely on the masses there and go deep among them. Only thus can we ensure our development.

4. The more complicated the circumstances, the more rapidly our united front will expand. A characteristic of China's united front is its complexity. Only under complicated circumstances will we be able to create model areas of the national united front.

5. The more competition we have, the greater the progress we shall make. At the Fifth Plenary Session of its Fifth Central Executive Committee, the Kuomintang raised the matter of competition. I believe that we shall temper ourselves better and make more progress through competition in areas both north and south of the Changjiang River, particularly through competition with the local governments and mass organizations south of the lower reaches of the river.

6. The longer we persist, the greater will be our nationwide in-

fluence and our influence on the outside world. We should persist in guerrilla warfare and create base areas both north and south of the Changjiang River, demonstrating to the enemy, to the whole country and to the outside world that we will never back down or run away. The fact that guerrilla warfare can be developed in such difficult areas proves that it can be expanded in China's War of Resistance in self-defence.

Although we enjoy favourable conditions for development, difficulties still exist:

1. The enemy keeps changing his policies and military techniques. We must under no circumstances rest content with our present ability to repulse attacks. When the enemy suffers setbacks, he will make changes. He is considering new policies in the military, political and economic fields. Therefore, although we can overcome today's difficulties, we need to consider how to overcome tomorrow's.

2. Our areas of operation are limited. Conditions in enemy-occupied areas north and south of the Changjiang River are different from those in the vast territory of north China. Our activities are restricted because the enemy has occupied the areas north and south of the Changjiang River. Furthermore, the enemy will intensify his efforts to build telephone lines and road networks and to build railways north of the river, in order to reduce the scope of our operations.

3. The topography and communications are not favourable.

4. The social environment and historical conditions south of the lower reaches of the Changjiang River are not very favourable to us.

5. We are still weak. Although we have been steeled and toughened by a year of fighting, we are still guerrilla units.

6. The friendly party and its armies<sup>465</sup> will not give up the area south of the lower reaches of the Changjiang River. This is an important region they will desperately contend for.

How shall we overcome these difficulties?

1. Persist in guerrilla warfare. We must overcome difficulties by winning battles. Only by winning more and greater victories will we make the friendly party and its armies take us seriously, the enemy fear us and friendly nations respect us.

2. Uphold the united front. We should expand the united front so as to counter all enemy slanders and vilifications, and we should unite with the friendly party and its armies, local governments and the broad masses around us so as to create a favourable environment for our work.

3. Continue to strengthen ourselves. We should expand our forces, raise our prestige and increase our strength, for only this will facilitate our work north and south of the Changjiang River.

4. Persist in going deep among the masses. We should make it known to the masses north and south of the Changjiang River that we are working for their interests and for national liberation, so that they will rally around us. We should unite with all people, from the toiling masses to members of the upper strata, provided they are not collaborators. We should immerse ourselves in hard work among the masses so as to spread our influence among them.

5. Persist in helping the friendly party and its armies. By helping and influencing them, we will make them feel that we are friends they can co-operate with.

These are the fundamental conditions and policies for overcoming our difficulties. So long as we adhere to such policies, we will be able to overcome our difficulties in the main. The details will have to be worked out through practice by our leading comrades at various levels.

### III. THE STRATEGY, GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND TASKS OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY

I shall deal with four problems:

#### 1. The areas for development.

There are three principles that should guide us in choosing the areas for our development behind enemy lines south of the lower reaches of the Changjiang River:

a. Move into areas where there is a vacuum.

b. Move into areas that are dangerous and establish new zones of operation there.

c. Move into areas with only enemy and puppet troops, areas that attract relatively less attention from the friendly party and its armies and where they have not been active. Thus friction can be reduced to the benefit of the War of Resistance.

In the light of the experience we have gained in the three years of guerrilla warfare,<sup>466</sup> we are of the opinion that in fighting the national enemy it is entirely possible to establish guerrilla base areas north and south of the Changjiang River. As long as we are able to go deep among the masses and carry on guerrilla warfare skilfully, we will pre-

vent the enemy from gaining control of the entire region in spite of his tight blockade.

2. The operational principle.

Considering the tasks of the whole nation at the new stage as well as the conditions of the region in which the New Fourth Army finds itself, the main principle guiding it in its operations is still to carry on guerrilla warfare. We should make a new effort to study, develop and perfect guerrilla tactics in the light of the special features of the region in which we operate. We should not employ the same guerrilla tactics as in north China, nor should we merely copy the experience of the past three years of guerrilla warfare. We should have greater flexibility and mobility, disappearing and reappearing still more unexpectedly and changing our tactics still more frequently.

3. The work of building the army.

The principle is to build a strong army, or in other words, first, it should be an army of high quality, second, it must expand. We must not ignore quality, for our recruits are limited in number. We should see to it that one fighter can play the role of ten and one cadre the role of a hundred. We cannot become regular forces by skipping the necessary intervening steps, for success will not come about overnight. Cadres are of decisive importance in the building of a powerful New Fourth Army. Only with sufficient numbers of competent cadres can we carry our work forward. The New Fourth Army has to make a great effort in this respect, because our cadres at present are inadequate militarily, culturally, technically and politically, and we must take pains to train and educate them.

It is very important to learn military techniques, particularly night fighting and hand-to-hand combat. We should also learn specific skills that are essential in guerrilla warfare, such as vaulting barbed wire to attack an enemy stronghold, or swimming with rifles to make a raid on the enemy. Later on, we will attack the enemy on the Changjiang River to destroy his transportation lines, so mastery of the special skills needed in conducting guerrilla warfare on the river will be of great significance to the development of our guerrilla units. In addition, we should learn how to use explosives. Scaling city walls is another basic skill we should master. While keeping up guerrilla warfare, we should encourage sports activities.

To guarantee success in the building of the New Fourth Army, we must engage in political work. We must consolidate the Party's leadership in the Army and preserve and carry forward our fine traditions.

#### 4. Political and economic struggles against the enemy.

Our central task in the past was to get our guerrilla units to assemble and move speedily to the front line and then to the rear of the enemy for operations. We have accomplished that task. Now we must wage arduous political and economic struggles against the enemy. He has adopted a policy of giving priority to political measures supplemented by military operations in order to exploit the resources of the occupied areas. This being the case, we shall have plenty of work to do. We must:

a. Try our best to destroy the enemy and puppet regimes, sabotaging those that can be sabotaged and overthrowing those that can be overthrown.

b. Ensure the restoration of our anti-Japanese political power. We should do our best, in co-ordination with local self-defence forces, to help the localities re-establish and protect the organs of anti-Japanese political power behind the enemy lines. We should also assist the local mass organizations in their work.

c. Weaken the morale of the enemy troops in every possible way so that their anti-war feeling will run high. Thus, they will be reluctant to face battle and will refuse to fight fiercely in the final decisive moments.

d. Bring about the disintegration of the puppet troops. As the enemy has great difficulty in transferring more troops from his homeland to China, he is trying to make up for his lack of manpower mainly with puppet troops, hoping to use Chinese to subdue Chinese. Therefore, we should place a high priority on bringing about the collapse of those troops. While trying to wipe them out militarily, we should try to undermine them politically, so that the enemy will not feel safe about using them.

e. Make use of puppet troops, "associations for the preservation of order," etc., as agents inside the enemy camp to gather intelligence and keep us informed. Later on, when the time is ripe for us to mount attacks from the outside, they can co-operate with us from the inside.

f. Cut the enemy's vital communication lines. This will have not only a military but also a political and economic impact.

g. Blow up the enemy's mines and factories.

h. Blockade the enemy's commercial activities.

i. See to it that the banknotes issued by the enemy are not used in our areas.

j. Study means of developing our own economic strength in the midst of guerrilla warfare. For instance, we should find ways of doing our own spinning and weaving to meet our own needs, as there is plenty of cotton south of the lower reaches of the Changjiang River.

k. Organize and train the masses and do all we can to help improve their literacy and political awareness, so that they will gradually attain a higher level politically, militarily and culturally. This is the way to strengthen the ability of the localities to govern themselves.

l. Develop local self-defence forces so that self-defence units simultaneously participating in production can be transformed into full-time guerrilla units.

m. Try to win over the members of the Green Band and the Big Sword Society.<sup>121</sup> We should study these organizations and try to win them to our cause through political work.

n. Improve the living conditions of the people appropriately. Landlords who have gone over to the enemy side must not be allowed to return to collect rents.

o. Resolutely eliminate collaborators. We must be prudent in this work, because there are double agents working among the puppet troops and in the puppet governments.

p. Strengthen our propaganda work. We should give the greatest publicity to our victories and promptly refute the enemy's false propaganda. When the enemy puts up a notice, we should post one of our own to expose his deceptions. This work is very important and brooks no delay. From now on, our political department should listen to the enemy's broadcasts in order to work out counter-measures.

q. Institute underground work in large cities.

I can only put forward these main points for your consideration and discussion. There is an enormous amount of work for us to do in waging political and economic struggles against the enemy. This work is exceedingly important, no less important than fighting the enemy with guns. What I have said is very superficial; I have only touched on some lessons from the past and a few problems of the present. I hope that all the political personnel of the New Fourth Army will work together, provide more concrete material and suggest more concrete measures. In this way we will demonstrate that our New Fourth Army can not only conduct exemplary guerrilla warfare but, at the same time, carry out exemplary political work and achieve exemplary successes in political and economic struggles against the enemy.

# ON BUILDING A STRONG AND MILITANT PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE SOUTHWEST

*January 1942*

The present political situation demands that we should be on the alert for changes and make the southwest Party organization stronger and more combat-ready so as to put into effect the policy the Central Committee has formulated for us, that is, to work underground for a long period, accumulating strength and biding our time.

The conditions for building a strong and militant Party organization are as follows:

1. We must turn the five thousand Party members into staunch and competent underground cadres who maintain their ties with the masses and are skilled at influencing them and urging them forward.

2. We must set up one sound Party branch, or indeed several parallel ones, in all major units (factories, schools, villages or big government offices) where the masses are concentrated. It is necessary to maintain the contacts which the Party organization or its individual members have established in the major departments or government offices (such as administrative departments, mass organizations, business firms and communications and economic institutions).

3. We must help the leading bodies of the Party gain the capability and confidence to exercise leadership independently. They must not be afraid of making mistakes, and when they do, they should be able to face and correct them. They must be good at appraising situations, employing the right tactics and devising different methods of work so that the Party's policies are embodied in each specific work assignment

---

From December 1941 to January 1942, the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a conference in Chongqing and summed up the work of the previous two years. At the end of the conference, Comrade Zhou Enlai made a speech, from which this section on the tasks before the southwest Party organization is taken.



(the reorganization of a unit, the examination of the records of cadres and Party members, the struggle against enemy agents, education in underground work, and so on).

4. We must consolidate the Party ideologically and organizationally so that the southwest Party organization will be turned into a truly and totally underground party, maintaining ties with the masses.

5. We must familiarize ourselves with the various important groupings, especially their history, policies, personages and activities. First and foremost, we must acquaint ourselves with both the normal activities and the emergency measures of the central and local Kuomintang authorities, and those of their secret agencies in particular.

6. We must see to it that we go to work wherever masses of people are found. The method should be the same as that followed in our day-to-day activities. The first thing needing to be accomplished is to gain access to the Kuomintang, the Three People's Principles Youth League,<sup>487</sup> workers' organizations, legal organizations in schools, co-operatives in the villages and all the important administrative departments, so that we can implement the Party's policy of resisting Japanese aggression and achieving democracy and progress.

7. We must be good at co-ordinating work among the upper strata with work among the lower, open work with underground work, public propaganda with secret propaganda and contacts outside the Party with contacts inside. But co-ordination does not mean exposure.

When all these seven points are implemented, our southwest Party organization will become strong and militant and will be prepared to go into battle the moment the opportunity arises.

# ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE KUOMINTANG FROM 1924 TO 1926

*Spring 1943*

After co-operation was established between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, with the help of the Communist Party of China Dr. Sun Yat-sen again set out upon the road of revolution as the representative of the bourgeois democrats. At the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, he accepted the manifesto drafted by our Party, which transformed his Three People's Principles into the new, revolutionary Three People's Principles.<sup>462</sup>

At that time, the Kuomintang relied on us not only ideologically, to revive and develop its Three People's Principles, but also organizationally, to set up its headquarters and expand its membership in the provinces. It was with our help that the Kuomintang was able to extend its influence and the influence of the Three People's Principles among the masses of workers, peasants and of the petty bourgeoisie. After the reorganization of the Kuomintang, it was thanks to the efforts of our Party that the workers' and peasants' movements grew rapidly throughout the country. And it was thanks to the work of our comrades that provincial organizations of the Kuomintang were established and expanded. Most of the leading members of the Kuomintang in the provinces at the time were our comrades, such as Dong Biwu<sup>122</sup> and Chen Tanqiu<sup>123</sup> in Hubei, He Shuheng<sup>124</sup> and Xia Xi<sup>125</sup> in Hunan, Xuan Zhonghua<sup>126</sup> in Zhejiang, Hou Shaoqiu<sup>127</sup> in Jiangsu, and in the north, Comrade Li Dazhao,<sup>128</sup> Yu Shude<sup>129</sup> (then a Communist), and Comrades Li Yongsheng,<sup>130</sup> Yu Fangzhou,<sup>131</sup> and others. It was our

---

An address delivered at a study session of the cadres of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party in Chongqing.

Party that drew the revolutionary youth into the Kuomintang and it was our Party that enabled it to establish ties with the workers and peasants. Members of the Kuomintang left wing predominated in all its local organizations. The places where the Kuomintang expanded most rapidly were precisely those where the left-wingers were in the dominant position and where there were the largest numbers of Communists. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen departed for the north,<sup>132</sup> our Party organized a countrywide Campaign of All Circles for a National Assembly,<sup>133</sup> and associations for the convocation of a national assembly were established in a number of places, as were similar associations of women's circles (since Dr. Sun Yat-sen's statement on the convocation of a national assembly did not clearly call for participation by women). That was how Dr. Sun Yat-sen's departure for the north got the backing of the masses and how his influence and that of the Kuomintang were able to spread farther north.

Quite naturally, in the circumstances then prevailing, the Kuomintang was divided into different factions and different interpretations of the Three People's Principles emerged. At the time of the reorganization of the Kuomintang, the fiercest opposition came from persons like Feng Ziyou and Xie Chi,<sup>134</sup> who were representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie<sup>468</sup> in Guangdong. They were sharply denounced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and expelled from the Kuomintang. It is not surprising that they were the first to oppose and sabotage the reorganization. This was because Guangdong was a British imperialist sphere of influence, and as the revolution developed there, it inevitably aimed at British imperialism and was thus bound to clash with the interests of the province's comprador bourgeoisie, which depended on British imperialism for its very existence. The fact that Feng Ziyou and his like were the first to break away when the revolutionary forces were gaining ground in Guangdong fully shows the regional character of China's comprador bourgeoisie.

After the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Western Hills Clique publicly opposed the Kuomintang's making revolution.<sup>135</sup> They broke away and formed an independent organization. They hurled abuse at the Kuomintang in Guangdong and at Mr. Liao Zhongkai of the Kuomintang left wing, saying that Guangdong was being turned red, but in general they did not oppose Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang right-wingers published a newspaper in Hongkong and worked openly to split the Guangdong Kuomintang. Their tactic was to attack Liao Zhongkai while trying to bring Chiang Kai-shek over to their camp.

And they were quite right in their estimate of Chiang. Even when the revolution surged ahead with full force throughout the country in 1925, these right-wingers remained opposed to it.

The most dangerous of them was Dai Jitao.<sup>52</sup> Although he, too, signed his name to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's testament, outwardly opposed the Western Hills Clique's attempt to split the party and stood for preserving the unity of the Kuomintang, in reality he was plotting to penetrate the Kuomintang in Guangdong and bring about a split from within. He greatly developed the negative aspect of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thought by writing *The Philosophical Foundation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines* and *The National Revolution and the Kuomintang*, both of which emptied Dr. Sun Yat-sen's doctrines of everything revolutionary. He talked volubly about Confucian orthodoxy and claimed that the orthodox teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were inherited from the emperors Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. From Shanghai to Guangdong and back, he would hold forth emotionally on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's doctrines to anyone he met. He went and spoke at the Whampoa Military Academy, attempting to create a split.<sup>114</sup> On April 24, 1925, shortly after his speech at the academy a right-wing organization, the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines, was founded there.<sup>136</sup> Sun Fo was another right-wing leader.<sup>137</sup> He was a bourgeois double-dealer who was actually opposed to revolution while appearing at times to favour it. During the War of Resistance, he has continued his duplicity. He would sometimes advocate democracy, whereas his notion of democracy was actually what was embodied in the May 5th Draft Constitution of the Kuomintang.<sup>138</sup>

On the surface, the centrists of the Kuomintang co-operated with us and favoured revolution, but they were not sincere in their co-operation. On the contrary, they were always guarded in dealing with the Communist Party and always put restrictions on it. Their representative was Chiang Kai-shek. In reality he co-operated with the right-wingers and was the protector and organizer of the right-wing forces. Under the prevailing conditions, he could be considered to belong to the centre for a short while, but later he openly turned to the right.

And now let me describe how the Whampoa Military Academy came to be founded. Before 1923, of the troops under Sun Yat-sen's control only the First Division, commanded by Li Jishen, was more or less revolutionary.<sup>139</sup> This division was originally under Deng Keng's<sup>140</sup> command, and Zhang Fakui,<sup>141</sup> Ye Ting,<sup>363</sup> Deng Yanda<sup>142</sup>

and indeed Chen Cheng<sup>78</sup> were all officers from this division during the period of the Great Revolution.<sup>461</sup> The founding of the Whampoa Military Academy should be regarded as the result of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's military defeats. During the 1911 Revolution<sup>143</sup> he had launched two movements, one to win over the New Army and the other the secret societies.<sup>144</sup> After the 1911 Revolution his activities gradually centred on winning over the warlords, which ended in repeated defeats for him. This taught him a lesson. And so, with the help of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, he came to see the importance of building a revolutionary army, and accepting a proposal by the Soviet advisor, he reached a decision in 1923 and formally opened the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, appointing Chiang Kai-shek its commandant.

How was it that Chiang Kai-shek got close to Dr. Sun Yat-sen and won this appointment? In the first place it was thanks to Chen Qimei<sup>145</sup> that Chiang gained access to Dr. Sun. Ever since Chen Qimei began his political career, he had been a follower of Dr. Sun. For example, when Dr. Sun organized the Chinese Revolutionary Party,<sup>146</sup> he asked all who wished to join to put their thumb-prints on the text of the oath. Many people, like Hu Hanmin<sup>51</sup> and Wang Jingwei<sup>107</sup> who came of scholar-bureaucrat families, refused to do so, and Huang Keqiang<sup>147</sup> was even more vigorous in his objection. But Chen Qimei was the first to take the oath and put his thumb-print on the text. That was how Chen Qimei won the trust of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek was one of Chen Qimei's disciples and thus came to Dr. Sun's favourable attention. Another important reason for Dr. Sun's confidence in him was that he had taken a gamble on the *Yongfeng* Warship<sup>148</sup> Incident. In 1922 Chen Jiongming bombarded the President's headquarters and drove Dr. Sun Yat-sen away.<sup>149</sup> After boarding the *Yongfeng*, Dr. Sun was locked in a stalemate with Chen Jiongming for over fifty days. Chiang Kai-shek, who had suffered a business failure on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, saw his chance in this incident, made a special trip from Shanghai to the *Yongfeng* and pledged to share life and death with Dr. Sun. Thereafter the two of them became quite close. Even today Chiang Kai-shek still capitalizes on this incident as proof of his being a loyal follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; he cites his stay on the *Yongfeng* as evidence that he went to the aid of Dr. Sun in his hour of need. After establishing relations with the Soviet Union, Dr. Sun sent Chiang Kai-shek on a mission there, since Deng Keng

and others were unable to leave Guangdong; later on he appointed him commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy.

When he first took charge of the academy, Chiang Kai-shek was outwardly in favour of revolution, but in fact he was ideologically opposed to communism and the Soviet Union and insincere in his co-operation with the Communist Party. Once, when the Soviet advisor put in a few words on behalf of the revolution, Chiang took offence and left for Shanghai in a huff. The Whampoa Military Academy then had an enrolment of 600, most of whom were left-leaning youths secretly drawn in by our Party from the provinces. There were 50 to 60 Communist Party and Youth League members among the cadets, about 10 per cent of the total. Chiang Kai-shek was on guard against them and put restrictions on them. Even then the warlord mentality was already developing in him. He put Wang Boling, a man held in utter contempt by all, in charge of discipline and training.<sup>150</sup> He only gave jobs to his own lackeys. He could not tolerate Deng Yanda, a man with some self-respect who refused to toady to him, while he had great trust in He Yingqin, the No. 2 lackey, recommended to him by Wang Boling. All the detachment commanders in the Whampoa Military Academy were his own men. Once I appointed a few left-wingers as detachment commanders, and he was so displeased that he withdrew the appointments. In dealing with his staff, his method was to create conflicts which he could exploit and manipulate, to have progressives watched by reactionaries, left-wingers pinned down by opponents of the left wing, and those who believed in communism kept in check by anti-communists. For example, since the commander of the First Division was He Yingqin, he appointed me — Zhou Enlai — Kuomintang party representative. Since Wang Maogong,<sup>151</sup> Commander of the Second Division, had come to be regarded as a "left-winger" because he was close to Wang Jingwei, Chiang would on no account accept my recommendation of Comrade Lu Yi<sup>152</sup> of our Party to be party representative in that division but appointed someone who belonged to the right wing instead. Since Tan Shuqing, commander of the Third Division, was a right-winger, he appointed Comrade Lu Yi party representative there. In February 1925, before the First Eastern Campaign, the Association of Young Soldiers<sup>153</sup> was founded at the Whampoa Military Academy; to counter it, Chiang lost no time in following Dai Jitao's scheme to split the Kuomintang and in April set up the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines.

In the Kuomintang in Guangdong at that time, the centrists were in the minority while the left-wingers constituted the overwhelming majority. Liao Zhongkai was a Kuomintang left-winger. As he came of an overseas Chinese family and had relatively few ties with the comprador and landlord classes at home, he displayed more of the traits of the progressives in the national bourgeoisie. With regard to the Guangzhou Merchants' Corps Incident, he was in favour of resolute suppression from the very beginning.<sup>154</sup> After the outbreak of the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike, he sympathized and sided with the workers.<sup>155</sup> He also stood with us in supporting and promoting the peasant movement, which was making headway in Guangdong. Although at times he was prone to waver in political struggle and was somewhat afraid of the strength of our Party and of the workers and peasants, his political career during his final days did him credit. He respected the opinions of the Soviet advisor, but he had a mind of his own and held independent views. He was a staunch representative of the left wing of the bourgeoisie.

Wang Jingwei, on the other hand, reflected the weakness of the bourgeoisie. When he was still a revolutionary, he could expound the views of our Party and of the Soviet advisor and he functioned very well as a mouthpiece. Hu Hanmin was ideologically a right-winger whose basic position was that of the landlord class, even though he would sometimes compromise with the left. Thus, it was he who most strongly advocated compromise at the time of the Merchants' Corps Incident, and he knew the truth about the assassination of Liao Zhongkai.<sup>4</sup> As a matter of fact, Tan Yankai<sup>156</sup> was also a right-winger, but where his own interests were concerned, he would sometimes take a position close to that of the left wing, because he wished to build up his own strength in face of the daily expansion of Chiang Kai-shek's military strength. Zhu Peide<sup>157</sup> was sometimes close to Wang Jingwei and sometimes to Chiang Kai-shek. Cheng Qian<sup>158</sup> also drew close to Wang Jingwei because he wanted to expand his own forces. But these people were invariably afraid of the masses. The reason why they didn't stand in open opposition to the masses in Guangdong was that the mass movements there had not directly affected their own interests. Once the mass movements began to make headway in their native provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, their real opposition to the masses was exposed.

Following the May 30th Movement in 1925, the worker and peasant movements made unprecedented progress throughout the country.<sup>3</sup> In

our Party Comrade Mao Zedong was representative of those who were able to realize from these movements that the revolution was developing into a revolutionary peasant war and that this was the over-all trend. He took over the job of running an institute to train cadres for the peasant movement<sup>159</sup> and made an investigation of the peasants' land problem, a study which resulted in the publication of some twenty pamphlets. Trainees from this institute were later sent to Hunan, Hubei and other places to launch a massive peasant movement.

The rapid progress of the revolution that year started a panic among the middle-of-the-roaders in the Kuomintang. After the First Eastern Campaign,<sup>115</sup> the armed rebellion of Liu Zhenhuan and Yang Ximin<sup>116</sup> was suppressed. Already at the time of the Shaji Massacre<sup>160</sup> we could see that Chiang Kai-shek was wavering, frightened as he was by the imperialists. In June 1925 the central headquarters of the Kuomintang sent word to the Whampoa Military Academy to participate in the demonstration in Guangzhou. I dispatched two battalions from the army and one battalion from the academy for the purpose. Later, when Chiang Kai-shek heard of this, he was very displeased, for he was against the demonstration itself. After Liao Zhongkai's assassination, Chiang dismissed Hu Hanmin and Xu Chongzhi.<sup>161</sup> Ostensibly he was opposing the right wing and showing he was revolutionary, but actually he was trying to grab power in his own hands. Since Hu was then acting Commander-in-Chief and Xu was a veteran in army circles, their continued presence would have made it impossible for Chiang to rise either in the army or in the government.

At the time of the Second Eastern Campaign<sup>115</sup> in October 1925, the peasant movement in Haifeng and Lufeng led by Comrade Peng Pai<sup>25</sup> was already in full swing. The self-defence forces of the peasants had occupied the county seat even before the arrival of the troops and had elected a brother of Comrade Peng Pai as county magistrate.<sup>162</sup> When Chiang Kai-shek arrived, he found himself a guest rather than the master; this, of course, could not but arouse his fear of the mass movement. In particular, in the Whampoa Military Academy the Association of Young Soldiers grew much larger than the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines. Communists became Kuomintang party representatives in two of the three divisions and seven of the nine regiments, and the Communist Party had organizations in companies, platoons and squads. Besides, political departments were established in the armies. Seeing the growth of the revolutionary forces, Chiang Kai-shek wavered even more and attempted



to impose restrictions. Accordingly, in the course of the Eastern Campaign in November 1925, he called a joint meeting of military and political cadres above the company level, openly stated that his Whampoa Academy would allow of no splits and asked to be informed of the names of all Communists in the academy and in the army, as well as the names of members of the Kuomintang who had joined the Communist Party. I stalled by saying that since this was a matter concerning the two parties, I must ask the Central Committee for instructions. Later, in a private conversation with me, he went a step further and said that to ensure unity in the Whampoa Academy, Communists should withdraw either from the Communist Party or from the Kuomintang and the academy — adding hypocritically that he hoped it would not be the latter.

That was right on the eve of the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang. I came back to Guangzhou from Shantou and discussed the matter with Comrade Chen Yannian,<sup>163</sup> Secretary of the Party Committee of Guangdong and Guangxi, and Borodin,<sup>164</sup> the advisor who had been sent by the Soviet Union to Guangdong to work in the Kuomintang and the government. The policy we decided on was to strike at the right wing, isolate the centre and expand the left wing. We planned that at the congress we would openly expel Dai Jitao, Sun Fo and others from the Kuomintang and elect to the Central Executive Committee fewer middle-of-the-roaders and more left-wingers, ensuring that one-third of its members would be Communists and that the left wing would have an absolute majority. In the army, as things then stood, Chiang Kai-shek's First Army had only three divisions. The First Division was commanded by He Yingqin and the Second by Wang Maogong, who was close to Wang Jingwei, then a Kuomintang left-winger. And the First Army was the only one belonging to Chiang. So we planned to deal a counter-blow at Chiang Kai-shek by withdrawing all Communists from the forces under his command and co-operating with Wang Jingwei to form a bipartisan army. I carried this plan back to Shantou, where I was to wait for its approval by the Central Committee and then put it formally to Chiang at once. Since left-wing delegates were predominant in the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang, our plan was sure to succeed. After a long wait, however, a telegram came from the Central Committee disapproving the plan. What was even more regrettable, the Central Committee had gone so far as to enter into full negotiations with Dai Jitao in Shanghai, had invited him and others to return to Guangdong

and, in order to get the right-wingers to return, had even wired Guangzhou to postpone the congress for a month to await their arrival. In short, they had adopted a policy of complete concession to the right wing. Thus, Sun Fo returned to Guangdong as representative of the right wing and Chiang Kai-shek got the backing he needed. Meanwhile, the Central Committee appointed Zhang Guotao<sup>165</sup> as the secretary of the Party fraction at the congress. He said that heretofore we had dominated the left wing and that we should now form an independent Communist wing distinct from the left wing and let the latter stand on its own. In the elections, big concessions were made to the right wing. As a result, among the thirty-six members of the Central Executive Committee there were only seven Communists, barely more than one half of what we had planned for. Kuomintang left-wingers, counting even persons like Zhu Peide and Tan Yankai, numbered only fourteen, while the right-wingers and middle-of-the-roaders numbered fifteen. The right-wingers Sun Fo, Dai Jitao, Hu Hanmin, Wu Chao-shu and Xiao Focheng were all elected. Among members of the Central Supervisory Committee, the right-wingers had an absolute majority. Since the two committees of the Kuomintang often held joint sessions, a situation was created in which the right wing was strong, the centre emboldened and the left wing isolated. And this was the first important concession that Chen Duxiu,<sup>166</sup> as a Right opportunist, made to the right wing and the middle section of the Kuomintang. It was a major political concession.

Events after the congress further isolated the left wing. At the conclusion of the congress Borodin returned to the Soviet Union, General Galen,<sup>167</sup> the Soviet military advisor, went to join Feng Yuxiang,<sup>71</sup> and the majority of Communists on the Central Executive Committee also left, so that Wang Jingwei even asked us whether he could still count on our help. Just at this point Chen Duxiu was hospitalized, and in the absence of the General Secretary there was a lack of leadership in the Central Committee. In addition, Comrade Chen Yannian had to go to Shanghai for an emergency meeting. The right-wingers, on the other hand, were returning to Guangdong one after another. Zhang Jingjiang<sup>168</sup> and Chen Lifu<sup>169</sup> returned to Guangzhou in January and February 1926 and, in collusion with Chiang Kai-shek, sowed discord between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. That was the ultimate cause of the *Zhongshan* Warship Incident of March 20. Such was the general political situation prior to the incident.

The March 20th Incident was created entirely by Chiang Kai-shek. On February 5, he dismissed Wang Maogong, making his first show of strength to intimidate Wang Jingwei. He wired me to return to Guangzhou. Seeing that he had the closest dealings with the right-wingers and sensing something suspicious in his demeanour, I reported to Comrade Zhang Tailei.<sup>169</sup> The then Soviet advisor underestimated the gravity of the situation, taking a major problem to be a minor one and brushing it aside as a mere trifle. And since Comrade Chen Yan-nian returned to Guangzhou from Shanghai only a day or two before March 20, he did not handle the matter quite properly either.

Comrade Li Zhilong was then the captain of the warship *Zhongsban*. He discovered that Chen Zhaoying, commander of the Humen Fortress, was engaged in smuggling and reported the fact to Wang Jingwei. Chen Zhaoying was Chiang's man, and naturally he complained to Chiang. Chiang Kai-shek, supported by the right-wingers, took advantage of the opportunity and created the March 20th Incident, spreading the tale that the *Zhongsban* planned to bombard the Whampoa Military Academy and that the Communists intended to throw him out. He ordered the arrest of Li Zhilong, imposed a curfew on the town of Whampoa, set a watch on the division party representatives and on the Soviet advisor, encircled the Soviet Consulate and disarmed the worker pickets of the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike. He also placed me under house arrest for a day. In collaboration with the right wing, Chiang dealt blows at Wang Jingwei and attacked the Communist Party, baring his teeth to the revolutionary forces. At the time, Tan Yankai, Cheng Qian and Li Jishen all bore grudges against Chiang, and Zhu Peide and Li Fulin<sup>170</sup> wavered, while all the armies wanted to test their strength against him. Had it been the policy of the Central Committee of the Party to make a strong counter-attack, doubtless things would have gone differently. But a policy of continued concessions was adopted instead. Believing that Chiang wanted to create a split and failing to realize that he was not yet strong enough to risk doing so, the Central Committee told him this was all a misunderstanding. Again he took advantage of the opportunity and immediately released those arrested, saying that he too took it as a "misunderstanding". This was the second important concession that Chen Duxiu, as a Right opportunist, made to Chiang Kai-shek. It was a major military concession.

To explain the "misunderstanding", the political committee met for one hour at Wang Jingwei's bedside. Wang Jingwei, Tan Yankai

and the Soviet advisor all made courteous apologies, but Chiang didn't say a word, thus taking a morally superior position and scoring a major political success. Following that, Wang Jingwei "disappeared" and the left wing of the Kuomintang was at a loss what to do. As we did not make a powerful response to Chiang Kai-shek's attack on the revolution, his position was further consolidated, and he then turned to strike at the right. He arrested Ouyang Ge,<sup>171</sup> passed over Chen Zhaoying and ignored Gu Yingfen<sup>172</sup> and Wu Chaoshu. After the March 20th Incident, Hu Hanmin had returned to Guangdong to try his luck, but now he had to leave again and, by coincidence, he arrived in Hongkong on the same boat with the "missing" Wang Jingwei. Chiang Kai-shek struck at the left to win the support of the right and then struck at the right to show that he was a revolutionary. Those were his methods — the treacherous, ruthless methods of a gangster. After that, Chiang actually became a Kuomintang right-winger. He took advantage of the situation to disband the Association of Young Soldiers and the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines in Guangdong and to force Communists out of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa Military Academy. More than two hundred and fifty known Communists withdrew from the Kuomintang and the First Division, including Comrade Jiang Xianyun,<sup>173</sup> a student of whom Chiang Kai-shek was particularly proud and who was the first to declare his withdrawal from the Kuomintang. There were only thirty-nine who withdrew from the Communist Party, Li Mo'an being the first.<sup>174</sup> After that, the First Army was thoroughly demoralized and its combat capabilities were drastically weakened.

The concessions that Chiang Kai-shek obtained from the Communists, thanks to Chen Duxiu's opportunism, allowed him to consolidate his position politically and militarily. Then he launched an offensive against us in the form of a Bill on the Regularization of Party Affairs, which was introduced on May 15 at the Second Plenary Session of the Second Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The sole purpose of this bill was to bring pressure to bear on the Communists. It included the following provisions:

(1) When members of other political parties joined the Kuomintang, the parties concerned should teach them that the foundation of the Kuomintang was the Three People's Principles formulated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and that they must not doubt or criticize him or those principles.

(2) When members of other political parties joined the Kuomintang, the parties concerned should submit a list of their names to be kept by the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

(3) When serving as executive members of high-level Kuomintang headquarters (*e.g.*, the Central Headquarters and the provincial or special municipal party headquarters), members of other parties who joined the Kuomintang should not hold more than one-third of the total seats of the said headquarters.

(4) No member of another political party who joined the Kuomintang should serve as director of any department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

(5) Members of the Kuomintang should not hold any meetings on party affairs in the name of the Kuomintang without the permission of the party headquarters.

(6) Members of the Kuomintang should not belong to other political organizations or take part in activities of a political nature without the permission of the highest party headquarters.

(7) All directives issued by other political parties to their members who joined the Kuomintang should be approved beforehand by joint Kuomintang-Communist meetings. In case of emergency, when there was no time for prior approval, such directives should be subject to subsequent approval by a joint meeting.

(8) Members of the Kuomintang should not join any other party before getting permission to withdraw from the Kuomintang; once they had withdrawn to join another party, they should not be readmitted to the Kuomintang.

(9) Any member of the Kuomintang violating the above provisions should have his membership cancelled at once or should be subjected to due punishment in keeping with the degree of the offence.

As matters then stood, it still would not have been hard to smash this offensive by Chiang Kai-shek if we had only had a correct policy. Since his troops were numerically inferior and all popular movements were wholly under our leadership or that of the Kuomintang left wing, he still didn't dare make a complete break with us. However, the Central Committee of our Party, persisting in an opportunist policy, sent Peng Shuzhi<sup>175</sup> and Zhang Guotao to lead the Communist Party Group at the Second Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The Party fraction met and discussed whether to accept or reject the Kuomintang's Bill on the Regularization of Party

Affairs. Peng Shuzhi quoted Marxist classics at length to prove it unacceptable. But when asked what we should do, he had no answer except that we should discuss the matter. When others came up with suggestions, he again quoted the classics at length, saying that this idea wouldn't work and that idea was wrong. The discussion went on for seven days without result. Then Zhang Guotao adopted a very dishonest tactic and asked all present to sign in favour of acceptance of the bill. Thus a third important concession was made. It was a major concession on party affairs.

As a result, Chiang Kai-shek, the right-winger, gained the greatest advantage. He promoted Zhang Jingjiang, who was really a puppet in the hands of Chen Guofu,<sup>176</sup> to the presidency of the Central Executive Committee. Chiang himself became the Director of the Organization Department and concurrently the Director of the newly established Military Department. The Organization Department was actually run by Chen Lifu. Several directorates (of the Departments of Propaganda, Peasant Affairs, etc.) that we had previously held were given up. Thus the right wing became predominant organizationally, and we lost all our positions as far as party affairs were concerned. Using their positions, Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu recruited right-wingers in the provinces. In north China they relied on the Great League of Ding Weifen and Wang Faqin<sup>177</sup> and bought over the Western Hills Clique. From then on the struggle between the left and right wings heated up in the local headquarters of the Kuomintang as well.

In spite of the triple victory Chiang Kai-shek had won politically, militarily and in party affairs, it was still possible to retrieve the situation. Had we launched a strong counter-offensive, Chiang Kai-shek's right-wing force could have been beaten. For even at that time there were only six divisions under his direct control. Of the eight armies, only one was his. The party representatives were Comrade Li Fuchun<sup>178</sup> in the Second Army, Comrade Zhu Kejing<sup>179</sup> in the Third Army, Luo Han<sup>180</sup> (still a Communist at the time) in the Fourth Army and Comrade Lin Boqu<sup>181</sup> in the Sixth Army. But Chen Duxiu continued to make crucial mistakes in his opportunist leadership during the Northern Expedition.

Militarily, we were absolutely certain of success in the Northern Expedition.<sup>117</sup> We had a detailed plan, and General Galen guaranteed that Wuhan would be taken before the Double Tenth Festival.<sup>182</sup> Before setting out, General Galen asked me to seek direction from the Central Committee as to whether we should assist Chiang Kai-shek

in the course of the expedition or try to weaken him. How should this political problem be resolved? I went to Shanghai and reported to the Central Committee. Chen Duxiu said that we should call a meeting and discuss the matter. (He was modest this time because he had been criticized by the comrades and attacked by the Kuomintang for an article opposing the idea of a northern expedition despite the changing political situation. He had written this article while in hospital without making any investigation of the facts.) At the meeting, Zhang Guotao was again the acting chairman, and there was no real discussion, just his cursory remarks to the effect that our policy in the Northern Expedition was both to oppose and not to oppose Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, we had no clear policy for dealing with Chiang during the expedition and right up to the time of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The result was that objectively we helped him and enhanced his position. However, the troops under his direct control were unsuccessful in battle. The First Army and the 17th Division were the first to be defeated at Niuhan, then Wang Boling's troops were wiped out in their attack on Nanchang, and Wang and Miao Bin<sup>183</sup> were captured. This was an ignominious defeat for Chiang. But Chen Duxiu, the opportunist, did not recognize this and went on making mistakes.

## GUIDELINES FOR MYSELF

*March 18, 1943*

1. Study diligently, grasp essentials, concentrate on one subject rather than seeking a superficial knowledge of many.
2. Work hard and have a plan, a focus and a method.
3. Combine study with work and keep them in proper balance according to time, place and circumstances; take care to review and systematize; discover and create.
4. On the basis of principles, resolutely combat all incorrect ideology in others as well as in myself.
5. Insofar as possible, make the most of my strengths and take concrete steps to overcome my weaknesses.
6. Never become alienated from the masses; learn from them and help them. Lead a collective life, inquire into the concerns of the people around you, study their problems and abide by the rules of discipline.
7. Keep fit and lead a reasonably regular life. This is the material basis for self-improvement.



## MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO DR. DWARKANATH S. KOTNIS' FAMILY

*March 22, 1943*

Dear Friends:

On behalf of the Eighteenth Group Army and the Chinese Communist Party, I extend to you our deepest condolences on the death of Dr. Kotnis.<sup>184</sup> Dr. Kotnis has made an immeasurable contribution in rendering help to the army and people where they needed it most — in the Wutai mountain region behind enemy lines in north China.

In 1938, on instructions from the Indian National Congress, Dr. Kotnis joined the Indian medical team that it sent to China. He arrived in Yan'an and entered the guerrilla areas of north China in 1939. He worked in many places in north China before finally settling down in the Wutai mountain region to become the late Dr. Norman Bethune's<sup>470</sup> successor. He was the director of the International Peace Hospital until he died. All his Chinese comrades loved and respected him. By carrying out the loftiest of tasks in the anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas and giving fraternal care to the sick and wounded soldiers, he saved the lives of many soldiers fighting the Japanese aggressors who had invaded our motherland, and he saved many people from becoming permanently disabled. We have benefited immensely from his work, and we will never forget it.

Dr. Kotnis is a symbol of the friendship between the great Chinese and Indian nations and a shining example of the Indian people, who are taking an active part in our common struggles against Japanese militarism and world fascism. His name will live forever in the hearts of the two great nations to whom he dedicated his life.

We share your grief at this loss to all freedom-loving mankind.  
Please accept our warmest respects!

Zhou Enlai

---

Published on March 22, 1943 in the *New China Daily*, Chongqing.

# HOW TO BE A GOOD LEADER

*April 22, 1943*

## I. The definition of a leader

Any cadre may at some time have to take up the work of leadership, and very likely he is already doing such work. Therefore, the work of leadership concerns leading cadres at all levels, whether the lower, middle or upper.

Among the staff members at Hongyan and Zengjiayan<sup>185</sup> there is only a difference in the kind of work each does, but no distinction is drawn between the leaders and the led, still less between cadres and non-cadres. Although some comrades working at Hongyan and Zengjiayan and in the office of the *New China Daily* are not directly shouldering the responsibilities of leadership, they are in fact leaders.

## II. The stand a leader should take

A leading cadre must proceed from the standpoint of the Party in everything he does. But this is only a general statement. More specifically, a leading cadre should have the following qualities:

1. A firm Marxist-Leninist world outlook and a revolutionary outlook on life;
2. Devotion to principle;
3. Faith in the strength of the people;
4. Dedication to study;
5. A tenacious fighting spirit; and
6. A high sense of discipline.

## III. The leaders and the leading organizations

1. Collective leadership and leadership of each level by the next higher level — unified leadership, centralization and democracy (discussion and division of labour).

---

The outline of a talk to cadres of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, originally entitled "Outline of a Talk on Leadership and Review of Work".

2. Individual responsibility and individual leadership — this is especially needed in the Great Rear Area and is by no means negated by collective leadership.

3. Direct personal intervention and decision from above — this is not the usual practice but one employed under special circumstances, or to set an example.

#### IV. What is correct leadership?

I shall now elaborate on the three points Stalin once made:<sup>186</sup>

1. Decisions made must be correct. First, leaders should evaluate the situation and anticipate possible changes, seeking out the characteristics of a given place at a given time. Second, they should relate all this to the general task of the Party and determine the tasks and policy for a given period. Third, in line with this policy, they should formulate slogans and tactics appropriate to the current situation. Fourth, they should then work out realistic plans and instructions. They should do all this through in-depth investigation and study of actual conditions, linking up the results with Party tenets and principles.

2. Correct decisions must be implemented. First, leaders should organize discussion of ways to implement the plan and carry out instructions. Second, they should carefully select capable persons and put them in charge of the plan's implementation. Third, they should organize efforts to realize the Party's plan. Fourth, they should personally take part in the implementation so as to set an example. By so doing, they can discover through practice whether the Party line and tactics are correct or whether they should be modified.

3. There must be reviews of the actual implementation of the decisions. Methods of making such reviews: (a) we must note tangible results of work rather than promises; (b) we must not merely look at plans on paper, but inquire whether tasks are being performed conscientiously or only perfunctorily; (c) we must pay attention to content rather than to form and examine whether a decision is really being correctly carried out or is being distorted; (d) reviews should not only be conducted from top to bottom, but also from bottom to top; (e) reviews should be systematic and regular; and (f) leaders should personally participate in reviews.

As Stalin has said, leaders must maintain close ties with the masses, and the experience gained by both leaders and masses must be synthesized. Only thus can there be correct leadership.

#### V. The tasks of leaders

Comrade Mao Zedong says that the tasks of leaders consist in using cadres well and implementing policies. This is true. Breaking them down, I think, they are as follows:

1. Leading cadres should pay close attention to ideological and political leadership. This requires that they constantly raise their own ideological level and strengthen their own political training. We ask our comrades to concentrate on the following: (a) placing emphasis on important matters; (b) sharpening political vigilance; (c) raising their theoretical level; (d) intensifying ideological struggle both inside and outside the Party; and (e) actively publicizing the policies and achievements of the Party.

2. Leading cadres should give careful thought to organizational leadership. Once the political line is laid down, organizational work decides everything. We draw our comrades' attention to the following points: (a) organizational leadership should be raised to the level of political leadership; in other words, all kinds of work should be put on a principled basis and connected with political tasks; (b) all organizational and day-to-day work should serve to guarantee the fulfilment of the Party's political tasks and the realization of its work plans; (c) importance should be attached to the Party's day-to-day leadership, so that Party organizations stay close to the grass roots and their work becomes even more concrete; (d) Party organizations and the masses must be mobilized to strive to surmount all difficulties; and (e) we should combat all forms of opportunism (such as perfunctoriness, empty talk, arrogance, bureaucracy, formalism, and red-taped routinism), corruption, degeneration, etc.

3. Prudence should be exercised in selecting cadres and assigning work. This is also part of organizational work, but it can be taken up separately. Both political qualifications and work competence are indispensable criteria for selecting cadres, but political trustworthiness takes precedence. Stalin once pointed out the harm done to the Party when people made appointments not in accordance with principle. He said that such persons were followed by a large "entourage" wherever they went and that they employed only those whom they regarded as their "own" men.<sup>187</sup> In one of his reports on the rectification movement,<sup>471</sup> Comrade Mao Zedong, too, criticized such persons for being "dishonest". That was the failing of those "imperial envoys who rushed everywhere". Given a cadre's political trustworthiness, it is still important to use him properly (in the light of the time, place and circumstances).

4. Work should be reviewed. The performance of working personnel and the implementation of the work plan must be reviewed. As Stalin has said, the objectives of the review are: first, to get to know the qualifications of the cadres; second, to determine the virtues and defects of the executive apparatus; and third, to determine the virtues and defects of the tasks or instructions that are set.<sup>188</sup> Some leaders think reviews of this sort are likely to expose their own weaknesses, marring their prestige or shaking their self-confidence. This is incorrect. Leaders enhance their prestige by correcting their mistakes, not by covering them up, and by immersing themselves in hard work, not by bragging and boasting. Confidence will only be strengthened and not weakened through the correction of mistakes. It is only those who are vain and concerned with face-saving who fear the exposure of mistakes.

5. Go among the masses. The leaders should not only educate the masses but should also learn from them. The reason is that the leaders' own knowledge is incomplete and their experience insufficient. Leading positions in themselves cannot bestow knowledge and experience, so it is essential to go to the people and draw experience from them. We ask that comrades: (a) get close to the people, maintain contact with them, and to some extent become one with them; (b) heed the voice of the people; (c) learn from them; and (d) educate them instead of tailing behind them.

#### VI. Leading the masses and befriending them

1. The masses are not to be led in the same way as Party members. The way we lead the masses and the attitude we take towards them should not make them feel that we are exercising leadership.

2. The basic method of leading the masses is persuasion, and definitely not command. Only in situations when it is necessary and when the majority agree while a minority still do not, may we compel the minority to carry out the decisions of the majority.

3. The leaders themselves should play an exemplary role in giving leadership to the masses and befriending them.

4. When necessary, leaders should ignore insults hurled at them.

5. Leaders must never underestimate the role they play or the influence they exert, and must work prudently and cautiously.

#### VII. The art of leadership

According to the art of leadership as expounded by Lenin and Stalin, leaders should not run too far ahead of a movement, nor should

they lag behind. Rather, they should grasp the key task and push the movement forward.

According to the art of leadership as expounded by Comrade Mao Zedong, they should take into account the over-all situation, think in terms of the majority and work together with our allies.

#### VIII. Work methods

1. Examine theoretical tenets and principles in the course of struggle;
2. Determine and review policies in the course of concrete work;
3. Improve work in a revolutionary spirit;
4. Promote democracy and encourage criticism and self-criticism; and
5. Employ mainly persuasion and not administrative fiat. Resort to orders only in emergency situations.

#### IX. Work style

1. Lenin's style of work consisted of:  
Russian revolutionary sweep; and  
American efficiency.
2. Comrade Mao Zedong's style of work consists of:  
The modesty and realism of the Chinese people;  
The simplicity and industriousness of the Chinese peasant;  
The love of study and deep thought of the intellectual;  
The flexibility and cool-headedness of the revolutionary soldier; and  
The tenacity and staunchness of a Bolshevik.
3. Combat all forms of opportunism manifested in day-to-day work. At present, we must especially combat perfunctoriness, empty talk, arrogance, formalism, routinism and all acts which sabotage the fine traditions of the Party and army.

## SPEECH AT A MEETING OF WELCOME IN YAN'AN

*August 2, 1943*

Comrades, thank you for your welcome. In the three years of my absence, I have actually done too little. But during this period, many big changes have occurred in China and abroad, and our Party has made enormous progress in many respects. We saw this all the more clearly when we were outside.

On the international scene, beginning with the fascist catastrophe visited upon the continent of Europe after the surrender of France,<sup>189</sup> we saw the treacherous attacks launched by Hitler's Germany against the Soviet Union;<sup>190</sup> we saw the surprise attacks launched by the Japanese marauders against Britain and the United States in the Pacific;<sup>191</sup> we saw fascist fifth columns<sup>192</sup> running rampant all over the world except in the Soviet Union. At the same time, we witnessed the heroic deeds of the Soviet Red Army and people rising up under the leadership of Stalin in resistance to Hitler's onslaught, and we saw their zeal for production. From the battles for the defence of Leningrad and Moscow to the battle of Stalingrad,<sup>193</sup> from the counter-offensives of the first two winters to the counter-offensive of this summer, their splendid victories have won the praise of the entire world. We also saw the formation and development of the Allied front to resist fascist aggression: from the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter<sup>194</sup> by Roosevelt and Churchill and the conclusion of the Soviet-British alliance and the Soviet-U.S. agreement<sup>195</sup> to the signing of the 26-power pact<sup>196</sup> in Washington; from the successful counter-offensive launched in North Africa by the Allied forces of Britain and the United States to the landing in Sicily. We also witnessed the birth and growth of the worldwide struggle against fascist domination: from the development

---

Published on August 6, 1943 in the *Liberation Daily*, Yan'an.

of the anti-fascist guerrilla war in the occupied countries of Europe to the emergence of the anti-fascist strikes and demonstrations in Germany and Italy; from the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation<sup>197</sup> to the founding of the National Committee of "Free Germany";<sup>198</sup> and from the restoration or recognition of the legal status of the Communist Parties of the United States and India to the arrival in Yan'an of Comrade Okano Susumu, leader of the Communist Party of Japan.<sup>199</sup> Over the past three years, the anti-fascist war of liberation waged by the Allied countries has passed from crisis to safety, from defeat to victory and from passive defence to active attack. This change was mainly due to the two years of Soviet resistance and to the three offensives waged by the Soviet Red Army and people. It was also due to the victory won by the Allied forces of Britain and the United States in North Africa and their operations in the South Pacific, to the massive production of the United States and the war mobilization of the Allied countries and to China's perseverance in the War of Resistance, particularly the development of its guerrilla war behind enemy lines.

With the fall of Mussolini<sup>200</sup> and the dissolution of the Fascist Party in Italy, fascist domination in the world has begun to crumble where it is weakest, and world fascism is heading for extinction. The dawn of victory in the worldwide anti-fascist war is in sight, and the fascists and their fifth columns, rampant for a time, are drawing closer to their doom day by day. Do we not see the Italian fascists at the end of their road? Do we not see Germany's fifth column in Italy scurrying for cover? They are living examples for the adherents of fascism throughout the world and to those in China as well!

Domestically, in the past three years, we have remained in a stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan. During this period, some people have thought that, with first the Soviet-German war and then the Pacific war breaking out, the Japanese aggressors would attack either India or the Soviet Union, with no time or strength for mounting further attacks on China. Hence, they have been passive in resisting the Japanese aggressors, thus hinting that the Japanese shouldn't strike at China; and they have been active in opposing the Communist Party, so as to nudge the Japanese into diverting their troops to attack the Soviet Union. The pity is that, however ingenious the stratagem, the Japanese aggressors have not entirely fallen for it. They have their own policy. Although they heartily approve of passivity in resisting them, you still haven't surrendered or laid down your arms, so whenever



there is a respite or the need to strike at China they will do so. They approve even more heartily of active opposition to the Communist Party, but you haven't gone all out to "suppress the Communists" and are unable to "annihilate the Communists", and they still have to use more than half their own troops in China to conduct campaigns to "tighten public security"<sup>201</sup> in their rear areas and carry out "mopping up" operations against the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

In the past three years, other people have thought that with the outbreak of the Pacific war, if the United States and Britain could not defeat the Japanese aggressors very quickly, they would try hard to help China, and China would reap the benefit without lifting a finger. Facts have certainly shown that the United States and Britain could not defeat the Japanese aggressors very quickly. As for their assistance to China, it's true that we've all been eagerly looking forward to it, but they too have been hard pressed to produce enough. They will first send help to those troops that are actually fighting in the war and to those places where fighting is effective, and they will surely think twice before helping troops that are hesitant in battle and divided in purpose. Moreover, since Wu Kaixian went from Nanjing to Chongqing,<sup>202</sup> the secret agents of the two sides have worked hand in glove, and yesterday the Japanese aggressors even broadcast their terms over the radio to induce capitulation.<sup>203</sup> This cannot but give rise to misgivings in the friendly Allied countries.

Over the past three years, still others have thought that you would win the war by dragging it out. But the enemy won't allow you to do that even if you want to. It's obvious that they will try to solve the China problem before the fall of Hitler, or at least before the decisive battle in the Pacific. And the fall of Mussolini is the main reason for the recent open attempt to induce capitulation. But apart from that, the domestic situation won't permit you to drag the war out either. How is it possible to raise the morale of the soldiers when a considerable number of troops are not sent to the front to engage in active combat? How is it possible to heighten combat effectiveness if the system of military service is not improved and the troops are not given higher pay? How is it possible to avert bankruptcy if financial and economic policies are not changed and bureaucrat-capital is not abolished, if corruption brings no punishment, and hoarding is not eliminated? How is it possible to maintain peace and stability in the rear areas during the War of Resistance if the people are denied freedom and their life is not improved, if labour productivity is not raised, if bureaucracy is not

eliminated and if the oppressive policy of discriminating against people outside one's own circle is not abolished? If all this is not changed or done away with, how will it be possible for China's War of Resistance to drag on until victory? Our answer is, victory requires not dragging on but fighting! Not passive but active resistance! Not internal division but unity! Not political oppression but democracy!

In the past three years, there have even been some people who have thought that, despite the rottenness in internal affairs, the War of Resistance could be maintained until victory if only the secret police were strengthened. But the goal of the War of Resistance is to achieve national liberation and democracy, not to consolidate a fascist system of secret police. Strengthening the secret police will only pave the way for domination by the fascist Japanese militarists; it definitely will not pave the way for victory in China's War of Resistance.

Since the ideas prevalent among the Kuomintang authorities for the past three years are all wrong, is there still a way of achieving victory in China's War of Resistance? Our answer is, yes, there is. We must look to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region!<sup>1472</sup> We must look to the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and to the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines! We must look to the Chinese people! We must look to the genuinely anti-Japanese parties and armies! We must look to the Chinese Communist Party, and particularly to our Comrade Mao Zedong!

Speaking of the War of Resistance, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have operated behind enemy lines for the past three years without ever receiving arms and ammunition, food, clothing, medicine or medical equipment from outside. Depending solely on the people and their own efforts, they have been fighting year in year out, maintaining these strategic anti-Japanese base areas and tying down more than half the enemy troops in China. In the face of these achievements by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies even the enemy is obliged to admit that they are the staunchest and most formidable force resisting Japan. Is not such an anti-Japanese force worthy of emulation by all other Chinese troops willing to resist Japan? Are not all those who want to attack and get rid of this force a pro-Japanese fifth column?

So far as democracy is concerned, in the last three years our Party has promulgated its administrative programme in the border region and other base areas. It has put into practice the "three thirds system"<sup>204</sup> based on universal suffrage and implemented democratic decrees pro-

protecting the rights of person and property and political rights. It has carried out a rural policy of reducing rent and interest charged by the landlords, encouraging the payment of rent and interest by the peasants and effecting a reasonable distribution of financial burdens. It has implemented its labour policy by instituting the ten-hour day, suitably improving the workers' standard of living and raising productivity, has introduced the systems of voluntary military service and people's militia, and has applied correct financial, economic, cultural and educational policies. Subject to the principle of respect for our sovereignty and observance of our laws and decrees, it has allowed all foreigners to work for the resistance against Japan or to conduct entrepreneurial, cultural and religious activities in the border areas. Our policies have enabled the base areas to become self-sufficient with ample supplies of food and clothing. Are not such border areas and base areas worthy of emulation by all other localities in China that genuinely wish to put democracy and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles into practice? Are not all those who want to attack and get rid of such areas fascists who oppose democracy and the Three People's Principles? All parties and armies genuinely resisting Japan, all patriotic fellow-countrymen, must surely be dissatisfied with the Kuomintang authorities for their continual vacillation with regard to the War of Resistance, for their erroneous internal policies, and particularly for their double-dealing policy of opposing the Communist Party while at the same time taking part in the War of Resistance. And they will surely be ready to befriend the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and form an alliance with them, to draw on the experience of democratic government in the border region and other base areas, and especially to form a genuine united front with the Chinese Communist Party.

Therefore, in the past three years, all the Chinese people and all the Allied countries have been faced with these questions: In China, which armies are active in the War of Resistance? Which armies are passive? Which areas practise democratic government? Which areas do not? They all have clear answers in their minds. And not only in their minds: these answers have been publicly expressed both in China and abroad.

At this point, we must mention the great progress made by our Party in the last three years. During this period, it has achieved more and greater successes than in the previous twenty years. Domestically, our Party has twice averted the crisis of a civil war (by exposing the intrigue in the Southern Anhui Incident<sup>205</sup> and the recent plot to attack

the Border Region<sup>206</sup>). It has persisted in the most arduous guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, toughened the leadership of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and reinforced support to the anti-Japanese base areas. By so doing, it has strengthened the morale and the will to resist of the people in the enemy-occupied areas and kept alive the hope for and confidence in victory of the people in the Great Rear Area. Internationally, not only has our Party foreseen the march of world events of the past three years and pointed out that world fascism is sure to be defeated and the democratic countries are sure to triumph; it has also made it clear to the Allied countries that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, led by the Chinese Communist Party, and their base areas are the only ones that are really carrying out counter-offensives against the Japanese aggressors at key points on the mainland. As far as the Party itself, the army and the Border Region are concerned, the rectification movement<sup>473</sup> conducted by our Party has yielded unprecedented results in ideological remoulding. The policy of "better troops and simpler administration" has led to the consolidation of our strength. Unified leadership has brought about political unanimity and the campaign to "support the government and cherish the people" has resulted in the solidarity of the Party, the government, the army and the people. The movement to develop production has set a fine example in self-reliance; and, lastly, the examination of the records of cadres has led to the unprecedented consolidation and unity of the Party. How has all this come about? It has been brought about by the whole Party, by relying on the strength of the people, by rallying under the leadership of the Central Committee and, most decisively, by rallying under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong.

At many critical junctures and on many key questions during the past three years, Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership and instructions have ensured that our Party did not in any way lose its bearings or take the wrong course.

Nothing offers clearer proof than the march of events of the last three years. All those who opposed or were sceptical about Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership or his views have now been proved utterly wrong.

The twenty-two years of our Party's history have proved that the views of Comrade Mao Zedong through the Party's entire history have developed into a sinified Marxist-Leninist line, that is, the communist line of China!

Comrade Mao Zedong's orientation is the orientation of the Chinese Communist Party!

Comrade Mao Zedong's line is the Bolshevik line in China!

Comrades, shouldn't we be proud to have such a Party? Shouldn't we be proud to have such a leader? But some anti-Communists in the country have clamoured shamelessly for the abolition and dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party. Aren't they the fifth column of the Japanese aggressors and the collaborators? And they have chosen this very moment to make this demand openly. They deliberately spread the idea that since the Communist International has been dissolved,<sup>62</sup> communism is no longer applicable to China, that the Chinese Communist Party has lost its backing and that the Party ranks will split. Will anyone believe such nonsense?

Is it true that communism is not applicable to China? The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is applicable to the whole of mankind and it can change the world. How can China be an exception? The anti-Communists talk such nonsense because they are afraid we will use the magic mirror of Marxism-Leninism to show them up for what they are — a fifth column — before the Chinese people. They talk such nonsense because they are afraid we will use the Marxist-Leninist world outlook to explain to the Chinese people the political, economic and social realities of China and show them the real truths of the Chinese revolution. We must warn the anti-Communists: Not only is communism applicable to China; through its application and development by Comrade Mao Zedong, the leader of our Party, it has been integrated with China's national liberation movement and the vital interests of the Chinese people — it has become rooted in Chinese soil. Whoever attempts to shake it is courting self-destruction.

Has the Chinese Communist Party lost its backing? True, in the course of its birth and growth, the Party received much guidance and help from the Communist International, but the Party's real support has come not from the Communist International but from the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party has grown out of the working people of China; it exists in the midst of the Chinese people. Ours is a mass Party. It has a membership of 800,000 and an army of 500,000, and it has formed ties of flesh and blood with nearly 100 million people in the course of the actual fighting. The Chinese nation needs it, the Chinese people need it. Who can abolish and dissolve it? We must warn the anti-Communists: Not only will the Chinese Communist Party not be abolished, it will exist for a long, long time!

With world fascism heading for its doom, it is not the Chinese Communist Party but China's fascist secret police system that should be abolished and dissolved.

Are the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party going to split? Day in and day out the anti-Communists dream that our Party can be split into factions just as they themselves are split, and so they have fabricated all sorts of slanders and rumours to try to do us harm. But our Party organization is united, it is based on ideological belief, class consciousness and revolutionary tempering and is cemented by a conscious self-discipline. It can in no way be split into factions like the Kuomintang, which is completely lacking in unity. True, quite a few mistakes have been made and there have been quite a few erring comrades, but it is precisely through the struggles to oppose and rectify those mistakes that our Party has matured and become unified ideologically and consolidated organizationally. Those who are willing to correct their mistakes will naturally return to the Party's correct line. Those who err time and again and are not willing to correct their mistakes will naturally be spurned by the Party. Were not Chen Duxiu<sup>166</sup> and Zhang Guotao<sup>165</sup> among the founders of the Chinese Communist Party? But when they were expelled from the Party for refusing to mend their ways, they were unable to split the Party; on the contrary, the Party became more consolidated. In the past three years, through the rectification movement and the examination of cadres' records, our Party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, has consolidated its unity to a degree never before known. We must warn the anti-Communists: far from splitting as a result of your rumours and slanders, the Chinese Communist Party will be even more vigilant, more united and more consolidated in the face of your intrigues and sabotage! In our opinion, the more arduous the War of Resistance becomes, the better the revolution will develop. The split will occur not in the Chinese Communist Party but elsewhere. Cases of this sort have occurred in history time and again.

In connection with the dissolution of the Communist International, one thing must be made especially clear, that is, the Chinese Communist Party will solve the problems of the Chinese revolution still more independently and with an even greater sense of responsibility.

We are determined to carry the War of Resistance through to the end. We believe that we can drive the Japanese aggressors out of China only by relying on our own strength. Passive resistance and double-dealing policies will surely lead to abandoning the war effort

half-way and expose us to the perils of compromise and capitulation. Furthermore, only by active resistance will we merit foreign aid and, in co-ordination with the Allied countries, bring about victory.

We uphold national unity. We are still prepared to continue consultations with the Kuomintang and work together with them to eliminate the grave danger of civil war and solve the existing problems. Such consultations, however, must be held in a spirit of sincerity, on an equal footing and on the basis of mutual concessions. There must be no heightening of friction while negotiations are going on, no manoeuvring of troops while messengers are going back and forth, no demands for the abolition and dissolution of our Party while there is talk of unity. And let no one in the Kuomintang conceive of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation as Kuomintang-Communist integration and hope to achieve it through coercion; that would lead not to unity but to civil war.

We uphold democracy and progress. We still hope that the Kuomintang authorities will change their erroneous internal policies and truly implement Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. We are ready to co-operate, on the basis of democracy, with all other anti-Japanese parties and forces so as to persevere in the War of Resistance and promote progress.

That is the policy of our Party!

Comrades! I am back. Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, I will continue to carry out this policy and fight for it to the very end!

# ON CHINESE FASCISM, THE NEW AUTOCRACY

*August 16, 1943*

## I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Ever since the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the beginning of the War of Resistance, there has been a lack of understanding both inside and outside the Party, both at home and abroad, of the essential nature of the rule of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, that is, the rule of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. It was Comrade Mao Zedong who pointed out before the War of Resistance that Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang was wavering and passive and who stated in the early stage of the war that it was conciliationist and two-faced. Today he has gone further and pointed out that it is fascist. All these insights have been historical clarifications of epochal significance. Therefore, I would now like to discuss Chinese fascism.

I must take up a few queries first.

Someone may ask: Why didn't we say earlier that Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang was fascist, rather than wait until now? Our answer is that before the War of Resistance our policy was focused on winning the Kuomintang over to the resistance, so we emphasized that it could change and that it had a revolutionary aspect. At that time it was enough to point out that it was wavering and passive. In the early stage of the anti-Japanese war, our policy was focused on persuading it to join in a protracted war of resistance and total resistance, so we stressed protracted war, unity and progress, and opposed capitulation, splitting and retrogression. This required a deep understanding of the conciliationist and dual character of Chiang's Kuomintang. Now it is playing a smaller and smaller role in the resistance and a greater

---

A draft of a speech; some passages in Part V have been omitted.



and greater reactionary role. Furthermore, Chiang has written the book entitled *China's Destiny*. If this is allowed to go on, it is bound to lead to defeat in the War of Resistance and the rekindling of civil war. Therefore, we must publicly reveal the fascist essence of the Kuomintang today. We did not lay so much stress on this in the past because it hadn't gone so far as it has now, and not because there were no fascists in it.

Another may ask: Since Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang is fascist, how is it that it can put up resistance to Japan? Our answer is: Comrade Mao Zedong tells us that Chiang's is a comprador-feudal fascism. Because of its comprador aspect, when the Japanese imperialists invaded China, the Kuomintang could rely on other imperialists in resisting the aggressors, and it played a revolutionary role, riding the wave of popular concern for national salvation. But at the same time it has a feudal aspect, so now that the Allied countries are gradually coming to pay more attention to the War of Resistance waged by the Chinese nation, it relapses into its former mode of thinking. It wishes to restore the ancient ways and opposes everything foreign, thus playing a reactionary role. It is precisely because it represents the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie that it always opposes, fears and oppresses the people, and its resistance can never be thoroughgoing. The proletariat and its political party must win and consolidate leadership in the national democratic revolution and must never tail behind the big bourgeoisie. Comrade Mao Zedong warned us on this point at a Party conference of the Soviet areas<sup>457</sup> before the anti-Japanese war.<sup>207</sup>

Then still another may ask: Since fascism means national aggression and since Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang is resisting the Japanese aggressors, why do we call it fascist? Our answer is that this is exactly why Comrade Mao Zedong calls it Chinese fascism. National aggression is one of the characteristics of fascism, but not the only one. Chinese fascism has all the characteristics of fascism pointed out by Georgi Dimitrov in his report<sup>208</sup> except that of national aggression. Both in the past and at present, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang has launched ruthless attacks on the people, on the working masses. It has even unleashed civil war to suppress the revolution and introduced rampant reaction and counter-revolution. It has thus become the arch-enemy of the whole Chinese people. It is only because China finds itself in the position of a colony or semi-colony that the Chinese big landlords and big bourgeoisie are powerless to invade other countries. Isn't their

treatment of China's own minority nationalities based on the sense of superiority inherent in Han chauvinism and on the traditional notion of a "vassal nations" policy.<sup>209</sup> Even in foreign affairs, are there not people in the Kuomintang who advocate a greater Chinese federation which would include Annam, Thailand, Burma, Korea and even the Malay Archipelago? Georgi Dimitrov once said: "The development of fascism and fascist dictatorship itself assumes different forms in different countries, according to historical, social and economic conditions and owing to the national peculiarities or the international position of a given country." Stalin also said long ago that the emergence of German fascism must "be regarded as a symptom of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, of the fact that the bourgeoisie is already unable to rule by the old methods of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, is compelled in its home policy to resort to terroristic methods of rule".<sup>210</sup> In a certain sense, we can also apply this to the rule of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie. We may say that Chinese fascism is the open terrorist rule of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, that is, rule by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and bureaucrat-capital through special agents.

Then again someone may ask: This being the case, why oppose only the reactionaries inside the Kuomintang and not the Kuomintang as a whole? Why call only for the abolition of fascism and not for the liquidation of the fascist chieftains? Our answer is: because the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang still have a dual character, and they have not yet reached the point of being purely reactionary. Since their banner of resistance has not yet been furled, the Kuomintang can still exert influence on certain persons, though their number is daily diminishing. Nor has it yet dared to call for fascism openly. (It has not yet dared to acknowledge its true nature publicly, not only because the War of Resistance is still going on, but also because China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie are too weak to assert their independence.) Therefore, we oppose only the reactionaries inside the Kuomintang, and not those Kuomintang members who are willing to resist the Japanese and who favour democracy. Moreover, we hope they will join us in opposing the reactionaries. Therefore, we advocate liquidating only fascism and hope these Kuomintang members will get rid of fascism of their own accord and truly put into practice the revolutionary Three People's Principles advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.<sup>462</sup> And we call for the disbanding of the fascist secret police only and not of

the Kuomintang organization as such. Since the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are becoming more openly fascist every day and have even published the book, *China's Destiny*, advocating the extremely reactionary view that the Communist Party should be liquidated, we must draw attention to the nature of Chinese fascism and emphasize the danger it presents. This will be not only a warning and an education for the Chinese people, and first and foremost for the Party, but also a most practical ideological lesson helping to rid the Party of any tendency to capitulate to the big bourgeoisie.

Yet again, someone else may ask: Since this is how things stand, does the fascism of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang have an ideology, historical roots, a programme, tactics, an organization and activities? Our answer is: yes, it has. We are going to take them up now under separate headings.

## II. THE IDEOLOGY OF CHINESE FASCISM

Waving the banner of the War of Resistance and the Three People's Principles, Chinese fascism nevertheless has its own ideology.

Chiang Kai-shek's philosophical thought is characterized by extreme idealism. He is very fond of quoting the old saying, "The mind of man is restless, prone to err; its affinity to what is right is small. Be discriminating, be single-minded in the pursuit of what is right, that you may sincerely hold fast to the Mean."<sup>211</sup> At the same time, he emphasizes the role played by the "mind" and gives an extremely idealist interpretation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's remark: "If I believe something to be feasible, I may one day bring it to pass, although it may be as difficult as removing a mountain or drying up a sea. If I believe something to be unfeasible, I will never achieve it, although it may be as easy as turning my hand over or breaking a twig."<sup>212</sup> Chiang wanted to eliminate the Communist Party, so he posed as if he believed that "without sincerity nothing would be achieved",<sup>213</sup> and stated with a heavy heart that if he could not resolve the problem of the Chinese Communist Party, he would not be able to close his eyes even in death. In fact, this is something he can never achieve because he is lacking in the virtue of sincerity. Although he had acknowledged the legal status of the Border Region in his Lushan interview<sup>214</sup> and despite the fact that it had been approved by the 333rd session of the Executive Yuan,

in reality he wanted to eliminate it and revoked the approval on his own authority. This is an example of his insincerity — as long as he can achieve what he wants, he does not even bother with sincerity.

Chiang Kai-shek advocates a philosophy of "action first".<sup>215</sup> Its core is having the people blindly obey him and carry out his orders without knowing what they mean. When Chiang was following a policy of non-resistance, he demanded that the people accept his internal pacification policy rather than resist Japanese aggression. In the early period of the War of Resistance, he wanted the people to blindly follow his policy of partial resistance. Now he wants the people to blindly follow his passive resistance to Japanese aggression but active opposition to the Communists. In fact, as early as the civil war period, it was his boast that if he failed in the suppression of the Communists, he would commit suicide to make atonement to his fellow-countrymen, but he has never been true to his word. When he failed, he was going to punish everyone who was even remotely connected with the enterprise, but he himself was never punished.<sup>216</sup> Before the War of Resistance, he also boasted that, provided he had upwards of 600,000 genuinely revolutionary troops who would strictly obey his orders and operate under unified command, there could be no doubt that with his brilliant tactics he could defeat these little Japanese bandits. But when the Japanese attacked Shanghai on August 13, 1937,<sup>474</sup> although the troops who were strictly obeying his orders numbered more than 600,000, we never saw any sign of his brilliant tactics for defeating the Japanese. Now that the number of his own troops — those who strictly obey his orders — is considerably greater than 600,000, he stands ready to collaborate with Japan. It is apparent that his philosophy of "action first" is not only an idealist philosophy for keeping the people in ignorance, but also a braggart's philosophy, a gangster's philosophy, no different from Hitler's.

To build morale, Chiang Kai-shek emphasizes "independence and self-reliance". In fact, because of the comprador aspect of his nature, he relies on foreign power, and he is anything but independent; the feudal aspect of his nature sometimes leads to xenophobia, but that is not the same thing as national self-reliance. He stresses sincerity, but he is totally insincere. From the earliest Kuomintang-Communist co-operation<sup>475</sup> to the present co-operation in the fight against Japan, he has been insincere with regard to the Soviet Union, the Communist Party and the people, that is, to the revolution and the War of Resistance. When he talks about sincerity, he means that others should

follow him with blind devotion, while he hasn't a shred of sincerity in his dealings with others.

In his ethical teachings Chiang emphasizes an abstract morality based upon the Four Principles and Eight Virtues.<sup>217</sup> But as soon as we get down to realities, we find that he and the ruling group under him have completely abandoned the Four Principles of "propriety", "righteousness", "honesty" and "honour". They deprived Madame Sun Yat-sen of the freedom of residence; they deprived Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government, of the right to convalesce; they are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist although they have had assistance from both the Soviet Union and the Communist Party; and they oppress the people although the people supported them. The whole government indulges in hoarding and speculation and is riddled with corruption, yet no one is punished. Those who work with the enemy and betray the country or who trade in contraband and pocket the soldiers' pay likewise go unpunished. What sense does it make to talk about national loyalty and filial piety when you are cowardly in resisting Japan but take the lead in waging a civil war? How can you talk of benevolence and love when people are driven to the battlefield by your officials and are forced to rise in revolt? How can you utter a word about faithfulness and justice when the War of Resistance has been going on for six years and you're still collaborating with the Japanese aggressors, and when war has been declared against Germany and couriers are still being exchanged with that country? How can you talk about peace and harmony when you incite Japan to attack the Soviet Union and your planes are bombing civilians in revolt? Obviously, these idealist moral principles of his are all hypocritical. But he tries to use them to befuddle people and get them to practise the virtues of loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, justice, peace and harmony towards his Kuomintang, so that he can oppress and attack the masses more freely.

Chiang Kai-shek's conception of history is a rag-bag of feudal ideology centring on a return to the ancients; it reflects the traditional, all-pervasive ideology of the exploiting class. In his *China's Destiny*, Chiang writes, "On the basis of Confucius' teachings, Mencius arose to draw a distinction between justice and utility and between rule by power and rule through virtue. . . . He refuted the teachings of Yang Zhu and Mo Di and rectified the hearts of the people. He thereby laid the foundation for the orthodox school of thought which has enjoyed an unbroken line of development in China over the past thirty centu-

ries." That is why he made much of the study of *Collected Essays on Government Affairs of the Empire* and Chen Hongmou's *Five Treatises on Moral and Educational Subjects*.<sup>218</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek's conception of the nationalities is Han chauvinism, pure and simple. He calls the Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan and Miao nationalities merely "frontier inhabitants" and refuses to recognize them as nationalities. So far as his actions are concerned, he practises racial discrimination and oppression.

Chiang Kai-shek's conception of the state is a one-party dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie or, more precisely, a new one-man dictatorship — a fascist rule by secret police — under the facade of a national state and a government by the entire people. The reason for this is that the more he senses the weakness of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, the less he dares adopt bourgeois-democratic methods, or even one-party rule, and the more he resorts to terrorism, the rule of secret agents and one-man dictatorship.

Chiang Kai-shek's conception of war is that armed strength decides everything. It is a combination of the warlord ideology common in modern China (the traditional ideology of the Hunan and Anhui warlords, Zeng Guofan, Hu Linyi, Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang)<sup>219</sup> and Napoleon's thesis of unification by force of arms. This is why we call it the "new warlordism", or "new autocracy". Because he attaches importance to military power alone, he thinks it impossible to mount resistance to Japanese aggression independently and looks to foreign aid. He openly declares: "[Japan] can take all of China's coastal areas and all regions contiguous to inland waterways not within ten days, but within three days, regardless of where they are — in the west, not just Chongqing, but even Chengdu; in the south, not just Guangdong, but Wuzhou and Yongning." "If they [meaning the Japanese] issue the order, it will actually take them only three days to capture all of China's vital regions and subjugate our country." And again: "What have we got to fight them with? We have neither weapons nor the conditions for war operations: our economy, education, politics — is any one of them up to operations against a modern country?" Therefore, his national policy concerning the War of Resistance has long been based on the assumption that "the Soviet Union is the target of [Japan's] army and Great Britain and the United States are the targets of its navy. If Japan wants to swallow China, it must conquer Russia, gobble up the United States and defeat Britain." But now that Japan, having neither conquered Russia nor gobbled up the United States, has

thrown its might against China, he has become worried, passively resisting while preserving his strength for a civil war on the one hand and standing ready to collaborate with Japan on the other. As he places great stock in military strength, he sticks to the idea of internal unification by force of arms and stands for "rule by the military". During the eighteen years of his rule, from the Incident of March 20, 1926,<sup>220</sup> to the present, hardly a single year has gone by when he was not fighting a war of some sort, and not a single hour when he was not planning civil war. First there was the Incident of March 20 before the Northern Expedition, and after the expedition there was the split between the rival governments in Nanjing and Wuhan and then co-operation between the two.<sup>221</sup> During the civil war there were wars both inside and outside the Kuomintang. During the War of Resistance, there have been military operations against the Communist Party and against other forces not his own.

Chiang Kai-shek's conception of political parties is to have all the parties and groupings in the country dissolved into his Kuomintang and Three People's Principles Youth League.<sup>467</sup> He openly states: "The Kuomintang is the artery of our nation and the members of the Three People's Principles Youth League may be likened to new blood corpuscles." And again: "The Chinese nation is able to exist only so long as the Kuomintang exists. Without the Kuomintang, there would be no China today. . . . In a word, China's destiny hinges entirely on the Kuomintang." Hence, he says, "all adults should join the Kuomintang and all youths the Three People's Principles Youth League." What a blatant exposure of the idea of one doctrine, one party, and one leader! Yet he still has the effrontery to declare: "As for the different ideologies and organizations in the country, not only do I have no intention of obstructing them, but I even hope they will grow and succeed, so long as they don't set up separate regimes, oppose the revolution, organize armed forces or undermine the resistance, and so long as they really work in the interests of the state and nation and revolutionary reconstruction." I will not speak of the Chinese Communist Party and the armed force and Border Region under its leadership, for they are carrying on the resistance and are a revolutionary organization, armed force and political regime. But why is it that other political parties, which possess neither armed forces nor political power, do not enjoy an iota of freedom and, far from "growing and succeeding", are subjected to oppression everywhere? Isn't it true that even some groupings inside the Kuomintang, in particular that of

Madame Sun Yat-sen, which sincerely follows Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, enjoy no freedom either but are subjected to oppression? Both the Kuomintang and the Three People's Principles Youth League belong to Chiang and have long since ceased to be the Kuomintang reorganized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, or the Kuomintang under which there was freedom of thought and various political groupings coexisted.

Chiang Kai-shek's view of the people is that they are just beasts of burden. That is why he stresses Confucius' remark, "The people may be made to follow a course of action, but they should not be brought to understand it." He wants the people to obey his words and abide by his law so that he can exploit and rule them at will. So for all his talk of "democracy", the Kuomintang's power reigns supreme and democracy has long since ceased to exist. The consultative councils at the various levels, the new county system,<sup>476</sup> etc. are all just showpieces designed to deceive people. To go one step further, it is not even party power that is supreme, but military power, the power of the secret agents.

Finally, Chiang Kai-shek's economic thought is also that of the semi-feudal and semi-colonial landlord and comprador classes. On the one hand, he prates about a planned economy aimed at industrialization, while on the other, he is longing for the utopian "great harmony" described in the *Book of Rites*.<sup>222</sup> Under the guise of the Principle of People's Livelihood, in effect he preserves the most backward and reactionary feudal and comprador economic thinking, that is, the concept of an agricultural China and industrialized foreign countries. Not only is this thinking incapable of solving the economic problems of the people, it is bound to bankrupt China's economy even further; the people's life will become still harder, and it will become still more difficult for the Chinese nation to extricate itself from its colonial and semi-colonial economic status.

In Chiang Kai-shek's ideology as outlined here, we can discern only Chinese fascism, and no trace of the revolutionary Three People's Principles set forth by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The idealist views and negative elements in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thought have been developed by Chiang and have become his own ideology. But Dr. Sun's thinking also included some rational elements and quite a few revolutionary views, especially in his later years when he drew close to the Communist Party, adopted a number of measures from the Russian revolution and turned his Three People's Principles into the revolutionary Three



People's Principles. Chiang Kai-shek's doctrine is of quite another order and is nothing but China's brand of fascism.

### III. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CHINESE FASCISM

The fascism of Chiang Kai-shek and his ruling clique has its own historical sources. Chiang always prides himself on being a disciple and student of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but he has long since departed from the right course. He turned traitor once, and now he has again betrayed Dr. Sun's revolutionary Three People's Principles.

Comrade Mao Zedong has pointed out that China's fascism is a comprador and feudal fascism. To be specific, it is a combination of bureaucrat-capital (that is, the capital, land, and tools of production are concentrated in the hands of a handful of bureaucrats and financial magnates) and a secret police system. In Chiang Kai-shek we have a mixture of warlord, stockbroker and underworld boss. His thinking is an agglomeration of all forms of reaction — past and present, domestic and foreign.

Let us take a look at Chiang Kai-shek and his ruling clique. Chiang himself comes from a feudal family. When the Revolution of 1911<sup>143</sup> broke out, he started as a platoon leader under the warlord Zhang Zongchang,<sup>223</sup> and on orders from Chen Qimei<sup>145</sup> he arranged the assassination of Tao Chengzhang,<sup>224</sup> a revolutionary political party leader in Zhejiang, and thus stole the fruits in the recovery of Zhejiang by the revolutionary forces. Dr. Sun was successful because he had been able to bring together his revolutionary party, the New Army and the various secret societies. But by their gangster acts, Chen Qimei and Chiang Kai-shek created a split in the revolutionary party at its very inception. At the same time they laid the foundation for the gangster politics which they have dealt in ever since the 1911 Revolution and which grew out of the alliance of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie with the underworld gangs of Shanghai, all under the protection of the imperialists.

From 1917 to 1920, Chiang Kai-shek, Dai Jitao<sup>52</sup> and Chen Guofu<sup>176</sup> joined forces in stock market speculation. Later this tradition was carried on by H. H. Kung, T. V. Soong and others. Then this comprador clique gradually became the nucleus of the group that has ruled China for the last twenty years. It is true that when he was in Guang-

dong, Chiang Kai-shek opposed the Guangdong compradors who served British interests. But right from the beginning, Dai Jitao and Chen Guofu, who stayed behind in Shanghai, opposed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, the Communist Party and the workers and peasants. And no sooner had Chiang arrived at the lower reaches of the Changjiang River than he threw himself into the embrace of the big bourgeoisie of Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces and took the lead in calling for opposition to the Soviet Union, the Communist Party and the workers and peasants. So Chiang has never really recognized or carried out the Three Great Policies set forth by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Although Chiang Kai-shek organized the Whampoa Military Academy and directed the Northern Expedition, he retained his warlord mentality and his love of speculation after he "joined" the revolutionary ranks. Even in the course of his study tour in the Soviet Union, what he really admired was not the Russian revolution but Napoleon's Russian expedition. In the early days of the Whampoa Military Academy, he opposed the Soviet advisor. When he got arms from the Soviet Union, he began to shout that the Third International<sup>62</sup> was the nerve-centre of world revolution and that China should follow its instructions. But not long afterwards, on March 20, he gave orders to surround and attack the residence of the Soviet advisor in Dongshan, Guangzhou. To educate the cadets at the academy, he did not teach them revolutionary strategy and tactics, but first of all *Zeng Guofan's and Hu Linyi's Quotations on Military Affairs*<sup>225</sup> and *The Life of Napoleon*. He led troops in the Eastern Campaign and was soon competing with Xu Chongzhi for control of territory. His expulsion of Wang Jingwei was a further instance of warlordism. He led the troops on the Northern Expedition but expelled people outside his own circle in the various armies and created his own private troops. Thus, even before the split between Nanjing and Wuhan he was already thinking and acting like a new warlord. Nonetheless, so long as he was in the revolutionary ranks, he still had to wave the revolutionary banner in order to exploit the strength of the people and expand his own forces and influence. But as soon as he went over to counter-revolution, he became a butcher of the people. And the clique he was leading followed his every step.

The ten years of civil war showed us this warlord, stock broker and underworld boss in action. Whether he was dealing with struggles and wars inside the Kuomintang or with the "suppression of Communists",

he employed the same methods. What's more, he learned new fascist tricks from Germany, Italy and Japan. Over the past ten years he has sent a number of Whampoa students to study there and has invited the German general Von Seeckt, the Berlin police commissioner Blomberg and other German secret agents to teach.

From the Xi'an Incident<sup>226</sup> to the sixth year of the resistance he has given a really marvellous conjuring performance. While we must not forget the revolutionary side of the dual character of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in a semi-colonial country as represented by Chiang Kai-shek, still less should we forget their other side, the reactionary side. And he is becoming more and more experienced in playing his reactionary role. With the experience of a decade of civil war behind him, he has been brazen enough to wage a partial civil war in the present War of Resistance. At the same time, when he was sure which way the wind was blowing, he could also deliberately make a show of restraint. But we should not be taken in by him. There is nothing profound about him once we strip off his disguise. The best way to counter his action is to follow Comrade Mao Zedong's revolutionary dual policy;<sup>477</sup> adhere to the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint; and adopt the method of tit-for-tat struggle.

#### IV. THE POLITICAL PROGRAMME AND TACTICS OF CHINESE FASCISM

Although Chiang Kai-shek loudly propagated the Three People's Principles, he never sincerely carried out the Three Great Policies in the period of the Great Revolution, and he ignored them completely in the period of civil war. At the beginning of the War of Resistance, when he advertised a programme of armed resistance and national reconstruction, he was simply deceiving people.<sup>227</sup> He interpreted the articles of the programme as opposing total resistance, opposing communism and opposing democracy and implemented them in that way. As a result, he produced not a programme for resistance and national reconstruction in accordance with the Three People's Principles, but a programme of fascism.

We may sum up Chiang's programme in the following twelve points:

1. Carry out passive resistance, while preparing for a compromise with Japan;
2. Betray Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, embrace German-Italian-Japanese fascism, oppose Soviet socialism and reject British and U.S. liberalism;
3. Work in collusion with the enemy and oppose the Communists in order to sabotage the War of Resistance; make use of foreign aid to fight a civil war;
4. Clamp down on the activities of the minor political parties, bully and humiliate the minority nationalities, ignore the difficulties of Chinese nationals abroad and turn a blind eye to the sufferings of victims of natural disasters at home;
5. Rely on military power, get rid of people outside one's own circle, build up the secret police and usurp the power of the Kuomintang;
6. Trample on the rights of the people, deprive them of their freedoms, make use of the *bao-jia* [mutual-surveillance] system<sup>478</sup> and impose dictatorship;
7. Rely on bureaucrat-capital to monopolize the economy, encourage commercial speculation and disrupt industrial production;
8. Issue unlimited amounts of paper currency,<sup>228</sup> raise prices of commodities, monopolize the people's means of livelihood and exploit labour power;
9. Concentrate the ownership of land at the expense of the people's food supply and press-gang able-bodied men for military service at the expense of the labour force;
10. Allow corruption to go unchecked, increase taxes and levies, wink at trade in contraband and carry out arbitrary searches;
11. Ban books and persecute scholars, corrupt young people, threaten and cajole, and destroy moral integrity; and
12. Violate law and discipline, debase the national morality, wreck the culture and ruin the nation.

Of course this programme of Chinese fascism is not openly proclaimed and will never even be publicly admitted. Yet it is being carried out nonetheless, article by article, item by item and, if anything, goes further than these 12 points. This duplicity reveals the weakness of Chinese fascism as well as its shamelessness and cowardice. How can Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang lead the War of Resistance to victory when carrying out a programme like this? Without a doubt, it will lead China to splits, disintegration, chaos and collapse. It will lead the War of Resistance to defeat.

We Communists uphold resistance, unity, democracy and progress. We will never allow the War of Resistance to fail. As Comrade Mao Zedong has pointed out, we must strive for leadership. We must first expand and strengthen our own forces before we can give strong leadership to others, prevent the middle-of-the-roaders from wavering, isolate the die-hards and firmly press ahead with our anti-Japanese Ten-Point Programme<sup>111</sup> and our administrative programme embodying the "three thirds system".<sup>204</sup>

So far as the tactics of Chinese fascism are concerned, they are applied flexibly, according to the general orientation of its programme and the dual character of that section of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.

Towards Japan the fascists pursue a policy of alternating fighting with cajoling in the hope of entering into an advantageous compromise.

Towards Britain and the United States they alternately coax and threaten them in the hope of getting their aid with which to pursue the civil war.

Towards the Soviet Union, they blow hot and cold, hoping that the U.S.S.R. will contain Japan, thus making it easier for them to resolve domestic strife in their favour.

In dealing with local forces and the minor political parties, they combine threats and inducements in an attempt to sow dissension, isolate us and thus destroy their opponents one by one.

They treat national capitalists, enlightened landlords and senior members of the Kuomintang now well and now badly in order to determine whether or not these persons are loyal towards the ruling group.

They publicly suppress — and privately seduce — progressive men of letters, intellectuals and students, so as to alienate them from us and make them oppose us.

They keep a close watch on the toiling masses of workers and peasants and obstruct all their relations with us.

Finally, as for their attitude towards us, everything is aimed at eliminating us, though their tactics may vary from soft to tough. But the soft tactics are only a temporary expedient and never mean a change for the better; at the very same time they are preparing the next tough move. At times when toughness doesn't work, they can temporarily soften up a bit. Now take the different periods. In the civil war period, Chiang Kai-shek took a hard line, imposing war on us, arresting our people and killing without mercy. Around the time of the Incident of

September 18, 1931, however, he supplemented this hard line with certain soft tactics, such as the policies of inducing our people to recant and planting agents inside our ranks. Since the start of the War of Resistance, he has ostensibly turned to unity, but he engaged first in veiled strife, then in open struggle. Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang has changed its tactics from restricting and corroding the Communist Party to attempting to liquidate us. Its policy of using secret agents is well adapted to the different tactics adopted in these three periods. If we fail to recognize the consistency with which Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang has opposed the Communist Party, we will not be able to maintain keen vigilance and carry on appropriate struggles against it. At the same time, if we fail to recognize the changes in its anti-Communist policy, we will not be able to analyse and understand it correctly and deal with it according to differing circumstances.

## V. THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE FASCISM

Chinese fascism is organized. The fascist organization was nurtured inside the Kuomintang and then usurped control of the party; it was nurtured inside the Three People's Principles Youth League and then gained control of the League; it was nurtured inside the army and then began to rule the army. It is an organization of secret agents.

It consists of three branches:

The first branch — the CC Clique<sup>476</sup> — is inside the Kuomintang. It existed in embryonic form in 1926 and after the defeat of the Great Revolution<sup>461</sup> in 1927 it was formally established with the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters as its core and seat of power. There are bureaus and offices of investigation and statistics from the central to the local levels. The power of the CC Clique, that is, the power of the secret agents, envelops the whole party, reaching into the country's administrative and educational systems, into some of the construction and communications institutions, certain financial and tax offices and banks (*e.g.*, the Bank of Communications and certain privately owned banks) and into relief organizations, overseas Chinese associations and women's organizations. It has a grip on the cultural and propaganda institutions, including the publishing industry, and the top priority of its propaganda policy is to combat the

Communist Party. The budgetary party expenditure of the Kuomintang for fiscal year 1943 is 284 million yuan, the bulk of which will be spent on party activities by the secret agents. And this figure does not include special expenses.

The second branch is inside the Three People's Principles Youth League. Its predecessor was the Fu Xing Society which has become the organization of secret agents inside the League. The Fu Xing Society existed in embryonic form in the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines<sup>136</sup> and the Alumni Society of the Whampoa Military Academy.<sup>229</sup> It was founded as the Li Xing Society after the Incident of September 18, 1931 and later took the name Fu Xing. It was incorporated into the Three People's Principles Youth League at the beginning of the War of Resistance. The special task force and the special training course under the leadership of Kang Ze<sup>230</sup> were added, and it became the core of the secret agent unit inside the league.

The third branch is inside the military system, in the Political Training Section and the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Council. There are a number of military secret agents in the Political Training Section under He Zhonghan, and even the officers hate them. The Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Council was founded by Dai Li in 1932. In the early period, it was a secret agent group of the Fu Xing Society under him; now it has become a full-fledged branch on its own. It is enormous, and it has many employees and a very large budget. The bureau itself is divided into departments, under which there are district offices, stations, groups and squads. Its tentacles reach far and wide. Under its control it has the intelligence officers at the various levels, who are directly under the second office of the Military Command Department of the army; the commissioners of investigation and statistics in the military organs; the supervision and instruction group in the border region; the Peace Preservation Department, from its head and the chief of its third section down to intelligence personnel at the grass-roots level; and the civilian and military police throughout the country (except for a few provinces). The entire tax collection system of the country is supervised by its anti-contraband units and inspection departments. The communications institutions are controlled by its supervisory departments and supervisory centres. The intelligence agents among diplomatic personnel both at home and abroad, including military attaches, are all under its administration and are sent out on its recommendations. It has customs officials and secret agents

throughout the national economic structure. Work in the enemy-occupied and puppet areas is under its control. It is also responsible for planning military actions and intelligence work to disrupt our army and the areas under our control. These last activities are carried out in parallel to those of the CC Clique.

From all this it can be seen that China under the Kuomintang has become a country ruled by secret agents. Moreover, the Kuomintang secret agents have ties with the special agents of Japan and of the puppet governments. Both in their organization and in their activities, they are utterly reactionary, evil, and ruthless.

But, after all, the world is changing. World fascism is moving to its doom and Chinese fascism is no exception. China's resistance will be victorious in the end; the Chinese people have their own path to liberation. For all the efforts of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang to keep China on the road to fascism, the Chinese people will get to know the Chinese Communist Party and accept its leadership and education, shake off the influence of Chinese fascism, avoid its traps and take the road to a bright future.

China will never succumb to fascism!

China will become a New Democracy!



# ON THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

*March 3 and 4, 1944*

Comrades, we have all been studying the problem of the struggle between two lines for half a year or so. When discussing the documents of the period of the Great Revolution,<sup>461</sup> we had many disputes, and heated ones too, over how to evaluate the Sixth National Congress of the Party.<sup>16</sup> It was a thought-provoking debate. Never has thinking in our Party been so emancipated as it is now. This is the result of the rectification movement led by Comrade Mao Zedong; it marks a great advance in our thinking.

I took part in the work of the Sixth Congress and was one of those bearing major responsibility. Naturally, it might be expected that I would have a somewhat clearer understanding of it than others. I feel that in studying the Sixth Congress we should both look at the historical facts and adopt the method of thinking employed in the rectification movement today. Otherwise, it will be impossible for us to draw correct conclusions. Of the facts about the Sixth Congress, there are some I no longer remember very clearly and others I have already forgotten. There are now nine other comrades in Yan'an who took part in the congress and I have talked with some of them. But we haven't all sat down together to compare notes. My talk will consist of six parts. First, I shall give the facts. If something was correct, I shall say it was correct, and if it was not, I shall say that too. I'll leave the conclusions to the end.

## I. THE NATURE, TASKS AND PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

It may seem superfluous now to speak about the nature of the Chinese revolution. Comrade Mao Zedong has already said in his articles

---

A report delivered at the Central Party School in Yan'an.

“The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, “On New Democracy”, etc., that the Chinese revolution is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal bourgeois-democratic revolution carried out by the masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. At the time of the Sixth Congress, however, this was a serious problem. What was meant by the nature of the revolution? What was it that determined the nature of the revolution? These questions were still unanswered in those days. It was only later that we came to understand that the nature of a revolution is determined by its tasks and not by its motive forces, which was something new to us at the time. Actually, the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International<sup>231</sup> had already affirmed that the Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the idea had already been put forward as far back as the Second National Congress of the Party.<sup>232</sup> The Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic revolution and yet it was necessary to oppose the bourgeoisie. This was hard to understand at that time; although the 1905 Revolution in Russia<sup>233</sup> was a similar case, we had not studied it carefully. Besides, both the comrades who had returned from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow<sup>234</sup> and those who had returned from Western Europe had neglected theory and therefore were not clear about the nature of the revolution. This may seem quite elementary now, but it was a serious problem in those days. No sooner had we learned of the proceedings of the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International<sup>235</sup> than we had to leave to attend the Sixth National Congress. Comrade Stalin had a talk with us before the congress. He dealt mainly with two questions, the nature of the Chinese revolution and the ebb and flow of a revolution. Citing Russia’s February Revolution<sup>236</sup> as an example, he pointed out that the Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic revolution and not a socialist revolution or a “permanent revolution”. Only then did we come to understand this question.

Before the Sixth Congress, however, the Chinese Party as a whole failed to understand it. From its Second Congress to its Fifth Congress inclusive, the Party had indeed recognized that the Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. However, according to the opportunist views of Chen Duxiu, a bourgeois revolution had to be led by the bourgeoisie and not by the proletariat, which should only assist the bourgeoisie; the proletariat should “carry the sedan-chair” for the bourgeoisie, but not seek leadership in the bourgeois revolution. Chen

Duxiu held that by helping the bourgeois revolution to succeed, the proletariat would win freedom and the eight-hour day and could carry out its own proletarian revolution later. In essence, this view was characteristic of old democracy. It was the view of bourgeois revolutionaries in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. Because it was adopted in studying the Chinese revolution, the problem of leadership remained unsolved for a very long period. There was much controversy at the time over the question of joining the Kuomintang.<sup>2</sup> Some held that we should join, and this was correct. But it was wrong to think that the sole purpose of joining was to help the Kuomintang. In the beginning Zhang Guotao<sup>165</sup> was against joining the Kuomintang, and later he held that at least the industrial workers should remain outside. He didn't understand that when the masses of workers and peasants entered the Kuomintang, they could help reform it and win leadership in it. At the Fourth National Congress of the Party, Peng Shuzhi<sup>175</sup> held that leadership automatically fell to the proletariat, that it was an "automatic leadership", so there was no point in the proletariat's striving for it. This shows that he didn't see that the bourgeoisie was fighting to seize leadership. So when Chiang Kai-shek launched an anti-Communist attack on March 20, 1926,<sup>220</sup> after the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang, we were totally unprepared. By the time we in China heard what had happened at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in the winter of 1926, the bourgeoisie had already turned traitor. It wasn't until its Fifth National Congress that our Party recognized that leadership had to be won by struggle and criticized the idea of "automatic leadership". But then the method used to win leadership was to put up posters everywhere and shout slogans calling for the seizure of leadership. This was mere empty talk, without real significance.

Then there was the question of a non-capitalist future for the Chinese revolution. There was controversy in the Communist International on this question too. The Trotskyites held that in the Wuhan period<sup>479</sup> it was necessary to organize Soviets, turn the trade unions into organs of political power and overthrow the Wuhan government.<sup>480</sup> This meant that they wanted to transplant to China the Russian experience in carrying the February Revolution forward to the October Revolution. But Comrade Stalin and the majority of the comrades in the Communist International held that we should try to seize leadership in the Wuhan government, rather than splitting with it immediately. Notwithstanding the opposition of Comrade Stalin, the Trotskyites

presented their views for discussion at the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.<sup>237</sup> At that time, M. N. Roy, an Indian, and Jacques Doriot, a Frenchman,<sup>238</sup> who had both worked in China, agreed with the Trotskyites. Although Chen Duxiu didn't openly concur in the views of the Trotskyites, he asserted that the resolution of the Communist International was wrong. Nevertheless, he failed to organize the workers and peasants for a showdown with the Wuhan government. Later, after betrayal by the Wuhan government, the Trotskyites held that the Chinese revolution was a socialist revolution, a view which influenced Chen Duxiu.<sup>166</sup> The Communist International sent B. Lominadze to China.<sup>239</sup> Lominadze held that there was a "permanent revolution" in China and that although the current revolution was a democratic one, it would develop directly into a socialist revolution. He said that there had been an alliance of four classes during the Guangzhou period,<sup>481</sup> of three classes during the Wuhan period, and of only two classes, namely, the working class and the peasantry, during the Nanchang Uprising.<sup>240</sup> There had been no intermissions or stages, and if things continued to advance, there would be a socialist revolution. This view was a kind of compromise with the Trotskyite view; in essence, it was Trotskyite. The enlarged session of the Provisional Political Bureau in November 1927<sup>241</sup> accepted this position and maintained that although a socialist revolution had not yet come into existence, continued progress along the existing course would lead to one. The views of B. Lominadze had thus influenced some of our Party members.

There were several reasons for the failure to understand that the Chinese revolution was a democratic revolution. First, there was lack of clarity about what was meant by the nature of a revolution and what it was that determined it. Second, in the history of the Chinese Party this question had never been clarified theoretically. Third, internationally there was the influence of the Trotskyites and of views conciliatory with theirs. All these problems needed to be resolved at the Sixth Congress and the congress did resolve them correctly. But why did the resolutions deal with the matter so briefly? Because there had already been propaganda in the Party to the effect that the Chinese revolution at its present stage was bourgeois-democratic in character and that it would be wrong to think of it as a socialist revolution or a "permanent revolution".

Turning to the tasks of the revolution, we must consider them in relation to the nature and motive forces of the revolution. The tasks

were to oppose imperialism and feudalism and to establish the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. In the discussions of this problem it was asserted that the democratic dictatorship did not exclude, but definitely included, the petty bourgeoisie. In fulfilling the twin tasks of opposing imperialism and feudalism through such a dictatorship, the basic forces we had to rely on were the workers and peasants. The regime would be anti-bourgeois, but it would not eliminate capitalism. This definition of the nature and tasks of the revolution was basically correct. But it was not so clear-cut as the formulation made some time later by Comrade Mao Zedong when he said that the Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. This stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution would be very long. According to his analysis, the old-democratic revolution in China began with the Opium War<sup>482</sup> and the new-democratic revolution began with the May 4th Movement. The ten objectives of the Chinese revolution<sup>242</sup> as set forth by the Sixth National Congress of the Party constituted the Party's programme for the stage of the democratic revolution. It was not yet possible to produce a detailed Party programme consisting of two parts, a maximum programme and a minimum programme. By coincidence, the Communist International passed its own programme at the time, which was adopted by our Party as its maximum programme. The ten major objectives of the Sixth National Congress became the Party programme, its strategic tasks, for the period of the democratic revolution.

As strategic tasks, there was nothing wrong with the ten major objectives. As tactical tasks, however, some were not quite appropriate. For example, the first one — to fight against imperialism — was correct. The second — to confiscate enterprises and banks owned by foreign capital — was also correct. Tactically, however, it might not be necessary to use coercive methods of confiscation. The fourth objective was to overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government. Of course, during the present period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, this will be passed over. But it goes without saying that in the course of the new-democratic revolution, the Kuomintang government must be overthrown if our victory is to be complete. Victory in the new-democratic revolution is a victory of the masses of the people, and the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorial regime cannot possibly continue to exist. The fifth point concerned the Soviets. Whether or not the name was appropriate, the Soviets were councils of representatives of workers and

peasants and hence were different in principle from the parliaments of the bourgeoisie. Lenin said that a Soviet regime might be feasible not only in capitalist countries, but also in colonial countries.<sup>243</sup> Comrade Mao Zedong took over this idea and developed the system of people's congresses in China. Under this system there is a single, unified political power and not one where legislative and administrative powers are separated.<sup>244</sup> The "three thirds system"<sup>204</sup> we practise today is a system of people's congresses at various levels, and it is genuine democracy. As for the eight-hour day it is a strategic goal. In the Border Region today, we still follow a ten-hour day, but that is a tactical necessity. So far as the distribution of land to the soldiers is concerned, in the past it was regarded as something very difficult to carry out, but today it has been realized in Nanniwan. With regard to uniting with the proletariat of the world and with the Soviet Union, it was of course a shortcoming not to have mentioned the oppressed nations also. But basically speaking, there were no big mistakes in the ten major objectives. And at the forthcoming Seventh Congress, there will probably not be any major changes. These objectives are not limited to the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, because the war is only one stage in the democratic revolution.

Let us turn now to the question of a non-capitalist future. The Sixth Party Congress made a decision in principle on the question of the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution led by the proletariat to a socialist revolution in the future. The transition would depend on whether or not we had superiority in strength and on the way things developed in the course of the revolution. We should therefore guard against impetuosity. These views were entirely different from those later expressed by Comrade Li Lisan.<sup>61</sup> He held that as soon as there were victories in one or more provinces, the revolution could be turned into a socialist one. Comrade Mao Zedong dealt with this question very clearly in his article "Introducing *The Communist*".

But the resolutions of the Sixth Party Congress on the nature, tasks and prospects of the Chinese revolution also had a shortcoming. That is, they did not reflect a clear understanding of conditions in China. The Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International had already pointed out the problem of the uneven development of the Chinese revolution. The Sixth Congress of the Party should have been able to study concrete ways of dealing with this strategic problem, but it didn't do enough. What were the

conditions in China? The country was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and agriculture played the predominant role in its economy; it had a vast territory, abundant resources and a large population; the classes at either end of the social spectrum were small, while the intermediate classes were large.<sup>483</sup> Politically, it was characterized by national disunity and fighting among warlords, and historically, there had been incessant peasant wars such as the uprising of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.<sup>484</sup> If the congress had made an analysis of these facts, it would have been able to draw the conclusion that the Chinese revolution was essentially an armed revolution against armed counter-revolution. Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong have all been of the view that the colonial question resolves itself into the question of peasant wars. Given China's uneven political and economic development, it is possible for peasant revolutionary wars to go on for a long time. In those days, we didn't understand this. We didn't relate the unevenness in political and economic development to the question of peasant wars, and we failed to appreciate fully the protracted nature of the Chinese revolution.

## II. THE MOTIVE FORCES AND CLASS RELATIONS IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

At the time of the Sixth Congress there was a new alignment of classes. The imperialists and the warlords were counter-revolutionary and the bourgeoisie had split off and gone over to the side of counter-revolution. During the Great Revolution, the national bourgeoisie had been against the northern warlords<sup>485</sup> and had been partly revolutionary in character. After the defeat of the revolution, Chiang Kai-shek collaborated with the imperialists and the comprador bourgeoisie,<sup>468</sup> worked hand in glove with the four big southern banks of the Jiangsu and Zhejiang tycoons<sup>245</sup> and slaughtered revolutionary workers and peasants in Shanghai and Guangzhou.<sup>246</sup> In view of the situation, the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International pointed out that there were three counter-revolutionary forces at the time, namely, imperialism, the feudal forces and the bourgeoisie. There was also division in the ranks of the revolution. The urban petty bourgeoisie vacillated. Some of them went over to the side of the Reorganization Clique<sup>39</sup> and the "third party".<sup>247</sup> By the same token, within the Party, some members deserted, some hesitated, others

were driven to desperate acts. So the main forces the revolution had to rely on were the workers and peasants. Of course, the petty bourgeoisie was not excluded. The Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International said that there was a radical polarization in Chinese society and that the middle strata were vacillating. In his report to the Central Committee sent from the Jinggang Mountains,<sup>486</sup> Comrade Mao Zedong also pointed out that the main forces to be relied on were the workers and peasants. The advanced workers were then the main force behind the revolution in the cities. The ordinary workers, who formed the majority, were somewhat afraid. In the rural areas too, there were peasants who were afraid. And so was the urban petty bourgeoisie (the small proprietors, small businessmen, students, etc.). While the Sixth Party Congress did not advocate the abolition of capitalism, it regarded the bourgeoisie as counter-revolutionary. It was correct to rely mainly on the workers and peasants. We could not look upon the urban petty bourgeoisie as the main force of the revolution, or we would have created ideological confusion. But the Sixth Congress didn't have a clear understanding of the urban petty bourgeoisie. Although acknowledging its revolutionary role, the Sixth Congress regarded only the workers and peasants as motive forces of the revolution and excluded the petty bourgeoisie. It wrongly took the fact that certain upper petty-bourgeois elements joined the hostile bourgeois forces as evidence that the entire petty bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution. Thus it made a tactical mistake.

The Sixth Congress did not make an analysis of the forces on the side of the counter-revolution. In particular, its assessment of the national bourgeoisie was different from that of the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Ninth Enlarged Plenum had held that there were contradictions among the counter-revolutionaries which could be exploited. The Sixth Congress reversed this view and held that although there were contradictions among them, since they were all anti-Communist, it was impossible to exploit these contradictions. This view was wrong. Comrade Mao Zedong says that to regard the enemy as a monolithic bloc is an approach characteristic of "closed-doorism". In fact, the Nanjing government was a government of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. There were opposition forces — a "third camp" — which were dissatisfied with the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. This third camp was not a middle force vacillating between the bourgeoisie and the prole-



tariat (which would have been impossible under the conditions then prevailing), but an opposition force within the camp of the ruling classes, a force opposing the government. In the beginning, there was the Reorganization Clique of the Kuomintang, but later that clique entered the Government; then there were such representative figures as Shi Liangcai and Yang Xingfo.<sup>248</sup> Originally, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei planned to go to Nanjing together in March or April of 1928, but the Guangxi warlord clique was against Wang Jingwei. Wang was forced to stay in Shanghai, where he opposed the Guangxi warlord clique and Hu Hanmin. At that time, the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei were not evident, but they did exist. Comrade Mao Zedong's analysis was correct.

The Sixth Congress' analysis of class relations in the rural areas was basically sound. But it was not so clear as that of Comrade Mao Zedong. The resolutions of the Sixth Congress stated that while calling for the confiscation of all land held by the landlords, we should not deliberately intensify the struggle against the rich peasants, but that when farm labourers struggled against rich peasants, we should stand on the side of the labourers (this was different from the intensified struggle against the rich peasants which appeared later). The resolutions, however, went no further in their analysis of the small landlords and rich peasants.

During the Great Revolution, there were four revolutionary classes: the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. In the stage of the new-democratic revolution, there are differences among these four classes. The proletariat is the leading class, the workers and peasants are the basic revolutionary forces, the petty bourgeoisie wavers and the bourgeoisie has a dual character, sometimes taking part in the revolution and sometimes opposing it. During the Great Revolution, some bourgeois figures with comprador leanings, namely, the right wing of the Kuomintang in the early period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, joined in with the hope of gain. They must not be regarded as motive forces of the revolution. The Chinese national bourgeoisie was revolutionary during the struggle against the northern warlords. But it was weak and had ties with imperialism and the feudal forces.

The Wuhan government was not a government of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. Representatives of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, such as Tan Yankai,<sup>156</sup> Sun Fo<sup>249</sup> and Tang Shengzhi,<sup>250</sup> were seated in the government. And Wang Jingwei also represented

the bourgeoisie. At that time, we should have directed our efforts towards turning the Wuhan government into an alliance of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie; those efforts might have succeeded. The Communist International<sup>62</sup> regarded the Kuomintang as a class alliance with a left wing, a centre, and a right wing. The right wing was the big bourgeoisie, the centre was the national bourgeoisie, and on the left were the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie, including our Party. But the opportunists in our Party excluded us from the left, calling us the Communist wing. They did not seek to reform the Kuomintang from within and to win leadership in it in accordance with the instructions of the Communist International.

Let me take a few typical figures for our consideration.

(1) Hu Hanmin.<sup>51</sup> He was an out-and-out rightist. His thinking was that of the comprador class. While in Guangdong, he strongly opposed the workers and peasants, he was against the peasants' organizing armed forces and stood on the side of the machinists' union against the masses of workers.<sup>251</sup> Among the high-ranking officers under him were Wu Tiesheng,<sup>252</sup> Ma Chaojun<sup>253</sup> and Gu Yingfen.<sup>172</sup> It was his cousin, Hu Yisheng,<sup>254</sup> who had had Liao Zhongkai assassinated,<sup>4</sup> and he knew it.

(2) Chiang Kai-shek. During the Great Revolution his thinking was mainly comprador-bourgeois. Yet we do not deny that he did have some national-bourgeois ideas. At the time of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, his national-bourgeois tendencies were stronger and he belonged to the centre. But even then he had connections with the landlords and the comprador bourgeoisie. During the period from the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang to the April 12th Incident, when the masses were rising in action, Chiang Kai-shek opposed the Communists. By the time of the Incident of March 20, 1926, he had already shifted his position over to the side of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and had become a new rightist, and his inspiration was Dai Jitao.<sup>52</sup> After the April 12th Incident,<sup>26</sup> he became a counter-revolutionary, representing the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, though he still made a show of national-bourgeois reformism in order to deceive people.

(3) Wang Jingwei. During the Great Revolution, his thinking was mainly bourgeois, and although sometimes appearing to be very left, he did not agree to confiscating the land of the landlords and was wary of the workers and peasants. In the early period of the Great Revolution, Wang Jingwei was not really active, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen

once said that Wang and Hu Hanmin could no longer be representative figures in a revolution of the Russian type.<sup>255</sup> The declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang was drafted by Borodin,<sup>164</sup> who was entrusted with the work by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was translated into Chinese by Qu Qiubai<sup>256</sup> and the translation was polished by Wang Jingwei. After Dr. Sun's death, Wang Jingwei seized the opportunity to take a more active part in affairs, and he was elected Chairman of the Kuomintang and President of the National Government in Guangdong. When he came back from Russia in 1927, he didn't intend to oppose Chiang Kai-shek. As soon as he reached Shanghai, Chiang asked him to attend a meeting. About this time, Chen Duxiu approached Wang and they drafted a "Wang-Chen Joint Declaration".<sup>257</sup> When Chiang discovered this, Wang Jingwei changed his mind and didn't want the declaration published, but it was too late to take it back because it had already gone to press at a newspaper office. The next day, Wang Jingwei attended another meeting, at which he was vehemently attacked by Wu Zihui.<sup>258</sup> Angered, he left for Wuhan. That's how he emerged as a leader of the left, loudly proclaiming that all revolutionaries should rally to the left. This was sheer opportunism. During the War of Resistance Against Japan he defected to the Japanese aggressors and became a traitor.

(4) Liao Zhongkai. He was a representative of the radicals among the national bourgeoisie and there was nothing of the comprador about him. He was an overseas Chinese and he was not wealthy. He had a deep-seated hatred of imperialism, opposed the feudal forces and sympathized with the peasants' struggles for the reduction of rent and interest. In the workers' struggles against the Chinese capitalists he favoured compromise, but he did assist them in their struggles against foreign capitalists. In the Whampoa Military Academy,<sup>114</sup> when members of the Association of Young Soldiers<sup>153</sup> opposed the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines,<sup>136</sup> he tried to conciliate the two sides. He was a radical bourgeois revolutionary.

(5) Deng Yanda.<sup>142</sup> He was a representative of the radicals among the petty bourgeoisie. He was for agrarian revolution<sup>505</sup> and was ready to co-operate with us on a long-term basis. He belonged to the left wing of the Kuomintang. At first, he believed in anarchism. After he came back from the Soviet Union, the views he expressed in discussions of the agrarian question were the same as Comrade Mao Zedong's. He strongly advocated the smashing of the feudal forces. He was an intellectual with a rural background and had some connections with

the army. During the Wuhan period, if Deng Yanda had been the central figure instead of Wang Jingwei, things would have been better. But we didn't take him seriously. When the Great Revolution failed, he felt dejected and left China with the Soviet advisor. Later he came back and organized a third party. Although he opposed us ideologically and we had to criticize him and struggle with him, tactically we should have united with him. He was a man of integrity and never bowed his head to Chiang Kai-shek. After the September 18th Incident,<sup>490</sup> Chiang had him executed.

In our analysis of class relations, our shortcomings in the past were formulism and the tendency to fall into rigid patterns of thinking. By formulism I mean that we dogmatically transplanted to China the formula of the 1905 struggle against the Tsar and of the bourgeois Constitutional Democratic Party in Russia, that we failed to understand China's bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie in particular, that we did not analyse the contradictions within the ruling classes and that we thought the petty bourgeoisie in China was the same as that in the capitalist countries in Western Europe. By rigid patterns of thinking I mean that we made definitive judgments of individuals and failed to understand that people can change. Chiang Kai-shek was once the mouthpiece of the national bourgeoisie, but his betrayal should not have been regarded as betrayal by the entire class. The same was true of Wang Jingwei. It was wrong not to see the complexity and changeability of class relations in China. The "third party" represented the petty bourgeoisie. When Deng Yanda returned to China in 1930, he approached us with a proposal for a joint struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. But we paid no attention to him. That was wrong.

Now I'd like to say something about whether or not it would have been all right to go on working under the banner of the Kuomintang and the Three People's Principles after the defeat of the Great Revolution. If Deng Yanda had not left and we had continued to co-operate with him, it would have been all right. But after the Nanchang Uprising, the Communist Party alone continued the revolution, while the Kuomintang turned traitor. To continue using the banner of the Kuomintang and the Three People's Principles in such circumstances would have created confusion in the minds of the masses. It was necessary to criticize and repudiate the non-revolutionary aspect of the Three People's Principles while preserving their revolutionary aspect. But we negated them in their totality and failed to make a historical and scientific analysis.

### III. THE EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION

The Sixth Party Congress was held at a turning point in the revolution, when many questions were being hotly debated — questions such as how to look upon the major mistakes of the past, opportunism and putschism. However, because time was pressing, the congress lasted only ten days, and it was followed immediately by the Sixth Congress of the Communist International. So there wasn't as much time for preparation as we now have for the Party's Seventh Congress. It was decided that special committees would be set up to deal with problems which had not been solved at the Sixth Party Congress. Three committees were organized to study the Autumn Harvest Uprising,<sup>259</sup> the Nanchang Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising<sup>260</sup> respectively, and all three were led by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International. But many delegates had already come back to China, so not much was achieved through these studies. It is true that the Sixth Party Congress raised some fundamental questions and drew conclusions about them, but since no adequate study was carried out, the delegates failed to get to the heart of the matter and they treated the various questions as if they were all equally important.

First, the analysis of opportunism. Although it was pointed out that opportunism was one of the main reasons for the failure of the Great Revolution in China, the essence of the question was never grasped. In his report to the congress, Bukharin<sup>261</sup> drew attention to three opportunist mistakes: (1) the Chinese Communist Party had failed to maintain its independence when co-operating with the Kuomintang; (2) it had not dared to criticize its allies directly; and (3) it had not made a sufficient effort to mobilize the masses. It is true that those were all opportunist mistakes, but the picture was not entirely as it had been painted. If we look at the process of the Great Revolution as a whole, and the period from 1925 to 1926 in particular, we see that the two enlarged sessions of the Central Committee both stressed the organizational independence of our Party, that there had been criticism of the Kuomintang (in some cases, inappropriate criticism) and that the masses had been mobilized. In early 1927, we organized more than two million peasants into peasant associations. Later, we organized even more. The workers had their own organizations — the trade unions and the armed pickets. It can also be seen from Comrade Mao

Zedong's article "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" that the masses had been mobilized. It was only during the Wuhan period that the opportunists said that the mass movement was going too far. There was an upsurge in the mass revolutionary movement. It was unprecedented in history, and even in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan there has been nothing like it. So, while it is true that these three were all opportunist mistakes, the main reason for the defeat of the Great Revolution was the failure to carry out the Communist International's instructions to win leadership in the Kuomintang, the government and the army, to carry out the agrarian revolution and to regard armed struggle as the central task.

The following four points were included in the resolution on the Chinese question adopted by the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. First, transform the Kuomintang and bring large numbers of workers and peasants into it, that is, win leadership in the Kuomintang. Second, turn the peasant associations into the political power in the rural areas, that is, win leadership in the government. Third, organize an army of seventy thousand men among whom there would be twenty thousand Communists, that is, win leadership in the army. And fourth, confiscate land and carry out the agrarian revolution. Before sending the resolution to our Party, the Communist International wired these four points to M. N. Roy, its representative in China. When Roy received the telegram, he did not show it to the Central Committee, but gave it to Wang Jingwei. Wang Jingwei was furious when he saw it and accused the Communist International of conspiracy. This act of class betrayal on the part of Roy was the same as that of Lev Kamenev on the eve of the October Revolution.<sup>262</sup> Later, the Central Committee of our Party learned the contents of the telegram. That was two months before the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. There was still time to act in accordance with the instructions of the Communist International. However, the Central Committee didn't pay enough attention to those instructions. Instead, it felt that the situation was hopeless. Tan Pingshan,<sup>263</sup> then Minister of Agricultural Affairs in the National Government, resigned from his post on the ground that "it was impossible to guide the peasant movement onto the right path". He hoped that the Kuomintang would clean up and reform the lower organs of political power, and he did not want to turn the peasant associations into rural governments. As for armed forces, we already had one army, two divisions and the Wuhan Guards Regiment. If we had taken the

military academy as a nucleus and added in the workers' and peasants' armed forces of Hunan and Hubei and the workers' pickets in Wuhan, it should have been possible to organize an army of fifty thousand to seventy thousand men. Moreover, Comrade Zhu De had an Officers' Training Corps in Jiangxi Province, and he was concurrently head of the Public Security Bureau in the city of Nanchang. It was wrong not to have made use of these available resources. Afterwards, the military academy was dissolved by Zhang Fakui.<sup>264</sup> As to the agrarian revolution, there was debate over whether it should be developed in breadth or in depth. Those who favoured development in depth wanted to carry out the agrarian revolution in Hunan and Hubei, while those who favoured development in breadth wanted to move into northwestern China instead. They hoped to open up an international route via the Northwest first and solve the land question later through regional self-government and reduction of rent and interest.

Incidentally, this question of opening up an international route has a history. As early as the Guangdong period, Borodin had said that it was necessary to move into the Northwest and avoid a premature conflict with imperialism, a conflict which should not be allowed to begin until an international route had been opened up. At the time, this view was worth considering. After we got to Wuhan, however, the situation changed. There were two enemies then. One was Chiang Kai-shek and the other was the northern warlord Zhang Zuolin.<sup>265</sup> Within the Central Committee there was debate over whether to move east or north. The majority were against going east, for the following reasons: first, the masses were still deceived by Chiang, as he was still calling for continuation of the Northern Expedition; second, going east would entail a premature clash with imperialism; and third, if we went east to fight Chiang, Zhang Zuolin might attack Wuhan from the rear. The central idea of the "go north" group was to steer clear of the peasant movement in Hunan and Hubei, get Feng Yuxiang<sup>71</sup> to join us, and establish an international linkup. That's why in April and May, Tang Shengzhi's army continued the Northern Expedition.

At that time, we were even more mistaken in our judgment of Feng Yuxiang than of Chiang Kai-shek. After Wuhan had been taken and while it was being used as a revolutionary centre to counter Chiang Kai-shek, who was in Nanchang, it was learned that G. Voitinsky,<sup>266</sup> the Communist International's representative working with the Central Committee, had gone to Nanchang to see Chiang with the intention of striking a compromise with him. After expelling Pu Yi from the palace

in Beiping, Feng Yuxiang went to the Soviet Union and bragged that he was born a mixture of worker and peasant stock. The Communist International didn't know his background and thought he was the leader of a peasant army. With the situation in Wuhan getting very difficult, the enemy blockading us, and some of our own members wavering, people pinned their last hopes on Feng Yuxiang and therefore paid little attention to the May 21st Incident.<sup>267</sup> After Zhengzhou was taken, all kinds of people rushed there to see Feng Yuxiang. Among them were Borodin and Galen.<sup>167</sup> But Chiang Kai-shek sent Wu Zihui to Zhengzhou. While temporizing with the people from Wuhan, Feng Yuxiang declared that he would go to Xuzhou to meet Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon those people who had gone to Zhengzhou hurried back to Wuhan one after another. By that time the attitude of Wang Jingwei, Tan Yankai, Sun Fo, Gu Mengyu<sup>268</sup> and so on had changed entirely, and the Kuomintang people were vacillating even more. The concessions made by leaders of the Communist Party on June 30 were in the nature of a surrender. (They recognized the leadership of the Kuomintang in the democratic revolution and acknowledged that the members of the Communist Party participated in the government only in their capacity as Kuomintang members, that they might withdraw from the government by asking for leave, that the armed forces of the workers and peasants should be under the command of the Kuomintang and that the Wuhan workers' pickets should be disbanded and incorporated into the army.) This was an attempt to save the situation, but it only made things worse.

When we look back at the whole process, we find the leadership of the Party was correct more often than not in the early period of the Great Revolution, while in the middle period it did some correct things and made some mistakes, including even mistakes on matters of principle. Its mistakes in connection with the *Zhongshan* Warship Incident and with the Northern Expedition are cases in point. In the last period of the Great Revolution, an opportunist line took shape. It is not correct to say that the leadership of the Party was wrong throughout the Great Revolution. If the four-point instructions of the Communist International had been firmly carried out, the situation could have been saved. In its resolution on the mistake of opportunism, the Party's Sixth Congress stated that the expression of opportunism in its highest form was that "no work was done to develop the agrarian revolution and the class struggles of the masses; rather, efforts were made only to collaborate with the upper strata and class contradictions were thus



obscured. No efforts were made to control the army or to arm the workers and peasants. No attempt was made to use the opportunity afforded by our participation in the government to serve the interests of the masses. As a result, when the critical moment came, we were encircled by the enemy and unable to break through". But the resolution put these mistakes on a par with others and did not identify the principal ones. So the resolution itself failed to make a deep impression.

Second, the assessment of the August 7th Meeting.<sup>15</sup> While pointing out the successes and achievements of the August 7th Meeting, the congress also drew attention to two shortcomings: in the first place, the meeting still entertained some illusions about the left wing of the Kuomintang and, in the second, it was not thorough enough on the land question. But these were not the main problems. The fact that the forces of the Nanchang Uprising continued to use the banner of the left wing of the Kuomintang after the August 7th Meeting was not really the main mistake. And it had been decided that the agrarian revolution should be carried out. Experience has proved, however, that it takes time to carry out an agrarian revolution and that in the initial stage it is impossible to do so thoroughly. I think the main shortcomings of the August 7th Meeting were as follows: First, although it forcefully censured opportunism and pointed out that it was necessary to oppose the Kuomintang's White terror with uprisings, it did not provide an orientation for the whole Party by stating in concrete terms what was to be done. Second, bad precedents were created in inner-Party struggle. Chen Duxiu was not allowed to attend the meeting, and opposition to opportunism was seen as a personal attack on those responsible for opportunist mistakes. Later, things reached the point where in any struggle against opportunism, one or two persons in responsible positions had to be singled out and attacked as if they were opportunism itself. Once they had been removed or transferred, it was believed that opportunism had been eliminated and everything was just fine. Thus the Party made the mistake of being vindictive. I think these were the main shortcomings.

Third, an assessment was also made of the enlarged session of the Provisional Political Bureau held in November 1927. I think the mistakes made at that session outweighed the correct decisions. It was correct to discard the banner of the Kuomintang and raise the banner of the Soviets. In fact, even before the session, the banner of the Soviets had already been raised in Haifeng and Lufeng. Nor had the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong used the name of the

Kuomintang. Rather, it used the name of the Revolutionary Committee of the Workers and Peasants. So by that time, the question had in fact been resolved. I think the main mistakes of the November session were as follows. First, the Provisional Political Bureau held that the Chinese revolution was a "permanent revolution", which could be taken all the way to socialism without interruption. Second, according to its estimate of the situation, there was a continuously rising tide of revolution. Third, it held that the basic policy for the revolution was to promote a nationwide insurrection. All these views had been criticized in the resolutions of the Sixth Congress. But we didn't know that the theory of "permanent revolution" had been put forward in China by B. Lominadze, then the Communist International's representative. The Sixth Congress did not underline the fact that the revolution was at low ebb. Another mistake made at the November session was that certain rules of political discipline were laid down which had also been proposed by the representative of the Communist International. We felt that this was something quite fresh. Political disciplinary measures were to be taken against those comrades who led uprisings that failed. The Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong was regarded as a failure.<sup>269</sup> Disciplinary measures were taken against him by removing him from his position as an alternate member of the Provisional Political Bureau of the Central Committee. A number of other comrades were punished too. In fact, however, the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong had been a success. He had led both the peasant armed forces that rose in revolt and the Wuhan Guards Regiment to establish a base area in the Jinggang Mountains and, later, to establish the Central Soviet Area. At the time of the Nanchang Uprising, Tan Pingshan was a member of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. He was expelled from the Communist Party for mistakes. Zhang Guotao was against the Nanchang Uprising, and Tan Pingshan was expelled from the Party because he told a division commander that if Zhang Guotao opposed the Nanchang Uprising, he would kill him. I was then secretary of the Front Party Committee. The division commander came to ask my opinion of the matter. I said that we couldn't act that way in inner-Party struggle. Later somebody told the story to the representative of the Communist International who decided to expel Tan Pingshan from the Party. When we look back today, this disciplinary measure was not entirely appropriate. It would have been better if some other

measures had been taken against him or if he had been sent to Moscow. Of course, Tan Pingshan had made mistakes. But Zhang Guotao had made mistakes too. Disciplinary measures were taken against Zhang and also against Li Lisan and myself.

Fourth, the Sixth Congress did not make an adequate summation of the experience of the Nanchang Uprising. The uprising was a military action attempted against the Kuomintang. While the Central Committee pointed out five mistakes made in the uprising, it failed to identify the main one. I feel the main mistake was that we did not remain on the spot to continue the revolution. After the uprising, the army should not have been pulled out or, if that was necessary, it should not have been withdrawn so far. If it had stayed and started an agrarian revolution on the spot, it would have been possible to muster the former cadets of the dissolved Wuhan Military Academy and part of the peasants who had survived the uprisings in Hunan and Hubei<sup>487</sup> to expand our forces. However, after the Nanchang Uprising, instead of carrying out agrarian revolution on the spot, we went all the way to Shantou and, instead of gradually building our strength there, we only launched military attacks and tried to make our way to the seaports in the hope of receiving arms and munitions from the Soviet Union. If we had stayed, the situation in the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi would have been different, and though we might not have been able to hold Nanchang, we could have joined forces with those of the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong.

Fifth, the Autumn Harvest Uprisings. Some of the autumn harvest uprisings in various parts of the country succeeded, and others failed. In many places in the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, the peasants, on their own initiative, had already turned their associations into governments. Later, when Comrade Mao Zedong arrived in Pingjiang, Liuyang and other places, uprisings were organized. He led the forces to the Jinggang Mountains. Under the influence of those uprisings, others occurred in the border areas between Hubei, Henan and Anhui and in northeastern Jiangxi and other places. But they failed in some areas, such as western and northern Hubei. The reason for these failures was that the central leadership was still making putschist mistakes. The major putschist mistakes were made after the enlarged session of the Provisional Political Bureau in November 1927, but indications of putschism had already appeared at the August 7th Meeting. For instance, after this meeting, the slogan of killing the local tyrants and the evil gentry had been widely raised, and in some places it had

even become the rallying call and had led to the burning of towns. By the time of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, petty-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism was already present in the leading organs of the Central Committee. Because of the failure of the Great Revolution, some of our people became indignant, vengeful and desperate. This was one of the factors giving rise to putschism.

Sixth, the Guangzhou Uprising. The counter-revolutionaries were running rampant, and all the cities in the country were in their hands. The Guangzhou Uprising was a heroic attempt made jointly by the workers and revolutionary soldiers of Guangzhou. The Sixth Congress looked upon the Guangzhou Uprising as a rearguard action during the retreat following the failure of the Great Revolution. That was correct. The uprising took place at a time when Wang Jingwei had succeeded Li Jishen<sup>139</sup> as the man controlling Guangzhou. He wanted to disband the strike committee. But the trade unions still had some arms. The Officers' Training Corps that had come back to Guangzhou from Wuhan with Zhang Fakui now had as its commander Comrade Ye Jianying, who said that they too would get disbanded. At that time, Zhang Fakui's forces had just been sent to block Huang Shaohong.<sup>270</sup> If we had delayed any longer, they would have sent a division back to Guangzhou to disband the trade unions and the Officers' Training Corps. We seized this opportunity to pull our forces out of Zhang's army, and our estimate of the situation was that an uprising could be organized but that it would be hard to hold on to the city. The Communist International's representative in Guangzhou then was a German by the name of Heinz Neumann. In his view, after the uprising we had to hold on to Guangzhou and establish a Soviet there. Comrade Ye Ting,<sup>363</sup> commander-in-chief of the uprising, was only invited there on the eve of the uprising. Comrade Ye Jianying had just joined the Party, and he was ignored and not assigned any work. On the eve of the day of the uprising Ye Ting maintained that the armed forces should be pulled out of the city, and Neumann cursed him for vacillating. He said that the Guangzhou Uprising was an offensive and that they must "attack, attack, and again attack". The next day, Comrade Zhang Tailei<sup>169</sup> was killed, and on the third day we were defeated and retreated in panic. In the end Zhang Fakui came back to Guangzhou and carried out a massacre. If instead we had made an orderly retreat, or if we had joined forces either with the peasant movement in Haifeng and Lufeng or with Comrade Zhu De in Quijiang, there would not have been such

panic, greater revolutionary strength could have been conserved and more cadres could have been saved.

After the defeat of the Guangzhou Uprising, Ye Ting went to Moscow, but the representative of the Communist International still maintained he was politically vacillating and no one in the International would have anything to do with him. The Communist University of the Toilers of the East<sup>271</sup> invited him to speak, but the International didn't even allow him to do that. That's why he left the Party and went to Germany. We should redress this wrong done to Ye Ting. In the Southern Anhui Incident<sup>205</sup> he was very courageous and ready to lay down his life to preserve the forces of the revolution. He showed a steadfastness which even some Communists could not match, and to this day he has never bowed his head to the Kuomintang.

The summation of these events made by the Sixth Congress had shortcomings. It summarized everything in general terms but never came to grips with basic questions. When discussing the experience of the uprisings, the representatives of various localities showed some localist tendencies, or what is known today as the "mountain-stronghold mentality". For instance, when it was suggested that an uprising in a certain place had not been well organized, the representatives from that place would become irritated, wanting their own uprisings to be painted in a favourable light. So it was not easy to sum up experience soberly and draw lessons.

The Chinese Party made two tactical mistakes. It failed to launch offensives when offensives were called for during the high tide of the revolution, as in the Wuhan period. And it failed to withdraw when withdrawal was called for at a low ebb of the revolution, as at the time of the Guangzhou Uprising.

#### IV. THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AND THE PARTY'S TACTICS

At the time of the Sixth Congress there was a controversy over the assessment of the revolutionary situation. The Chinese delegates took the debate to Comrade Stalin, who said that at present the revolution was not at high tide but at low ebb. Comrade Li Lisan, however, asserted that it was still at high tide because workers' and peasants'

struggles were still going on in various places. Comrade Stalin replied that there were ripples even during an ebb tide.

The land question was also hotly debated. Someone said that Chiang Kai-shek might carry out a land policy of the Russian Stolypin type in China.<sup>272</sup> Comrade Stalin pointed out, however, that it would be impossible for Chiang to implement a reformist policy of that sort, because he relied on imperialism and collaborated with the feudal forces.

The Sixth Congress took the position that the revolutionary situation in China was between two high tides, because none of the contradictions that had given rise to the revolution had been resolved. The fact that some peasants were still conducting armed struggles was a slight indication that a new high tide of revolution was on the way, but it did not mean that it had already arrived. As subsequent developments proved, predictions that the peasant struggle would become an important part of a new upsurge were correct. In 1930, the Red Army captured Changsha. Whether or not the decision to attack Changsha was correct, it did show that the peasant guerrilla war was at high tide. What the Sixth Congress meant by saying that the national revolutionary movement was growing again was that an upsurge was fast approaching, and events following the Incident of September 18, 1931, proved that this was correct. So it cannot be said that the predictions of the Sixth Congress in this regard were premature.

The basic tactic worked out by the Sixth Congress — to win over the masses and prepare for uprisings — was correct, and it was different from that of the enlarged session of the Provisional Political Bureau of November 1927. In its struggle against current deviations, the Sixth Congress directed its main attack against “Left” putschism and “commandism”, because opportunism was already a thing of the past. Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi did not attend the congress. Zhang Guotao alone was present. Conversely, the number of those attending who had made the mistake of putschism was comparatively large. The person who received the most criticism was Comrade Li Lisan. Even so, the Sixth Congress made “Left” mistakes of its own.

First of all, with regard to the high and low tides of the revolution, there were several points on which there had been confusion all along. (1) No clear distinction was made between the objective conditions and the subjective strength involved in a revolutionary upsurge. We did not understand the importance of the mass movement, the subjective element, in helping to bring about a revolutionary upsurge. Therefore,

when assessing whether or not there was a revolutionary high tide at a given moment, we frequently overstressed favourable objective conditions and failed to understand that no revolutionary upsurge could really be created so long as our subjective strength was insufficient. (2) No clear distinction was made between a revolutionary high tide and an immediate revolutionary situation. We didn't understand that although a revolutionary high tide showed that the conditions for an uprising were maturing, or even that they were already ripe, it didn't necessarily mean that uprisings could be organized all over the country immediately. For example, there was a high tide of revolution in the rural areas in 1930, but it was not possible to organize uprisings everywhere right away. Li Lisan's line failed because it called for starting uprisings everywhere. (3) No clear distinction was made between partial and general high tides. Although at the time it was asserted that things were at a low ebb, no attempt was made to understand the problem clearly. It was due precisely to the lack of clarity on these points that when we debated the question of revolutionary high tides after our return from abroad in October 1928, we could only talk in empty phrases about waves and ripples.

Second, there was also confusion on several points relating to tactics. (1) Although the Sixth Congress declared that we were in retreat and must concentrate on winning over the masses, it did not make a clear-cut distinction between high tides during which attacks might be launched and low ebbs during which retreats were called for. (2) It was not made clear that even during a general retreat, offensive and defensive attacks could still be carried out locally. For example, we were making local attacks in the Jinggang Mountains, although in the country as a whole we were in retreat. (3) Nor was it made clear that even in attacks, there could be retreats. For example, while in the Jinggang Mountains, Comrade Mao Zedong sometimes used the tactic of retreat during an attack. Because we did not understand these matters clearly, we could not make our tactics more concrete and explicit. But it should have been possible for us to understand them. Failure to do so was a shortcoming of the Sixth Congress.

We did not make a very good analysis of the problem of uneven development of the revolution, and consequently we did not establish the principle of "taking the countryside as the centre of operations" and "using the countryside to defeat the cities". But with the conditions and theoretical level then prevailing, it was impossible for the Sixth Congress to conceive the idea of taking the proletariat as the leading

force and the countryside as our centre of operations. Although there had been peasant guerrilla wars, we had not yet gained enough experience and were still groping. I made a study of the historical experience and the existing situation. The Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom started in the villages, and it was only when Nanjing was occupied that it assumed its later nationwide significance. There were also peasant guerrilla wars of the "roving rebel" type, in which the cities were not occupied and which ended in defeat. These made me feel that the revolution could not be long sustained unless it had the cities as its centre. Besides, in Russia, after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution, there was no revolutionary high tide in the rural areas. Indeed, the revolutionary movement in the rural areas declined even more rapidly than the workers' movement in the cities. Needless to say, this was also the case in smaller countries. So I could find no historical instance in which the countryside had "encircled" the cities, either in China or abroad. Judging from the actual situation in China at the time, the entire revolutionary guerrilla movement in the rural areas was in extreme difficulty and the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords had not yet broken out.<sup>33</sup> Under such circumstances, it was impossible to take the rural areas as the centre of our operations.

When we talk about making the rural areas our centre, we must relate that idea to another, namely, that the peasants must be led by the Party of the proletariat. But at that time, there was no historical precedent for a Communist Party to concentrate on work in the countryside and not on building ties with the urban proletariat. In the documents of the Communist International, whenever the question of leadership by the proletarian party came up, it was in connection with the workers' movement. Only after the Chinese Communists had proved, through a long period of practice, that the Party could be built into a staunch Bolshevik Party even though it was cut off from the urban proletariat was it clear that such a thing was possible. As we study this question, it might be useful to consider what would have happened if such had not been the case. Without the leadership of a strong proletarian party, failures would have been unavoidable even if the line of "taking the countryside as the centre of operations" had been adopted. In fact, there were defeats in many places. At that time, the forces located in Haifeng and Lufeng were bigger than those in the Jinggang Mountains and various other conditions were also more favourable. Yet the movement there ended in failure. One of the important reasons



was that the idea of proletarian leadership had not yet been developed and the leaders were still to some extent petty-bourgeois revolutionaries.

Of course, I don't mean that no one could have conceived of taking the rural areas as the centre. In fact, that idea should have taken hold after the Sixth Congress, that is, in 1929 or 1930. But when I attended the Communist International in 1940, all the leading comrades there were still worried that we were too far separated from the working class. I said that after we had been tempered through protracted struggles in the villages, it was entirely possible for us to become proletarianized under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong. Some comrades of the Communist International were shocked when they heard this view and took exception to it.

It also took time for Comrade Mao Zedong to understand this question. Before the Great Revolution, Comrade Yun Daiying<sup>273</sup> once wrote a letter to Comrade Mao Zedong about the work Tao Xingzhi<sup>274</sup> and others were doing in the rural areas. In his letter of reply Comrade Mao Zedong said: "We cannot find enough time now to work even among the urban workers; how can we find time for rural work?" It wasn't until 1925, when he went home to recuperate and carried out some rural surveys in Hunan, that he began to pay attention to the peasant question. By the time of the Sixth Party Congress, Comrade Mao Zedong had already recognized the need to stress rural work and the importance, as well as the possibility, of setting up independent regimes in the rural areas by armed force — things which the congress didn't understand. However, I think that Comrade Mao Zedong had not yet formed the idea that our work should be centred on the rural areas and that the Communist Party, on behalf of the proletariat, should lead peasant guerrilla warfare. He too still believed that our work should be centred on the cities. In the beginning he held that Soviets should be established in the border areas between Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi in order to exert influence on, and give support to, the work in the cities. It was not until he wrote that letter<sup>488</sup> to Lin Biao<sup>84</sup> that he explicitly pointed out the need to create Red areas and set up independent regimes by armed force. That, he said, would be the most important factor in bringing about a nationwide revolutionary upsurge — in other words, the centre of our work should be the rural areas. So the thinking of Comrade Mao Zedong underwent a process of development. That was also true of Comrade Stalin's thinking. For example, it was not in 1928 but on the eve of the Red Army's attack on Changsha in 1930 that he came to regard the Red Army as of prime importance to

the Chinese revolution. That was after he had summed up the experience of the growth of the Red Army in 1929.

## V. THE POLICIES OF THE PARTY

The Sixth Party Congress set forth various Party policies in general terms. It adopted separate resolutions on problems relating to the Red Army, the work among workers, the work among peasants, the land policy and so on in the Soviet areas. Viewed from the present level of understanding, these resolutions gave inadequate consideration to questions of tactics and were not based on sufficiently thorough study of actual conditions and the needs of the masses. The most obvious example was the failure to emphasize the importance of establishing armies and political power in the rural areas in the form of independent regimes backed by armed force. A second example relates to Party building. At that time, Comrade Mao Zedong had already recognized the importance of both these questions, as was clearly indicated in the resolutions of the Second Party Congress of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area in October 1928 and the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army in December 1929.

First, the question of Party building. Before the defeat of the Great Revolution, our Party organizations were either semi- or fully open in their operations. After the defeat, the Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas were driven underground and had to function secretly, while those in the guerrilla areas openly led the masses in armed struggle. The task in the White areas was to turn the open or semi-open Party organizations into secret underground ones, whereas the task in the guerrilla areas was to build the Party through armed struggle. The Sixth Party Congress did not hold an adequate discussion of organizational matters. I remember that I gave a report on the question of organization, but the available information was limited to the problem of Party organizations in the cities in White areas. The Sixth Congress did not understand that the general policy for the Party in White areas should have been to accumulate strength; it only paid attention to changing the forms of organizations and reducing their size. Actually, however, the Party organizations there continued to function semi-openly. For instance, contacts between higher and lower levels were still close,

the leading bodies remained unwieldy, and the branches continued to consider that their central task was to lead struggles, instead of — as Lenin had suggested — to accumulate strength and conserve cadres even if that meant maintaining silence. We had no such ideas. Anybody who did have them would certainly have been called an opportunist. The style of work was characterized by much “running around”. Those who did the most running around were regarded as fine Party members, and those who wanted to sit down to study problems were regarded as poor ones. Later, Comrade Liu Shaoqi criticized this work style when he was in north China. Many comrades then thought his criticism unjustified. As for the question of how to proletarianize the leading bodies, there was a tendency after the August 7th Meeting to regard the struggle against opportunism simply as a matter of the dismissal and replacement of personnel. This formalism affected later attempts at proletarianization: cadres of working-class origin were idolized and intellectuals were not treated according to their individual merits. Comrade Li Lisan, then secretary of the Provincial Party Committee in Guangdong, once said that the role of the intellectuals was finished and that from then on only cadres of working-class and peasant origin should be relied on. So when several hundred cadets of the Officers’ Training Corps withdrew to Haifeng and Lufeng after the failure of the Guangzhou Uprising, instead of being used as cadres, they were sent to the Fourth Division as soldiers. Later the great majority of them died in action. Besides, in matters of ideological struggle, we didn’t follow the method of skilful guidance and patient persuasion exemplified in Comrade Mao Zedong’s letter to Lin Biao. There were signs of the “mountain-stronghold mentality” at the Sixth Congress, and people did not discuss a question calmly, especially if it concerned themselves. The struggle against opportunism and putschism was waged in the form of personal attacks. The representative of opportunism was Zhang Guotao, and the representative of putschism was Comrade Qu Qiubai. The two of them argued endlessly. Finally Bukharin said: “It’s you two big intellectuals who are doing all this quarrelling. If you don’t stop it, we’ll promote cadres of working-class origin to replace you.” This remark had a very bad influence at the time and also later, because it created antagonism between cadres of working-class and intellectual backgrounds.

Second, the workers’ movement. It was correct to set the goal of winning the majority of the working class to our side, and that was

written into the resolutions. But how were we to go about it? Should we organize Red unions,<sup>56</sup> or should we work inside the yellow trade unions? There was no clear answer in the political resolution adopted by the Sixth Congress. Later, however, the resolution on the workers' movement stipulated that the main task was to organize Red unions. This was wrong. It is true that during the Great Revolution we had organized vast numbers of workers in major cities, such as Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou. But after the defeat of the Great Revolution almost all of these workers' organizations were destroyed, and the trade unions that did manage to survive, like the Party organizations, had few members. At that time, several kinds of trade unions still existed. There were some of the original trade unions, which had registered with Kuomintang headquarters as legal organizations. There were also trade unions which had not registered with the Kuomintang and yet managed to survive. Then there were trade unions which the Kuomintang people had organized themselves. Some of these unions still had a mass following, and the chances of setting up Red unions were pretty slim. So what we should have done was to join the yellow unions and work within them. The fact that the resolution on the workers' movement stipulated that the chief goal was to organize Red unions was related to the "Left" deviation inside the Chinese Party and to the consistent "Left" deviation of the Red International of Labour Unions.<sup>275</sup> And the resolution in turn had a great deal to do with the "Left" tendency that appeared later in the workers' movement led by the Party. As for the establishment of workers' committees in the factories, it was an attempt to create a unified organization of workers in the labour movement, one which was neither a Red nor a yellow union. In looking back, we can see that this too was impossible at the time.

Third, the peasant movement. The Sixth Congress adopted two resolutions, one on the peasant question and one on the land question. It took a long period of groping before we came to a solution of these problems. Furthermore, specific methods had to be found to implement that solution. For instance, the method proposed by Comrade Mao Zedong of "taking from those who have a surplus and giving to those who have a shortage, and taking from those who have better and giving to those who have worse" was a very good one. If instead, all the land of the landlord class had been confiscated and distributed only to the poverty-stricken peasants according to the principles laid down by the Sixth Congress, the result would certainly have been the physical liqui-

dation of the landlords or their expulsion from the Soviet areas. That would have had an unfavourable effect on the struggle.

Fourth, the question of the Soviets. Nowhere in the resolutions of the Sixth Congress can one find anything like the conception put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong of creating Soviet areas and long-term independent regimes in the rural areas. Instead, the congress merely copied the experience of the Soviet Union, stressing the establishment of Soviets in the cities; thus it was again dogmatic.

Fifth, the struggle against the imperialists and warlords. It is true that we must oppose both. However, the Sixth Congress treated them as a monolithic bloc within which there were no contradictions we could exploit. Unlike Comrade Mao Zedong, it paid no attention to making use of the contradictions among our enemies to increase our own strength.

Sixth, the policy towards other political parties. The resolutions treated them all as enemies without differentiation. For example, it is true that the Reorganization Clique of the Kuomintang was against us. But the contradiction between the clique and Nanjing could have been exploited. Another example was the "third party". No doubt we had to criticize and counter its attempts to erode our ideology. But it was still possible to co-operate with it in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. Besides, the Sixth Congress did not stress the need to develop broad democratic struggles in the cities, a point put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong.

Seventh, the movement in the armed forces. The Sixth Congress adopted a secret resolution on our work in the armed forces, which included a section dealing with our work in the White army. At that time, we were definitely not paying sufficient attention to such work. Besides, we were limiting our work to the rank and file, and that was a mistake. It is true that after the defeat of the Great Revolution, many officers in the Kuomintang armies were reactionary. But a characteristic of the mercenary armies in China is that the officers play a most significant role. The Sixth Congress held that it was military opportunism to carry out work among the officers. Subsequent events proved, however, that the mutinies of large contingents of enemy troops and their surrender to the Red Army were all due to our work among the officers. The defection to the Red Army of the division under Li Ming-rui in Guangxi<sup>276</sup> and the revolt of the 26th Route Army in Jiangxi<sup>277</sup> are cases in point — both were led by officers.

## VI. THE SIXTH CONGRESS AND ITS IMPACT

(1) The impact of the Communist International on the Sixth Party Congress. The Sixth Congress was held directly under the leadership of the Communist International, and it is now necessary to make an analysis of the congress. Its correct decisions, which I have just mentioned, were largely attributable to the influence of Comrade Stalin. Two facts testify to this. First, the resolution on the China question which was adopted by the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in February 1928 and which essentially became the foundation of the Sixth Party Congress had been read and revised by Comrade Stalin. All the main questions, such as the nature of the revolution and its motive forces, were dealt with in this resolution. Second, Comrade Stalin had a talk with leading cadres of the Chinese Party on the eve of the Sixth Congress and expounded to them in detail the nature of the revolution and the revolutionary situation.

Bukharin, Pavel Mif and others did the day-to-day work, and Bukharin delivered a report at the congress. He was secretary of the Communist International, while Mif was deputy head of the Far Eastern Bureau. Naturally, they too had an influence on the Sixth Congress. For instance, in his report to the congress, Bukharin took Zhang Guotao and Comrade Qu Qiubai to task and claimed that both were big intellectuals and should be replaced by cadres of working-class origin. This is point one. Two, Bukharin's assessment of the Soviets and of the Red Army movement in China was pessimistic. He held that they could exist only in a state of dispersion, and that if they operated in large formations they would only harm the people's interests, consuming all they had, down to the last chicken, and causing great resentment. He wanted the high-ranking cadres to leave the Red Army. For example, he wanted Comrades Zhu De and Mao Zedong to be removed from their posts and assigned to study. So when we came back to China, we gave instructions for Comrades Zhu De and Mao Zedong to be transferred out of the Red Army. They did not agree. At this point, the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords broke out and we felt that this was an opportunity to expand the Red Army and gave up the idea of removing the two comrades. But we didn't realize that it would have been wrong to do so anyway. Three, the question of rich peasants in China. Although Bukharin had

made mistakes on the question of the kulaks in the Soviet Union, the resolution of the Sixth Congress on the question of rich peasants, while emphasizing the feudal side to their character, pointed out that we should not deliberately intensify opposition to them. So in this case the resolution was not adversely affected.

The resolutions of the Sixth Congress were drafted by Comrade Qu Qiubai. Mif and Bukharin revised the drafts, and then Comrade Qu Qiubai read them over and made further changes. But Mif's role in preparing the resolutions was not very significant. His influence on the congress was felt mainly in three ways. (a) He made some contemptuous and mistrustful remarks about responsible cadres of the Chinese Party, and these had a certain effect. When preparations were being made for elections, Mif said at a meeting of the preparatory committee that the leading cadres of the Chinese Party were weak in theory and that there were some stronger comrades like Wang Ming,<sup>65</sup> Shen Zemin<sup>278</sup> and so on, hinting that they should be promoted to the Central Committee. Of course, not many people paid attention to what he said. (Later, the story was circulated that Mif had wanted them on the Central Committee.) But this kind of talk did have the effect of making students at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East and other schools look down on the leading cadres of the Party. It even gave rise to a struggle against the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party to the Communist International. (b) He created a barrier between workers and students. For instance, he praised Xiang Zhongfa<sup>279</sup> highly and used him as a mouthpiece, trying to get him to oppose the so-called association of students from Jiangsu and Zhejiang.<sup>489</sup> After the Sixth Congress, before all of the delegates had returned to China he called several meetings, at one of which Wang Ming gave a report on the struggle against the association. Generally speaking, the delegates did not have a good impression of Mif. (c) He also had a certain role in organizational matters, but it was not a major one. For example, a large number of the working personnel for the Sixth Congress were selected from the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International. This smacked of sectarianism.

(2) The composition of the delegations. Looking back on it, we can see that the composition was not very sound. There were altogether seventy-five delegates from various parts of China. With the staff members who attended as observers, they made a total of one hundred and twelve. The composition of this group was unsound for three reasons. First, too much stress was laid on the number of dele-

gates of working-class origin. It was all right for such delegates to constitute the majority at the congress. But the fact is that many cadres of working-class origin had laid down their lives during the Great Revolution, and a number of the leading comrades who survived were too busy working to leave their posts. So many of the delegates were selected from the branches. But after the Great Revolution, the leading cadres in the branches were all new, the old ones having either died or left. As a result, many of the branch leaders were not very capable. Of the seventy-five delegates, forty-one were workers, and not many of them had been tempered in the Great Revolution. Second, no effort was made to assemble cadres with revolutionary experience at the Sixth Congress. The Communist International wired the notice of the meeting to our Party at the end of March, and the delegates had to leave in April. It would have been difficult for Comrade Mao Zedong to go, but many other comrades could have attended, such as Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi,<sup>260</sup> Yun Daiying, Chen Tanqiu,<sup>123</sup> and Li Fuchun.<sup>281</sup> If more comrades engaged in the day-to-day work had gone, it would have been possible for the congress to learn more about actual problems and to collect more opinions. However, it was felt that the work at home was more important, and so those comrades didn't go. Third, there were defeatist sentiments, "mountain-stronghold" tendencies and personal attacks at the congress. So it was impossible to discuss matters thoroughly, and whenever a specific question came under discussion, there would be a quarrel. For example, when we began to examine the mistakes made in the Hunan and Hubei uprisings, the delegates from those two provinces, who felt that they had not a few achievements to their credit, became extremely argumentative. It must be pointed out, however, that there were no factional divisions within the various delegations from different parts of the country.

These were the three major weaknesses. The unsound composition of the delegations made it impossible to discuss questions in depth. Moreover, the leading comrades whose views were more correct than other people's — Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong for example — did not attend.

In the elections to the Central Committee there was a tendency to overemphasize the importance of a working-class background. Of the thirty-six members elected, twenty-one were workers. Although many leaders had emerged from among the workers during the Great Revolution, the Party had not given enough attention to their education. On the other hand, of the cadres with an intellectual background, many had



emerged in the May 4th Movement and had done a great deal of work. Quite a few of them were experienced. However, because working-class origin was overemphasized, many good cadres of intellectual background were prevented from serving on the Central Committee. For example, Comrade Liu Shaoqi was only elected secretary of the Control Commission but not a member of the Central Committee. Comrade Yun Daiying was not elected either, and he became a member of the Central Committee only at its second plenary session. This was one reason why the Central Committee was later very weak. Nevertheless, there was nothing sectarian about the delegates' attitude in the elections. For example, Comrades like Mao Zedong and Guan Xiangying<sup>282</sup> received many votes, whereas Zhang Guotao, Comrade Qu Qiubai and others who had made mistakes, received the fewest.

(3) The duration of the congress. There was not sufficient time to study and discuss problems. The delegates were not prepared beforehand, and they had not been elected by the local organizations. (Only the delegates from Guangdong had been elected at meetings held for the purpose. Most of the other delegates had been appointed by the Central Committee.) Many of the resolutions were adopted without adequate discussion. They were only "adopted in principle", as it was called, and then sent to the various committees for minor changes in wording. If we had had a little more time, we could have achieved better results.

To sum up, the resolutions of the Sixth Congress on the nature, motive forces, prospects, situation and tactics of the revolution were basically correct. That is why we say that the line of the Sixth Congress was basically correct. On the other hand, the congress also made many mistakes on specific and practical questions. (1) It failed to understand that the central problem of the Chinese revolution was the problem of the peasants' land and that peasant struggle and the establishment of independent regimes by armed force were special features of that revolution. (2) It failed to understand the complexity of the changes in China's class relations and it did not focus the Party's tactics on winning over the classes in the middle. (3) It failed to understand the unevenness in the development of the revolutionary situation and hence the importance of working in the rural areas and building the Party. Admittedly, at the time it was not yet possible to envisage the countryside encircling the cities. (4) It was not sufficiently conscientious in summing up previous experience and lessons and therefore failed to recognize the importance of armed struggle and the need to build the

Party, establish our own regimes and work among the masses in connection with armed struggle. All this was already being done by Comrade Mao Zedong at the time. That's why we say that the Sixth Congress made mistakes on matters of principle which had an adverse effect on subsequent events. Comrade Mao Zedong's views were correct. But the resolutions of the Sixth Congress carried more weight, because it was an all-Party congress, whereas Comrade Mao Zedong had not yet become the leader of the Party as a whole. That was the Party's misfortune.

The Bolshevization of our Party began with its birth and has been a steady process ever since. Comrade Mao Zedong's own development is representative of that process. The correct aspects of the Sixth Congress were attributable to the same process. The Sixth Congress also had shortcomings and made a number of mistakes. But these mistakes were not mistakes in Party line or of sectarianism. Although there were certain erroneous tendencies at the time and these tendencies later did have an influence on the formation of the Li Lisan line and the emergence of sectarianism, they were not the direct cause. That is my personal view.

## ON RECTIFICATION AMONG CULTURAL WORKERS IN THE GREAT REAR AREA

*January 18, 1945*

Please consider the following opinions about rectification among cultural workers in the Great Rear Area.

1. Rectification may be carried out if it is limited to comrades working with the Committee on Cultural Work<sup>283</sup> and in the office of the *New China Daily*.<sup>284</sup> It would seem inopportune, however, to extend it to cultural workers outside the Party. The reason is that, with the democratic movement making headway, this is just the right time to persuade the progressives in cultural circles to unite with the middle elements in demanding that the Kuomintang authorities grant academic freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and in conducting an ideological struggle against the die-hards. We must urge them to expose the Kuomintang's criminal policy of cultural control, to get in touch with the youth and take an active interest in the welfare of the working people. In this way they will become a part of the mass democratic movement and make a real contribution to it. That will be a very good form of rectification. By contrast, an abstract debate over world view and outlook on life, or even an unnecessary dispute over events in the past, will inevitably dilute the struggle against the Kuomintang die-hards and bring about internal strife. The matter must be handled with great care. As for the Yan'an Conference on Culture and Education,<sup>285</sup> we should teach cultural workers in the Great Rear Area only the general principles that were emphasized there: following the mass line, seeking truth from facts, promoting the united front, adapting culture and education to the needs of the masses and giving them a specifically national character. The particular con-

---

A telegram sent by Comrades Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu from Yan'an to Comrade Wang Ruofei, who was directing the work of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee in Chongqing.

tent and resolutions of the conference should not be used as criteria to assess their work.

2. Even for the rectification among comrades working with the Committee on Cultural Work and in the office of the *New China Daily*, though it is necessary to review the past, the main thing is to examine our present work in the light of the realities, that is, the circumstances in the Great Rear Area. Our goal should be to lead the comrades to unite even more closely and participate even more actively in the struggle against the Kuomintang and to prevent the growth of mutual mistrust and grievances.

## ON THE UNITED FRONT

*April 30, 1945*

Comrades, I am going to speak on two questions. One concerns the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and especially the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the other concerns the experience of the united front and the lessons to be drawn from it. Both questions relate to the united front.

### I. ON THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

Having already proposed the establishment of an Anti-Japanese National United Front, last year our Party proposed the establishment of a coalition government. This is a step forward, but actually, the two are one and the same thing. A coalition government is the united front's highest form of political power. The Kuomintang has always been against our proposals, whether for an Anti-Japanese National United Front, a democratic republic or a coalition government. The reason is that it stands for the interests of a small minority and opposes the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, which we represent. In his political report "On Coalition Government", Comrade Mao Zedong tells us that this is a struggle between two lines: the Kuomintang government's line of oppressing the Chinese people and carrying out passive resistance against Japan versus the Chinese people's line of raising their own political consciousness and cementing their unity to wage a people's war. As we know, the gestation of an Anti-Japanese National United Front took a very long time. Things started to move in this direction from about the time of the Incident of

---

Speech delivered at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

September 18, 1931.<sup>490</sup> The period since may be divided into five stages. The first stage extended from the Incident of September 18 to the Xi'an Incident;<sup>226</sup> the second stage from the Xi'an Incident to the Incident of July 7; the third stage from the Incident of July 7 to the withdrawal from Wuhan;<sup>491</sup> the fourth stage from the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1939 to last year's session of the People's Political Council;<sup>492</sup> and the last stage from the time we first proposed the establishment of a coalition government to the present. Throughout these five stages, there were persistent differences in principle and intense struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party on the questions of democracy and national resistance to Japan.

The first stage, from the Incident of September 18 to the Xi'an Incident, lasted more than five years. The main issue between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was whether or not to resist Japanese aggression. For our part, we urged the whole nation to put an end to the civil war and unite to resist Japan. But the Kuomintang authorities proposed and persisted in "internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion". This was actually a policy of civil war.

After the Incident of September 18, we proposed to Kuomintang armies throughout the country that an armistice agreement be concluded so as to unite against Japan. We set three conditions: stop the attacks against us, grant democratic rights to the people, and arm the people. The proposal was mentioned in Comrade Mao Zedong's report. Some Kuomintang troops responded to our call. For example, the Northern Chahar Allied Army,<sup>286</sup> the Fujian People's Government<sup>287</sup> and the 19th Route Army, and later the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army all responded and co-operated with us. Some troops belonging to local factions also co-operated with us to a certain extent, although they didn't completely agree with our slogans. Even some troops of the Kuomintang central army, although they were fighting us in Jiangxi, were in favour of coming to north China to fight the Japanese. But how did the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek react to our proposal? They launched repeated "encirclement and suppression" campaigns against us, intensifying the civil war. They attacked, disbanded and eliminated friendly armies that co-operated with us. To his own personal troops Chiang issued this statement: "Anyone who prates about resisting Japan will be executed without mercy." In other words, anyone who dared to call for resistance would be shot.

Then, after the North China Incident<sup>493</sup> took place in 1935 and the main force of our Red Army came north, we put forth the slogan of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and proposed that a democratic republic be formed. In a letter to the Kuomintang written in 1936,<sup>288</sup> we proposed convening a national defence council, mobilizing the nation to fight the aggressors, convening a national assembly elected by the people and founding a democratic republic. In response to the December 9th Movement<sup>290</sup> in north China we went into action and marched east across the Huanghe River to fight the Japanese,<sup>289</sup> thus stirring up a national salvation movement throughout the country. The Kuomintang authorities sent large forces to Shanxi not only to stop us from fighting the Japanese but also to annihilate us in the Northwest. During the Xi'an Incident, I once asked Chiang Kai-shek, "We called for an end to the civil war, why wouldn't you stop it?" He answered, "I was waiting for you to come to the Northwest." I said, "We've been in the Northwest for more than a year." He had nothing to say to that. It is quite clear he was thinking of exterminating us in the Northwest. That is why the battle of Shanchengbu<sup>291</sup> took place just before the Xi'an Incident. He blocked us here, blocked us there and was bent on wiping us out. As for the national salvation movement, he did his best to suppress it, and this led to the imprisonment of the "seven patriotic leaders".<sup>91</sup> That is why the letter Comrade Mao Zedong sent to the Kuomintang on behalf of our Party said, "Patriotism is penalized and innocent people are in jail everywhere; treason is rewarded and traitors are gloating over their new appointments and honours." Nevertheless, thanks to our insistence and the incessant demands of the whole nation to stop the civil war and unite against the Japanese, the Kuomintang sent two representatives to negotiate with us at Wayaobu; later, we sent Comrade Pan Hannian as a representative for further negotiations.<sup>292</sup> And how did Chiang Kai-shek view the negotiations? He looked upon us as if we were surrendering to him and wanted to incorporate us into his army. This was his idea up to the Xi'an Incident. He would only allow us to have an army of 3,000 to 5,000 men at most. As for those Kuomintang troops who were willing to fight the Japanese — and there were many, especially in the Northeastern Army — he repressed them. Chiang Kai-shek once said to General Zhang Xueliang, "Your duty is to wipe out the Communists. You must not go to Suiyuan to fight the Japanese. If you do, I'll have you removed." Later, he planned to call a conference<sup>494</sup>

in Xi'an attended by Chen Cheng<sup>78</sup> and also by Jiang Dingwen,<sup>80</sup> who was to replace Zhang Xueliang. This precipitated the Xi'an Incident.

Our Party insisted on a peaceful solution of the Xi'an Incident and, with the consent of generals Zhang Xueliang<sup>87</sup> and Yang Hucheng,<sup>88</sup> had Chiang Kai-shek released and sent back. And what was the specific promise that Chiang Kai-shek personally gave? "I will absolutely not engage in civil war any longer. I will definitely fight the Japanese." But he detained Zhang Xueliang, who had accompanied him back to Nanjing, and dispatched Yang Hucheng abroad. This enraged the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army and nearly sabotaged the peace. Moreover, he used troops to suppress them, sent special agents to sow discord and engineered the murder of Wang Yizhe.<sup>293</sup> It is apparent from all this that after the peaceful solution of the Xi'an Incident, Chiang Kai-shek did not give up his intention of conducting civil war and that he has never given it up. Now I can tell you something else. T. V. Soong<sup>86</sup> was also a so-called peace envoy at the Xi'an negotiations. He promised to reorganize the Nanjing government after Chiang Kai-shek was released. To date, after eight years, this pledge has not been honoured. Last year when I met him in Chongqing, I said to him sarcastically, "I have not yet made public the promise you made during the Xi'an Incident." The fact is the promise was never kept.

So during this first stage, although civil war was stopped and peace achieved, these things were brought about through pressure. It was the policy of our Party's Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong to compel Chiang to resist the Japanese. But Chiang Kai-shek never abandoned his intention to carry on civil war.

The second stage, from the time of the Xi'an Incident to the beginning of the armed resistance against Japan on July 7, 1937, lasted a little over half a year. The main question at issue between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang was whether there was to be real preparation for armed resistance or merely empty talk. Our Party's telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong's report to the Party conference of the Soviet areas<sup>294</sup> both said that there must be genuine democracy and freedom and genuine preparation for armed resistance and that the former was essential to the latter. Our central policy was to promote armed resistance against Japan through democracy. What was the policy of the Kuomintang? To "root out the Red evil" and delay armed resistance against Japan. That meant



they wanted to suppress the activities of the Communist Party completely and delay armed resistance under the pretence of making preparations for it. That was what Chiang Kai-shek had in mind.

Let us look at the facts. In our telegram of February 1937 to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, we made four pledges and five demands. In essence the four pledges were that we would reorganize our troops, change our Soviet areas<sup>457</sup> into democratic border areas, cease our attempts to overthrow the Kuomintang regime by armed insurrection and discontinue our policy of confiscating the land of the landlords. And the five demands were that the Kuomintang should stop the civil war, extend freedoms to the people and release political prisoners, convene a conference representing the various political parties, make genuine preparations for armed resistance and raise the people's standard of living. And what was the Kuomintang's answer? A resolution to "root out the Red evil", which consisted of four demands: that we abolish the Red Army, abolish the political power of the Soviets, discontinue Red propaganda and stop class struggle. The word "abolish" was open to different interpretations. Once the Red Army was redesignated, you could say that there was no longer a Red Army, but it would still exist; once the name of the Soviet areas was changed, you could also say that there were no more Soviets, but they would still exist. "Discontinue Red propaganda and stop class struggle" meant that we were not to carry on political activities in the areas under Kuomintang rule. So there was peace, but beneath the calm waters there was a reef. And it's still there today; they are bent on physically abolishing our armed forces and political power. At the time, there was a section of the Kuomintang that was prepared to co-operate with us. These people, among whom were Sun Fo<sup>90</sup> and Feng Yuxiang,<sup>71</sup> put forward a draft resolution to restore the Three Great Policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but it was not adopted. We had proposed the convening of a national congress elected by the people and the establishment of a democratic government. Comrade Mao Zedong made a report at the May conference and, under instructions from the Central Committee of the Party, I wrote an article on the subject as well.<sup>295</sup> Democrats inside China and abroad were very much in favour of our proposal. But what was the Kuomintang's response? They rigged the elections for the national assembly, thus setting the stage for the very national assembly that is being prepared now. We had proposed a conference of all political parties, but instead the Kuomintang invited everyone to take part in a forum

that they held at Lushan.<sup>214</sup> But the forum was not a round-table conference where people could have serious discussions. Not long ago, when I was negotiating with Wang Shijie,<sup>206</sup> he still preferred a meeting at which there would only be inconclusive speech-making. He suggested organizing a sort of political advisory meeting, which would be nothing but such a forum. The only difference was that the Communist Party was not included in the Lushan forum. Comrades Lin Boqu,<sup>207</sup> Bo Gu<sup>362</sup> and I did not appear in public, and our presence was kept secret. This time they propose to make things "public"; I think that's the only difference.

Our negotiations with the Kuomintang were held once in Xi'an, once near West Lake in Hangzhou and twice in Lushan,<sup>208</sup> with Gu Zhutong,<sup>209</sup> Chiang Kai-shek and others. These negotiations dealt with recognition of our army and our border areas, legal status for all political parties and the establishment of an alliance of the political parties, that is, a united front. And what was the reply of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek to our demands? Permission to organize only three divisions (45,000 men), something they still insist on. Chiang Kai-shek would on no account let us set up our own high command, because he wanted to command directly. As for the border areas, at first they were given formal recognition, but that was rescinded after the War of Resistance began. Chiang Kai-shek once said to Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, "What do you want border areas for, now that you're engaged in the War of Resistance?" He thought the border areas could be abolished in exchange for the title of commander-in-chief. He gave recognition to them again, as a result of the victory at Pingxingguan;<sup>300</sup> a resolution to that effect was adopted at the 333rd Meeting of the Executive Yuan, but was again shelved after the withdrawal from Nanjing.<sup>495</sup> To date, the border areas still haven't been recognized. His attitude towards our Party has been even more outrageous. We demanded legal status for all political parties and an alliance between them. But at the first Lushan forum he actually had the audacity to say, "Mr. Mao and Mr. Zhu should go abroad." He could actually entertain such an idea! We were negotiating in complete good faith, but he was trying to deal with us the same way he had dealt with Yang Hucheng. There was also the problem of issuing a joint declaration on Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. We took a draft declaration to the second Lushan forum. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to revise a couple of sentences. At the time, we were still being polite, so we agreed to his revisions. But even after the changes

were made, he still wouldn't release it to the public. He was always hoping to take away the legal status of the Communist Party. If it had not been for the outbreak of war on August 13, 1937, he wouldn't even have allowed us to set up a general command for the Eighth Route Army or a headquarters for the Eighteenth Group Army. When Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, Chief-of-Staff Ye Jianying and I first arrived in Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek had not yet redesignated the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army. It was not until the battle of Shanghai started, when he hurried back from Lushan feeling an all-out war had begun, that he announced the new designations Eighth Route Army and, shortly thereafter, Eighteenth Group Army and called on our troops to go into action. Later, the declaration was released, but he issued another statement in which, while recognizing the Communist Party, he spoke of abolishing the Red Army and the Soviet areas. He described us as a group, not a party, and stressed that all groups should be unified under the leadership of the Kuomintang. He was still dealing with us in the spirit of Ah Q-ism.

The events of this stage show that what we stood for aroused the entire nation. The peaceful solution of the Xi'an Incident promoted nationwide armed resistance to Japan. Thus, armed resistance was brought about through pressure, and we can say the same of the negotiations and the united front. At the same time, these events show that only the people have the strength to apply the necessary pressure. Furthermore, they show that Chiang Kai-shek will not change his anti-Communist stand.

The third stage, from the Incident of July 7, 1937, to the withdrawal from Wuhan, lasted about a year and a half. The main issue during this period was whether there should be total or partial armed resistance to Japan. Our Party envisaged a protracted war, a people's war, that is, total war and armed resistance by the whole nation. And what about the Kuomintang? On the contrary, they envisaged a war of quick decision, with the government alone carrying out armed resistance and the people forbidden to rise in arms. The first argument arose after August 13 over the question of our dispatching troops. The policy of the Central Committee of our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong was to dispatch troops in batches and not all at once. Our main goal was to go to north China and develop guerrilla warfare in the mountains — independently and with the initiative in our own hands — to create a war theatre and make preparations for a protracted war. That was the only way to win victory. But the Kuo-

mintang wanted our troops dispatched all at once, and they designated small pieces of territory (such as Laiyuan and Weixian) on the northeast edge of the Wutai Mountains as our area of defence. Their plan was for the Japanese to besiege and exterminate us in the mountains.

On a national scale, the policy of the Central Committee of our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong was to persist in protracted war. How about the Kuomintang? They cherished illusions of quick victories. They thought that winning a few battles would bring international intervention. Their greatest hope was that the Soviet Union would dispatch troops or, failing that, that Britain and the United States would intervene in Shanghai. So they engaged in positional warfare, sending a force of between one and two million men to Shanghai to fight a desperate battle which resulted in extremely heavy sacrifices. Just before Nanjing was lost, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Stalin, saying: "I cannot hold on here any longer, please send troops quickly!" He wanted to conclude a military treaty with the Soviet Union. In reality, the Soviet Union was already aiding China in the War of Resistance with ammunition and aeroplanes and had signed a mutual non-aggression treaty<sup>301</sup> with it, giving it political help. As a result of his positional warfare Chiang Kai-shek lost a big part of his main force, so that after the withdrawal from Nanjing he vacillated and tried to negotiate peace. However, he was unsuccessful, because Japan's terms were too harsh and, more important, because in view of the nationwide upsurge of armed resistance, he dared not capitulate. The different policies and methods adopted by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party brought different results. In north China we created a guerrilla war front and base areas, while the Kuomintang lost large pieces of territory in north and central China and suffered heavy casualties in positional warfare until the withdrawal from Wuhan. These results reflected the difference in strategy. Of course, in Wuhan we made mistakes also. Comrades in leading positions there, including myself, believed unduly in the ability of the Kuomintang forces to win victory and neglected the development of our own forces; we stressed mobile warfare and played down guerrilla warfare. So during the Wuhan period,<sup>479</sup> in the Changjiang basin we did not take advantage of the withdrawal of the Kuomintang troops to go to the countryside, mobilize the peasants and wage widespread guerrilla warfare, as we had done in north China.

During the negotiations in Wuhan, we still persisted in our call for an alliance of all parties, that is, a united front organization, a common programme and reform of the existing political apparatus. And

the Kuomintang? The slogan they put forth was, one party, one doctrine, one leader. They wanted to assimilate us into the Kuomintang, to dissolve us. They called it "the policy of dissolving the Communists" — as if they could simply melt us in water. Like Lin Daiyu, the Kuomintang was made of water, but we were not a Jia Baoyu, we were indissoluble.<sup>496</sup> They proposed that we join the Kuomintang, and everything would be fine. We replied that we were prepared to form an alliance in which we would each have a share but would maintain independent organizations. We could join the Kuomintang, but we would have to preserve our own Communist Party organization, as we had done during the first period of co-operation with the Kuomintang at the time of the Great Revolution.<sup>461</sup> But Chiang Kai-shek wouldn't hear of it. He said there could be no party outside his party. We said that since there were already factions within his party, it wouldn't matter if there were other parties besides his. He replied that we could join the Kuomintang as a Communist faction, but not stay outside. He was bent on dissolving us, but of course we could never agree to that. He was going to organize a Three People's Principles Youth League;<sup>467</sup> we proposed to take part in the work so as to develop the youth movement, but Chiang Kai-shek wouldn't have that either. He wanted to use the Youth League to abolish all other youth organizations and to unify everything under his own control, forbidding other parties to carry on activities inside the League. Of course, we couldn't come to an agreement about that either. His policy for the Communist Party behind enemy lines was to have us fight the Japanese and let our strength be whittled down. As Comrade Zhu De said the other day, since the Kuomintang withdrew very quickly from north China, it had to let us go there. That was why during the Wuhan period Chiang permitted us to go to north China and Shandong to develop guerrilla warfare. Comrade Xu Xiangqian<sup>302</sup> took the 115th Division to Shandong with his permission. But when Chiang saw that we were expanding our guerrilla warfare and setting up base areas and that the people's strength was growing, he was frightened and immediately sent Lu Zhonglin and Zhang Yinwu<sup>303</sup> with troops to create friction. We called for political reforms and the establishment of popular organs. He produced a Political Council but continued to exercise the dictatorship of a single party — the Kuomintang. The council members were only "guests in the house of the Kuomintang". He also disbanded a number of people's organizations.

From this third stage we can see that Chiang Kai-shek's theory of winning quick victories met with defeat, that his plan to rely on foreign countries' joining in the war came to naught and that while his opportunism had failed, he did not dare to capitulate. Thanks to the strength of the Eighth Route Army and the people, he was compelled to move towards a protracted war and to give an appearance of being politically progressive. But essentially he remained opportunistic and reactionary.

The fourth stage of the united front lasted a full six years, from the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1939 to last year's open negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party when the Political Council was in session. The main issue during this period was that, as recorded in our Party's Manifesto of July 7, 1939,<sup>497</sup> the Kuomintang wanted compromise, a split and retrogression, while we persevered in resistance, unity and progress. This struggle is still going on. During these six years, we have advocated active armed resistance, progress and self-reliance. While demanding that the Kuomintang act according to these same principles, we for our part have accomplished much behind the enemy lines. We have created nineteen Liberated Areas there<sup>498</sup> and formed many armed units, thus proving that our approach is correct and that this is the only way to provide support to the Kuomintang in its front-line battles and to give impetus to the nationwide democratic movement. But what did the Kuomintang do in these six years? Just the opposite. As we have often said, they have been passive in fighting the Japanese and active in opposing the Communists. In his report to this congress, Comrade Mao Zedong analyses their policy of relying on foreign aid, waiting for victory and collaborating with the enemy and the puppet troops to bring about civil war. For precisely this reason there have been three anti-Communist onslaughts and three rounds of negotiations in these six years.

Let me say something about this couple of threes. As a prelude, there was the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in January 1939 after the withdrawal from Wuhan. Our Party sent a telegram stating that we were for progress and against the capitulation of Wang Jingwei, and calling for a thorough reorganization of the ranks of armed resistance, a political housecleaning and government reform. But the answer of the Fifth Plenary Session was to adopt in principle "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties".<sup>499</sup> After the session the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek drew up further measures for restricting the activities

of our troops, the border areas, the Communist Party and the people. Generally speaking, they were as follows. First, in the War of Resistance there must be only one leader, and military and government orders must be unified. They still maintain this position today. Second, "special privileges" must be abolished and so-called feudal separatism must be opposed; the border areas must be surrounded and sealed off. This policy too they are still pursuing. Third, the Eighth Route Army must no longer be called the Eighth Route Army but rather the Eighteenth Group Army. And what did that mean? "Eighth Route Army" was a peacetime designation, which implied that the army existed even in ordinary times, whereas "Eighteenth Group Army" was a battle-order designation for the period of the War of Resistance. Since it was a wartime designation, it implied that the army would be disbanded at the end of the war. That was the trick! But the ordinary folk of north China answered them. "Eighth Route Army" was more convenient, they said. "Eighteenth Group Army" was longer and thus harder to say. Chiang Kai-shek brought up the question of designation as a step towards liquidating the Eighth Route Army. Following that he kept dispatching troops to north China to create friction with us; there were Zhu Huaibing, Shi Yousan,<sup>304</sup> Gao Shuxun<sup>305</sup> and Tang Enbo.<sup>306</sup> In addition, he wanted to abolish all but two of our liaison offices, leaving only those in Xi'an and Chongqing. That was the cause of the Pingjiang massacre<sup>307</sup> and the Zhugou massacre<sup>308</sup> and of the closing of our offices in Guilin and in Shaoguan, Guangdong Province. All this happened at that time. Fourth, no Communist Party organizations were allowed in Kuomintang regions. So later, whenever they discovered underground Communist organizations, they destroyed them. Underground people's movements were also prohibited and so was propaganda. The *New China Daily*<sup>284</sup> was often censored and confiscated, and many articles by the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong were banned. This policy of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee held in 1939 has been pursued for six years. The Kuomintang's passive resistance against Japan and active opposition to communism that we talk about started at that time. The roots, of course, go back to an earlier period.

After the prelude came the three anti-Communist onslaughts. As Comrade Zhu De has pointed out, the first began with attacks on our border areas, the closing down of our offices and the massacre at Pingjiang. It took place mainly in north China, from the New Army In-

cident<sup>309</sup> to the frictions created by Zhu Huaibing. After that Chiang Kai-shek couldn't carry on; he was defeated. Comrade Zhu De was right when he said that Chiang is afraid of only one thing, strength. When you prove strong enough to wipe out part of his forces, he is rendered speechless. Zhu Huaibing was wiped out completely, and Chiang has never even mentioned the matter. He could only bite his lip and tell Wei Lihuang<sup>04</sup> to negotiate with Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, proposing the Zhanghe River as the demarcation line.

The first anti-Communist onslaught was followed by the first round of negotiations. Our policy was to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint. Although we had won, we were not arrogant but were willing to negotiate. We maintained our forbearance for our country's sake. I went to the negotiations.<sup>310</sup> No sooner had the talks begun than Chiang tried to gain advantage over us. The negotiations dealt with four points: the legal status of the Party, recognition of the border areas, troop increases and the demarcation of war zones. The last point was the crucial one. Bent on driving us north of the Huanghe River, Chiang didn't want the New Fourth Army operating south of the Changjiang River. At that time a number of places were considered "north" — the northern parts of Shandong and Shanxi Provinces as well as the area north of the Huanghe River. He wanted to dispatch us all north, or as the saying goes, "to banish [us] to the barren north."<sup>311</sup> We wouldn't have it, and a sharp dispute ensued. He refused to yield one iota. So we made a small concession, consenting to withdraw our troops in south Anhui north of the Changjiang; this too was "north", north of the river. But he wouldn't accept that either and produced the telegram of October 19, 1940,<sup>312</sup> from He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi ordering our troops to march north of the Huanghe River (again "north"). He insisted that we abide by the Central Government instructions,<sup>313</sup> and that led to the second anti-Communist onslaught.

It started in the winter of 1940, in the wake of the battle of north Jiangsu. The battle was plotted by Chiang Kai-shek. His original idea was to strike in north Jiangsu Province and then attack our forces in south Anhui, since we had few troops in north Jiangsu while he had two armies there commanded by Han Deqin and Li Shouwei respectively.<sup>314</sup> They thought they could make us "drink river water" by pressing down upon us from the north and attacking us in the south. But Chiang's plan went awry because Comrade Liu Shaoqi had taken charge in north Jiangsu and had corrected Comrade Xiang Ying's<sup>57</sup> mistake.



The troops commanded by Comrade Chen Yi<sup>315</sup> carried out the correct policy of the Central Committee and avoided a head-on clash by "making a retreat of 90 li". When the Kuomintang attacked, at first our troops retreated. Then we counter-attacked at Huangqiao and wiped out two Kuomintang divisions. Chiang was again rendered speechless and again could only bite his lip. But he was bent on revenge. After the fighting in north Jiangsu ended, Wang Maogong<sup>151</sup> went to see Gu Zhutong<sup>299</sup> to lay plans for the Southern Anhui Incident,<sup>205</sup> while on the surface they acted as if nothing had happened, trying to put us off our guard. I was then in Chongqing. On December 25, Christmas Day, the same day that several years earlier he had been sent home after the Xi'an Incident, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly invited me over and began to talk about our being friends in adversity. He laid it on thick. I didn't like the taste of his flattery, and it put me on the alert. I hurriedly wired Comrade Mao Zedong, saying something suspicious was going on. Sure enough, within ten days, Chiang had encircled our troops in south Anhui and had launched the second anti-Communist onslaught. We suffered losses because comrades commanding the troops there made mistakes. Chiang became even more truculent and declared the official designation of the New Fourth Army cancelled. Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, our Party replied that we would recognize the New Fourth Army even if he did not. Since then, the New Fourth Army has been a force led and commanded only by the Communist Party and not by Chiang Kai-shek. Like a flock of sparrows rising until they fill the sky, it has grown from an army of 100,000 to 300,000 and its zone of operations has expanded from three provinces to seven or eight. So that was the second anti-Communist onslaught. It was concluded when victory was won in the Second Political Council.

Quite a long time elapsed between the second onslaught and the second round of negotiations, because it was a complicated period, with the conclusion of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan,<sup>316</sup> the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union,<sup>190</sup> the war in the Pacific<sup>191</sup> and the Xinjiang problem.<sup>317</sup> The second round of negotiations took place in the latter half of 1942, although we had had some contact with the Kuomintang before that. Thus, immediately after the Japanese-Soviet pact was signed, the battle of the Zhongtiao Mountains took place;<sup>500</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, afraid that he wouldn't be able to hold on, asked for our co-operation. His main purpose was to sound us out as to whether we still wanted to fight the

Japanese. Of course, he was completely muddled on this question. We expressed our willingness to co-operate, but then he became frightened and wouldn't let us cross the Zhanghe River. He wanted to restrict us in our fighting, which made it hard for us to co-operate. With his troops in the Zhongtiao Mountains and ours north of the Zhanghe River, how could we fight? Moreover, he wouldn't order us into battle but wanted us to fight of our own accord. When we asked for supplies and ammunition, he said all we had to do was fight and he wouldn't let us down. We fought, but he didn't keep his promise. This was only one instance of the encounters between us.

Then on the eve of the Pacific War, when the situation in China was very tense and it was possible that Japan and the United States might reach a compromise, Chiang wanted the Political Council to meet. He said he was for the unity of the whole nation. In order to block a Japanese-U.S. compromise and to show that we maintained solidarity with him when it came to resisting the Japanese, we agreed to participate in the Political Council on condition that General Ye Ting be released<sup>363</sup> (during the Southern Anhui Incident General Ye Ting had been very courageous and had been in the forefront of the struggle against the Kuomintang). Chiang Kai-shek accepted this condition and Zhang Qun<sup>318</sup> was to guarantee its fulfilment. We demanded that General Ye Ting be released before the meeting, but Chiang would not agree. We decided to pay him back by reducing our participation in the Political Council. Both Comrades Dong Biwu<sup>319</sup> and Deng Yingchao<sup>320</sup> were then in Chongqing, but we decided that only one of them should attend. If he was going to play the game that way, we had some cards in our hand too. After the council meeting, he still wouldn't release General Ye Ting. According to the latest news, Chiang has turned him over to Dai Li's secret police in Chongqing. There is nobody in the world like Chiang Kai-shek for breaking promises. This was another of our minor encounters in this period. On the eve of the negotiations that took place during the latter half of 1942, Chiang tried to play another trick. The Xinjiang problem had been settled, and he was so pleased with himself that it went to his head and he said, "I'll go to Xi'an and ask Mr. Mao Zedong to come out for a talk." Division Commander Lin Biao went for a second round of negotiations.

We were still hoping to find some way to unite in the War of Resistance, so in our Party's Manifesto of July 7, 1942, we expressed this desire for unity. Chiang Kai-shek thought it was a sign that we were prepared to make concessions, and he became even more demanding. He

insisted that we couldn't have more than eight divisions, that our Party would be made legal only after the troops were reorganized, that the border areas had to be changed to administrative areas and that our war zone had to be moved even farther north. This round of negotiations dragged on for a long time; actually he didn't want to solve any problems. He was still gambling on war breaking out between Japan and the Soviet Union, after which he would drive us north according to his original plans. So he wanted to delay. When Lin Biao<sup>84</sup> and I went to see Zhang Zhizhong,<sup>321</sup> he said quite frankly of Chiang, "What else could he be doing but delaying?" There was something more behind his delaying tactic. It enabled him to publish his book, *China's Destiny*, and to launch the third anti-Communist onslaught.

The Communist International was then being dissolved,<sup>62</sup> and Chiang imagined there would be arguments in our Party over it. To capitalize on this, he called for the abolition of the Chinese Communist Party and had his troops encircle our border region and strike at our heart. The first anti-Communist onslaught was aimed at north China, the second at central China and the third at the Northwest. We exposed Chiang, and the whole nation sympathized with us. Public opinion abroad, not only in the Soviet Union but also in Britain and the United States, was against civil war in China. So Chiang's third anti-Communist onslaught was checked.

After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, Chiang expressed his willingness to seek a political solution at the Political Council, but to justify himself, he said we had "sabotaged the War of Resistance" and "endangered the state". With the third anti-Communist onslaught over, we said that provided he was willing to accept a political solution, we were always ready to talk. So last year, Comrade Lin Boqu went to carry on the third round of negotiations. It took place in the midst of the movement for constitutional government.<sup>322</sup> We said we were for democracy and constitutional government and raised three political problems and seventeen specific questions. These were later cut down to nine — we presented the other eight orally — so that our official document consisted of twelve items. The talks were held first in Xi'an and then in Chongqing and lasted almost half a year, but with no results. Chiang Kai-shek produced a second set of "Central Government instructions", which in essence made three demands. First, all but ten divisions of our armed forces must be disbanded within a certain time limit. Second, those ten divisions must go where assigned. Third, all local political power

in the Liberated Areas behind enemy lines must be handed over to the provincial governments in exile in Chongqing. Naturally, we could not accept such conditions, and the negotiations came to an end after Comrade Lin Boqu's report was delivered to the People's Political Council.

From the three anti-Communist onslaughts and the three rounds of negotiations we can see that the Kuomintang's policy of civil war and continued opposition to the Communists became especially apparent in the fourth stage. Its representatives came to the negotiations filled with anti-Communist ideas, and fighting broke out during the anti-Communist onslaughts so that in fact there was civil war. Even so, that was not the end of the story. A new chapter was still to be written — either a fourth anti-Communist onslaught or a fourth round of negotiations. In the event, it was not another anti-Communist onslaught, but continued negotiations. This time, however, there was a third party to the negotiations — democratic personages. And foreigners participated as well. In addition, the negotiations were open. In this regard, they were different from previous negotiations. We had entered a new stage.

The fifth stage extends from the time we first proposed the establishment of a coalition government to the present. The main issue in the present negotiations is our proposal to establish a democratic coalition government versus the Kuomintang's desire to continue a one-party dictatorship. It's a struggle, a struggle between two lines, as Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out in his report. Our position is that a conference of all parties should be called at once to set up a provisional coalition government and that, after the war, a national assembly should be convened to establish a formal coalition government. The Kuomintang's position is that they don't want to relinquish one-party dictatorship but want to monopolize the national assembly and continue with one-party despotism. In the last six months the struggle has sharpened. It has given further impetus to the nationwide democratic movement and has won increasing sympathy and support for a coalition government on the part of democrats both inside and outside China. The negotiations have continued precisely because of this; Hurley<sup>323</sup> came to Yan'an and I went to Chongqing twice.<sup>324</sup>

In Yan'an, Hurley signed a five-article accord with us, agreeing to the coalition government proposed by Comrade Mao Zedong on behalf of our Party. The main provisions of the five articles are the follow-

ing. There must be unification under a coalition government in order to defeat the Japanese bandits and build a new China; a coalition government of all parties, groups and non-party personages must be established, together with a united high command representing all forces for armed resistance to Japan; the people must be accorded freedom and democratic reforms must be carried out; all forces opposing Japan must be recognized, armed and united (under a coalition government); and the legal status of all parties must be recognized. These five provisions were put forward by us, but they were also signed by Ambassador Hurley of the United States. Since he had formally agreed to these five articles, I went to Chongqing to implement the policy of coalition government. But Chiang Kai-shek rejected these provisions.

After I returned to Yan'an, Hurley sent me another invitation. I went to Chongqing again. I proposed that as a preparatory step to realizing a coalition government we should call a meeting of all parties — the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, the Democratic League,<sup>325</sup> and public figures without party affiliation — to discuss ways of reorganizing the national government into a coalition government, drafting a common programme and abolishing the one-party dictatorship. Again the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek would not agree. On the contrary, they said, "You want a coalition government because you want to overthrow the government; you want to convene a conference of all parties just to divide the spoils!" They rejected our proposal outright. Chiang Kai-shek still wanted to pursue his original policy. From his "Decision to Root Out the Red Evil" to "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties", he has always demanded that we hand over our military and political power. This is quite obvious from his speech of March 1 this year, which called on us to transfer our troops and the governments in the enemy rear areas to him. And what would he give us in return? Not coalition government. Only participation in the government as "guests". We have been playing the role of guest for eight years and we don't relish it. Of course, we definitely aren't going to hand over military and political power. But Chiang insists on it, saying that he will then give the Communist Party legal status. But it would be a legal status which bound us hand and foot. What kind of legal status would that be? It is not hard to see the trick behind this proposal: as announced on March 1, he wants to convene the national assembly on November 12 this year,

the very national assembly whose election was stage-managed by the Kuomintang eight years ago.<sup>326</sup> Nominally, Chiang Kai-shek will be handing state power back to the people, but actually what he wants is to legalize the Kuomintang's despotism through the adoption of a one-party autocratic constitution by a national assembly monopolized by one party. Then if people come out against it, he'll say they're causing a split. He'll try to unify them, and if they refuse to be unified, he'll take punitive action against them. That will mean the nationwide civil war he has been preparing.

Chiang Kai-shek's policy is entirely at odds with ours. Today, while it can be said that we agree on the need to continue the War of Resistance Against Japan, we differ altogether on how to conduct the war. We want victory — total victory; we want democracy — new-democratic democracy; we want unity — democratic unity, not only within China but also internationally. The Kuomintang has another set of aims. It wants not total victory but compromise and capitulation, hoping to use Japanese capital and arms and the reorganized puppet troops in a future civil war. It wants not democracy but the maintenance of its dictatorship; it wants not unity but a split. Internationally, it sows dissension and tries to get help from Britain and the United States and "do a Scobie".<sup>327</sup> That is the Kuomintang line.

A review of the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party since September 18, 1931, shows that on the whole large-scale civil war has been ended and armed resistance against Japan has been mobilized. This is a success of the united front. We have created and expanded the Liberated Areas, roused the Chinese people and pushed forward the democratic movement in China. But even with the War of Resistance going on, there have been local civil wars and frequent Kuomintang activities aimed against the Communist Party, the people and democracy. This struggle of opposites is still continuing. On the one hand, we oppose this line which is reactionary and passive in resistance to Japan, while on the other, we allow some leeway and do not close the door to negotiations. We've gone through three anti-Communist onslaughts and three rounds of negotiations, and again we're engaged in negotiations. We are negotiating for victory, democracy and unity, which is the only kind of negotiation that is meaningful. Everything else is idle talk leading nowhere. This has been the state of affairs over the years in the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

## II. ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED FRONT AND THE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM IT

Turning now to the experience of the united front and the lessons to be drawn from it, we must review mistakes made during the ten years of civil war and even during the earlier period of the Great Revolution. We had an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national united front during the Great Revolution, but it was subsequently broken up because the reactionary group in the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution. The Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, was defeated and had to retreat to the countryside, where it mobilized the masses to carry out the agrarian revolution, established Red political power in the form of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers and organized worker-peasant Red Armies. The united front of that period was a democratic worker-peasant national united front against feudal oppression and Kuomintang rule. After the September 18th Incident, we changed over to the Anti-Japanese National United Front. In these three periods — the Great Revolution, the ten years of civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan — the form and nature of the united front have varied, but it has always been a new-democratic united front, because its political foundation has always been New Democracy. The new-democratic united front is a united front of the broad masses led by the proletariat against imperialism and feudalism. Comrade Mao Zedong has put it very clearly: to establish a consolidated, new-democratic united front, we must have a clear understanding of the enemy, our own ranks and the question of "the commanding officer". In the course of the revolution, owing to frequent changes in the relations between the enemy and ourselves and in the conflicting camps as well as to constant change in the over-all situation, the problems of the united front have been very complicated. We should study the experience of the united front and the lessons to be learned from it by considering the three problems identified by Comrade Mao Zedong.

First, the enemy.

The enemies of the new-democratic revolution are imperialism and feudalism. This fact has remained unchanged throughout the period of the revolution. But there is more than one imperialist country in the world, and in China there are cliques and groups within the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. They are often at odds with each other, so the enemy camp keeps changing. For this reason, it is

not easy to have a clear understanding of the enemy, and things can get complicated. Sometimes the enemies are united in oppressing the masses. For example, after the failure of the Great Revolution the reactionary forces in Nanjing and Wuhan collaborated (the episode known as the "Nanjing-Wuhan co-operation")<sup>221</sup> and the imperialists backed them in repressing the revolution. But such cases have been rare in the last twenty years. The enemies have more often than not been divided. After the September 18th Incident, when Japan launched armed aggression against China, it became obvious that they were divided. Then, after the War of Resistance began, it was even more obvious that Britain and the United States stood on our side against Japan, becoming China's allies during the war. So the imperialists sometimes collaborate with each other and sometimes split — and the splits last a long time. As for the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, during the expedition against the northern warlords, some feudal forces, members of the big bourgeoisie and warlords in the South joined the revolutionary ranks as adventurers to seize leadership. Neither was the enemy united in its attacks on the Red Army during the ten years of civil war. During the War of Resistance, the big bourgeoisie belonging to the British and U.S. faction came over to our side and backed armed resistance to Japan, but at the same time they connived with the Japanese. With the enemy sometimes collaborating, sometimes splitting, the situation became even more complicated, especially since people representing each class were themselves changing in their allegiance. When they changed allegiance, those who had not previously been our enemies sometimes turned against us, and this was often confusing. In the early period of the Great Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek played the role of a representative of the bourgeoisie as a whole. But after the *Zhongsban* Warship Incident of March 20, 1926,<sup>220</sup> he quickly switched over to the side of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. During the early period of the Great Revolution, Wang Jingwei<sup>107</sup> was also a representative of the bourgeoisie; in the middle period he was very radical, drawing close to the petty bourgeoisie; then during the Wuhan period he switched again — to the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In short, representatives of all classes can change. Throughout China's new-democratic revolution, there have been big changes in the imperialist and feudal forces, especially during the War of Resistance.

In these last twenty-five years of revolutionary struggles, the changes in the united front have been so frequent, so great and so complicated



that we must be clear-headed and be able to investigate problems and study them analytically. Those who follow the line of thought represented by Comrade Mao Zedong are capable of correctly understanding the changing contradictions in the course of history, identifying and analysing the enemy at all times and setting forth a correct policy for defeating him. But the various "Left" and Right opportunists are not clear about these problems and have made many mistakes, first and foremost in identifying and dealing with the enemy. Those who err to the Right often mistake enemies for friends. The most glaring mistake of this kind was made when we reached Wuhan during the Northern Expedition. Chiang Kai-shek murdered Chen Zanzhan<sup>328</sup> in Jiangxi and after having struck this first blow at the Communist Party, became more and more reactionary, quite obviously going over to the enemy. Yet people in our Party like Chen Duxiu<sup>166</sup> were still for cooperating with him, because they failed to detect the change that had taken place in him at this turning point. Those who err to the "Left" often mistake friends for enemies. During the civil war, the petty bourgeoisie — even the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie — were our friends, and after the September 18th Incident, even the middle bourgeoisie were capable of being friends. But people with the "Left" deviationist viewpoint considered them enemies, and the most dangerous ones at that. They were totally wrong.

Under certain conditions, some enemies have two sides to their nature. When forming a united front with them, comrades with the Right deviationist viewpoint think only of the possibility of uniting with them and forget their reactionary nature. For example, in the early period of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek and his group, who represent a section of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, took part in armed resistance, but they were still essentially reactionary. Those who made the Right deviationist mistake tried to whitewash them, covering up their reactionary nature. In 1938, during the second Wuhan period, it was wrong to say that Chiang Kai-shek and his group were not fascists or warlords. He is truly reactionary, he is a warlord and a fascist; it's all right not to stress that fact at certain times, but it is wrong to portray him in glowing colours. Comrades with the "Left" deviationist viewpoint fail to see the changes taking place at a turning point. They think only of the reactionary nature of their enemies and forget the possibility of uniting with them. For instance, at the Wayaobu meeting<sup>329</sup> in 1935, Comrade Mao Zedong predicted that the bourgeoisie, and even a section of the big bourgeoisie, could change

its position and support the War of Resistance. But comrades with the "Left" deviationist viewpoint refused to believe that was possible. They didn't understand that we could unite with them to promote the War of Resistance.

We must clearly distinguish the nature of the divisions in the camp of the ruling classes. For example, there are many regional power groups in the Great Rear Area which are against the fascist dictatorship and despotism of Chiang Kai-shek; of course we can unite with them on this point. But we must understand that they themselves represent the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and that they are no different, fundamentally, from Chiang in opposing democracy and a thoroughgoing War of Resistance. Their contradiction with Chiang is a contradiction within the camp of the ruling classes. People with the "Left" deviationist viewpoint don't recognize this contradiction, believing all enemies should be overthrown at the same time. But the result of trying to overthrow everybody is that nobody is overthrown.

The enemy camp can change. Those with the Right deviationist viewpoint take all who were friends yesterday to be friends today, even if they have in fact become enemies. Take for example Wang Jingwei, whom we have just mentioned, in the first Wuhan period. At one stage, he did co-operate with us as a representative of the bourgeoisie. But after arriving in Wuhan, he was under the daily influence of the big bourgeoisie and so turned reactionary and went over to the side of the enemy. However, comrades with the Right deviationist viewpoint still thought he was a trustworthy friend, believed in him and relied on him. Those with the "Left" deviationist viewpoint consider an enemy anyone who was an enemy yesterday, though he may be a friend today. For example, before the September 18th Incident, the 19th Route Army attacked us in Jiangxi Province in the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. But after the Incident, when the national revolution reached a high tide, it co-operated with us in Fujian. Comrades with the "Left" deviationist viewpoint still considered them enemies and were hostile towards them. All this shows that there is the greatest disunity and disagreement in the enemy camp and that enormous changes occur. We should conscientiously analyse the situation and follow Comrade Mao Zedong's policy of making use of contradictions, winning over the many, opposing the few and crushing our enemies one by one. Only in this way will we avoid "Left" or Right mistakes.

Next, let's talk about our own ranks.

The new-democratic united front consists of the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie, and at times even includes some big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie. So our ranks cover a broad spectrum and are very complex, uneven in strength and hard to unite. We must be clear-sighted about forces of this kind. We must know how to analyse them, how to win over the vast majority and oppose those few persons who contend with us for leadership. If we don't understand this, we will commit errors.

The backbone of our forces is the proletariat. Its political consciousness is high and its ability great, but it is small in terms of numbers and strength. It is therefore necessary, in the new-democratic revolution, to rely on the most dependable ally — the peasantry, which makes up the bulk of these forces. As Comrade Mao Zedong has put it, they constitute four out of the five fingers. China's war is in fact a peasant war. Battles cannot be fought without peasants. During the Northern Expedition,<sup>117</sup> the overwhelming majority, both in the armies and in the supporting forces, were peasants. During the civil war, it was even clearer, and we relied on the peasants completely. The same has been true of the War of Resistance. With the peasants we can both advance and retreat; without them we can advance only in small numbers and in isolation, and there's no place to retreat to. The trouble with "Left" and Right deviationists is precisely that they fail to recognize the importance of the peasants. They forget the peasants. It is a "Left" deviationist mistake to rely not on the peasants but only on the proletariat, expecting it to charge forward alone. The result is isolation. It is a Right deviationist mistake to rely on the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie. During the Wuhan period, towards the end of the Great Revolution, there were people who considered the bourgeoisie dependable, and even relied on the forces of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie — Tang Shengzhi<sup>250</sup> and Feng Yuxiang,<sup>71</sup> for example — but not on the peasantry. During the second Wuhan period,<sup>501</sup> that is, the earlier period of the War of Resistance, some comrades relied not on the peasants but on the big bourgeoisie, believing that troops led by the Kuomintang could win battles. They forgot the peasantry, our main force. This kind of reliance is very dangerous, because it leads to defeat and to our captivity. In the second Wuhan period, since the line taken by the Party's Central Committee was correct and since most of our troops were stationed in north China, we did not meet with defeats, as in the Great Revolution. But there was still danger. Later, one of the weaknesses in our work in the Great

Rear Area was that we failed to expand the democratic movement in the countryside.

The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a basic force in the ranks of the new-democratic revolution. But even so, we still have to integrate ourselves with the peasants. We will never be able to carry the revolution to victory by relying only on the workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Comrades who lean to the Right think otherwise. They are wrong. Those who lean to the "Left", on the other hand, want to exclude even the urban petty bourgeoisie. The typical representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie are the intellectuals. Comrades who believe that the intellectuals have no role to play are also wrong. But at the time of the failure of the Great Revolution, only workers and urban intellectuals were relied on. For instance, in the Guangzhou Uprising,<sup>260</sup> only the city workers and the Officers' Training Corps, composed mainly of intellectuals, were mobilized. The peasants were not relied on, nor was there any plan to withdraw to the countryside. So the Guangzhou Uprising failed. It was the same with the Shanghai Uprisings.<sup>330</sup> The plan was to rely on the city workers and a part of the intellectuals to put up a stubborn resistance in Shanghai, where the enemy was strongest. The result was failure. Today we are about to enter the big cities again. Of course, our main forces are now in the countryside. Comrades working in the cities in enemy-occupied areas should realize that only by co-ordinating with the countryside can we advance or retreat at will. We are strong only when the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie stand united.

The liberal bourgeoisie is also among the ranks of the new-democratic united front. We call it an intermediate force. Comrade Mao Zedong tells us that this is a weak, vacillating class and that the proletariat should win it over, unite with it, or at least neutralize it, but should not rely on it. It is a Right deviation to forget the peasantry and the worker-peasant masses and to rely on the liberal bourgeoisie. That is wrong. It is a "Left" deviation to refuse to unite with the liberal bourgeoisie. That too is wrong.

Some big landlords and some members of the big bourgeoisie may sometimes join the united front, but with obvious ambivalence. The bourgeoisie has two sides to its character. So does the petty bourgeoisie. But the dual character of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie is more apparent; reaction is deeply ingrained in them. So in co-operating with them, we must be constantly on our guard, oppose their reactionary tendencies and never rely on them. During the Wuhan period, towards

the end of the Great Revolution, we relied not only on Wang Jingwei, but on Tang Shengzhi and Feng Yuxiang as well. As a result, everything collapsed. This is one of the lessons to be learned from the failure of the Great Revolution. There were two kinds of armed forces at the time. One was our Party's forces, consisting of Ye Ting's<sup>363</sup> 24th Division and other armed units, directly under the leadership of the Party, and of the armed forces of the broad worker-peasant masses. Everywhere from Guangdong to Wuhan, and especially in Hunan, the workers and peasants were armed. These were our forces. The other was the armed forces of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The policy of our Party was to rely not on our own forces, but rather on the forces of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, on the troops of Tang Shengzhi and Feng Yuxiang. As I recall, this policy was most apparent after the Incident of May 21, 1927, when Wuhan was in a crisis. At that time the Central Committee still pinned its hopes on the so-called peasant leader Feng Yuxiang, the "Christian general". The Communist Party, the Kuomintang and even the foreign comrades all pinned their hopes on him. When Feng Yuxiang fought his way from Tongguan to Zhengzhou, the head of the National Government at Wuhan went by special train to meet him; our Party also sent Zhang Guotao<sup>165</sup> to meet him. It turned out, however, that Feng Yuxiang met with Chiang Kai-shek in Xuzhou, which resulted in a big reversal for us: Feng sold out the people from Wuhan. So Wuhan's hopes were dashed. This was the bitter consequence of relying on the armed forces of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie rather than on our own. Of course, there was the question of the agrarian revolution, but the central problem was arms, and this was quite evident at the time. During the second Wuhan period, we believed that we could co-operate effectively with the Kuomintang troops even if unreformed. That was likewise an opportunist error.

It can be seen from what I have said that we will commit "Left" or Right deviationist errors unless we have a clear understanding of the large and complex forces involved in our Anti-Japanese National United Front, which embraces the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie and a portion of the big bourgeoisie. Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong, we have analysed these forces and grouped them into three categories: the progressive forces, made up of the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie; the middle forces, or intermediate strata; and the die-hard or reactionary forces, that is, the big

landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The regional power groups are somewhere near the middle — or between the middle and the die-hard forces. In their class character they resemble the reactionaries, but in their opposition to Chiang Kai-shek they perform the same function as the middle forces. On the basis of this analysis, we have drawn up the policy of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating, splitting and attacking the die-hards. This is the policy of uniting with the many, opposing the few and striking at the worst die-hards. People with the Rightist viewpoint do not concur in this policy. Towards the end of the Great Revolution, Chen Duxiu was against making any distinctions between left, middle and right, fearing that people would say we were splitting them up. The big landlords and the big bourgeoisie didn't like such distinctions, and Chen became their mouthpiece. The result of this failure to distinguish between the left, middle and right was that the left slipped over to the middle and finally joined the right. This error was repeated in the second Wuhan period. At the December conference in 1937, there were again some who wanted to classify the forces not into left, middle and right, but into those resisting Japan and those not resisting, or into anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese. With the exception of forces that were pro-Japanese, they believed all classes were as solid as iron in their opposition to Japan. This kind of thinking reflected the influence of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.<sup>331</sup> So during this period, the warlord and fascist character of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuo-mintang was obliterated. They were considered just as tall and handsome as anyone else, standing shoulder to shoulder with us. It is necessary to classify forces into left, middle and right. It is correct to make such distinctions and wrong not to. On the other hand, those with the "Left" viewpoint believe only in the proletariat, only in the vanguard of the proletariat. They alienate themselves from the masses and don't ally themselves even with those in their own ranks. This is also wrong. Therefore, both "Left" and Right mistakes are made through a lack of understanding of Comrade Mao Zedong's analysis of left, middle and right and of the ways to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the die-hards and reactionaries. The result is that one isolates oneself. This is the analysis of the forces in the united front. We should have this kind of understanding, or else we shall make mistakes.

But it is not enough to classify the components of the united front into left, middle and right. We must go a step further and make finer

distinctions. This is necessary when we are dealing with so vast a force, which includes not only the proletariat but also the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie and sometimes even big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie. The proletariat is at the head of this contingent, the leader. The other classes, embracing not only the big landlords, the big bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie but also the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, are all distinct from it. That is why Comrade Mao Zedong has pointed out the need to maintain our independence and initiative within the united front. Independence and initiative mean the independence of the proletariat, which has its own policy and ideology. It allies itself with others, but is not to be assimilated by others. Wherever there are distinctions, there is struggle. The proletariat is for solidarity in the united front on condition that its independence and initiative are maintained. It does not allow itself to be influenced by the other classes. Comrade Mao Zedong often says that being in the united front makes us highly susceptible to the influence of the other classes, so it is wrong not to insist on making distinctions. The exponents of the Right viewpoint don't want to make distinctions. In the Wuhan period during the War of Resistance, some people held that we should "seek for common ground and ignore differences", meaning there should be only agreement and no differences. That was because they didn't realize that the proletariat is different from the other classes. Some comrades don't understand why it is necessary to have distinctions as well as unity. Without making distinctions, we would merge with the others and certainly be influenced by them. Comrades with "Left" tendencies talk day in day out about drawing distinctions and refuse to take part in common action with others. They are in a hurry to achieve socialism. During the agrarian revolution they wanted to conduct education in communism. They wanted to teach everybody socialist ideology, and they didn't understand that we should rather be educating them about New Democracy, about the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle for New Democracy that was being waged by the broad masses and led by the proletariat. Both the Right deviationists, who make no distinctions, and the "Left" deviationists, who overemphasize distinctions instead of seeking ways to achieve unity for the present, are incorrect. Both positions are influenced by other classes and neither reflects genuine proletarian thinking. The Rightist mistake is due to the influence of the big bourgeoisie; co-operating with them makes it easy to be influenced by them. When they are being polite and invite us

to tea or dinner, we cease to make distinctions, and we put forward the proposals of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords as if they were our own. Comrade Mao Zedong has said that generally speaking, we are liable to make Rightist mistakes when we are allied with the bourgeoisie and "Leftist" mistakes when we have split with them. This was pointed out in the Party's "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party".<sup>502</sup> Besides, because many comrades in our Party were born into petty-bourgeois families, it is easy for them to be directly influenced by the petty bourgeoisie and to have "Left" deviationist sentiments when we are in difficulty and oppressed by the big bourgeoisie. These mistakes are caused by the influence exerted on us by the other classes.

Now let us discuss the question of leadership.

The proletariat, being more progressive than the other classes, should lead the others and be what Comrade Mao Zedong calls "the commanding officer". But the proletariat doesn't gain the position of command automatically. It cannot be said that everybody, from the peasantry to the big bourgeoisie, is for us and acknowledges us as the commanding officer. During the Great Revolution, a man by the name of Peng Shuzhi<sup>175</sup> wrote an article saying that the proletariat was automatically the leader, so there was no point in struggling for leadership! This notion is completely contrary to Comrade Mao Zedong's ideas concerning the struggle for leadership. The proletariat and the Communist Party must win leadership through struggle, because others are contending for leadership as well — not only the big bourgeoisie but also the liberal bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Each wants the united front to be led according to its own ideas. But the main force contending with us for leadership is the Kuomintang, the ruling group representing the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. Therefore, it is mainly the Kuomintang and the Communist Party which struggle with each other for leadership of the united front. The big bourgeoisie is our principal opponent. For if there are two commanding officers in a unit, they are bound to come to blows, and one of them must step down. At one time in the early days of the Great Revolution, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were united in a single force. After the failure of the revolution, they separated into two forces that have remained separate to this day. One is the force led by the Communist Party representing the proletariat, a force which has grown to the point where it now has a people's army and Liberated Areas. The other is led by the Kuomintang representing the



big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, a force which for eighteen years has carried out one-party, dictatorial rule. These two forces are in contention with each other, both of them trying to win over the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie. Some people say we only want to win the allegiance of the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. That isn't true. We also want to win the allegiance of the liberal bourgeoisie. The methods adopted by each side to win people and to lead them are different. The Kuomintang resorts to oppression. It oppresses not only the workers and peasants, but also the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie. Our method is to co-operate with everyone we can win over. Our relations with the peasantry are excellent, and those with the petty bourgeoisie are also very good. Our relations with the liberal bourgeoisie are not quite the same as with the others. They are somewhat like our relations with the friendly troops in the early and middle period of the Great Revolution. The problem here is that the liberal bourgeoisie doesn't always listen to us and often asserts its independence. So we cannot lead the liberal bourgeoisie in everything, but only in respect to major issues. Of course, in dealing with the liberal bourgeoisie in different circumstances we can have not only the substance, but also the form of leadership. For instance, in the Liberated Areas the liberal bourgeoisie can accept our formal leadership, although it still wants to maintain its independence.

Can we sometimes lead the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie? Historical experience shows that it is possible for us to lead them temporarily or on a certain question. Generally speaking, they can accept our leadership when they are weak. For example, after March 20, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek didn't want to accept our leadership any more, but he didn't have the strength to carry on the Northern Expedition, so he asked us and the Soviet Union to help him. He still accepted our leadership, but not for long, since he was preparing to split with us, although ostensibly letting us lead. Another example was given by Comrade Zhu De in his report made the other day. When the Kuomintang troops were in a very difficult situation and besieged by nine advancing enemy columns in north China, they were willing to accept the leadership of Commander-in-Chief Zhu De. But that was only momentary. Once they made contact with their rear area, they would run away and then turn round to attack us. So we must constantly be on our guard. When Chiang Kai-shek decided to engage in the War of Resistance, he was led — or rather pushed — into it by us. But as

for the conduct of the war, he wants to do it his way, not ours. He won't accept our leadership. The big landlords and the big bourgeoisie accept our leadership only when they have to, and only on a specific question. Once they have the strength or the necessary foreign aid, they split with us. To sum up, the proletariat is able to do a very good job of leading the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie and to have very close ties with them. It is also able to lead the liberal bourgeoisie, although the latter is forever asserting its independence. But, generally speaking, it cannot lead the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, except on a specific question or for a certain period.

Our Party's many successes in different periods of history have all been achieved by the application of Comrade Mao Zedong's ideas and line on the question of leadership. "Left" and Right opportunists have stumbled over this question more than over any other. It can be said that neither understands the problem. They don't understand that leadership can only be won through struggle.

Persons with the Right deviationist viewpoint waive leadership. Chen Duxiu did so in the later period of the Great Revolution. He judged it sufficient to make some flippant remark about automatic leadership. Actually, he felt that since it was a bourgeois revolution, the leadership should belong to the bourgeoisie and that the proletariat's part was, at best, to "carry the sedan-chair" and try to win freedom of assembly, association and speech and the right to strike. On the peasant question, he didn't even approve of reducing rent and interest, let alone of solving the land problem. Many posters were put up bearing two slogans. One read: "Establish the leadership of the proletariat"; the other: "Strive for a non-capitalist future". These slogans were also much in evidence at our Party's Fifth Congress. But slogans are only slogans, and in reality we were relinquishing leadership. It was believed that leadership fell to us automatically, so there was no point in struggling for it. Therefore, in terms of policy, there was no need to build a worker-peasant armed force or to set up a government led by workers and peasants. Although political power in such provinces as Hunan, Jiangxi and Hubei and in some counties elsewhere was still in the hands of the Wuhan government, Chen Duxiu suppressed the struggles of the workers and peasants and gave up everything. The result of such yielding was the failure of the Great Revolution. This was the error committed during the first Wuhan period.

The error in the second Wuhan period was also committed because we failed to understand the question of leadership. According to one

line of reasoning, so long as there was resistance, there was unity, Chiang Kai-shek's government was already unified, his big bourgeois government was already becoming democratic and the people already enjoyed full freedom. In other words, the big bourgeoisie was wonderful, very democratic, quite unified. This was tantamount to recognizing the leadership of the big bourgeoisie. Therefore, in terms of policy, there was no need to demand democratic reforms or improvement in the life of the people. But the Central Committee of our Party put great stress on democratic reforms and a better life for the people. The fact that we were relinquishing leadership manifested itself in other ways as well: we neglected to develop behind enemy lines, failed to call for the establishment of political power there and urged that everything be done through the united front. If the united front had been led by us, of course, that would have been fine. But in reality the Kuomintang did not acknowledge our leadership. In a united front acceptable to the Kuomintang, the troops we led would have been united under its military and governmental orders. So to say that everything should be done through the united front meant in fact that everything should be done under the military and governmental orders of the Kuomintang. It was proposed that seven things should be unified:<sup>332</sup> the command, the organizational line-up, arms, discipline, pay, operational plans and combat operations. That would have meant that everything would be handed over to the Kuomintang and unified under its military orders. It was also proposed that the establishment of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area must be approved by the Kuomintang. This would have meant that everything would be unified under the governmental orders of the Kuomintang. As a result of this conciliationist policy, three mass organizations were disbanded in Wuhan.<sup>333</sup> Then there was the Southern Anhui Incident in central China.<sup>205</sup> All this was the consequence of not following Comrade Mao Zedong's advice to be constantly on guard against attacks by others. We didn't make the Kuomintang adapt its position to meet our standards, but lowered our standards to meet their wishes. That was a Right deviationist error committed in the struggle for leadership.

The "Left" opportunists also have stumbled many times over this question of leadership. To put it briefly, they didn't understand the new-democratic nature of the Chinese revolution. They believed that we had already passed the stage that Russia went through between 1905 and 1907, and they were impatient for an immediate transition and a non-capitalist future. They intoned empty phrases about proletarian

leadership. When the policy was "Left", we were divorced not only from the petty-bourgeois masses, but also from the worker-peasant masses, and that caused grave losses. During the War of Resistance certain persons with "Left" viewpoints have been confused on these issues as well. They want only struggle and no unity. They fail to recognize the tactical principles put forth by Comrade Mao Zedong, according to which there is both unity and struggle in the united front and struggles are waged only on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint.

The problem of leadership is, therefore, the central problem of the united front. The Right deviationists waive leadership, while the "Left" isolates itself, becoming "a commander without an army". We can put it this way: the Right deviationists give away the whole army, while the "Left" deviationists push it away.

This is my over-all understanding of the united front, reached by examining historical experience. I myself made quite a number of mistakes in these three periods, and especially in the last two. Today, speaking on this experience, I feel that we should see the seriousness of our mistakes. Of course, they have already been corrected. In future, if we fail to understand clearly the enemy, our own ranks, or the question of leadership, if we are unwary or blind with regard to any one of these points, it is on that point that we will make mistakes. This is true of me and of all comrades in our Party.

## PRESENT URGENT DEMANDS

*August 1945*

The War of Resistance Against Japan has ended in victory for us and a new period, that of peaceful reconstruction, is beginning. In order to unite the anti-Japanese parties and groups throughout the country, ensure domestic peace, begin the construction of a new China on the basis of democracy and strengthen international solidarity, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party hereby presents the following urgent demands to the National Government:

1. Recognize the popularly elected governments and the anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas.
2. Withdraw the Kuomintang troops encircling and attacking the Liberated Areas and avert a civil war which will endanger the people of the whole nation and disrupt international peace.
3. Delimit the areas where the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column<sup>503</sup> respectively are to accept the surrender of Japanese troops.
4. Allow the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas and their representatives to participate in the handling of all important matters concerning Japan after its surrender.
5. Allow the elected representatives from the Liberated Areas to take part in any future peace conference concerned with Japan and in any United Nations meetings.
6. Severely punish collaborators and disband puppet armies.
7. Release patriotic political prisoners.
8. Provide relief to compatriots in distress.
9. Recognize the legal status of the various political parties and groups.

---

A document drafted for the CPC Central Committee and then revised by Comrade Mao Zedong. It was not distributed at the time, but its content was included in the "Declaration on the Current Situation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" published on August 25, 1945.

10. Abolish the secret police agencies.

11. Annul all laws and decrees which contravene civil liberties and abolish regulations concerning censorship of the press and publications.

12. Organize democratic local coalition governments in all recovered territories with the participation of the Chinese Communist Party and of anti-Japanese democrats from all circles.

13. Reorganize and demobilize troops in a fair and rational way.

14. Convene forthwith a political conference of the various parties and personages without party affiliation to discuss urgent measures to be taken following the conclusion of the War of Resistance, formulate a democratic programme, put an end to political tutelage,<sup>334</sup> establish a democratic coalition government of national solidarity and make preparations for a National Assembly through a free and unconstrained general election.

## ACTIVELY PROPAGATE OPPOSITION TO CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP AND EXPOSE CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S DECEITFUL PLOT

*August 16, 1945*

1. For several days now, Chiang Kai-shek has been intensifying his propaganda for civil war, and he has mobilized Chinese and foreign newsmen close to him to spread the propaganda abroad. He is trying to shift the blame onto us and to frighten the people so that he may have a free hand in unleashing civil war and continuing his dictatorship.

2. In order to expose Chiang Kai-shek's scheme, we should concentrate on propagating the four slogans against civil war, against dictatorship, for peace and for democracy. On specific issues, we should emphasize our right to disarm the Japanese and puppet troops whom we have already encircled. We should point out that for the last five or six years Chiang Kai-shek has refused to recognize the armed forces of the Liberated Areas or to send them supplies and that he has not been in command of them. Now he suddenly instructs them to stay where they are, pending further orders.<sup>335</sup> He hopes that this will enable him to accept the Japanese surrender himself and to incorporate the puppet troops into his own armies. We are opposed to taking irrational orders; that is, we are opposed to civil war. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek long ago forfeited his right to issue orders to the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas. Should the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces<sup>336</sup> arbitrarily order the Japanese troops to surrender only to Chiang's army and not to ours, it would be tantamount to aiding Chiang to unleash a civil war, and we would

---

A directive drafted on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to its Chongqing Bureau.

firmly oppose it. Chiang first rejected negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in his speech of March 1 and then rejected the plans brought back by the six councillors.<sup>337</sup> Furthermore, he vilified us as enemies of the people. His invitation to Mao Zedong to go to Chongqing is therefore sheer deception. All Chiang's present propaganda is a preparation for civil war, but it is often confused and full of loopholes. In the newspapers and among influential Chinese and foreigners you should firmly denounce Chiang's intrigues, co-ordinating your statements with the broadcasts from Yan'an so as to discredit his reactionary propaganda and arouse all sections of the people. The current international and domestic situation is most favourable to our struggle against Chiang's intended civil war. We hope that you will continue to pursue this policy so as to mobilize the masses and consolidate and extend the victory we have already won.



## LETTER OF CONSOLATION TO MADAME SHEN CUIZHEN, WIDOW OF ZOU TAOFEN

*September 12, 1945*

Madame Cuizhen,

Amidst the jubilation over victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, we cannot but feel immensely grieved at the thought that Zou Taofen, who fought all his life for the freedom and liberation of our nation, is no longer with us to share our joy.<sup>338</sup> Naturally, your sorrow must be even greater. We know that during his lifetime, Zou dedicated all his energies to public affairs, oblivious to the problems connected with supporting his family, and that only with your assistance and encouragement was he able to devote himself to his cause with an unencumbered mind. Now his brilliant life-long work is beginning to be rewarded. His writings have fostered the awakening and unity of the Chinese people and contributed to their present victory. There is no doubt that the Chinese people will continue to fight unremittingly for the birth of the peace-loving, united and democratic new China to which Zou looked forward with all his heart. His achievements will remain forever in the hearts of the Chinese people, and his name will be a banner constantly guiding the Chinese people forward. Thinking of all this, you who have known him best must feel some consolation even in the midst of grief. Your son Jialiu is doing well in Yan'an. In strength of character and diligence in study he lives up to his father's expectations. This must also be a source of gratification to you. I would like to extend to you my heartfelt sympathy. I wish you and your children good health.

Zhou Enlai

STATEMENT  
ON THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF  
THE SIXTH CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE KUOMINTANG

*March 18, 1946*

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Despite the great hopes we had placed on the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang convened after the Political Consultative Conference,<sup>339</sup> the results have been truly disheartening, for its resolutions have undermined those of the Conference. It is not surprising that the considerable number of die-hards within the Kuomintang should have exploited the session and have it adopt a number of significant decisions violating the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. What is strange, however, is that the resolutions of the two meetings, which are so contradictory, should have been adopted under the chairmanship and leadership of the same person — President Chiang Kai-shek.

1. The protection of the people's rights. When the Political Consultative Conference was in session, President Chiang made four pledges concerning the protection of the people's rights.<sup>340</sup> Yet incidents occurred one after another both during and after the session: the beating of people at Cangbaitang,<sup>341</sup> the Jiaochangkou Incident,<sup>342</sup> the smashing of the *New China Daily* offices,<sup>343</sup> the vandalism at the office of the Eighteenth Group Army in Xi'an<sup>344</sup> and even the disturbance at the Beiping Executive Headquarters,<sup>345</sup> which is in charge of the implementation of the Truce Agreement. To this day not one of these incidents has been settled. Take freedom of speech and the press for example. Though, nominally, the laws and decrees

---

Made at a press conference for Chinese and foreign correspondents in Chongqing and published there in the *New China Daily* on March 19, 1946.

restricting freedom of speech have been annulled, in fact many restrictions still exist and the methods of imposing them are extremely unfair. For instance, in Beijing the paper *Liberation*, which is published every three days by the Chinese Communist Party, has been illegally banned, while in Shanghai circulation of other newly-started newspapers is permitted. As for the release of well-known political prisoners, with the exception of Ye Ting<sup>363</sup> and Liao Chengzhi,<sup>346</sup> there has not even been news of the persons arrested, either of the young students or of members of the Chinese Communist Party and other parties and of non-party personages. The present government is still a one-party government of the Kuomintang, which should be held responsible for these violations of human rights. However, during the Second Plenary Session no mention was made of these issues and the resolutions contained not a single word of condemnation of the criminal infringements on human rights.

2. The reorganization of the government. This is an important matter. The Second Plenary Session did not take a clear-cut position on the question of ending political tutelage<sup>334</sup> and moving towards a constitutional government by setting up during this transition period a government of national solidarity based on co-operation among the various parties. Not only did it evade the question of ending political tutelage, it even demanded that members of the National Government, instead of being chosen by the various parties, be nominated by the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. This was in total violation of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. It cannot but raise suspicions about the nature of the Central Political Council to be "restored" after the Second Plenary Session. It is quite possible that the same Political Council which formerly guided the National Government will be "restored".<sup>347</sup> If it is true that members of the National Government will be chosen by the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee and that the Central Political Council will again guide the National Government, it will remain a one-party government and will certainly not be a democratic government based on the co-operation of the various parties. This runs counter to the expectations of the Political Consultative Conference, the various parties, public figures, the people of the whole country, and the friendly nations.

3. The draft constitution. This is even more important. The constitution has a vital bearing on the basic question of whether China

will become a democracy or remain a one-party dictatorship. The principles laid down by the Political Consultative Conference for the revision of the draft constitution<sup>348</sup> were unanimously approved in a standing vote by the delegates from the various parties and those without party affiliation. Any change in these principles should be unanimously agreed upon by the delegates representing the various sides in the Conference. Certain members of the Kuomintang have made a point of criticizing them as not conforming to the Five-Power Constitution.<sup>349</sup> Let us set aside for a moment the fact that they were unanimously approved in a standing vote by the delegates to the Political Consultative Conference (including the representatives of the government) held under the chairmanship of President Chiang. Let us consider the Five-Power Constitution itself. In the first place, a Five-Power Constitution would provide for the separation of the five powers. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the concentration of state power in the hands of one person or one Yuan. In the second place, the localities were to enjoy a fair share of powers; some powers would belong to the central government and others to the localities. That is why Dr. Sun favoured provincial self-government, with each province formulating its own constitution. It can thus be seen that these principles laid down by the Political Consultative Conference are completely in keeping with those of Dr. Sun's Five-Power Constitution. As to how the government is to be organized to conform to these principles, that will have to be decided according to the time and circumstances. Methods used in the past are not necessarily suitable to the present. If it is alleged that not a single word of Dr. Sun's behests can be changed, then the things the Kuomintang is doing today are in violation of his Programme of National Reconstruction.<sup>350</sup> According to the procedures laid down in the programme, self-government should be practised first at the county level and then at the provincial level, and only after it has been instituted in more than half the provinces can a national assembly be convened and a constitutional government set up. The fact that the present government is not so acting shows that these procedures can be changed. Despite all this, we continue to hold consultations with the Kuomintang. In order to mitigate the difficulties encountered within their own party by those in the Kuomintang who advocate democracy, peace, unity and unification, the various sides have recently worked out three other agreements through consultation.<sup>351</sup>

However, this concession has only inflated the arrogance of the die-hards.

The Second Plenary Session has adopted five principles for the revision of the draft constitution. Two of these principles and part of another are of paramount importance,<sup>352</sup> for their purpose is to repudiate the principles laid down by the Political Consultative Conference, so that the Kuomintang will not be bound by them. Moreover, Mr. Wu Zihui<sup>258</sup> raised three objections which were immediately incorporated in the resolutions. He held that the May 5th Draft Constitution,<sup>138</sup> the agreements of the Conference, the resolutions of the Second Plenary Session, etc. should all be submitted to the National Assembly for deliberation. This runs counter to the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. According to its decision, only the amendments proposed by the Draft Constitution Review Committee, and nothing else, were to be submitted to the National Assembly. The delegates to the National Assembly are free as individuals, but each party should be responsible for restraining its members, so that this democratic draft constitution can be adopted. Under such circumstances, the National Assembly,<sup>326</sup> which includes delegates chosen by one party ten years ago, is no longer important; what is important is to ensure the adoption of a genuine democratic constitution. That is why the various parties have made great concessions to the Kuomintang on the question of a National Assembly. But now the Kuomintang hopes to use a National Assembly recognized by the various parties to oppose the principles for the revision of the draft constitution decided upon by the Political Consultative Conference and to obstruct the drawing up of a democratic constitution. Such a violation of democratic practice is intolerable.

4. The National Assembly. The question of delegates representing the localities in the National Assembly has not yet been finally decided upon, and the Organic Law of the National Assembly has not yet been revised. According to the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, the function and power of the National Assembly are limited to the drawing up of the constitution, which can be adopted only with a three-fourths majority. But if the Organic Law remains unrevised for long or is not properly revised, it will very probably be used to enable a mere two-thirds majority to adopt resolutions under which further activities detrimental to democracy will be carried out. In this way, the future National Assembly would serve as an even better guardian of one-party dictatorship.

5. The reorganization of troops. In a session of the Political Consultative Conference, Lin Wei, Vice-Minister of Military Affairs, reported that the government troops now numbered 3,800,000, but that they would be reduced to 1,800,000, reorganized into 90 divisions. But during the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the same person reported that government troops, plus administrative and training personnel, numbered 4,900,000 and that they would be reduced to 3,470,000, still reorganized into 90 divisions. This figure is 1,670,000 more than that mentioned in the report to the Conference. That is to say, even deducting the administrative and training personnel, the total number of troops would still be much higher, which means that the so-called military industrial workers' corps are to serve as reserves or replacements for the regular army. This is not in keeping with the resolutions of the Conference and the demobilization plan set forth in the programme for the reorganization of troops.<sup>353</sup> Contrary to the spirit of demobilization, it will mean no reduction in the expenditures of the national treasury but rather the maintenance of extra troops.

6. The truce. In its declaration, the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang called on the Communist troops to put an immediate stop to their attacks. But which side is really guilty of non-compliance with the cease-fire order and of continued attacks?<sup>354</sup> One need only listen to the reports just made by Lin Ping and Zheng Shaowen on the situation in Guangdong and Hubei to get a clear idea.<sup>355</sup> Anyone can see that in Shanxi the Japanese troops stationed in Taiyuan and Datong have not yet been disarmed, because Yan Xishan<sup>92</sup> is still using them to attack the Communist Party and the army and people in the Liberated Areas. In other places in north and central China, towns and villages in areas under the control of the Communist Party continue to be attacked and nibbled away.

As to the situation in the Northeast, two months ago General Marshall<sup>356</sup> suggested sending a field team there to mediate military clashes. We agreed immediately, but the government has only recently consented. Now the tasks of the field team have been called into question. We have made two suggestions on how to resolve this problem. One is to send the field team without preconditions, put an immediate end to all military clashes, investigate on the spot and then bring back the findings so that problems can be settled by the Committee of Three.<sup>357</sup> The other method, which is better, is to hold

negotiations in Chongqing on general principles for the settlement of military and political issues and then send the field team to attend to matters at issue, in accordance with the agreed principles. The consultations over these two suggestions have not yet yielded results. We have always held that domestic and foreign affairs in the Northeast should be dealt with separately. Issues in foreign affairs have always been in the charge of the government and that is still the case. But domestic issues are matters for which everyone shares responsibility, and they should be settled peacefully and by political means. This is the view not only of the Communist Party, but of the other democratic parties and the people in the Northeast as well.

Most of the problems I have mentioned became apparent during the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. It is not surprising that the die-hards in the Kuomintang should have tried deliberately to violate all the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. What is really surprising is that President Chiang, who personally presided over the session of the Conference, should have let the demands of the die-hards be approved by the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. Although in its resolutions the Second Plenary Session expressed the intent of implementing the resolution of the Conference, its adoption of resolutions that conflict with those of the Conference is, in fact, a negation of that intent. Moreover, the resolutions of the Second Plenary Session stress opposition to the Chinese Communist Party and accuse us of doing this and that. The Communist Party is ready firmly to carry out the Truce Agreement, the resolutions of the Conference and the programme for the reorganization of troops, all of which we signed. We are also willing to have our friends supervise our actions in a spirit of goodwill and without malicious intent. But, on the other hand, we would like to tell our Kuomintang friends that since they demand that others abide by the agreements and yet write into the resolutions of the Second Plenary Session provisions that run counter to the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, one cannot but think that some deception is involved. Just what are they trying to do? They are trying to blur the issues. Would China be a "democratic" state if, under these circumstances, the various parties were to join the government, and the National Assembly were to convene and adopt a constitution as demanded by the Second Plenary Session? No, that would be impossible! We will not be deceived, nor will we ever deceive the

people. We will speak the truth and present the facts to the people. And first of all, we must find out the intentions behind the decisions of the Second Plenary Session. This is not a question affecting a single person or party but one that concerns the common people: are they to be deceived or not? We should not tell the people that total peace has been won when it has not, that democracy prevails when it does not, or that there is stability when there is not.

We agree with General Marshall when he says that the next few months will be critical for China. But the situation will be much worse if it develops in line with the resolutions of the Second Plenary Session. We cannot be as optimistic as some sections of the public both at home and abroad. However, that does not mean the situation cannot be changed. Change can be brought about through the efforts of the whole nation and with the assistance of friendly countries. The delegates to the Political Consultative Conference in particular must strive to safeguard its resolutions.

Besides, as General Marshall said at the press conference in Washington, those who hold power in the Kuomintang are not prepared to hand over the greater part of that power. In fact, the Political Consultative Conference did not demand that of them. It demanded only that the people be allowed to enjoy democratic rights, such as adequate representation of the various parties in the government. At present, the Kuomintang is still the biggest party, whether in the central and provincial governments or in the National Assembly. However, the die-hards are not willing to let the people enjoy even this modicum of democracy. Their only interest is in suppressing and attacking the democratic movements of the people and the other parties. It can also be seen that the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference do not go so far as the demands for democracy contained in President Truman's statement<sup>358</sup> and in the communique of the conference of the foreign ministers of the three powers.<sup>359</sup> A programme for the reorganization and unification of troops has been worked out, but a fully representative government has not yet been established — the Kuomintang remains unwilling to practise even this modicum of democracy called for by the Political Consultative Conference, continuing to insist that members of the National Government should be nominated by the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee.



Therefore, I hold that there must be no undermining or revision of any of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. They were approved in a standing vote by the delegates representing the five sides<sup>360</sup> and should become the charter for democracy in China. Whoever tries to sabotage them is sabotaging democracy, peace, unity and unification in China today. This also applies to the agreement reached by the Committee of Three on putting a stop to military clashes and that reached by the military sub-committee on the programme for the reorganization of troops. If human rights are not safeguarded, it will be impossible to reorganize the government so as to make it a genuinely democratic one based on co-operation. The National Assembly cannot possibly be successful unless the various parties engaged in revising the draft constitution honour their commitments and unless amendments are worked out in accordance with the principles approved by the five sides. There can be no guarantee of peace unless military clashes cease throughout the country. What we call for is a genuinely peaceful, democratic and stable China.

We wish to call on the people of the whole country and on our friends in the allied countries and in the various parties to support and supervise the implementation of all the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. In particular, we hope that those friends in the Kuomintang who uphold democracy and unity will come forward, under the leadership of President Chiang, to check and repudiate schemes hatched within their party against the Conference. Since the Kuomintang bears the heaviest responsibility for affairs of state today, we should remind our Kuomintang friends that these schemes have now become resolutions and will soon be put into effect. For this reason, it is necessary for us to make this statement following the conclusion of the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. We do not want to fool the public, but to appeal to it.

## ETERNAL GLORY TO THE MARTYRS OF APRIL 8TH!

*April 19, 1946*

Ruofei!<sup>361</sup> Bo Gu!<sup>362</sup> Xiyi!<sup>363</sup> Deng Fa!<sup>364</sup> Venerable Mr. Huang,<sup>365</sup> Yangmei, and all other Chinese and American friends and comrades<sup>366</sup> who died in the accident! You laid down your lives together and have become the April 8th martyrs.

Ten days have elapsed, days of bitter sorrow. Grief-laden hearts, tears of sorrow and indignation, agonizing memories, and the heavy tasks you left behind so overwhelm us that we still mourn you in silence.

Over the last twenty years, tens of thousands of comrades-in-arms have given their lives in the common struggle, but none died so suddenly and unexpectedly as you. Sudden blows and unexpected deaths make us feel irretrievable losses all the more keenly.

Twenty or thirty years of struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people tempered you and made you people's heroes, leaders of the masses, teachers of the young, and staunch revolutionary fighters. Seven among you, like Ruofei, were educated by the Communist Party for ten or twenty years and became fine, long-tested Party leaders or backbone cadres, forever loyal to the cause of the people. You were the treasure of the Chinese people and the glory of the Chinese Communist Party. Now you have literally been snatched from our midst, from the midst of the Chinese people. This is a tremendous misfortune to the Party, a tremendous misfortune to the people.

After victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, Ruofei and the other comrades struggled hard for the cause of peace, unity, democracy and unification, never ceasing in their exertions. Comrade

---

A signed article written for the *New China Daily* on the day that various circles in Chongqing held a rally to mourn the martyrs of April 8th.

Ruofei took part — the other comrades joined later — in the task of preparing the Summary of Conversations signed by the representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China on October 10,<sup>367</sup> the five resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference,<sup>339</sup> the Truce Agreement,<sup>354</sup> the programme for the reorganization of troops<sup>353</sup> and the Truce Agreement of March 27 for the Northeast.<sup>368</sup> During the past two months in particular, Comrades Ruofei and Bo Gu stood at the forefront of the struggle and fought most firmly against the reactionary plots of saboteurs, trying to safeguard human rights and the five resolutions of the Conference, uphold the principles for revising the Draft Constitution<sup>348</sup> and prevent the Truce Agreement from being sabotaged. And it was precisely in order to safeguard those Conference resolutions and uphold those principles that you were flying back to Yan'an on April 8 to report to the Central Committee of our Party and ask for instructions. Disaster tragically befell you. To the last minute of your lives you were busy working for the country and fighting for the people's cause. Your deeds will live forever in the history of the people. Your spirit will encourage the tens of millions of people and Party members to rush into the gap you have left and march forward towards your goal.

If there had been no conspiracy on the part of the reactionaries to undermine the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, there would have been no need for you to fly back to Yan'an in such bad weather. But as the saying goes, "While virtue is growing, vice is growing ten times faster." The implementation of the Conference resolutions, of the Truce Agreement and of the programme for the reorganization of troops will not come easily. The Chinese people have already paid a high price for peace and democracy, but they did not expect to pay such a heavy additional price. And they are not done with paying. Under the pretext of reorganizing the government, convening the National Assembly and recovering sovereignty, the reactionaries are engaged in an even greater conspiracy to strengthen dictatorship, split the country and massacre the people.

Martyrs! Comrades! You have discharged your responsibilities. I can confidently assure you that as long as the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and any democratic parties and forces exist, we will never allow the reactionaries to succeed in their conspiracy to undermine the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, the truce and the troop reorganization. The basic policies

which you upheld are the policies of the entire Chinese people. Peace and democracy will eventually be realized throughout China.

Ruofei! In your last conversation with me, you cried out against the oppression of the Chinese people and their representatives by the rulers. I remember — I will always remember. I can assure you that hundreds of millions of Chinese people have awakened and risen up and that the Chinese Communist Party, guided by the thinking of Comrade Mao Zedong, will never forsake them. We will fight to the end for a people's China and a people's era.

Bo Gu! You died in the interest of revising the Draft Constitution. I remember — I will always remember. I can assure you that we will fight to the end to complete a democratic Constitution and establish a democratic China.

Xiyi! You were a founder of the people's army. During the Northern Expedition and the War of Resistance Against Japan, you made great contributions to the old and New Fourth Armies for the liberation of the people. Ten years in exile and five in prison turned your hair grey but left you more determined than ever. As soon as you were out of jail, you asked for readmission into the Party. The moment we met, you spoke of the comrades who were murdered in southern Anhui, made a self-criticism concerning the Southern Anhui Incident<sup>205</sup> and asked me to continue negotiations for the release of more comrades. I remember — I will always remember. I can assure you that we will fight to the end to protect the people's army and win the release of all political prisoners.

Deng Fa! You were a trained leader from the ranks of the workers. You scored brilliant achievements for the united front of the Chinese working class and that of the international working class. But just as success was being attained, you left us, never to return. I can assure you that in order to preserve and extend these achievements, we will struggle for the complete success of the movement for the unity of the working people of China and the world.

All Chinese and American friends and comrades who died in the accident while flying back to Yan'an! The hopes of the people lie in the merits and achievements of each one of you. We must learn from you. We must forever maintain the spirit you have left with us, the spirit of service to the cause of the people's education, of arduous labour in revolutionary work, of self-sacrifice in fostering the next revolutionary generation and of defying personal danger to promote co-operation between China and the United States.

---

We must turn our grief into united strength and struggle against all the reactionaries.

Peace and democracy were your banners!

Eternal glory to the martyrs of April 8th!

## STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE SPREAD OF CIVIL WAR AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS

*July 17, 1946*

The two most serious and pressing problems in China at present are, first, the civil war and, second, political assassinations. I wish to issue the following statement on behalf of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. At present, the civil war is escalating from limited war to total war. Large-scale civil war is going on mainly in four theatres. First, in the Central Plains theatre. On June 26, Kuomintang troops numbering 300,000 started an "encirclement and annihilation" campaign against our Central Plains Military Area,<sup>369</sup> and on the 29th they took Xuanhuadian. On June 30 and July 1, our army began to break out across the Beiping-Hankou Railway line, but it is still being pursued and attacked at this moment. Second, in the Shandong theatre. Five Kuomintang corps with about 150,000 men have been attacking us along the Qingdao-Jinan Railway line, and in the middle of this month their units from Jinan and Weixian joined forces. Third, in the northern Jiangsu theatre. On the 15th of this month the Kuomintang put in twelve corps plus local forces, totalling some 500,000 men, and began an all-out offensive against us from three directions, supported by naval and air operations. Fourth, in the triangular area of southern Shanxi. On July 3, Hu Zongnan's<sup>370</sup> First Corps crossed the Huanghe River from Shaanxi and occupied Maojindu, then joined Yan Xishan's<sup>92</sup> troops and took Wenxi and Houma from us. If the situation is permitted to develop unchecked, it is likely that areas along the Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou Railways and Rehe

---

Made at a press conference held in Nanjing and published in the *New China Daily* in Chongqing on July 18, 1946.

Province and the Northeast will soon be involved in the civil war. We demand that the Kuomintang authorities stop spreading propaganda which does not square with the facts and immediately order an over-all cease-fire; otherwise, they should be held responsible for all the consequences of civil war.

2. The two political assassinations which took place in Kunming are enough to undermine the very foundation of the all-important unity and co-operation between the various democratic parties of the country and the Kuomintang authorities. Four days after the assassination of Mr. Li Gongpu,<sup>371</sup> Mr. Wen Yiduo was murdered and his son wounded.<sup>372</sup> These were planned, brazen political assassinations. With the bloody incidents of Xi'an and Nantong<sup>373</sup> still unsettled, we now learn of these in Kunming. More of these wanton killings may very well take place in Chongqing, Chengdu, Wuhan, Beiping, Guangzhou and even in Nanjing or Shanghai. These events starkly reveal the ruthless, fascist nature of the Kuomintang secret agents, who have adopted the most despicable methods to suppress the movement for peace and democracy and its leading figures. Unless the Kuomintang authorities take urgent measures to put an end to all this, change their ways and abolish the secret police, all political consultations will be futile.

## TAKE BETTER CARE OF OUR PROGRESSIVE FRIENDS

*July 25, 1946*

1. Xiao Chao<sup>374</sup> and I and the others flew back to Nanjing this afternoon.

2. In the morning, before we left Shanghai, Tao Xingzhi<sup>274</sup> suffered a sudden cerebral hemorrhage. By the time we reached his bedside, to our great sorrow, he had stopped breathing. But when I took his hand, his temperature and colour had still not changed. According to Shen Junru's son<sup>504</sup> (a doctor), he had really died of a cerebral hemorrhage and there had been no signs of poisoning. For prudence' sake, we decided after discussion to leave the body at a funeral parlour and to have it placed in a coffin only after twelve hours of observation, to see whether there would be any change.

3. Unless some other reason is found, Tao must have died of overwork, failing health and excessive mental strain. This is another irreparable loss to the Chinese people. For the past decade, he consistently followed the Party's correct line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong and was a Bolshevik outside the Party, which he supported without reservation. During this trip to Shanghai, I was concerned about his health and proposed that the Shanghai Party Working Committee persuade him to rest for a while. But he died before my message reached him. Had Tao been able to speak as he approached the end, he would, I believe, have applied for Party membership, as Zou Taofen had done before him.<sup>338</sup>

4. From now on, we must see to it that the safety and health of our progressive friends are ensured. I have told Pan Hannian<sup>292</sup> and Wu Yunfu<sup>375</sup> in Shanghai to give them more material help and eco-



---

conomic assistance, as well as showing constant solicitude for them politically.

5. I propose that the Central Committee have the report on the death of Tao written by the New China News Agency in Nanjing broadcast nationwide.

6. I shall find out the true state of affairs today and meet Marshall<sup>356</sup> and Leighton Stuart<sup>376</sup> tomorrow.

## IN MEMORY OF LI GONGPU AND WEN YIDUO

*October 4, 1946*

We are here to mourn Li Gongpu<sup>371</sup> and Wen Yiduo<sup>372</sup> at a time when the political situation is extremely perilous and the people are exceedingly indignant. But here and now, what words can be appropriate? With the most devout belief, I silently vow to the martyrs: I will never give up, I will continue to fight for our ideal. Peace and democracy are bound to come. Murderers are doomed to perish.

---

Written for a memorial meeting for Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo held by people from all walks of life in Shanghai. It was read at the meeting by Comrade Deng Yingchao on behalf of Comrade Zhou Enlai and published in the *New China Daily* in Chongqing on October 4, 1946.

## SPEECH AT THE SHANGHAI MEETING TO COMMEMORATE THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF LU XUN

*October 19, 1946*

Ten years, a full ten years, have elapsed since Lu Xun passed away. In that time China moved from civil war to the War of Resistance and is now back to civil war again. Lu Xun cursed civil war and hoped for a war of resistance, speaking of it in glowing terms. The War of Resistance he hoped for was realized through the efforts of the masses of the people, but the civil war he cursed still goes on, which saddens every one of us present at this meeting. The people are looking forward to democracy, independence, unity and unification, but it is over a year now since the Japanese surrender, and their hopes are still unfulfilled. The year Lu Xun died, negotiations were going on. They have been going on for a full ten years, but they have failed to produce a modicum of peace for the Chinese people, and to me personally that is a source of great distress. But once the people unite, there is no question that the problem of peace, democracy and unification in China will be solved. Today I wish to pledge before the portrait of Lu Xun that so long as there is a chance for peace, we will never abandon the negotiations. Even if driven to all-out resistance in self-defence, we will strive for China's independence, peace, democracy and unification.

Lu Xun once said:

Fierce-browed, I coolly defy a thousand pointing fingers,  
Head bowed, like a willing ox I serve the children.

That was Lu Xun's attitude and that was the position he took. Lu Xun detested the reactionaries. When it comes to the reactionaries, we

will defy their "thousand pointing fingers" coolly, fierce-browed, without fear. We must demand an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. But as for the people, we should be like willing oxen in the service of the children. We should serve them sincerely and honestly. We must know what to hate, what to feel indignant about, what to love and what to strive for. How many tyrants, emperors and dictators in history have gone down one after another! But the multitude of slaves, the oppressed and the peasants have stood firm and grown from strength to strength. The age of the common man is at hand. We should therefore work diligently, like willing oxen, unite as one and serve the people to our dying day. Both Lu Xun and Wen Yiduo are examples for us to follow.<sup>372</sup>

## STATEMENT ON THE KUOMINTANG'S CONVENING OF A "NATIONAL ASSEMBLY"

*November 16, 1946*

A "National Assembly" entirely controlled by the Kuomintang government opened yesterday. This "National Assembly", convened unilaterally by a one-party government, violates the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and runs counter to the will of the whole nation. The Chinese Communist Party is resolutely against it. Not only was the date for its convening not discussed by the Conference, but even more important, it is a divisive "National Assembly" convened by a single party, and not one of unity in which various political parties take part. According to the principles and procedures set forth in the resolutions of the Conference, the National Assembly can be convened only under the auspices of a reorganized government and only after the resolutions adopted by the Conference have been put into effect one by one.

The resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference<sup>339</sup> constitute a provisional Magna Charta agreed upon by various political parties, and they form an inseparable whole. Over the past ten months, not one iota of the resolutions has been carried out; on the contrary, they have been completely scrapped by the Kuomintang authorities. The Truce Agreement was approved by decision of the Conference but, with civil war being fought on a large scale all the way from the North-east to south of the Great Wall, the government authorities have completely altered the positions fixed by the January cease-fire order.<sup>354</sup>

---

After the Kuomintang troops captured Zhangjiakou on October 11, 1946, Chiang Kai-shek quickly issued the order to convene a "National Assembly" unilaterally, so that it might adopt a constitution that would legitimize his policy of civil war, dictatorship and national betrayal. On the day following the opening of the "National Assembly", Comrade Zhou Enlai held a press conference in Nanjing and issued this written statement. It was published in the *New China Daily* in Chongqing on November 17, 1946.

The four pledges<sup>340</sup> they made at the opening of the Political Consultative Conference have been nullified under the rule of the Kuomintang secret police, as witness events ranging from the brutal suppression at Jiaochangkou<sup>342</sup> to the assassination of Li Gongpu<sup>371</sup> and Wen Yiduo.<sup>372</sup> Since agreement has not yet been reached on the reorganization of the government, the Programme for Peace and National Reconstruction cannot be realized either. As for the local governments in many Liberated Areas, the Kuomintang authorities not only refuse to allow them to maintain the *status quo* in accordance with the provisions of the programme, but insist on a "takeover"; if it is resisted, they resort to occupation by force. The basic principle of the resolution on military affairs is that military authority shall be separated from civil authority, yet nearly all the provincial governorships of the Kuomintang government are presently held by officers on active service. Since the review of the Draft Constitution was not completed in Chongqing, the representatives of the Communist Party issued a statement of total reservation at the time; after the government moved to Nanjing, the Kuomintang authorities pigeonholed it and have not allowed any further discussions to this day. The agreement concerning a National Assembly was the last compromise reached while the Political Consultative Conference was in session. The Kuomintang authorities guaranteed not to hold a divisive "National Assembly" controlled exclusively by one party and pledged to approve the Draft Constitution reviewed and finalized by the Conference. It was only then that the other political parties agreed to include the delegates chosen by a single party ten years ago<sup>326</sup> in the quota set for delegates from constituencies and professions, on condition that the number of delegates from all other political parties and the Liberated Areas be increased. The National Assembly can be convened only after the civil war is truly stopped, the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference have been carried out, the people's rights and freedoms are protected and the government has been reorganized. Only then will a National Assembly be an assembly of unity in which various political parties participate. Not only does the so-called National Assembly now in session run counter to the above resolutions and their spirit, but even the date for its convening — or postponement — was decided by the one-party government. As announced on the morning of November 15, the number of Kuomintang delegates has risen to 1,580, so that another 410 seats have been taken away from the other political parties out of a total of 2,050 originally agreed upon. In particular, the Kuomintang

has usurped no less than 140 seats out of the 200 for the Liberated Areas. It is quite obvious that this "National Assembly" is a divisive assembly controlled exclusively by one party. To keep seats vacant for the Communist Party, as is allegedly being done, is both a violation of the resolutions of the Conference and a sheer fraud, the real purpose of which is simply to bamboozle the other political parties into attending the assembly and thus to gloss over the autocratic nature of the Kuomintang authorities.

With regard to the talks in Nanjing, which people of the third force have tried hard to bring about, the Communist Party has been proposing for a month now that while the form may be flexible, the talks must follow the principles and procedures laid down in the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. But the government authorities have rejected our proposal. The closer the date came for the one-party "National Assembly", the more we urged its cancellation, so that the Military Committee of Three,<sup>357</sup> the joint sub-committee of the Political Consultative Conference and the Draft Constitution Review Committee could meet simultaneously. Thus, in accordance with the Truce Agreement, the programme for the reorganization of troops<sup>353</sup> and the resolutions of the Conference, they could settle the present military and political issues and promptly put into effect the agreements reached. Only then, in a peaceful environment, would it be possible to convene unhurriedly a National Assembly of unity in which various political parties would take part. However, the government authorities, anxious to whitewash their dictatorship, turned a deaf ear to all this.

The one-party "National Assembly" now in session has made it impossible for the Communist Party and the third force to agree upon any proposals to send to the suggested Nanjing talks. What is more, it has definitely broken all the resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Conference as well as the Truce Agreement and the programme for the reorganization of troops and has blocked the road to peace talks that has been open since the Conference. At the same time, it has fully exposed the fraudulent nature of the "cease-fire order" issued by the government authorities on November 8.<sup>377</sup> This one-party "National Assembly" wants to adopt a so-called constitution in order to "legalize" that party's dictatorship, the civil war, its divisive activities and its betrayal of the interests of the nation and the people. If things go on this way, the Chinese people are bound to be plunged into an abyss of misery. We Communists categorically refuse to rec-

ognize this "National Assembly". The door to peace negotiations has now been shut by the Kuomintang government authorities. We will not take the slightest notice of any of the tricks they are going to play in this one-party "National Assembly", including the reorganization of the government. Participation in this "National Assembly" and acceptance of such tricks would inevitably mean the sabotage of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and the blocking of the path to peace, democracy, unity and unification laid out by the Conference. There is no middle road. The bloody attacks against the Liberated Areas are being intensified and the U.S. government is continuing its policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war, so sham peace and sham democracy can deceive no one. We Communists, together with the Chinese people and all other political parties earnestly working for peace and democracy, will strive to the very end for genuine peace and genuine democracy.



SPEECH IN  
CELEBRATION OF THE SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY  
OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ZHU DE

*November 30, 1946*

Dear Commander-in-Chief, Comrade Zhu De,

Your sixtieth birthday is a joyous occasion for the whole Party and a moment of pride for the Chinese people.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to come back to Yan'an and personally extend my congratulations to you. What is more, it is a supreme honour for me to congratulate you on behalf of the thousands upon thousands of comrades, friends and other people in areas under reactionary rule who are unable to see you in person.

Dear Commander-in-Chief, thanks to your struggle over the decades, you have won worldwide recognition as a liberator of the Chinese nation, a champion of the labouring people, a founder and leader of the people's army.

Dear Commander-in-Chief, you have proven your unfailing loyalty and devotion to the Party and the people. In the course of revolution, you have gone through all kinds of difficulties and setbacks, hardships and ordeals, but you have always held high the revolutionary torch illuminating the path to a bright future, so that millions of people have confidently followed you in the march forward.

During the twenty-five years I have known you, you have always been so unassuming and approachable, yet always steadfast and unshakable — that is precisely what makes you a great man. You have such affection and love for the people and such scorn and hatred for the enemy — that makes you all the greater.

---

Published in the *Liberation Daily* in Yan'an on November 30, 1946. Comrade Zhu De's sixtieth birthday fell on December 1, 1946.

You were the first in the Party to co-operate with Comrade Mao Zedong in founding the army of the Chinese people and establishing the base areas for the people's revolution, thus adding a new chapter to the annals of the Chinese revolution. Marching under the banner of Comrade Mao Zedong, you have been his close and worthy comrade-in-arms, and you well deserve to be called a leader of the people.

Dear Commander-in-Chief, your revolutionary achievements have become milestones in the Chinese revolution of the twentieth century. The Revolution of 1911,<sup>143</sup> the Yunnan Uprising,<sup>378</sup> the Northern Expedition,<sup>117</sup> the Nanchang Uprising,<sup>240</sup> the Agrarian Revolution,<sup>505</sup> the War of Resistance Against Japan, the production campaign<sup>506</sup> and the present war of self-defence — you have participated in them all. You are now sixty and still in robust health. I am confident that you will lead the Chinese people to final victory in national liberation and will see with your own eyes the defeat of the dictator and the destruction of the reactionary forces.

Your strong constitution and your cheerful spirit augur well for the prosperity of the Chinese people.

The people wish you a long life!

The whole Party wishes you lasting good health!

SPEECH AT A MEETING HELD BY  
REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL WALKS OF LIFE  
IN YAN'AN IN COMMEMORATION OF  
THE DECEMBER 12TH INCIDENT

*December 12, 1946*

Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades, it is ten full years since the Incident of December 12, 1936.<sup>226</sup> During that time China moved from civil war to the War of Resistance and is now unfortunately back to civil war again. This is indeed a historic lesson worthy of our study. Although China is back to civil war, she has gone through the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Japanese fascists have been overthrown, the people's army that resisted Japan has grown in strength, and areas with a total population of 140 million have been truly liberated under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The people in these areas have won democracy and the peasants have obtained land, and, inspired by all this, the entire Chinese people have come to realize that a powerful imperialist country can be defeated. That is the historic outcome of the Incident of December 12. The significance of the incident itself is that it was a turning point in history, marking the cessation of the civil war and the launching of the War of Resistance. After the Incident of September 18, 1931,<sup>490</sup> the people became increasingly dissatisfied with the Kuomintang authorities' policy of non-resistance to Japan. In particular, after the Communist Party led the people's armed forces north to resist the Japanese aggressors and called on the entire nation to form an Anti-Japanese National United Front, the people's demand for an end to civil war and for resistance to Japan became increasingly widespread. That demand exerted an influence on the "Communist suppression" troops,

and in the first place on the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army, which were in the front lines of the civil war. The nation was heading inexorably towards a war of resistance, having witnessed the Student Movement of December 9, 1935,<sup>290</sup> the national salvation movement, the jailing of the seven patriotic leaders,<sup>91</sup> and particularly the conclusion of the 25,000-*li* Long March of the Red Army and its movement east to cross the Huanghe River and resist Japan.<sup>289</sup> The general trend of events and the will of the people had become irresistible. Mr. Chiang Kai-shek alone had something else in mind. When the Japanese aggressors were attacking eastern Suiyuan,<sup>379</sup> he flatly rejected the Northeastern Army's request for orders to resist Japan and forced Generals Zhang Xueliang<sup>87</sup> and Yang Hucheng<sup>88</sup> to continue the civil war. However, not only did those perverse acts fail of their intended effect, but on the contrary, they triggered the Xi'an Incident of 1936, and he was forced to resist Japan. History will attest that Chiang Kai-shek brought the Xi'an Incident on himself and that he was pressured into the War of Resistance by Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, who acted in conformity with the will of the people. It was no accident that after that Generals Zhang and Yang won the understanding and support of the people. It is more than a year now since the victory in the War of Resistance, yet Generals Zhang and Yang have been kept under arrest by Chiang Kai-shek for ten years. The people will come forward and pass the correct judgment on this case, and it is they alone who are persisting in demanding the release of Zhang and Yang, while the lady and the gentlemen who vouched for the safety of the two generals shamelessly went back on their word a long time ago. As we commemorate the tenth anniversary of the December 12th Incident today, we demand the immediate release of Generals Zhang and Yang, for they made great contributions to the cause of the War of Resistance.

Since Chiang Kai-shek joined in the War of Resistance only reluctantly and under pressure, there was a struggle between two lines throughout the war: one was the line of resistance, unity and democracy and the other the line of compromise, split and dictatorship. The first line was upheld by the Communist Party and supported by the people, while the second was upheld by Chiang and applauded by the enemy, the puppet troops and the reactionaries. The Communist Party and the people were for active resistance until victory; but Chiang joined with Germany and Italy in an attempt to bring about a compromise

in the earlier stage of the war and collaborated with the enemy and the puppet troops in passive resistance in the later stage. The Communist Party and the people were for bringing together all anti-Japanese forces to defeat the Japanese aggressors, but Chiang sought to split the anti-Japanese front and constantly exploited the War of Resistance to weaken and even wipe out troops other than his own, especially the Northeastern and 17th Route Armies. As to the anti-Japanese forces led by the Communist Party, Chiang did not hesitate to engage them in civil war. The Communist Party and the people were for introducing democracy so as to mobilize all the people's strength to sustain the war, but Chiang exercised strict dictatorship and suppressed the people, thus weakening the resistance. In these circumstances, had it not been for the efforts of the Communist Party behind the enemy lines and the perseverance of the people all over the country, the War of Resistance in China would have long since been abandoned by Chiang. Consequently, as soon as the Japanese aggressors surrendered, Chiang launched civil war on an even larger scale against the Communists and the people, making use of Japanese prisoners and incorporating the puppet troops into his own army. In January of this year, with the entire Chinese people demanding peace and democracy, Chiang accepted the Truce Agreement<sup>354</sup> and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference<sup>339</sup> with great reluctance and under compulsion. But at his instigation, the agreement and the resolutions were soon jettisoned either overtly or covertly at the meeting on the reorganization of troops in Nanjing in February and at the Second Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in Chongqing in March. When large-scale fighting broke out in the Northeast and south of the Great Wall, it became even more apparent that he was on no account willing to accept the resolutions and the agreement. In the last five months of civil war Chiang's troops have invaded and occupied large pieces of territory in our Liberated Areas, and he is now convening the illegal and divisive "National Assembly" which is exclusively controlled by one party. Thus he himself has exposed all his deceptions with his own hand.

To judge by the developments of the past year or so, the struggle between the two lines which went on both before and after the Xi'an Incident is still going on between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese people. Since the victory in the War of Resistance, the Communist Party and the people have called for democracy and independence in accordance

with the line of the Political Consultative Conference, upheld the January cease-fire order, advocated the consecutive implementation of the resolutions of the Conference, opposed the interference of U.S. imperialism in China's internal affairs and demanded that the U.S. withdraw its troops from China and stop aiding Chiang Kai-shek in civil war. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek has not hesitated to violate the line of the Political Consultative Conference and has stubbornly taken the road of civil war, dictatorship and national betrayal. He is trying to abolish the Liberated Areas by force, legalize his dictatorship by means of a "constitution" and sell out the national interests through the disastrous "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce",<sup>380</sup> bartering them for more aid from U.S. imperialism to carry on the civil war. But these attempts are bound to end in miserable failure, just as did the civil war ten years ago. At present, peace, democracy and independence are the major trend and the will of the people. In attempting to dominate the world and enslave the people, the U.S. imperialists will place themselves in an utterly isolated position. In attempting to dominate China and enslave the Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek will place himself in the same predicament. Hoping to find a way out by following in the footsteps of U.S. imperialism, he will end up teetering on the brink of a precipice. The line set by the Political Consultative Conference represents the only way out. The people's era has arrived. A new wave of democracy is bound to sweep over China. Its advent will be hastened by the perseverance and victory of the people of the Liberated Areas in the war of self-defence, by the growth of the patriotic and democratic movement in the areas under reactionary rule and by the progress of the people in various countries. Historical developments offer a warning to the reactionary rulers: are you going to follow the road of civil war, dictatorship and national betrayal to the very end?

Even now Chiang Kai-shek is prating about a "political solution", yet the majority of the people already know that it is a fraud, a so-called peace offensive. In order to test whether this "political solution" is genuine or not, we have asked him to dismiss immediately the current illegal and divisive "National Assembly" controlled exclusively by one party and to recognize and restore the positions of the armies of the two sides as prescribed in the January Truce Agreement, so that the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party can resume. Only when Chiang is willing to do all this will it be possible for him to return to the line of the Political Consultative Conference. Otherwise,

---

the Chinese people will come to see even more clearly that his real aim is to abolish the Liberated Areas by force and that his "political solution" is merely a fraudulent slogan. We are convinced that, having learned the lessons of the ten years that have elapsed since the Xi'an Incident, the Chinese people will not be fooled again.

# THE PAST YEAR'S NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS

*December 18, 1946*

The trend of events during the past year has been very complicated and full of twists and turns. Here I can only take up the main problems, review the Chinese people's struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries and say a few words about the prospects.

## I. THE PAST YEAR'S NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party since the surrender of Japan fall into three periods: the first, from August 25 of last year, when the Central Committee of the Party issued its declaration<sup>381</sup> and Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing, to the end of the year; the second, from the convening of the Political Consultative Conference to the cease-fire in June; and the third, from July, when extensive fighting broke out, to the present. Quite a number of differences distinguish the three periods. In the first period, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party held direct negotiations which yielded no results, while the civil war went on for three months. In the second, the various political parties held consultations yielding some results, which, however, were nullified by the Kuomintang reactionaries. In the third, the negotiations became a smokescreen, covering up the extensive fighting which testified to the failure of the negotiations. These are the distinctive features of the three periods and I shall now deal with them separately.

---

Report delivered at a meeting of cadres in Yan'an. The second part is a summary.



## THE FIRST PERIOD

The eight years of the War of Resistance ended in the surrender of Japan. The situation was then as follows: (1) The people were longing for peace after Japan's surrender, and we could not afford to ignore their wishes. (2) While the forces of the people led by the Communist Party of China were still unable to set up a democratic government on a national scale, under our leadership some local democratic governments had been established. (3) The eight years of the War of Resistance had proved that as long as the Chinese people were united, they could defeat any imperialist power, however strong. And so peace, democracy and independence became the common aspirations of the Chinese people. In conformity with these aspirations, we issued a declaration on August 25 of last year. This was entirely correct. Our Party has consistently pursued the policy of New Democracy throughout the three historical periods, the Great Revolution, the ten-year civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan. In the present fourth historical period, we must continue to implement it. This has always been the policy of our Party, the policy laid down by Comrade Mao Zedong in his report "On Coalition Government" last year. And we will pursue it for a long time to come.

In pursuance of this policy, Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing to negotiate with the Kuomintang. On October 10 of last year, the Summary of Conversations<sup>367</sup> was made public. It provided solutions to many of the problems, but a few important ones remained unsolved.

The three most important problems solved were:

1. The status of the Communist Party of China was recognized. Although the Kuomintang is still arresting and killing our comrades and our Party organizations still work underground in the areas ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, the status of the Chinese Communist Party in both China and the rest of the world has changed since the publication of the Summary of Conversations of October 10. Our status is now recognized by the people both at home and abroad. This is a very important historical event. Ten years ago, after the Xi'an Incident<sup>226</sup> of 1936, Chiang suggested to me at Lushan that Zhu and Mao go abroad, taking us for local warlords and insulting our Party. For the sake of resisting Japan, we proposed to Chiang a Common Programme for the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,<sup>382</sup> but he shelved it and published his own Programme for Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction.<sup>227</sup> During the eight years of the War of Resistance, he never treated us as equals

either in form or reality. However, owing to our own efforts over the eight years, the Liberated Areas have extended to embrace a population of 140 million and the armed forces under the Communist Party have grown to 1.4 million. China's problems cannot be solved without the participation of the Communist Party. That's why after the surrender of Japan Chiang had to send telegrams time and again to invite Comrade Mao Zedong to negotiations. It was imperative that Comrade Mao Zedong should go to Chongqing last year, since the trip affected the Communist Party's standing both at home and abroad. We did not lose anything. Although our forces had grown as a result of eight years of struggle, the very fact that he went to Chongqing gave a new status to the Party, a status commensurate with our present strength. That is why, when Chiang Kai-shek gave an admonitory talk in Lushan to his subordinates last September, he said that the Communist Party could no longer be suppressed as easily as in the Jiangxi period of the 1930s, because it had acquired international standing.

2. The status of the conference of the political parties was recognized. Before that time, Chiang did not recognize the status of the various political parties at all, but now he does, which means that their standing has been raised. Events have developed very quickly. The idea of a conference of all political parties and the idea of a coalition government were both proposed by the Chinese Communist Party. It was also due to the efforts of the Communist Party and the Chinese people that the various political parties have attained a certain standing today. Even the Youth Party<sup>383</sup> has to admit in private that it owes its present status to the Communist Party. While Zhang Junmai<sup>384</sup> was attending the "National Assembly", he expressed the hope to some journalists that the Communist Party would understand him. Thus China's affairs cannot be monopolized by the Kuomintang but must be conducted through consultation among a number of political parties. This means that we should carry out Comrade Mao Zedong's thinking on the "three thirds system".<sup>204</sup> That thinking has two features: one is that our Party need not necessarily hold a majority in the government but strives for co-operation with the democratic personages. No big party should use an absolute majority to overpower the others, but it should be tolerant towards them and prevail by virtue of its correct policies. The other feature is the desire that all the political parties take part in consultations, arrive at consensus, work out a common programme and implement it as government policy. These two features constitute Comrade Mao Zedong's thinking on the "three thirds system".

3. The status and size of the people's army led by the Communist Party were recognized. According to the Summary of Conversations, twenty divisions of our army were recognized. In the early period of the War of Resistance, however, only three of our divisions had been recognized. When Comrade Lin Biao<sup>84</sup> went to ask for nine divisions, Chiang would recognize only six. When Chairman Lin Boqu<sup>297</sup> went, we were asking for sixteen, but Chiang would recognize only eight. This time Chairman Mao went, and Chiang immediately recognized twenty.

I have been speaking about the three main achievements of the Summary of Conversations of October 10. We should not consider the negotiations fruitless just because Chiang Kai-shek has violated these agreements. For it has become obvious to the people of China that the Communist Party cannot be ignored. Although the Kuomintang has violated the agreements, it still does not dare to openly abandon consultations with the other political parties.

On the other hand, the problems that remained unsolved were those of the Liberated Areas and political power. Our policy was to win recognition for our existing democratic governments and then to extend democracy to other places. To Chiang Kai-shek this was much more important than the three questions I have mentioned. It posed a mortal threat to him, for wherever there is democracy, there is no room for autocrats. So he would not agree to our demand. This was also the central problem over which we fell out with Hurley.<sup>323</sup> After Comrade Mao Zedong returned to Yan'an, Comrade Wang Ruofei<sup>361</sup> and I continued the talks with the Kuomintang for a month and a half. We tried everything to make them recognize our governments, but they still refused. The heart of the matter was that they didn't want the Chinese people to have a democratic base area. China is so big that its revolution cannot possibly develop at an even pace. There are ups and downs, and progress is made by capturing positions one by one. This is how our revolution has developed. So for the Chinese people the base areas are more important than anything else. Of course, the armed forces play a vital role, but ultimately they are an instrument for safeguarding the base areas. They can no longer survive, once cut off from the base areas. Chiang saw this clearly and understood the significance of the problem very well. Therefore, on no account would he recognize our governments.

There were, moreover, three things which Chiang recognized in form but did not carry out in reality, namely, the agreements relating to the acceptance of Japan's surrender, the repatriation of the prisoners of war and the reorganization of the puppet troops. In principle, agreement had

been reached on all these issues, but in reality he went his own way. He had the Americans transport his troops from the Southwest to the big cities occupied by Japan to accept the surrender. At the same time, he used Japanese prisoners of war and puppet troops to fight us, thus rekindling civil war.

Therefore, while we scored undeniable achievements in the first period of negotiations, there were some problems on which no agreement was reached and other problems on which there was agreement in words but violation in deeds. Thus the negotiations were not really fruitful, and civil war went on for three months.

The three months of civil war showed that Chiang was still not well prepared. His main forces were in the Southwest. Although the United States did what it could to help him transport five of his corps to Shanhaiguan, two to north China and two to Shandong, most of his troops remained in the Southwest, whereas vast areas of northeast and north China had been liberated by us. This made it impossible for him to continue the war. Meanwhile, internationally, there were Truman's statement,<sup>358</sup> the communique of the Moscow conference of the three foreign ministers<sup>359</sup> and Marshall's arrival in China.<sup>356</sup> In consequence, the civil war came to a halt and the negotiations entered the second period.

### THE SECOND PERIOD

It must be acknowledged that the negotiations were fruitful in the early part of this period. For example, the Truce Agreement<sup>354</sup> was signed on January 10, five resolutions<sup>359</sup> were passed by the Political Consultative Conference at the end of January, the agreement on the reorganization of troops<sup>353</sup> was reached in February and the truce agreement for the Northeast<sup>368</sup> was signed in March. There are four problems that need clarification here:

1. On a nationwide scale, the war did indeed come to a halt for a time. This gave the Chinese people hope that the war might end, and it could not but affect the people in the Liberated Areas and the policies of our Party. Of course, we would have been indulging in fantasy if we had overestimated the possibility of peace. But there were indeed grounds for the Central Committee's estimate that this possibility actually existed. Chiang Kai-shek had been forced to accept a temporary truce. The agreement specified that neither side was allowed to move its troops. If Chiang had not moved his troops, most of them would have remained

in the Southwest, there would not have been many in north China, and the extensive fighting of the past five or six months could not have broken out. So we signed the agreement. Only in May and June, when Chiang's troops began manoeuvring on a large scale, was the agreement sabotaged. Our Party also needed the truce to consolidate its strength, especially in the Northeast, where the Liberated Areas had just been established after the surrender of Japan, and in north China, where the Liberated Areas had never before been so vast. Thus it was correct for the Party to sign the Truce Agreement. Carrying out the agreement has remained our fighting slogan to this very day. We endorse the agreement. We do so even though Chiang Kai-shek has violated it, for if the cease-fire order were carried out, it would be beneficial to the people.

2. The Political Consultative Conference was a conference of the political parties, and in its resolutions it recognized the principle of a coalition government. If the government had been reorganized in accordance with those resolutions, it would have indeed become a coalition government. However much Chiang dislikes the term, it comes out as "coalition government" just the same when it is put into English. Of course, it would have still been a far cry from the political structure of New Democracy that we advocate. But to continue along the line of the Conference would have been to move towards New Democracy. That's why Chiang Kai-shek opposed the conference resolutions and tried to sabotage them. But so far he has not dared to repudiate them openly, because the Conference is supported by the people of the whole country. At the Seventh Congress of our Party held a year ago, we did not expect that the conference of the political parties would be convened so soon and that these resolutions would be adopted. Carrying out these resolutions remains the objective of our struggle. They are in fact the embodiment of Comrade Mao Zedong's line. We must understand clearly that the line of the Political Consultative Conference is the line put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong in his report "On Coalition Government" and is our long-term objective.

But why in our present slogan do we refer to the line of the Conference instead of to its resolutions? Because the resolutions have already been sabotaged by the Kuomintang. We reached agreement on many issues at that time. We even reached a compromise on the question of the National Assembly. We gave our approval to the appointment by the Kuomintang of 950 delegates, because according to the resolutions, the National Assembly would become only a matter of form; all prob-

lems would have had to be solved through consultation at the conference of political parties. However, the Kuomintang is now holding the "National Assembly" in violation of the Draft Constitution of the Political Consultative Conference,<sup>348</sup> and we cannot compromise again on this question. If the negotiations are resumed in future, we certainly will not recognize Chiang's "National Assembly". In regard to the reorganization of the government, the provisions for its membership can no longer be the same as before. This is also true for the programme for the reorganization of troops; its provisions will have to change too. We will never accept the five to one ratio in the future reorganization of troops. Therefore, there will be changes in the resolutions, but the line itself will not change. There can be no changes regarding consultation among political parties, the Common Programme and the coalition government. As things stand in China, signatures don't mean anything to Chiang Kai-shek. Whether or not he can come to terms with us in future, we will neither change nor abandon the line of the Political Consultative Conference.

3. The programme for the reorganization of troops. This programme is not easily understandable to many comrades. It has two aspects: while it would place some restraint on the armed forces of the Chinese people, it would also provide a certain safeguard. In terms of numbers, the Kuomintang would have 50 divisions while we would have 10. This would have been a restraint, but it was of minor importance. What would have mattered was that the troops, including our ten divisions, would have been equipped by the United States. If our troops were concentrated and supplies of gasoline and ammunition were withheld, nothing could have been done about it even though their equipment might have been good. Once fighting broke out, all these things from the United States would have been a heap of scrap iron. The Americans hoped to control us through such means. But could we have been checkmated this way? No. For the programme for the reorganization of troops also had a positive aspect, that is, it provided for local self-government. Our people's armed forces were instruments of local self-government, while the sixty divisions were only to be used for the nation's defence. Local self-government must rely on the people's armed forces for protection. In our area we already have self-government, and we no longer need the national army to come here to ward off bandits. The arrangement ensured that our people's forces in the Liberated Areas were free from interference by the national army. In this sense, the people would not have been at a disadvantage. The only restraint imposed on us would have

been the U.S. involvement. But that would not have been serious. We would have been prepared to let the equipment of those ten divisions be turned into a heap of scrap.

4. In the programme for the reorganization of troops, we acquired a military status equal to Chiang's. During the eight years of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek had used his position as "supreme commander" to put pressure on us. But in the course of these negotiations, Marshall arrived and, in order to coax us, he had no choice but to recognize our status as equal to Chiang's. As a result, Chiang became commander only of his own side instead of the supreme commander of both sides.

So the main achievements of the second period of the negotiations were the four agreements I have mentioned. Although Chiang very soon broke them, the four achievements were not to be denied. As for the Truce Agreement, Chiang began to violate it around the time of the Nanjing military conference in February. There were two slogans at the conference: "Work hard for the leader without complaint" and "Strive for the survival of the motherland". In essence, they meant "Work hard without complaint to sabotage the Political Consultative Conference" and "Strive for the survival of the reactionary clique". After the conference, in order to deceive people, Chiang ordered Zhang Zhizhong<sup>321</sup> to sign the programme for the reorganization of troops with us in Chongqing. In March he convened the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and thus undermined the Political Consultative Conference politically, hurling abuse at the Kuomintang delegates to the Conference and concentrating his attacks on us on the question of the draft constitution. He put forward three amendments through the co-ordinating sub-committee. They were designed to make the National Assembly a standing body, to rescind the Legislative Yuan's right to express no confidence in the Executive Yuan,<sup>385</sup> and to abrogate provincial constitutions and replace them with provincial laws for self-government. We imprudently agreed to the three amendments. The Kuomintang aimed to relegate autonomy to the county level, leaving the provinces powerless, to exercise centralized state power, convert the cabinet system into a presidential system, enlarge the powers of the National Assembly and strip the Legislative Yuan of power. The central idea behind all this was the maintenance of centralized state power and one-man dictatorship. Facts have proved that ever since the conclusion of its conference on the reorganization of troops, the policy of the Kuomintang has been to hold negotiations at the

top but sabotage them in practice. Thus, a National Assembly could not be convened on May 5, and both the truce and the resolutions of the Conference were sabotaged by the heavy fighting in the Northeast from Shenyang to Changchun in March, April and May. But why, then, was there a cease-fire in June in the Northeast? Because after the Kuomintang occupied Changchun, its forces were dispersed and could not advance farther. Also, we occupied favourable positions in the Northeast and had recovered several cities that had previously been occupied by puppet troops in the provinces of Shandong and Shanxi. The Kuomintang needed several months for rest in the Northeast while engaging in extensive fighting south of the Great Wall. Hence the cease-fire in the Northeast. During the 23 days of negotiations, many problems were discussed. We were prepared to relinquish another one or two places in order to safeguard the vast Liberated Areas. We also made many concessions on such issues as the cease-fire in the Northeast, the restoration of communications and the reorganization of troops. But the negotiations still broke down. The central problem remained that of political power and the base areas. Superficially, it seemed that Chiang was merely asking us to withdraw from Jiangsu, Anhui, Chengde, Andong and eastern Hebei, but the only places which he recognized as belonging to us were the two provinces of Heilongjiang and Xing'an, half of Nenjiang Province and in north China the districts of Linyi, Daming and Shangdang. His intention was to restrict us to these few regions, cut us off completely and then annihilate us. Thus, in June the contention was still over the problem of the base areas, the same key issue over which negotiations had broken down in the first period.

### THE THIRD PERIOD

This period was characterized by heavy fighting behind a facade of negotiations. That is, heavy fighting went on while the talks were being dragged out. We adhered to the line of the Political Consultative Conference but Chiang Kai-shek constantly undermined it. We turned the negotiations into a means of educating the people. George Marshall remarked to Chief of Staff Ye Jianying that for months General Zhou hadn't been negotiating for the sake of negotiation, but for propaganda purposes instead. He was partly correct. But it wasn't our fault, because the other side was unwilling to settle the problems. We simply told the



people this fact in order to educate them. That went on from July until I returned to Yan'an.

In July, Marshall said that since negotiations between the political parties yielded no results, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party should hold direct talks. We said, very well. And so a five-man meeting<sup>386</sup> was held, but still nothing came of it. Later, Leighton Stuart<sup>376</sup> was also asked to join in the talks. He went to Lushan to see Chiang Kai-shek, who then stipulated even harsher terms. Apart from the original ones, he demanded that we withdraw from the cities we had taken after June 7 in Shandong and Shanxi Provinces. When Leighton Stuart returned from Lushan and informed us of this, we asked him whether he thought these terms would be acceptable to us, but he wouldn't give an opinion. So we asked how we could possibly accept them if he too was aware how difficult they would be to accept. The third time, Marshall and Stuart suggested negotiating the reorganization of the government first. I agreed, but I said the cease-fire would have to be guaranteed. Neither Chiang nor Marshall nor Stuart could guarantee this, so there was nothing that could be discussed. We took the initiative and proposed a resumption of the sessions of the Committee of Three<sup>357</sup> and a return to the positions of January 13. Marshall wouldn't call the meeting. Then I left for Shanghai. Marshall became anxious and sent for me. The Kuomintang was then attacking Zhangjiakou. We said the failure to convene the committee and the attack on Zhangjiakou meant that the Kuomintang wanted a complete break with us. So they halted their attacks for ten days and asked us to submit a list of our delegates to the National Assembly and inform them of the deployment of our eighteen divisions. How could we agree? So the negotiations broke down again.

The last act of the play was mediation by a third force. The third force people had not yet acted as the mediator all by themselves. In order to enable them to learn something and to realize that mediation would be fruitless, we agreed to let them try. Chiang put forward eight conditions, we put forward two. The third force people wanted to make an attempt at mediation and asked us to return to Nanjing. We agreed and returned to Nanjing together with them. They suggested a compromise. Most of them were wavering. We knew that both the Youth Party<sup>383</sup> and the Democratic Socialist Party<sup>387</sup> would attend the assembly anyway, but as long as the Democratic League<sup>325</sup> could be persuaded not to attend, the National Assembly would be discredited. We succeeded in our aim. This in itself was an impor-

tant achievement of the War of Resistance and the negotiations during the past year. Most of the members of the third force had the courage to oppose Chiang's private National Assembly and follow us.

In regard to the "National Assembly", some non-party personages were trapped by Chiang Kai-shek. On November 11, when some social luminaries went to ask Chiang for a postponement of the "National Assembly", Chiang intimidated them by saying, "The country will perish if it is not convened tomorrow." The luminaries asked for a few more days. Chiang said, "Well, in deference to your opinions, I'll put it off for three days. But then you must definitely attend and you must also persuade the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party to attend." Once news of this got around, the luminaries lost prestige and, since the convening of the assembly, they've been hiding in corners for fear of having their photographs taken by reporters. Hu Zhengzhi<sup>388</sup> said, "If I don't attend, our *Da Gong Bao*<sup>507</sup> will be suppressed; but if I do, I'm afraid the paper will lose all its readers." The members of the Youth Party said, "We are in a dilemma and caught in the cross fire." Huang Yanpei<sup>389</sup> added: "It's a war between conscience and human frailty." So the third force was aware that it was a disgrace to attend, but they were afraid not to. By the time the "National Assembly" was convened, the negotiations had broken down completely and nothing could be done. Chiang, the Youth Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and some "luminaries" were repudiated by the people for sabotaging the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference.

Thus, it can be seen that although since July the talks themselves have been fruitless, we would have been isolated if we had refused to talk, because Marshall and Chiang were deceiving the people, many of whom didn't understand what was going on. In order to complete the task of educating the people, we could not leave Nanjing until the "National Assembly" was convened, that is, until the end of the third period of negotiations.

## II. THE LESSONS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE PAST YEAR AND THEIR PROSPECTS

Summing up the lessons and experience of the three periods, we can draw the conclusion that neither side would make any change or con-

cession on the fundamental policies involved in the struggle. Chiang Kai-shek's fundamental policy is to strive in every devious way to annihilate the Communist Party of China. Our Party's fundamental policy is to use every possible means to bring about democracy and overpower the reactionary camp. However, the reactionary clique could not make its policy public, as that would have worked to its disadvantage. No reactionary clique has the courage to state its goals openly. The reactionary forces are now weakened, while the people's forces have gained strength. But we Communists publicize our policy of peace, democracy and independence and openly mobilize the people throughout China to carry it out. That is our fundamental policy. But does this mean that there is no possibility for talks or room for compromise? It depends on tactics, which are determined according to circumstances. When the circumstances change, tactics too should change, but tactics are always employed to implement the fundamental policy. The purpose of the policy of coalition government is to abolish the autocratic government. It is a fact that in our areas the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie cannot carry on. Of course they won't endorse the coalition government, for it is contrary to their policy. The fundamental policy of the reactionary clique will never alter. Whenever they get the chance, they will try to carry it out, but the objective situation often prevents them from doing so. Hence they have to zigzag. The same is true for us. The purpose of the policy of coalition government is to topple the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. This is also a set policy. But because of disparities between the objective situation and our subjective strength, our route too must sometimes zigzag. That is why the struggle is very complicated and always changing, and there are many difficulties that must be overcome. But our tactics should not go against our policy. Of course, our fundamental policy is still that of the Seventh National Party Congress. The aim of both armed struggle and peaceful negotiations is to implement the line of the Political Consultative Conference, that is, to establish a coalition government.

Since the beginning of the third period, large-scale fighting has been going on south of the Great Wall, and the United States has given Chiang even greater quantities of supplies. Today the struggle against the U.S.-Chiang monopoly and dictatorship is being carried out not only in the Liberated Areas but also in the Chiang-ruled areas, not only by the common people but also by the industrialists. We are confident that, even if conditions remain unchanged, we will be able to anni-

hilate at least forty to sixty more brigades by fighting another six months to a year. By then Chiang will no longer be able to launch any offensives, and a balance will be attained between our forces and his. So the coming six to twelve months are certain to be the most tense for us. After that, the situation will surely change and this will affect the patriotic democratic movement in the Chiang-ruled areas and the armed struggles in the rural areas. In the not too distant future, the combination of these three kinds of struggle will again bring about a high tide for democracy.

## ON MARSHALL'S STATEMENT ON LEAVING CHINA<sup>356</sup>

*January 10, 1947*

A year ago today the national Truce Agreement<sup>354</sup> was signed and the Political Consultative Conference convened. During this year, events have moved quickly and the awakening of the people has been very rapid. A year ago today, the whole nation was rejoicing over peace and the cease-fire. But soon after, the country was once again plunged into the abyss of civil war. It is now clear to everyone that China will never have peace unless warlord rule is abolished. In January and February last year, the whole nation was celebrating the success of the Political Consultative Conference. But soon after, all the resolutions of the Conference<sup>339</sup> were thrown overboard by the Kuomintang reactionaries. It is now clear to everyone that the democratic line of the Conference will never be put into effect unless autocracy is abolished. A year ago, the whole Chinese people was welcoming President Truman's statement on China<sup>358</sup> and General Marshall's arrival in China as a mediator. But before long, the policy of U.S. imperialism towards China was revealed in its true colours and the traitorous diplomacy of the Chiang Kai-shek government was also exposed. As a result, in all the big cities of China hundreds of thousands of students and the population in general began to shout such slogans as "U.S. troops, get out of China!", "Oppose U.S. intervention in China's internal affairs!", "Oppose servile diplomacy!" and "Oppose the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce!"

During the past year, not only did the Kuomintang reactionaries renew the civil war and violate the resolutions of the Political Consulta-

---

A speech delivered at a meeting of representatives of all walks of life in Yan'an to support the nationwide patriotic student movement and commemorate the first anniversary of the Political Consultative Conference. It was published in the *Liberation Daily* in Yan'an on January 14, 1947.

tive Conference, but even the U.S. mediator, who had put his signature to the Truce Agreement, stopped mentioning the cease-fire order of last January. And the Youth Party,<sup>383</sup> the Democratic Socialist Party<sup>387</sup> and most of the so-called social luminaries who had participated in the Conference, went so far as to take part in the illegal "National Assembly", which was manipulated by a single party and totally violated the line of the Conference. Thus they participated in the adoption of a dictatorial "constitution" diametrically opposed to the principles laid down by the Conference, thereby deepening the split in the country as a whole. So it is the Chinese Communist Party, the genuinely democratic parties and public figures and the broad masses who have been striving all along to uphold the Truce Agreement of last January and the line of the Conference. It is they who have been demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from China and opposing U.S. intervention in China's internal affairs. Reviewing the struggle of the past year, we cannot help remembering the martyrs of the Incident of April 8 and Wen Yiduo,<sup>372</sup> Li Gongpu<sup>371</sup> and Tao Xingzhi,<sup>274</sup> who unremittingly defended the cease-fire and the Political Consultative Conference. We have continued to be inspired by the spirit they displayed in denouncing the reactionary clique for its violation of both.

After the lapse of exactly a full year and on the eve of his departure from China, General Marshall has issued a statement which is a kind of summary of the year's mediation. In connection with this statement, I would now like to comment briefly on the major problems concerning last year's negotiations.

General Marshall admits that a reactionary group exists within the Kuomintang and dominates the Kuomintang government, that it includes military as well as political leaders, that it opposes coalition government, that it believes not in domestic co-operation but in the use of force to settle issues and that it clearly has no intention of sincerely carrying out the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. He is correct on all these points. It is to be regretted, however, that he does not point out that Chiang Kai-shek is the supreme leader of this reactionary group. Chiang Kai-shek has said that a coalition government would mean the overthrow of the government and that a conference of the various parties would be merely a conference to divide the spoils. After the establishment of the Beiping Executive Headquarters<sup>508</sup> last year, Chiang opposed the sending of a field team to the Northeast for mediation. Immediately after the signing of the Northeast Truce Agreement<sup>368</sup> on March 27, Chiang ordered Du

Yuming<sup>390</sup> to launch large-scale attacks in the Northeast. The cease-fire parley in June failed because it was sabotaged by Chiang who, willfully violating the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, demanded that the Communist Party withdraw from four Liberated Areas, including those in northern Jiangsu and in Rehe. Later, he launched large-scale attacks south of the Great Wall, which are continuing at the present time. In the past year, he has turned his back on the Truce Agreement and has sent 218 divisions, amounting to 90 per cent of his total strength, to attack the Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party. By the end of last year, they had occupied more than 179,000 square kilometres of our Liberated Areas and seized 165 cities. What is that if not armed attack? The one-party "National Assembly" convened last year totally violated the line of the Political Consultative Conference; it was stage-managed by Chiang Kai-shek from beginning to end. So the chief culprit in violating the Truce Agreement and the resolutions of the Conference is none other than Chiang himself.

The reactionary Chiang Kai-shek group uses armed force "in the preservation of their own feudal control of China", but the result is that it "accentuates the weakness of civil government in China", a fact which even General Marshall cannot deny. As for the "destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy", it is the consequence of the civil war waged by Chiang. What can one expect but financial chaos and economic collapse, when one considers the Chiang government's massive military expenditures, amounting to 80 per cent of its budget and associated as they are with bureaucrat-capital exploitation and control and the dictatorial government's corruption and incompetence?

General Marshall thinks that this rotten government, still headed by the same Chiang Kai-shek, can suddenly be transformed into a good one by reshuffling it to include a few so-called liberals belonging to the Kuomintang and a few others belonging to a couple of parties such as the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party — the very persons who took part in the Political Consultative Conference last January but later betrayed it and actively participated in Chiang's private "National Assembly". Unfortunately, good government doesn't come so cheaply. A coalition government that excludes the Communist Party can never put an end to Chiang Kai-shek's autocracy, and it can never be a liberal government.

General Marshall knows full well that Chiang's personal "National Assembly" convened last year violated the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and the procedures it had decided upon. Nevertheless, he still says that the dictatorial constitution adopted by the assembly is a "democratic constitution", that in all major respects it conforms to the principles laid down by the Conference and that it seems to meet the demands of the Chinese Communist Party. This is sheer deception. The dictatorial constitution adopted by Chiang's private "National Assembly" runs counter to the principles of the Conference in all major respects. The Conference favoured protecting the people's freedom, while the Chiang constitution restricts it. The Conference favoured guaranteeing the right of self-government to the minority nationalities, while the Chiang constitution deprives them of that right. The Conference envisaged a fair distribution of powers to the localities, according to which the province would be the highest unit of local self-government and would formulate its own constitution, while the Chiang constitution makes no mention of provincial constitutions and enforces centralized power. The Conference advocated coalition government at the top with a responsible cabinet system, while the Chiang constitution has restored the dictatorship of the president in accordance with the Draft Constitution of May 5.<sup>138</sup> General Marshall is trying to find a way out for the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government by claiming that carrying out the Chiang constitution and reshuffling the government would mean the end of one-party political tutelage.<sup>334</sup> He will only succeed in making Chiang's government even less credible and more isolated, with no popular support whatever.

The Chinese Communist Party opposes the Chiang constitution and refuses to participate in the government as it stands. It demands that the military forces of both sides be restored to the positions of last January 13, that the Chiang constitution be abrogated and that the conference of various political parties be reconvened. Does this mean, as General Marshall claims, that the Communist Party is unwilling to help bring about a fair compromise? No. On the contrary, these demands constitute the fairest of compromises. They are the minimum demands for peace and democracy. And even General Marshall has to admit that the Communist Party was willing to reach a compromise last January and February. It is clear that all the violations of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and of the cease-fire beginning from last February and March were the doing of the Kuomintang reactionary clique. Therefore, the Communist Party, to this



day, still persists in seeking a compromise on the basis of the Truce Agreement of last January and the line of the Conference, that is, on the basis of the "liberal and forward-looking charter" applauded by Marshall. A comparison shows that Chiang Kai-shek is violating the Truce Agreement and the line of the Conference, whereas the Communist Party is upholding that agreement and that line. Are not the answers to the questions of whether the Communist Party is seeking to overthrow the government or whether Chiang Kai-shek is trying to wipe out the Liberated Areas abundantly clear? If it is all right for Chiang Kai-shek to reject the fairest of compromises, namely, the abrogation of his constitution and restoration of the military positions prevailing on January 13, does that mean that there can be no "fair compromise" unless the Communist Party recognizes Chiang's private "National Assembly" and "constitution", both of which violate the resolutions of the Conference, and recognizes the territories he has occupied, which violates the Truce Agreement? When it rejects these unreasonable demands, the Communist Party is said to include extremists, who ignore the interests of the country and the sufferings of the people. Such allegations have absolutely no basis in fact; they are designed to slander the Communist Party, and the Chinese people will never believe them. For twenty-six years, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently served the people and relied on them in all matters, and that is why it enjoys the prestige it has today. If it were to agree to Chiang Kai-shek's occupation of part of the Liberated Areas and let him oppress the people, and if it were to recognize his "National Assembly" and "constitution" and let him perpetuate his dictatorship, then the Communist Party would really be ignoring the sufferings of the people and the interests of the country. Nor, quite definitely, would there be any genuine peace.

Many of our naive friends who are yearning for peace do not concern themselves with the question of a reliable basis for a cease-fire and minimum guarantees; they are not willing to fight for principles, but wait idly for peace to be bestowed on them. Understanding this mentality, Chiang Kai-shek never stops fighting when conditions are favourable for his attacks, but when his attacks fail and he needs time to reorganize his troops for a new push, as was the case last January and February, he agrees to a cease-fire and holds "peace talks". And how, may I ask, can that lead to a fair compromise? It never will. A fair compromise must be based on a foundation that is favourable to the people and is therefore reliable, and that foundation is the Truce

Agreement to which Marshall and Zhang Qun,<sup>318</sup> Chiang's representative, affixed their signatures last January, together with the resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Conference which was presided over by Chiang himself. In his statement, General Marshall mentions only the resolutions but not the agreement. This is not an accidental omission but a deliberate evasion of the responsibility entailed by his signature. It is an attempt to find an excuse for the U.S. representatives on the Committee of Three<sup>357</sup> and at the Beiping Executive Headquarters. However, it only proves all the more clearly that the U.S. government is deliberately helping Chiang Kai-shek in his massive civil war.

There is evidence that General Marshall deeply resents the propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party. It is true that over the past year the Communist Party has repeatedly exposed the error of the U.S. government in changing its policy towards China after last March. In particular, it has constantly exposed and protested the stationing of U.S. troops in China, their interference in China's internal affairs, their encroachment on and harassment of the Liberated Areas (the Anping Incident<sup>391</sup> mentioned by Marshall is only one of over thirty such instances), and their provision of transport to Chiang Kai-shek's troops. It has constantly exposed and protested the assistance given by the U.S. government to Chiang Kai-shek's government and troops in the form of leased material, surplus material, loans, warships, airplanes, military advisors, technical training and so on. Moreover, we have often laid bare the true colonialist nature of U.S. imperialism's policy towards China and the facts about the traitorous diplomacy of the Kuomintang government (such as the signing of the "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce"<sup>380</sup> and the "Aviation Agreement"<sup>392</sup>). After July, despite the large-scale offensives mounted by Chiang Kai-shek, the Communist Party continued to work with the American mediator in order to reach a compromise, whereas Chiang, rapacious and insatiable as ever, made endless unreasonable demands. The American mediator never uttered a word of reproach about this but instead issued two statements severely criticizing the Communist Party for not accepting his mediation. This naturally left us no choice but to refute his accusations. General Marshall considers that our propaganda will arouse the world's bitter hatred for the U.S. government and is therefore "vicious". In fact, what arouses people is not abstract propaganda but living reality. If the reality I have described is not changed, that will

truly be a vicious crime in the eyes of nations which love independence and freedom.

General Marshall has now returned to the United States to become its Secretary of State. I very much hope that he will keep to the China policy of the late President Roosevelt and that for the sake of the traditional friendship and interests of our two great nations he will review the U.S. government's policy towards China over the past year. I hope that he will break with past mistakes, stop helping the Chiang Kai-shek government wage civil war, withdraw U.S. troops stationed in China, refrain from further intervention in China's internal affairs and readjust the relations between the two countries. That will certainly do a lot to help the Chinese people achieve peace, democracy and independence, and it will do even more to ensure peace in the Far East and international co-operation.

It is just one year since the signing of the Truce Agreement and the convening of the Political Consultative Conference. We must not forget this great anniversary, and we must continue to work for the implementation of the Truce Agreement and of the line of the Conference. We are convinced that all leading democratic figures, and indeed all compatriots, will join in the struggle for their complete implementation, never resting until this aim is achieved.

# TWO DOCUMENTS ON THE GUIDELINES FOR WORK AND THE TACTICS FOR STRUGGLE IN AREAS CONTROLLED BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK

*February 28 and May 5, 1947*

## I

1. At this time when they are meeting with heavy defeats at the front and all kinds of crises in the rear areas and when the Moscow Conference seems likely to solve international problems, the die-hard forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek are resorting to harsh suppression in the cities under their control, expelling our personnel, menacing the democratic movement and beating or arresting students and other people. Their designs are as follows:

(1) if we, the people's organizations and the public do not speak out, they will take advantage of our silence to increase their repression;

(2) if we and the progressive masses respond to their provocations and clash with them head-on, they will launch premeditated attacks to crush our militancy and will intensify their terrorism; and

(3) if we resist their attacks by mobilizing the small number of progressives and putting forward slogans that are not yet acceptable to the middle elements, we will play right into their hands

---

In the spring of 1947, the Chinese revolution was on the eve of a new upsurge. In the light of this situation, Comrade Zhou Enlai drafted many directives for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the patriotic and democratic movement in the areas controlled by Chiang Kai-shek. These are two of them.

by revealing our own weakness, thus making it easier for them to sow discord, split our ranks and destroy us one by one.

Chiang's tactics of suppression, therefore, are still of an exploratory nature. The people can no longer tolerate the financial and economic crisis that is making life impossible for them and, in view of the Kuomintang's continued defeats at the front, they can no longer be intimidated. So although it has its twists and turns and ups and downs, the mass struggle in the Chiang-controlled areas will certainly continue to expand — that is the general trend. Whether it will expand quickly and whether it can avoid setbacks will depend on what tactics we adopt as leaders and how well we organize our strength.

2. In countering Chiang's current policy of suppression, we should expand the scope of our propaganda, avoid direct confrontations, win over the middle elements, utilize legal means and, on the basis of the struggle for survival, strive to form a broad front against national betrayal, civil war, dictatorship and secret police terrorism. In our propaganda we should fully expose every one of Chiang's reactionary measures and terrorist acts and publicize them both at home and abroad, and we must seek out his vulnerable spots and strike hard at them. Chiang and the United States are mortally afraid that their reactionary schemes will be exposed. We should avoid direct confrontations under unfavourable circumstances. This is not conservatism; it means leading the masses to change their course and steer around submerged reefs. At the end of last year, the students in a number of places demonstrated against the United States. The movement was very successful and productive, because U.S. troops had been running amuck for over a year, we had been conducting anti-U.S. propaganda for more than six months, there was widespread indignation over the Shen Chong Incident,<sup>393</sup> and Chiang Kai-shek and the United States were caught totally unprepared. But this time Chiang's agents are beating and arresting people according to set plans. If, disregarding the circumstances, we still call on the students to demonstrate, there will be the danger of a massacre. Furthermore, among the general run of students, some will be indignant at the arrests and others will recoil. Taking into account this difference in sentiment, we should first unite the majority of the students to demand that the school authorities help to guarantee their personal safety and release their fellow students, and then unite with the school authorities to demand that the local authorities do the same. If arrests continue, the students should take

defensive measures in their schools, such as going out and coming back in groups for mutual protection. And when conditions are ripe, they can take such actions as boycotting classes and demanding the release of their fellow students. At the same time, by linking the students' struggle with the economic struggle and sometimes by switching to the latter, we can mobilize more people to join in and make it easier for the struggle to become legal. Once the economic struggle has achieved a broad basis, it will be easier for us to expand it into a struggle against the special agents and the civil war. Organizationally, the students' Anti-Brutality Association has had some influence and has established contact among the students in Nanjing, Shanghai, Beiping, Tianjin and Chongqing, but it is still necessary to adopt a strategy of self-defence. That is to say, if it is discovered by Chiang Kai-shek's special agents and subjected to intense pressure, we can change the name of the association or carry on the struggle separately, so that we will still be able to keep up the struggle and maintain contact without suffering heavy losses. With regard to the workers and the urban poor (such as pedlars), there is even more need to stress the guidance and development of economic struggle. At present, the workers in Shanghai and Tianjin have started a struggle to oppose the January cost-of-living index and are demanding a rise in wages.<sup>394</sup> We should give it proper leadership and seek limited victories so as to consolidate our position and pave the way for future growth.

3. In the next few months, there will be big changes in the Chiang-controlled areas. We hope that you will do a good job of applying our tactics in the light of specific circumstances. We also hope that before Wu and Zhang<sup>395</sup> withdraw they will do their best to pass these ideas on to the comrades working underground.

## II

As they are unable to extricate themselves from their military, economic and political crises, the die-hards headed by Chiang Kai-shek have recently resorted to rumour-mongering. They have fabricated a "Programme of the Chinese Communist Party on the Line for Underground Struggle" in an attempt to frame leading democratic figures and mass organizations and to arrest and kill progressives and our Party's secret personnel. Their purpose is to suppress the people's

movement in the Chiang-controlled areas. In these circumstances, your guidelines in places under Chiang's rigorous rule, and especially in the big cities, should be to protect our Party and the other democratic, progressive forces, so as to promote the people's movement. To achieve this aim, you should be determined and brave, and at the same time vigilant and prudent. You should keep a close watch on the developing situation. While upholding the Party's policy of mobilizing the masses to oppose the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, you should be flexible, now combining legal and illegal struggles and now carrying them on separately. To mobilize the masses, you should encourage them to put forward slogans which correspond to their urgent demands and which boost their morale. In the Party's propaganda work, emphasis should be laid on having non-Party people who hold jobs and have some degree of social standing criticize the current political situation and sharpen discontent through legal publications, newspapers and public gatherings. The Party's views broadcast over the radio and the news of victories from the Liberated Areas, however, should be disseminated secretly through the most reliable channels. As for the Party's relations with democratic bodies, mass organizations and leading progressives, we should recruit more well-hidden Party members and sympathizers to work among them under single-contact leadership. They should try in their work to conceal their identity as Party members and especially refrain from exchanges of letters and documents, so as to avoid complications. Party organizations should strictly follow such principles as having carefully selected cadres work underground, maintaining parallel organizations, working through single-contact leadership, transferring members from one cell to another without having them carry any identification papers, separating urban and rural work and keeping higher-level units separate from lower-level units and covert operations separate from overt. When people are sent from the cities to the villages in outlying counties to organize, launch and guide armed struggles, they should be cut off from all urban work and personnel so as to avoid complications. Higher leading bodies should be kept very much under cover; they should hold fewer meetings, make less frequent contact and devote more effort to analysing the general situation and giving tactical guidance. To sum up, all our urban work in the Chiang-controlled areas should be put on a long-term basis, so as to promote mass struggle and broaden the united front. Only thus can it be co-ordinated with the victories won in the Liberated Areas so as to hasten the advent of a new high tide throughout the country.

## LAUNCH A MASSIVE NATIONWIDE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TO OVERTHROW CHIANG KAI-SHEK

*September 28, 1947*

We have now entered the period of a massive counter-offensive. Since it was last year that the war of self-defence took on major proportions, why didn't we call for a general counter-offensive and the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek then? Why have we done so only now? This is the question troubling our comrades. The call for a massive nationwide counter-offensive to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek has been issued not capriciously, but with good reason. Let us first sum up the events of the war of self-defence over the last year.

Since the surrender of Japan, the Party's policy has been to establish an independent, peaceful and democratic new China. How is this to be achieved? All of us remember Comrade Mao Zedong's trip to Chongqing to participate in the negotiations, the signing of the Truce Agreement,<sup>354</sup> the convening of the Political Consultative Conference<sup>339</sup> and the resolutions adopted by that Conference. Those were peaceful methods. For a time after the Japanese surrender, the Party hoped to establish a new China through peaceful means, though without any relaxation of armed self-defence. Times were different then. Today we have to use force to achieve this aim.

The two methods are different. Is one correct and the other incorrect? Everyone knows that our present method is correct. Only

---

A report on the prevailing situation made at Shenquanbu in Jiaxian County, northern Shaanxi, to cadres and soldiers of units directly under the Central Committee of the Party. At the end of June, 1946, Chiang Kai-shek had launched a full-scale civil war and an all-out offensive against the Liberated Areas. The army and people in the Liberated Areas rose to strike back. After eight months of fierce fighting, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to change to a strategy of attacks against key sectors. This strategy too was defeated between July and September 1947 and the People's Liberation Army began a nationwide general counter-offensive.



when we topple Chiang Kai-shek by armed force can we have independence, peace and democracy. Does that mean that the method adopted in the past was incorrect? Our answer is that we were correct then as we are correct now. You may think this doesn't make sense. Well, it does. At that time, by peaceful means we meant consolidating the Liberated Areas and mobilizing the masses in the Kuomintang areas. Was there much chance of attaining our objective by that method? No, not much, but we had to give it a try. Most of the people in the country wanted peace. The whole world wanted peace. The Party could not but consider this demand. Although it is the vanguard of the people and is far-sighted, it must not alienate itself from the masses but should respect their opinions. After ten years of civil war and eight years of the War of Resistance, the people were demanding peace. Because they were thinking this way, we tried the peaceful, yet troublesome, method. Hence the Chongqing negotiations<sup>509</sup> and the "Agreement of October 10",<sup>367</sup> the Truce Agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference to which Chiang Kai-shek also put his signature — so the peaceful method might have succeeded. At the same time, we lost nothing by this method. During that period our army marched into northeast China. Wasn't that a victory? It was also advantageous to us when we were consolidating the army and the greater part of the Liberated Areas. Moreover, we carried out the resolutions and the agreements whereas Chiang Kai-shek violated them. This proved to the people that Chiang didn't want peace, and that fact was proved not just once, but several times (for example, the Truce Agreement of January and negotiations in June about the question of the Northeast<sup>396</sup>). This way the people have come to a better understanding of the fact that peace cannot be won by signing a few agreements and that we must use armed force to safeguard our interests and achieve peace. The transition from the application of peaceful means to the use of armed force involves a process, a change. That is, the people have to come to recognize the truth that the problem can be settled only through the use of force.

If we had called for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek in July last year, would it have been practicable? No, it would not. Our slogan then was armed self-defence and we could not yet openly put forward the slogan of overthrowing him, because neither the subjective nor the objective conditions were ripe. Chiang claimed to have four million troops. It is difficult to put so many troops out of action at one stroke. Some people said, "The Kuomintang can't destroy the

Communist Party, nor can the Communist Party destroy the Kuomintang; . . . neither can annihilate the other". That kind of talk was quite common. When fighting began on a large scale, the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and other middle elements were not all in agreement with us. Many people still believed that neither side could annihilate the other. If we had raised the slogan of overthrowing Chiang, they would not have believed or accepted it. Besides, if we had raised that slogan when he had just started fighting on an extensive scale, he would have accused us of wanting to attack him. To have changed the slogan of self-defence to one of attack would have given the impression that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party each wanted to launch an offensive, and this would have cancelled out our advantage. When we spoke of self-defence, we meant resisting the attacks of the Kuomintang. Then how should we show that we intended to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek? By saying that we would certainly win victory, that we had confidence in success, that Chiang would surely be defeated and we would be victorious, and not by saying outright who would annihilate whom. Even then, many people still wanted to think it over and wondered whether we could succeed or not. We would show them with deeds. Our People's Liberation Army has confidence, because we are a new force with all the strength of youth, while Chiang is like a dying consumptive. The war of self-defence over the last year has demonstrated this truth: Chiang Kai-shek is sure to be defeated and we are sure to triumph.

During this last year of war, Chiang Kai-shek has thrown in three million troops against us. In terms of numbers, more than 1,100,000 of his men were killed, injured or captured in the year's fighting; that is to say, more than a third were put out of action. In terms of organizational units, Chiang had a total of 248 brigades. We have wiped out 97 $\frac{1}{2}$  of them, that is, an average of eight each month plus another 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  brigades, also totalling over a third. With so many of Chiang's brigades crushed, rebuilding the units destroyed with new recruits is not enough to restore their combat effectiveness. For example, our troops have annihilated several brigades under Hu Zongnan twice.<sup>370</sup> The second time, those brigades were much easier to deal with. Many captured enemy officers said when they were released that if they met us again, they would raise their hands and surrender. The enemy's recruits are forced into service, just as we see in the play *Pressganging*. They are given no training, their combat effectiveness is low, and there are more desertions among them than among

the veterans. More than 200 of Chiang's officers of the rank of general have been killed or captured by us, and newly promoted officers lack battle experience. The case is similar with regard to arms. Much of Chiang's U.S.-made equipment has fallen into our hands. So he is slipping, whether we consider his position in terms of manpower, combat effectiveness, or equipment. It's the same with food supplies. While Hu Zongnan's army was fighting its way into the Liberated Areas, he needed ten planes every day to transport enough food supplies for his one hundred thousand troops. The many difficulties Chiang is facing make it certain that he cannot afford to go on fighting for long. He definitely cannot annihilate us. This view has become quite common even among officers in his own army — not only among those we have captured, but also among those who pull themselves up very straight in front of him and declare that the Communists are certain to be annihilated, but shake their heads behind his back. When large-scale fighting began, Chiang's troops were crushed brigade by brigade, and later on division by division. Chiang claimed that we concentrated our attacks on their headquarters and thus were able to capture brigade and division commanders. How was that possible?! Their headquarters were usually surrounded and closely guarded by troops. Naturally, after we wiped out all their troops, we took the brigade and division commanders prisoner. Facing annihilation on such a scale, are there any among them who don't feel chilled or frightened? So, the outcome of a year of the war of self-defence is that Chiang Kai-shek's troops admit their inability to annihilate us. Not only that, they are doomed to defeat. In the second half of last year, many people were not certain of Chiang's defeat or our victory. But this year, after our victories in Shandong Province and other places, they have come to believe in it. This is a new development, and a rapid one too; and what a big change to have occurred in only a single year! Thus, on July 7, after our victories in the past year, conditions were ripe and we were confident enough to call for wiping out all of Chiang's invading troops resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely. And in September, we called for a general counter-offensive and raised the slogan of overthrowing Chiang, which the people are now ready to accept.

Chiang Kai-shek has done many stupid things this last year, further demonstrating that he can in no way continue his rule. He unilaterally convened a "National Assembly". The Chinese Communist Party did not participate nor did the Democratic League,<sup>325</sup> so the assembly

was hamstrung from the outset and the people did not support it. Nor were they happy about his "constitution" which they called the bogus constitution. But Chiang did not stop halfway, and in April he reorganized the government.<sup>397</sup> The Political Consultative Conference had agreed that a coalition government should be set up with the participation of the Chinese Communist Party. He didn't want the Communist Party to participate, nor, of course, would we have done so. He roped in the Democratic Socialist Party<sup>387</sup> and the Youth Party,<sup>383</sup> but the people are very familiar with them. They are utterly discredited and nobody has any faith in them. Chiang Kai-shek has used up all his methods, played out all his tricks, and now he is at his wit's end. It's no use relying on political tricks alone. People want to see whether or not there is food to eat, whether or not the price of gold goes up or the value of the U.S. dollar rises. Now, in areas under Chiang's control, not only the toiling masses of workers and peasants but even the petty bourgeoisie and government employees can't make ends meet. U.S. goods are flooding in and imports far exceed exports. More than half the imported goods come from the United States. Is there anyone living in the areas under Kuomintang control who can possibly welcome this? Chiang has been living on borrowed money. He used up the \$4 billion long ago and now he is again holding out his hand to the United States for money. The people can see that no loans can save him from utter military defeat, political bankruptcy and economic collapse. Young students in the cities have been demonstrating against the raping of Chinese women and the shooting of Chinese citizens by American soldiers. Some students have risen to oppose Chiang Kai-shek himself. When he attended the meeting of the Political Council, the students of the Central University in Nanjing went to the auditorium and created an uproar which placed him in an embarrassing position.<sup>398</sup> Chiang has run up against the people's opposition and has become politically bankrupt. So we ought to put forward the slogan calling for his overthrow. We have shown the people with facts that we are strong enough to overthrow him, and the people don't want him anyway. Even people in the upper social strata (except for a few reactionary cliques) and the middle class are getting tired of the load and want to overthrow him. Thus, it is opportune to raise the slogan: "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek."

How is it that we have won such an enormous victory? Why do we say that we are sure to succeed?

First, the people support us in the war, convinced that we work for them. We carried out agrarian reform and divided up the land owned by landlords, distributing it equally among peasants who had little or no land. The feudal forces have been overthrown and the impoverished peasants have become masters of their own affairs. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, we adopted a policy of reducing rent and interest in order to win over the landlords to the resistance. Now that Japan has been defeated, the big landlords are supporting Chiang Kai-shek. To destroy Chiang's power, we must eliminate the landlord class and transform its members into working people living by their own labour. If the land question is solved well, the people will support us and we will win our battles. The peasants constitute 80 per cent of our population and over 90 per cent of them will benefit from agrarian reform. With such a mighty force behind us, how can we fail to win the war?

Second, our army is composed of the sons and daughters of the people and it serves the people. It has been working for the interests of the people ever since it came into being. It has a staunch core force, abides by the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention<sup>510</sup> and maintains close links with the people. Steeled through arduous struggle, bloodshed and sacrifice, its officers and men are united and fight well. Our army has a glorious tradition and is invincible.

Third, we are under the excellent guidance of the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong. Since last year our policy has been to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's troops inside the Liberated Areas. This means we have fought "on interior lines", that is, we have lured the enemy deep into our territories, letting them occupy some places and disperse their forces, while we mobilized the masses, seeking opportunities to wipe out the enemy and then going over to the counter-offensive. Our policy has been one of strategic defence and tactical offence in order to wipe out the enemy inside the Liberated Areas. As a result, in the past year, although the enemy occupied more than 100 of our towns and cities, we put out of action more than a million of its troops, including nearly 700,000 taken prisoner. That is what Comrade Mao Zedong meant by offence within defence so as to destroy the enemy's effective strength. Chiang's strategy has been one of offence, but his tactics have been defensive. His tactics are similar to those of the Japanese. The fighting in northern Shaanxi is a case in point. At first Chiang's army was very fierce, but

at Chakou we besieged five of his brigades with a force of equal strength. They didn't dare make a move and exhibited not the slightest enthusiasm for attack. Such, then, are the tactics adopted by Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng.<sup>78</sup> They are chiefly concerned with defending themselves, breaking through encirclements, posting guards and holding out for reinforcements — rather like a man with tuberculosis who only thinks about staving off colds, coughs, indigestion and what not. Such a man's days are numbered.

That is a summary of last year's fighting. From it we can see that this year it is quite appropriate to raise the slogan of launching a massive counter-offensive to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.

Now I want to say something about how to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.

The decision to overthrow him was made a long time ago. We fought ten years of civil war with that in mind. The War of Resistance marked one period during which we wanted him to fight with us against Japan. For some time after the Japanese surrender we tried to overthrow him by peaceful means. Now we must fight our way out, launch a countrywide massive counter-offensive and annihilate him — not inside the Liberated Areas but in the areas under his control. Last year we were on the strategic defensive and the tactical offensive. Now strategically we are on the offensive too. Chiang is on the defensive now both tactically and strategically. It is impossible to annihilate him by fighting only inside the Liberated Areas, because he still occupies three quarters of the country and controls two-thirds of China's population. Only by adopting the strategic offensive can we thoroughly defeat him. Military operations should follow up the slogan now that it has been raised, which means a nationwide counter-offensive and fighting our way out of the boundaries of the Liberated Areas. All our operations are aimed at turning this slogan into a reality. The three armies commanded respectively by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, and Chen Yi and Su Yu have thrust south,<sup>399</sup> crossed the Huanghe River and the Longhai Railway and reached areas north of the Changjiang River. The Huanghe River was Chiang Kai-shek's "outer trench", the Longhai Railway his "barbed wire" and the Changjiang River his "inner trench". He has always wanted to drive us beyond his outer trench. However, we have already crossed his barbed wire and fought our way to his inner trench. The situation has changed and we are now expanding our operations between the Huanghe and Changjiang Rivers. There are

four large rivers in central China — the Changjiang, Huaihe, Huanghe and Hanshui Rivers. Our battles now will be in the areas bounded by them. This is our southern front and we have three armies there. The Northwest Liberation Army will fight its way out too. The Northeast Liberation Army has already made an outward thrust. What we have now is a nationwide counter-offensive. Our policy is to fight our way into areas ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, wipe out his troops there and expand the Liberated Areas. This policy will be realized in the next one or two years. Are we sure of this? Yes we are, and with reason. Let's look at the matter under the three following aspects.

First, the enemy. It has three weaknesses: it is short of troops, its rear areas are poorly guarded, and the people oppose it.

(1) The shortage of troops. Chiang Kai-shek had altogether 1,800,000 regular troops of whom 1,500,000 are left, and 1,100,000 irregular troops of whom 900,000 are left. In the coming year, the enemy troops will be depleted even more. If we do no more than maintain the same rate as in the past year, wiping out eight brigades a month, there is no doubt that from ninety-six to a hundred brigades will be annihilated. And will Chiang be able to find as many recruits as in the past year? Definitely not. Even if he does and he loses no more than 300,000 regulars, it would still mean that he would have only 1,200,000 left next year. With things going on this way, Chiang will have fewer and fewer troops as the fighting continues. Last year, he had a large force to deploy; he began by using only half his troops in the attacks on us. By April of this year, there were only 40 brigades on the attack, and now there are even fewer. Let us first take a look at the southern front, his main front. Out of a total of 248 brigades he has deployed 157 there. Among them, only the 15 brigades in eastern Shandong are being used for offence. The rest are all for defence. If our armies on various routes are again victorious in battle, these 15 brigades will also be put on the defensive. Of the 70 brigades on the northern front only the 29 brigades of Sun Lianzhong and Fu Zuoyi<sup>400</sup> can carry out a few local offensives. Deducting those 227 brigades on the southern and northern fronts, there are only 21 left in reserve. Considering the question from every point of view, we see that Chiang Kai-shek is short of troops.

(2) The poorly guarded rear areas. With only 21 brigades left there, Chiang's rear areas are of course poorly defended. Moreover, eight of those brigades are in Xinjiang and western Gansu. The nationalities problem in Xinjiang has flared up again, and they cannot

leave. The other 13 brigades have been stationed south of the Changjiang River. There are two in Yunnan, seven in Sichuan and Xikang, two in Guangdong, and two in Taiwan. The other places are all defended by reactionary local militia and peace preservation corps. It's very easy to beat the peace preservation corps — they can only be used in a defensive capacity and are weak in numbers. Thus, the defence in Chiang's rear areas is exceedingly vulnerable. Now that we have reached the areas north of the Changjiang River, the troops south of the river are getting panicky.

(3) The opposition from the people. I have already mentioned that the areas under Chiang Kai-shek are economically bankrupt and politically corrupt. This is manifest everywhere. The people's movement in those areas rises and falls like the tides of the sea. The number of people who oppose him is increasing daily. Even university professors, the somewhat enlightened gentry and businessmen are participating in this movement. The farther we extend our attacks into the areas under Chiang Kai-shek, the better we can promote an upsurge in the people's movement there.

These three weaknesses of the enemy provide excellent conditions for us to attack.

Second, as far as we ourselves are concerned, conditions are also ripe for a general counter-offensive.

(1) Our army is growing stronger with every battle. We used to consider it a victory whenever we put a regiment or a battalion out of action. Now it's quite easy for us to annihilate one or two brigades. Our combat effectiveness has gone up and our numbers have increased. As for the source of our recruits, besides the large numbers of emancipated peasants, there are significant numbers of ex-prisoners of war joining up. Over half our army consists of "liberated soldiers"<sup>511</sup> who, having been educated through the collective outpouring of grievances against the old society,<sup>518</sup> have turned their guns against Chiang Kai-shek. Take, for example, the artillerymen who participated in the recent attack on Shanzhou. They had been liberated at Lingbao only the day before. The next day the very same men using the very same guns went into battle with us. Such things are rare in the history of the world. Since last year, our regular forces have increased by almost one half. Our field armies and regional troops are close to two million strong. Chiang's troops total only 2,500,000. Our strength is almost equal to his. After our main force has left, the local forces will still be capable of taking Yuncheng and besieging Fenyang. And once



the large force has left, the small ones will grow, confirming the truth that if the big don't leave, the small won't grow.

(2) The agrarian reform. People in the Liberated Areas and in the areas under Chiang Kai-shek as well are happy when they hear about the results of agrarian reform. A conference on the land problem has been convened recently in north China and a new agrarian programme<sup>401</sup> will be announced which will provide for the equal and thorough distribution of land. Only by relying on the Communist Party can the Chinese peasants emancipate themselves. To overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, agrarian reform must go hand in hand with military operations; both are indispensable.

(3) Expanded Liberated Areas. Last year, we were annihilating the enemy forces inside the Liberated Areas where we had the advantage of the help of the masses. That was all right for one year, but we couldn't go on for long because we would have placed too great a burden on the people. Only by fighting the war beyond the Liberated Areas can we draw on Chiang's source of food supplies, get recruits from the areas formerly under him, upset his conscription plan and disrupt his general mobilization. Of course, there will be difficulties. We are not familiar with the topography of the new areas and the people there have not yet identified themselves with us. But difficulties can be overcome. If we work for the people and lead them in carrying out the agrarian reform, we will win their active support and the Liberated Areas will be expanded.

Third, let's take a look at the international conditions and see if they are favourable, since the internal conditions are ripe for launching a general counter-offensive. We can be fairly confident if we exclude the international factor. But what if the Americans come? To answer this question, we should examine and analyse the general world situation. We must not be frightened at the mere mention of the United States. The United States can't use the atom bomb to deal with a peasant war. What can U.S. imperialism give Chiang Kai-shek? First, munitions. How much has it already given him? Originally the plan was to equip 39 of his divisions, but in the end 45 divisions were equipped. Chiang's troops in northeast China and Shandong Province received the most weapons, but it was also in those two areas that we captured the most. So, there is nothing to be afraid of on that score. Second, money. How much can the United States actually give Chiang? Since the War of Resistance Against Japan began, he has been given a total of \$4 billion<sup>402</sup> — of which more than \$2 billion

have been given since the Japanese surrender. But he has already spent it all. How much more can the United States offer? U.S. imperialists may be rich and prodigal but many countries have asked the United States for money. How much does it have? How much can it give Chiang? As soon as Marshall<sup>356</sup> left, Wedemeyer<sup>403</sup> came. Why is he here? The United States wants to exercise tighter control over Chiang's troops and economy and exploit the resources of Taiwan. T. V. Soong<sup>404</sup> has advocated building railways, establishing military bases and constructing seaports, all to be under U.S. control. Since Chiang is selling out the country and inviting U.S. imperialists to invade China, it becomes even easier for us to mobilize the people against him. Third, if the United States wanted to get tough, it could send troops. How many troops does it have in all? It has 1,100,000. It has to dispatch troops to many places around the world. How many troops does it need for that? Suppose it sent 200,000 troops to China, one-fifth of its total military strength. What are 200,000 men to China? At the most they could be stationed in the big cities and Taiwan. Japan once poured one million troops into north China. And U.S. soldiers are pampered soldiers. Even if there were 500,000 of them, what would they amount to? Our comrades really must get rid of the idea that the United States is terrifying. If the United States did indeed dispatch troops, its aggressive features would be thoroughly unmasked, and that would make it even easier for us to mobilize the people. The most these troops could do would be to occupy some cities. When we besieged them, they would either be wiped out or have to flee. The United States can be defeated. Don't think that just because we are in a small and backward place like Shenquanbu, we cannot do much. Accomplishing great things in small and backward places is what the Chinese Communist Party is best at. The United States is beset with innumerable difficulties. It cannot avert political and economic crises. The people of the world are growing stronger day by day and things are getting tougher for U.S. imperialism.

To sum up, we are confident we can overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. The decision to fight outside the Liberated Areas and launch a general counter-offensive this year is correct. Both internal and external conditions provide a firm basis for such a counter-offensive, and our aim can be achieved. Not in one year, of course. We'll have to fight another three years, and possibly four. It will be two years before the war comes to a climax, so we have two more years of hard struggle before us. Chiang Kai-shek's strength has declined but has not yet reached

its nadir. At present, we are conducting mobile warfare, but in future we will have to conduct positional warfare. Taiyuan and the other cities are still there. But in the end, even if Shanghai is defended by the U.S. imperialists, we will recapture it all the same. So, we have to build up our firepower in order to conduct positional warfare. We still face difficulties. For example, the foundation of our war industry is weak, we are short of cadres, food supplies are insufficient, and so on. All these difficulties must be overcome. To defeat Chiang Kai-shek is also to throw U.S. imperialism out of China. Therefore, it will not be a small-scale war. China is very large, and its victorious revolution and the emancipation of its 450 million people will be of great significance to world revolution. So it will be worthwhile even if it takes five years to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, let alone two. Most of you are young people, from twenty to thirty years of age. Why should you worry that you won't live to see the day of victory? Even I have confidence that I will see it.

You may ask how we can capture the cities and win nationwide victory when we are still in the countryside and Chiang Kai-shek and the Americans still occupy the cities. The method of the Chinese revolution is to encircle the cities from the countryside and then seize them. After our main force goes into action outside the Liberated Areas, our regional armed forces will rise and remove enemy strongholds like so many nails to be pulled out. Don't just look at the fact that Hu Zongnan's troops still occupy a number of towns in northern Shaanxi today. Once our armies get to the Greater Guanzhong Area,<sup>512</sup> we'll pull him out like a nail — if he doesn't run away first. Our control of the cities will be secure only if we take them last. We start from the part and progress to the whole: that is the way things develop. We began in the Jinggang Mountains, but now we will establish Liberated Areas everywhere and liberate the whole of China. The general direction of development is set. The leading comrades of the Party know this pattern of development well, and now all comrades in the Party should recognize it too.

We are most excited and happy about launching this massive nationwide counter-offensive to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. Every comrade, whatever department he belongs to, must work hard at his own post, be a useful "cog in the mechanism" and bring all his capacities into play.

Carry the war to Nanjing!

Capture Chiang Kai-shek!

## OPINIONS ON OUR PRESENT WORK AMONG THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

*January 1948*

1. Some members of the Central Committee of the Democratic League<sup>325</sup> have met in Hongkong and resumed activities. Members of the opposition in the Kuomintang have formed a Revolutionary Committee in Hongkong<sup>405</sup> and issued a declaration against Chiang Kai-shek. In the United States, Feng Yuxiang<sup>71</sup> has organized a League of Chinese Residents in the United States for Peace and Democracy, which opposes U.S. aid to Chiang in the civil war and demands that the United States help the Democratic League secure peace in China. The Kuomintang has announced the expulsion of Feng Yuxiang. On the other hand, T. V. Soong<sup>404</sup> has actually been to Hongkong to contact Li Jishen<sup>139</sup> and Cai Tingkai.<sup>406</sup> In general the Democratic League and democrats within the Kuomintang think highly of Feng, Li and Cai, and some are even attracted by the feigned opposition of the reactionary authorities of the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi to Chiang Kai-shek. For these reasons, it is necessary for the Party to make a further concrete analysis of the problem of the democratic parties in the Chiang-controlled areas in the light of the directive<sup>407</sup> of the Central Committee issued on October 27 of last year and to formulate a clear policy towards them.

2. When certain leading members of the Democratic League accepted the dictates of the Kuomintang and the League was forced to announce its dissolution in the Chiang-controlled areas, the movement for a third national party ended in failure and the idea of a "third road" became bankrupt. As a result of historical developments, China's democratic movement has mainly taken the form of armed struggle. After the Great Revolution<sup>461</sup> there were only two major national parties in China,

---

An excerpt from a directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

and two decades of struggle and war have constantly proved that a middle road, or third road, is not feasible. For a time, thanks to the War of Resistance and especially to the Political Consultative Conference,<sup>339</sup> the Democratic League was objectively the third national party. Many of its leading figures held the views of the middle class and tried to find a third road distinct from the conflicting programmes of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. But the moment the League became involved in actual struggle and especially when civil war flared up again, it could only choose between leaning towards the Communist Party and leaning towards the Kuomintang — there was no other road. Members of the Youth Party<sup>383</sup> and the Democratic Socialist Party<sup>387</sup> who had joined the Democratic League, being what they were, broke away from the League one after another and turned to follow the Kuomintang. Most of the other members of the Democratic League leaned towards the Communist Party for a time, especially during the struggle against participation in the “National Assembly” and in the Kuomintang government and against the bogus constitution,<sup>408</sup> with the result that the League won the confidence of the people. But when confronted with the threats of the Kuomintang, some of the leaders of the League openly announced its dissolution, so that the League lost the people’s confidence. This demonstrates the failure of the movement to form a third major party taking a position between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

3. The fact that the movement to form a third major party failed and the idea of a middle road proved bankrupt does not mean that the Democratic League will not resume its activities, that the Kuomintang cannot split, or that the small parties, groups and other popular political organizations in different places will cease to exist. Nor does it mean that the idea of a middle road will henceforth disappear. On the contrary, in Hongkong and in places abroad, and even in many big cities in the Chiang-controlled areas, small parties and groups representing certain sections of the bourgeoisie, of the regional upper strata, or of progressive and democratic circles have already appeared and will continue to appear. The more defeats the United States and Chiang Kai-shek suffer, the more such small parties and groups will be formed. The more victories we win, the more urgently will they ask to come and conduct their activities in the Liberated Areas. The reason why these parties are small and generally confined to specific localities is that, on the one hand, they do little or no work among the masses and, on the other, owing to the fierce nature of the struggle and especially to

the long periods of war, it is very difficult for them to find room for their activities outside the camps of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. It is easy for our Party to decide on our policy towards those parties which clearly lean either towards the Kuomintang or towards the Communist Party in programme and action. But we must pay great attention to the democratic parties of a middle character and to the middle class, overseas Chinese businessmen and other patriots whom those parties represent and influence. Although these parties are of a middle character, their members often range all the way from oppositionists within the ruling classes to real progressives (as witness the Democratic League, the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and the Democratic National Construction Association<sup>409</sup>), and their political leanings vary all the way from constitutional monarchy<sup>410</sup> to New Democracy. Moreover, these parties are mostly based in Hongkong or in places abroad, and they do not have much opportunity to prove their political leanings through practical activity. At the same time, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are trying to make it appear that there is opposition to Chiang in southern China and a split in the Kuomintang. Thus, the governments of the United States and Britain may well choose to support Feng Yuxiang, Li Jishen, Cai Tingkai or others. In view of this complicated state of affairs, it is imperative for our Party to have a Marxist understanding and analysis on which to base our united front policy of promoting the growth of the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating the right wing, and to guide our propaganda of encouraging what is good, criticizing what is wrong and exposing what is bad.

4. With regard to the progress of the revolutionary war and the changes in class relations, the leadership of our Party must have vision. But it must demonstrate the correctness of its vision by mobilizing the whole Party to lead the masses in realizing that vision through practical work; otherwise, nothing will come of it. Propaganda can only serve to elucidate principles and exert a general influence; the correctness of any policy must be verified by the masses through their own experience. We cannot merely indulge in empty talk about so-and-so's being a constitutional monarchist. We must try to win over the Democratic League, the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, the League of Chinese Residents in the United States for Peace and Democracy and other parties and help them to make progress. We must identify and isolate the constitutional monarchist right-wingers by exposing, in actual struggle, the intrigues of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek,

by dispelling any illusions about them and by opposing all the attempts of the U.S. imperialists to continue their aggression and all the attempts of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie to maintain their rule in China. If we fail to do these things, the masses, instead of being further awakened, will reject our propaganda, thinking that we are just shooting aimlessly. One might say empty propaganda is worse than no propaganda at all. We should remember the tactics we used against Zhang Junmai,<sup>384</sup> other right-wingers and the Youth Party at the time when our Party delegation was engaged in co-operation and struggle with the Democratic League on the question of staying away from the "National Assembly" in Nanjing. Our tactics then were successful not because we predicted that the Democratic Socialist Party and the Youth Party would participate in the "National Assembly", but because we stressed that anyone who did participate would violate the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and become Chiang's accomplice in the civil war, and because we welcomed anyone's refusal to participate, including the refusal of delegates from the Kuomintang. At that time, the newspapers and periodicals of our Party and the left wing all conducted their propaganda work along this line. Thus the Democratic Socialist Party and the Youth Party were isolated and rejected by the masses, and the Democratic League was later prevented from wavering over the questions of the bogus constitution and the reorganization of the government. We should especially bear in mind Comrade Mao Zedong's united front policy, namely, win over the many, oppose the few, make use of contradictions and crush our enemies one by one. This is a principle to which we should steadfastly adhere at all times and on all occasions when there is struggle. We must understand that "the many" also includes the small number of enlightened persons in the enemy camp (*i.e.*, the enlightened gentry, patriots and so on in the feudal and comprador classes). We should try to win them over with our Party's programmes of action (as set forth in Comrade Mao Zedong's report delivered on December 25 of last year, entitled *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*, as well as in the October 10th Manifesto of the Liberation Army<sup>411</sup> and the Outline Land Law<sup>401</sup>). So far as exploiting the contradictions among our enemies is concerned, when some people are merely oppositionists within the reactionary ruling clique or members of regional power groups that oppose Chiang Kai-shek, we can regard them only as our indirect allies. But when they change their position, support our Party's programmes of action and openly oppose the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, we must

welcome them and encourage them to remould themselves in the course of struggle and prove themselves our direct allies. Of course, such persons will often prove inconsistent and opportunistic, and we should have some reservations about them. The problem can be solved only by strengthening our Party's leadership and by combining unity with struggle.



## AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM CONCERNING THE LEADERS' STYLE OF WORK

*February 5, 1948*

When comrades have shortcomings in their ideology and their work style, instead of rejecting them, we must have faith in them and try hard to help them make progress. This is Comrade Mao Zedong's style of leadership. We must have a basic estimate of each of our comrades, which means knowing whether or not he is basically trustworthy. If there is enough evidence that he is not, the Party should be wary of him and reject him. If he is, then however numerous his mistakes, or however defective his ideology and work style, the Party should trust him, and at the same time criticize his mistakes and help him improve his style. Since such comrades are basically sound, though their mistakes may be many or serious, we should trust them and help them as much as we can. We should not treat them coldly or ignore them. Otherwise, the leaders will not be in a position to criticize their mistakes and will find themselves in an awkward position. A good leader must unite with comrades whom he dislikes and is reluctant to associate with. Then he should work hard to help them, commending their good points and criticizing the bad. Only in this way can he remould them while improving his own leadership.

---

Excerpt from an inner-Party letter.

# AGRARIAN REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY IN THE OLD AND SEMI-OLD LIBERATED AREAS

*February 22, 1948*

## I

According to reports received from various places during recent months, the old and semi-old Liberated Areas — that is, all our areas with the exception of those newly liberated after the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive last autumn — generally fall into three categories. Different policies should be adopted for our work in accordance with the different conditions prevailing in areas in each category.

The first category includes areas where agrarian reform has been comparatively thorough. In most of these areas the reduction of rent and interest, the struggle to settle accounts with the landlords, and the agrarian reform in accordance with the "Directive of May 4"<sup>412</sup> of 1946 have all been carried out. Other areas have only gone through the struggle to settle accounts and the agrarian reform. Still others — parts of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region — have gone through the pre-1937 land redistribution and the return of land to the tillers in 1940.<sup>413</sup> In all these areas, the land has been equally distributed and the feudal system abolished. The average amount of land held by peasants of the different strata is about equal. As for the class situation, except in the Northeast and in other areas where the equal distribution of land was carried out only recently, the number of landlords and old-type rich peasants<sup>513</sup> has been greatly reduced. Some of them have already become labouring peasants and others have been reduced to

---

A directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was revised by Comrade Mao Zedong.

destitution. Nevertheless, there is still a handful who possess more and better land and property. Many cadres working in these areas also possess more and better land and property. New rich peasants<sup>513</sup> have appeared and in some places their number exceeds that of the old ones. However, in these areas middle peasants<sup>514</sup> have become the majority, making up about 50 to 80 per cent of the rural population. Among them the new middle peasants<sup>514</sup> constitute a large group, in some cases over 50 per cent. The average amount of land owned by the middle peasants generally exceeds that owned by the poor peasants and farm labourers by about one half. The poor peasants and farm labourers are now a minority and account for only about 10 to 40 per cent of the rural population. Among them there are some who have not yet been completely emancipated. There are also former landlords and old-type rich peasants who have been reduced to the status of poor peasants.

In these areas equal distribution of land should be considered to have been completed, and there is definitely no need to go through it a second time. All that remains is to make minor readjustments in the distribution of land and certain other means of production by taking from those who are better off and giving to those who are poorer. In this way those poor peasants and farm labourers who have not been completely emancipated will acquire more land and other necessary means of production from the landlords and old-type rich peasants, and especially from those families of cadres who possess far more land and property than the peasants. If it is necessary to take land from the new rich peasants or even from some of the well-to-do middle peasants, we should first have their consent. In general the exemplary experience of Huangjiachuan in Suide County<sup>414</sup> can be applied to these areas.

The second category includes areas where agrarian reform has not been very thorough. In some of these areas the reduction of rent and interest, the struggle to settle accounts with landlords and the agrarian reform following the "Directive of May 4" have been carried out. In other areas, the settling of accounts and agrarian reform have been carried out, but for various reasons — indecisive guiding policies, the presence of unreliable persons within the Party, bureaucracy, commandism, wartime conditions, and so on — equal distribution of land has not been thorough, vestiges of feudalism still exist, and there are considerable disparities in the average amount of land possessed by the peasants of different strata. As for the class situation, there are more landlords and old-type rich peasants in these areas than in the areas in the first category, and most of them still own more and better land

and property. Many cadres also own more and better land and property. New rich peasants are few in number. The middle peasants are a minority, constituting about 20 to 40 per cent of the population, and among them the new middle peasants are a minority. As a result of land changing hands in the course of rent reduction and settling accounts, the average amount owned by the middle peasants is about twice as much as that owned by the poor peasants and farm labourers, who still constitute a majority, that is, about 50 to 70 per cent of the population. Most of them have not been completely emancipated.

It should be concluded that in these areas, equal distribution of land has in general been carried out, but not thoroughly. So, in most places, there will be readjustments on a relatively large scale but no further general land redistribution. Land redistribution is necessary only in certain specific places where the majority of the peasants demand it and the middle peasants give their consent. Since the number of poor peasants and farm labourers in these areas is large and the disparity in the distribution of land is considerable, in general we cannot meet their demands by taking land and property only from the landlords, old-type rich peasants and cadres but must also requisition land from the new rich peasants and from some of the middle peasants. Therefore, if on an average the amount of land owned by a middle peasant is about twice that owned by a poor peasant or a farm labourer, we can take a part of the former's land after obtaining his consent. However, the amount taken must be less than a quarter of his total holdings. In this way the number of middle peasants affected will not be too large, and on an average the middle peasants will still be able to retain more land than the poor peasants and farm labourers, though the gap will be narrowed considerably. If the average amount of land owned by the middle peasants is more than twice that owned by poor peasants and farm labourers, the land may be redistributed equally with the consent of the middle peasants. In these areas, moreover, it is important to adopt the method of work that was used by the personnel engaged in agrarian reform in Huangjiachuan in Suide County.

The third category includes areas where agrarian reform has been least thorough. In some of these areas, the settling of accounts with landlords and agrarian reform have been carried out, but the work has been done very inadequately. In other areas, that is, in Liberated Areas bordering on enemy territory or in areas retaken from enemy occupation, agrarian reform has not been carried out at all. In all these areas land has yet to be equally redistributed, the feudal system still

exists, only a few changes have taken place in the ownership of land and the class situation, and landlords and old-type rich peasants still possess considerable land and property while the numbers of poor peasants and farm labourers remain large and their landholdings small.

In these areas, the policy of distributing land and property equally and liquidating the feudal system is entirely applicable. To carry out equal distribution we should focus on confiscating the land and property of the landlords and requisitioning the surplus land and property of old-type rich peasants. The surplus land of some middle peasants may be taken and redistributed only after they give their consent. If the amount of land owned by a middle peasant exceeds that owned by the average peasant by less than 10 per cent, no part of it should be taken. Areas bordering on enemy territory where guerrilla war is still going on should be treated as new Liberated Areas. The provisions laid down in the Essential Points for Agrarian Reform in the New Liberated Areas issued by the Central Committee would then be applicable, and these areas should not be included in the third category.

## II

In both the distribution of land and the readjustment of holdings, we should pay attention not only to differences in the amount of land but also to differences in quality, yield and location. We should consider not only the ordinary cultivated land in the villages but also public land, waste land, unregistered land, and land which belongs to families without offspring. In particular, our first concern should be to deal with land or property which was taken illegally or distributed unfairly, or acquired by cadres through graft or misappropriation. Only in this way can we really put into effect the policy of equal distribution by taking from those who have a surplus and giving to those who have a shortage, or by taking from those who have better and giving to those who have worse. Only by so doing can we satisfy the demands of the poor peasants and farm labourers, while at the same time taking into account the interests of the middle peasants. In distributing land or making readjustments, if we take land from the new rich peasants or the middle peasants, it is very important to explain our reasons fully

and gain their consent. If they do not consent, we should make concessions, and there must be no coercion.

### III

To satisfy the demands of the poor peasants and farm labourers, readjustments in the distribution of land should first of all meet the needs of those who have least. This done, we can give an extra share of land to each able-bodied, unmarried young man or unmarried older man still in the prime of life. If not enough land is available, they can be given less than two full shares each, or even no extra share at all. When there is not sufficient land available, orphans, childless old people and widows need not be given the extra share, since they lack labour power. Big families may be allotted less land per member than small families. As for lumpen elements who cannot be expected to reform in the near future, in the readjustments they may be given less additional land than the others, or be given additional land later or even none at all. For the time being they should only be given the right to use land, and not proprietary rights. Landlords and rich peasants who have recently fallen to the status of poor peasants or farm labourers may also be allotted additional land later or none at all. In short, we should rationally make up for the shortage of land of the poor peasants and farm labourers in the interests of production and not fall prey to the mistaken idea of absolute egalitarianism. After the readjustments, if there are orphans, childless old people or widows and poor peasants or farm labourers who are still in difficulty, the government should use other means to help them.

### IV

In areas in the first and second categories, wherever the peasants have already been mobilized and organized, the readjustments should be accomplished and the ownership of land fixed in accordance with the above stipulations before the spring ploughing, so as to benefit production. Wherever preparatory work has not yet been finished and it does not appear possible to complete agrarian reform before the spring

ploughing, it should be postponed until after the coming summer. However, in this case, we should see to it that the current year's agricultural output goes to the tillers and that our efforts are quickly shifted to agricultural production, consolidation of the Party and the promotion of democratic life in the countryside. In areas in the first two categories, wherever readjustments in land distribution have already been accomplished, the ownership of land should be fixed and no further alterations made. In areas in the third category, it is especially necessary to call an immediate halt to agrarian reform wherever it has begun. It should be postponed and taken up again after the summer, while our present efforts should be speedily shifted to production and general propaganda and organizational work.

## V

In the old and semi-old Liberated Areas, we should be prepared to spend two or three years (from 1948 to 1950) on completing the agrarian reform and the consolidation of the Party in a planned way. We should not be too hasty, for that would create otherwise avoidable problems. Carrying out agrarian reform and Party consolidation calls for painstaking work among the masses, and the pace has to be determined by their level of political consciousness and organization as well as by the number and competence of their leaders. Decisions regarding agrarian reform and Party consolidation in each village must be made and action taken only through deliberations and consultations with the masses and with the approval of the great majority. It is impermissible for a few people to impose their will upon others, for that would mean the mistake of commandism. At the same time, when the masses hold incorrect ideas, we should exercise the leadership of the Party through patient persuasion and avoid the mistake of tailing after them.

## VI

In carrying out agrarian reform and Party consolidation, we should select a few places to begin with and then expand the movement step by step to other areas, progressing in waves. Where there are no competent leading cadres or well-organized working corps, it is preferable

to postpone the work for the time being. We should be patient so as to avoid detours. But wherever we have decided to go ahead, we should concentrate our efforts and fulfil our work plan on schedule. We must not drag it out too long, for that would dampen the enthusiasm of the masses, to the detriment of production and the work of agrarian reform and Party consolidation. It is imperative to train all the leading cadres and working corps responsible for guiding agrarian reform and Party consolidation, to explain our policies to them clearly and to check up on their work at appropriate intervals.

## VII

There is no doubt that the poor peasant leagues are the mainstay of the peasants in carrying out a thorough agrarian reform and abolishing the feudal system. But in areas in the first category where land has already been equally distributed and middle peasants now constitute the majority of the population, we will isolate ourselves from that majority if we still arbitrarily insist on organizing the poor peasant leagues to lead everything. Therefore, in these areas we ought to expand the existing peasant associations and elect new association committees so as to enable them to direct all the work. Where there are no peasant associations, they should be set up. Within the associations the poor peasants and farm labourers should be organized into a group. Wherever poor peasant leagues have already been set up, we should gradually turn them into poor peasant and farm labourer groups within the peasant associations and not announce their immediate dissolution.

In areas in the second category, where the distribution of land has not been carried out thoroughly and the poor peasants and farm labourers still constitute a majority, poor peasant leagues can continue to play an independent leading role. In these places such leagues should be organized and enabled to exercise leadership among the peasants, but they should draw in the new middle peasants. After poor peasant leagues have been operating for a short time (say one or two months), we should expand and strengthen the original peasant associations, elect new association committees and enable them to take on the leadership of all the work. Where there are no peasant associations, they should be set up. Once readjustments in land distribution have been completed, the poor peasant leagues can be turned into poor peasant



and farm labourer groups. Where there are well-organized peasant associations that were set up during the agrarian reform and are led by poor peasants, farm labourers and new middle peasants, the establishment of poor peasant leagues can be dispensed with and poor peasant and farm labourer groups should be set up instead within the peasant associations. This also applies to places where there are favourable conditions ensuring that poor peasants, farm labourers and new middle peasants will constitute two-thirds of the membership of the re-elected peasant association committees and that these committees will be able to exercise sound leadership over agrarian reform.

In areas in the third category, where land has not been distributed, where the poor peasants and farm labourers who constitute the majority of the population have not won emancipation and where the middle peasants still adopt a wait-and-see attitude towards agrarian reform, it is necessary first to set up poor peasant leagues, launch the agrarian reform and build the prestige of their leadership. Then, after a period of time (say three or four months), we can establish peasant associations which will include all the peasants. These associations should allow the new rich peasants to join, but they should firmly exclude landlords, old-type rich peasants and all careerists.

In all places, as soon as agrarian reform and Party consolidation are in the main completed, general elections should be carried out, people's congresses at the village level established and new rural governments elected. Generally speaking, poor peasants, farm labourers and new middle peasants should constitute two-thirds of the membership of the peasant association committees, the people's congresses at the village level, and the village government councils, while the old middle peasants and other labouring people should constitute one-third.

## VIII

Consolidation of the Party is under way in various places and many new methods have been devised. The soundest is for the Party branch to invite non-Party people to attend Party meetings and take part in the examination of Party members and cadres. All places should draw upon the exemplary experience of Pingshan County.<sup>415</sup> In areas in the first and second categories, the feudal forces have generally been wiped out, and the dissatisfaction of the peasants now often centres on

those Party members and cadres who take advantage of their political position to do evil and to seize the benefits of agrarian reform for themselves. Therefore, in these areas readjustments in land distribution must be associated with Party consolidation. Sometimes we may even have to begin with Party consolidation in order to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses.

On the one hand, the method of holding Party meetings attended by both Party members and non-Party people as mentioned above will enable the masses outside the Party to examine and freely criticize Party members and cadres whom they oppose or even those they support, so that they will feel they are in close touch with the Party. On the other hand, it will enable Party leaders to consider all aspects of problems, taking account of the opinions of the masses and circumstances within the Party to distinguish right from wrong and differences in degree and to mete out punishment and reward fairly, so that the masses inside and outside the Party will feel satisfied. At the same time, we can admit activists into the Party who are recommended or supported by the masses. In this way, the ranks of both the Party and the masses will be consolidated, a democratic way of life will develop inside and outside the Party, and the Party's prestige will be greatly enhanced. This method should be used in the countryside, towns and cities, factories, army units, government institutions and schools.

All Party branches should function publicly, except for those in new Liberated Areas which have not yet been consolidated. All Party branch meetings at which problems concerning the interests of the masses are discussed — including meetings for criticism and self-criticism — should be attended by non-Party people, and no secret meetings should be held. This will dispel the aura of mystery surrounding the Party organization and its meetings and bring negative as well as positive aspects within the Party out into the open, so that the masses may exercise supervision, supporting what is positive and criticizing what is negative.

There are, however, two preconditions for the application of this method. The first is that the leadership at the next higher level must be strong, the second that there must be several good Party members serving as the mainstay of the branch in question. If the leadership at the next higher level is not strong, it must first be strengthened. If a Party branch has come under the control of bad people or been overrun by them so that there are no good Party members left to serve as the mainstay and reform is hardly possible, it should be dissolved. The

leaders at higher levels should bypass such Party branches, mobilize the masses directly and lead the agrarian reform and production by relying on the poor peasant leagues, the poor peasant and farm labourer groups, or the peasant associations. After working this way for a period of time, they should again begin admitting people into the Party and re-establish the Party branch. Once the original branch has been dissolved, the leaders at the next higher level should send the branch members to a general meeting of the poor peasant league or of all the peasants for examination and criticism, and then deal with them appropriately. Some, whose mistakes are considered by the masses to be relatively light, may be reinstated as Party members if, after a certain period under observation, they prove to have really corrected their mistakes. But this is an exception rather than the rule. Generally speaking, there are always some good Party members in a Party branch. It is the responsibility of the higher leadership to discover those good Party members and rely on them in recruiting new Party members and transforming the branch — and not to ignore or abandon them.

We should be conscientious and cautious in carrying out Party consolidation and the examination of cadres. While remaining on the lookout for unreliable persons in the Party ranks, we should remember that, taken as a whole, our Party is long-tested and enjoys high prestige among the masses and that it is marching forward victoriously. We should recognize that in the course of war and agrarian reform it is inevitable that a number of alien class elements will be expelled from the Party, but that at the same time many revolutionary activists will pour into it. Hence, in the work of Party consolidation, Party committees everywhere should solve problems on the merits of each case. Those who have obviously committed major crimes and no longer meet the minimum requirements for Party membership should be expelled. Alien class elements who have made their way into the Party and members who have become incorrigibly corrupt must be resolutely weeded out. As for intellectuals and other persons within our Party who come from families of the exploiting classes but have given up their original standpoint, if they have made serious mistakes but still meet the minimum requirements for Party membership, we should observe them and educate them, if they admit their mistakes and want to correct them and if the masses outside the Party agree. We should not immediately expel them from the Party. Party members whose mistakes are not so serious should be educated, whatever their class origin.

# TELEGRAM TO THE FUPING BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONCERNING AGRARIAN REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY

*February 23, 1948*

The directive issued by your Bureau concerning the equal distribution of land is in general very good. The Central Committee has issued a directive concerning the work of agrarian reform and consolidation of the Party in the old and semi-old Liberated Areas. In addition to the points in that document, the following are relevant to your directive.

1. With regard to agrarian reform, in the second paragraph of Section II of your directive you have laid down different policies according to different circumstances in the various types of areas. But it seems that the categorization of the areas and the measures envisaged for carrying out the policies are not sufficiently clear in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. In paragraph 3, which deals with areas where the agrarian reform has been fairly thorough, it is stipulated that if the differences in the amount of landholdings are generally within 10 per cent of the average, there will be no redistribution but, at most, readjustment of the larger differences. However, there is no provision for cases in which the differences have gone beyond the 10 per cent limit. In connection with the areas dealt with in paragraph 4, it is stipulated that, if less than 40 or 50 per cent of the peasant households are short of land and the number of households from which land must be taken for redistribution is over 20 per cent of the total, then the method to be adopted is not equal redistribution, but readjustment of the landholdings of households at either end of the scale without change in the middle section. In fact, slight changes affecting the middle section may be necessary if these are areas where the agrarian reform has not been

---

A directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

thorough, and the method of readjustment may still be adopted even when the peasant households short of land are over 50 per cent and the households from which land must be taken are less than 20 per cent of the total. If these are areas where agrarian reform has not been thorough at all, then the method to be used is redistribution, and the question of readjustment simply does not arise.

Our view is that there are two types of areas where, in principle, we should only make readjustments and not carry out a further round of equal distribution of land, mainly because ownership of land has already changed, feudal exploitation by landlords and rich peasants has ceased to exist or only vestiges remain, and the holders of more and better land are cadres, dependants of revolutionary soldiers and martyrs, and some landlords and rich peasants. In the first type, where the agrarian reform has been fairly thorough, the middle peasants are many and the poor peasants and farm labourers few, so the scope of readjustment will naturally be narrow. In the second type, where the agrarian reform has not been thorough, the middle peasants are few and the poor peasants and farm labourers many, so the scope of readjustment must be wide. Where there are many middle peasants, the average amount of land held by them cannot differ greatly from that of the poor peasants and farm labourers, and as there are few poor peasants and farm labourers, not much land is needed for the readjustment, so we should try to take no land or as little as possible from the middle peasants. On the other hand, where there are few middle peasants, their average holdings may differ markedly from that of the poor peasants and farm labourers, and as there are many of the latter, a fairly large amount of land is needed for the readjustment, and we have to take a part of the land from the middle peasants. According to the directive of the Central Committee, if on an average the amount of land owned by a middle peasant in an area of the second type is about twice that owned by a poor peasant or farm labourer, we can take a part of the former's land after obtaining his consent, but the amount taken must be less than a quarter of his total holdings, for that seems to be a reasonable limit. We hope you will use your discretion in the light of the actual circumstances. In areas of this type, even if an equal distribution is called for, it should be the exception rather than the rule. A number of other concrete measures you have stipulated for this type of area are very good and are also applicable to areas where the reform has been fairly thorough. In areas where the agrarian reform has not been thorough at all, for practical purposes there has been no agrarian

reform to speak of and feudal exploitation by landlords and rich peasants still continues. So, the principle to be applied is equal distribution of land and not readjustment. But the method to be adopted should still be to "take from those with a surplus and give to those with a shortage" and not to take all the land from everyone and then redivide it. If paragraphs 4 and 5 of your directive both refer to this type of area, there is no need to draw a distinction between cases in which all the land will be taken and redivided when more than 50 per cent of the peasant households are short of land while households from which land must be taken account for less than 20 per cent, and cases in which only changes affecting the two ends will be made when things are otherwise. In fact, whenever the landlords and rich peasants have plenty of land and the poor peasants and farm labourers are large in number, the "take-and-give" method of equal distribution will in practice affect only the two ends and not the middle section. In these areas, if it is further stipulated that middle peasants whose holdings do not exceed the average by 10 per cent should not be affected, the middle peasants would be affected even less; the two ceiling standards (10 per cent and 5 per cent) you set in paragraphs 4 and 5 are not quite proper either.

2. Spring ploughing is a matter of very great importance. It is not likely that we can accomplish the readjustment or equal distribution of land in all three types of areas in one big push just to satisfy the desire of the peasants for land, without bothering to ensure that sufficient groundwork has been done and that conditions are ripe. Anyone who tries to accomplish such exacting work as agrarian reform through one big effort will at best produce only half-cooked rice, as has been the case in the Northeast, or else he will make mistakes which it will take time to correct. The poor peasants and farm labourers will have to devote much of their time to completing the reform, the middle peasants will lose interest in production and indulge in extravagant eating and drinking, while the landlords and rich peasants will engage in slow-downs and wilful sabotage. These phenomena will be clear indications that we have not done our work well. If the readjustment or equal distribution of land is carried out on such a foundation, the result, as you can well imagine, will not be very good. You should study the example set by Huangjiachuan Village, Suide County, in the readjustment of landownership.<sup>414</sup> If meticulous work among the masses is needed even in an area like that, where the agrarian reform has been fairly thorough, one can imagine what will have to be done in areas where the reform has not been thorough or where it has been superficial. With

regard to the moods among the masses, you should also examine the effects of your propaganda. You should consider whether the contrast in mood between the middle and poor peasants has not been caused by the fact that you have emphasized the importance of helping the poor peasants and farm labourers to the neglect of the middle peasants, made mistakes in class identification and, while publicizing equal distribution of land, failed to work out details for the "take-and-give" procedure. You should also examine whether your sudden suspension of the membership of tens of thousands of Party members of landlord or rich peasant status in the villages may have had adverse effects. In short, you should analyse the causes of the different reactions among the people by studying the various factors that have created them and quickly set things right through correct leadership and proper methods. At the same time, you should act in accordance with the Central Committee's directive, adopt the method set forth in the urgent circular of February 10 issued by the Shanxi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau and respect the guarantees ordered by the Shanxi-Suiyuan Administrative Office and the Provisional Committee of the Regional Peasant Association. Then the peasants will be willing to speed up spring ploughing and will not be afraid to increase production and become well-to-do through labour.

3. You should give further consideration to the indiscriminate suspension of the membership of tens of thousands of Party members of landlord and rich peasant status in the villages in areas of all categories. First, although it is true that many opportunist alien elements may be found among such Party members, it cannot be said that there are none who have voluntarily given up exploitation or severed their relations with the exploiting classes. Second, since mistakes are made in class identification, some Party members of middle peasant status are inevitably treated as if they were rich peasants. Third, as the local Party organizations recruited so many landlords and rich peasants during the War of Resistance and the war of self-defence while the leadership of the higher organizations paid no attention, the present sudden suspension of their membership is certain to have some impact on the Party branches at the township and village levels, and it may even have more widespread repercussions. Fourth, it is not clear whether all the leading cadres and work teams in the counties, districts and villages are competent, and whether, with the war going on, they can deal properly with the harmful side effects of the suspensions. The question is not whether, in principle, Party members recruited from among landlords

and rich peasants should or should not remain in the Party, but rather whether it was right to be so rash and indiscriminate in suspending their membership in the first place. How do you propose to deal with this matter? What preparations will you make for carrying out your decision and what effects will it have? We hope you will collect material, make a careful study and then wire us your findings. Since you have already ordered the suspension, certainly it would not be good to cancel it. We do not mean that you should annul your former decision about the suspension of Party membership, but rather that you should study its effects and, if they are negative, take appropriate measures to deal with them. In this connection, we believe that the method used in Party consolidation and the examination of cadres in Pingshan County — that is, the method of combining democracy inside and outside the Party — is a useful innovation and the best method to employ.



## THE POLICIES OF THE PARTY MUST BE MADE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC PROMPTLY

*March 7, 1948*

The policies and measures for agrarian reform and Party consolidation set forth in the directives issued over the last two months by the Shanxi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau and in the urgent circular published by the Sub-Bureau in the *Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily*<sup>515</sup> on February 10 do not differ in fundamentals from those in the directive of the Central Committee on agrarian reform and Party consolidation in the old and semi-old Liberated Areas. Therefore, the directive of the Central Committee should be made public. The new spirit in the directive will help you to clear up the confusion among cadres who have hazy ideas on these issues, who do not understand how to make distinctions between different cases and who fail to grasp the specific policies.

The understanding and support of the masses can be won and turned into a dynamic force only when all new policies, changes in policies, and decisions as to the correctness or incorrectness of any part of a particular policy are promptly made known to the masses and cadres. Leading cadres should constantly take the initiative to provide policy information and not limit such information to just a few cadres through over-caution. The latter approach will cause doubts and hesitation among the masses and cadres at lower levels, and in the end it will reduce the leading cadres themselves to a passive role. If you think that in implementing the directive from the Central Committee, cadres at lower levels need some explanation on specific points (not points of principle), so that they will not think they have to do over again anything they may have done that is not in complete con-

---

A directive to the Shanxi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

formity with that directive, you may pass and publish a resolution accepting the directive, together with an attached list of points for attention.

Section IV of the directive of the Central Committee provides that "wherever readjustments in land distribution have already been accomplished, the ownership of land should be fixed and no further alterations be made". This fully applies to most places in your region where land has been distributed; an exception will be made, however, of places where, as pointed out in your urgent circular, too many middle peasants have been affected. In those places, the amount of land requisitioned from middle peasants (including those assigned the wrong class status) who were unwilling to give it up should be reduced or returned in part.

## ON THE EXPERIMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF SOLDIERS' COMMITTEES IN THE ARMY

*March 8, 1948*

The new type of ideological education movement employing the methods of the "pouring out of grievances" and the "three check-ups"<sup>416</sup> has been or is being carried out in all the field armies and all the army units in the various military areas, and its success is being reflected in their political consciousness, consolidation and unity, their attention to study and their fighting. This movement is an innovation and a development of the democratic spirit in the army in the political, economic and military spheres. If there have been errors and deviations, they were largely due to the leadership's failure to keep to the correct orientation in the "three check-ups" movement; in the beginning the leadership was timid in arousing the soldiers, and when they did become aroused, the leadership was unable to forestall some "Left" deviations. But, generally speaking, this movement has been conducted in the various major army units under proper guidance and in a planned and orderly way, and the achievements have been great. To consolidate and add to the achievements we must now turn this democratic movement into a regular pattern of democratic life in the army under centralized guidance. The soldiers' committee as provided for in the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army<sup>516</sup> seems to suit this purpose rather well. As to the name, the various units may themselves decide whether it should be "soldiers' conference", "soldiers' committee", "congress of revolutionary soldiers" or "revolutionary soldiers' committee". The main question is what powers these organs should have and how they should function. At present, only a few units have begun to set up such committees; most have not. The

---

A directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Central Committee believes that specific provisions for the organization of such committees, provisions suited to present conditions, can be formulated with assurance only through the practice of the different armies. Therefore, the Central Committee gives the following instructions to the political departments of all the field armies and military areas: In the coming months, when there are lulls in the fighting, you should choose several companies of different types and one or two units and organs of different types which are under direct command of a higher organ above the battalion level, and establish such committees on an experimental basis. Assign leading cadres to take direct charge of the work so as to gain experience, and report that experience to the Central Committee. The types are to be differentiated by the proportion of soldiers recruited from among prisoners of war, the proportion of new recruits, the competence of the administrative leadership of the company or organ, the soundness of the Party branch, the location of the company, unit or organ (at the front or in a rear area), the time of the experiment (during an engagement or during rest and consolidation), and so on. Different laws governing the methods of work may be derived from different cases. In outline, the fundamental principles for establishing the committee are as follows:

1. This organization, whether in a company or in an organ, shall promote political, economic, military and cultural democracy under the leadership of the immediate administrative head.
2. No decision of this organization shall be implemented without the approval of the administrative head.
3. This organization shall obey orders from the upper level absolutely. It has no authority to make any changes, but, when conditions require or permit, the administrative head may submit such orders to this organization for discussion of ways to implement them.
4. When this organization wishes to hold meetings to criticize leading administrative cadres, it shall do so at fixed times when conditions require or permit and when the political department of the upper level gives its approval and guidance.
5. Criticism and self-criticism in this organization shall be undertaken always with a view to helping win victory and consolidating the army itself.

In the experimental period, the political departments concerned may make these fundamental principles more concrete or supplement them in the light of the actual circumstances. After several months,

---

the political departments of the field armies and military areas shall report to the Central Committee on their experience in experimental implementation of this directive — whether good or bad (both successes and failures must be taken into account) — so that their experience may be distilled and final measures decided upon.

## NEW-DEMOCRATIC ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

June 21, 1948

New-democratic economic construction is incompatible with old-democratic or capitalist economic policies.

The fundamental differences between the economy of New Democracy and that of Old Democracy.

The principles:

- (1) An economy under the leadership of the proletariat or of the bourgeoisie;
- (2) An economy for the majority or for the minority;
- (3) Labouring masses dominant with a liberal bourgeoisie secondary or the bourgeoisie dominant with the labouring masses secondary;
- (4) A fundamentally planned economy or a wholly *laissez-faire* economy;
- (5) When the interests of the individual or the minority are not in conflict with those of the majority, then it's the majority plus the minority; when the interests of the minority or the individual are in fundamental conflict with those of the majority, then we must abandon the minority and look after the majority.

The differences between industry and commerce. Industry is productive and commerce is subordinate to it. Commerce involves a great deal of speculation and profiteering. A distinction must be made between them, the criterion being benefit to the national economy and the life of the people.

Financial struggle — the national banks vs. the old-style private banks. What do we promote and protect? What do we oppose and

abolish? What should we tolerate for the time being because it cannot be abolished immediately and yet restrict because it does not benefit us?

Tax policy. The various grounds for distinctions between tax on excess profits, restrictive tax, general tax, tax exemptions and reductions, and between license tax, income tax and lump sum tax for small shopowners.

Re the three sectors of the economy, public, private and co-operative: primary and secondary, majority and minority, vital or not to economic lifelines of the nation, beneficial or not to the economy and the life of the people.

How to exercise the powers of the state. Political power, the law, prisons, taxation, control, rewards, loans, prohibitions and new approaches to accounting procedures.

Rational organization under New Democracy and capitalist rationalization.

The factory committee and the system of giving chief responsibility to the factory director.

Functions of the trade unions and Party committees.

At the same time, new-democratic economic construction is also incompatible with the economic policies of agrarian socialism<sup>517</sup> or extreme egalitarianism.

The scientific management of industry or the system of administrative organs in the former rear areas.

The wage system or the "supply system".

The production viewpoint or the relief viewpoint.

The stand of the industrial proletariat or the line of the poor peasants and the farm labourers.

Technological advance or acceptance of backwardness.

What are the political qualifications? Old-timers or newcomers?

From whom to learn? What to learn?

## FRUSTRATE THE ENEMY'S SCHEME FOR A SHAM PEACE CAMPAIGN

*July 27, 1948*

1. As victory in the People's War of Liberation is approaching, the classes, political parties and groups, popular organizations, and individuals in Kuomintang areas are all considering their future. Many progressives and left-leaning centrists have given support to the proposal for a new Political Consultative Conference,<sup>417</sup> which was put forward in our Party's May Day slogans. However, at the instigation of the U.S. imperialist chieftains and with their encouragement, quite a few factions and individuals in the reactionary Kuomintang ruling clique have initiated a sham peace campaign. Their purpose is to make use of the illusions about peace still held by a section of the people in the Kuomintang areas and to stage a coup when Chiang's forces suffer more defeats and the situation becomes more precarious for the Kuomintang. In appearance, they will abandon Chiang Kai-shek, declare a cease-fire and call for peace talks, but in reality they will try to gain a breathing spell for the reactionary Kuomintang ruling clique as a whole. In this way, they hope their troops, rested and consolidated, will eventually make a comeback and destroy the people's forces. Many local warlords and politicians, headed by Li Zongren,<sup>418</sup> have joined in these activities and are attempting to remove Chiang Kai-shek and take power themselves. A number of right-wingers of the middle group are also attempting to overthrow Chiang and to seize power and positions in the hope of limiting the scope of the Chinese revolution to suit their needs and avoiding thorough changes. In addition, there are some people who are really naive enough to dream of a peace following the fall of Chiang and who still cherish illusions about the U.S. imperialists and about Li Zongren and

---

A draft directive written for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was revised by Comrade Mao Zedong.



the right-wingers of the middle group. As for Chiang Kai-shek and his die-hard followers, they will put up a last-ditch struggle and will not step down so long as they have even a single alternative open to them. Therefore, in addition to the revolutionary war and the people's anti-U.S., anti-Chiang movement, there is an increasingly complex trend of events. Last October the Central Committee called your attention to the possible development of such a situation and asked you to prepare the masses for it. Now this work has to be accelerated. You must understand that the peace hoax being played by the U.S. imperialists and some of the Kuomintang reactionaries is harmful to the revolution because it can deceive the masses. On the other hand, however, the activities aimed at overthrowing Chiang reveal a major split in the reactionary Kuomintang ruling clique. Even if Chiang is brought down in a coup, those who have plotted against him will have no magic up their sleeves by which to save the reactionaries from their doom, but can only hasten the disintegration and collapse of the Kuomintang. That would only benefit the revolution.

2. You should watch the situation closely, and, as it changes, expose this scheme of the U.S. imperialists and Chinese reactionaries to the people and to the democratic parties and personages. To rid them of their illusions about a peace after Chiang's overthrow, you should take pains to be convincing in your analysis of the aims of this scheme and its inherent dangers, and not go about it in a sweeping or arbitrary fashion. At the same time, a distinction should be made between the peace scheme involving the overthrow of Chiang — that is, the scheme devised within the reactionary ruling clique — and the peace demands of the people and the democratic personages, which are different in nature. If the latter confuse their demands with the schemes of the former, they will be hoodwinked by the reactionaries and the progress of the revolution will be impeded. If the latter strictly distinguish their demands from the schemes of the former, they will be able to make use of the splits within the reactionary ruling clique and turn them to advantage for progress and victory in the revolution. Therefore, in the Kuomintang areas you should not take a stance of blanket opposition to peace campaigns or attempts by certain people to overthrow Chiang but, instead, should make use of the activities aimed at overthrowing Chiang to split the reactionary ruling clique. This will help us to destroy the reactionaries one by one and pave the way for turning the sham peace campaign of the enemy into a genuine peace movement of the people. In other words, among the masses or at gatherings of

platoon leaders or company commanders. This is rare in world military history and would be impossible in the absence of effective political education.

Even our commanders did not foresee the present high level of democracy among our troops. Although Comrade Mao Zedong proposed the establishment of democratic centralism among our troops as early as in the Jinggang Mountains period, its development today goes beyond our expectations. In the "three evaluations" movement, the revolutionary soldiers' committees can criticize cadres and recommend lower-level officers. Those who are correctly recommended can be commissioned, and in the majority of cases they are. How is it that this can be done? It is possible because the soldiers understand very well that an officer must not only be courageous in battle but also have wisdom. Whether or not he is a likable chap is of secondary importance. So most of the recommendations made by the soldiers are correct. This is cadre evaluation. Second, there is the evaluation of Party members. Make Party members known so that the masses can criticize them when necessary: this ensures genuine supervision of the Party by the masses. Third, there is the evaluation of military achievements. The masses are the clearest on who has shown merit and, naturally, their evaluations are likely to be the most appropriate. Only thus is it possible to be fair in giving rewards and punishments. With the expansion of democracy and the strengthening of discipline, the officers say that the troops are easy to lead now, while the men say that the officers' work style has improved.

Our military forces are democratic not only in the political but also in the military sense. Sometimes we even allow the men to discuss battle orders. Each combat group holds "Zhuge Liang meetings", on the principle of the old saying, "Three cobblers with their wits combined excel Zhuge Liang the master mind." Orders from the upper levels cannot be very specific, and when they get down to the company level, the combat groups hold Zhuge Liang meetings to discuss how to carry them out. This gives full play to the men's initiative and creativity. It is especially important today when we are engaged in close combat. In the Huai-Hai campaign, the enemy's defence works were scattered all over like stars in the sky or pieces on a chessboard, but in a single night the situation changed and our defence works surrounded theirs. Our soldiers had found a way to penetrate the enemy's defences, destroy them and set up our own defence works. In fighting, we have to use explosives, but to be effective these inanimate, material

democratic personages, if the peace schemes of the reactionaries and the peace demands of the people are still intertwined, we should not be afraid to face the issue, but rather should play an active role, lead the people and uphold their revolutionary demands for peace, democracy and independence, thereby pinpointing and exposing the schemes of the reactionaries. Meanwhile, when the anti-Chiang Kuomintang factions which are attempting to stage a coup seek to negotiate with us, we should not refuse to negotiate with them. Then, once the coup is actually set in motion within the reactionary ruling clique, we will be ready to turn the deceptive slogans of the enemy into action slogans of the masses. These will include slogans demanding civil liberties, guarantees of basic livelihood, the arrest of war criminals, the disbanding of Chiang's troops, abrogation of the bogus constitution and National Assembly, the cessation of U.S. aid, withdrawal of U.S. troops, confiscation of bureaucrat-capital, realization of agrarian reform, etc. We should demand all this from those who replace Chiang but who remain lackeys of the United States, so as to promote an upsurge in the people's revolutionary movement in co-ordination with the coming national victory of the people's revolutionary war. Only by so doing will we be able to force those who are anti-U.S. and anti-Chiang in words — that is, the right-wingers of the middle group — to reveal themselves in deeds. They will either have to follow our Party forward or betray their hypocrisy and discredit themselves in the eyes of the people. But you must take care to unite with these right-wingers and encourage them to go forward — so long as they continue to maintain a centrist position and do not side openly with U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, directly obstructing the progress of the people's revolution. We must not strike at them improperly or too hard.

3. So long as you have a clear understanding of the above tactics and employ them resolutely but flexibly, you will be able to carry on your activities in the Kuomintang areas in support of the victorious War of Liberation and defeat all the enemy's tricks and schemes.

## COOL-HEADEDNESS AND FLEXIBLE TACTICS — REQUIREMENTS OF THE STRUGGLE IN AREAS UNDER THE CHIANG REGIME

*August 22, 1948*

Chiang Kai-shek has now made up his mind to shed the last vestiges of his democratic camouflage and is putting up a frantic, last-ditch fight for the survival of his fascist rule. Economically, there is now the Decree on Emergency Financial and Economic Measures.<sup>419</sup> Politically, there are indictments for special criminal offences.<sup>420</sup> Two hundred and forty warrants have been issued for the arrest of students in Beiping and one hundred and forty in Nanjing. Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Kunming and other cities under the Chiang regime will surely follow suit, and arrests will be extended to workers, writers and artists and all democratic and progressive personages. In the Decree on Emergency Measures, strikes and slowdowns are already banned, and soon all mass activities will be prohibited. These are measures which Chiang Kai-shek must inevitably take in the face of the growing success of the People's Liberation Army, but they are also signs of his approaching doom. The nearer Chiang draws to his end, the more completely his ruling clique will disintegrate with every man for himself, the harder it will be for the people under his rule to make a living, and the more revolutionary they will become. When that time comes, Chiang and his sworn followers may still continue their frantic, fascist, last-ditch fight in the cities where they are entrenched. But the outcome will be either the immediate destruction of his regime, or his replacement by a coup inside the ruling clique itself masterminded by the U.S. imperialists in connection with the peace scheme, and then followed by the downfall of those who replace Chiang. Therefore, when carrying

---

A directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was revised by Comrade Mao Zedong.

on our present work in Kuomintang areas, we must keep cool heads and use flexible tactics, and we must rely on the masses and avoid the error of adventurism.

In accordance with the foregoing principle and in view of the present emergency and possible future developments, armed struggle must be intensified as much as possible in rural areas where conditions are ripe. In areas where conditions are not ripe or where our work does not have a solid foundation, we must persist in mass work and the development of underground Party organizations while awaiting the arrival of the PLA. In the cities, we should resolutely follow the tactic of evacuation and concealment, accumulating strength and biding our time. It must be reaffirmed that generally speaking it is out of the question to promote unsupported armed uprisings of workers and other inhabitants in Kuomintang cities. There are definite limits to the struggles of workers, students and the people as a whole in places where the reactionary armed forces of the Kuomintang are still in control. It is impermissible to overstep these limits, that is, to put forward the slogan of overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang or any slogan to the same effect and to directly initiate or prepare for armed struggle. To do so would be to risk alienating the minority vanguard force from the masses and incurring heavy losses and even temporary defeats. In particular, before the approach of the PLA and the final collapse of the enemy it would be most unwise to expend too soon the strength of revolutionary leadership that has been accumulated in the cities over the years. According to recent reports from Shanghai, there are adventurist tendencies of that sort in the Party's preparatory work and in the student movement. Such tendencies will make it harder for us to hold on now, to support the PLA's entry into the cities in the future and to launch a people's revolutionary movement in the event of a coup inside the reactionary ruling clique.

Now the enemy has sounded the final alarm. All cities under Chiang's rule, and Shanghai in particular, should be evacuated in an orderly fashion. Whether Party members or not, all those who have been discovered or are being watched by enemy agents should find a way of leaving their present posts and withdrawing to the Liberated Areas. Those who are already in Liberated Areas for training (as in Botou) should on no account be allowed to leave for the moment. Those who have no way of reaching the Liberated Areas at present but can get back to their native places should do so and carry on covert work;

those who cannot should move to other places and find other jobs as camouflage. Those who have not yet been discovered and are not being watched by enemy agents should continue to lie low; they should resume activities step by step, only after the wave of informing on people has passed, so as to accumulate fresh strength while biding their time. The tactic against the massive informing is to carry on legal struggles (making maximum use of internal contradictions in the ruling clique) in accordance with the level of consciousness of the masses and their numerical strength in each unit. This means appealing to school authorities for protection, opposing indictments for special criminal offences, fighting for justice in the special criminal courts, organizing rescue efforts by the public, and so on. If the majority of the students are panicky and dare not or will not carry on the struggle, do not allow the politically conscious minority to put up a fight alone. We must take care to win over the middle forces and do everything possible to avoid mass actions that alienate them. After going into hiding, Party organizations should adopt the policy applied in the later years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, that is, the policy of maintaining parallel organizations, working through single-contact leadership and transferring members from one cell to another without having them carry any identification papers. The leading organs of the Party in cities under Chiang's rule must also abide strictly by the principle of single-line contacts and decentralized leadership; no exceptions are to be allowed. It must be understood that the Party organization is the enemy's chief target. The enemy will definitely try to track down and strike at our Party organizations through open arrests, and you should pay particular attention to protecting them, especially the leading organs. Organizations already smashed should not be restored in a hurry. Contact should be temporarily cut off with organizations in which renegades are found, and decisions about such organizations should be made only after things become clear.

No matter how fierce the suppression resorted to by the reactionaries, we will surely be able to ward off their attack and retain and expand our positions, so long as our Party remains cool-headed, adopts flexible tactics, relies on the masses and avoids adventurist errors.

## MESSAGE TO ZHENG DONGGUO

*October 18, 1948*

Dear Dongguo,

I have received the gratifying news that Corps Commander Zeng Zesheng has revolted and come over with his troops<sup>422</sup> and that you yourself are considering a similar act.<sup>421</sup> The outcome of the nationwide war is now a foregone conclusion. We don't need to go far back; just consider what has happened in this past month. Jinan and Jinzhou have both been liberated, and a whole army two hundred thousand strong has been destroyed. Wang Yaowu and Fan Hanjie<sup>423</sup> have been captured, and Wu Huawen<sup>424</sup> and Zeng Zesheng have revolted and come over. This is ample proof that the People's Liberation Army will win national victory. There is no room for doubt. You are now isolated in a beleaguered city among unco-operative people and with a demoralized army. Chiang has repeatedly ordered you to break out of our encirclement, but with the People's Liberation Army surrounding you ring upon ring, what escape is there? The righteous act by Corps Commander Zeng has shown the way for you to atone for past mistakes by rendering a service to the people. At a time when your future and honour are hanging by a thread, I ask you to recall your former dedication to the revolution when you enlisted in the Whampoa Military Academy. If you resolutely raise again the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal banner and, with all the garrison troops in Changchun, declare your opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, to U.S. imperialism and to Kuo-mintang reactionary rule and if you support the agrarian reform and join the ranks of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, then I can guarantee that in accordance with the lenient policy of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese people and their Liberation Army will forget about the past, welcome you and your troops and extend to you the same treatment that Corps Commander Zeng and his troops received. As time is pressing, I am wiring this message out of past friend-

---

ship to urge you to make a quick decision. It is my hope that you will contact our Generals Xiao Jingguang and Xiao Hua at the front,<sup>425</sup> so that General Wu Huawen and General Zeng Zesheng will not go down in history as the only ones who were wise and far-sighted.

Sincerely,

Zhou Enlai



## REPORT ON PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE PEACE TALKS

*April 17, 1949*

Friends,

I have specially requested you to assemble here today. Although we've been here more than twenty days, I'm very sorry I haven't had a chance to call on you separately and seek your advice, because I've been extremely busy. Yesterday, we invited friends staying at the Peking Hotel and Hotel Wagons-Lits for a talk. And today we've invited professors from the universities and other friends who have arrived from Hongkong to seek advice from you all.

There are a great many problems that ought to be discussed, but today I can only report to you on the recent peace talks. I've given this kind of report a good many times in the past, but I believe that this time the peace talks will be different from the previous ones. In our previous talks with Chiang Kai-shek, it was like "asking the tiger for its skin", as Mr. Tan Kah Kee aptly put it in a telegram to me in 1946.<sup>426</sup> But we had to hold the talks because the people were longing for peace, persons like Mr. Tan Kah Kee and Mr. Zhang Xiruo<sup>427</sup> were few, and the general public had not yet seen through Chiang Kai-shek's peace swindle. Today the situation has changed. It can be said now that if you endorse the Agreement on Internal Peace drawn up in the current peace talks, we have the confidence and the strength to see that it is carried out, whether through peace or war. We will use every possible peaceful means, but if they prove unsuccessful, it will be carried out just the same — through war. This change is due to the growth of the Chinese people's strength, the development of the democratic movement in the Kuomintang areas and the heroic fight of the People's

---

A report made to some of the patriotic democratic personages who were going to take part in the New Political Consultative Conference to be convened in Beijing and some of the professors in universities there.

Liberation Army. You know more about the democratic movement than I do, so today I'll only talk about the military victories.

Chiang Kai-shek dared to tear up the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and go to war because he had armed strength and U.S. aid. At the time he had clear superiority in arms. He had a regular force of 4,300,000 men constituting 248 brigades. None of these brigades had suffered losses in the War of Resistance because Chiang was passive in that war. When the fighting began to get heavy in July 1946, he thought that he could wipe out the People's Liberation Army in a few months. But after two years and nine months there has been a complete change. In the first two years, the war proceeded steadily, and we eliminated 1,500,000 enemy troops each year. In the third year there was a sudden turn of events and in seven months (up to January this year) we eliminated more than two million enemy troops. This sudden change was brought about by the Jinan, Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Beiping-Tianjin campaigns.<sup>428</sup> Now Chiang Kai-shek's troop strength, including that of rear establishments such as military academies and logistical and other support units, amounts to 2,200,000 men, and his regular army units have only something over 1,000,000 men. Quite a few of those units have been destroyed and then built up again, so their combat effectiveness is especially low. Thus even Chiang knows that the battle is lost, that his counter-revolutionary schemes have been defeated.

Meanwhile, the People's Liberation Army has been growing in strength. Two years and nine months ago, the People's Liberation Army had 1,200,000 men and now it has grown to more than 4,000,000 men. Moreover, the majority have been equipped with U.S. arms. U.S. imperialism has given us much equipment (there was no need to write receipts of course), and Chiang Kai-shek has been a fine director of the transport corps. A majority of our men are captured enemy soldiers, who came over; we call them "liberated soldiers".<sup>511</sup> In some units they account for as much as 80 per cent of the total, while the lowest is 50-60 per cent and the average 65-70 per cent. With respect to prisoners, the conversion process is one of "capture, check-up, assignment, education and participation in fighting". In other words, as soon as captured soldiers come over, they are assigned to a unit, acquire education through the "outpouring of grievances"<sup>518</sup> and then participate in fighting. At the time of the battle against Huang Botao,<sup>429</sup> it went so far that troops captured in the morning went into battle for us in the afternoon. Many of the soldiers liberated then have now become

things must be used by living people. Without the soldiers' courage and wisdom, explosives are of no avail. Our soldiers have both courage and wisdom and there is no citadel they cannot demolish. Even if it is of solid concrete, when one catty of explosives is insufficient, we will use five, ten, one hundred or two hundred — ultimately it can be destroyed. If rock in mines can be blasted apart, why not defence works? The enemy calls this the "homemade airplane". The effectiveness of this homemade airplane depends on the rank and file, and not only on the commanders. Wang Yaowu asked us why the Kuomintang troops were defeated in every place to which Chiang Kai-shek fled, while we won victories everywhere with Chairman Mao just sitting in northern Shaanxi day after day. This is because the people have awakened, because our troops are led by the Chinese Communist Party, because they belong to the masses, to us all. The People's Liberation Army today is stronger than we ever imagined. So the enemy cannot but admit defeat.

With things going this way, the reactionary Nanjing government had no option but to put forward peace proposals on January 1.<sup>430</sup> Although their proposals were hypocritical and their conditions unacceptable, we took them up all the same. The people want a genuine peace, and so do we. In a statement on January 14, Comrade Mao Zedong specified eight conditions, conditions for a real peace.<sup>431</sup> Chiang Kai-shek refused to accept them, but after Tianjin was liberated, he had to step down<sup>432</sup> and let Li Zongren<sup>418</sup> take his place. This shows that a peace faction has already begun to split off from the Nanjing ruling clique. Li Zongren accepted the eight conditions as the basis for talks and dispatched his personal representatives<sup>433</sup> to Beijing, and finally we received the delegation from the Nanjing Kuomintang government.<sup>434</sup>

Why did we do this? Because today victory is certain, there is not the slightest doubt about the outcome of the war — it is merely a matter of time. What we should think about now is how to use peaceful means to attain victory, so that we can minimize damage to the nation and conserve more manpower and materials, that is, more material forces for our future peacetime reconstruction. China is very backward, with modern industry accounting for only around 10 per cent of the national economy, and it will require tremendous efforts to modernize our country.<sup>435</sup> In the war, the Chinese people have already paid a very great price, and on the battlefield both the enemy's and our own casualties and the masses' losses have been very heavy. For

example, in the Huai-Hai battlefield, several hundred villages were completely destroyed and we are now undertaking relief work. Of course, it would be best if such losses could be stopped right now. But it takes two parties to reach a peace agreement. Since Li Zongren has expressed his willingness to accept our conditions, at long last there is a possibility for peace, which we should grasp and promote. We see not only the growth of the people's strength but also the splits among the enemy. We must encourage the development of the peace faction's strength and win its co-operation. After helping Chiang Kai-shek to fight three years of civil war, the United States also admits defeat, and it now wants some kind of peace so that its secret agents can infiltrate the institutions of the people's state and work inside them. This also spurs the willingness of the Nanjing government to hold peace talks. The unbridled extortions of the Kuomintang reactionary clique have gone beyond what the Shanghai bourgeoisie can tolerate, so even they want peace. In addition, large numbers of government employees and teachers and professors in the Kuomintang-ruled areas are also a factor for peace, the gold yuan notes<sup>436</sup> having really made it impossible for them to carry on. The present peace talks are the result of all the above factors. After more than ten days of discussion, we have given a final peace plan to the Nanjing delegation to be forwarded to its government.

The Agreement on Internal Peace has eight sections with twenty-four articles. The central problems are the takeover and the reorganization. Of course there is still a gap between the Nanjing delegation and us, although they do have one good idea, namely, that the defeat of the Kuomintang and the victory of the People's Liberation Army is a certainty. They acknowledge their mistakes, admit their defeat and are therefore willing to hand over political power and the armed forces. But although the Nanjing delegation has this understanding, the Nanjing government still does not, not to mention those fellows in Guangzhou and Xikou.<sup>437</sup>

Concerning the takeover. In today's revolution, we must definitely not allow the reactionaries to win ultimate victory because we compromise half way through, as was the case in the 1911 Revolution<sup>443</sup> and the Northern Expedition.<sup>447</sup> Historical experience proves that if a revolution cannot be carried through to the end, it will certainly fail. Today we must under no circumstances repeat that course. The Nanjing delegation says that historically the dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has been one between brothers, but

we took strong exception to that. It cannot be called a quarrel between brothers. Could the struggle between Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai have been a quarrel between brothers? No, it was a struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. And the same has been true of the struggle between us and the Kuomintang over the past twenty years. But the argument between the Nanjing delegation and us over a common basis for peace and democracy might be considered an argument between brothers. On such occasions, we must stick strictly to principles and must never obscure right and wrong.

The reason why we insist on using the People's Liberation Army to take over political power is that this is a question of whether or not the revolution will be carried through to the end. After the Revolution of 1911, the warlord governors<sup>519</sup> and their like remained in place and the only thing that changed was the flag. At the time of the Great Revolution,<sup>461</sup> after the expeditionary armies got to the lower reaches of the Changjiang River, even the Kuomintang said, "The armies were moving north while politics was moving south." Thus the revolution changed its character. Zhang Zhizhong<sup>321</sup> quoted the proverb "the overturned cart ahead is a lesson to the carts behind". Well, the lesson is precisely this: if once again we just change flags and let all sorts of reactionaries go on oppressing the people and churning out gold yuan notes, the people will go on suffering as before and they will certainly condemn us. That would not be acting responsibly towards the people. Unless we overthrow the old order, we cannot set up a new revolutionary order. Where there is no People's Liberation Army, the nature of the regime will not change, the reactionary armies will not be reorganized and production will not resume.

But taking over is not simple either; it will require time and qualified personnel, and we must do it in an organized fashion. The takeover will occur first in the cities and later in the countryside. As for qualified personnel, the Communist Party cannot provide them all, and public figures in all walks of life must participate in the work. Once the Changjiang River is crossed, I'm afraid the Peking Hotel and Hotel Wagons-Lits will be emptied. We are worried that the work may not be done well; still we can't shirk our responsibility. In the future coalition government things will be the same. As we are short of personnel, we can't take over all places at once. First we will take over in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei and Shaanxi Provinces and the Longdong region; the rest will have to wait. The Nanjing delegation hopes that we will go slow on crossing the Changjiang River.

When I handed over the draft of the peace agreement to them, they asked whether it included any articles about crossing the Changjiang, and when I said no, they were pleasantly surprised. But I said that although there was nothing in the draft about "crossing the river", there was something about "takeover". As a matter of fact, crossing the Changjiang is simply taken for granted. Many of the places to be taken over are south of the river, and, besides, historically the Changjiang River has never prevented China's unification. Nanjing and Xikou still have not completely severed connections; they are like a "severed lotus root still joined by fibres". The Nanjing delegation says that they will wait for us to do the severing, but first we want them to sever connections politically; we can do it militarily. They cannot possibly oppose our crossing the Changjiang because, obviously, if they recognize our right to take over, they must recognize our right to cross the river too. But they always want us to go slow. As for those fellows in Guangzhou and Xikou, they hope to divide the country and rule south of the river. We pointed out that if we delayed crossing the Changjiang, we would just be sheltering Guangzhou and Xikou and allowing them a breathing spell. There is no way the Nanjing delegation can challenge this point.

Now about reorganization, that is, reorganization of the armed forces. Without it, we cannot eradicate the factors which make for civil war. But we must not be impetuous, and the conditions should be lenient. Our conditions for reorganization are even more lenient than what the Nanjing delegation has proposed. For example, they suggested disbanding troops and demobilizing them, while we proposed assembling them for training and regrouping. Comrade Mao Zedong has specially emphasized this point. At first glance, this seems to go against the wishes of the people, so it's necessary to explain the matter further. As soon as the more than 2,000,000 Kuomintang troops heard of disbanding, they would be badly shaken, each man worrying about his own future, and then there would be disturbances everywhere to the detriment of the people's interests. We must take a responsible attitude towards the people. Therefore, we propose that in the initial period Kuomintang troops should assemble and go through training without any change in their numerical strength, formations and designations and be treated the same as the Liberation Army soldiers (four and a half catties of millet per person per day). Comrade Mao Zedong has said, "The number of troops they report will be the number we accept." Payment of inflated rations for a few months won't amount

to much. We will not discriminate against them the way the Kuomintang formerly discriminated against the Eighth Route Army. Then it will be admitted that we are magnanimous and the Chinese people will have nothing to apologize for. If the Kuomintang troops still stir up trouble, they will be firmly dealt with. After being assembled and trained, the soldiers will become politically conscious while the officers will obtain political education, and they can be accepted into the People's Liberation Army. But we must not be hasty, and after they have been assembled, we should treat them on their merits and wait for their awakening. Some will awaken quickly, others slowly, but we believe that the majority can change over. Of course, there may also be some trouble-makers.

Only with the takeover of political power and the reorganization of troops can we achieve genuine peace. These points are covered by sections four and eight in the Agreement on Internal Peace.

The Nanjing delegation argued vigorously about the first section, which deals with the punishment of war criminals. We respect their opinion: we will refrain from presenting a list of war criminals, and the phrases "chief culprits" and "arch criminals" have been deleted. Moreover, we say, "All war criminals, no matter who they are, may be cleared of the charge and treated with leniency, provided they show by actual deeds that they are really sincere in distinguishing right from wrong and are determined to make a clean break with their past, thus facilitating the progress of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the peaceful settlement of the internal problem." Some people ask what we will do about Chiang Kai-shek. If he can meet this requirement, he will be treated accordingly.

Concerning sections two and three on abrogating the bogus constitution and the bogus constituted authority, there wasn't much argument. But naturally this too will not be easy to accomplish.

About sections five and six on confiscating bureaucrat-capital and reforming the system of landownership. We have explained the confiscation of bureaucrat-capital as referring to bureaucrat-capital acquired during the rule of the Kuomintang in Nanjing. Small enterprises that are not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood will not be confiscated. If there is private capital stock and investigation proves that it was not transferred from bureaucrat-capital, it will all be honoured. Otherwise, too many enterprises would be involved and production would be affected.

Concerning the seventh section on abrogating traitorous treaties. We are very careful about this. Some foreign treaties must be abrogated, others need revision, while still others can be retained.

With respect to foreign relations, we have a basic stand: we uphold China's national independence and the principle of independence and self-reliance. Ever since the Opium War, China has been oppressed by foreign invaders. Many martyrs have shed their blood and laid down their lives for our nation's liberation, but this oppression could never be thrown off. Today the Chinese people have stood up, and they feel proud and elated! This is the result of the people's struggle led by the Chinese Communist Party. Japanese imperialism was defeated in China, U.S. imperialism is being defeated. Although U.S. imperialism is still strong, it is strong only in appearance but weak in reality. To combat U.S. imperialism, we have used both pen and sword. We fought a battle of words with Marshall<sup>356</sup> for a year, and ultimately he left in defeat. Imperialism is a paper tiger; if you show that you can be tough, it will become soft; if you are soft, it will be on your back. On questions of principle, we are firm — absolutely firm. There is no question that we must adopt a serious attitude towards U.S. imperialism and let it know that China cannot be bullied, that no country may interfere in China's internal affairs. To this end we have struggled for more than a hundred years. We must not seek foreign aid without being self-reliant. If foreign aid holds benefits for China, of course we want it; but we cannot be dependent on it. We should not be dependent even on the Soviet Union and the New Democracies. If we only relied on aid from abroad, what could we accomplish? One of the main causes for Chiang Kai-shek's defeat is that he relied on foreign aid for everything. This is another case of learning from the overturned cart ahead. We are willing to cooperate with all countries that treat us as equals. We don't discriminate against foreigners or engage in provocation, but we must take a firm stand, otherwise we will become wholly dependent upon them. The Chinese Communist Party started out with the lofty aim of overthrowing the warlords and the imperialists. At the time there were only some fifty members (among them the heroic martyr Comrade Li Dazhao, who gave his life here in Beiping<sup>128</sup>), but anything new is only a sprout in the beginning, and all new things are precious because these sprouts are filled with unlimited vitality and will grow into mighty trees. This is a law of nature. And all decadent things, however big, must gradually die out, and there's nothing terrifying about them. We take



a firm stand, but we must also be very careful and handle problems according to the principle of "on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint". In this connection, we should remember the years of the May 4th Movement when we were combating feudalism. At that time we were very resolute in opposing feudalism and raised the slogans of overthrowing Confucius and fighting against the feudal family system. But today we realize that if there is anything good in what Confucius says, we can quote him for our use. And if our parents come and stay with us, we should take care of them. We must make a clean break with feudalism and take a firm class stand, but at the same time we must have an analytical approach. We must do likewise with respect to imperialism.

With regard to military matters, the stationing of U.S. troops in China is unjustifiable under any circumstances. We are telling them to withdraw — this is the demand of the whole Chinese people. U.S. affairs are not our business, but if American troops don't withdraw from Chinese territory, we have the right to wipe them out. And we will not be frightened if the United States sends large contingents of troops. China cannot be intimidated. The Chinese are an ancient people and a heroic people. They have two strong points: they are brave, and they are industrious. What a fine people! It is no wonder we love them! (Of course other peoples have their good points too, and we certainly recognize that.) This is the source of our self-confidence. If U.S. armies actually dare to invade China and occupy our big cities, we will use the countryside to surround the cities, and all their supplies (including toilet paper and ice cream) will have to be brought in from the United States. Moreover, they will have to bear the burden of the cities and be responsible for their provisioning. The American people's standard of living is high, and they are not willing to fight. After Russia's October Revolution, the United States also sent troops to intervene, but the only result was "voluntary withdrawal".<sup>436</sup> That was because they couldn't stand the hardships. We have defeated the army of the Japanese aggressors; are we going to be afraid of U.S. soldiers?

Politically, we stand for national independence and equality. The U.S. Congress is wrangling over whether or not to recognize China. Actually, it's not worth making such a fuss about. Even if they recognize us, there is still the question of whether we will recognize them. Nevertheless, we don't engage in provocation. Although we have not established diplomatic relations with the United States, we will protect

its nationals. The U.S. Consul-General in Tianjin sent us a letter in his official capacity. We returned it, saying, "Sorry, we can't have any dealings with you because we have no diplomatic relations." Later he wrote simply as a railway employee, and we allowed him to register as a foreign resident. Actually, it's not that the United States doesn't want to have dealings with us; Leighton Stuart<sup>376</sup> ran around everywhere trying to establish contact. Fu Jingbo<sup>439</sup> is always writing from Hongkong to Deng Yingchao and me and to others. But the Americans use dual tactics, and at the same time they try different methods to sound us out, to find out what the Chinese Communists are really after. That's not hard to discover: all they need do is listen to a speech or read a few statements and they'll know. As for the future, after peace has been achieved, we'll manage things practically and realistically. The embassies of the various countries are still all there; we are not going to cut off contact, nor will we be in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations with them. If we press for recognition, we will lose the initiative. If the imperialists want to establish diplomatic relations with us, they will have to conduct negotiations with us according to the principle of equality. Politically we aren't anti-foreign, and militarily we don't engage in provocation. "On just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint" — is there anything we need fear?

Economically, if there is an opportunity for trade, we will take it. Foreign trade should be developed; it is mutually beneficial. We don't recognize the privileges of the imperialists, but the problems involved are complex and cannot be solved instantly.

Culturally, the imperialists have many institutions of aggression like schools and colleges, hospitals and churches. These must all be taken over by the Chinese, but we must not be hasty — we must move prudently, step by step. These cultural institutions have a bad aspect, but they also have a good one. For example, take the hospital of the Peking Union Medical College. When we get sick, we too can go there for treatment. We can transform these institutions from within and change them into national ones.

Let me add a little more concerning the eighth section. Before a coalition government is established, we can permit the Nanjing government to continue to exist for a time. At first we thought we would use the Revolutionary Military Commission to direct it, but the Nanjing delegation felt that would not be good, so we dropped this demand and put the two on a par. If the Nanjing government signs the peace agreement and keeps its word, we pledge ourselves to propose to the Pre-

paratory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference that the Nanjing government be allowed to participate in the Conference. Of course, whether or not the proposal will be accepted is another matter.

The Nanjing delegation has expressed its willingness to accept these eight sections with twenty-four articles. We are holding the Nanjing government to a reply before the twentieth. If they don't accept, then we'll definitely fight our way across the Changjiang River on the twentieth. Even the Nanjing delegation says that if we don't cross the river, then the people in the south will not be able to endure their lot any longer. So there must be no procrastination; if we were to delay any longer, we would fail the people there. Of course, after we've crossed the river, they can still sign the agreement, if they are willing to. In a word, the door is open. The Nanjing delegation thinks we must have weaknesses, since we are always seeking peace. First, seeing that we are going to take over the country, they think that we are afraid of further destruction and that we are prepared to "spare the rat to save the vase on which it sits". Second, they assume that, facing the surging Changjiang River, we must be afraid of losing too many lives. Hence they are always trying to bargain. Actually, they are aware of only one aspect, but not the other. Peace doesn't necessarily mean that nothing will be destroyed, and war doesn't necessarily mean that everything will be smashed. There is always something that isn't smashed; and if we advance somewhat sooner, they may not even have time for destruction. What we are trying to do is to have as little destruction as possible. Therefore, we are not afraid of war. We tell them frankly that if they choose war, they're done for. But with peace, they still have a way out. Naturally, there won't be any division into new Southern and Northern Dynasties, but rather transformation.

Friends, China's new-democratic politics involve the co-operation of four classes. Even landlords, after a few years of labour, can become peasants. In the past, because the circumstances were different, we were divided. But now, we find ourselves in circumstances favourable to unity and we can work together. Those who are not Communists can work as well as we do, or even better. There are no born Communists. My forebears were "Shaoxing aides";<sup>440</sup> any talk of my having had "lofty ambition even when young" is nonsense.

The provisions of the Agreement on Internal Peace with its eight sections and twenty-four articles will certainly be carried out, whether

through war or by peaceful means. The use of peaceful means will require more effort than war, and we hope that everyone will help. I hope that you will make suggestions in group discussions or in a larger forum. We have been in the countryside for a long time and are unfamiliar with the cities, so I hope you will all give us as much advice as you can.

## UNITE WITH THE BROAD MASSES TO ADVANCE TOGETHER

*April 22, 1949*

For the Party, the question of uniting with the broad masses to advance together is one of co-operation between Party members and non-Party people; for the Youth League, it is one of co-operation between League members and non-League people. In other words, it is a question of achieving co-operation among the broad masses. This is a very important question in carrying on revolutionary work. Today, when we are combating imperialism and domestic reaction, we cannot rely on the Communists, Youth League members and cadres alone. There are only 200,000 League members, and even with the Party members added in, the number doesn't exceed three million all told. Compared with the national population of 475 million, this figure is very small, less than one per cent of the total. We want to lead the entire people forward with us, and if we don't work together with large numbers of people outside the Party and the League, how will we be able to do so? At the Seventh National Congress of the Party, Comrade Mao Zedong said that we should guard against arrogance and impetuosity and be modest and prudent and that we must unite the large numbers of non-Party people and co-operate with those outside the Party. This is more easily said than done. Both in the Party and in the League, we used to have a bad habit: as soon as we heard that such-and-such a person was a Party or Youth League member, we relaxed and trusted that person completely, but as soon as we heard that so-and-so was not a Party or League member, we immediately looked askance at him or her. To draw such a line is extremely dangerous. For whether among the workers, peasants, or students,

---

An excerpt from the fourth part of a report made at the First National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League of China.

Party and League members are usually the minority. And if a minority draw a circle around themselves and cut themselves off from everybody outside, they are, as the saying goes, "drawing a circle on the ground to make a prison for themselves."

Some comrades think that comrades within the Party are fine in all respects, but actually this is not the way things are. When a comrade joins the Party, that only means he has joined it organizationally — it doesn't necessarily mean that he has fully joined the Party ideologically. Take me for instance. I was once a Youth League member too; later I became a Party member. Although I've been in the Party for twenty-seven or twenty-eight years, I have also made a good many mistakes, and each time the matter comes up, I always feel that I am in debt to the revolution, that I haven't done my work well enough, and I am dissatisfied with myself. Each person in the Party has his or her strong points, and we should all learn from one another. Persons outside the Party also have many strong points, and we ought to learn from them too. Every Party member must undergo a long period of tempering, just as steel is not created in an instant but is made in an extended process of heating and hammering. Above all else we must submit to a long period of trials in regard to our life, ideology and style of work. So after we join the Party or the League, we must study diligently and conduct criticism and self-criticism — only thus can we forge ahead. This is the minimum requirement for Party and League members. As for people outside, because they haven't joined the Party or the League, naturally there are some things they don't know, and they lag behind us a little, but it doesn't mean that they don't have strong points. In the countryside, for example, many peasants are more hard-working and courageous than we are, and more resourceful too. In the factories, the masses of workers are more capable in production, more creative than we are. And among the working intellectuals and students, some are better than we in many respects. Although some of these people have been somewhat slower in raising their political consciousness or are temporarily unwilling to join the Party or the League, we should help them, enlighten them and treat them as friends, and we should all learn from each other. We should not discriminate against them because they are not Party or League members — and then trust them completely the moment they join the Party or the League. This kind of attitude is childish; it's a defect common among young people.

How can we solve this problem? We should treat all people outside the Party who can be won over and can co-operate with us in the same way as we do Party cadres. We should first draw a huge circle and unite with the masses in their hundreds of millions in a joint struggle to isolate, oppose and overthrow the most reactionary landlord and bureaucrat-capitalist classes. Of course, within the ranks of the people there are also different classes and strata; those closest to us are the workers, peasants, students and working intellectuals. Next comes the petty bourgeoisie, and then the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriots. We should be discriminating in our treatment of them, win them over and educate them. This is the broad-minded spirit that should animate the Communist Party and the Youth League. We are masters of the new China. And we must not indulge in mere talk about the people's democratic state or about the political power of the masses led by the proletariat, at the same time acting not like leaders but like a small coterie of isolationists, so that our deeds do not match our words. Young people must be modest and not arrogant; they should be conscious of their own inadequacies and of the insignificance of their accomplishments. At the same time, we should unite with all those who can be won over. That is to say, we should exert ourselves and should be stricter with ourselves and more lenient with other people. So the saying goes, "be strict with yourself and be lenient to others". Of course, this lenience should not be unprincipled. We must first distinguish between revolution and counter-revolution, and we must have no illusions about counter-revolutionaries. The tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions of the most reactionary among the 475 million must be excluded from this huge circle of ours. But we must also recognize that among them there are many people who can still be transformed. For example, after the agrarian reform, landlords and rich peasants can be gradually changed through three to five years of education and remoulding. Of course it can't be done overnight, but their future is still hopeful. We should do it step by step and have them participate in production and gradually be transformed into new people. We can't just take them all in immediately and indiscriminately. But we should be broad-minded and try to transform them all, to lead them all.

Lately, we've been holding talks with the Kuomintang delegation.<sup>434</sup> Some comrades say that the Kuomintang delegation consists of only a few people, and why should we bother ourselves so much about them? But although they are few, they have a multitude behind them. The

people under their influence in the army, government and Kuomintang as well as among public functionaries and teaching personnel come to several million all told, and when you add in their spouses and children, there are some ten million. With these people, the delegation's word carries more weight than ours. They do have a representative character, and if we can win over a few leaders, that will influence a batch behind them. This will help us to cross the Changjiang River and it will also play a role after the crossing. Thus, those who can be split off from the enemy camp should be won over, educated and helped.

As soon as we begin thinking this way, we can take a broader view instead of isolating ourselves inside a small circle. Only when we do things in this spirit can we persuade more and more people to go along with us. What is more, we have to learn from them. We should understand that only when people with different opinions discuss and argue with us can the truth become further clarified. "Dialectics" comes from a Greek word meaning "debate". Isn't this point already made clear in the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*?<sup>441</sup> Many philosophers and statesmen have enjoyed debate in the past. The sages of old all enjoyed arguing, and why shouldn't we late-comers do the same? In searching for truth we must have debate, we must not be arbitrary. What does being arbitrary mean? It means that whatever I say must be correct, and whatever others say must be incorrect. If that's the way it is, what is there left to debate? If your opinion is inviolable, what's the use of arguing with you? Even if you do have a good many correct opinions, you should still listen to the opinions of others, heeding the good ones — only then can your thinking make further progress. Dialectics deals with the unity of opposites. Only through debate is it possible to discover more truths. Therefore, if young people want to learn, they should listen to all kinds of opinions, distilling them afterwards. There are people who, listening first to one side, then the other, are in a constant quandary. They start out with definite ideas, but as soon as they begin listening this way, they lose their certainty. We should listen to opinions from all sides, but we must also use our brains. Everyone has two ears with which to hear, two eyes with which to see and two nostrils with which to smell. When listening, we can hear incorrect as well as correct opinions, when viewing colours, we can see black as well as white, and when sniffing, we can smell the foul as well as the fragrant. So the human senses accord with dialectical laws. We must listen to opinions from all sides, distinguishing right from wrong,



and starting in our youth we must develop the ability to think. There are also comrades who are not afraid as long as they are meeting Party and League people but who are as timid as a shy girl in the presence of strangers. Why should we be afraid of strangers? We ought to unite with them, educate them and transform them. Only with this approach can we unite with ever more people in our society to go forward together. Only when we keep in constant touch with the broad masses are we able to be brave. It's no good for us to shut ourselves up in a room, remaining ignorant and uninformed. We must dare to have contact with people in the hubbub of real life, to persuade and educate people, to learn from them, to unite with the vast majority in common struggle. This is courage — and people doing so are men of great courage. This is precisely the style of work our young need very much to cultivate.

## LEARN FROM MAO ZEDONG

May 7, 1949

The Chinese people's great revolution is on its way to nationwide victory. The young people of our country must press ahead, taking part in building a new China. We must have a leader recognized by us all, for such a leader can guide us in our advance. The practice of the revolutionary movement of the last thirty years has given the Chinese people that leader, namely, Mao Zedong. And our slogan at this National Youth Congress is:<sup>442</sup> "Advance under the banner of Mao Zedong!" We are determined to hold this banner high and forge ahead. Today, at this congress, I wish to explain several major points to show why Comrade Mao Zedong deserves our respect and how we should learn from him.

Learning from Mao Zedong is not just a slogan, the words are rich in content. When you delegates go back after this congress, you should tell all our young people — in the villages, factories and cities, in the Liberated Areas and in areas under Kuomintang rule — what this congress advocates, so as to mobilize and win over to our side millions of them who will advance together with us. The best way for us to do that is to call upon them to follow the banner of Mao Zedong. In calling on all our young people to march forward behind this banner, we must know how it has become the banner it is today. Mao Zedong is a great man sprung from our own Chinese soil. When doing propaganda work among the young people of the country, or when learning from him by yourselves, you must not regard Mao Zedong as a chance leader, a born leader, a demi-god or a leader impossible to emulate. If you see things that way, it will become empty talk to accept him as our leader. If one couldn't learn from him, he would be isolated from

---

An excerpt from the third part of a report made at the First National Youth Congress. It was published in the *People's Daily* on October 8, 1978. For inclusion in this volume, it has been re-edited on the basis of the original minutes.

us, wouldn't he? Wouldn't we be making Mao Zedong into a deity apart? That's the kind of leader publicized in feudal and capitalist societies. Our leader is born of the Chinese people, has flesh-and-blood ties with them and is deeply rooted in the land and society of China. He is a people's leader born of China's revolutionary movements in the past hundred years and, since the May 4th Movement, of the long years of accumulated revolutionary experience. In learning from Mao Zedong, we must therefore learn from him in a comprehensive way, in the light of his historical development — not just by looking at his great achievements today and neglecting the process of his growth.

Chairman Mao often says that he was born and bred in the countryside and that when he was young he, too, was superstitious and backward in some aspects of his thinking. He was most unhappy about a textbook published in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area, which said that even at the age of ten he had opposed superstition and that from the time he was a child he had not believed in gods. He says that, quite the contrary, when he was a little boy, he did believe in gods and, what's more, was very pious. When his mother was ill, he prayed to Buddha for help. Wasn't that superstitious? The story about Chairman Mao in that textbook turned things the other way round when it said that he wasn't superstitious as a child and that he was born with innate wisdom and had broken with superstition. Chairman Mao says that doesn't accord with the facts. Besides, generally speaking, in the feudal society of that period, it was impossible for anyone, whether from a peasant or a worker's family, to break with superstition all at once. Chairman Mao was born in a village at the end of the 19th century, so it was impossible for him not to be a little superstitious. Why is it necessary to explain this? Because we must not think that since some of our youth are still superstitious, they cannot be educated and should be excluded. Yesterday's superstitious child was able to become today's Chairman Mao (of course, I'm not saying that every child can become a Chairman Mao). Superstition can be done away with. Weren't you also superstitious a few years ago? You can't deny that you snivelled when you were kids! You must not refuse to acknowledge the weaknesses of childhood just because you've made progress.

Chairman Mao often says that he is also a reader of ancient classics. Everything hinges on whether you know how to read them. Chairman Mao was very fond of reading such books in his younger days. Now, when writing and speaking, he often draws on historical experience and lessons and is very skilful in doing so. Reading classics broadened

and enriched his knowledge and made him all the greater. On May 4, I read an article by Comrade Fan Wenlan<sup>443</sup> in which he said that around the time of the May 4th Movement he devoted himself to the study of Chinese classics and ancient things. But once he began to acquire a correct perspective, things of the past became a help to him in the compiling and writing of Chinese history, and he has made use of them with great skill. So we should not think that some of our young people who like to read ancient books and study things of the past cannot be progressive. We should not refuse to unite with people and educate them simply because they have old ideas. We should not give them the cold shoulder because they're a little backward. As long as they're willing to make progress, they can remould themselves. As Chairman Mao has said, this is how he himself was remoulded.

Chairman Mao also often says that when he starts studying something, he first tackles one aspect of it, and if he doesn't understand it, he keeps boring into it until he's got it clear. When Chairman Mao joined the revolution after the May 4th Movement, he first lived in the city and devoted himself to the workers' movement. At that time, Mr. Tao Xingzhi<sup>274</sup> was advocating a movement for rural development. Comrade Yun Daiying<sup>273</sup> wrote a letter to Chairman Mao, saying that they might follow Tao Xingzhi's example and go to work in the countryside. Chairman Mao replied: "We've got more work than we can handle in the cities; how can we possibly go to work in the countryside?" This shows that he hadn't given his attention to that aspect of the problem at the time. But he did so soon after and he learned all about the peasant movement, linking it with the revolutionary movement in the towns. Still later he studied military affairs. He mastered them all and acquired a comprehensive knowledge. This should tell us that if some young people like to concentrate on one aspect of a problem before grasping it in its entirety, we should not discourage their interest. If they are reluctant to participate in political activities, we should take time to educate them and not shut them out.

I have cited these three examples to show that being a child of a peasant family in feudal society, Chairman Mao too was once superstitious, read books written in ancient times and, when studying a problem, paid attention only to one aspect at first. His greatness lies in the fact that he awakened from superstition and rejected what was outdated; it lies even more in the fact that he dared to face up to the past. We can see that in societies ruled by the people, to say nothing of old society, there are those who, once they've made progress, think that they were

just fine all along, that they were "born sages", and they speak of themselves as if they were perfect, with no shortcomings at all. Others also speak of them in that way, and they like to listen to such praise. This is very dangerous. So we must not abandon those young people who are superstitious and backward, who see things only from one side instead of seeing them whole. Rather, we should educate them. We should help them learn from us and, at the same time, we should learn from them; our young people must learn from each other. Chairman Mao is a people's leader born of the experience and lessons of a history of several thousand years, of the revolutionary movements of the last hundred years, and of direct struggle over the last thirty years. This is the way we should look at Chairman Mao's development. And this view will help comrades to overcome any arrogance they may feel. If such was the case even with Chairman Mao, what is there for us to be conceited about? Which of us does not make mistakes? Which of us has no shortcomings? Is there anything to be complacent about? We are all far, far behind Chairman Mao.

We must learn from Mao Zedong because he is a leader who is very good at adhering to principles while applying them in a flexible way. Since he became one of its leaders, the Chinese revolution has gradually found the right orientation. Chairman Mao has been correct in all the four stages of the Chinese revolution and he represents the correct orientation for the Chinese people. At the beginning, both the Central Committee of the Party and sections of the revolutionary masses often made mistakes in orientation and lost their bearings. But Chairman Mao has always had the right orientation. Chairman Mao's views during the Great Revolution (1924-27) were correct, but they were not accepted by the leadership of the time. He was right during the ten-year civil war (1927-37), but some comrades made mistakes and didn't fully agree with him. During the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45), the whole Party recognized Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership, and we won victory. In the present War of Liberation (1946-49), he has further proved to be correct. Therefore, Chairman Mao's orientation is the correct orientation for the Chinese people. He has time and again pointed out the truth and upheld the truth. And that is why we often say that Chairman Mao has applied the truth of world revolution — the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism — to China and has integrated it with China's revolutionary practice to create Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong is a man who points out the truth and upholds and develops it. His orientation has been correct at the many

crucial historical junctures of the Chinese revolution over the past thirty years.

There are two things we must learn from Chairman Mao in connection with upholding principle. One is to persist in an orientation and the other is to concretize it. Its concretization is impossible if only one person understands it, or if only a few people accept it; this must depend on the masses. For principles to be put into practice, they must be given substance and be approved and implemented by the majority. There are difficulties in adhering to the truth. Not only has Chairman Mao pointed out what the principles are, he has also formulated concrete policies and tactics to put them into practice, and his policies for a given historical stage are suited to that stage.

Our young people will realize this when they study the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. During the Great Revolution, it was imperative to develop the peasant movement in depth so as to meet the demand of the peasants for land. This truth was made clear by Chairman Mao in his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, in which he supported and elaborated upon the methods put forward by the peasants, offering not only theory, but also the ways to apply it in practice. The trouble was that it was rejected by the leading body of the Communist Party of the time, and the Great Revolution ended in failure. During the civil war, Chairman Mao wanted to promote political work in the army. If you study the draft resolution he proposed at the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, you'll find that the political work now conducted in the People's Liberation Army can be traced all the way back to then. But it took many years to implement Chairman Mao's ideas step by step, and there were many twists and turns along the way. Although these ideas were generally accepted in form, their power was felt in actual practice only after a long time. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, we needed to unite with Chiang Kai-shek's government in order to fight Japanese aggression, and though we knew very well that he was wavering and half-hearted, still we had to push him to fight, for only thus could the strength of the whole nation be mobilized. We had to unite with him, and we also had to be watchful and struggle against his reactionary tendency. This is what we call "unity as well as struggle". In order to use this tactic to carry on the War of Resistance and to expand the people's own forces, we had to convince many people. Within the Anti-Japanese National United Front, there were people who said: Since you want unity, there shouldn't be any criticism. Some

people inside our Party shared this view. So there were many complicated struggles before this principle was really applied. The War of Liberation has been going on relatively well, but there have been minor setbacks and errors too. For instance, "Left" mistakes were made during the agrarian reform, and they were not fully rectified until the publication of Chairman Mao's report on December 25, 1947.<sup>444</sup>

All this points up the fact that it requires great effort and much concrete work to put a principle, a truth, or a policy into practice. Besides upholding the truth and pointing out the correct orientation, Chairman Mao has worked out many specific policies and tactics for applying a truth or a principle. Otherwise we could not bring the revolution to victory. Chairman Mao does not indulge in empty talk about truth but integrates truth with practice and gives it substance. That is how we have won our present victories. In learning from Mao Zedong, our young people must study his specific policies and tactics as well as the orientation, principles and truths he points out; only thus can our work be closely linked with reality. Young people must not indulge in empty talk but should go into action. Lenin, the great revolutionary leader of the world's proletariat, called for "fewer pompous phrases, more plain, *everyday* work".<sup>445</sup> This is a precious teaching for our young people. Mao Zedong Thought has the distinctive feature of giving concrete expression to universal truth and applying it on Chinese soil. Our young people should learn to do likewise.

When Chairman Mao gives universal truth concrete expression and applies it to China, he doesn't just confine himself to working out the measures. Nor is it a case of a few individuals carrying those measures out by themselves, regardless of whether they are understandable or acceptable to others. No, it's not like that at all. Chairman Mao explains a truth tirelessly, going over it again and again, until it's accepted by everyone and turned into strength. So in order to transform the leaders' understanding and wisdom into the strength of the masses, it is necessary to go through a process of education and persuasion and sometimes even a period of waiting, waiting for the masses to come to an awakening. When Chairman Mao's views have not yet been accepted by everybody, he waits. He explains his views whenever there is an opportunity, doing more educating and persuading. He has run into this situation inside the Party too, when his opinion wasn't accepted by others. As I said earlier, that was the case during the ten-year civil war. We wanted to attack big cities, but Chairman Mao saw that our forces were inadequate. He maintained that we should concentrate

our efforts on building base areas, not on striking at the cities. But his views weren't accepted by the majority who wanted such attacks, and he had no alternative but to follow the majority. The result was that we were defeated. Then he promptly said at a meeting: "Well, we've lost; this proves that our method is wrong. Let's change it." When the others still wouldn't go along, he had to wait again and follow the majority. Take the Long March which I've mentioned. We were defeated in Jiangxi, having blindly fought a war of attrition; in the end we couldn't hold out and were forced to evacuate. But in the course of the Long March, Chairman Mao again put forward his correct views, rectified the erroneous line at the Zunyi Meeting and led the Red Army out of danger by taking it across the snow-capped mountains and the marshland into northern Shaanxi. His views finally proved to be correct, while those of the majority were wrong. All this shows us what must be done when correct ideas are not accepted by other people. We must wait and we must persuade. But, organizationally, we must submit to the decisions taken by the majority. When the masses are deceived, it isn't easy for them to accept the truth, but they will support the correct views after they have gradually become awakened.

Thus very often correct views will triumph and become acceptable only after many twists and turns and a period of waiting. Of course, this period of waiting is a painful one. If the Party's leading organs had accepted Chairman Mao's views earlier, the revolution would not have sustained such great losses and we would have become much stronger. Since the influence of our backward Chinese society is felt inside the Party and the revolutionary organizations, it often happens that correct opinions are not easily understood at once. Thus, we have to wait and do some persuading, and go through a painful process. However, there will be less of that in our future work. This is because the Central Committee of our Communist Party today is not the same as it was in those days. The overwhelming majority of our comrades accept Mao Zedong as their leader and have real faith in him, and he enjoys the support of the people. But this is true only as regards the general orientation. For instance, all agree with the general principle of carrying the revolution through to the end and engaging in new-democratic construction. But there will still be much controversy over specific policies and specific work. Hence the need to learn, to learn from Chairman Mao's persistence in upholding the truth, clarifying principles and orientation, and giving them concrete expression so as to turn them into the people's strength. These things cannot be ac-



completed in haste. To push the revolution forward we must have great perseverance, patience and indomitable will. Only then will we win final victory. We must not think that it's enough just to raise a simple slogan. We should not be discouraged when a slogan fails of its effect, or be complacent and tempted to rest on our oars when it succeeds. If we did that, we wouldn't be worthy students of Chairman Mao. He has persisted in giving the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism concrete expression on Chinese soil and turning it into the strength of the masses, and this accounts for our great victories in the Chinese revolution. Today, not only does the Chinese Communist Party respect him, but all the people who are enjoying the fruits of victory of the revolution will have faith in him and trust him wholeheartedly.

Another thing we must learn from Chairman Mao in upholding truth and making it prevail is that the principles he puts forward always take the majority of people into consideration and are in their interests. It's true that he is the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, but at the same time it is generally acknowledged that he is the leader of the whole nation. As far as the Communist Party is concerned, he represents the proletariat. Numerically, the Chinese proletariat consists of only several million people, less than one per cent of the population. How is the Communist Party, which represents this class, to win victory in the Chinese revolution? Chairman Mao makes it his central objective to apply the proletarian Marxist ideology to Chinese reality, win over the overwhelming majority of the people and rally them around the proletariat to bring the revolution to victory. He does not confine himself to a tiny circle and indulge in empty talk about revolution. Chairman Mao understands that in order to wipe out the fiercely reactionary enemy, it is necessary to muster all the forces available and not just rely on the vanguard to do everything. The proletariat is the vanguard, but we can't rely on the vanguard alone.

During the Great Revolution, Chairman Mao was already aware that the peasants were the largest ally and that the people's revolution could not triumph without them. And sure enough, the revolution suffered defeat because his views weren't listened to. Later, when we got to the countryside, Chairman Mao saw that in order to carry out the revolution it is necessary not only to rely on the peasants, but also to win over the middle and petty bourgeoisie. As Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary treachery became further exposed, only the comprador-bureaucrat and feudal landlord classes supported him. But

a group of people inside the Communist Party made "Left" deviationist mistakes and were very narrow in their outlook, holding that the middle and petty bourgeoisie were unreliable. They didn't listen to Chairman Mao, and the result was that the revolution suffered another setback and we had to march 25,000 *li*. Then Chairman Mao proposed that we unite with Chiang Kai-shek and other members of the upper strata to resist Japanese aggression. But some people said that if we wanted unity, there shouldn't be any struggle. Chairman Mao replied that Chiang and the others were our domestic enemy; we were uniting with them in order to fight the national enemy. But they were not reliable partners or allies, and we must guard against them; otherwise, they might turn on us. We took measures to avert Right deviations and to prevent unqualified compromises. During the present War of Liberation, "Left" deviationist mistakes were made in agrarian reform in the countryside. In order to eliminate the landlord class, landlords were given poor land or no land at all so that they could not eke out a living; or too many people were classified as feudal rich peasants or landlords. Moreover, on the question of executions, it was stipulated that no one should be executed except for those who had committed serious crimes, refused to mend their ways and were bitterly hated by the people. But, sometimes, when the people were filled with wrath, these distinctions were not made, and the leadership did not attempt to persuade the masses, so too many people were put to death. This had an adverse effect on our united front with the peasantry, and particularly with the middle peasants. This mistake was also corrected by Chairman Mao.

From these four revolutionary stages we can see that Chairman Mao's view on the united front is that we should bring together the broadest possible army of allies and defeat our enemies one by one. During the War of Resistance, our aim was to defeat Japanese imperialism. Since the Japanese imperialists were driven out of our country, we have gone on to defeat the Kuomintang reactionaries and topple the reactionary regime in China. In the countryside, overthrow the feudal landlord class — the foundation of the reactionary regime. Internationally, oppose U.S. imperialist aggression against China. Under these slogans we have united more than 90 per cent of the people, including large numbers of peasants. So Chairman Mao tells many cadres in our Party that when they write their diaries every day, if they just jot down "unite the 90 per cent" and nothing else, that will be enough. I think that our biggest achievement under his leadership is that we have won over the vast majority to the common cause of

overthrowing reactionary rule. This our young people should learn. To apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism successfully in our country, we must combine it with Chinese realities, undertake many concrete, arduous tasks, forge ahead unflinchingly, struggle for a long time and get the vast majority of the people, including large numbers of young people, to follow us in our march forward. We cannot rely only on this small contingent of ours.

The most important role of the Youth Federation is to organize young people throughout the country and inspire and educate them, so that they will study, progress and march forward with us. Among the young people we unite with we do not include reactionaries; we must not allow them to sneak in. But we must embrace all young people who are ready to fight for the cause of New Democracy. Though different in ideology, they are now ready to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Some of them still have superstitious and backward ideas, place technological expertise above all else and are one-sided in their approach, but we should include them nevertheless. We can educate and remould them. That is why we have put forward the slogan which is also our objective: "Learn from Mao Zedong!" This is acceptable to all young people, not only progressives but others as well. Naturally, to unite with and educate young people doesn't mean that we tell them only about the merits of the Communist Party, and not about its mistakes. At this youth conference, instead of trying to cover up the mistakes of the Communist Party, we have made many of them known. Some of the things about the Party that I have discussed today were not known to you before, and they may still be unknown to some comrades within the Party, but now you know them. Today you are representing not just several million young people but tens of millions or even a hundred million. You are, therefore, asked to note that the Communist Party must not be rash and force its ideas upon so many young people. It is the Kuomintang's way to force people to accept what they don't want to, imposing restraints upon people, just like the Goddess of Mercy throwing the magic tightening ring onto the head of the Monkey King. In teaching people to learn from Mao Zedong, we shall not resort to coercion. What we have put forward is just a slogan, a resounding slogan to which young people in their millions will respond. For today Chairman Mao is the leader not only of the Chinese youth but also of the whole Chinese people and of the Chinese Communist Party. He is a banner for us to follow.

Here, a word of explanation is needed regarding the question of freedom of thought. Reactionaries, including Chiang Kai-shek, often claim that they are for freedom of thought. As everybody knows, that is nonsense, for what freedom is there under Chiang Kai-shek's rule? The people are suffering oppression and exploitation. Only the small handful of reactionary landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists are free — free to exploit, oppress and slaughter the people. In the bourgeois-democratic countries, only the bourgeoisie have freedom of thought, which is denied to the workers and peasants. In our new-democratic country, the people will enjoy full freedom of thought. Aside from reactionary ideology, all other kinds will be allowed to exist. Not only progressive, socialist or communist but also religious ideas may exist. The propagation of reactionary ideas is not allowed, but apart from that, there is freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association. The Communist Party holds that historical materialism is correct and that Mao Zedong Thought is correct. These ideas, of course, should be propagated. But it does not mean that other ideologies are not allowed to exist. We educate people in our ideology, but they are free to choose whether to listen or not, whether to accept or not. This is the only approach that is truly educational and appropriate to leadership — an approach of working together with other people, a co-operative approach.

Our slogan is "Learn from Mao Zedong!", but we need not confine ourselves to the study of Mao Zedong Thought. Under this slogan, our young people must study various subjects, such as new-democratic construction, economics, politics and culture and the many different specialized fields in the sciences and technology. All these should be studied. Dedication to study — that is one of Chairman Mao's characteristics. He studies day in, day out, and never feels satisfied. He often says that he doesn't understand this or that subject and needs to study it. To be his pupils, we must learn this spirit from him.

In making these remarks, of course I have not introduced to you all of Chairman Mao's merits or all of his principal doctrines. I've only taken up a very small part of Mao Zedong Thought. Chairman Mao's achievements in founding a people's army, his military strategy and tactics; his political writings *On New Democracy* and *On Coalition Government*; his articles on economics; in culture, his *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art*; his new contributions to philosophy and his Marxist ideological system; and all the rest — his

achievements are enormous. They are not only wide-ranging, but specialized, profound. I don't intend to say more about them here.

As for Chairman Mao's attitude towards study, his own motto is "seek truth from facts". He is most honest, unequivocal about what is right and what is wrong. He is strongly opposed to conceit and impetuosity. In the thirty years of the revolutionary movement, he has matured through the struggle against conceit and impetuosity. He has a modest and prudent style of work. He has both the revolutionary sweep and the efficiency Stalin spoke of in the book *The Foundations of Leninism*. So in order to learn from him to seek truth from facts, we should have an honest attitude and style of work and should not acquire habits of superficiality, conceit or impetuosity. The Chinese Communist Party has learned this lesson through the people's revolutionary movement. I too have been impatient in the past. Of course it's not easy for the younger generation to learn this. We must be careful and conscientious and make as few mistakes as possible. Mistakes are unavoidable, but we must not repeat them. There is no young person who won't stumble or suffer setbacks. But you should not lose heart when you meet with setbacks. In our revolutionary struggle, no one knows how much blood has been shed, how many reverses have been suffered, or how many people have fallen. But we should not lose heart even in the most difficult times. As Chairman Mao said, we should pick ourselves up, wipe off the blood, bury our fallen comrades and go into battle again. This is the kind of willpower and courage we must have.

Today we're about to win nationwide victory, and a great new day is dawning for us. But we must not become arrogant because we are winning; we must not think that we are all-powerful and can be oblivious to the lessons of the past. Chairman Mao says that winning nationwide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand *li*, and there is much arduous work waiting to be done. Here two lessons merit our attention. One is that we must not look down on others and become alienated from the masses; the other is that we must not degenerate politically. These are the enemies, so to speak, of our young people. We must rid ourselves of impetuosity, arrogance, dejection, discouragement and demoralization; we must learn from Mao Zedong's style of study and style of work, be honest, seek truth from facts, work conscientiously and advance steadily and courageously. Only thus can we get millions upon millions of young people to march forward

with us. Only thus can we bring about the democratic emancipation of the people of the whole country, achieve national independence, build a new-democratic new China and strive for a lasting world peace. Our slogan is: "Young people of the whole country, unite and march forward under the banner of Mao Zedong!"

# POLITICAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF WORKERS IN LITERATURE AND ART

*July 6, 1949*

Delegates,

Let me first congratulate you on the success of this National Congress of Workers in Literature and Art,<sup>446</sup> on your coming together today after having been gradually forced apart into two separate regions after the defeat of the Great Revolution. Since the May 4th Movement, our workers in new literature and art have won many victories in battle against the enemy. We have defeated feudal literature and art, and over the past twenty years we have also defeated the fascist literature and art of the Kuomintang reactionary clique as well as the traitorous literature and art of the servants of imperialism. With the new-democratic orientation for literature and art, we have formed a broad literary and art front. In the Liberated Areas, many literary and art workers have visited the army units, the villages and recently also the factories; they have gone among the worker-peasant-soldier masses in order to serve them. We have already witnessed preliminary achievements in this respect. In areas formerly ruled by the Kuomintang, revolutionary literary and art workers stuck to their posts and, despite heavy pressure, upheld the revolutionary traditions in literature and art that date back to the May 4th Movement. Except for a few reactionaries, who have been rejected by the people, almost all the members of the National Association for Literature and Art,<sup>447</sup> which was established in Kuomintang areas during the period of the anti-Japanese war and which is one of the organizations sponsoring the present congress, have united under the banner of New Democracy and nearly all of their major representative figures are participating in this congress.

For the achievement of this great unity in literary and art circles, we must give credit to friends who have stuck to their posts and carried on arduous struggles, to the people throughout the country who have supported the new literary and art movement and especially to the People's Liberation Army, which has won tremendous victories on the military front. Without this victory, this great unity and this great assemblage of more than seven hundred people would be impossible today. Therefore, in the first part of my speech, I'd like to talk about the victories won in the three years of the People's War of Liberation, about their causes and about the lessons that writers and artists should draw from them.

## I. THE VICTORIES OF THE THREE YEARS OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR OF LIBERATION

Counting from July 1946, the People's War of Liberation has been going on a full three years. The battle records of these three years are unprecedented in Chinese history. Three years ago, with the support of U.S. imperialism, the Kuomintang reactionaries mobilized 4,300,000 troops for attack. We had only 1,200,000 men in the People's Liberation Army, or 3,100,000 fewer than the enemy. The reactionaries and their U.S. masters were confident that they could overpower the PLA. Many well-intentioned friends were also worried about us. We thanked these friends, but told them with confidence that victory in the war would certainly be ours. In November 1946 when I left Nanjing, the Kuomintang capital, with the rest of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party, many reporters asked me, "Will you come back again?" I said, "One of these days we will return." Friends! Today, sure enough, we have returned to Nanjing — except that it is not that old delegation which has entered Nanjing, but the victorious People's Liberation Army!

In the first year of the war, the enemy was on the offensive, but because of our heavy counter-blows, its total offensive very quickly became a partial offensive or an offensive against key sectors only. In the second year, we began to counter-attack. Our field armies in north and east China crossed the Huanghe River and advanced on the north bank of the Changjiang, while the Northeastern People's Liberation Army fought from north to south Manchuria. In the third year of the



war, our offensive was crowned with decisive victories. After the Jinan campaign of September 1948, the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign of September to November 1948, the Huai-Hai campaign of November 1948 to the beginning of January this year and the Beiping-Tianjin campaign of December 1948 to the end of January,<sup>428</sup> Chiang Kai-shek's military strength was basically destroyed. When the PLA crossed the Changjiang River and advanced south in April this year, Chiang was unable to organize a really significant defence. In the three years from July 1946 to the present, the Kuomintang's military strength has been reduced from its initial 4,300,000 to 1,490,000 men, of whom only about a half are combat troops, the rest being administrative, training and logistics personnel. Our People's Liberation Army, on the other hand, has increased from 1,200,000 to more than four million. By a remarkable coincidence, they have lost 2,800,000 men and we have gained 2,800,000. Of our 4,000,000 troops, more than 2,200,000 field troops are now on the advance, mopping up the remaining 800,000 enemy troops, who have already lost their fighting strength. We have already liberated 279,000,000 people, some 59 per cent of the entire population, 1,061 cities and towns, or 53 per cent of the nation's urban centres, and 21,600 kilometres of railroads, 80 per cent of the nation's total. Aside from the temporary superiority still held by the enemy on the sea and in the air, the people already enjoy superiority in all respects. This situation leads us to believe that the fourth year of the People's War of Liberation will be the year in which we shall win nationwide victory.

In these three years, our casualties have totalled 1,430,000, while we have eliminated 5,690,000 of the enemy — which is to say that for every one of our casualties we put four of their men out of action. Of the 5,690,000 troops lost by the enemy, 70 per cent, or 4,150,000, have been captured by us, and 2,800,000 have become liberated soldiers. In the three years, we eliminated 495 divisions of regular enemy troops; if irregular troops are included, we annihilated 2,150 regiments. Captured officers of the rank of general, plus division commanders of the rank of colonel, number 927. Weaponry captured in the three years includes over 44,000 cannon, over 250,000 light and heavy machine-guns, over 2,000,000 rifles and pistols, 134 aeroplanes, 123 naval vessels, 582 tanks, 361 armoured vehicles, 130,000 horses, more than 370,000,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition, and 3,110,000 shells. With these liberated soldiers and captured arms and ammunition, we have struck back at the enemy and defeated him.

Why is it that the People's Liberation Army has been able to achieve such great victories? The first reason, of course, is that the war it is fighting is a just, patriotic, people's revolutionary war, because the PLA represents the interests of the whole people and has fought the war in their interest. But here we ought to point out the fine qualities of the People's Liberation Army itself. Having undergone twenty-two years of tempering, it has a high level of political consciousness, strict discipline, great combat effectiveness and mature strategy and tactics. During the last three years in particular, the PLA has undergone remoulding. Why do I use this word "remoulding"? Because a majority of the soldiers were prisoners of war a short while ago, and without undergoing remoulding they wouldn't be able to abide by Liberation Army discipline. The most effective means of remoulding is to arouse class consciousness. We do this by the "pouring out of grievances", by the "three check-ups" (on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight) and by the "three evaluations" (of cadres, Party members and battle performance). Through these campaigns, the captured enemy soldiers come to realize that they are all of working people's origin and have been oppressed and exploited by the reactionaries, that the PLA is the working people's own army and that they should unite as one to fight in their own interests against those who have oppressed and exploited them. The PLA is an army with strict discipline, but this discipline is based on political consciousness. Within the PLA units military, political and economic democracy is practised, while externally work is done to demoralize the enemy forces, to support the government and cherish the people, and to educate and organize the local people. The officers and men of the PLA are thus able to maintain close ties with the masses, to steadily heighten their own political consciousness and to acquire an invincible strength in battle.

Comrades and friends from literary and art circles! If you wish to write, you should not forget to portray the great people's army of this great epoch. I suggest to the Political Department of our People's Revolutionary Military Commission, to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and to all the delegates from the Liberation Army that you should take advantage of this time while the war is still going on to welcome those writers and artists who have not seen the People's Liberation Army, to let them visit the units and give them facilities to investigate and write.

The People's Liberation Army is not fighting this war alone. In the high tide of the three years of people's war, 200 million peasants

have been a great supporting force. More than 100 million peasants have carried on a struggle for agrarian reform and have gained land, while another 100 million are now preparing to solve the land problem. In the near future another 200 million peasants will plunge into the tempests of agrarian reform. For agrarian China, this is a matter of earth-shaking significance. What does the great Chinese peasantry contribute to the war after agrarian reform? They send their sons and husbands to join the People's War of Liberation, they supply our front and rear areas with the grain they produce and save, and they serve as militiamen and labourers. Not only do they maintain order in the rear, but large numbers also follow the troops out to the front lines to do various kinds of work in support of the war effort. And as soon as the war has passed beyond a given area, there is a surge in production there. Comrades and friends, it is by relying on the great, industrious and courageous Chinese peasantry that we have won victory today. We should be grateful to the great Chinese peasantry, and particularly to those in the old Liberated Areas. Even though the peasants are backward in some respects and need remoulding through patient work, their bravery, industriousness, thrift and simplicity deserve to be praised, recorded and publicized. Thus we hope that writers and artists who are already accustomed to rural life will continue to work in the villages and serve them. At the same time, we also urge those who have not been to the countryside and are not accustomed to rural life to go and learn from the peasants and make friends with them, so as to be able to record their heroic struggles and the achievements they have scored in the face of extreme hardships and immense difficulties.

The victory in the People's War of Liberation must also be attributed to the efforts of the working class. Although we have spent most of the last twenty-two years in the villages, among the peasants or in the army, the struggle we have been carrying on is inseparable from the working class. Politically, it has been waged under the leadership of the working class, through its vanguard, the Communist Party. Actually, even when we were in the countryside, the workers were indispensable to us. First of all, it would have been impossible to conduct large-scale warfare without munitions. The weapons were obtained mainly from the enemy, but we still had to supply the ammunition ourselves. We relied on workers; we had several thousand men carry big boilers from mines and factories up to the Taihang Mountains, to Mount Wutai and to the Yi-Meng mountain area and set up factories there. Tens

of millions of hand-grenades, several million mortar shells and several hundred thousand cannon shells were produced this way. By the second half of last year, we were already producing more grenades, mortar shells, cannon shells and explosives than the Kuomintang reactionaries. Aside from the munitions industry, we also developed small-scale light industry in the rural areas to meet the needs of the troops and the people. Now that we've entered the cities, it becomes still clearer that workers are indispensable. Only by relying on the working class will we be able to restore and develop industry. Day by day, the working class is becoming the major force in building China, and day by day it is becoming an important theme for our literary and art work.

Writers and artists engage in mental labour; in a broad sense, they too are members of the working class. Mental workers should learn from manual workers. A characteristic of mental workers in general is that they work alone (of course, many of the activities of choral groups, drama troupes and film studios are collective), and this can easily give rise to non-collectivist tendencies. Writers and artists should make a special effort to learn the working-class spirit of collectivism.

To achieve victory in the People's War of Liberation we relied on the PLA and on the people's democratic united front comprising peasants, workers, revolutionary intellectuals and all patriotic democrats. But basically, the most decisive factor has been the correct leadership of the Communist Party, which organized the Chinese people's revolution, and the correct leadership of the Chinese people's leader, Comrade Mao Zedong. From birth to maturity, the Chinese Communist Party has made many mistakes and met with many failures, but Comrade Mao has always been on the correct side. As you all know, the enemies of the Chinese revolution are not the ordinary run of enemies. The reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang is the concentrated expression of thousands of years of feudal rule and of more than a century of foreign capitalist and imperialist aggression. We should be grateful to Comrade Mao Zedong for correctly applying the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism to China's revolutionary practice, thereby creating a tremendous force with which to vanquish the powerful enemies of the Chinese revolution. We call on everyone to learn from Comrade Mao Zedong and to combine revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice. At the same time, we call on all progressive writers and artists to try to understand the Communist Party, because it has already formed unbreakable bonds with

the Chinese people in their life and struggles. If you do not understand the Communist Party, you cannot correctly understand and portray the main aspect of the Chinese people's life and struggles today. Comrade Liu Shaoqi often says that members of Party committees at every level should all make some friends in literary and art circles, in order to help them and to learn from them. We hope that everyone will join in the common effort to this end.

Finally, we must call attention to the support and assistance which popular forces all over the world have rendered to the Chinese people in their struggle for liberation. It was not only in their victorious war against Japan that the Chinese people received tremendous aid from the world anti-fascist front, with the Soviet Union at its head. In the War of Liberation too they have received enormous assistance from the world camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union. The imperialist camp committed the major part of its forces to the West and only a secondary part to the East, and from the point of view of the Chinese revolution, this was a favourable condition of the first importance. The existence of the Soviet Union and of the People's Democracies, the anti-imperialist struggles of the oppressed nations of Asia and other regions and, in the capitalist countries, the revolutionary movements of the proletariat and the anti-war movements of peace-loving people — all these forces make a sum total larger than the sum total of the forces of imperialism and reaction. This has prevented the outbreak of a new world war, and it has prevented U.S. imperialism from expanding its armed intervention in China.

One task of our writers and artists is to spread this truth among the people of the whole country. We must clearly distinguish between ourselves and the enemy, lay bare the crimes of imperialism, strike hard at the propaganda of the warmongers and expose their threats and their attempts at incitement and deception. This is a serious task necessitated by both the interests of the Chinese nation and by those of the people the world over. To undertake it signifies at once patriotism and internationalism.

## II. SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING LITERATURE AND ART

In the second part of my speech, I want to discuss some problems concerning literature and art.

First, the question of unity. This present congress of ours is one of unity among literary and art circles. It should be said that the 753 delegates attending this congress are highly representative. If propaganda teams and choral groups are included, there are 25,000 to 30,000 people engaged in literary and art work in the four field armies of the PLA as well as in the armies directly under the General Headquarters of the PLA and in the five military areas.<sup>468</sup> Estimates place the number of local writers and artists in the Liberated Areas at upwards of twenty thousand. Taken together, the two groups amount to around 60,000 people. These are the literary and art workers represented by the more than 400 delegates from the Liberated Areas. The number of people engaged in new literature and art in regions formerly under Kuomintang rule is more difficult to calculate, but the total is probably more than ten thousand. In other words, the 753 delegates here represent a total force of around 70,000 engaged in new literature and art — each of you represents about a hundred people. In addition, there are large numbers of popular artists of the old type. I hope that after you go back, you will be able to lead writers and artists in every field in propagating the spirit of unity that characterizes this congress. Moreover, I hope that you will maintain constant and close ties with this army of literary and art workers so that you will truly be their worthy representatives.

Second, the question of serving the people. Everybody agrees with this slogan, so the problem now is how to implement it. First we should ask ourselves what we are familiar with and what we are not. Writers and artists in the army are familiar with their units and to some extent with the countryside, but they are unacquainted with workers and conditions in the cities. The local writers and artists in the Liberated Areas are familiar with the peasantry but are not completely familiar with the army units, and they also know little about the cities. Owing to circumstances, our friends from the new Liberated Areas were not able to go among the masses in the past, but today the situation has changed and they have the opportunity to do so. In short, the first thing we should do is to become familiar with workers, peasants and soldiers, because they are the main body of the people and, besides, they are people about whom most of you present here know little or nothing. When it comes to the life, thinking and feelings of the petty bourgeoisie, most of you are already well acquainted with them.

We must get to know the workers first. At present, writers and artists are generally unfamiliar with workers, so there are very few works reflecting their life. We hope it will be possible for a number of writers and artists to go to the factories. Those who are unable to go themselves should spread the slogan and start a movement to urge tens of thousands of writers and artists to go there.

In recent years, some comrades have already begun to become familiar with peasants and soldiers, and our soldiers are in the main peasants carrying guns. You should try to know them better and to help those who don't know them at all. It takes a long time to understand the life of the workers, peasants and soldiers and to think and feel the way they do. So I hope that those who have already been to the countryside will not be complacent. The peasants make up the vast majority of the Chinese population. For a long long time, Chinese history has been mainly a history of peasant wars, and in the last twenty-odd years it has been a history of peasant war under the leadership of the working class. So all workers in literature and art should get to know the peasants and understand the war.

In saying that literature and art should serve the workers, peasants and soldiers, we do not mean, of course, that literary and art works must only portray workers, peasants and soldiers. For example, we cannot portray the condition of workers before liberation without writing about oppression by bureaucrat-capital; we cannot write about present-day production without touching on the policy of benefiting both labour and capital; we cannot write about peasants in the feudal countryside without dealing with landlord brutality; and we cannot write about the People's War of Liberation without describing the senseless sacrifice of the soldiers in the Kuomintang armies and describing their reactionary officers. So I'm not saying that we shouldn't be familiar with the other classes in society, or that we shouldn't write about persons from other classes, but that we must be clear about what to emphasize. Otherwise, we won't be able to portray this great era or its creators, the great working people.

Third, popularization and the raising of standards. Doesn't popularization still take first place at present? Yes it does. In the Liberated Areas some work has been done by way of popularization, but it's still far from meeting our needs. It is true that the literary and art works of a popular nature currently being produced are still very rough, requiring improvement and refinement, but that is no cause for worry. And it would be a serious mistake to look down on popularization for

that reason. All newborn things are crude and childish. We shouldn't criticize them too much, but rather cherish them and help them, just as we would our own children. We should criticize and educate our children, but we must not beat and curse them or we'll stunt their growth. The newborn things are always shouting at the top of their lungs, for they want to transform the old world; this is a revolutionary spirit. The old literature and art, separated as it is from the people, is already moribund. No matter how fine it appears on the surface, inside it is already rotten. Hope lies in the new. Although our works of popular literature and art still aren't of very high quality, they are what the broad masses enjoy hearing and seeing. So we must stress the growth and successes, however small, of the new literature and art.

Fourth, the transformation of the old literature and art. I feel that we have not paid adequate attention to this matter. We ought to stress the transformation of whatever in the old literature and art appeals to the masses. First and foremost, this means a transformation of content. But at the same time there must also be suitable, step-by-step transformation of the old forms. Only then will it be possible to achieve harmony and unity of form and content. We are happy that many friends well-established in the old literary and art world are willing to participate in this work of transformation and that they even hope to join with the cadres of the new literary and art circles to carry it out. We ought to welcome them very warmly. The old society was fond of the old content and the old forms of literature and art, but it looked down on the traditional artists and held them in contempt. Now there is a new society, a new era, and we ought to respect all artists loved by the masses. Only when we respect them will it be possible to remould them. We have done something in this regard, but our accomplishments are still very small. From now on, we must unite with all the traditional artists in the country who are willing to remould themselves; we must organize them, lead them and transform the old literature and art completely. If, instead of uniting with them, we reject them and attempt to suddenly replace them, we will never succeed. We should mobilize the enormous strength of the old literary and art world — the hundreds of thousands of writers and artists who influence an audience of tens of millions — mobilize them to take an active part in the movement for transformation. To be frank, this work has only just started. Some people feel that the old literature and art have no future and will die out anyway, and so they just ignore



them, leaving them to their fate. But in actual fact, the masses still enjoy watching and listening to them. Writers and artists who are responsible to the people cannot treat this fact lightly. Will the old literature and art die out? I think that question should be answered this way: they will die out, but they also have a future. Parts of the old literature and art that are bad and out of keeping with the people's interests and demands will certainly die out. For example, things that propagate feudal and other counter-revolutionary ideologies will be eliminated, while those that are desirable and fit to develop will improve and advance and gradually become part of the new literature and art. They have a future and will not perish. This approach will help solve the problem correctly. If we maintain that everything in the old literature and art is good and must be preserved, we will be moving towards the doctrine of "back to the ancients". If, on the other hand, we hold that everything in them is bad and must be rejected or ignored, we will be taking a mistaken attitude towards the national tradition and mass sentiment, contradicting our principle of popularization first and, at the same time, going against our theory of placing everything in its proper historical context. Like the new popular literature and art we create, the old literature and art will be crude at the beginning of its transformation. But we must not look down on it just because it is unrefined, for as long as we look down on it, it will have very little chance to grow and become strong. Without doubt, the transformation will be an enormous job, taking a long time. It cannot possibly be done to perfection at one stroke. But neither should we relax our efforts because the work will be long and arduous.

Fifth, the need for our literary and art circles to take the over-all situation into account. Our writer and artist friends come from many quarters. Take those from the Liberated Areas. Some are from army units and have worked there for a long time. Others are from local organizations in the Liberated Areas. Their work bears a local stamp because of historical circumstances. Now we are all gathered under one roof to discuss future work in literature and art for the whole nation. This means that of necessity everyone must take the over-all situation into account. We should consider not only our own branch of work or the circumstances in which we as individuals work, but also the whole struggle for liberation and literary and art work throughout the country. Only thus can our work be properly organized. Today, as the nation approaches complete liberation, the most important task in the rear areas is to increase production. Our writers and artists must

understand that the initial period in the building of a new-democratic China will be an extremely difficult period of reconstruction in which, insofar as possible, each department, each individual and each project will have to grow very quickly. At the same time, these developments will have to be planned in accordance with the demands and possibilities of the over-all situation. Arrangements for the division of labour in the various departments must be decided according to priority.

The present congress of unity among writers and artists has gone really well. But if we believe that everything is satisfactory, or that from now on the work will proceed smoothly, we are bound to be disappointed in many aspects of our work as soon as we come into contact with reality. If all the writers and artists in our various departments have the over-all situation in mind and are able to think in terms of the present task of construction and our political movements, our work will progress more rapidly. For example, our troops will continue their advance in the South, the Northwest and the Southwest to liberate the as yet unliberated 200 million people. The many writers and artists in army units will move into new areas along with them and popularize our literature and art — this will be the main task for our literary and art workers in the armed forces. For this reason, even though our writers and artists in army units may ask for a chance to study and raise their professional level, and though some of them may be sent back for training, the number is bound to be small. And in the beginning it may not be possible to release any at all. At times like these, individual demands must be subordinated to the interests of the whole. The same is true of local writers and artists in the old Liberated Areas, who may be transferred to the new areas to organize the local writers and artists and promote literary and art work there. This is also a kind of co-ordination of literature and art with politics.

At present, we should be prepared to meet more difficulties than expected, so that we can carry on under any conditions, however difficult. If conditions turn out less difficult than expected, so much the better. I say this so that we may all be mentally prepared.

Finally, the question of organization. As the delegates to this congress all feel that we should establish an organization, we must settle the matter. Not only must we establish an all-China federation of literary and art circles. We should also set up separate associations for literature, drama, the cinema, music, painting, dance, etc. following the pattern of the Federation of Trade Unions, under which there are various industrial unions. Only in this way will we be able to carry

on our work better, train new talent, extend activities and institute reforms. Everybody agrees on this point, so now we must get started, because we can't convene this kind of congress often. I hope that during or after this meeting, you will establish the different associations. So much for the mass organizations.

At the same time, the New Political Consultative Conference<sup>417</sup> will establish a nationwide democratic coalition government, which will include a department of literature and art. This department will rely on the support of the mass organizations we just spoke of, because its purpose will be to serve the broad masses and their organizations as well as the large numbers of writers and artists. Our state is a people's state and the government is a people's government, a people's regime in which democratic centralism is practised from the bottom to the top and vice versa. It is a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat. Therefore, our literary and art circles should also pay attention to this aspect and should send representatives to participate in the New Political Consultative Conference. The department of literature and art under our new-democratic regime will need to have all our writers and artists actively participate in its affairs.

In the past, some field armies had as many as 8,000 literary and art workers each, while others had very few. Naturally this was because the different armies had developed separately under different circumstances. It's the same in the localities: some counties have a performing arts troupe while others do not. This uneven development will persist for some time, but there will be gradual adjustment among the various army units and localities and between the cities and countryside. In particular, we must send large groups of people to the new liberated areas. In the past, our friends in the Kuomintang areas fought alone, with no contact with others. They worked their way into any openings available under the reactionaries' rule, strengthened their foothold and went into hiding when faced with suppression. Things are different now: it's a people's country and we can organize things ourselves. So all work in literature and art, whether it is sponsored by the government or by the mass organizations, should be organized in a planned way. The leading bodies you elect will have to ensure that this is done.

Those are the things I wanted to say about literature and art. I hope you will consider them during your deliberations.

Comrades and friends! This congress is one of unity. It signifies the coming together of the two armies of writers and artists, one from

the old Liberated Areas and the other from the new. It is a gathering of representatives of the new literature and art and of representatives of the old literature and art who favour transformation, a gathering of writers and artists from the countryside, the cities and the army units. This congress demonstrates the breadth of our unity, a great, triumphant unity under the banner of New Democracy and with Comrade Mao Zedong's orientation for a new literature and art.

With the approach of final nationwide victory, it is at last possible for the more than 700 representatives to manifest this great unity, to hold this great gathering. We have Comrade Mao Zedong to thank for this. It is he who has led the Chinese revolution to victory. And it is he whom we must thank for the new orientation in literature and art, which has made it possible for us to achieve victory in this field.

## RESTORE PRODUCTION, RECONSTRUCT CHINA

*July 23, 1949*

Comrades,

Our National Conference on Trade Union Work has opened. Commander-in-Chief Zhu De has just spoken about many of the problems in trade union work, and at the following sessions you will discuss many specific matters, so I won't go into them here. What I am going to talk about is the present political situation and the focus of our work.

Basic victory has now been won in the People's War of Liberation, but not yet total victory. We have started reconstruction but the war is still going on. The revolution has yet to move towards complete victory. We find ourselves in a complicated situation, in the midst of transition and development. We must fight the war to the finish and carry the revolution through to the end. We must fight our way to Taiwan, to Hainan Island, to Kunming and to Xinjiang. We must drive out the imperialist forces of aggression, overcome their blockade and transform China's colonial and semi-colonial economy into a self-reliant, independent economy. The prime aim of all our work is to support the war and to carry the revolution through to the end. The same is true of our trade union work.

In the present circumstances, "Restore production and build a new China" is the slogan our trade unions should use to mobilize the entire working class. It will be an arduous task to restore production and readjust the economy, for the production units we are taking over are so numerous and so unwieldy. It is relatively easy to take them over without making any changes. In each successive city — Tianjin, Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan — the takeover has been accomplished more smoothly than in the last. However, the next task, the task of management, will be much harder. What is more, we have to reform

---

An excerpt from a speech delivered at the National Conference on Trade Union Work.

the old system. China's semi-colonial economy was structured to serve imperialism. Now we must change it. Gradually but confidently we must restructure China's economy. The first problem confronting us is the disharmony between the urban and the rural economy, a problem that is aggravated because of the imperialist blockade. Factories in the cities used to rely mainly on the raw materials and means of transportation from imperialist countries for their operations. For instance, the textile mills in Shanghai relied mainly on U.S. cotton for spinning their yarn and weaving their cloth, and on foreign transport for marketing their goods overseas. They served the interests of imperialism. Today, things are different. Conditions have completely changed, as they should have. We should rely on our own raw materials and transport capabilities for production. But the economic structure remains lopsided and irrational as before, which causes difficulties for us. Next, the bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises we take over have a great many supernumeraries. Kuomintang personnel were added to their staffs during Japanese and puppet rule, and together they formed a bureaucratic managerial structure. That means a waste of manpower and enormous expenditures and has saddled us with another heavy burden. Last, the rural areas under the Kuomintang rule are so devastated that they are no longer able to provide the urban industries with raw materials. The production of cotton is an example. Output has fallen in all the Kuomintang areas because of the dumping of American cotton. The same is true of the production of all other raw materials. So after the liberation of the cities, we shall find shortages of raw materials, falling production, shrinking markets, inadequate transportation and considerable unemployment. This is unavoidable for a certain period of time. We should realize, however, that such difficulties are different both from those which arise following the defeat of a revolution or from those in the imperialist countries' economies. How many times greater than our present difficulties were those we had to face in times of defeat! Yet even then, we were able to turn defeat into victory. The economic difficulties in the imperialist countries are inherent in the imperialist economic system and are thus insurmountable. But our difficulties are such as arise after the victory of a revolution. They are a legacy of imperialism and Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalism. They have not been created by the new-democratic system. Rather, it is precisely this system which will enable us to overcome them.

In order to restore production, we must first restore agricultural production. When we carry out agrarian reform after the liberation of the villages, agricultural output will increase within a year. This has already been demonstrated in the North, Northeast and Northwest. The liberation of the Northeast was completed last year. We are planning to increase grain output there by one and a half million tons this year. This will be a significant increase. The liberation of north China was completed in the spring of this year, and we can expect an increase in agricultural output there next year. It will be the same in east, central and south China. At present, our war is proceeding very satisfactorily, and little damage is being done to the villages. If first we work to avoid a decline in agricultural production, then we can go on to achieve an increase. When agricultural production and supplies of raw materials are increased, we shall have a better foundation for industrial production. The second task is to restore transportation, starting with the railways. By the end of this year, 80 per cent of China's 20,000 kilometres of railways should be restored. Next year, we should not only restore the remaining 20 per cent, but also build new railways. We must have a sound transportation system if we are to restore production. For example, restoring the railways in the area south of the Huaihe River can stimulate its coal production and thus help to ensure the rehabilitation of industry in Shanghai. Later the Beiping-Hankou and Guangzhou-Hankou Railways should likewise be restored. Moreover, our iron and steel and engineering industries should give priority to manufacturing rails, locomotives, coaches and freight cars. They should also produce more farm implements, such as water wheels, to help the villages. All these things urgently need to be done to restore our production, but of course we must do far more.

Viewed as a whole, our cause is prospering. However, in a few particular localities, such as Shanghai, or in a few particular fields, there may actually have been some decline in production. The colonial commerce in the big cities, which has been flooding the market with foreign goods, will suffer some decline and a number of business undertakings will have to close down. In particular, factories manufacturing consumer goods which the people don't need will have to shut down, together with the shops which sold those goods. With the decline in such production, some workers will lose their jobs. But that will be a temporary decline in an expanding economy, a slump in a developing commerce, stagnation in a recovering transportation system and unemployment amidst increasing job opportunities. All this is a question

of the relationship between the whole and the part, between the main current and side eddies. We must have a correct understanding of these matters.

In our efforts to win complete victory in the revolution and to shake off all the shackles imposed on us by the imperialists, we are bound to encounter many difficulties they left behind. We must be prepared to meet and overcome them. Hence, we must maintain and carry forward the revolutionary tradition of hard work and plain living that we have established over the years in the countryside. Now, in new surroundings, we must see to it that we have better staff and simpler administration, and that we persist in our frugal way of life. When taking over the various institutions, we should not inherit the characteristics of bureaucratic organizations. Instead, we must transform them. Although we are in the cities now, we should keep on wearing our old clothes and not emulate the extravagant and corrupt way of life fostered by the exploiting classes. Rather, we should keep to the style of plain living that we have always maintained. Only thus can we reduce government expenditures and ensure that the goods produced by the people, especially by the working class, are used first of all for the revolution, for the war. This alone will give us the strength to increase production and overcome the difficulties left to us by the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries. This is what we ask of the working class as we rehabilitate production. This is what we ask of the entire people.

While in the countryside, our Party relied on the peasants and led them in the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the three years of the War of Liberation. The peasants' contribution to the country has been especially great. In terms of manpower, they have sent more than seven million of their sons and husbands to join the army. And think of all the people they have sent to serve as labourers at the front! Think of all the people who have joined the militia and fought in guerrilla wars! Then there is the grain contributed by the peasants. The average annual income of a peasant is probably four hundred catties of millet. Out of that, he has to give eighty catties, or 20 per cent of the total, to the state. Now we are in the cities. Our expenditures have increased. For instance, the three big cities of Shanghai, Tianjin and Beiping have a total population of ten million. And their production has not yet been restored. How much people's currency will we have to issue there? Who is going to bear the burden? It will still fall on the shoulders of the peasantry —



the most reliable ally of the working class. So our comrades working in the cities should keep the peasants in mind. Now our working class too will have to bear similar hardships and play its appropriate role.

The working class will take part in all kinds of reconstruction work in new China. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the local federations of trade unions will send representatives to the forthcoming New Political Consultative Conference,<sup>417</sup> thus participating in the work of building New China's organs of political power. But not only the representatives of the trade unions should participate. Our revolutionary functionaries, who have been engaged in revolutionary work for decades, are also a part of the working class. Their representatives also represent the working class, and they too should play a leading role in the establishment of the national organs of political power. Local people's governments are also being built in various parts of the country. The working class must play a leading role in that work as well. It must also take part in building up our national defence capability. We have proceeded from guerrilla to regular warfare, equipping ourselves with captured arms while eliminating the enemy. To deal with imperialist aggression in the future, we must rely on our own capability to produce weapons and military equipment. This means that our working class must make still greater efforts. And the working class must participate in cultural development too. In short, it must take part in all kinds of reconstruction work, but its fundamental task is to restore and increase production. If we can restore and increase production in a systematic, planned and organized way, we will surely be able to build a new China.

Lastly, I want to take up the question of unity. We need unity in order to carry the revolution through to the end, to restore production and to build a new China. There are four types of unity:

First of all, our working class itself must unite. The number of organized workers is said to be more than a million at present. If we get all the workers, staff and handicraftsmen in the nation united and draw in the rural agricultural workers as well, the total will exceed ten million. Trade unions are mass organizations of the working class. They are organs which educate the workers, serve their interests and help to lead and participate in various kinds of reconstruction work on behalf of the working class. In order to achieve the unity of the working class, we must pay attention not just to its advanced section, but also to the backward and middle sections. We must help, educate, organize and unite with these backward and middle sections and lead

them forward, instead of being sectarian and finding fault with them, treating them coldly or excluding them from our ranks. It is imperative that we understand clearly the importance of achieving the unity of the entire working class. Only then can it display its tremendous strength and shoulder the tasks I mentioned earlier.

Second, there must be unity between the workers and the managerial staff in state-owned enterprises. Both workers and staff belong to the working class, the only difference between them being a division of labour, with the staff holding managerial posts and the workers engaging directly in manual labour. There is no class antagonism between them. These factories were formerly owned by bureaucrat-capital, and naturally the workers had feelings of antagonism and resentment towards management and struggled against it. But now the situation has changed, and we should replace the old attitude of antagonism with a new attitude of unity. The best organ for achieving this unity is the factory management committee. All managerial personnel in the factories should guard against the old bureaucratic practices. Democracy should be practised in the factories, and all issues, such as production policies and plans, should be discussed democratically and in concrete terms by representatives of the workers, the management and the engineers together. At the same time, however, factory directors should be given the power of final decision. Only when we have democracy, centralism and unity among all can we raise production.

Third, in privately owned enterprises, we must unite with the national bourgeoisie. Having suffered from oppression by imperialism, China's national bourgeoisie are willing to free themselves from its economic fetters and develop their enterprises. So there is still a progressive and constructive side to their character. At the same time, they are weak, vacillating and sometimes opportunistic and destructive. This is because they could not survive in the past without being opportunistic. Today, the opportunistic and destructive side of their character must be discarded, which will require struggle. However, we must also recognize their progressive side and encourage them to develop their constructive side. Only thus will we be able to unite with them. We must carry out the policy of benefiting both labour and capital, and here the key link is the signing of collective contracts in all these enterprises and industries so as to resolve the problem between labour and capital. Otherwise, it will be impossible to restrict the struggle between the two, which, if not correctly handled, might

lead to strikes and damage production. By signing such collective contracts, both sides will be able to devote their efforts to production.

Fourth, there is the unity of the Chinese working class with the international working class. Only with such unity will it be possible to check the war adventures of the imperialist aggressors. The victory of the Chinese revolution has won the welcome and support of the workers of the whole world and has in turn strengthened all the forces for world peace.

Unity is strength! Only with unity will we be able to fulfil all our tasks!

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DRAFT COMMON PROGRAMME OF THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

*September 22, 1949*

The draft "Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference"<sup>449</sup> was prepared by the Communist Party of China, which has been entrusted with this responsibility by the Third Sub-Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative Conference.<sup>417</sup> After the first version of the draft was ready, it was discussed and revised seven times, twice in group sessions of the five to six hundred delegates to the CPPCC who had arrived in Beijing, three times by the Third Sub-Committee itself and twice by the Standing Committee of the Preparatory Committee. The revised draft, incorporating suggestions from all quarters, was then presented to the second plenary session of the Preparatory Committee, which basically approved it. The draft is now being submitted to the present plenary session of the CPPCC for discussion. In the course of the consultations, discussions have centred on the following issues, which I shall now explain.

The first is the question of the Chinese people's democratic united front. The united front dates back to the period of the Great Revolution.<sup>461</sup> Thanks to the proposal and efforts of the Chinese Communist Party and with the approval of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang was reorganized, the co-operation of the Kuomintang and the Communist

---

The first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was held in Beijing from September 21 to September 30, 1949. Comrade Zhou Enlai was delegated by the Central Committee of the Party to take charge of drafting the Common Programme of the CPPCC, and he made a report at the plenary session entitled "On the Preparation of the Draft 'Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference' and Its Characteristics". This is an abstract of the report.

Party was facilitated and the Northern Expedition<sup>117</sup> was carried out victoriously. Later, Chiang Kai-shek sabotaged this united front. But the Communist Party continued to strive for a people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front. It was especially thanks to Comrade Mao Zedong that this policy was further developed and successfully applied. But the Kuomintang reactionaries opposed the united front from beginning to end: they launched three anti-Communist onslaughts<sup>450</sup> during the War of Resistance Against Japan and, after the war, they abrogated the "October 10th Agreement"<sup>367</sup> and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference,<sup>339</sup> finally unleashing full-scale civil war. The civil war has educated the people, so that gradually they have come to give unanimous support to the People's Liberation Army in waging the War of Liberation, wiping out the reactionaries and carrying the revolution through to the end. Last year, in keeping with its consistent stand for a united front, the Chinese Communist Party called for a New Political Consultative Conference and received a warm response from the democratic parties and from the people of the whole nation. Now this demand is being met. Our goal is very clear: as stated in the draft Common Programme and in the organic law of the CPPCC, we want to realize New Democracy, oppose imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and establish an independent, democratic, peaceful, united, prosperous and strong new China. To this end, we unite with the democratic classes and nationalities in the country and the overseas Chinese as well and form the great people's democratic united front. It is not only the Communist Party that has been struggling for the last twenty-eight years to achieve this goal; the democratic parties, people's organizations, regions, troops, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and all patriotic democratic personages likewise favour and support it. In his essay, *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Comrade Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that it is the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army and the people's democratic united front which have brought about the present victory in the people's democratic revolution. Hence, in the discussions of the Preparatory Committee, it was agreed that this kind of united front should continue throughout the new-democratic period and that it should be given organizational form to promote its development. It was further agreed that the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is its best organizational form.

Two other opinions emerged from the discussions. The first was that after the convening of the people's congress there would no longer

be any need for such an organization as the CPPCC. The second was that the parties were so closely united that New Democracy would develop rapidly and that consequently the democratic parties would not last very long. Later on in the discussions, these two opinions were generally considered not quite right, because they did not accord with the development of China's revolution and the needs of reconstruction. Undoubtedly, it will take some time to convene a national people's congress elected by universal suffrage, but even after it is convened, the CPPCC will still play a consultative, advisory and promotive role with regard to the work of the central government. Moreover, since classes will still exist during the new-democratic period, so will political parties. The rulers of the old democratic state were bourgeois, and the bourgeois factions inevitably tried to squeeze each other out, scrambling for power and profit. In the new-democratic state, though there are differences in interests and attitudes among the various classes led by the working class, agreement can be reached on common demands and major policies — witness the draft Common Programme adopted by the Preparatory Committee. And in the face of the struggle against the remnants of imperialism and feudalism, the different demands and contradictions within the people's democratic united front can and should be adjusted.

The second question is the general programme of New Democracy. The opinion was expressed that since we recognize that New Democracy is only a transitional stage and must develop towards the higher stages of socialism and communism, this perspective should be clearly defined in the general programme. The Preparatory Committee held that there was not the slightest doubt about the future course of development, but that its validity should be explained, publicized and, especially, proved to the entire people through practice. Only when they come to understand through their own practice that this is the sole — the best — course will they really acknowledge it and wholeheartedly strive for it. So while we are not putting it in writing for the time being, we do not deny it; on the contrary, we are treating it with the utmost care. Moreover, in the economic section of the programme, it is already specified that we will make sure to advance along this course.

The general programme has very clear provisions concerning the rights of the people and their duties to the state. One definition requires explanation, that is, the distinction between "people" and "nationals". "People" refers to the working class, the peasantry, the petty bour-

geoisie, the national bourgeoisie and those patriotic democratic elements who are politically conscious and have come over from the reactionary classes. As for the bureaucrat-capitalist class after its property has been confiscated and the landlord class after its land has been redistributed, we must severely suppress their reactionary activities. But that constitutes the negative side. From a positive point of view, we must pay more attention to compelling them to engage in labour, so that they can be reformed and become new people. Until such time as they are changed, they do not fall under the category of the people, although they are Chinese nationals. Temporarily they are not allowed to enjoy the same rights as the people, but they must discharge the duties of nationals. This is the people's democratic dictatorship. It will be beneficial to unity and production in the People's Republic of China.

The key reactionary elements among these reactionary classes are by no means reconciled to the loss of their past privileges and will certainly engage in conspiracy and sabotage. The recent murder of General Yang Jie is a case in point.<sup>451</sup> The people's armed forces and police will intensify their work to prevent conspiracy and sabotage. We for our part must strengthen unity, sharpen vigilance and foil the plots of the reactionaries.

The third question is the political system of New Democracy. It is a democratic centralist system with people's congresses. It is completely different from the old democratic parliamentary system and belongs to the same category as the congress system adopted in the socialist Soviet Union. But it is not exactly the same as the Soviet system either, because the Soviet Union has already abolished classes,<sup>452</sup> while we have an alliance of revolutionary classes. This characteristic is reflected in the organizational form of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. It will likewise be reflected in the departments of the government, the present local people's conferences and the future people's congresses. The entire process — from the election of delegates, the holding of people's congresses and the election of people's governments to the exercise of state power by people's governments in the interim between congresses — will be a democratic centralist process of exercising state power. And the organs which exercise state power will be the people's congresses and people's governments at all levels.

The fourth question is the military system. It is certainly not fortuitous that the People's Liberation Army has achieved victory today

and won the support of the entire people. Not only is it courageous and resourceful in battle, but it is able to implement policy correctly and to assist the people in their productive labour. Such are its characteristics. The soul of the army is its system of political work. Not only is this military system different from that of the feudal warlords, it is also different from that of the bourgeoisie. The Common Programme provides that the troops of the whole country will be unified under this new-democratic military system, including all troops that rose against the Kuomintang's reactionary regime and came over to our side. This provision is in sharp contrast to the practice of the warlords, who gobbled up others or excluded them. It treats former enemies without discrimination and helps them to transform themselves into people's troops.

The fifth question is the economic policy of New Democracy. The basic spirit is to take all sectors into account, that is, to take into consideration both the public and the private interest, benefit both labour and capital, encourage mutual assistance between town and country and promote domestic and foreign trade, in order to increase production and promote economic prosperity. Of the five economic sectors under New Democracy,<sup>453</sup> the state-owned economy is the leading one. It is a formidable task, but one that must be accomplished, to fit everything in our society into its proper place while gradually establishing a planned economy so as to reap the fruits of the division of labour and co-operation. In the preparatory period most of the discussions have focused on economic questions, and good ideas from every quarter have been incorporated into the articles of the draft. There are a thousand things to be done in economic construction, but we must have a scheme of priorities. The specific articles have been worked out according to an analysis of what ought or ought not to be done, what can or cannot be done at present and what is already or not yet underway.

The sixth question is the cultural policy of New Democracy. There was not much discussion about cultural policy, but in a nutshell, it is a policy promoting national form, scientific content and mass orientation. The draft specifically mentions several items we must emphasize; but that doesn't mean that things not mentioned will not be done, as they have already been covered in general in the fifth section of the draft.

The seventh question is the nationalities policy of New Democracy. Its essence is to make the People's Republic of China a big, fraternal, co-operative family of all nationalities, which will combat imperialists



externally and common enemies of the nationalities internally. But within this great family of nationalities, we must also constantly oppose any tendencies towards big-nation chauvinism and narrow nationalism. The autonomy of the minority nationality regions, the right of their people to bear arms and respect for their religious beliefs have all been clearly stipulated in the text.

The eighth question is the foreign policy of New Democracy. The seventh section of the draft explicitly states what is to be guaranteed, what will be supported and what will be opposed. We must guarantee national independence, freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity, support long-term international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries and oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war. The programme explicitly endorses Comrade Mao Zedong's policy, set forth in *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*, concerning the matter of siding with the Soviet Union and the New Democracies. This is our basic stand on the question of foreign policy.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> In some of the documents of the Central Committee of the Party at the time, the term "semi-feudal forces" was applied to warlords, bureaucrats, compradors of foreign firms, landlords, local tyrants, etc. It is in this sense that the term is used here. p. 13

<sup>2</sup> The Kuomintang was a political party founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In 1905, the *Xing Zhong Hui* (Society for China's Revival) led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen united with the *Hua Xing Hui* (Society for China's Regeneration) and the *Guang Fu Hui* (Society for Breaking the Foreign Yoke) to form the *Tong Meng Hui*, or Chinese Revolutionary League. Dr. Sun assumed the presidency of the League, which led the 1911 Revolution. Uniting with a few small parties in 1912, the League was reorganized into the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), which reached a compromise with the northern warlord Yuan Shikai and in the main became a group of bureaucrat politicians. In order to oppose Yuan Shikai's rule, Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1914 led part of the Kuomintang members in organizing the Chinese Revolutionary Party, which took the name Nationalist Party of China (Kuomintang) in October 1919. With the assistance of the Communist Party of China, Dr. Sun reorganized the Nationalist Party in January 1924. The reorganized Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, accepted the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal political theses put forward by the Chinese Communist Party, gave new content to Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles and laid down the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the workers and peasants. This opened the first period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. The Northern Expedition was carried out on the basis of this co-operation. In this period, the Kuomintang was a democratic revolutionary alliance of the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. After the counter-revolutionary coup staged by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927, the Kuomintang became, in essence, a reactionary clique representing the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. pp. 13, 111, 179

<sup>3</sup> The May 30th Movement was a nationwide anti-imperialist, patriotic movement ignited by the massacre of May 30th in Shanghai in 1925. On that day about ten thousand people in Shanghai turned out for anti-imperialist demonstrations in the International Settlement. Their brutal massacre by the British imperialists aroused the indignation of the whole people. Great numbers of workers, students, merchants and peasants conducted many demonstrations and strikes, which grew into a nationwide anti-imperialist, patriotic movement. pp. 14, 59, 70, 107, 135

<sup>4</sup> At the instigation of the imperialists, the Kuomintang right wing had Liao Zhongkai assassinated in Guangzhou on August 20, 1925. Liao was a leader of the Kuomintang left wing who upheld Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. In order to investigate this assassination of a major figure, a Committee to Investigate Liao's Assassination was formed, of which Zhou Enlai was a member. pp. 14, 135, 186

<sup>5</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1973, p. 77. p. 16

<sup>6</sup> Fan E, "From the Haikang Case to the Peasants' Movement", *National Weekly*, No. 3 (October 23, 1926). This article exposed and condemned the military and administrative authorities of Haikang County, Guangdong Province, for their collusion with the local tyrants and evil gentry in the shooting of Cheng Geng, a staff member of the peasants' movement. p. 17

<sup>7</sup> Guo Moruo (1892-1978) was deputy director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition. Upon the orders of the National Government in Wuhan, he left Jiujiang for Shanghai towards the end of March 1927 to organize a branch of the General Political Department. He arrived in Shanghai on April 14. Having witnessed the counter-revolutionary incidents single-handedly engineered by Chiang Kai-shek in Jiujiang and Anqing, he wrote "Take a Look at Chiang Kai-shek Today" on March 31 in Nanchang, in which he denounced Chiang's betrayal of the revolution. p. 18

<sup>8</sup> On March 17, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek incited hooligans and dispatched troops to smash and forcefully occupy the Jiujiang municipal Kuomintang headquarters and the office of the Municipal Federation of Trade Unions which were both under left-wing leadership. On March 23, the left-wing-led Kuomintang headquarters of Anhui Province and Anqing Municipality and the preparatory offices of the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions and the Provincial Peasant Association were smashed in Anqing. Many people were injured. p. 18

<sup>9</sup> On March 20, 1927, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries destroyed the offices of the Ningbo Municipal Federation of Trade Unions and its Sales Clerks' Union. On April 9, they smashed the Ningbo municipal Kuomintang headquarters and the offices of the *Republic Daily*, which were under the leadership of the left wing, and arrested Yang Meishan (a Communist), a member of the standing committee of the municipal Kuomintang headquarters, Wang Kun (a Communist), the president of the Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, and Zhuang Yumei, the director of the *Republic Daily*. On March 30, they attacked the Hangzhou Municipal Federation of Trade Unions and next day opened fire on demonstrating workers, wounding or killing more than eighty. On April 9 in Nanjing, they destroyed the Kuomintang headquarters of Jiangsu Province and of Nanjing Municipality which were under left-wing leadership and next day beat up and arrested the demonstrating revolutionary masses, killing Hou Shaoqiu (a Communist), a member of the standing committee of the provincial Kuomintang headquarters. On April 12, they perpetrated the bloody slaughter of Communists and revolutionary people in Shanghai. This marked the complete betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek and his followers and signalled Chiang's open surrender to the imperialists and feudal forces. p. 18

<sup>10</sup> On April 15, 1927, the Kuomintang reactionaries launched a counter-revolutionary coup d'état in Guangzhou in which they disarmed the Whampoa Military Academy cadets and the pickets of the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike committee, encircled the Guangzhou office of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike committee, and arrested or massacred more than two thousand Communists and activists among the workers. p. 18

<sup>11</sup> Xue Yue (1896- ) was then commander of the 1st Division of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Later, Xue followed Chiang Kai-shek in actively opposing the Communist Party. p. 18

<sup>12</sup> Yan Zhong (1892-1944) was first instructor and then chief instructor of the Whampoa Military Academy for a time. During the Northern Expedition, he served as commander of the 21st Division of the National Revolutionary Army. After the counter-revolutionary coup of April 12, 1927, Yan refused a post offered him by Chiang

Kai-shek. He was murdered by the Kuomintang reactionaries during the War of Resistance Against Japan. pp. 18, 87

<sup>13</sup> Chen Tiaoyuan (1886-1943) was commander-in-chief of the Third Army Group (northern front) of the First Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army and concurrently commander of its 37th Army. p. 19

<sup>14</sup> The term "central government" here refers to the Wuhan National Government led by the Kuomintang left wing and the Communist Party. p. 19

<sup>15</sup> The August 7th Meeting was an emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC held in Hankou on August 7, 1927. Twenty-one members of the Central Committee and the Control Commission of the Party attended it. Qu Qiubai made a report on "Policies for Future Work". A "Message to Members of the Whole Party" and resolutions on the peasants' movement, the workers' movement, and organization were passed. New central leading organs were elected. At a critical moment in the Chinese revolution, the meeting resolutely corrected and put an end to Chen Duxiu's capitulationism, laid down the general principles of agrarian revolution and of armed resistance against the Kuomintang reactionaries' murderous policies, and called on the Party and people to persist in the revolutionary struggle. All this was correct and constituted the main aspect of the meeting. However, in combating the Right capitulationist errors, the meeting paved the way for later "Left" errors by failing to realize the need to organize appropriate counter-offensives or necessary tactical retreats according to the different conditions in the different localities and, organizationally, it touched off excessive, sectarian struggles inside the Party. pp. 20, 31, 58, 193

<sup>16</sup> The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Moscow from June 18 to July 10, 1928. Qu Qiubai made a report on "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party". Zhou Enlai delivered reports on organizational and military affairs. Liu Bochong delivered a supplementary military report. Resolutions on political, military and organizational affairs were adopted. The congress affirmed that Chinese society was semi-colonial and semi-feudal and that the Chinese revolution in process was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It pointed out that the prevailing political situation was in the nature of a lull between two revolutionary high tides, that the revolution was developing in an uneven way and that the Party's general task at the time was not to carry out offensives or organize uprisings, but to win over the masses. While criticizing Right opportunism, the congress pointed particularly to putschism, military adventurism and commandism, which resulted from being divorced from the masses, as the most dangerous tendencies inside the Party. The main thrust of the congress was correct, but there were also shortcomings and mistakes. It failed to make correct evaluations either of the dual character of the intermediate classes or of the internal contradictions among the reactionaries and to put forward appropriate policies on these questions. It also lacked a proper understanding of the need for an orderly tactical retreat by the Party after the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, of the importance of rural base areas, and of the protracted nature of the democratic revolution. pp. 23, 26, 58, 68, 177

<sup>17</sup> Lu Dongsheng (1908-45) joined the Communist Party in 1927. In 1928 he served as the liaison man between the Central Committee and the Western Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area. He joined the Red Army in the Western Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area in 1929 and served successively as commander of a company, a battalion, a regiment and a division, and then as divisional political commissar. He took part in the Long March. In the early years of the War of Resistance Against Japan he served as commander of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division. After the anti-Japanese

war, he was appointed commander of the Songjiang Military Area in northeastern China. p. 26

<sup>18</sup> After Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei (see Note 107 below) successively betrayed the revolution in 1927, workers and peasants in many places, led by the Communist Party, launched armed uprisings and established revolutionary regimes which called themselves Soviets. The peasants in Haifeng and Lufeng, Guangdong Province, launched three armed uprisings in April, September and October and set up revolutionary regimes. Peasants in Ding'an, Qiongzhan, Wanning and Lehui on Hainan Island staged uprisings in October and organized the Third Red Division. Peasants in Wan'an, Yanfu, Donggu and Yudu, Jiangxi Province, launched insurrections in December and a Soviet regime was established and guerrilla troops organized in Wan'an. Rebel peasants in Huang'an (now Hong'an), Macheng and Xiaogan, Hubei Province, seized the county town of Huang'an in November, held it for over a month and established a revolutionary regime. Peasants in eastern Hunan rose up in September and seized Liuyang, Pingjiang, Liling, Zhuzhou and adjacent areas. The peasants in Liling established a rural revolutionary regime early in 1928. p. 27

<sup>19</sup> The battles of Jianshi and Hefeng were waged by the Red Army led by He Long. The former, in December 1928, resulted in the capture of Jianshi county town and the latter, in January 1929, in the capture of Hefeng county town in Hubei Province. p. 27

<sup>20</sup> Yang Weifan had been secretary of the Enshi-Hefeng Provisional Special Committee of the Communist Party. Owing to his slack work attitude, his Party membership was suspended at the beginning of 1929. After the battle of Hefeng, he tried to defect, taking his weapons with him. He was apprehended and executed. p. 29

<sup>21</sup> The two circulars are Central Committee Circular No. 25, "Opposing Warlord Wars and Winning Over the Masses" of January 1929, and Central Committee Circular No. 30, "Analysis of the Current Political Situation and the Party's Main Line" of February 1929. p. 29

<sup>22</sup> Waang Ming (1903-31) joined the Communist Party in 1925. He became secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee in 1928. He was arrested by the Kuomintang in 1929 and died a martyr in October 1931. p. 31

<sup>23</sup> The Shunzhi Committee of the Communist Party of China was successively called the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Committee of Beiping and Zhili Province of the CPC, and the Hebei Provincial Committee of the CPC. The name "Shunzhi" refers to Beijing (originally, Shuntianfu) and Hebei (originally, Zhili Province). It directed Party work in Hebei, Shanxi, Beiping (Beijing), Tianjin, Chahar, Suiyuan, Rehe, the northern part of Henan, and part of northern Shaanxi. p. 32

<sup>24</sup> The seven counties east of the Huanghe River constituted an area now included in the counties of Anyi, Wenxi, Xiaxian, Xiexian, Yishi, Jiangzhou (Xinjiang) and Jiangxian in the southern part of Shanxi Province. p. 34

<sup>25</sup> Peng Pai, Yang Yin, Yan Changyi and Xing Shizhen were martyrs murdered by the enemy at Longhua in Shanghai on August 30, 1929.

Peng Pai (1896-1929) was our Party's earliest peasant movement leader. In July 1922 he initiated and helped found a peasant association, the first in China, at Chishan in Haifeng County. Peng was elected chairman of the Haifeng Federation of Peasant Associations in January 1923. He joined the Communist Party in 1924. In the same year, he initiated and helped found the Guangzhou Peasant Movement Institute and served as a member of the Guangdong-Guangxi Committee of the CPC. He was

elected vice-chairman of the Guangdong Peasant Association in May 1925. In 1927 he took part in the Nanchang Uprising and served as a member of the Front Committee of the CPC. After the defeat of the Nanchang Uprising, he led the third armed uprising in Haifeng and Lufeng (October 1927) and founded a Soviet there. He became chairman of the Soviet and secretary of the Dongjiang Special Committee of the CPC. Peng served as secretary of the peasant movement committee of the Central Committee and concurrently as secretary of the Military Commission of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee. He was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Party's Fifth and Sixth National Congresses, a member of the Political Bureau at the August 7th Meeting of the Central Committee in 1927 (see Note 15 above), and an alternate member of the Political Bureau at the Party's Sixth National Congress.

pp. 35, 136

Yang Yin (1893-1929) was a member of the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) in his early years and joined the Communist Party in 1923. During the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27), he served as a member of the Guangdong-Guangxi Committee of the CPC and was one of the leaders of the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike. At the time of the Guangzhou Uprising on December 11, 1927, he served in the Guangzhou Soviet Government as chairman of its Committee for the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries and acted for a time on behalf of the chairman of the People's Council. He was elected a member of the Central Committee, an alternate member of the Political Bureau and a member of its Standing Committee at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1928. He served as head of the Military Department of the Central Committee.

p. 35

Yan Changyi (1898-1929) joined the Communist Party in 1921. He served on the Military Commission of the Central Committee and the Military Commission of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in 1925. He took part in the three armed uprisings of the Shanghai workers between October 1926 and March 1927. Yan served as the Party representative in the 24th Division during the Nanchang Uprising of 1927. After its defeat, he and Peng Pai initiated the third insurrection in Haifeng and Lufeng (October 1927). He helped found the Soviet there and became Party representative in the Red Army. He was a member of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC and concurrently a member of the Military Commission of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee in 1928.

p. 35

King Shizhen (?-1929) joined the Communist Party in 1927. He was a cadre of the Military Commission of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CPC and a leading member of the soldiers' movement.

p. 35

<sup>20</sup> For Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927, see Note 9 above.

pp. 35, 186

<sup>27</sup> Zhang Jichun (?-1933) was a member of the Communist Party. He became deputy general director of the pickets of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions in 1929 and played a leading role in the two anti-imperialist demonstrations of May 30 and August 1 the same year. He was arrested on August 24, 1929, and released from prison in the winter of 1931.

p. 36

<sup>28</sup> *The Bolshevik*, an organ of the Central Committee of the CPC, began publication on October 24, 1927. It was a weekly before November 1928 and then a fortnightly. The latest issue that has been found is No. 1, Volume 5, published in July 1932.

p. 36

*Red Flag* was also an organ of the Central Committee. It began publication on November 20, 1928. Altogether 126 issues were published, appearing weekly with the first 23 issues and then every three days. The paper ceased publication on August 2, 1930 and merged with the *Shanghai Daily* to become the *Red Flag Daily* on the 15th.

The latter became an organ of the Central Committee of the CPC and its Jiangsu Provincial Committee on February 14, 1931. On March 9 the same year, it was renamed the *Red Flag Weekly*. It continued as an organ of the Central Committee. The latest issue that has been found is No. 64, published on March 1, 1934. p. 36

<sup>29</sup> Xiong Shihui (1893-1974) was commander of the 5th Division of the Kuomintang army and commander of the Wusong-Shanghai Garrison Headquarters. p. 37

<sup>30</sup> *The Song of the Young Pioneers* was a revolutionary song with words by the Soviet poet A. I. Betsimensky. Originally called *The Young Guards*, it was once adopted as the song of the Communist Youth League of the Soviet Union and was introduced to China during the First Revolutionary Civil War. p. 37

<sup>31</sup> The anti-Party clique formed by a handful of Trotskyites within the Chinese Communist Party. After the defeat of the First Revolutionary Civil War, the Chinese Trotskyites, posing as "Leftists", denied that the Chinese revolution was then bourgeois-democratic in nature. They urged immediate socialist revolution and confiscation of capitalist factories and enterprises. Organizationally they carried out factional activities to split the Party. In August 1928, the Central Committee of the Party decided to unfold a struggle against Trotskyism and called on the whole Party to repudiate the fallacies of the Trotskyites ideologically and theoretically. It also decided that all key members of the clique should be expelled from the Party while its rank-and-file should be re-educated so that they would abandon their Trotskyite viewpoints and return to the Marxist stand. pp. 38, 37

<sup>32</sup> Chen Yi (1901-72) joined the Communist Party in 1923. In June 1929 he was elected secretary of the Front Committee at the Seventh Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army and he attended the Central Committee's military conference in Shanghai in August of the same year. p. 41

<sup>33</sup> The first of these two internecine wars broke out in March 1929 and the second in May. Chiang, the two Guangxi warlords Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, and Feng Yuxiang of the Northwestern Army were all trying to seize more territory and expand their forces. pp. 41, 200

<sup>34</sup> On April 17, 1929, the Kuomintang government's China Airlines and the U.S. Aviation Development Corporation concluded an air postal contract granting the latter the right to operate air postal services between Nanjing and Hankou, Nanjing and Beiping, and Hankou and Guangzhou, granting it monopoly rights on air mail transport, and permitting it to extend existing domestic air routes and open new ones in China. p. 42

<sup>35</sup> The Kuomintang government concluded a naval assistance agreement with Britain on June 20, 1929, by which Britain undertook to help the Kuomintang government train its navy. p. 42

<sup>36</sup> The Japanese imperialists' Manchu-Mongolian plan called for the invasion of the Northeast and Inner Mongolia as a preliminary step to the invasion of the whole of China. According to contemporary Chinese and foreign newspapers, Tanaka Giichi, the Japanese Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed in a secret memorial to the throne in 1927: "It is imperative to subjugate Manchuria and Mongolia first if China is to be conquered; and it is imperative to subjugate China first if the world is to be conquered." p. 42

<sup>37</sup> The Russians constructed the Chinese Eastern Railway in China's Northeast after the Qing Dynasty government concluded a secret pact with tsarist Russia in 1896. It was operated by Russia until a 1924 Sino-Soviet agreement brought it under joint management. After the Kuomintang reactionary regime was established in 1927, it pursued a pro-imperialist and anti-Soviet foreign policy and created a series of

anti-Soviet incidents. On July 10, 1929, the Kuomintang government unilaterally tore up the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924, took over the Chinese Eastern Railway by force and expelled the Soviet personnel. On July 17, the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang government. In October, Chiang Kai-shek ordered more than 80,000 men of the Northeastern Army to march to the Suifenhe area and launch an attack on the Soviet Union. The attack was repulsed by Soviet troops.

p. 42

<sup>38</sup> Also called the Zhang Fakui Incident. A war against Chiang Kai-shek launched jointly by Zhang Fakui, commander of the 4th Division of the Kuomintang army, and Yu Zuobo, a Guangxi clique warlord and governor of Guangxi Province, in September 1929. It is also known as the Guangdong-Guangxi war against Chiang.

pp. 42, 43

<sup>39</sup> The Reorganization Clique was a faction inside the Kuomintang during the late Twenties and early Thirties. After Wang Jingwei launched his counter-revolutionary coup in Wuhan on July 15, 1927 to suppress the Communist Party, his Kuomintang in Wuhan collaborated with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang in Nanjing. Then, dissatisfied with Chiang's keeping all the power in his own hands, Wang, Chen Gongbo, Gu Mengyu and others set up the Society of Comrades for the Reorganization of the Kuomintang, or the Reorganization Clique, in Shanghai at the end of 1928.

pp. 42, 183

<sup>40</sup> The exponents of reformism in the Kuomintang Reorganization Clique headed by Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo stood for "state capitalism", "co-operative enterprises", workers' "dividends" and "self-government" in the rural areas "so as to oppose the Communist Party and the warlords both inside and outside the (Kuomintang) party".

p. 43

<sup>41</sup> The struggle between the old and new factions among the subordinates of the northeastern warlord Zhang Zuolin (see Note 265 below). The old faction, headed by Zhang Jinghui and Zhang Zuoxiang, consisted of ex-bandits, while the new faction, headed by Yang Yuting and Han Linchun, consisted of ex-students from officers' schools in Japan.

p. 43

<sup>42</sup> Yang Yuting was superintendent of the Northeast Ordnance Factory and Chang Yinhuai was governor of Heilongjiang Province. Both were prominent subordinates of Zhang Zuolin. After Zhang Zuolin's death, his son, Zhang Xueliang (see Note 87 below), had Yang and Chang shot on January 11, 1929 in order to consolidate his own control.

p. 43

<sup>43</sup> Liu Heding was commander of the Kuomintang's 56th Division stationed in the area of Pukou. In 1929 Chiang Kai-shek sent him to Fujian to suppress the Red Army.

pp. 44, 82

<sup>44</sup> Zhang Zhen was commander of the Provisional 1st Division of the Kuomintang army.

p. 44

<sup>45</sup> The contest between Chen Mingshu and Chen Jitang in the summer of 1929 for military and political power over Guangdong. Chen Mingshu was the Kuomintang governor of Guangdong Province and Chen Jitang commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Eighth Route Army.

p. 44

<sup>46</sup> Zhu Peide was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Fifth Front Army and concurrently governor of Jiangxi Province. In 1929 he was transferred from Jiangxi by Chiang Kai-shek, and Lu Diping became provincial governor.

p. 44

<sup>47</sup> Wang Jun was then commander of the Kuomintang Third Army.

p. 44

<sup>48</sup> Jin Handing was commander of the Kuomintang 31st Army.

p. 44



<sup>49</sup> The circular entitled "On the Opposition Faction in the Chinese Party", issued on August 13, 1929. p. 57

<sup>50</sup> At the time of the October Revolution, Trotsky (1879-1940) was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. After the October Revolution, he assumed the office of Chairman of the Supreme Military Council and other posts.

In 1912 Trotsky contacted the Mensheviks and other opportunist factions and formed the August League to oppose the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin. Taking a "Leftist" stand during the First World War and after the October Revolution, Trotsky was an opponent of the correct policies of Lenin on the fundamental questions of war, peace and revolution. In the autumn of 1923 he mustered his cohorts, put forward the opposition faction's programme and demanded freedom for factional activity. After the death of Lenin he opposed Lenin's theories and lines on building socialism in the Soviet Union and engaged in anti-party factional activities and sabotage. In November 1927 the Fifteenth National Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.) expelled Trotsky and the Trotskyites from the party. Trotsky was deported from the Soviet Union in 1929. He carried out many divisive and disruptive activities in the international communist movement. p. 57

<sup>51</sup> Hu Hanmin (1879-1936), a prominent right-wing leader, served as acting chief of the military headquarters in Guangzhou and concurrently governor of Guangdong Province during the First Revolutionary Civil War. He was an accomplice of Chiang Kai-shek's in the staging of the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927. Later he engaged in a protracted struggle for power with the Chiang Kai-shek clique. pp. 57, 186

<sup>52</sup> During the First Revolutionary Civil War, Dai Jitao (1890-1949) distorted the revolutionary content of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's doctrines and spread opposition to the Communist Party and the workers' and peasants' movements, thus preparing the way ideologically for the counter-revolutionary coup d'état later launched by Chiang Kai-shek. After the coup d'état, he continued to be a faithful follower of Chiang Kai-shek. pp. 57, 132, 169, 186

<sup>53</sup> Zhou Fohai (1897-1948) attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1921 but betrayed the Party in 1924. Among the various posts he held after Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution was that of head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he followed Wang Jingwei in betraying the country and surrendering to the Japanese aggressors, serving as vice-president of the Executive Yuan in the puppet government headed by Wang Jingwei. p. 57

<sup>54</sup> *New Life* was a reactionary monthly magazine of which Zhou Fohai was chief editor. It started publication in Shanghai in 1928. p. 59

<sup>55</sup> In July 1919, the Second International, which sided with the imperialist governments that took part in the First World War, decided to convene a congress in Lucerne, Switzerland, on August 1. The Executive Committee of the Communist International called upon the workers of all countries to hold demonstrations on that day as a protest against the Second International. At the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in July 1929, it was decided that August 1 would be an international day against imperialist war. On that day, the Communist Party of China organized a big anti-imperialist demonstration in Shanghai. p. 59

<sup>56</sup> Red trade unions were revolutionary unions under the leadership of the Communist Party. They were in opposition to the yellow trade unions under the leadership of the Kuomintang. pp. 61, 204

<sup>57</sup> Jiang Jun was an alias of Xiang Ying (1898-1941). Xiang Ying joined the Communist Party in 1922 and was elected a member of the Central Committee and also its Political Bureau at the Sixth National Congress of the Party in 1928. In August 1930, he became secretary of the Changjiang Bureau of the Central Committee. In December of the same year, he went to the revolutionary base area in Jiangxi and served successively as acting secretary of the Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee, chairman of the Military Commission of the Soviet Area Bureau, and vice-chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. After the main force of the Red Army began its Long March in October 1934, he stayed behind to persist in guerrilla war. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as secretary of the Southeastern Bureau of the Central Committee and concurrently as deputy commander of the New Fourth Army. He was killed in the Southern Anhui Incident in January 1941. pp. 61, 224

<sup>58</sup> The author maintained that the Chinese Communists should join yellow unions to win over the masses. In this letter, however, he used the wording "wiping out yellow unions" common in the documents of the Central Committee at the time. p. 64

<sup>59</sup> In April 1930, the Hubei Provincial Congress of the Communist Party decided to set up a workers' Red Vanguard to act as the central force in urban insurrections. In fact, it was never established. p. 64

<sup>60</sup> While mainly opposing the "Left" deviation and especially the erroneous view that the "Left" deviation is better than the Right, the author in this letter used the formulation that "at present the Right deviation is still the main danger inside the Party", a formulation common in Central Committee documents at the time. p. 65

<sup>61</sup> Li Lisan (1899-1967) joined the Communist Party in 1921. From June to September 1930, while he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its secretary-general and concurrently head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, he committed "Left" opportunist errors (*i.e.*, "the Li Lisan line"). He relinquished his leading position in the Central Committee after the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in September 1930. Later, he corrected his erroneous views and was re-elected a member of the Central Committee at the Party's Seventh and Eighth National Congresses. pp. 67, 182

<sup>62</sup> The Communist, or Third, International was established in March 1919. It was an organization uniting the Communist Parties of different countries. The Communist Party of China became one of its affiliates in 1922. The Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International decided to dissolve the International in May 1943. pp. 67, 157, 170, 186, 227

<sup>63</sup> This resolution was adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party on June 11, 1930 and was entitled, "The New Revolutionary High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces". It denied the uneven development of the Chinese revolution and asserted that an outbreak of workers' struggles in key cities would inevitably bring about a countrywide revolutionary upsurge and that the Chinese revolution would inevitably bring on world revolution. It criticized the idea of using the countryside to encircle the cities as reflecting the parochialism and conservatism characteristic of the peasant mentality, denied the protracted nature of

China's democratic revolution, and asserted that the winning of initial victory in one or several provinces would mark the beginning of a revolutionary transformation. With the adoption of this resolution, the Li Lisan line became dominant in the leading organs at the central level. p. 68

<sup>64</sup> The circular entitled "The Present Political Situation and the Party's Central Strategy". It was issued on February 26, 1930. p. 68

<sup>65</sup> Chen Shaoyu (1904-74), alias Wang Ming, was the principal exponent of the third "Left" opportunist line in the Party. During the Sixties, he degenerated and became a traitor to the Chinese revolution. pp. 68, 207

<sup>66</sup> The Fifth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army occupied Changsha on July 27, 1930, and established a Hunan Provincial Soviet on July 29. It withdrew from Changsha on August 5. This event is known as the Changsha Incident. p. 68

<sup>67</sup> The Sixth Congress of the Communist International held in August 1928 regarded the post-World War I world situation as falling into three stages. The first, which extended from the conclusion of the war to 1923, was one in which the economic crises of capitalism became so acute that proletarian revolutions could be immediately initiated. The second, from 1924 to 1927, was characterized by the relative stability of the capitalist economy. The third, beginning in 1928, was one in which "stability" no longer prevailed in the capitalist economy but gave way to the intensification of the general crisis and "extensive class struggle". p. 68

<sup>68</sup> A resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in July 1929. p. 69

<sup>69</sup> The Congress was held secretly in Shanghai in May and June 1930 under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Party and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. p. 70

<sup>70</sup> The August 1st and August 3rd meetings were held by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in Shanghai in 1930. It was decided at the first meeting that the leading organs of the Party, the Youth League, and the trade unions would be merged into a Central Action Committee (otherwise known as the General Action Committee). At the second meeting it was decided to stage insurrections in Wuhan and Nanjing and a general strike in Shanghai and to make the General Action Committee the supreme leading body for insurrections throughout the country. Zhou Enlai was then abroad. Li Lisan wrongly criticized him at the meetings, saying that the "danger of his Right tendency has been revealed both in political and organizational matters". p. 70

<sup>71</sup> Feng Yuxiang (1882-1948) served as brigade commander, division commander, military governor, director-general, and so on at the time the northern warlords held sway. In October 1924, he launched a coup in Beijing and reorganized his army as the National Army. On November 5, he abolished the title of emperor, which Pu Yi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, had continued to hold after his dethronement, and drove him out of the imperial palace in Beijing. In September 1926, he announced his break with the northern warlords and joined the national revolution. After the coup of April 12, 1927, he participated in the anti-Communist activities of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. After the Incident of September 18, 1931, he favoured resistance against Japan and in May 1933 co-operated with the Communist Party in forming the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Chahar Province (consisting of parts of what are now Shanxi, Hebei and Inner Mongolia) to resist the Japanese imperialist invasion. Feng subsequently continued to co-operate with the

Communist Party. Early in 1948, he joined the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and was chairman of the Political Committee of its Central Committee. On September 1 of the same year, he died in a fire on his way back to China from the United States to attend the New Political Consultative Conference.

pp. 70, 138, 191, 217, 233, 316

<sup>72</sup> Towards the end of 1932, Chiang Kai-shek amassed four to five hundred thousand troops for a fourth massive "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Soviet Area. In February 1933, twelve of his divisions, adopting the strategy of concerted attack by converging columns, set out towards Guangchang in three columns from Le'an, Nancheng and Jinxi. With part of the Red Army's forces pretending to be the main force marching eastward to cross the Fuhe River so as to lure the enemy's second and third columns — the enemy's main force — towards Lichuan, the real main force of the Red Army moved secretly to the right flank of the enemy forces, covertly gathering in the Dongshao-Luokou area west of Guangchang to await its opportunity. On February 26, three divisions of the enemy's first column marched towards Guangchang from Le'an and Yihuang. At first, the Red Army used local forces to confuse the enemy by constant interception and harassment. When the 52nd and 59th Divisions of the enemy right wing reached the Huangbei-Dalongping area south of Yihuang, the Red Army launched a fierce attack at dawn on February 27 and, after two days of heated battle, completely wiped them out. After this heavy blow, the enemy changed its deployments. On March 15, six divisions left Yihuang in two echelon formations and pressed on to Guangchang via Dongbei and Ganzhu. After letting the enemy's first four divisions pass, the Red Army launched a sudden attack on the morning of the 21st against the two rear enemy divisions which had already reached the Caotaigang-Dongbei area. After a day's fierce battle, the Red Army annihilated most of the enemy's 11th and part of its 9th Division. The rest of the enemy forces hastily withdrew in panic. The Red Army captured more than ten thousand guns in the two battles. Thus the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign was in the main defeated. (See appended map.)

p. 72

<sup>73</sup> The battle at Jinxi was fought by the First Front Army of the Red Army in the Huangshidu and Xuwan area southwest of Jinxi, Jiangxi Province. It lasted from January 4 to 8, 1933.

p. 72

<sup>74</sup> The three divisions in question were the Kuomintang's 90th Division under Wu Qiwei, its 11th under Luo Zhuoying, and its 14th under Zhou Zhirou.

p. 72

<sup>75</sup> The Battle of Nanfeng was fought by the First Front Army of the Red Army in the Shigouxu area, east of the town of Nanfeng, Jiangxi Province. It lasted from November 1 to 2, 1932. The Battle of Nancheng was fought on November 21 and 22, 1932, by the First Front Army of the Red Army in the Lixizhao area, east of Nancheng, Jiangxi Province. For the battle at Jinxi, see Note 73 above.

p. 73


<sup>76</sup> Zeng Hongyi, then political commissar of the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Military Area of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. He turned traitor and went over to the enemy in 1935.

Shao Shiping (1898-1965), then head of the Political Department of the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Military Area of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

Tang Zaigang (1903-35), then head of the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Military Area of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Tang died on his way to the north to resist Japan in January 1935.

p. 74

# SKETCH MAP OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COUNTER-CAMPAIGN AGAINST "ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION"



<sup>77</sup> These campaigns were battles in which the First Front Army of the Red Army attacked and occupied Le'an and Yihuang in Jiangxi Province, August 16 to 20, 1932. p. 74

<sup>78</sup> Chen Cheng (1896-1965) became a company commander in the Guangdong Army in 1922 and served as commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's Second Route Army at the time of the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1933. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, he was Administrative Vice-Minister of War in the Kuomintang government. During the War of Liberation, he held several posts, among them that of chief of general staff of the Kuomintang army. pp. 75, 133, 216, 310

<sup>79</sup> Zhu De (1886-1976) was then a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and of its Political Bureau, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. p. 76

Wang Jiaxiang (1906-74) was then a member of the Central Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, director of the General Political Department of the Red Army and vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. p. 76

<sup>80</sup> Peng Ao (1904-33) joined the Communist Party in 1926. At the time of the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", he was commander of the 3rd Division of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. He was killed in action on February 13, 1933. p. 79

<sup>81</sup> Zhao Guantao was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Eighth Route Army at the time. p. 80

<sup>82</sup> Dong Zhentang (1895-1937) had served in the Kuomintang forces as company, battalion, regiment, and division commander. On December 14, 1931, he and Zhao Bosheng led their troops in an uprising in Ningdu and together joined the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. He was appointed commander of the 13th Army of the Fifth Army Group. He joined the Communist Party in 1932. Later he served as commander of the Fifth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. He was killed in action in the Battle of Gaotai in Gansu Province on January 20, 1937. p. 83

Zhu Rui (1905-48) joined the Communist Party in 1928. At the time he was political commissar of the Fifth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as secretary of the Military Commission of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee, secretary of the Shandong Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee and principal of the Yan'an Artillery School. After the War of Resistance he was appointed commanding officer of the artillery units of the Northeast People's Liberation Army. He was killed in action in the battle to liberate Yixian County in October 1948. p. 83

<sup>83</sup> Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) joined the Communist Party in 1928. At the time in question, he was vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC and commander-in-chief of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. p. 84

Teng Daiyuan (1904-74) joined the Communist Youth League in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1925. At the time in question, he was political commissar of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. p. 84

<sup>84</sup> Lin Biao (1907-71) became commander of the First Column of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in January 1930, and in the fourth

counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in 1933 he was commander of its First Army Group. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he was commander of the 117th Division of the Eighth Route Army. After 1966, he organized a counter-revolutionary conspiratorial clique in an attempt to usurp Party and state power. When his plot was exposed, he fled the country on September 13, 1971, but died when his plane crashed. pp. 84, 201, 227, 283

<sup>85</sup> Nie Rongzhen (1899- ) was then political commissar of the First Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. p. 84

<sup>86</sup> T. V. Soong (1894-1971) was then a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and chairman of the Economic Council of the Kuomintang government. pp. 86, 216

Soong Mei-ling (1901- ) was Chiang Kai-shek's wife. p. 86

Jiang Dingwen (1896-1974) was then director of the Fujian Pacification Headquarters of the Kuomintang government. Prior to the Xi'an Incident, Chiang Kai-shek was planning to appoint him commander-in-chief of the "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at the northwestern front. pp. 86, 216

<sup>87</sup> Zhang Xueliang (1901- ), a patriotic general in the Northeastern Army, was then deputy commander of the Kuomintang "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters in northwestern China. He triggered the Xi'an Incident together with General Yang Hucheng when they demanded that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and join in the fight against Japanese aggression. Immediately after the Xi'an Incident Zhang was detained by Chiang; he remained under detention for many years. pp. 86, 216, 276

<sup>88</sup> Yang Hucheng (1893-1949) was a patriotic general in the Northwestern Army. He was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's 17th Route Army and head of the Pacification Headquarters in Xi'an at the time. In April 1937, Chiang Kai-shek forced Yang to leave his posts and go abroad. In November of the same year, Yang returned to China to take part in resisting Japan but was soon jailed by Chiang Kai-shek. He remained in prison until his murder in a Kuomintang concentration camp in Chongqing in September 1949. pp. 86, 216, 276

<sup>89</sup> He Yingqin (1889- ) was then Minister of War and Chief of General Staff of the Military Council of the Kuomintang government.

Zhang Qun (1889- ) was Foreign Minister in the Kuomintang government.

Zhang Jia'ao (1888- ) was Minister of Railways in the Kuomintang government.

Wu Dingchang (1884-1950) was Minister of Industry in the Kuomintang government.

Chen Shaokuan (1888-1969) was Minister of the Navy in the Kuomintang government. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the National Defence Council. p. 87

<sup>90</sup> H. H. Kung (1880-1967) was then Acting President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance in the Kuomintang government.

Xu Xinliu (1890-1938) was the general manager of the National Commercial Bank and concurrently president of Fudan University.

Yan Huiqing (1877-1950) had been a foreign minister in the northern warlord government and chief representative of China at the sixteenth conference of the League of Nations (1935).

Zhao Daiwen (1867-1943) was Kuomintang governor of Shanxi Province.

Shao Lizi (1881-1967) was Kuomintang governor of Shaanxi Province. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he was a member of the Government Administration Council.

Hu Zongnan (1896-1962) was commander of the Kuomintang's First Army.

Chen Jiliang (1883-1944) was Political Vice-Minister of the Navy in the Kuomintang government.

Shen Honglie (1882-1969) was Kuomintang mayor of Qingdao. p. 87

Sun Fo (1891-1973) was President of the Legislative Yuan of the Kuomintang government. pp. 87, 217

Zeng Yangfu (1898-1969) was Kuomintang mayor of Guangzhou.

Zhu Jiahua (1893-1963) was Kuomintang governor of Zhejiang Province and concurrently head of its Civil Affairs Bureau.

Yu Feipeng (1884-1966) was Acting Minister of Communications in the Kuomintang government.

Lu Zuofu (1894-1952) was managing director of the Minsheng Industrial and Commercial Corporation. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Zhang Boling (1876-1951) was president of Nankai University.

Wang Shijie (1892- ) was Minister of Education in the Kuomintang government.

Soong Ching Ling was a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and a member of the executive committee of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation.

Du Zhongyuan (1897-?) was editor-in-chief of the *Xinsheng Weekly*, a progressive journal in Shanghai. In May 1935, he was sentenced to jail by the Kuomintang government for publishing patriotic articles in his journal. Prior to the Xi'an Incident, he encouraged Zhang Xueliang to accept the Communist Party's policy of a national united front against Japan. He was killed secretly in Xinjiang by the warlord Sheng Shicai during the War of Resistance Against Japan.

Shen Junru (1875-1963) was one of the principal leaders of the Shanghai Federation of Cultural Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. In November 1936, he was arrested and imprisoned together with Zhang Naiqi, Zou Taofen, Li Gongpu, Sha Qianli, Shi Liang and Wang Zaoshi by the Kuomintang reactionaries, and was held until the outbreak of the War of Resistance. In 1948 he went to the Liberated Areas to participate in the preparatory work for a new political consultative conference. After the founding of the People's Republic, he served as President of the Supreme People's Court and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Zhang Naiqi (1897-1977) was one of the main leaders of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. After the founding of the People's Republic of China he served for a time as Minister of Food. pp. 87, 217

<sup>91</sup> The seven patriotic leaders were Shen Junru, Zhang Naiqi, Zou Taofen, Li Gongpu, Sha Qianli, Shi Liang and Wang Zaoshi, who were leading the patriotic anti-Japanese movement in Shanghai and were arrested by the Kuomintang reactionaries. pp. 88, 215, 276

<sup>92</sup> Yan Xishan (1883-1960), a warlord, ruled Shanxi for a long time. In August 1937, he became commander of the 2nd War Zone of the Kuomintang.

pp. 96, 104, 254, 262

<sup>93</sup> Officers' Training Corps is short for the Officers' Training Corps of the Shanxi National Army. "Daredevil" Corps is short for the Shanxi Youth Resistance "Daredevil" Corps. Young Vanguard is short for the Shanxi Young Vanguard for Resistance. These were all popular anti-Japanese armed forces, known jointly as



the New Army of Shanxi. They were organized with the approval of Yan Xishan in the autumn of 1936 after Bo Yibo and others were sent by the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC to begin work in Shanxi. p. 96

<sup>94</sup> Huang Shaohong (1895-1966) was a Kuomintang officer in the Guangxi clique. He was deputy commander of the 2nd War Zone. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the Government Administration Council. p. 96

Wei Lihuang (1896-1960) was deputy commander of the 2nd War Zone. In 1955, he returned to Beijing from Hongkong and served as Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council. pp. 96, 224

<sup>95</sup> Liu Xiang (1889-1938) was a Sichuan warlord. He was commander of the 7th War Zone. p. 96

<sup>96</sup> The brigade under Xu Quanzhong was the 529th Brigade, 177th Division, 96th Corps of the 17th Route Army of the Northwestern Army. Xu (1894-1943) was a member of the Communist Party. In 1928, he took part in the Weinan-Huaxian Rebellion in Shaanxi Province. In 1933, he became commander of the 18th Division of the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Chahar Province. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he fought in the battles of Yixian and Quyang to block the advance of the Japanese troops and then in the Battle of Xinkou. In 1943, he was murdered by Hu Zongnan's men in Meixian County, Shaanxi Province.

The division under Zhao Shoushan was the 17th Division of the 17th Route Army. Zhao (1893-1965) was involved in secret work under the guidance of the Communist Party after the Xi'an Incident and joined the Communist Party in 1942. In March 1946, he went to the Liberated Areas and in January 1948 was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China he served as a member of the National Defence Council.

The army under Sun Weiru was the 38th Army of the 17th Route Army. Sun (1896-1979) was a patriotic general in the Northwestern Army. Over the years, he maintained contact with the Communist Party and showed sympathy and support for the people's revolutionary cause. After the founding of the People's Republic of China he served as a member of the National Defence Council. p. 97

<sup>97</sup> The committee referred to was the Battlefield General Mobilization Committee of the 2nd War Zone in the National Revolutionary War, an organization set up and promoted by the Communist Party and having the character of a wartime administration. Its task was to mobilize and organize the masses to participate in activities directed against Japanese imperialism in the northern Shanxi, Suiyuan and southern Chahar battle areas. The chairman of the committee was Xu Fanting. p. 97

<sup>98</sup> Hu Fu was an alias of Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969), who was leading the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as representative of the Central Committee at the time. p. 97

<sup>99</sup> Song Renqiong (1909- ) was director of the Political Department of the 129th Division of the Eighteenth Group Army. p. 97

<sup>100</sup> Peng Zhen (1902- ) was head of the Organization Department of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. p. 97

<sup>101</sup> Peng Xuefeng (1907-44) joined the Communist Party in 1926. At the time in question, he was director of the Taiyuan Office of the Eighth Route Army. In 1941, he became commander of the 4th Division of the New Fourth Army and concurrently commander-in-chief of the Huaihe River North Military Area. In September 1944, he

was killed in action while fighting Japanese and puppet troops in Xiayi County, Henan Province. p. 98

<sup>102</sup> The Nine-Power Treaty was signed by the United States, Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and the northern warlord government of China at the Washington Conference in February 1922. The Treaty reflected the contradictions between the U.S. and British imperialists on the one hand, and the Japanese imperialists on the other, on the question of China and put forward the ideas of the open door and of equal opportunity for imperialist interests in China. In November 1937, a conference of the states signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty was convened in Brussels. Japan refused to participate. Besides the remaining signatory states, the Soviet Union, India and seventeen other countries attended. Because Britain and the United States adopted a policy of appeasing Japan and refused to discuss the principle of collective security put forward by the Soviet Union, the conference failed to yield any positive result but abetted Japanese aggression. p. 100

<sup>103</sup> According to a report in the London *Evening Standard* on October 30, 1937, the Japanese Government had put forward six conditions for peace negotiations and the cessation of war to Chiang Kai-shek: 1) China's recognition of the independence of Inner Mongolia; 2) the right of five provinces in north China to adopt "autonomous" rule; 3) the changing of the area occupied by Japanese troops in Shanghai into a Japanese concession and the granting to Japan of roads leading to the sea; 4) the granting to Japan of fishing rights in the vicinity of all islands off China's coast from Shanhaiguan to the border with Viet Nam; 5) China's withdrawal from the League of Nations; and 6) China's abstention from establishing an aviation system for military use. p. 100

<sup>104</sup> The traitorous regime then being rigged up by the Japanese invaders in north China. This puppet regime, named the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, was set up on December 14, 1937 in Beiping. Its main chieftains were Wang Kemin and Wang Yitang. p. 101

<sup>105</sup> Temporary organizations of local puppet power set up by the Japanese invaders in the occupied areas during the War of Resistance using Chinese traitors. p. 101

<sup>106</sup> In October 1937, in a move planned and orchestrated by the Japanese invaders, the clique of the Mongolian renegade Demchukdonggrub changed the existing Military Government of Mongolia into a Federated Mongolian Autonomous Government and declared the autonomy of Mongolia. p. 101

<sup>107</sup> Wang Jingwei (1883-1944) became president of the Guangzhou National Government in 1925. On July 15, 1927 he launched a counter-revolutionary coup in Wuhan. Following the Incident of September 18, 1931 (see Note 490 below), he advocated compromise with Japanese imperialism. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he served as Vice-President of the Kuomintang. At the end of 1938 he openly surrendered to the Japanese invaders and in 1940 set up a puppet government in Nanjing. pp. 101, 133, 232

<sup>108</sup> The term "special areas" refers to a tactical measure used by Japanese imperialism in its invasion of China. In April 1935, Japan plotted to establish so-called special areas in five provinces in north China (namely Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, Shandong and Suiyuan); they were to break away from the Kuomintang government and take orders from the Japanese imperialists. In June of the same year, He Yingqin, the Kuomintang government's representative in north China, accepted the Japanese demand and signed an agreement with Umezu Yoshijiro, commander of the Japanese invading forces in north China. Under the "He-Umezu Agreement" China forfeited the greater part of her sovereignty in the provinces of Hebei and Chahar. In October

1935, the Japanese invaders got a number of Chinese traitors to start a "movement for the autonomy of the five northern provinces" and set up the Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration of Eastern Hebei. The Kuomintang government then appointed Song Zheyuan and others to form the Political Council for Hebei and Chahar, thereby complying with the Japanese demand for a "special administration for north China".

p. 101

<sup>109</sup> Nanhuaihua is located in what is now Wangjiazhuang Commune, Yuanping County, Shanxi Province.

p. 103

<sup>110</sup> A form of army organization with each level exercising direct jurisdiction over three subordinate units. For instance, under each regiment there were three battalions, under each battalion three companies, under each company three platoons, and under each platoon, three squads.

p. 105

<sup>111</sup> At an enlarged meeting held at Luochuan, northern Shaanxi Province, on August 25, 1937, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party put forth a ten-point programme for a war of resistance against Japanese imperialism calling for: 1) the overthrow of Japanese imperialism; 2) mobilization of the military strength of the whole nation; 3) mobilization of the whole people; 4) reform of the government apparatus; 5) an anti-Japanese foreign policy; 6) wartime financial and economic policies; 7) the improvement of the people's livelihood; 8) an anti-Japanese educational policy; 9) the weeding out of traitors and pro-Japanese elements and consolidation of the rear; and 10) national unity against Japan.

pp. 106, 173

<sup>112</sup> These were the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Rehe (the Rehe provincial administration was abolished in 1955 and the territory formerly under its jurisdiction was incorporated into Hebei and Liaoning Provinces and the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia). In 1931, the Japanese imperialists engineered the September 18th Incident in Shenyang and soon afterwards dispatched troops to attack Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces. As Chiang Kai-shek persisted in a policy of non-resistance, the three provinces were completely occupied by the Japanese army in just over a hundred days. In February 1933, the Japanese attacked Rehe, and within ten days the whole of Rehe was occupied.

p. 109

<sup>113</sup> Chen Jiongming, commander-in-chief of the Guangdong troops, betrayed Dr. Sun Yat-sen in June 1922 and ensconced himself in the Dongjiang area [the region around Huizhou and Shantou (Swatow)] after being driven out of Guangzhou by Xu Chongzhi and others. Between the summer of 1923 and the summer of 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen successively gathered together the Guangdong troops led by Xu Chongzhi, the Hunan troops led by Tan Yankai and Cheng Qian, the Yunnan troops led by Yang Ximin and the Guangxi troops led by Liu Zhenhuan to make war against Chen's troops in what became known as the Dongjiang campaign. The campaign of Xijiang was fought in January and May 1923 in the area of Zhaoqing, Guangdong Province, by the allied forces of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong against first the troops led by Chen Jiongming and then those led by Shen Hongying, another warlord. The campaign of Beijiang was fought from May to November 1923 in the area of Shaoguan, Guangdong Province, between the same allied forces and Shen Hongying's troops. The battles in the south were skirmishes in September 1923 and July 1924 in Lianzhou, Leizhou and other places in Guangdong between the Guangdong troops and troops led by Chen's subordinate, Deng Benyin.

p. 111

<sup>114</sup> The Whampoa Military Academy was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Huangpu (Whampoa), Guangzhou, in 1924, with the help of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union. The Communist Party assigned Zhou Enlai, Yun Daiying,

Xiao Chunü, Nic Rongzhen and others to take up posts in the academy, and many cadets were members of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth League. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. pp. 111, 132, 187

<sup>115</sup> In order to consolidate the Guangdong revolutionary base and pave the way for the Northern Expedition, the revolutionary army, which was organized jointly by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and in which the Whampoa Military Academy cadets constituted the backbone, set out eastward from Guangzhou in February and March of 1925, and defeated the main force of warlord Chen Jiongming which was entrenched in Dongjiang. In June, the revolutionary army returned to Guangzhou and put down the rebellion of the Yunnan and Guangxi warlords Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan who had by then entrenched themselves there. In October and November the revolutionary forces conducted a second eastern campaign, wiping out Chen Jiongming's forces once and for all. pp. 111, 136

<sup>116</sup> Yang Ximin was commander-in-chief of the Yunnan troops stationed in Guangdong and concurrently commander of the First Army and a member of the Guangzhou revolutionary government. Liu Zhenhuan was commander-in-chief of the Guangxi troops stationed in Guangdong and concurrently the governor of Guangxi Province and a member of the Guangzhou revolutionary government. In June 1925, Yang and Liu worked hand in glove to launch a rebellion in an attempt to subvert the Guangzhou revolutionary government, but the National Revolutionary Army returned to Guangzhou from Dongjiang and speedily put it down. pp. 112, 136

<sup>117</sup> In July 1926, the National Revolutionary Army set out from Guangzhou on the Northern Expedition in order to overthrow the rule of the northern warlords. Thanks to the political leadership of the Communist Party and the active support of the masses of workers and peasants, the army quickly occupied vast areas in the middle and lower reaches of the Changjiang River, thus dealing a heavy blow at imperialism and the feudal forces. On April 12, 1927, the right wing of the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek launched a counter-revolutionary coup. Thus the First Revolutionary Civil War ended in failure. pp. 112, 142, 235, 274, 356, 405

<sup>118</sup> In parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Spain in February 1936, the Popular Front led by the Spanish Communist Party won and formed the government. In July of the same year, the Spanish general Franco unleashed a civil war with the direct participation of the fascist troops of Germany and Italy. The progressive forces of the world actively supported the government of Spain, organizing an International Brigade to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Spanish people. In the name of non-intervention, the British and French governments imposed a blockade against the Spanish Republic. After three years of bitter fighting, Madrid, the capital, fell in March 1939, and the government of the Republic was defeated. Franco seized political power and set up a fascist regime. p. 112

<sup>119</sup> After Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'état of April 12, 1927, most of the political training sections in the Kuomintang army were turned into secret agencies. Their tasks were to conduct anti-Communist propaganda and to investigate and supervise the thinking and actions of officers and men so as to facilitate Chiang Kai-shek's personal control over the army. p. 113

<sup>120</sup> The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC held in Yan'an in October 1938. p. 121

<sup>121</sup> The Green Band, a secret society, was originally founded by people engaged in water transport early in the Qing Dynasty. Its members were mainly boatmen, handicraftsmen, the urban poor, *lumpen*-proletarians and impoverished peasants. It

was a feudal-patriarchal organization, deeply tinged with religious superstition, and was often bought over and used by bureaucrats and warlords. Nevertheless, it played a certain role in the 1911 Revolution. When Chiang Kai-shek staged his coup d'état in 1927, the Green Band chieftains in Shanghai, Wuhan and other places served as his tools in massacring Communists and suppressing the revolution.

The Big Sword Society, a secret society which emerged at the end of the Qing Dynasty, was a branch of the Bailian (White Lotus) religious sect. The Society operated mainly in Shandong, northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui. The majority of its members were poor peasants. It was deeply tinged with feudal superstition. Though it did conduct struggles against feudal oppression and foreign missionaries in a number of areas and join the patriotic anti-imperialist Yi He Tuan Movement, it was often used by feudal landlords to suppress peasant uprisings. p. 127

<sup>122</sup> Dong Biwu (1885-1975) was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. In 1924 he served as secretary of the Wuhan Prefectural Committee and member of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPC. He directed the setting up of the Kuomintang headquarters in Hubei Province and was made a member of its standing committee. p. 130

<sup>123</sup> Chen Tanqiu (1896-1943) was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. After 1924 he served successively as secretary of the Wuhan Prefectural Party Committee and member of the Hubei Party Committee and concurrently head of its Organization Department. He also helped in setting up the Kuomintang headquarters in Hubei Province. In 1939 he was the representative of the Communist Party and chief of the Office of the Eighth Route Army in Xinjiang. He was arrested by warlord Sheng Shicai in 1942 and was secretly killed in September 1943. He was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in Yan'an in 1945, the news of his death not yet having reached Yan'an. pp. 130, 208

<sup>124</sup> He Shuheng (1875-1935) was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. He was a leading member of the Hunan Committee of the CPC and principal of the Xiangjiang Middle School. He helped reorganize the Kuomintang headquarters in Hunan Province. In 1931, he was a member of the Workers' and Peasants' Control Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and President of the Supreme People's Court. After the Red Army left on the Long March in 1934, he stayed behind in the base area to carry on the struggle. In February 1935 he was killed in battle while attempting to break through the enemy's encirclement in Changding, Fujian Province. p. 130

<sup>125</sup> Xia Xi (1900-36) joined the Communist Party in 1921. At the time of the Northern Expedition, he was a member of the Hunan Committee of the CPC and was elected an alternate member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at its Second National Congress. He helped set up the Kuomintang headquarters in Hunan Province and was made a member of its standing committee. p. 130

<sup>126</sup> Xuan Zhonghua (1898-1927) joined the Communist Party in 1923 and was one of the leaders of its Hangzhou Prefectural Committee. In 1924 he took part in preparatory work for the establishment of the Kuomintang headquarters in Zhejiang Province and was elected a member of its executive and standing committees. He was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries in Shanghai on April 11, 1927, and died a martyr the next day. p. 130

<sup>127</sup> Hou Shaoqiu (1896-1927) joined the Communist Party in 1923. In 1926 he became a member of the standing committee of the Kuomintang headquarters in

Jiangsu Province. He was arrested in Nanjing on April 10, 1927, and died a martyr.  
p. 130

<sup>128</sup> Li Dazhao (1889-1927) was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. He was in charge of the Northern Executive Committee of the Communist Party and was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at its First National Congress. He directed the preparatory work for establishing the Kuomintang headquarters in the Beijing and Tianjin municipalities and in Zhili Province and was in charge of the work of the Kuomintang's Central Political Council, its highest leading organ in the north. On April 6, 1927 he was arrested in Beijing by warlord Zhang Zuolin (see Note 265 below) and died a martyr on April 28.  
pp. 130, 360

<sup>129</sup> Yu Shude (1894- ) joined the Communist Party in 1922 while he was a professor at Beijing University. He is now a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.  
p. 130

<sup>130</sup> Li Yongsheng (1872-1952), also named Li Xijiu, joined the Communist Party in 1922 and helped with preparations for the establishment of the Shunzhi Committee of the CPC in Tianjin in the same year. In 1924 he attended the First National Congress of the Kuomintang and then helped found and direct the Zhili provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the Central People's Government Council.  
p. 130

<sup>131</sup> Yu Fangzhou (1900-28) joined the Communist Party in 1922 and became head of the Organization Department of the Shunzhi Party Committee in 1923. In 1924 he attended the First National Congress of the Kuomintang and was elected an alternate member of its Central Executive Committee. He helped form and direct the Zhili provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang. He was captured in battle by the enemy in the autumn of 1927 when leading a peasant insurrection in Yutian, Hebei Province, and died a martyr in the spring of 1928.  
p. 130

<sup>132</sup> In November 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived in Beijing from Guangzhou via Shanghai, prepared to negotiate with Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin who had defeated the Zhili warlords and brought the Beijing government under their control. In a statement before departing for the north, Dr. Sun advocated the overthrow of the warlords internally and, in foreign affairs, the overthrow of imperialism and abrogation of the unequal treaties, and he called for the convocation of a national assembly to settle these questions. He was already seriously ill when he reached Tianjin, and he died in Beijing on March 12, 1925.  
p. 131

<sup>133</sup> The Communist Party issued two statements in August 1923 and November 1924 calling for the convocation of a national assembly to replace the reactionary rule of the northern warlords. This call evoked a favourable response from people throughout the country and won the active support of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In a very short time a nationwide popular movement emerged, having as its main objectives the convocation of a national assembly and the abrogation of the unequal treaties. Associations for the convocation of a national assembly were quickly formed throughout the country. In March 1925, a Congress of Associations for the Convocation of a National Assembly was convened in Beijing.  
p. 131

<sup>134</sup> Feng Ziyou was at the time a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

Xie Chi was a member of the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang. In June 1924, he joined Zhang Ji and others in issuing a "Statement on Impeaching the

Communist Party". In 1925 he joined Zou Lu and others in sponsoring the Western Hills Meeting (see following note). p. 131

<sup>135</sup> In November 1925, a dozen or so Kuomintang right-wingers including Zou Lu, Xie Chi, Ju Zheng, Zhang Ji and Lin Sen called a Fourth Plenary Meeting of the First Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Biyun Temple in the Western Hills near Beijing. They adopted reactionary resolutions opposing the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China and co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. They set up a Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang in Shanghai and a local headquarters in Beijing. Those attending this meeting became known as the Western Hills Clique. p. 131

<sup>136</sup> The Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines was a reactionary organization established by Kuomintang right-wingers to counter the Association of Young Soldiers, an organization of revolutionary soldiers at the Whampoa Military Academy. Among the leaders of the society were Dai Jitao, Wang Boling, Chen Cheng, He Zhonghan and Miao Bin. pp. 132, 175, 187

<sup>137</sup> Sun Fo was then mayor of Guangzhou under the National Government. Shortly after the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, he demanded the impeachment of the Communist Party. p. 132

<sup>138</sup> The gist of the Draft Constitution promulgated by the Kuomintang government on May 5, 1936 was the preservation of Kuomintang one-party dictatorship. pp. 132, 253, 296

<sup>139</sup> In his early years, Li Jishen (1886-1959) was chief of staff and later commander of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army. At the time of the Northern Expedition, he was chief of staff of the General Headquarters of the National Revolutionary Army and was assigned to stay behind in Guangzhou for garrison duty. In 1927 he participated in the Kuomintang's reactionary activities. In 1933 he allied himself with the 19th Route Army in organizing the People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China in Fujian Province, a government which opposed Chiang Kai-shek and stood for resistance to Japanese aggression. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he answered the call of the Communist Party for unity against Japan by uniting with patriotic and democratic forces in the Kuomintang and opposing Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial policies. In 1948 he organized the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and assumed its presidency. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government. pp. 132, 196, 316

<sup>140</sup> Deng Keng (1886-1922) joined the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) in his youth. After 1917, he served successively as chief of staff of the Guangdong Army and commander of its 1st Division. p. 132

<sup>141</sup> Zhang Fakui (1896-1980), who had been a regimental commander of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army, became commander of the 12th Division of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army in 1925. p. 132

<sup>142</sup> Deng Yanda (1895-1931) was a leader of the Kuomintang left wing. In 1920 he joined the Guangdong Army organized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and served as battalion and then regimental commander. In 1926 he was Dean of Studies of the Whampoa Military Academy. During the Northern Expedition he was head of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army and governor of Hubei Province. In March 1927, together with Soong Ching Ling, He Xiangning, Wu Yuzhang and others, he called the Third Plenary Session of the Second Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Wuhan at which a decision to restrict the powers

of Chiang Kai-shek was adopted. After the coup of April 12, 1927, Deng was proscribed by order of Chiang Kai-shek. With the establishment of collaboration between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek, Deng went into exile, living in the Soviet Union and Germany. He returned to China in 1930 and was murdered in Nanjing in November 1931 at the order of Chiang Kai-shek. pp. 132, 187

<sup>143</sup> The 1911 Revolution was a bourgeois-democratic revolution which overthrew the Qing autocratic monarchy. On October 10, 1911, as a result of revolutionary agitation, part of the New Army stationed in Wuchang, Hubei Province, launched an uprising against the rule of the Qing Dynasty. A positive response from various provinces led to the quick collapse of the Qing government. On January 1, 1912, a provisional government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanjing.

pp. 133, 169, 274, 336

<sup>144</sup> The New Army was a new type of armed force organized and trained during the last years of the Qing Dynasty. Thanks to the efforts of the revolutionaries on the eve of the 1911 Revolution, increasing numbers of junior officers and men of the New Army in various provinces became inclined towards revolution, and eventually the New Army constituted the main force in the uprisings in Nanchang and other places. The secret societies were clandestine popular organizations in old China, typified by the Society of Brothers. The *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen made use of these secret societies to launch armed insurrections. p. 133

<sup>145</sup> Chen Qimei (1878-1916) joined the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) in his youth. For a time he took part in launching revolutionary movements against the Qing Dynasty in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. Meanwhile, he joined the Green Band in Shanghai and became one of its chieftains. After the 1911 Revolution he became military governor of Shanghai. Early in 1912 he incited Chiang Kai-shek to assassinate Tao Chengzhang, a well-known leader of the *Guang Fu Hui* (see Note 2 above). pp. 133, 169

<sup>146</sup> For the Chinese Revolutionary Party, see Note 2 above.

p. 133

<sup>147</sup> Huang Keqiang (1874-1916), or Huang Xing, organized the *Hua Xing Hui*, an anti-Qing Dynasty revolutionary group, in 1904 and assumed its presidency. In 1905 when the *Hua Xing Hui*, *Xing Zhong Hui* and *Guang Fu Hui* merged into the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League), he stood second only to Dr. Sun Yat-sen among its leaders. From 1907 on, he took part in and led many armed insurrections against the Qing regime. After the Wuchang Uprising he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Army. In 1912 he served as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Provisional Government in Nanjing and in 1913 he was commander-in-chief of the Jiangsu troops opposing Yuan Shikai. p. 133

<sup>148</sup> The *Yongfeng* was the largest warship under the command of the Revolutionary Government in Guangzhou. When Chen Jiongming staged a rebellion against the revolutionary forces in 1922, Dr. Sun Yat-sen took refuge on board the ship. After the death of Dr. Sun the ship was renamed the *Zhongshan*, after him. p. 133

<sup>149</sup> Colluding with British imperialism and the Zhili warlord clique, Chen Jiongming betrayed Dr. Sun Yat-sen and bombarded the President's headquarters in Guangzhou on June 16, 1922. p. 133

<sup>150</sup> Wang Boling was then director of the Department of Instruction at the Whampoa Military Academy. He strongly opposed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies and was one of the sponsors of the so-called Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines (see Note 136 above). In 1923 he was Acting Dean of Studies of the Whampoa Military Academy. p. 134



<sup>151</sup> Wang Maogong was commander-in-chief of the Guangzhou Garrison in 1925, but in February 1926 he was removed from office by Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he later threw in his lot, serving as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, governor of Jiangsu Province, and deputy commander-in-chief of the 10th War Zone. pp. 134, 225

<sup>152</sup> Lu Yi (1900-32) joined the Communist Party of Chinese Youth in Europe in 1921 and became a member of the Communist Party of China in 1922. During the First Revolutionary Civil War, he served as deputy director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy and Party representative in the 3rd Division of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army. He was captured in battle and died a martyr at Honghu Lake, Hubei Province, in August 1932. p. 134

<sup>153</sup> The Association of Young Soldiers, an organization of revolutionary soldiers, was founded under the leadership of Zhou Enlai in the Whampoa Military Academy on February 1, 1925. Communist Party and Youth League members in the Whampoa Military Academy formed its core and it recruited young soldiers from the military academies of the Guangdong, Yunnan and Guangxi armies. Among its members were Jiang Xianyun and Zhou Yiqun. The association actively spread revolutionary theories and the Communist Party's united front policy, united with the revolutionary forces, combated the Kuomintang right-wing forces and conducted a tit-for-tat struggle against the reactionary Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines (see Note 136 above). After the *Zhongsban* Warship Incident of March 20, 1926, it was disbanded by Chiang Kai-shek. pp. 134, 187

<sup>154</sup> In 1924, the British imperialists assisted the Merchants' Corps, a counter-revolutionary armed group controlled by the big comprador Chen Lianbo in Guangzhou, with large amounts of money and munitions in an attempt to subvert the Guangdong Revolutionary Government. In August 1924, the Guangdong Revolutionary Government confiscated the munitions smuggled in by Chen Lianbo. Chen Lianbo then instigated the Merchants' Corps to petition Dr. Sun Yat-sen and incited shopkeepers throughout the province to go on strike. On October 10, when the people of Guangzhou paraded in celebration of the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, they were fired on by the Merchants' Corps. The 16 organizations represented in the parade formed the Revolutionary Alliance of Workers, Peasants, Soldiers and Students and issued a declaration demanding the dissolution of the Merchants' Corps and the severe punishment of the assailants. Influenced and supported by the Communist Party, the masses of workers and peasants and the Kuomintang left-wingers, Dr. Sun Yat-sen took resolute measures. He assembled the armed forces of workers and peasants, Whampoa cadets and other troops which routed the Merchants' Corps on October 15. p. 135

<sup>155</sup> To express support for the May 30th Movement, the workers of Hongkong called a general strike on June 19, 1925. The strike involved some 250,000 workers. On June 21, the Chinese workers in the foreign concession at Shamian (Shameen) in Guangzhou also walked out. The two strikes against British imperialism were together known as the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike. On June 23, the strikers organized the Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike Committee, set up a picket corps, and blockaded Hongkong and the Shamian foreign concession, thus inflicting heavy political and economic losses on British imperialism. The strike lasted 16 months and ended in victory in October 1926 after the Northern Expeditionary Army took Wuhan. p. 135

<sup>156</sup> Tan Yankai (1880-1930) was a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and chairman of its Central Political Council in 1924. In 1925 he became a standing member of the National Government and concurrently a member of the

Military Council and commander of the Second Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In 1927, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, a member of the presidium of its Central Political Council and a standing member of the National Government in Wuhan. pp. 135, 185

<sup>157</sup> Zhu Peide (1889-1937) served as a member of the Central Executive Committee and of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, and commander of the Third Army of the National Revolutionary Army. p. 135

<sup>158</sup> Cheng Qian (1881-1968) was commander of the Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. p. 135

<sup>159</sup> The Peasant Movement Institute for the Peasant Association of Guangdong Province was founded by Peng Pai in 1924 (see Note 25 above). The first five classes were run by Peng Pai, Ruan Xiaoxian and others. The sixth class, which started in May 1926, was run by the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee; thereafter the institute was known as the Central Peasant Movement Institute and Mao Zedong was appointed its director. Among the teachers were such Communists as Xiao Chunü, Peng Pai, Yun Daiying, Zhou Enlai, Ruan Xiaoxian and Zhao Zixuan. The 327 trainees in the sixth class came from 20 provinces and prefectures. They graduated in September 1926. In March 1927, Mao Zedong set up another peasant movement institute in Wuchang and trained a class of students there. p. 136

<sup>160</sup> To protest against the imperialist-engineered massacre of May 30th in Shanghai (see Note 3 above), a large-scale demonstration was held in Guangzhou on June 23, 1925 by some 100,000 people and cadets from the Whampoa Military Academy. While the demonstrators were passing along Shaji Street, they were machine-gunned by the British and French troops in the foreign concession in Shamian. Fifty-two were killed on the spot and more than one hundred and seventy were seriously wounded. This incident became known as the Shaji Massacre. p. 136

<sup>161</sup> Xu Chongzhi (1886-1961) was then commander-in-chief of the Guangdong Army. p. 136

<sup>162</sup> Peng Hanyuan, a brother of Peng Pai, joined the revolutionary ranks under the latter's influence. He was elected county magistrate of Haifeng after the First Eastern Campaign in 1925. He was arrested in March 1928 and died a martyr in Guangzhou. p. 136

<sup>163</sup> Chen Yannian (1898-1927) joined the Communist Party in 1922. In 1924 he served as secretary of the Guangdong-Guangxi Party Committee. In April 1927 he was elected a member of the Central Committee and an alternate member of its Political Bureau at the Party's Fifth National Congress. After the congress he served as secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CPC. In June 1927 he was arrested and in July he died a martyr in Longhua, Shanghai. p. 137

<sup>164</sup> Mikhail Markovich Borodin (1884-1951) was the Soviet Government emissary to the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government and political advisor to the Kuomintang during the first period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. He came to China in October 1923 and returned to the Soviet Union after Wang Jingwei's coup d'état of July 15, 1927. pp. 137, 187

<sup>165</sup> Zhang Guotao (1897-1979) attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1921 and was elected a member of the Central Committee at its 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th national congresses. At the First Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress, he was elected a member of the Political Bureau. In 1931 he went to work in the Fourth Front Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet

Area and became secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China. In 1935, after the Central Red Army reached western Sichuan and joined forces with the Fourth Front Army during the Long March, he became General Political Commissar of the Red Army. He opposed the Central Committee's decision that the Red Army should continue its northward march and carried out criminal activities to split the Party and the Red Army. In April 1938 he betrayed the revolution and joined the Kuomintang secret police; he was subsequently expelled from the Party.

pp. 138, 158, 179, 237

<sup>166</sup> Chen Duxiu (1880-1942) began editing the magazine *New Youth* in September 1915. Together with Li Dazhao, he founded the *Weekly Review* in 1918, advocated the new culture and was one of the chief leaders of the May 4th new cultural movement. After the May 4th Movement, he accepted and propagated Marxism. He was one of the main founders of the Communist Party of China and held the post of general secretary of the Party for the first six years after its founding. In the last period of the First Revolutionary Civil War, he pushed a Right opportunist line and thus committed a serious error. Later, he lost faith in the future of the revolution and denied the necessity of the proletariat's continuing to carry out the tasks of the democratic revolution in China. He formed a faction inside the Party, engaged in anti-Party activities and was consequently expelled from the Party in November 1929. He later linked up with the Trotskyites, and in May 1931 the self-styled Left opposition faction of the Communist Party of China, a Trotskyite organization, made him its general secretary. In 1932 he was arrested and imprisoned by the Kuomintang. He was released in August 1937.

pp. 138, 158, 180, 233

<sup>167</sup> Galen, or General Blücher (1890-1938), was sent by the Soviet Government in 1924 to be chief military advisor to the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government. He returned to the Soviet Union after Wang Jingwei's coup d'état of July 15, 1927.

pp. 138, 192

<sup>168</sup> Zhang Jingjiang (1877-1950) served as acting chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. In 1927 he helped Chiang Kai-shek plot the coup d'état of April 12 and helped promote the formation of the counter-revolutionary alliance of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. p. 138

<sup>169</sup> Zhang Tailei (1899-1927) joined a communist group in 1920. He was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee at the Fourth National Congress of the Communist Party in 1925 and was elected League secretary at the Third National Congress of the Communist Youth League in the same year. He served as interpreter for the Soviet advisor Borodin and as a member of the Standing Committee and head of the Propaganda Department of the Guangdong-Guangxi Party Committee. In April 1927 he was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Party's Fifth National Congress. He attended the emergency meeting of the Central Committee on August 7, 1927 and was elected an alternate member of the Political Bureau. In October he took charge of the work of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee and served concurrently as secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee. He laid down his life while leading the Guangzhou Uprising in December.

pp. 139, 196

<sup>170</sup> Li Fulin was commander of the Fifth Army of the National Revolutionary Army.

p. 139

<sup>171</sup> Ouyang Ge was commander-in-chief of the Navy of the National Revolutionary Army and commander of a fleet.

p. 140

<sup>172</sup> After 1924 Gu Yingfen served successively as a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of the Central Supervisory Committee and as chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau of Guangdong Province. In 1927 he helped suppress the Guangzhou Uprising. pp. 140, 186

<sup>173</sup> Jiang Xianyun (1902-27) joined the Communist Party in 1921. He led the strike of the Shuikoushan lead and zinc miners in Hunan Province in 1922. In 1924 he entered the Whampoa Military Academy. After graduation he stayed on, serving as secretary, and was one of the leading cadres of the Association of Young Soldiers. In 1926 he was a secretary in the General Headquarters of the National Revolutionary Army, commander of the Fifth Regiment of Reinforcements and general head of the workers' pickets of the Federation of Trade Unions of Hubei Province. In 1927 he was commander and Party representative of the 77th Regiment of the 26th Division of the Eleventh Army. On May 28, 1927, he was killed in action in the Battle of Linying, Henan Province. p. 140

<sup>174</sup> Li Mo'an was then a secretary with the rank of major in the Office of the Kuomintang Party Representative in the 3rd Regiment, 1st Division, First Army of the National Revolutionary Army. p. 140

<sup>175</sup> Peng Shuzhi (1896- ) joined the Communist Party in 1921. In 1924, he took up teaching in Shanghai University and served as editor of *New Youth* and *The Guide*. In the last stage of the First Revolutionary Civil War he implemented Chen Duxiu's Right opportunist line. After the revolution suffered defeat, he became a liquidationist and took the reactionary Trotskyite stand. He organized a faction inside the Party and conducted anti-Party activities. He was expelled from the Party in November 1929 and subsequently became a Trotskyite. pp. 141, 179, 240

<sup>176</sup> Chen Guofu (1892-1951) was a member of the Central Supervisory Committee and acting director of the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. After the setting up of the Kuomintang government in Nanjing in 1927, he and his younger brother, Chen Lifu, formed the Central Club (*i.e.*, the "CC Clique") to control the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters, a secret service agency. pp. 142, 169, 174

<sup>177</sup> Ding Weifen was director of the Party Affairs Department of the Beijing Executive Bureau of the Kuomintang. Wang Faqin was a member of the Beijing Branch of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang.

The Great League was organized by Ding Weifen after the May 4th Movement. For a time after the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924, it came under the control of the North China Executive Bureau of the Kuomintang. After Dr. Sun Yat-sen died, the Great League increasingly threw its support behind Chiang Kai-shek and opposed the Communist Party. p. 142

<sup>178</sup> Li Fuchun (1900-75) joined the Communist Party in 1922. During the Northern Expedition he served as Party representative and director of the Political Department of the Second Army of the National Revolutionary Army. p. 142

<sup>179</sup> Zhu Kejing (1895-1947) joined the Communist Party in 1922. During the Northern Expedition he served as Party representative in the Third Army of the National Revolutionary Army. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he was advisor to the Political Department of the New Fourth Army and director of the Administrative Office of Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. After the War of Resistance, he served as head of the Liaison Department of the New Fourth Army. In 1946, after the Communist Party succeeded in winning over the forces under the command of Hao Pengju, he served as their political commissar. In 1947, when Hao Pengju turned against the Communist Party, Zhu was detained. He

was murdered by the Kuomintang reactionaries in Nanjing in the autumn of that year. p. 142

<sup>180</sup> Luo Han, once a member of the Communist Party, joined a Trotskyite group while studying in Moscow in 1927. p. 142

<sup>181</sup> Lin Boqu (1885-1960) joined the Communist Party in 1921. During the Northern Expedition, he served as Party representative in the Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. p. 142

<sup>182</sup> The Wuchang Uprising, the first victorious battle of the 1911 Revolution, began on October 10, 1911, and in 1912 the Senate of the Republic of China decided to designate October 10 as National Day. The day became popularly known as the Double Tenth Festival. p. 142

<sup>183</sup> Miao Bin was then Party representative in the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army. p. 143

<sup>184</sup> The Indian progressive Dwarkanath Santram Kotnis (1910-42) graduated from Grant Medical College in 1936. In September 1938, he joined an Indian medical team bound for China to aid the Chinese people in the War of Resistance. In February 1939, after breaking through the Kuomintang blockade, Dr. Kotnis arrived in Yan'an with the team. In December of that year, he went to the anti-Japanese front in southeastern Shanxi. In August 1940, he worked in the Norman Bethune School and the Norman Bethune International Peace Hospital in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area. In January 1941, he became director of the hospital. Dr. Kotnis joined the Communist Party of China on July 7, 1942. He died in Tangxian County, Hebei Province, on December 9, 1942. p. 143

<sup>185</sup> Hongyan (No. 13 Hongyanzui, Hualongqiao, in the suburbs of Chongqing) was the site of the Chongqing offices of both the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Eighteenth Group Army. No. 50 Zengjiayan was the site of the Chongqing offices of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee and the Eighteenth Group Army inside Chongqing proper. p. 146

<sup>186</sup> J. V. Stalin, *Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite and Other Double-Dealers*, Eng. ed., Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1937, p. 39.

The text reads: "Leading properly means:

Firstly, finding the proper solution to a problem; but it is impossible to find the proper solution to a problem without taking into account the experience of the masses who feel the results of our leadership on their own backs;

Secondly, organizing the application of the correct solution, which, however, cannot be done without the direct assistance of the masses;

Thirdly, organizing the verification of the fulfilment of this solution, which again cannot be done without the direct assistance of the masses." p. 147

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34. p. 148

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34. p. 149

<sup>189</sup> After fascist Germany occupied Paris in June 1940, traitors headed by Pétain, then Prime Minister of France, surrendered to Germany. On July 1, they moved the government to Vichy and organized the Vichy puppet government. p. 151

<sup>190</sup> On June 22, 1941, unilaterally tearing up the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression and without declaring war, fascist Germany launched a sudden attack against the Soviet Union. The people of the Soviet Union began their Great Patriotic War under the leadership of the Party and the government headed by Stalin. pp. 151, 225

<sup>191</sup> On the morning of December 7, 1941, without declaring war, the Japanese navy and air force suddenly attacked Pearl Harbour, the main base of the U.S. navy and air force in the Pacific area, inflicting grave losses on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. On December 8, the United States and Britain formally declared war on Japan, while Germany declared war on the United States. Thus the Pacific War started. On December 10, the Japanese air force attacked the British Far East Fleet at sea off Singapore, inflicting heavy losses on it. pp. 151, 225

<sup>192</sup> During the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), traitors, spies and saboteurs carried out counter-revolutionary activities in the rear areas of the republic. When the traitorous Spanish army and the German and Italian fascists launched a concerted attack against Madrid, capital of the Spanish Republic, in October 1936, the traitor General Mola claimed in a broadcast speech that his four columns were attacking Madrid while a fifth column was already waiting inside the capital. Afterwards, the term fifth column became a popular synonym for traitors and spies bought over or sent in from abroad by imperialism to engage in subversion and sabotage. p. 151

<sup>193</sup> The battle for the defence of Leningrad. In September 1941, the invading German army surrounded Leningrad. The Soviet army and people waged a heroic battle for the defence of Leningrad which lasted 16 months and wiped out 250,000 German marauders and vassal troops. On January 18, 1943, the Soviet army broke through the blockade of the German army and rescued Leningrad from the siege.

The battle for the defence of Moscow. Between September and November 1941 the German army massed over 70 divisions for a large-scale offensive on Moscow. Together with the people, three Soviet front armies put up a staunch resistance and, on December 6, the Soviet army turned to the offensive. By January 1942, 50 divisions of the German army had been annihilated. Hitler's plans for a Blitzkrieg were thus smashed.

The battle for the defence of Stalingrad. On July 17, 1942, the invading German army started a fierce offensive against Stalingrad. Altogether over 1,500,000 men were committed to the battle to occupy the city, cut off communications on the Volga, bring the Caucasus under control and attack Moscow in the north. The Soviet army successively put three front armies into the battle. They fought tenaciously together with the populace and wiped out large numbers of the enemy in unyielding battles of defence. On November 19, 1942, they turned to the offensive and, on the 23rd, surrounded 330,000 German troops, which were completely destroyed on February 2, 1943. This battle marked the turning point both in the Soviet-German war and in the Second World War as a whole. p. 151

<sup>194</sup> The Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration made by Roosevelt as President of the United States and Churchill as Prime Minister of Britain on August 14, 1941 after holding talks at sea off Newfoundland. Both Britain and the United States had already suffered from German and Japanese fascist aggression (the former being already at war with Germany), and the anti-fascist struggles of China, the Soviet Union and the people of the world had swelled to unprecedented proportions. In the declaration, Britain and the United States claimed that they sought no territorial or other aggrandizement and respected the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government, and they endorsed the destruction of German Nazi tyranny and the disarming of aggressor nations. p. 151

<sup>195</sup> The instrument of Soviet-British alliance signed in London on May 26, 1942, was formally called the "Treaty of Alliance in the War Against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe and of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter Concluded Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland". Its main points included the establishment

of an alliance of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Britain in the war against fascist Germany, the taking of all necessary measures to prevent renewed German aggression after the war, and the undertaking by each side not to join in any alliance or grouping in opposition to the other. As Britain joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the member nations of NATO concluded the Paris Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War, the Soviet Union proclaimed the abrogation of the treaty of alliance on May 7, 1955.

The Soviet-U.S. agreement is also known as the Soviet-U.S. commercial agreement. It was formalized through an exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and the United States on August 4, 1937, with the stipulation that its term of validity was to be extended on an annual basis. In 1942 the two sides agreed that the agreement would be valid until it was replaced by a more comprehensive one or until one of the two countries announced its wish to terminate it. According to this agreement, both countries would enjoy unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment on all issues involving export and import. On June 22, 1951, the United States declared the 1937 agreement invalid and on December 23 of the same year the preferential treatment in trade which both countries had hitherto enjoyed was discontinued. p. 151

<sup>196</sup> The joint declaration issued in Washington on January 1, 1942 by 26 nations (including China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, Poland, India and Canada) at war with the Axis Powers — Germany, Italy and Japan. By March 1, 1945, 21 other nations (including France, Mexico and the Philippines) had successively expressed their approval of the declaration, which later became known as the Declaration of the United Nations. Its main points were that (1) the signatory countries pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against the fascist aggression of Germany, Italy and Japan and (2) each country undertook not to make a separate armistice or peace with the belligerent countries. p. 151

<sup>197</sup> After the German fascist occupation of Paris and the surrender of the Pétain government in France in June 1940, the French Communist Party led the French people in its anti-fascist struggle. The struggle developed from the organization of slow-downs and strikes to the establishment of guerrilla units and armed struggle. By June 1944 the guerrillas numbered more than 200,000. General de Gaulle organized the Free French movement and the French Committee of National Liberation abroad. In January 1943, an agreement on co-operation was concluded between the French Communist Party and the French Committee of National Liberation, and on June 3, 1943, the United French Committee of National Liberation proclaimed its founding in Algiers. Lucien Midol and Etienne Fajon, deputies of the French Communist Party, participated in the Committee as individuals. When the Committee underwent a second reorganization on April 1, 1944, the French Communist Party officially sent representatives to take part. p. 152

<sup>198</sup> The National Committee of "Free Germany" was an anti-fascist organization established during World War II by Germans residing abroad. Its first congress was convened in Moscow in July 1943. The participants included anti-fascist parliamentarians, provincial parliamentarians, scientists and engineers, and representatives from camps for German prisoners-of-war. After formally establishing the Committee, the congress adopted a declaration and elected Erich Weinert, a well-known author, Committee chairman. p. 152

<sup>199</sup> Okano Susumu (1892- ), also known as Nozaka Sanzo, came to Yan'an in March 1940 and organized and led the "Anti-War League of Japanese Soldiers in China". He returned to his country after the War of Resistance Against Japan and served as chairman of the Communist Party of Japan. p. 152

<sup>200</sup> Mussolini (1883-1945) was dictator of Italy and the originator of fascism. In 1922 he seized power by force and established a fascist dictatorship. In 1939 he entered into a political and military alliance with Germany and followed Germany into the Second World War the next year. In July 1943, Mussolini's autocratic regime fell because of its military failures and the upsurge of the anti-fascist movement at home. He fled to northern Italy where he served as head of the puppet government in the German-occupied areas. On April 28, 1945 he was captured and executed by Italian guerrillas. p. 152

<sup>201</sup> From March 1941, in their so-called campaign to "tighten public security", the Japanese aggressors and Chinese traitors in north China launched "mopping-up" operations against the Liberated Areas, carried out "mass exposures" in the guerrilla zones, implemented the *bao-jia* administrative system (see Note 478 below) and checked household registers in areas under their occupation, and reorganized and expanded the puppet troops, all in order to suppress the anti-Japanese forces. p. 153

<sup>202</sup> Wu Kaixian, sometime deputy director of the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, had surrendered to the Japanese aggressors. He went to Chongqing from Nanjing in May 1943, carrying with him Japan's terms for Chiang Kai-shek's surrender. Chiang personally received him. p. 153

<sup>203</sup> On August 1, 1943, Yahagi Nakao, head of the press department of the Japanese Supreme Headquarters, made a public statement to induce Chiang Kai-shek to surrender. Its main point was that if China would agree to terminate its resistance and join in a front against the United States and Britain, Japan would withdraw its troops from China and recognize China's independence. p. 153

<sup>204</sup> In accordance with the Communist Party's anti-Japanese national united front policy, it was stipulated that the anti-Japanese democratic governments in the Liberated Areas should be one-third Communist, one-third non-Party Left progressive and one-third middle forces. The system was known as the "three thirds system". pp. 154, 173, 182, 282

<sup>205</sup> In January 1941, Kuomintang troops encircled and launched a surprise attack on the New Fourth Army near Maolin Township, Jingxian County, Anhui Province, as the New Fourth Army was moving northward with the consent of the Kuomintang authorities. The bloody battle lasted eight days, and in the end Army Commander Ye Ting was wounded and captured; most of the nine thousand officers and men died heroically in battle. This event, which shocked China and the rest of the world, became known as the Southern Anhui Incident. On January 17, 1941, Chiang Kai-shek declared that, as the New Fourth Army had "mutinied", its official designation was cancelled and that Commander Ye Ting was to be handed over to a "Court Martial". On the 20th, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued an order appointing Chen Yi Acting Commander, Zhang Yunyi Deputy Commander, Liu Shaoqi Political Commissar, Lai Chuanzhu Chief of Staff and Deng Zihui Director of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army. On the 22nd, its spokesman issued a statement sharply refuting the slanders heaped on the New Fourth Army by the Kuomintang reactionaries and solemnly raising twelve demands, including the rescinding of the reactionary order of January 17 and the punishment of the chief culprits of the Southern Anhui Incident. pp. 155, 197, 225, 243, 260

<sup>206</sup> In June 1943, when the third anti-Communist onslaught launched by Chiang Kai-shek was under way, Hu Zongnan moved two of the three armies deployed for the Huanghe River defences so as to mount a lightning attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-



Ningxia Border Region and thus initiate a civil war. The people of Yan'an held a rally, at which all were called upon to get mobilized and defend the Border Region. Mao Zedong wrote an article entitled "Some Pointed Questions for the Kuomintang" (see Vol. III of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., pp. 123-29), which enumerated Chiang Kai-shek's criminal acts in passively resisting the Japanese aggressors while actively attacking the Communist Party and exposed his plots to invade the Border Region. Chiang Kai-shek was thus forced to call off the attack.

p. 156

<sup>207</sup> At a Party conference of Soviet areas held in Yan'an from May 2 to 14, 1937, Mao Zedong made a report on "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", in which he pointed out:

"The experience of 1924-27 shows how the revolution forged ahead when the bourgeoisie followed the political leadership of the proletariat and met defeat when the proletariat became the political tail of the bourgeoisie through the fault of the Communist Party. This piece of history should not be allowed to repeat itself." (*Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1967, Vol. I, p. 273.)

p. 161

<sup>208</sup> See "At the Seventh Congress of the Communist International" for the original passage: "*Fascism is a most ferocious attack by capital on the mass of the working people; fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatory war; fascism is rabid reaction and counter-revolution; fascism is the most vicious enemy of the working class and of all working people!*" (Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1951, p. 44. Italics in the original.)

p. 161

<sup>209</sup> The ruling classes of the feudal dynasties followed a dual policy of suppressing the minority nationalities and at the same time making certain gestures to win their support. Chiang Kai-shek inherited this approach to the nationality question; he went so far as to dismiss the minority nationalities as non-existent, claiming that they were but branches of the Han ethnic group.

p. 162

<sup>210</sup> J. V. Stalin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.)", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1947, p. 461.

p. 162

<sup>211</sup> According to a story in the classical *Book of History*, the mythical monarch Shun made these remarks to Yu, the legendary first emperor of the Xia Dynasty.

p. 163

<sup>212</sup> "Plans for National Reconstruction", *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin. ed., People's Publishing House, Beijing, 1966, Vol. I, p. 105.

p. 163

<sup>213</sup> The whole sentence in the section on the "Doctrine of the Mean" in the classical *Book of Rites* reads: "Sincerity is both the end and the beginning of things; without sincerity there is nothing."

"Sincerity" as interpreted in the "Doctrine of the Mean" is a moral quality bequeathed by heaven and possessed by all mankind; it is also a universal law of objective things. Only with sincerity can all things exist; without it there can be no objective existence. This viewpoint is typical of subjective idealism. The author's comments draw on the Confucian saying in order to expose and ridicule Chiang Kai-shek from the materialist point of view. He points out that Chiang Kai-shek refused to acknowledge the objective necessity of the Communist Party's existence and dreamt of eliminating it; thus "this is something he can never achieve because he is lacking in the virtue of sincerity". The revolutionary strength of the people compelled Chiang to acknowledge the existence of the Border Region as an objective fact, but he still

wanted to eliminate it; hence the line, "as long as he can achieve what he wants, he does not even bother with sincerity". p. 163

<sup>214</sup> The forum of various political parties and non-party personages called by the Kuomintang government at Lushan in July 1937. pp. 163, 218

<sup>215</sup> The philosophy of "action first" advocated by Chiang Kai-shek separates knowledge and action and places sole emphasis on the role played by action. It is an idealist philosophy which is meant to keep the people ignorant, an extremely reactionary fascist philosophy. p. 164

<sup>216</sup> The practice of collateral punishment was implemented by the ruling classes in the old society to ruthlessly suppress the people. It was stipulated that if a person was found to have committed an offence, punishment would be meted out to his or her family members, relatives, friends and even neighbours. In order to consolidate his fascist rule, Chiang Kai-shek implemented the practice in local communities in 1932 and in the army in 1933. p. 164

<sup>217</sup> The Four Principles and Eight Virtues were moral norms advocated by the former feudal ruling classes. The Four Principles were propriety, righteousness, a sense of honour, and a sense of shame. The Eight Virtues were loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, justice, peace and harmony. p. 165

<sup>218</sup> *Collected Essays on Government Affairs of the Empire* was compiled by He Changling during the Qing period. It consists of 120 volumes and includes official documents, essays, memorials to the throne and correspondence from the mid-17th to the end of the 18th century. Its eight sections cover academic matters, government systems, and the administration of personnel, revenue, rites, military affairs, punishments and public works.

Chen Hongmou was a *jinsbi* (winner of the highest degree in the imperial examinations) during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng (1723-35). Chen was an official scholar of the cabinet and minister of economic development. In editing the *Five Treatises on Moral and Educational Subjects*, he included writings, speeches and stories regarding self-cultivation, the running of households, how to conduct oneself, how to hold official posts, and education. The five works were *Precepts for the Education of Youth*, *Precepts for Community Life*, *Precepts for the Education of Women*, *Precepts for Administration*, and *Admonitions for Officials*. p. 166

<sup>219</sup> Zeng Guofan (1811-72) was a Qing bureaucrat and the commanding general in the campaigns to suppress the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom revolutionary movement. For the purpose of such suppression, Zeng began to recruit, arm and train a landlord force in Hunan Province in 1852. It was called the Hunan Army because most of its officers and men were from Hunan, Zeng's home province. From top to bottom, the Army embodied very strict feudal relationships and was subordinate to Zeng alone. China's modern warlord armies had their beginnings in the Hunan Army. From the forces of Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui down to those of Chiang Kai-shek, all inherited the tradition.

Hu Linyi (1812-61) suppressed the uprisings of the Miao people when he was the governor of Guizhou. After 1854, he went to Hubei, Jiangsu and other areas to put down the Taiping army. In the Hunan Army, he was second only to Zeng Guofan.

When Zuo Zongtang (1812-85) was an aide to the Hunan Commissioner in 1860, he recruited people to form the Zuo branch of the Hunan Army (also known as the Chu Army) and suppressed the Taiping Army in Jiangxi and Anhui Provinces. After 1866, he successively put down the Nian Army (a peasant army that rose against the Qing Dynasty in the middle of the 19th century) and the uprising of the Hui people in northwest China, to earn his reputation as a prominent Hunan Army warlord.

Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) was an Anhui Army warlord. In 1861 he returned to his native province by order of Zeng Guofan and reorganized the landlord militia of central Anhui along the lines of the Hunan Army, thus setting up the Anhui Army which took part in the suppression of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement.

p. 166

<sup>220</sup> For the Incident of March 20th, see "On the Relations Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang from 1924 to 1926", pp. 139-40 of this volume.

pp. 167, 179, 232

<sup>221</sup> Pushed by the rising momentum of the revolutionary mass movement and prodded by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang left, the National Government in Wuhan adopted a stance of co-operation with the Communist Party and opposition to Chiang Kai-shek following Chiang's coup on April 12, 1927. On April 17, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Wuhan passed a resolution expelling Chiang from the party. On the same day, the Wuhan National Government issued an order dismissing Chiang from all his posts, including that of commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, and impeaching him. On April 18, Chiang organized another "national government" in Nanjing, appointing himself its president. He also had various counter-revolutionary resolutions passed, including one on purging the party, ordered the arrest of Communists and declared all resolutions adopted by the National Government in Wuhan and by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Wuhan illegal. These are the events described here as the split between the rival Nanjing and Wuhan governments.

After May 1927 the National Government in Wuhan headed by Wang Jingwei moved onto the path of open anti-Communism. On July 15, Wang called a meeting which formally decided on a split with the Communist Party and then began to massacre Communists. This marked the beginning of co-operation between Nanjing and Wuhan, with Chiang and Wang collaborating in counter-revolutionary activity.

pp. 167, 232

<sup>222</sup> The utopian concept of "great harmony" is outlined in "Li Yun", a section of the *Book of Rites*. Great harmony represented the ideal society preached by the Confucians. It was a small producers' fantasy.

p. 168

<sup>223</sup> Zhang Zongchang (1881-1932) was a warlord who ruled Shandong Province from 1924 to 1927. In his early years he served as a regimental commander under Chen Qimei in Shanghai. In 1913, he threw in his lot with the warlords of the Zhili clique (a faction of the northern warlords) but later shifted to the Fengtian clique (see Note 265 below).

p. 169

<sup>224</sup> Tao Chengzhang (1878-1912) helped organize the *Guang Fu Hui* (see Note 2 above) in Shanghai in 1904 and was one of its leaders. In 1906, he joined the *Tong Meng Hui*. After the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911, Tao mobilized uprisings against the Qing Dynasty in Shanghai, Zhejiang and other areas. In January 1912, Chen Qimei and Chiang Kai-shek had him assassinated in Shanghai.

p. 169

<sup>225</sup> A pamphlet of statements made by Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi on military training compiled by Cai E.

p. 170

<sup>226</sup> For the Xi'an Incident, see the editorial note to the article, "Three Telegrams Relating to the Xi'an Incident", pp. 86-87 of this volume.

pp. 171, 214, 275, 281

<sup>227</sup> In March 1938, the Kuomintang adopted a programme of armed resistance and national reconstruction at a provisional national congress held in Hankou. The programme included military, political, economic and foreign policy measures for resistance. It had a dual character. On the one hand, the Kuomintang had to make some formal concessions to the people — such as promising to organize a people's

political council and to grant freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association. On the other hand, it still clung to Kuomintang one-party dictatorship. Because Chiang Kai-shek maintained his policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party, these formal concessions remained mere empty words. pp. 171, 281

<sup>228</sup> In November 1935, the Kuomintang government endorsed the paper notes issued by the banks run by Kuomintang bureaucrat-capital (the Central Bank, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and later the Farmers' Bank) as the unified currency for the whole country. p. 172

<sup>229</sup> Following the Incident of March 20, 1926 (see pp. 139-40 above), Chiang Kai-shek disbanded the Association of Young Soldiers in April (shutting down the Society for the Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrines at the same time) in order to acquire greater control over the Whampoa Military Academy cadets. In July, he organized the Whampoa Academy Alumni Society and proclaimed himself its president. After the coup of April 12, 1927, it became one of Chiang's chief means for bribing and controlling his own key military personnel. p. 175

<sup>230</sup> Kang Ze (1906-67) was chief of the Kuomintang secret service. He was leader of the special task detachment under the Military Council of the Kuomintang and head of the organization department of the Central Committee of the Three People's Principles Youth League. He was appointed commanding officer of the 15th Pacification Zone of the Kuomintang army in 1947 and was captured by our troops in the Battle of Xiangfan in July 1948. After the special amnesty of 1963, he became a special aide to the Historical Data Research Committee under the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. p. 175

<sup>231</sup> The Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was held in Moscow from November 22 to December 16, 1926. It discussed the Chinese question and adopted a resolution pointing out that "the Chinese revolution at the present stage of development is bourgeois-democratic in character". p. 178

<sup>232</sup> The Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Shanghai in July 1922. The Manifesto of the Congress clearly pointed out: "All the facts prove that it is capitalist imperialism and the feudal forces of the warlords and bureaucrats which have imposed the biggest sufferings on the Chinese people (whether it be the workers and peasants or the bourgeoisie). Therefore, the democratic revolutionary movement against these two forces is of the utmost significance." p. 178

<sup>233</sup> Russia's 1905 Revolution was its first bourgeois-democratic revolution. It took place between 1905 and 1907, and its task was the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy and the establishment of a democratic republic. There were major divergences among the political parties and groups on the question of the leadership of the revolution and on whether to overthrow the tsarist system completely. The Constitutional Democratic Party, which had consistently supported the domestic and foreign policies of the tsarist government, tried to deceive the masses of workers and peasants by spreading the illusion that the system the people required could be brought about without resorting to revolution and rebellion. The Mensheviks in the Social-Democratic Party and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party advocated giving the leadership to the bourgeoisie, opposed armed uprisings and compromised with the tsarist government. The Bolsheviks headed by Lenin firmly opposed the erroneous line of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. They exposed the Constitutional Democratic Party's counter-revolutionary defence of tsardom, pointed out that a thoroughgoing victory could be ensured only if the revolution was led by the pro-

letariat and called upon the proletariat to launch an armed uprising which they led. The 1905 Revolution was ultimately defeated because of the unfavourable balance of class forces and the lack of a solid worker-peasant alliance. Nevertheless, it prepared the way for the victorious October Revolution. p. 178

<sup>234</sup> The Sun Yat-sen University for the Toilers of China was set up in Moscow in 1925. In 1929, it changed its name to the Communist University for the Toilers of China. It ceased to function in the autumn of 1930. p. 178

<sup>235</sup> The Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was held in Moscow from February 9 to 25, 1928. The Plenum discussed the Chinese question and passed relevant resolutions. p. 178

<sup>236</sup> The February Revolution was the second bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. In February (by the old Russian calendar) 1917, the workers of Petrograd went on strike in opposition to tsardom. Under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, the strike quickly turned into an uprising. The garrison forces in the capital participated in the uprising, which drew countrywide response, and the tsarist autocratic system was overthrown. After the revolution, a Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was established, while the bourgeoisie, supported by petty-bourgeois compromisers, formed a provisional government, giving rise to two centres of political power. Thereupon, the Bolsheviks led the people in preparing and carrying out a socialist revolution. p. 178

<sup>237</sup> The Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was held in Moscow from May 18 to 30, 1927. As Chiang Kai-shek had betrayed the Chinese revolution and was slaughtering the Communists, the Plenum paid special attention to the Chinese question and adopted a resolution entitled "The Chinese Question". p. 180

<sup>238</sup> M. N. Roy was a leader of the Indian Communist Party and a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He came to China in 1927 as a representative of the Communist International. Later, he turned renegade and was expelled from the Indian Communist Party and the Communist International in 1929.

Jacques Doriot was an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International at the time. He came to China in 1927. Later he turned renegade and supported the German fascists. p. 180

<sup>239</sup> B. Lominadze (1897-1935), a Russian, came to China as a representative of the Communist International in 1927. After the coup of July 15th in Wuhan, he participated in the direction of the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Party on August 7, 1927, at which he put forward the view that the Chinese revolution was a "permanent revolution" which would immediately develop into a socialist revolution without going through any intervening stages. The Communist International criticized this erroneous view at the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of its Executive Committee. p. 180

<sup>240</sup> On August 1, 1927, after the failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War, the Communist Party launched an armed uprising under the direct command of Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De and Liu Bochong and seized Nanchang in order to combat the counter-revolutionary forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. This uprising fired the first shot of the Chinese people's armed opposition to the Kuomintang reactionaries. More than 30,000 troops took part, including troops of the Twentieth Army of the National Revolutionary Army under He Long, the Eleventh Army of the National Revolutionary Army under Ye Ting, and the Officers' Training Corps of the Third Army of the National Revolutionary Army under Zhu

De. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on August 5 and headed south for Guangdong. At the end of September it came under attack from all sides by superior enemy forces in the Chaozhou-Shantou (Swatow) region and was defeated. Later, part of the surviving army led by Peng Pai and Yan Changyi linked up with the armed forces withdrawing from Haifeng-Lufeng and Guangzhou after the uprisings there and continued activities in the Dongjiang area. Another part, commanded by Zhu De and Chen Yi, arrived in the Jinggang Mountains in April 1928 and linked up with the workers' and peasants' revolutionary armed force under Mao Zedong. Together the two formed the Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

pp. 180, 274

<sup>241</sup> In mid-November 1927, an enlarged session of the Provisional Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC was convened in Shanghai. The session adopted resolutions on the current situation in China and the tasks of the Communist Party and on the Sixth National Congress of the Party. The session denied that the revolution was at a low ebb and held that "there is now an immediate revolutionary situation in the country as a whole" and that "the massacres and attacks by the enemy only serve to prove the existence of a revolutionary upsurge". It stipulated that the task of the Party was to "actively promote the high tide of revolution in every town and village and create conditions for a general insurrection". The session also held that "as the Chinese revolution proceeds, it is bound to turn abruptly onto the socialist road after the fulfilment of its democratic tasks".

p. 180

<sup>242</sup> The Ten-Point Programme set forth in 1928 by the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China included the following tasks: (1) the overthrow of imperialist rule; (2) the confiscation of enterprises and banks owned by foreign capital; (3) the unification of China and the recognition of the right of national self-determination; (4) the overthrow of the Kuomintang warlord government; (5) the establishment of a government of councils (or Soviets) of workers, peasants and soldiers; (6) the institution of the eight-hour day, an increase in wages, and the establishment of unemployment relief and social insurance; (7) the confiscation of the land of all landlords and its distribution among the peasants; (8) the improvement of soldiers' living conditions and the provision of land and jobs to soldiers; (9) the abolition of all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and the adoption of a consolidated progressive tax; and (10) uniting with the world proletariat and uniting with the Soviet Union.

p. 181

<sup>243</sup> V. I. Lenin, "Report of the Commission on the National and the Colonial Questions", Part 3 of "The Second Congress of the Communist International", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, Vol. XXXI, p. 243.

The text reads, "However, the debate in the commission, in which several representatives from colonial countries participated, demonstrated convincingly that the Communist International's theses should point out that peasants' Soviets, Soviets of the exploited, are a weapon which can be employed, not only in capitalist countries but also in countries with pre-capitalist relations, and that it is the absolute duty of Communist parties and of elements prepared to form Communist parties, everywhere to conduct propaganda in favour of peasants' Soviets or of working people's Soviets, this to include backward and colonial countries. Wherever conditions permit, they should at once make attempts to set up Soviets of the working people."

p. 182

<sup>244</sup> The system of separation of powers is a political system created by the bourgeoisie, a parliamentary system in which the legislative and executive powers are separate. The parliament exercises legislative power and the government executive power, and the two restrict each other.

p. 182

<sup>245</sup> The four big southern banks were the Bank of China, the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, the National Commercial Bank and the Zhejiang Industrial Bank, with Zhang Jia'ao, Chen Guangpu, Xu Jiqing and Li Ming as their respective presidents. p. 183

<sup>246</sup> See Notes 9 and 10 above. p. 183

<sup>247</sup> After Wang Jingwei's counter-revolutionary coup of July 15, 1927, Deng Yanda and other Kuomintang left-wingers formed a "Provisional Action Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang", i.e., a "third party", in Shanghai. While it opposed the Kuomintang dominated by Chiang Kai-shek, it did not favour the Communist Party either. In 1935, it changed its name to the China National Liberation Action Committee. Responding to the Communist Party's call for all parties and groups to co-operate in the fight against Japan and share the responsibility for national salvation, it actively participated in the anti-Japanese movement. In 1941, it participated in the founding of the China League of Democratic Political Groups. It changed its name to the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party in 1947. It attended the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, it has supported the leadership of the Communist Party and is one of the democratic parties taking part in socialist revolution and socialist construction. p. 183

<sup>248</sup> Shi Liangcai (1878-1934) began to serve as general director of the newspaper *Shen Bao* in 1913. In the early years of Chiang Kai-shek's rule, he supported Chiang, but his political attitude gradually changed after the Incident of September 18, 1931. At the time of the Japanese attack on Shanghai (January 28, 1932), he donated money to the resistance and served as president of the Shanghai Local Association, an anti-Japanese mass organization. Later on, he actively supported the China League for Civil Rights. He was murdered by Chiang Kai-shek's secret agents in November 1934.

Yang Xingfo (1883-1933) accompanied Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Beijing in 1925 as his secretary. Later, he was president of the College of Engineering of the Southeastern University and chief secretary of the National Research Institute of the Kuomintang government. In 1932, together with Soong Ching Ling, Cai Yuanpei and Lu Xun, he participated in setting up the China League for Civil Rights to carry out progressive activities against Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese imperialism, serving as its general secretary. He was murdered by Chiang Kai-shek's secret agents on June 18, 1933. p. 185

<sup>249</sup> Sun Fo was a member of the standing committee of the National Government in Wuhan in 1927. (See also Note 137 above.) p. 185

<sup>250</sup> Tang Shengzhi (1889-1970) was commander of the 8th Army and commander-in-chief of the Fourth Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army, governor of Hunan Province and a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Tang was a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and held several other posts. pp. 185, 235

<sup>251</sup> The machinists' union was originally called the Guangdong Machinists' Research Association, later changing its name to the Guangdong Machinists' Trade Union. It served as a tool of the Kuomintang right-wingers. After Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was established in 1924, it opposed and sabotaged the workers' movement led by the Communist Party. In January 1926, it published a manifesto opposing the Communist Party. It helped the counter-revolutionary regime to track down and arrest Communists and other progressives in the Guangzhou counter-revolutionary coup of April 15, 1927, and participated in the suppression of the Guangzhou Uprising in that December. p. 186

<sup>252</sup> Wu Tiejeng (1888-1963) served as commander of the First Route Army of the East Route Expeditionary Army and of the Guangdong garrison under the Guangdong Revolutionary Government, and was a member of the Executive Committee of the Guangzhou headquarters of the Kuomintang. In 1926 he was an alternate member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and commander of the 17th Division of the Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. p. 186

<sup>253</sup> Ma Chaojun (1886-1977) was head of a yellow Kuomintang trade union during the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War. p. 186

<sup>254</sup> Hu Yisheng was a cousin of Hu Hanmin. In 1925 he participated in the work of founding a Kuomintang rightist newspaper, *The National Daily News*, in Guangzhou and was active in opposing the Communist Party. He fled to Hongkong after Liao Zhongkai was assassinated. p. 186

<sup>255</sup> Sun Yat-sen, "A Personal Letter to Chiang Kai-shek", *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin. ed., People's Publishing House, Beijing, 1966, Vol. II, p. 876. p. 187

<sup>256</sup> Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) joined the Communist Party in 1922 and was one of the main leaders of the Party in its early period. He served as chief editor of *New Youth* and *The Guide*, the official periodicals of the Central Committee of the Party. He was elected to the Central Committee at the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth National Congresses of the Party. After the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, he presided over the emergency meeting of the Central Committee on August 7, which ended the domination of Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism inside the Party. At this meeting he was elected a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee. During the winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928, while in charge of the work of the central leading body, he committed the "Left" error of putschism. In 1928 he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Communist International and to its presidium. In September 1930 he chaired the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, which corrected Li Lisan's "Left" opportunist line. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931, he was attacked by Wang Ming and other exponents of "Left" dogmatism and factionalism and was pushed out of the central leading body. From then on he worked in the revolutionary cultural movement in Shanghai in co-operation with Lu Xun. In 1934 he arrived in the revolutionary base area in Jiangxi Province and was made Commissioner of People's Education in the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China. When the main forces of the Red Army embarked on the Long March in October that year, he was assigned to stay behind and carry on the struggle in the base area. In February 1935 he was arrested by Kuomintang troops in the Fujian guerrilla area and on June 18 he died a martyr in Changding, Fujian Province. p. 187

<sup>257</sup> The declaration issued in Shanghai by Wang Jingwei and Chen Duxiu on April 5, 1927. In it they did their utmost to cover up the counter-revolutionary activities of the Kuomintang rightists and claimed: "The Kuomintang... has never attempted to expel friendly parties or suppress labour unions." At the same time they stated that "no matter how incorrect the Communist Party is, it wouldn't go so far as to call for the overthrow of its fraternal party, the Kuomintang". The declaration disarmed the working class ideologically, causing it to relax its vigilance against Chiang Kai-shek's imminent betrayal of the revolution. p. 187

<sup>258</sup> Wu Zhihui (1866-1933), a member of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee at the time, consistently supported Chiang Kai-shek and bitterly opposed the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. pp. 187, 253



on behalf of the Kuomintang. In 1949 he was appointed head of the delegation of the Kuomintang government sent to hold peace talks with the Communist Party delegation in Beijing. After the agreement on internal peace worked out jointly by the representatives of the two sides was rejected by the Kuomintang government, Zhang remained in Beijing. Following the founding of the People's Republic of China, he held, among other posts, that of vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. pp. 227, 287, 357

<sup>322</sup> In the spring of 1944, democratic parties and personages in the Kuomintang areas set up various mass organizations in Chongqing, Chengdu, Kunming, Guilin and Xi'an and discussed the question of constitutional government through newspapers and magazines and at rallies, denouncing the Kuomintang's fascist dictatorship, demanding democracy and freedom, and advocating a broadening of political power and a constitutional government. These activities won a wide response. p. 227

<sup>323</sup> Patrick J. Hurley, a U.S. Republican Party politician, came to China as a personal envoy of the president of the United States in September 1944. He visited Yan'an in November to discuss with the Communist Party the question of a coalition government with the Kuomintang and other issues. He was appointed U.S. Ambassador to China at the end of the year. Hurley encountered the Chinese people's resolute opposition by his support of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist policies and he had to quit his post in November 1945. pp. 228, 283

<sup>324</sup> Zhou Enlai was sent from Yan'an to Chongqing on November 11, 1944, and again on January 24, 1945, to carry on negotiations with the Kuomintang. p. 228

<sup>325</sup> The Democratic League (in full, the China Democratic League) was set up in 1941 under the name "League of Democratic Political Groups"; it took its new name in 1944. Its members were mainly intellectuals in cultural and educational circles. It was declared an illegal organization by the Kuomintang government in 1947 but was rebuilt in Hongkong in January 1948. In May 1948, it responded to the call of the Communist Party for the convening of a new political consultative conference, and it participated in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic League has supported the leadership of the Communist Party and has been one of the democratic parties participating in socialist revolution and socialist construction. pp. 229, 289, 307, 316

<sup>326</sup> The Kuomintang government decided to convene a national assembly in 1936. On May 5th that year, it promulgated its so-called "Draft Constitution" (also known as the May 5th Draft Constitution). It also specified that election of deputies to the proposed national assembly should start in July and that the assembly itself should be convened on November 12. However, the assembly never materialized. pp. 230, 253, 270

<sup>327</sup> Scobie was the British commander of allied forces in Greece during the later stages of World War II. In October 1944, when the German invaders were retreating in defeat on the European continent, Scobie led British troops into Greece, taking along the reactionary Greek government then in exile in London. He directed and assisted it in massacring Greek patriots and in attacking the Greek People's Liberation Army, which had waged a long and heroic struggle against the German invaders. p. 230

<sup>328</sup> Chen Zanzhan (1894-1927) joined the Communist Party in 1925. In January 1927 he was elected chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ganzhou and vice-chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Jiangxi Province. On March 6, 1927, he was killed in Ganzhou by the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries. p. 233

<sup>329</sup> The meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC held at Wayaobu, Zichang County in northern Shaanxi in December 1935. The "Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party" adopted on December 25 made a comprehensive analysis of the current national and international situation and the changes in class relations in China, laid down the policy of establishing an anti-Japanese national united front, criticized "closed-doorism", which had become the main danger inside the Party, and pointed out the necessity of preventing a revival of Right opportunism in the new period of the revolution. p. 233

<sup>330</sup> During the First Revolutionary Civil War, workers in Shanghai carried out two armed uprisings — on October 22, 1926 and February 21, 1927 — both of which failed. On March 21, 1927, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, Luo Yinong and Zhao Shiyan, they staged a third armed uprising in which they overthrew the rule of the northern warlords in Shanghai and established a government of representatives of the citizens of Shanghai. p. 236

<sup>331</sup> This criticism is directed against the erroneous view put forward by Wang Ming in his report delivered at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC on December 9, 1937. p. 238

<sup>332</sup> This was a proposal put forward by Wang Ming in his concluding speech at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC on March 11, 1938. p. 243

<sup>333</sup> On August 20, 1938, the political department of the Kuomintang's Wuhan Garrison Command decreed the dissolution of the Pioneers of Chinese National Liberation led by the Communist Party and of the progressive mass organizations the Youth Society for National Salvation and the Yishe Society. p. 243

<sup>334</sup> In his *A Programme of National Reconstruction*, Dr. Sun Yat-sen divided the process of the building of the Republic into three periods, namely, a period of military government, a period of political tutelage and finally a period of constitutional government. As Dr. Sun Yat-sen envisaged it, in the period of political tutelage, it would be necessary for the government to select qualified persons who had passed an examination to be sent to assist counties in preparing for self-government. They would start building county administrations and train the masses to exercise their rights and perform their duties. County self-government would be instituted only after stipulated standards were attained. When all the counties in a province had instituted self-rule, political tutelage could be brought to an end and provincial constitutional government established. When more than half of the provinces in the country had established constitutional governments, a national assembly would be convened and a national constitution promulgated. In the name of political tutelage the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek long deprived the people of democratic rights and freedom and imposed their fascist rule. pp. 246, 251, 296

<sup>335</sup> Chiang Kai-shek's order issued on August 11, 1945 to Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Group Army, reads in part: "All units of the Eighteenth Group Army should stay where they are, pending further orders. . . . No unauthorized action is to be taken" against Japanese and puppet forces. p. 247

<sup>336</sup> On August 10, 1945, the Japanese Government issued notes to the Allied Powers — China, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain — which had been fighting against Japan, to arrange for its surrender. On August 12, the Governments of China, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to the U.S.-proposed appointment of MacArthur, commander of the American ground troops stationed in the Pacific region, as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers occupying Japan. China, the Soviet

Union and Britain all sent senior generals to participate in the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces and to accept the surrender of Japan. p. 247

<sup>337</sup> In January 1945, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhou Enlai proposed to the Kuomintang government that a preparatory conference of the various political parties and groups be convened prior to holding a conference on state affairs. The preparatory conference would formally discuss the question of the conference on state affairs and procedures for the organization and institution of a coalition government. Chiang Kai-shek rejected this CPC proposal in a speech on March 1. On July 4 of the same year, the Communist representatives reached agreement with the six councillors who had come to Yan'an — Chu Fucheng, Huang Yanpei, Leng Yu, Fu Sinian, Zuo Shunsheng and Zhang Bojun — on a proposal to the Kuomintang government to "suspend the National Assembly and convene a political conference as soon as possible". In his opening speech to the People's Political Council on July 7, Chiang Kai-shek went so far as to slander as a "wanton attack" the rational criticism by the Communist Party and the democratic parties of the Kuomintang's insistence on convening the National Assembly under its autocratic control. A resolution passed on July 19 by the Kuomintang-controlled Political Council once again rejected the demand for a conference of political parties and groups, the abolition of the one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a coalition government. p. 248

<sup>338</sup> Zou Taofen (1895-1944) was an outstanding journalist, political commentator and publisher. From the time he began editing the weekly publication *Life* in Shanghai in 1926, he devoted his whole life to journalism and publishing. After the September 18th Incident of 1931 (see Note 112 above), he repudiated Chiang Kai-shek's policy of non-resistance. He founded the Life Bookstore in 1932. He joined the China League for Civil Rights early in 1933 and was forced to go into exile abroad in July. After his return to China in 1935, Zou participated in the movement for saving the country led by the Communist Party, served successively in Shanghai and Hongkong as editor-in-chief of the *Life of the Public* (a weekly), *Life Daily* and *Life Weekly*, and was one of the leaders of the Shanghai Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. He was arrested by the Kuomintang reactionaries in 1936 together with Shen Junru and others, but was released following the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. He edited *The War of Resistance* and *The War of Resistance of the Whole People* successively in Shanghai, Wuhan and Chongqing, while actively participating in the political struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary policies. After the Southern Anhui Incident (see Note 205), he was forced into exile in Hongkong where he resumed the publication of *Life of the Public*. After Hongkong was taken by Japanese troops (December 1941), he went to the Dongjiang guerrilla area in Guangdong Province and reached the Liberated Area of Northern Jiangsu in 1942. Zou Taofen died in Shanghai on July 24, 1944. Accepting the application he made in his letter to the Party before his death, the Central Committee of the Communist Party admitted him posthumously as a Party member. pp. 249, 264

<sup>339</sup> With the whole nation pressing for peace and democracy, Chiang Kai-shek had to agree to convene a political consultative conference in Chongqing in January 1946. Representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, other political parties and public figures participated. The conference lasted from January 10 to 31 and adopted five resolutions, namely, the Agreement on Government Organization, the Programme for Peace and National Reconstruction, the Agreement on the National Assembly, the Agreement on the Draft Constitution, and the Agreement on Military

Affairs. Collectively, these were known as the "Resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference". pp. 250, 259, 269, 277, 284, 293, 304, 317, 405

<sup>340</sup> Chiang Kai-shek's pledges were: (1) to guarantee the people's liberty; (2) to guarantee the legal status of the political parties; (3) to hold general elections; and (4) to release political prisoners. pp. 250, 270

<sup>341</sup> In January 1946, when the Political Consultative Conference was in session, people of all circles in Chongqing formed the Association for the Promotion of the Political Consultative Conference. It held daily rallies at Cangbaitang and invited the delegates to the Conference to deliver speeches on the progress of the meeting. On a number of occasions the Kuomintang reactionaries dispatched special agents to make trouble at the rallying place, beat up those presiding over or attending the rallies, and tail and threaten those delegates to the Conference who went there to make speeches. p. 250

<sup>342</sup> On February 10, 1946, people from twenty or so miscellaneous organizations in Chongqing held a rally in Jiaochangkou Square to celebrate the success of the Political Consultative Conference. Kuomintang special agents harassed the participants, beating and injuring more than sixty persons, including Li Gongpu, Guo Moruo and a number of journalists. pp. 250, 270

<sup>343</sup> On February 22, 1946, instigated by Kuomintang special agents, some students in the Shapingba-Ciqikou District of Chongqing held anti-Soviet demonstrations. The special agents took the opportunity to smash up the sales departments of the *New China Daily* and *Democracy* (the organ of the Democratic League). Many of the newspapers' staff members were beaten and injured. Subsequently, the sales section of the *New China Daily* in Chengdu was also wrecked by special agents. p. 250

<sup>344</sup> On March 1, 1946, Kuomintang special agents incited some students in Xi'an to hold an anti-Soviet demonstration. The agents made use of the opportunity to attack the Xi'an office of the Eighteenth Group Army. p. 250

<sup>345</sup> On February 20, 1946, in the name of the "League of Hebei Refugees Petitioning for Repatriation", the Kuomintang reactionaries gathered together over a thousand runaway landlords, special agents and hooligans to hold an anti-Communist demonstration and create disturbances at the Beiping Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation. (See also Note 508 below.) p. 250

<sup>346</sup> Liao Chengzhi (1908- ) was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the time in question. p. 251

<sup>347</sup> For the purpose of perpetuating their one-party dictatorship, the Kuomintang reactionaries stipulated in their "Programme for Political Tutelage" issued in October 1928 that the Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was to be responsible for "the direction and control of the National Government in the administration of important state affairs" and for the appointment of the president and members of the National Government, the presidents of the various Yuan and other political officials. p. 251

<sup>348</sup> The main principles guiding the revision of the Draft Constitution laid down by the Political Consultative Conference were: the Legislative Yuan should be the supreme legislative organ of the state to be elected directly by the electorate and its functions and powers should be similar to those of the parliaments of the democratic countries; the Executive Yuan should be the highest administrative organ of the state and the Legislative Yuan was to have the power of approval and expression of non-confidence over the Executive Yuan; the Control Yuan should be the highest supervisory organ of the state and was to exercise powers of confirmation, im-

peachment and supervision. The province should be the highest unit of local self-government and might have a provincial constitution which, however, must not contravene the provisions of the national constitution. pp. 252, 259, 286

<sup>349</sup> The Five-Power Constitution was introduced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He advocated the constitutional principle of the separation of the five powers, administrative, legislative, judicial, examination and supervision. p. 252

<sup>350</sup> A programme put forward by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 for founding a bourgeois republic. See *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin. ed., People's Publishing House, Beijing, 1966, pp. 569-71. p. 252

<sup>351</sup> The joint sub-committee of the Political Consultative Conference and the consultative sub-committee of the Draft Constitution Review Committee held a session on March 15, 1946. As a result of the compromise made by the delegation of the Communist Party of China, three agreements on the principles for revision of the Draft Constitution were reached through consultation. They were as follows: 1. that the nominal National Assembly should be turned into a substantive one; 2. that Clause 2, Article 6, of the Draft Constitution, the wording of which had been agreed upon at the Political Consultative Conference, should be deleted (the clause in question reads: "If the Legislative Yuan loses confidence in the entire Executive Yuan, the Executive Yuan should either resign or ask the President to dissolve the Legislative Yuan. The same President of the Executive Yuan may not, however, ask for dissolution of a new Legislative Yuan."); and 3. that the provision that provinces might draw up provincial constitutions should be changed to provide that provinces might enact laws concerning provincial self-government. p. 252

<sup>352</sup> In order to maintain Chiang Kai-shek's fascist dictatorial rule, the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang passed a five-point resolution which overturned the "Principles Guiding the Revision of the Draft Constitution" decided upon through consultation by the Political Consultative Conference. The five points were: 1. "In drawing up the Constitution, the Programme of National Reconstruction shall be taken as the fundamental basis"; 2. "The National Assembly shall be a substantive organization. But it shall exercise its functions and powers as provided for by the Programme of National Reconstruction through the holding of plenary sessions"; 3. "The Legislative Yuan shall not have the powers of approval or expression of non-confidence over the Executive Yuan, and the Executive Yuan shall not have the right to ask for dissolution of the Legislative Yuan"; 4. "The Control Yuan shall have no right of confirmation"; and 5. "The provinces shall not necessarily enact provincial constitutions." The "two of these principles and part of another" mentioned here refers to the first and fourth points and the provision contained in the second point that the National Assembly should exercise its functions and powers as provided for by the Programme of National Reconstruction through the holding of plenary sessions. p. 253

<sup>353</sup> A reference to the "Basic Plan for Reorganizing the Army and Incorporating Chinese Communist Troops into the National Army" signed on February 25, 1946 by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. The plan consisted of eight articles; its main stipulation was that the country's ground forces would be limited to 108 divisions (each having no more than 14,000 men), 18 divisions of which would be Chinese Communist troops. Personnel in excess on both sides were to be demobilized within twelve months. The plan also provided for the power of unified command over the armies of the two parties, the time limits for unification, the allocation of military regions, the organization of local forces, etc. It designated the Executive

Headquarters for Military Mediation as the executive organ to implement the plan.

pp. 254, 259, 271, 284

<sup>354</sup> The Kuomintang and the Communist Party signed a truce agreement on January 10, 1946, and issued a cease-fire order on the afternoon of the same day. The truce agreement and the cease-fire order stipulated that the troops of the two sides should stop military operations at their respective positions as of midnight, January 13. When issuing the cease-fire order, Chiang Kai-shek covertly ordered Kuomintang troops to "seize strategic points". He subsequently kept on manoeuvring his troops to launch attacks on the Liberated Areas. In July the same year, Chiang Kai-shek openly scrapped the truce agreement and launched an all-out offensive on the Liberated Areas.

pp. 254, 259, 269, 277, 284, 293, 304

<sup>355</sup> Lin Ping (now Yin Linping) was then political commissar of the Dongjiang Anti-Japanese Column in Guangdong Province.

Zheng Shaowen was then political commissar of the Jiangnan Military Area of the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army and head of the Wuhan Office of the Central Plains Military Command of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

p. 254

<sup>356</sup> George Marshall (1880-1959), an American professional officer and politician, was appointed special envoy to China by U.S. President Truman in December 1945. Using mediation as a cover, he participated in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations but supported the Kuomintang government in its anti-Communist and anti-popular civil war. In August 1946, he declared the "mediation" a failure. He left China for home on January 8, 1947.

pp. 254, 265, 284, 314, 360

<sup>357</sup> The Committee of Three was also known as the Military Committee of Three. It was a truce body formed in January 1946 and made up of Zhang Qun (later Zhang Zhizhong), the representative of the Kuomintang, Zhou Enlai, the representative of the Communist Party, and George Marshall, President Truman's special envoy. Marshall acted as its chairman. The Beijing Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation and all its local field teams were under the Committee's command and control. The Committee ceased its activities after June 1946 because Chiang Kai-shek stuck to his policies of civil war and autocratic rule and deliberately sabotaged the truce agreement, and because the United States pursued a policy of helping Chiang wage civil war.

pp. 254, 271, 289, 298

<sup>358</sup> On December 15, 1945, U.S. President Truman issued a statement on United States policy towards China, declaring that "the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party 'political tutelage'..."

pp. 256, 284, 293

<sup>359</sup> The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain was held between December 16 and 26, 1945, and a communiqué was issued on December 27. On the question of realizing democracy in China, the communiqué affirmed "the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government."

pp. 256, 284

<sup>360</sup> The delegates from the five sides represented the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China, the China Democratic League, the Chinese Youth Party and public figures at the Political Consultative Conference.

p. 257

<sup>361</sup> Wang Ruofei, Bo Gu, Ye Ting, Deng Fa, Huang Qisheng and others died as martyrs on their way back to Yan'an from Chongqing in an airplane crash on Heicha Mountain, in Xingxian County, Shanxi Province, on April 8, 1946.

Wang Ruofei (1896-1946) went to France to study on a work-study basis in 1919. He took part in founding the Communist Party of Chinese Youth in Europe in 1921. He joined the Communist Party in 1922, and from 1925 onward was successively secretary of the Henan-Shaanxi Committee of the CPC, secretary-general of the Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee. He became the CPC's representative to the Communist International in 1928. After his return to China in 1931, he was arrested in Suiyuan by the Kuomintang government but persisted in the revolutionary struggle in prison. After his release in the summer of 1937, he served as head of the Propaganda Department of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Committee of the CPC, deputy chief-of-staff of the Eighteenth Group Army, secretary-general of the North China and Central China Party Working Committees, and secretary-general of the Central Committee and director of its Office of Research on Party Affairs. In May 1944, he was appointed a representative of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations. He was elected to the Central Committee at the Party's Fifth and Seventh National Congresses, and was a representative of the Party at the Political Consultative Conference in 1946. pp. 258, 283

<sup>362</sup> Bo Gu (1907-46), whose real name was Qin Bangxian, joined the Communist Party in 1925. In April 1931 he served as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and from September 1931 to January 1935 held over-all responsibility in the provisional central leadership of the CPC, in which position he followed a "Left" line and thus committed serious errors. After the Zunyi Meeting (January 1935), he served as head of the Field Political Department of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1936, he, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying took part in the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident as representatives of the Central Committee of the CPC. In 1937 Bo Gu became head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was appointed the CPC's representative in Nanjing. After 1938, he served successively as member of the Changjiang Bureau and as member and concurrently head of the Organization Department of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. In 1941, he was head of the *Liberation Daily* and the New China News Agency in Yan'an. In 1945 he was elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Party. In 1946 he was appointed the CPC's representative to the Draft Constitution Review Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. pp. 218, 258

<sup>363</sup> Ye Ting (1896-1946), also known as Xiyi, was one of the founders of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1924. In 1925 he became the head of a section under the chief of staff of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army and commander of the Independent Regiment. During the Northern Expedition, he led his troops in winning the two battles of Dingsiqiao and Heshengqiao in Hubei Province, which earned the Fourth Army the title of Iron Army. In October 1926, he became commander of the 24th Division of the Eleventh Army and concurrently of the Wuhan Garrison Headquarters. In 1927 he took part in leading the August 1 Nanchang Uprising, serving concurrently as commander-in-chief at the battle front and commander of the Eleventh Army. In December of that year he took part in leading the Guangzhou Uprising, serving as commander-in-chief of the insurrectionary army. After its failure, he went abroad. When the War of Resistance broke out, he returned to China, arriving in Yan'an at the end of 1937. Later he became commander of the New Fourth Army. In the Southern Anhui

Incident of January 1941 (see Note 205 above), he was wounded and captured by the enemy. On March 4, 1946 he was released and on the 7th of the month he rejoined the Communist Party with the approval of the Central Committee.

pp. 132, 196, 226, 237, 251, 258

<sup>364</sup> Deng Fa (1906-46) took part in the great seamen's strike in Hongkong in 1922. He joined the Communist Party in 1925 and took part in the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike and the Eastern Campaigns in the same year and in the Guangzhou Uprising in 1927. After 1928, he served as secretary of the Hongkong Municipal Committee of the CPC, secretary of the Guangzhou Municipal Committee of the CPC, head of the Organization Department of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and director of the Political and Security Bureau of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China. During the Long March, he was deputy commander of the Second Column under the Military Commission. From 1938, he served successively as head of the Communist Party office in Xinjiang, president of the Central Committee's Party School, and secretary of the Central Committee's Trade Unions and Mass Movement Commissions. He was elected to the Central Committee at the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC and at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC, and was elected an alternate member of the Political Bureau at the Fifth Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC. In September 1945, he attended the World Trade Union Congress in Paris on behalf of the workers and public functionaries of the Liberated Areas.

p. 258

<sup>365</sup> Huang Qisheng (1879-1946) was an educator. He founded the Dade School in Guiyang at the end of the Qing Dynasty. He took part in the 1911 Revolution and went to France to study on a work-study basis in 1921. After his return to China he directed the Zunyi Middle School before taking up teaching in Xiaozhuang School in 1929. After the Incident of September 18, 1931, he worked actively for the anti-Japanese movement. He went to Yan'an in 1945 and after the Jiaochangkou incident in 1946 (see Note 342 above) he went to Chongqing to express the Yan'an people's sympathy and solicitude to the democratic personages who had been beaten up in the incident.

p. 258

<sup>366</sup> The other victims in the crash included Lt. Colonel Li Shaohua, an Eighth Route Army staff officer, adjutants Zhao Dengjun and Wei Wanji, Ye Ting's wife Li Xiuwen, his daughter Ye Yangmei, his son A Jiu, his housekeeper Gao Qiong, Mr. Huang Qisheng's grandson Huang Xiaozhuang (a teacher at the Lu Xun Art Academy in Yan'an) and the four members of the U.S. Air Force crew.

p. 258

<sup>367</sup> For the October 10th "Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China", see the article "The Past Year's Negotiations and the Prospects", pp. 280-92 above.

pp. 259, 281, 305, 405

<sup>368</sup> When the truce agreement was to be signed in January 1946, the Kuomintang reactionaries insisted on the exclusion of the northeastern region, hoping to seize it by force. After sustaining heavy blows at the hands of the People's Liberation Army and meeting with nationwide opposition, Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to sign a truce agreement for the northeast on March 27, 1946 in Chongqing. But hardly three days had passed before Kuomintang troops, with the help of the United States, launched fresh attacks on Yingkou, Anshan, Sipingjie and other places under our control.

pp. 259, 284, 294

<sup>369</sup> On the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPC and its Military Commission, the Central Plains Military Command was organized in the first half of 1946, with Li Xiannian as its commander and Zheng Weisan as its political commissar. On June 26, the Kuomintang reactionaries broke the truce agreement and launched a



large-scale offensive against the Central Plains Military Area with 300,000 troops. At the end of June, in order to preserve its strength and gain the initiative, the Central Plains Liberation Army divided and broke through the encirclement at different points. This strategic shift tied down large numbers of enemy troops, thereby giving effective support to the operations of other Liberated Areas. p. 262

<sup>370</sup> Hu Zongnan was deputy chief of the Kuomintang's northwest field headquarters and concurrently director of the Xi'an Pacification Headquarters during the War of Liberation. pp. 262, 306

<sup>371</sup> Li Gongpu (1900-46) was a patriotic democratic personage. After the Incident of September 18, 1931 (see Note 490 below), he devoted himself to the anti-Japanese national salvation movement and to cultural and educational work among the masses. In 1936, he joined the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and was elected one of its leaders. Together with Shen Junru and others, he was arrested by the Kuomintang reactionaries in November of that year but was released after the outbreak of the War of Resistance. In 1945, he became a member of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League. He was assassinated by Kuomintang secret agents in Kunming on July 11, 1946.

pp. 263, 266, 270, 294

<sup>372</sup> Wen Yiduo (1899-1946) was a patriotic democratic personage and famed poet and scholar. After 1943, with bitter hatred for the dictatorial and corrupt Kuomintang government, he took an active part in the struggle for democracy. In 1945, he became a member of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League. He was assassinated by Kuomintang secret agents in Kunming on July 15, 1946. His eldest son Wen Lihe was seriously wounded while trying to protect him.

pp. 263, 266, 268, 270, 294

<sup>373</sup> On March 1, 1946, Kuomintang secret agents destroyed the office of the *Qin-jeng Industrial and Commercial News*, a Xi'an local paper. In April, they arrested and executed its legal advisor, the lawyer Wang Ren, a member of the Democratic League. On the evening of April 30, Li Furen, director of the youth department of the Democratic League in Xi'an, chief editor of another paper, the *People's Guide*, and a member of the Communist Party, was kidnapped and shot by Kuomintang secret agents (though seriously wounded, he survived and with the help and shelter provided by the people he eventually arrived in Yan'an after a roundabout journey; there he became president of Yan'an University). These came to be known as "the bloody incidents of Xi'an".

On March 18, 1946, the Huaiyin field team under the Military Mediation Headquarters received a warm welcome from the local people on its arrival in Nantong, Jiangsu Province. After the team left, however, the Kuomintang reactionaries secretly arrested and killed more than twenty people who had taken part in welcoming the team. Among the victims was Sun Pingtian, a New China News Agency journalist who had travelled to Nantong together with the team. This came to be known as "the bloody incident of Nantong". p. 263

<sup>374</sup> Xiao Chao, or Deng Yingchao, was then a Communist delegate to the Political Consultative Conference. p. 264

<sup>375</sup> Wu Yunfu (1904-69) joined the Communist Party of China in 1926. In 1946 he served as secretary-general of the China Liberated Areas Relief Association. p. 264

p. 264

<sup>376</sup> Leighton Stuart (1876-1962) was then U.S. Ambassador to China.

pp. 263, 289, 362

<sup>377</sup> On the eve of the convocation of the divisive "National Assembly", held in violation of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, the Kuomintang reactionaries unilaterally issued a so-called cease-fire order on November 8, 1946, thereby attempting to cover up their political responsibility for creating a split and for expanding the civil war. p. 271

<sup>378</sup> The uprising broke out in Yunnan Province on December 25, 1915, against Yuan Shikai's attempt to restore the monarchy and to proclaim himself emperor. On the same day Cai E and others cabled all the other provinces in China, declaring the independence of Yunnan. Cai E also organized a national salvation army and launched a punitive war against Yuan. Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces immediately responded. In June the following year, Yuan Shikai died a natural death. p. 274

<sup>379</sup> In November 1936, the Japanese aggressors incited their puppet troops under Li Shouxin and Wang Ying in Inner Mongolia to attack eastern Suiyuan (now the area of the Ulanqab League of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia) in coordination with Japanese troops. The invading forces were routed by the local army and people. p. 276

<sup>380</sup> The "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce" or "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" was concluded between the Kuomintang government and the U.S. government on November 4, 1946, in Nanjing. The treaty sold out a large part of China's sovereignty. pp. 278, 298

<sup>381</sup> *The Declaration on the Current Situation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* issued on August 25, 1945. It put forward the policy of unifying the state and building an independent, free, prosperous and strong New China on the basis of peace, democracy and unity. To deal with the reactionaries' plot for a civil war, their sabotage of unity and their suppression of democracy, it proposed six urgent measures to the Kuomintang government. These measures were: (1) recognition of the popularly elected governments and anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas and withdrawal of the troops encircling and attacking these areas; (2) delimitation of the areas where the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column were to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, granting them the right to participate in the handling of all matters relating to Japan; (3) severe punishment of traitors and the disbanding of the puppet armies; (4) fair and rational reorganization and demobilization of the troops, provision of relief to compatriots in distress and reduction of taxes; (5) recognition of the legal status of the political parties, annulment of all laws and decrees contravening the people's freedom of assembly, association, speech and the press, abolition of the secret police organs and the release of patriotic political prisoners; and (6) the immediate convening of a conference of the representatives of the political parties and non-party personages to formulate a democratic administrative programme, put an end to political tutelage, establish a democratic coalition government of the whole country and make preparations for a popularly elected National Assembly. p. 280

<sup>382</sup> In April 1937, the Communist Party of China drafted a *Common Programme for the Kuomintang and the Communist Party*, proposing the lifting of the ban on mass movements, the release of political prisoners, recognition of the revolutionary base areas, changing the name of the Red Army to the National Revolutionary Army, and so on. The CPC proposed that the Kuomintang publicize the *Common Programme* to the whole nation in the name of both parties. But the Kuomintang rejected the proposal and never published the programme. p. 281

<sup>259</sup> At its emergency meeting of August 7, 1927, the Central Committee of the CPC decided on the organization of armed peasant uprisings in Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi Provinces during the autumn harvest. After the meeting, many peasant uprisings led by the Party organizations in different places broke out. See also Note 18 above and Note 269 below. p. 189

<sup>260</sup> The uprising took place in Guangzhou from the 11th to the 13th of December 1927 with the Officers' Training Corps of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Guangzhou Workers' Red Detachment as the main force. Led by Zhang Tailei, Su Zhaozheng, Ye Ting, Yun Daiying, Ye Jianying, and Yang Yin, the insurrectionaries occupied most of Guangzhou city and set up the Guangzhou Soviet, a short-lived people's political regime under Communist leadership. After the failure of the uprising, part of these forces joined those of the Dongjiang Peasants' Uprising led by Peng Pai, while another part moved into Guangxi Province and fought in the peasant uprisings along the Zuojiang and Youjiang Rivers. Still another part joined the forces led by Zhu De and Chen Yi which had participated in the Nanchang Uprising and fought its way to the Jinggang Mountains. pp. 189, 236

<sup>261</sup> Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938) was then a member of the Secretariat of the Communist International. p. 189

<sup>262</sup> On the eve of the October Revolution, the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party convened an enlarged session, at which the Party headquarters for the uprising was elected. Zinoviev and Kamenev, both members of the Central Committee, opposed the uprising. When their objections were rejected, they went so far as to issue a statement through the Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*, professing their opposition to the "adventurist" uprising being prepared by the Bolsheviks. This revealed to the enemy the decision of the Central Committee to launch the uprising in the immediate future. p. 190

<sup>263</sup> Tan Pingshan (1886-1936) organized a communist group in Guangzhou in 1920 and was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Third, Fourth and Fifth National Congresses of the Communist Party. During the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27), he was successively a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, head of the Organization Department and of the Peasant Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and a member of the Wuhan National Government Council. He participated in the Nanchang Uprising, serving as a member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Committee. Later he quit the Communist Party and took part in organizing the "Provisional Action Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang" (i.e., the "third party"). During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he opposed the traitorous and dictatorial policy of Chiang Kai-shek. He took the initiative in organizing the Federation of Comrades of the Three People's Principles in 1943 and participated in the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang in 1948. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the Central People's Government Council. p. 190

<sup>264</sup> In July 1927, the Central Military and Political Academy in Wuhan was dissolved by Zhang Fakui, commander-in-chief of the Second Front Army of the Kuomintang forces. Its cadets were reorganized into the Officers' Training Corps of the Second Front Army. p. 191

<sup>265</sup> Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928), head of the Fengtian northern warlord clique, ruled northeast China for a long time with the support of Japanese imperialism. After defeating the warlords of the Zhili clique in 1924, he extended his influence south

<sup>380</sup> The Youth Party is short for the Youth Party of China. Its members included landlords, capitalists, politicians and intellectuals. It was set up in France in 1923 under the name Chinese *Étatiste* Youth League and took the name Youth Party of China in 1929. It trumpeted *étatisme* and opposed communism. For a time during the War of Resistance, it joined the China Democratic League. Later it attached itself to the Kuomintang and attended the Kuomintang-monopolized "National Assembly" in November 1946. It followed the Kuomintang to Taiwan Province in 1949.

pp. 282, 289, 294, 308, 317

<sup>384</sup> Zhang Junmai (1887-1969) was then chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party of China.

pp. 282, 319

<sup>385</sup> For the rescinding of the Legislative Yuan's right to express no confidence in the Executive Yuan, see Note 351 above.

p. 287

<sup>386</sup> The "five-man meeting" refers to the talks held on July 1, 1946, by Chen Cheng, Wang Shijie and Shao Lizi, representatives of the Kuomintang appointed by Chiang Kai-shek, and Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu, representatives of the Communist Party of China.

p. 289

<sup>387</sup> The Democratic Socialist Party was formed through the merger of the National Socialist Party and the Democratic Constitutional Party in 1946. It consisted mainly of representatives of the landlords and bourgeoisie. In November 1946, it participated in the Kuomintang-monopolized "National Assembly". At a meeting of its standing committee convened in Hongkong in May 1949, it declared that it would continue to follow the Kuomintang. That same year it fled to Taiwan Province with the Kuomintang.

pp. 289, 294, 308, 317

<sup>388</sup> Hu Zhengzhi (1889-1949) was then general manager of the newspaper *Da Gong Bao*.

p. 290

<sup>389</sup> Huang Yanpei (1878-1965) was a representative of the China Democratic League at the Political Consultative Conference and was the convener of the China Democratic National Construction Association. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as Vice-Premier of the Government Administration Council and also held other posts.

p. 290

<sup>390</sup> Du Yuming (1904- ) was then commander of the Northeast Peace Preservation Headquarters of the Kuomintang army. He was later deputy commander-in-chief of the "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters of the Kuomintang army in Xuzhou and was captured by the People's Liberation Army in January 1949 during the Huai-Hai campaign. He was released by special pardon in 1959 and is now a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

p. 295

<sup>391</sup> On July 29, 1946, U.S. marines and Kuomintang detachments stationed in Tianjin, each numbering some dozens of men, patrolled the vicinity of Anping Township in Xianghe County, Hebei Province, 70 kilometres northwest of Tianjin. They intruded into and attacked the defence sector of the Eighth Route Army units in eastern Hebei who were forced to fight back in self-defence. The Kuomintang reactionaries seized upon this incident to make demagogic propaganda in an effort to get U.S. troops involved in China's civil war. The Communist Party of China made a timely exposure of this act of aggression by U.S. troops and of the conspiratorial activities of the Kuomintang reactionaries, and solemnly demanded an apology and compensation from the U.S. marines and the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. ground, naval and air forces stationed in China.

p. 298

<sup>392</sup> This was the "Air Transport Agreement" signed by the Kuomintang and U.S. governments in Nanjing on December 20, 1946. It sold out China's sovereignty over its territorial air space. p. 298

<sup>393</sup> On December 24, 1946, Shen Chong, a girl student of Peking University, was raped by U.S. soldiers in Beiping. Students in scores of big and medium-sized cities in the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled areas organized Federations for Protesting the GIs' Outrage and held demonstrations against U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from China. These student actions won a response from people in all walks of life. p. 301

<sup>394</sup> In February 1947, the Kuomintang reactionary government issued a "Programme of Emergency Economic Measures", which froze the cost of living index. Thereafter, no matter how prices sky-rocketed, workers' wages were to be artificially held at the January level. (The price of rice in Shanghai early in January was 60,000 Kuomintang yuan per hundred catties, but by June it had risen to 500,000 yuan.) Shanghai workers and shop assistants held mammoth demonstrations in May, strongly opposing this reactionary measure. The Kuomintang government was forced to unfreeze the index in June. p. 302

<sup>395</sup> Wu Yuzhang (1878-1966), joined the Communist Party in 1925 and, at the time in question, was secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee.

Zhang Youyu (1899- ) was then deputy secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, head of its Propaganda Department and concurrently director of the *New China Daily Press*. p. 302

<sup>396</sup> On June 6, 1946, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party began negotiations in Nanjing concerning the three problems of ending the conflict in the Northeast, restoring communications facilities and reorganizing the armies. George Marshall, representative of the U.S. government, participated in the negotiations together with Xu Yongchang, representing the Kuomintang, and Zhou Enlai, representing the Communist Party. Since neither the United States nor Chiang Kai-shek was the least bit sincere in the negotiations, they rejected the four proposals of the Communist Party concerning a protracted cease-fire, restoration of communications, reorganization of the armies and demobilization of servicemen, and re-inauguration of the Political Consultative Conference. p. 305

<sup>397</sup> The reorganization of the government carried out in April 1947 when the Democratic Socialist Party, the Youth Party and certain non-party politicians, all bought over by Chiang Kai-shek, joined the Kuomintang government. Chiang Kai-shek claimed that after this reorganization the Kuomintang government became a liberal multi-party government, trying thereby to gloss over his continued autocratic rule. p. 308

<sup>398</sup> The Third Session of the Fourth People's Political Council, which was controlled by the Kuomintang, began on May 20, 1947. Chiang Kai-shek attended it and made the opening speech. Students from the Central University and other universities, colleges and schools in Nanjing, as well as students who had come to Nanjing from Suzhou, Hangzhou and Shanghai, totalling over 7,000, demonstrated in front of the National Hall where the Council was in session, demanding an end to the civil war. The Kuomintang reactionaries arrested and injured over 100 students. p. 308

<sup>399</sup> Starting on June 30, 1947, five columns of the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, over 130,000 strong, forced their way across the Huanghe River and pushed towards the Dabie Mountains. This ushered in the strategic offensive of the People's Liberation Army.

Two columns and one army of the Taiyue Corps of the same Field Army, over 80,000 strong, commanded by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, forced their way across the Huanghe River in southern Shanxi on August 22 and advanced into western Henan. One hundred and eighty thousand men comprising eight columns of the East China Field Army led by Chen Yi and Su Yu swept into southwestern Shandong in the first ten days of September and then marched into the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu region. p. 310

<sup>400</sup> Sun Lianzhong (1893- ) was then the director of the Baoding Pacification Headquarters of the Kuomintang army.

Fu Zuoyi (1894-1974) was then the director of the Zhangyuan Pacification Headquarters of the Kuomintang army and later commander-in-chief of its North China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters. In January 1949, he came over to the side of the people with his troops, thus making a contribution to the peaceful liberation of Beijing and Suiyuan Province. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he was a member of the Central People's Government Council and held other posts, including that of Minister of Water Conservancy and later Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power. p. 311

<sup>401</sup> In September 1947, the Communist Party called the National Land Conference in Xibaipo Village, Jianping (now Pingshan) County, Hebei Province. The Outline Land Law of China adopted by the conference was promulgated by the Central Committee on October 10, 1947. Among its stipulations were abolition of the land system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and implementation of a system of land to the tillers. pp. 313, 319

<sup>402</sup> According to statistics up to 1949, the U.S. government provided Chiang Kai-shek with military and economic aid amounting to \$1,567,800,000 during the War of Resistance and \$4,640,490,000 during the War of Liberation, a total of \$6,208,290,000. p. 313

<sup>403</sup> Albert C. Wedemeyer was an American professional soldier. In July 1947 he came to China as special envoy of the U.S. president to seek ways both to support and control the Chiang Kai-shek clique. p. 314

<sup>404</sup> T. V. Soong was successively president of the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government and governor of Guangdong Province between May 1945 and January 1949. pp. 314, 316

<sup>405</sup> Around the end of the War of Resistance, a number of patriotic democratic personages within the Kuomintang formed democratic groups such as the Federation of Comrades for the Three People's Principles and the Kuomintang Association for Promoting Democracy to oppose Chiang Kai-shek's traitorous, dictatorial policies. In 1947, leaders of the democratic groups within the Kuomintang and a number of patriotic democratic personages within that party went to Hongkong, where they held the first national congress of democratic groups within the Kuomintang in November. The Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang was formally established in Hongkong on January 1, 1948, and a leading body was elected with Soong Ching Ling as honorary chairman, Li Jishen as chairman, and He Xiangning, Feng Yuxiang, Li Zhangda, Tan Pingshan, Cai Tingkai, Zhu Yunshan and others as members of its Standing Committee. At the same time, an inaugural declaration was issued explicitly calling for "the overthrow of the traitorous, dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek regime and the realization of independence, democracy and peace in China". p. 316

<sup>406</sup> After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Cai Tingkai (1892-1968) served as a member of the Central People's Government Council and also held other posts. p. 316

<sup>407</sup> The "Directive on the Necessity of Carrying the Revolution Through to the End and on Opposing the Sham Peace Scheme of Liu Hangchen and His ilk" issued by the Central Committee of the CPC on October 27, 1947. At the instigation and with the support of the U.S. imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek, a few representatives of local politicians, warlords and the right wing of the bourgeoisie were attempting to launch a sham peace movement to win a breathing space for the Kuomintang regime, then on the verge of total collapse, and to induce the people to give up the revolution halfway. Liu Hangchen was one such representative. The Central Committee directive exposed this scheme and upheld the necessity of carrying the revolution through to the end. p. 316

<sup>408</sup> The "bogus constitution" was the anti-Communist, anti-popular Constitution of the Republic of China adopted at the National Assembly which Chiang Kai-shek illegally convened in November 1946 after he had scrapped the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and launched all-out civil war. p. 317

<sup>409</sup> The China Democratic National Construction Association, composed mainly of national industrialists and businessmen, was founded in 1945. In 1948 it responded to the call of the Communist Party for the convocation of a new consultative conference and in 1949 participated in the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, it has supported the leadership of the Communist Party and has been one of the democratic parties participating in socialist revolution and socialist construction. p. 318

<sup>410</sup> Constitutional monarchy is a political system prevailing in those capitalist countries which retain monarchs, but with monarchical powers limited by the constitution. Here the term refers to the political system advocated by the right wing of the national bourgeoisie in China, which would retain the rule of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie while undertaking only certain reforms. p. 318

<sup>411</sup> The "Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" published on October 10, 1947 (see *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1967, Vol. IV, pp. 147-53), which raised the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China!" and announced the eight basic policies of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Communist Party of China. p. 319

<sup>412</sup> The "Directive on the Land Question" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on May 4, 1946. It marked the change from the land policy of reduction of rent and interest, implemented during the War of Resistance, to one of confiscation of the land of the landlords and its distribution to the peasants. p. 322

<sup>413</sup> The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was established in September 1937. Before the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi in 1935, the Worker-Peasant Democratic Governments of the two revolutionary base areas in northern Shaanxi and along the Shaanxi-Gansu border had led the masses in carrying out the equal distribution of the land of the landlords and in cancelling the peasants' debts. In order to unite all political parties and groups and all classes to form an anti-Japanese national united front, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China announced the discontinuance of the confiscation and equal distribution of the land of the landlords and implemented a policy of reduction of rent and interest, but also resolutely protected the gains already secured by the peasants in the land reform. Owing to the disruptive activities of the Kuomintang reactionaries and to some mistakes in our work, some peasants in certain areas of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border

Region were forced to return to the former owners land and houses that had been distributed to them. In view of this phenomenon, Mao Zedong drafted the "Proclamation by the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Rear Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army" in May 1938 (see *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, pp. 75-77). The Proclamation proscribed such disruptive activities which violated the principle of unity for resistance to Japan. From then until 1940, the people of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region resolutely struggled to have the above-mentioned reappropriated land gradually returned to the peasants in accordance with the spirit of the Proclamation. p. 322

<sup>444</sup> Huangjiachuan, Suide County, Shaanxi Province, was then part of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. On the basis of the agrarian reform already carried out, the readjustment of landholdings by taking from those who had better and giving to those who had worse and taking from those who had a surplus and giving to those who had a shortage, ensured a more equitable distribution. Thus the demand for land on the part of the poor peasants and farm labourers was satisfied and at the same time unity with the middle peasants was consolidated. This constituted the exemplary experience referred to by the author. pp. 323, 334

<sup>445</sup> Pingshan County, Hebei Province, was then part of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Liberated Area. During the agrarian reform the Party organizations in this county invited non-Party people to attend Party meetings so as to help strengthen the Party's primary organizations in the rural areas. This constituted the exemplary experience of Pingshan. p. 329

<sup>446</sup> The new type of ideological education movement in the army, using the methods of the "outpouring of grievances" and of the "three check-ups", was an important movement in conjunction with agrarian reform during the War of Liberation. These methods involved mobilizing the officers and men in the army units to check up on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight, and to pour out grievances against the wrongs done to the labouring people by the reactionaries in the old society. p. 339

<sup>447</sup> The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. One of the May Day slogans issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on April 30, 1948 urged that "All democratic parties, people's organizations and personages quickly call a political consultative conference to discuss the convening of a people's congress and to bring about its convocation and the formation of a democratic coalition government." The proposed conference was called the New Political Consultative Conference in order to distinguish it from the one convened by the Kuomintang in January 1946. In September 1949, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held its First Plenary Session. Exercising the functions and powers of a national people's congress, it enacted the "Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference", the "Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" and the "Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China", elected the Central People's Government Council headed by Chairman Mao Zedong and proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China. Since the First Session of the First National People's Congress in September 1954, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference no longer exercises the functions and powers of a national people's congress, but has continued as an organization of the people's democratic united front led by the Communist Party for uniting the country's nationalities, the democratic parties and groups, the people's organizations, overseas Chinese, and patriotic democratic personages. pp. 344, 395, 401, 404



<sup>418</sup> Li Zongren (1890-1969) was at one time the head of the Guangxi warlords in the Kuomintang. He became vice-president of the Kuomintang government in April 1948 and acting president in January 1949. He went to the United States after the fall of the Kuomintang regime and returned to Beijing in July 1965. He died a natural death in 1969. pp. 344, 355

<sup>419</sup> The decree was issued on August 19, 1948, on the eve of the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique, in order to further fleece the people. It dealt mainly with the issuance of a "gold yuan" currency and its exchange within a given time limit for the old currency at a rate of 1:3 million; it called in all gold, silver, silver coinage and foreign currency in the hands of the people within a given time limit, prohibiting their possession by any individual; and it demanded the registration and disposition within a given time limit of people's assets held abroad. p. 347

<sup>420</sup> In April 1948, the Kuomintang reactionaries set up a court for special criminal offences and on August 17 issued an order in the name of the Executive Yuan initiating indictments for so-called special criminal offences. Blacklists of progressive workers and students were prepared by secret agents and detectives, and starting from August 19 blacklists of students were published in the press, with an order for those named to give themselves up to the court for special criminal offences within a day after publication of their names. Large-scale arrests were made at the same time. p. 347

<sup>421</sup> Zheng Dongguo (1903- ) was then deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters of the Kuomintang forces and concurrently commander of the 1st Army. On October 19, 1948, he led his troops in laying down their arms in Changchun. He is presently a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and also holds other posts. p. 350

<sup>422</sup> Zeng Zesheng (1902-73) was then deputy commander of the Kuomintang's 1st Army and concurrently commander of the 60th Corps. He led his troops in a mutiny in Changchun on October 17, 1948. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as an army commander in the Chinese People's Liberation Army and as a member of the National Defence Council. p. 350

<sup>423</sup> Wang Yaowu (1903-68) was then commander of the Kuomintang's 2nd Pacification Zone and concurrently governor of Shandong Province. In September 1948 he was captured by the People's Liberation Army during the Jinan campaign and was released by special pardon in December 1959. In 1964, he became a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. p. 350

Fan Hanjie (1895-1976) was then deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters of the Kuomintang forces and head of the Jinzhou Command Post. He was captured by the People's Liberation Army in October 1948 during the Jinzhou campaign and was released by special pardon in November 1960. He became a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1964. p. 350

<sup>424</sup> Wu Huawen (1904-62) was then commander of the Kuomintang's Reorganized 96th Corps. He came over to the side of the people in September 1948 during the Jinan campaign. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as an army commander in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. p. 350

<sup>425</sup> Xiao Jingguang (1903- ) was then deputy commander of the Northeast Field Army of the People's Liberation Army and concurrently commander of its First Army.

Xiao Hua (1914- ) was then political commissar of the First Army of the Northeast Field Army of the People's Liberation Army. p. 351

<sup>426</sup> Tan Kah Kee (1874-1961) was a patriotic overseas Chinese leader. During the War of Resistance, he supported the Communist Party's policy of forming an anti-Japanese national united front, initiated and helped found the "General Association of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia for Aid to Refugees of the Motherland", and served as its chairman. He travelled to Yan'an to express solicitude for the anti-Japanese army and the people in the Border Region. During the War of Liberation, he was active in the patriotic democratic movements against Chiang Kai-shek. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he held several posts, among them that of member of the Central People's Government Council. p. 352

<sup>427</sup> Zhang Xiruo (1889-1973) was a patriotic democratic personage. From the latter part of the War of Resistance, he opposed Chiang Kai-shek's autocratic rule, supported the proposal put forth by the Communist Party for setting up a democratic coalition government and took an active part in the patriotic democratic movements in the Kuomintang areas. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he held several posts, among them that of member of the Central People's Government Council. p. 352

<sup>428</sup> The Jinan campaign was waged for the liberation of Jinan by the East China Field Army from September 16 to 24, 1948. The defending enemy forces, numbering 110,000 men, were completely put out of action (one corps revolted and came over to our side), and Wang Yaowu, commander of the Kuomintang's 2nd Pacification Zone, was captured.

The Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the Northeast Field Army in western Liaoning and in the Shenyang-Changchun area from September 12 to November 2, 1948. During the campaign, Zheng Dongguo, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, was compelled to lay down his arms, while Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters and army commanders Lu Junquan and Liao Yaoxiang were captured. In all, 470,000 enemy troops were put out of action and the liberation of the Northeast was completed. This victory, plus the victories in other theatres in the same period, brought about a fundamental change in the military situation of the country as a whole, with our army attaining superiority not only in quality, which had long been the case, but in numbers as well.

The Huai-Hai campaign was a decisive campaign fought between November 6, 1948 and January 10, 1949 by the East China and Central Plains Field Armies over a large territory, centring on Xuzhou and extending as far as Haizhou in the east, Shangqiu in the west, Lincheng (now Xuecheng) in the north and the Huaihe River in the south. The Central Committee of the CPC decided to form a General Front Committee consisting of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, with Deng Xiaoping as secretary, to lead all military operations on the Huai-Hai front. During this campaign, enemy army commanders Huang Botao and Qiu Qingquan were killed, Du Yuming, deputy commander-in-chief of the "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters of the Kuomintang forces at Xuzhou, army commander Huang Wei and deputy army commander Wu Shaozhou were captured, a total of 550,000 enemy troops were put out of action, and a vast area north of the Changjiang River was liberated. Chiang Kai-shek lost all his crack forces, while such centres of reactionary rule as Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan fell under direct threat from our army.

The Beiping-Tianjin campaign was a gigantic campaign fought between the beginning of December 1948 and the end of January 1949 by the North China Field

of the Great Wall. In 1926, he attacked and occupied Beijing with his ally Wu Peifu. Later, he fell out with the Japanese imperialists, and in June 1928, while returning to the Northeast by rail, he was killed by a bomb planted by the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army. p. 191

<sup>266</sup> G. Voitinsky (1893-1933) was a Soviet citizen and a representative of the Communist International in China. He came to China in the spring of 1920 to find out about the situation and to help found the Communist Party of China. From 1926 to 1927 he was in China again as representative of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International. p. 191

<sup>267</sup> Instigated by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang army officers in Hunan, including Xu Kexiang and He Jian, ordered a raid on the provincial headquarters of the trade unions and peasant associations and other revolutionary mass organizations in Changsha on May 21, 1927. Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants were arrested and killed. This was a prelude to the open collaboration of the two counter-revolutionary Kuomintang cliques, the Wuhan clique headed by Wang Jingwei and the Nanjing clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek. p. 192

<sup>268</sup> Gu Mengyu (1889-1972) was Minister of Education in the Wuhan National Government. p. 192

<sup>269</sup> The Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao Zedong was launched in September 1927 by the people's armed forces in Xiushui, Pingxiang, Liling, Pingjiang and Liuyang Counties on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. The armed forces of workers and peasants which took part in the uprising and the Guards Regiment of the former Wuhan National Government later combined to form the 1st Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. This force fought its way to the Jinggang Mountains where it established a rural revolutionary base. p. 194

<sup>270</sup> In early September 1927, Li Jishen, director of the Guangzhou Branch of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, asked Huang Shaohong, the Kuomintang governor of Guangxi Province and concurrently a member of the Guangzhou Branch of the Central Political Council and of its Military Council, to have his army take up positions along the Beijiang River to prevent the forces led by He Long and Ye Ting from entering Guandong Province. Fearing that Huang Shaohong's own influence would spread into Guandong, Wang Jingwei, who then controlled Guangzhou, sent Zhang Fakui to lead the Fourth Army back to Guandong to block Huang's army. p. 196

<sup>271</sup> The Communist University of the Toilers of the East was established in Moscow in 1921. Its task was to train revolutionary cadres for the republics in the eastern part of the Soviet Union and for imperialist colonies and dependencies. It was closed towards the end of the 1930s. p. 197

<sup>272</sup> A reference to the agrarian law issued in 1906 by Stolypin, a minister in the tsarist government. In essence, the law provided that peasants should be allowed to withdraw from the *mir*, or village communes, and take possession of their land allotments as private property. Its implementation resulted in the breakdown of the village communes, the strengthening of the position of the kulaks who could buy up the land at low prices and the deterioration of the condition of peasants with only small land allotments and of the rural poor, and it hastened the polarization of the peasantry. p. 198

<sup>273</sup> Yun Daiying (1895-1931) joined the Communist Party in 1921. In 1923 he headed the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Socialist Youth League and started publishing *Chinese Youth*. In 1926 he was elected to

the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at its Second National Congress. In March of the same year, he served as chief political instructor at the Whampoa Military Academy. He was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party at its Fifth National Congress and at the Second Plenary Session of its Sixth National Congress. He was arrested in Shanghai by the Kuomintang on May 6, 1930 and died a martyr in Nanjing on April 29, 1931. pp. 201, 372

<sup>274</sup> Tao Kingzhi (1891-1946) was a people's educator and a patriotic and democratic personage. He studied in the United States in his early years. After his return to China in 1916, he served first as dean of studies at the Nanjing Advanced Teachers Training College and then as chief secretary of the China Educational Reform Society. He initiated the Chinese Association for the Advancement of Popular Education and promoted education for the common people and the rural educational movement by setting up the Xiaozhuang School in the suburbs of Nanjing and the Shanhai Work Study Corps in the suburbs of Shanghai. After the December 9th Movement of 1935, he participated in organizing the Shanghai Federation of Cultural Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and the Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he actively participated in the struggle against Japanese imperialism and in political activities in the Kuomintang areas against the Kuomintang's autocratic rule and its civil war provocations. He established the Yucai School and the Social University in Chongqing. In the spring of 1945, he joined the China Democratic League and was elected a member of the Standing Committee of its Central Committee; he was concurrently director of the League's Educational Committee. After the War of Resistance, Tao continued to participate in the democratic movement in Kuomintang areas. pp. 201, 264, 294, 372

<sup>275</sup> The Red International of Labour Unions was set up in 1921 and dissolved at the end of 1937. p. 204

<sup>276</sup> Li Mingrui (1896-1931) was director and special military commissioner of the Kuomintang Pacification Headquarters in Guangxi in 1929. In December 1929 and February 1930, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yunyi, Li led his troops in launching the Youjiang River and Zuojiang River uprisings and organized the Seventh and then the Eighth Red Armies. Li was commander-in-chief of both. He joined the Communist Party in February 1930. In 1931, he led the Seventh Red Army in fighting its way to the Central Soviet Area. He laid down his life in the same year. p. 205

<sup>277</sup> On December 14, 1931, the 26th Route Army of the Kuomintang staged an armed uprising in Ningdu County, Jiangxi Province, under the leadership of its chief of staff Zhao Bosheng (a Communist) and the commander of the 73rd Brigade Dong Zhentang. Subsequently, the insurrectionary forces were reorganized into the Fifth Army Group of the Red Army. p. 205

<sup>278</sup> Shen Zemin (1902-33) was a member of the Communist Party in its early years and taught in the Department of Social Sciences of Shanghai University which was under Communist leadership. In 1931, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, he was elected to the Central Committee of the Party and made head of its Propaganda Department. p. 207

<sup>279</sup> Xiang Zhongfa was elected general secretary of the Communist Party at its Sixth National Congress in 1928. On June 22, 1931, he was arrested and turned traitor. He was shot by the Kuomintang on June 24, 1931. p. 207

<sup>280</sup> Ren Bishi (1904-50) joined the Communist Party in 1922. He served as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League. p. 208

<sup>281</sup> In 1928, Li Fuchun was head of the Propaganda Department and acting secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CPC and secretary of the Fa'nan District Committee of the CPC in Shanghai. p. 208

<sup>282</sup> Guan Xiangying (1902-46) joined the Communist Party in 1925. He was then director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League. He was elected to the Central Committee of the CPC at its Sixth and Seventh National Congresses. p. 209

<sup>283</sup> The Committee on Cultural Work under the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. p. 211

<sup>284</sup> A newspaper openly published by the Communist Party in the Kuomintang areas. It started publication in Hankou on January 11, 1938 and moved to Chongqing on October 25 of the same year. It was banned by the Kuomintang reactionaries on February 28, 1947. pp. 211, 223

<sup>285</sup> A conference of cultural and educational workers of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region convened in Yan'an on October 30, 1944. p. 211

<sup>286</sup> A popular anti-Japanese army organized in Chahar Province in May 1933 by Feng Yuxiang in co-operation with the Communist Party. Its top leadership included Ji Hongchang (a Communist) and Fang Zhenwu. It engaged in fierce battles with the Japanese aggressor troops in Zhangbei, Guyuan and other places and drove the Japanese and puppet troops out of the whole of Chahar Province. Owing to suppression by both Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese aggressor troops, this allied army was defeated in October 1933. p. 214

<sup>287</sup> The People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China was founded in Fuzhou in November 1933 by people in the Kuomintang who had broken with Chiang Kai-shek, including Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai. In October of that year, the 19th Route Army led by Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai concluded an agreement with the Red Army on resisting Japan and opposing Chiang Kai-shek. After its founding, the Fujian People's Government concluded an armistice agreement with the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Fujian People's Government fell in January 1934 under military pressure by Chiang Kai-shek. p. 214

<sup>288</sup> The "Message of the Communist Party of China to the Kuomintang" dated August 25, 1936. It sternly criticized the Kuomintang's reactionary rule and the reactionary policies laid down at the Second Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Fifth Central Executive Committee, and expounded the policies of the Communist Party on establishing an anti-Japanese national united front and renewing Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. p. 215

<sup>289</sup> In order to help bring about active nationwide resistance to Japan, the Communist Party of China organized the First and Fifteenth Army Groups of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army into an Anti-Japanese Vanguard of the Chinese People's Red Army. It crossed to the east bank of the Huanghe River on February 20, 1936 to fight the Japanese, but was blocked by the armed forces of Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan. In face of impending national disaster and mindful of the basic interest of nationwide resistance, the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Red Army were unwilling to engage in battle with the Kuomintang troops blocking the way. On May 5th they sent a telegram calling the eastern expeditionary army to return to the west bank of the Huanghe River. pp. 215, 276

<sup>290</sup> On December 9, 1935, several thousand students in Beiping held a patriotic demonstration under Communist leadership and raised slogans such as "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" The demonstrating students were suppressed by the Kuomintang government. On the following day, students of all schools in Beiping declared a general strike. On the 16th of the month, over ten thousand students and city residents held a second demonstration. This patriotic movement won a warm response from people throughout the country and brought about a new upsurge in the Chinese people's movement against Japanese aggression and for national salvation. pp. 215, 276

<sup>291</sup> The First Army Group and part of the Fifteenth Army Group of the Red Army wiped out the whole of the 232nd Brigade and two regiments of the 234th Brigade of Hu Zongnan's 78th Division on November 21, 1936, at Shanchengbu, Huanxian County, Ningxia Province, in the last battle of the Second Revolutionary Civil War. p. 215

<sup>292</sup> Pan Hannian joined the Communist Party in 1925. In 1936 he participated in the negotiations with the Kuomintang as a representative of the CPC. However, he secretly betrayed the Party in the same year and became a Kuomintang spy inside the Communist Party. Between 1946 and 1948, he worked in the information and united front departments of the CPC in Shanghai and Hongkong. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as deputy mayor of Shanghai. His counter-revolutionary activities were exposed in 1955. pp. 215, 264

<sup>293</sup> Wang Yizhe (1896-1937) was a patriotic general in the Northeastern Army. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, he was commander of the 67th Corps in the Northeastern Army. When Zhang Xuiliang was detained by Chiang Kai-shek, the Northeastern Army split over the question of how to rescue him. Some officers of the younger group were for a settlement by force while Wang Yizhe and others were for a settlement through peaceful means. At the instigation of reactionary forces, Wang was assassinated by the younger group on February 2, 1937. p. 216

<sup>294</sup> The report on "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan" was delivered by Mao Zedong on May 3, 1937 (see Volume I of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., pp. 263-75). The reference to "Chairman Mao's report at the May conference" elsewhere in this article is to the same report. p. 216

<sup>295</sup> "Our Opinions About Amending the Laws and Regulations for the National Assembly", *Liberation Weekly*, No. 2, Vol. 1, May 1, 1937. p. 217

<sup>296</sup> Wang Shijie was then head of the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. p. 218

<sup>297</sup> Lin Boqu served as chairman of the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region from 1937 to 1948. During the War of Resistance, he took part in negotiations with the Kuomintang as a representative of the Communist Party. pp. 218, 283

<sup>298</sup> From mid-February to mid-March 1937, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, representing the Communist Party, conducted negotiations in Xi'an with Gu Zhutong, He Zhonghan and Zhang Chong, representing the Kuomintang. The CPC representatives reiterated the five demands and four pledges which had been put forward in the telegram of the Central Committee of the CPC to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Fifth Central Executive Committee. The five demands were: 1) end all civil wars and concentrate the country's strength in a united effort to meet the foreign aggression; 2) guarantee freedom of speech, assembly and association, and release all political prisoners; 3) call a conference of representatives of all political

parties and groups, people of all walks of life and all armies, and concentrate the nation's talents in a common endeavour to save the country; 4) speedily complete all preparations for resisting Japan; and 5) improve the livelihood of the people. The four pledges were: "1) the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National Government will be discontinued throughout the country; 2) the Soviet Government will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army (a reorganized army consisting of four divisions, with 15,000 men in each division), and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanjing and its Military Council respectively; 3) a democratic system based on universal suffrage will be put into effect in the areas under the Government of the Special Region; and 4) the policy of confiscating land will be discontinued and the common programme of the anti-Japanese national united front resolutely carried out." During the negotiations, Zhou Enlai also put forward the proposal that General Zhang Xueliang be set free and reinstated. Owing to Kuomintang obstruction, the negotiations yielded no results. In the end, agreement was reached only on the CPC establishing an office in Xi'an.

In late March, Zhou Enlai went to Hangzhou to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, putting forward concrete proposals for the implementation of the Communist Party's five demands and four pledges. Chiang on his part demanded that a programme for the national united front be formulated and that his status as the leader be recognized. The two sides decided to continue the talks.

In June, Zhou Enlai went to Lushan to hold talks with Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. Both sides argued for a long time about such issues as the appointment of personnel in the general headquarters of the Red Army and in its armed forces after its reorganization, and in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, but no settlement was reached.

On July 15, 1937, the Communist Party delivered to the Kuomintang the "Declaration of the Communist Party of China on Announcing Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation", and on July 17 Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu and Lin Boqu resumed negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi and Zhang Chong at Lushan. The Kuomintang recognized the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and agreed to the reorganizing of the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army. After the Japanese attacked Shanghai on August 13, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to publish the above declaration on September 22 and to agree to the establishment of an Eighth Route Army headquarters.

p. 218

<sup>299</sup> Gu Zhutong (1892- ) was director of Chiang Kai-shek's Chongqing headquarters of the Kuomintang Military Council and concurrently director of Chiang's headquarters in Xi'an in 1937. At the time of the Southern Anhui Incident, he was commander of the 3rd War Zone.

pp. 218, 225

<sup>300</sup> During September and October 1937, three divisions of the Eighth Route Army arrived in succession at the front line of the war of resistance in Shanxi. On September 25, the 115th Division ambushed Japanese troops passing Pingxingguan, wiping out about 3,000 men of the Itagaki Division. This was the first major victory for Chinese troops in the War of Resistance.

p. 218

<sup>301</sup> The Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded in August 1937.

p. 220

<sup>302</sup> Xu Xiangqian (1902- ) was sent to Shandong Province by the Central Committee of the CPC in 1939 and served as commander of the First Column and as a member of the Shandong Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee.

p. 221

<sup>303</sup> Lu Zhonglin (1886-1966) was then the Kuomintang governor of Hebei Province. Acting on Chiang Kai-shek's orders, he created friction with the Eighth Route Army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Lu held, among other posts, membership on the National Defence Council.

Zhang Yinwu, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang local army in Hebei Province, continually created friction with and attacked the Eighth Route Army. In June 1939 he led troops in an attack on its rear headquarters in Shenxian County, Hebei Province, and massacred more than 400 of our officers and men. p. 221

<sup>304</sup> Zhu Huaibing was commander of the Kuomintang's 99th Corps. During February and March 1940, Chiang Kai-shek ordered him to muster the troops of Pang Bingxun, Zhang Yinwu and Hou Ruyong to attack the Eighth Route Army in the Taihang region from three directions. The Eighth Route Army thoroughly defeated this attack.

Shi Yousan, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's 10th Army Group, colluded with Japanese troops to attack the Eighth Route Army in southern Hebei, destroy anti-Japanese democratic political power and slaughter Communists and progressives. p. 223

<sup>305</sup> Gao Shuxun (1898-1972), commander of the Kuomintang's New 8th Corps, created friction with the Eighth Route Army in Hebei Province on Chiang Kai-shek's orders. On October 30, 1945, Gao led a corps and a column of the Kuomintang's troops on the civil war front line at Handan to revolt, and in 1946 he joined the Communist Party. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he held various posts, among them membership on the National Defence Council. p. 223

<sup>306</sup> Tang Enbo (1898-1959), deputy commander of the 1st War Zone and commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang troops in the Henan-Shandong-Jiangsu-Anhui border area, was stationed in Henan and actively implemented anti-Communist and anti-popular policies. p. 223

<sup>307</sup> On June 12, 1939, the Kuomintang's 27th Group Army, upon secret orders from Chiang Kai-shek, dispatched troops to surround the New Fourth Army Liaison Office in Jiayi Township, Pingjiang County, Hunan Province. Tu Zhengkun, a staff officer of the New Fourth Army, Luo Ziming, major and adjutant of the Eighth Route Army, and four others were murdered. p. 223

<sup>308</sup> On November 11 and 12, 1939, over 1,800 Kuomintang troops in Queshan, Xinyang and Biyang Counties in Henan Province besieged the New Fourth Army's rear office in Zhugou Township, Queshan County, massacring over 200 people including wounded officers and men of the New Fourth Army, their families and other non-combatants. p. 223

<sup>309</sup> In December 1939, at Chiang Kai-shek's instigation, Yan Xishan mustered six corps and launched an offensive against the New Army stationed in western Shanxi. It was crushed by the New Army's counter-attack. At the same time Yan's troops launched an offensive against the New Army in southeastern Shanxi, wrecking the anti-Japanese democratic governments and people's organizations in Yangcheng, Jincheng, Changzhi and Qinshui and massacring Communists and progressives. p. 224

<sup>310</sup> A reference to negotiations with the Kuomintang in Chongqing in June 1940. p. 224

<sup>311</sup> The author here quotes a line from the ode *Xiang Bo*, in the classical *Book of Songs* (*Minor Odes* section): "I would seize those slanderers and throw them to the wolves and tigers. If these beasts refuse to devour them, I would banish them to the barren north." p. 224



<sup>312</sup> This telegram was sent to the leaders of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies by Chiang Kai-shek on October 19, 1940, in the name of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, chief and deputy chief of general staff of the Military Council of the Kuomintang government. It vilified the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies which were persisting in the war of resistance behind enemy lines and arbitrarily ordered troops resisting Japan south of the Huanghe River to withdraw north of the river within a specified time. Taking over-all interests into account, the Central Committee of the CPC, in the name of Commander-in-Chief Zhu De and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai of the Eighteenth Group Army and of Commander Ye Ting and Deputy Commander Xiang Ying of the New Fourth Army, replied by telegram to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi on November 9, repudiating the fabrications in the telegram of October 19, but agreeing to withdraw the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui to north of the Changjiang River. p. 224

<sup>313</sup> The Kuomintang issued the so-called Central Government instructions on July 16, 1940. Their main idea was to replace the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region administration by a Northern Shaanxi Administrative Commission under the leadership of the Shaanxi Provincial Government, reduce the size of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and limit their defence sectors. These so-called Central Government instructions were put forward to our Party in the telegram of October 19 in the form of a final decision. p. 224

<sup>314</sup> The two armies in question were the troops under Li Mingyang, commander-in-chief of guerrilla forces in Jiangsu, Shandong and Anhui (Li was subordinate to Han Deqin, deputy commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's Jiangsu-Shandong War Zone), and Li Shouwei's 89th Corps. p. 224

<sup>315</sup> Between 1938 and 1946 Chen Yi served first as commander of the first detachment of the New Fourth Army and then as that army's acting commander. (See also Note 32 above.) p. 225

<sup>316</sup> The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact concluded by representatives of the two sides in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On April 5, 1945, the Government of the Soviet Union issued a statement abrogating the pact. p. 225

<sup>317</sup> The Xinjiang problem consisted of the counter-revolutionary incidents occurring in 1942 and 1943 when Sheng Shicai, the dictatorial ruler of Xinjiang, cast away his "revolutionary" mask and threw in his lot with Chiang Kai-shek, arresting and massacring Communists and progressives. p. 225

<sup>318</sup> Beginning in 1940, Zhang Qun was director of the generalissimo's headquarters of the Kuomintang army in Chengdu and concurrently governor of Sichuan Province. pp. 226, 298

<sup>319</sup> During the War of Resistance Against Japan, Dong Biwu was one of the representatives of the Communist Party who served as members of the People's Political Council. p. 226

<sup>320</sup> Deng Yingchao (1904- ) was one of the representatives of the Communist Party of China who served as members of the People's Political Council during the War of Resistance. p. 226

<sup>321</sup> Zhang Zhizhong (1890-1969) served successively as the Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province, head of the Political Department of the Military Council and secretary-general of the Three People's Principles Youth League during the War of Resistance. In 1945 he served concurrently as director of Chiang Kai-shek's northwest headquarters of the Kuomintang army and governor of Xinjiang Province, and was one of the Kuomintang representatives in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations. In 1946 he participated in the Military Committee of Three (see Note 357 below)

Army and the Northeast Field Army over an area extending from Zhangjiakou in the west to Tanggu and Tangshan in the east, and including Beiping and Tianjin. The Central Committee decided to form a General Front Committee consisting of Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Nie Rongzhen to lead all military operations on the Beiping-Tianjin front. During this campaign, the defending enemy forces in Xibaipo, Zhangjiakou and Tianjin were put out of action and Chen Changjie, commander of the Tianjin Garrison Headquarters, was captured. Owing to our efforts to win them over and as a result of negotiations, the defending enemy forces in Beiping commanded by Fu Zuoyi, commander-in-chief of the enemy's North China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, accepted reorganization by our army, and Beiping was liberated peacefully. In the over-all campaign, over 520,000 enemy troops were put out of action or reorganized, and north China was, in the main, liberated.

pp. 353, 365

<sup>420</sup> For Huang Botao, see Note 428 above.

p. 353

<sup>430</sup> On January 1, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek issued a New Year's message in which he hypocritically expressed willingness to hold peace talks with the Communist Party. He insisted on the preservation of the bogus constitution, the bogus "constituted authority" and the reactionary armed forces as the basis for the peace talks — terms totally unacceptable to the people.

p. 355

<sup>431</sup> On January 14, 1949, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, issued a statement on the existing situation, in which he exposed Chiang Kai-shek's plot for a sham peace. He put forward eight terms for peace talks: (1) punish the war criminals; (2) abolish the bogus constitution; (3) abolish the bogus "constituted authority"; (4) reorganize all reactionary troops on democratic principles; (5) confiscate bureaucrat-capital; (6) reform the land system; (7) abrogate treasonable treaties; and (8) convene a political consultative conference without the participation of reactionary elements, and form a democratic coalition government to take over all the powers of the reactionary Nanjing Kuomintang government and of its subordinate governments at all levels.

p. 355

<sup>432</sup> When the Kuomintang regime was on the verge of total collapse after the People's Liberation Army had liberated Tianjin on January 15, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek announced his "resignation" on January 21 on the pretext that he was "unable to attend to affairs for certain reasons". He handed over his duties to the vice-president, Li Zongren, who was to serve as acting president, while he himself retired, pulling the strings from behind the scenes.

p. 355

<sup>433</sup> Having taken up the post of acting president of the Kuomintang government, Li Zongren organized a "delegation of the people of Shanghai" consisting of Yan Huiqing, Zhang Shizhao, and Jiang Yong in early February. Shao Lizi joined the delegation in a private capacity. It travelled to Beiping on February 14 to discuss issues concerning peace talks with the Communist Party. The delegates also went to Xibaipo where they were received by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. They returned to Nanjing on February 27.

p. 355

<sup>434</sup> Deputies of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China held peace talks in Beiping from April 1, 1949. The members of the Nanjing Kuomintang government delegation were Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Huang Shaohong, Zhang Shizhao, Li Zheng and Liu Fei, with Zhang Zhizhong as head of the delegation. The members of the Chinese Communist Party delegation were Zhou Enlai, Lin Boqu, Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, Li Weihan and Nie Rongzhen, with Zhou Enlai as head of the delegation.

pp. 355, 367

<sup>435</sup> According to data published by the State Statistical Bureau in 1959 in *The Ten Great Years—Statistics of the Achievements in the Economic and Cultural Construction of the People's Republic of China*, modern industry accounted for about 17 per cent of the gross output value of industry and agriculture in 1949. p. 355

<sup>436</sup> See Note 419 above. p. 356

<sup>437</sup> Guangzhou was then the seat of the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government. Xikou is situated in Fenghua County, Zhejiang Province. After Chiang Kai-shek announced his "resignation", he resided in Xikou and manipulated the Kuomintang reactionaries' sabotage of the peace talks from behind the scenes, continuing to oppose the people. p. 356

<sup>438</sup> After the October Revolution of 1917, Britain, France, Japan, the United States and other imperialist countries launched armed interventions in Soviet Russia. The troops of the United States landed in north and east Russia, occupying, among other places, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Vladivostok. These troops were withdrawn piecemeal only in 1919 and 1920. p. 361

<sup>439</sup> Fu Jingbo was then a private advisor to Leighton Stuart, U.S. ambassador to China. p. 362

<sup>440</sup> "Shaoxing aides" was an appellation applied to people such as court clerks and revenue clerks working in government offices in old China. Since people from Shaoxing were over-represented in such posts, the term came to be used for all such non-official functionaries. p. 363

<sup>441</sup> See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1951, Chapter 4, Section 2, pp. 165-206. p. 368

<sup>442</sup> The First National Youth Congress was held in Beiping May 4-10, 1949. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth was founded at the congress. It was later renamed the All-China Youth Federation. p. 370

<sup>443</sup> Fan Wenlan (1895-1969) was a Marxist historian. He was then serving concurrently as vice-president of North China University and director of its research department. At the Party's Eighth and Ninth National Congresses, he was elected an alternate member and then a full member of the Central Committee. p. 372

<sup>444</sup> Mao Zedong's report, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. See *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1967, Vol. IV, pp. 157-76. p. 375

<sup>445</sup> V. I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. XXIX, p. 428. p. 375

<sup>446</sup> The National Congress of Workers in Literature and Art was held in Beiping, July 2-19, 1949. It summed up the experience in literary and art work since the publication of Mao Zedong's *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art* in 1942, laid down the principles and set the tasks for literary and art work under the new conditions, and founded a unified national organization for literary and art circles, the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. p. 383

<sup>447</sup> The National Association for Literature and Art, or the National Anti-Japanese Association for Literary and Art Circles (popularly known as the Association for Literature and Art), was founded in Hankou in March 1938 as a united front organization rallying all anti-Japanese literary and art workers under the leadership of the Communist Party. Zhou Enlai was elected an honorary member of the council of the association, and Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Lao She and 42 others were elected members of the council. The association unfolded resistance-oriented literary

and art activities on a big scale and published the magazine *Anti-Japanese Literature and Art*. It played an important role in the movements to uphold unity in the War of Resistance and to strive for democracy and progress. It was one of the organizations sponsoring the First National Congress of Workers in Literature and Art in 1949.

p. 383

<sup>448</sup> Acting on the instruction of the Central Committee of the CPC, its Military Commission issued a general order to the army on November 1, 1948, to carry out reorganization and implement a system of unified structure and designations. It provided for the division of the units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army into field, regional and guerrilla forces. In the spring of 1949, all the field armies were reorganized in turn. The Northwest, Central Plains, East China and Northeast Field Armies were respectively reorganized as the First, Second, Third and Fourth Field Armies. The 18th, 19th and 20th Armies of the North China Field Army were placed under the direct command of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The joint Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia and Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Areas were renamed the Northwest Military Area, but the designations of the North China, Northeast, East China and Central Plains Military Areas remained unchanged.

p. 390

<sup>449</sup> The Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (or Common Programme for short) was adopted at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 29, 1949. It includes 60 articles in 7 chapters. It was a programme for building the country under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and was enacted by the representatives of all the democratic parties and groups, people's organizations, and people of all walks of life and of all nationalities. It laid down the common goals which the entire Chinese people would strive to attain within a fixed period and constituted the political foundation for unity in action. It served as a provisional constitution before China promulgated a formal constitution in 1954.

p. 404

<sup>450</sup> For the three anti-Communist onslaughts, see "On the United Front", pp. 223-28 above.

p. 405

<sup>451</sup> Yang Jie (1888-1949) was a patriotic Kuomintang general. During the War of Liberation, he took part in activities opposing the civil war and autocracy. In 1949, he was invited to attend the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. However, he was assassinated by Kuomintang agents in Hongkong on September 19, 1949, while on his way from Yunnan to Beijing.

p. 407

<sup>452</sup> The reference here is to the abolition of the exploiting classes. In November 1936, J. V. Stalin made a report entitled "On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R." at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. He said, "The landlord class . . . had already been eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the Civil War. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. . . . Thus all the exploiting classes have now been eliminated." (*Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1953, p. 683.)

p. 407

<sup>453</sup> The five economic sectors under New Democracy refer to the state-owned socialist economy, the private capitalist economy, the individual economy of peasants and handicraftsmen, the semi-socialist co-operative economy, and the state-capitalist economy jointly run by the state and private capitalists.

p. 408

## ADDITIONAL NOTES TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

<sup>454</sup> The national bourgeoisie was the middle section of the Chinese bourgeoisie which had little or no connection with imperialism, as distinguished from the big bourgeoisie which was comprador in character. p. 14

<sup>455</sup> The imperialist powers compelled the Qing government to open a number of towns along China's coast and rivers as trading ports and forcibly marked off certain areas in these ports as concessions under their direct administration. Within these concessions they enforced an imperialist system of colonial rule entirely independent of Chinese law and administration. With the concessions as strongholds, the imperialist powers exercised direct or indirect political and economic control over the Chinese feudal-comprador regime. pp. 18, 96

<sup>456</sup> In 1919, the victors of World War I — Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and other countries — convened a peace conference in Paris, at which it was decided to hand over to Japan the colonialist privileges previously obtained by Germany in Shandong Province. The delegation sent by China's warlord government was prepared to accept this decision. On May 4, students in Beijing held demonstrations to protest the imperialists' unjust decision and the warlord government's compromise. The student movement evoked an immediate response throughout the country. After June 3, it developed into a countrywide anti-imperialist and anti-feudal mass movement embracing large numbers of the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and even the national bourgeoisie. p. 20

<sup>457</sup> After Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei betrayed the revolution in 1927, the Communists staged a number of armed uprisings and set up political regimes which were called Soviets. The areas under the control of Soviets were known as Soviet areas. pp. 26, 31, 71, 76, 87, 97, 112, 161, 217

<sup>458</sup> See *Confucian Analects*, Book IV, "Li Ren". Comrade Yang Yin quoted this sentence from the *Analects* to express his determination to dedicate his life to the cause of communism. p. 38

<sup>459</sup> A reference to the initial stage of the Guangdong-Guangxi war against Chiang Kai-shek, fought between September and October 1929. On September 17, 1929, Zhang Fakui turned his troops against Chiang Kai-shek in the Yichang area west of Wuhan, Hubei Province. Chiang ordered Liu Zhi, then stationed in Wuhan, to take charge of the attack against Zhang Fakui. Zhang retreated from Hubei back to Guangdong and linked up with Yu Zuobo, warlord and governor of Guangxi Province, to oppose Chiang Kai-shek. This developed into the Guangdong-Guangxi war. "Wuhan war" here refers to Zhang Fakui's battle with Chiang Kai-shek in the vicinity of Wuhan. p. 43

<sup>460</sup> The "sixteen-character formula" translates: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." This basic principle of guerrilla warfare was worked out by the Red Army operating in the Jinggang Mountains area during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. p. 48

<sup>461</sup> A reference to the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27), also known as the Northern Expedition. pp. 57, 58, 107, 133, 174, 177, 221, 316, 357, 404

<sup>462</sup> The Three People's Principles were Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles and programme for the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China and dealt with the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood. In 1924, in the Manifesto of the

First National Congress of the Kuomintang, Dr. Sun made a new interpretation of his Three People's Principles, developing them into the "revolutionary Three People's Principles" with the "Three Great Policies", namely, alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. These Revolutionary Three People's Principles served as the political basis for Communist-Kuomintang co-operation during the First Revolutionary Civil War period. pp. 112, 130, 162

<sup>463</sup> In 1925, the revolutionary government in Guangdong reorganized the local warlord armed forces that had joined the revolution into a unified National Revolutionary Army, with the cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy as its backbone. p. 111

<sup>464</sup> The period from early August 1938, when the Japanese aggressors launched an offensive to seize Wuhan, to October 25, when the Kuomintang government and armed forces pulled out of that city. p. 121

<sup>465</sup> This refers to the Kuomintang and its armies with which the Communist Party formed an Anti-Japanese National United Front at the time. p. 123

<sup>466</sup> In October 1934, the main force of the Central Red Army embarked on the Long March, leaving behind part of its troops. For the next three years these troops conducted guerrilla warfare in fourteen areas in eight southern provinces. After the War of Resistance broke out in 1937, they were reorganized into the New Fourth Army which threw itself into operations in the war theatres behind enemy lines in central China. p. 124

<sup>467</sup> Established in July 1938, this league was controlled by the Kuomintang which incorporated it in September 1947. pp. 129, 167, 221

<sup>468</sup> The comprador bourgeoisie was the big bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, the section of the Chinese bourgeoisie which was nurtured by and directly served the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries. pp. 131, 183

<sup>469</sup> Chen Lifu (1900- ) arrived in Guangzhou in 1926 and later served as confidential secretary to Chiang Kai-shek. After the Nanjing Kuomintang government was established in 1927, he served successively as secretary-general of the central headquarters and head of the Organization Department of the Kuomintang, and as Minister of Education and vice-president of the Legislative Yuan in the Kuomintang government. Together with his brother Chen Guofu, he organized the Central Club (see Note 176 above). p. 138

<sup>470</sup> Norman Bethune (1890-1939), a distinguished surgeon, was a member of the Canadian Communist Party. He came to China at the head of a medical team in order to help in the War of Resistance and arrived in Yan'an in the spring of 1938. Not long after, he left for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area. Filled with the internationalist spirit and a selfless devotion to his work, he served the army and people of the Liberated Areas for nearly two years. He contracted blood poisoning while operating on a wounded soldier and died in Tangxian County, Hebei Province, on November 12, 1939. p. 145

<sup>471</sup> These reports, including "Reform Our Study", "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" and "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing", were delivered by Mao Zedong in Yan'an in 1941 and 1942. p. 148

<sup>472</sup> The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was a revolutionary base area gradually built up after 1931 through revolutionary guerrilla warfare in northern Shaanxi. When the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi after the Long March, the Region became the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

and the central base area of the revolution. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Revolutionary Base Area became the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region after the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in 1937 and included over twenty counties situated around the common borders of the three provinces. p. 154

<sup>473</sup> The Rectification Movement was a Partywide movement conducted by the Communist Party of China in 1942-43. It was aimed at rectifying the style of work through combating subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing. p. 156

<sup>474</sup> After the Incident of July 7, 1937, Japanese imperialism further expanded its war of aggression and, on August 13, launched a large-scale military attack on Shanghai in order to implement its policy of subjugating the whole of China. p. 164

<sup>475</sup> In 1924, with the help of the Communist Party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Kuomintang and effected co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The Revolutionary Civil War of 1924-27 was launched against the northern warlords on the basis of this co-operation. This first co-operative arrangement between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was wrecked in 1927 as a result of betrayals by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. p. 164

<sup>476</sup> In 1934, the Kuomintang government enforced a new county system which changed the primary level of township and village authority into the *bao jia* structure, consisting of *jia*'s, each made up of ten households, *bao*'s, each made up of ten *jia*'s, and "joint *bao*'s", each made up of ten *bao*'s. In form, the heads of the *jia* and *bao* and the director of the joint *bao* were elected, but in fact they were all selected and controlled by the landlords and gentry. The Kuomintang reactionary government used the system to consolidate its fascist rule (see also Note 478 below). p. 168

<sup>477</sup> During the War of Resistance, Mao Zedong put forward a revolutionary dual policy combining unity and struggle to cope with the dual character of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek. p. 171

<sup>478</sup> The Regulations for the Organization of *Bao* and *Jia* and for a Population Census in the Counties promulgated by the Kuomintang government stated, "The *bao* and *jia* are to be organized on the basis of households; there is to be a head of each household, of each *jia*, which is made up of ten households, and of each *bao*, which is made up of ten *jia*'s." Neighbours were required to keep watch on each other's activities and report them to the authorities. Punishment was meted out to the whole group when a member was found guilty of an offence. The system was also used to exact various forms of compulsory labour. p. 172

<sup>479</sup> A National Government was formally set up in Guangzhou on July 1, 1925. As victories were being won in the Northern Expedition, the seat of government was moved to Wuhan in January 1927 and the government became known as the Wuhan government. On April 12 of the same year, Chiang Kai-shek staged a counter-revolutionary coup and organized another "national government" in Nanjing. The Wuhan National Government headed by Wang Jingwei also moved step by step onto the anti-Communist road. On July 15, it officially decided to break with the Communist Party and took to openly slaughtering Communists. Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei thereafter collaborated in counter-revolution. The period from January to July 1927 was called "the Wuhan period". pp. 70, 179, 220

<sup>480</sup> See Note 479 above. p. 179

<sup>481</sup> The period from 1924 to the end of 1926 when the Northern Expedition got under way with Guangdong as the revolutionary base area. p. 180

<sup>482</sup> Between 1840 and 1842, after China had forbidden trafficking in opium, Britain sent forces to invade China under the pretext of protecting its trade. The

Chinese troops and people put up a heroic resistance. This war is known as the Opium War. p. 181

<sup>483</sup> In old China, the industrial proletariat, the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie constituted only a minority of China's population, while the overwhelming majority of the people belonged to the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and other intermediate classes. p. 183

<sup>484</sup> The Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a large-scale mid-19th century revolutionary peasant revolt against the feudal rule of the Qing Dynasty. In January 1851, Hong Xiuquan, Yang Xiuqing and other leaders of this revolution launched an uprising in Jintian Village, Guiping County, Guangxi Province, and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the Taiping army marched northward from Guangxi through Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Anhui and took Nanjing in 1853. A section of the forces then continued the drive northward and pushed as far as the vicinity of Tianjin. However, the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied; moreover, after establishing its capital in Nanjing, its leading group committed many political and military errors. Ultimately it could not withstand the combined onslaughts of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Qing government and the British, U.S. and French aggressors, and was finally defeated in 1864. p. 183

<sup>485</sup> In the last years of the Qing Dynasty, Yuan Shikai was Minister in charge of the northern coastal provinces. The new army he organized and trained was called "the northern army". Later, Yuan Shikai and his military subordinates became known as the "northern warlords". The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing Dynasty, but the fruits of the revolution were seized by Yuan Shikai. When he became president, the northern warlords began their rule over China. After Yuan died, the northern warlords split up into many factions and cliques. Backed by different imperialist countries, they waged constant internecine warfare as they scrambled for power and gain. The first revolutionary civil war resulted in the overthrow of the northern warlord government. p. 183

<sup>486</sup> See "The Struggle in the Chinggang Mountains", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 73-104. p. 184

<sup>487</sup> The autumn harvest uprisings against the Kuomintang in several places in Hunan and Hubei Provinces in accordance with the decision of the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on August 7, 1927. p. 195

<sup>488</sup> This letter is included as an article, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", in the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 117-28. p. 201

<sup>489</sup> The association of students from Jiangsu and Zhejiang was an imaginary anti-Party factional organization dreamt up by Wang Ming and others in 1927 at the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in order to retaliate against those who opposed them. In 1928, an investigatory committee, which was established by the Control Commission of the Communist International, the Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Delegation of the Communist Party of China and participated in by Comrades Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai, found that the association was a pure fabrication. p. 207

<sup>490</sup> On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Guandong Army stationed in northeast China assaulted and occupied Shenyang. Acting on Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance", the Chinese troops in Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army), withdrew to the south of Shanhaiguan, leaving



the way clear for the Japanese forces to rapidly occupy Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces. This act of aggression on the part of Japan is known to the Chinese people as the Incident of September 18. pp. 188, 214, 275

<sup>491</sup> See Note 464 above. p. 214

<sup>492</sup> The People's Political Council was an advisory body set up by the Kuomintang government in 1938. Its members were all appointed by the Kuomintang. Nominally it included representatives of all anti-Japanese political parties and groups, but it was actually dominated by the Kuomintang majority. As Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang became increasingly reactionary, the Council became more and more of a tool for glossing over their autocratic rule. p. 214

<sup>493</sup> A chain of events in 1935 when the Japanese carried on aggression against north China and the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek betrayed our sovereignty and humiliated our nation. In June of that year, He Yingqin, the Kuomintang government's representative in north China, signed the "He-Umezu Agreement" with Yoshihiro Umezu, commander of the invading Japanese forces there. By its terms much of China's sovereignty in the provinces of Hebei and Chahar was forfeited. In November, a number of Chinese traitors were put up by the Japanese invaders to start a so-called Movement of Autonomy in the Five Provinces of North China, and a puppet "Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration" was established in eastern Hebei. p. 215

<sup>494</sup> This refers to the Communist-suppression conference Chiang Kai-shek planned to call in Xi'an in December 1936. Because of the Xi'an Incident, it failed to materialize. p. 215

<sup>495</sup> Under attack by the Japanese invading troops, the Kuomintang government withdrew from Nanjing on December 13, 1937. p. 218

<sup>496</sup> Jia Baoyu and Lin Daiyu are the hero and heroine of the Chinese classic, *Dream of the Red Chamber*. In Chapter Two of the novel, Jia Baoyu says: "Girls are made of water, men of mud." Zhou Enlai borrowed the metaphor to explain that the Communist Party hadn't been taken in by the Kuomintang's policy of dissolving the Communists. p. 221

<sup>497</sup> A reference to the "Declaration on the Current Situation on the Occasion of the Second Anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on July 7, 1939. p. 222

<sup>498</sup> The nineteen Liberated Areas were: Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, Shanxi-Suiyuan, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning, Shanxi-Hebei-Henan, Hebei-Shandong-Henan, Shandong, Northern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Southern Jiangsu, Huaihe River North, Huaihe River South, Central Anhui, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Qiongya (Hainan Island), Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Henan. p. 222

<sup>499</sup> The Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties were secretly issued by the central authorities of the Kuomintang in 1939. They imposed severe restrictions on communist and all other progressive ideas, speech and action, with the aim of disrupting all popular anti-Japanese organizations. p. 222

<sup>500</sup> In May 1941, a Japanese invading force 50,000 strong attacked the Zhongtiao Mountains area to the north of the Huanghe River in southern Shanxi Province. A total of 250,000 Kuomintang troops were massed there, but since the fight against the Communists was their main job, they had never prepared themselves to fight the Japanese and most of them tried to avoid combat when the Japanese aggressors attacked. Therefore, in spite of vigorous efforts by the Eighth Route Army to support

the Kuomintang troops against the common enemy in this campaign, the Kuomintang troops were completely routed. p. 225

<sup>501</sup> At the end of 1937, while serving as secretary of the Changjiang Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC in Wuhan, Wang Ming pursued a Right opportunist line. His error was corrected at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC held in October 1938. Zhou Enlai called this period "the second Wuhan period" in order to distinguish it from 1927, when Chen Duxiu had also pushed a Right opportunist line in Wuhan. p. 235

<sup>502</sup> The resolution was adopted by the Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 20, 1945. p. 240

<sup>503</sup> The South China Anti-Japanese Column was the general name for the Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla units operating in south China. p. 245

<sup>504</sup> Shen Junru's son, Shen Qian (1895-1977), was a doctor. p. 264

<sup>505</sup> The Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37). pp. 27, 187, 274

<sup>506</sup> A large-scale production campaign waged by the army men and people in the Liberated Areas from 1941 to 1942 under the leadership of the Communist Party. It was aimed at breaking the Kuomintang's military encirclement and economic blockade of the Liberated Areas. p. 274

<sup>507</sup> The *Da Gong Bao* newspaper was published in Tianjin prior to the War of Resistance. With the outbreak of war, it moved to Wuhan and then Chongqing. It had connections with the bureaucrats of the Kuomintang's Political Science Group. p. 290

<sup>508</sup> On January 10, 1946, representatives of the Kuomintang government and the Communist Party signed a truce agreement. Under its terms, a "Beiping Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation" was formed consisting of one representative from the Kuomintang government, one from the Communist Party, and one nominated by the U.S. government. Under the headquarters there were several field teams composed of staff members from the three sides, who were to mediate wherever military clashes occurred. In June of the same year, the Kuomintang launched all-out civil war and the United States announced the failure of its "mediation" efforts. The headquarters accordingly folded up. p. 294

<sup>509</sup> After the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek was faced with nationwide opposition to civil war and the demand for internal peace and unity. He was forced to send three telegrams to Chairman Mao Zedong of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on August 14, 20 and 23, 1945, inviting him to go to Chongqing for peace negotiations. In order to win peace, expose Chiang Kai-shek's plot for a sham peace, and to educate the people, the Communist Party decided to send Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei to Chongqing to negotiate with the Kuomintang. The delegation arrived in Chongqing on August 28, and the negotiations lasted for 43 days. On October 10, a Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party (known as the Double Tenth Agreement) was signed. Shortly afterwards, Chiang Kai-shek tore it up and launched attacks against the Liberated Areas. p. 305

<sup>510</sup> The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were the rules of discipline laid down by Mao Zedong for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. After continuous amplification and revision through years of practice, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army issued a unified version in October 1947. The Three Main Rules of Discipline are: (1) Obey orders in all your actions. (2)

Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses. (3) Turn in everything captured. The Eight Points for Attention are: (1) Speak politely. (2) Pay fairly for what you buy. (3) Return everything you borrow. (4) Pay for anything you damage. (5) Don't hit or swear at people. (6) Don't damage crops. (7) Don't take liberties with women. (8) Don't ill-treat captives. p. 309

<sup>511</sup> Kuomintang soldiers who were captured by the People's Liberation Army during the Third Revolutionary Civil War and who joined the Liberation Army's ranks after having been re-educated were known as liberated soldiers. pp. 312, 353

<sup>512</sup> The Greater Guanzhong Area refers to central Shaanxi. p. 315

<sup>513</sup> The old-type rich peasants were already rich peasants before the revolutionary base areas were established. Generally speaking, they had a pronounced feudal or semi-feudal exploitative character. The new rich peasants had started as middle or poor peasants in the revolutionary base areas. pp. 322, 323

<sup>514</sup> Middle peasants owned all their land or owned part of their land and rented the rest. They generally had a certain number of farm implements. As a rule they did not exploit others, but were economically self-supporting. New middle peasants were originally poor peasants who had become middle peasants after the land reform. p. 323

<sup>515</sup> The official newspaper of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party during the Third Revolutionary Civil War. p. 337

<sup>516</sup> This resolution was adopted at the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, held at Gutian, Shanghang County, Fujian Province, in December 1929. It is also known as the resolution of the Gutian Meeting. p. 339

<sup>517</sup> Agrarian socialism is the egalitarian ideology which emerges on the basis of small-scale peasant economy. It maintains that capitalism can be avoided and socialism realized by transforming the entire economy into a uniform egalitarian small-scale peasant economy. p. 343

<sup>518</sup> See Note 416 above. pp. 312, 353

<sup>519</sup> Under the rule of the northern warlords, the military head of a province was called "military governor". p. 357

## NOTE ON SPELLING

In this book Chinese proper names (with a few exceptions) are spelled in accordance with *Pinyin*, the Chinese phonetic alphabet. For the benefit of readers who are familiar with Chinese names otherwise spelled, a list of names is given below in both *Pinyin* and their most common former spelling.

CHINESE	PINYIN SPELLING	FORMER SPELLING
<i>NAMES OF PERSONS</i>		
蔡廷锴	Cai Tingkai	Tsai Ting-kai
陈独秀	Chen Duxiu	Chen Tu-hsiu
邓小平	Deng Xiaoping	Teng Hsiao-ping
邓颖超	Deng Yingchao	Teng Ying-chao
董必武	Dong Biwu	Tung Pi-wu
杜聿明	Du Yuming	Tu Yu-ming
冯玉祥	Feng Yuxiang	Feng Yu-hsiang
傅作义	Fu Zuoyi	Fu Tso-yi
郭沫若	Guo Moruo	Kuo Mo-jo
贺龙	He Long	Ho Lung
何应钦	He Yingqin	Ho Ying-chin
胡宗南	Hu Zongnan	Hu Tsung-nan
李大钊	Li Dazhao	Li Ta-chao
李公朴	Li Gongpu	Li Kung-pu
李鸿章	Li Hongzhang	Li Hung-chang
李先念	Li Xiannian	Li Hsien-nien
李宗仁	Li Zongren	Li Tsung-jen
廖承志	Liao Chengzhi	Liao Cheng-chih

廖仲恺	Liao Zhongkai	Liao Chung-kai
林彪	Lin Biao	Lin Piao
林伯渠	Lin Boqu	Lin Po-chu
刘少奇	Liu Shaoqi	Liu Shao-chi
陆定一	Lu Dingyi	Lu Ting-yi
鲁迅	Lu Xun	Lu Hsun
毛泽东	Mao Zedong	Mao Tsetung
聂荣臻	Nie Rongzhen	Nieh Jung-chen
彭德怀	Peng Dehuai	Peng Teh-huai
彭真	Peng Zhen	Peng Chen
秦邦宪	Qin Bangxian	Chin Pang-hsien
瞿秋白	Qu Qiubai	Chu Chiu-pai
任弼时	Ren Bishi	Jen Pi-shih
沈钧儒	Shen Junru	Shen Chun-ju
陶行知	Tao Xingzhi	Tao Hsing-chih
王稼祥	Wang Jiaxiang	Wang Chia-hsiang
汪精卫	Wang Jingwei	Wang Ching-wei
王若飞	Wang Ruofei	Wang Jo-fei
闻一多	Wen Yiduo	Wen Yi-to
吴玉章	Wu Yuzhang	Wu Yu-chang
项英	Xiang Ying	Hsiang Ying
谢富治	Xie Fuzhi	Hsieh Fu-chih
徐向前	Xu Xiangqian	Hsu Hsiang-chien
颜惠庆	Yan Huiqing	Yen Hui-ching
阎锡山	Yan Xishan	Yen Hsi-shan
叶剑英	Ye Jianying	Yeh Chien-ying
恽代英	Yun Daiying	Yun Tai-ying
曾藩	Zeng Guofan	Tseng Kuo-fan
张国焘	Zhang Guotao	Chang Kuo-tao
张乃器	Zhang Naiqi	Chang Nai-chi
张群	Zhang Qun	Chang Chun
张学良	Zhang Xueliang	Chang Hsueh-liang
张治中	Zhang Zhizhong	Chang Chih-chung
张作霖	Zhang Zuolin	Chang Tso-lin
周恩来	Zhou Enlai	Chou En-lai
朱德	Zhu De	Chu Teh
诸葛亮	Zhuge Liang	Chukeh Liang

邹 韬 奋	Zou Taofen	Tsou Tao-fen
左 宗 棠	Zuo Zongtang	Tso Tsung-tang

## NAMES OF RIVERS

长 江(扬子江)	Changjiang River	Yangtse River
黄 河	Huanghe River	Yellow River (Huang Ho; Hwang Ho)
松 花 江	Songhua River	Sungari River

## NAMES OF PLACES

北 京	Beijing	Peking
北 平	Beiping*	Peiping*
重 庆	Chongqing	Chungking
广 州	Guangzhou	Canton, Kwangchow
杭 州	Hangzhou	Hangchow
济 南	Jinan	Tsinan
南 京	Nanjing	Nanking
汕 头	Shantou	Swatow
苏 州	Suzhou	Soochow
天 津	Tianjin	Tientsin
西 安	Xi'an	Sian
延 安	Yan'an	Yenan
安 徽	Anhui	Anhwei
福 建	Fujian	Fukien
甘 肃	Gansu	Kansu
广 东	Guangdong	Kwangtung
广 西	Guangxi	Kwangsi
贵 州	Guizhou	Kweichow
河 北	Hebei	Hopei
黑 龙 江	Heilongjiang	Heilungkiang
河 南	Henan	Honan
湖 北	Hubei	Hupeh

\* Beijing (Peking) was called Beiping (Peiping) from 1928 to October 1, 1949, when the People's Republic of China was proclaimed.

---

吉	林	Jilin	Kirin
江	苏	Jiangsu	Kiangsu
江	西	Jiangxi	Kiangsi
宁	夏	Ningxia	Ningsia
青	海	Qinghai	Chinghai
热	河	Rehe	Jehol
陕	西	Shaanxi	Shensi
山	西	Shanxi	Shansi
山	东	Shandong	Shantung
四	川	Sichuan	Szechuan
西	康	Xikang	Sikang
新	疆	Xinjiang	Sinkiang
浙	江	Zhejiang	Chekiang

**周恩来选集**

**（上卷）**

•

外文出版社出版  
（中国北京百万庄路24号）  
外文印刷厂印刷  
中国国际书店发行  
1981年（小16开）第一版  
编号：（英）3050—2844  
00575（精）  
00395（平）  
3—E—1561A