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CONTENTS

	PAGE		PAGE
Our Attitude towards the Workers Party.....	1	Legal and Illegal activities	<i>James Ballister</i> 12-17
Speech of Comrade Zinoviev at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the C. I. Dec. 4, 1921..	2-5	Young Communist International	<i>Wm. Turner</i> 18-19
Party Problems.....	<i>A. Raphael</i> 6-7	The C. I. Decision and the Minority Members....	<i>G. Lewis</i> 20
Decision of the Communist International C. E. C. of C. P. of A. written by.....	<i>James Ballister</i> 8-10	In the Rank	<i>R. Ganly</i> 21
Our Prisoners	<i>R. Ganly</i> 11	The Situation in the Lithuanian Federation....	<i>Edward Riley</i> 22
		Minutes of the C. E. C. Meeting, January.....	23
		C. I. Decision on Minority Appeal	24

Our Attitude Toward the Workers' Party

Our attitude towards the new political party launched in New York City during Christmas week under the name of "The Workers' Party of America," must be determined by the following two considerations:

First—The program of the Party.

Second—The elements composing it.

In speaking about the program of the W. P., the following seems to be its most characteristic feature, that it is a plan for immediate action rather than a statement and exposition of principles. It starts out from the most immediate and pressing needs of the workers such, for instance, as the drive for open shop and reduction of wages. It criticizes the old, traditional trade-union style of dealing with such problems as being inadequate and objectively reactionary. It then proceeds to outline a course of action which is based upon the organized struggles of the workers themselves, which of course, is a perfectly correct and up-to-date method of dealing with the class-struggle as it manifests itself from day to day.

For the curse of the American labor movement is this, that the working class does not defend itself against the attacks of capitalism. Here we have, in his country, millions of organized workers within potentially strong and powerful trade-unions, but we have no class-struggle as far as workers are concerned. All the fighting is being done by

the capitalists. The workers merely submit. The few sporadic attempts at resistance springing up here and there, are usually of the "outlaw" type which are being mercilessly crushed by the combined efforts of the capitalists and the trade-union bureaucracy.

What is wanted at this moment, what is being hoped and anxiously looked for by every honest worker is a fighting leadership, one that would take up the challenge thrown by capitalism inspiring and leading the workers to fight for and defend their interests.

This is clearly the need of the hour and the program of the Workers' Party unquestionably responds to this and moreover, responds in a manner that is revolutionary in its implications. When a political party such as the W. P. adopts a program of action that is based on the immediate needs and struggles of the workers, one of the following two things is bound to happen. Either the masses mistrust the party and don't respond to its appeals, or, if they do, the daily struggles of the masses take the course of political action rather than purely economic. We then witness a combination of industrial and parliamentary action that is revolutionary, not only because of its far-reaching implications but by reason of the fact that it is the capitalist state that the workers are fighting against and no isolated capitalist groups.

Viewing the program of the W. P. from this angle we must conclude that it is a revolutionary, fighting program that needs only to be lived up to by a well organized and disciplined party to create the real beginnings of an independent political movement of the American working class. The question that must be uppermost in our minds is whether the W. P. will in reality live up to its program. Which brings us to the second determining consideration, the elements composing it.

The W. P., as is well known, was formed by two distinct groups, the American Labor Alliance and the Workers Council. Of the two, the American Labor Alliance, which, by the way, was the moving spirit and backbone of the whole affair, is by its antecedents the more revolutionary. The bulk of its membership had split with the Socialist Party as early as the summer of 1919, undergoing since then a process of development that has tested their revolutionary understanding as well as integrity. They have emerged from this process, most of them, wiser, more cautious but as determined, courageous and persistent as they went into it. And inasmuch as this membership, formerly of the A. L. A., is the largest and practically leading part of the W. P., we have no doubt that its program will not remain a dead letter.

Unfortunately the same cannot be said about the Workers' Council group, particularly its leadership. We shall abstain for the present from mentioning their old sins against the Communist Party of America and the Communist International. We shall do so only when necessity will compel. However, we feel it our duty to point out the fact that their last public appearance before merging into the W. P. (see the last issues of the Workers' Council Magazine and the "Nue Welt") breathed the same fierce antog-

onism and hatred towards the American section of the Communist International as was manifested by them in those inglorious days when some of them were still working hand in hand with Hillquit, Stedman and Co. against the Revolutionary left wing. We point to this attitude with very serious misgivings as to the revolutionary sincerity of some of the leaders of the former Workers' Council group. To us there is but one test of such sincerity, only one proof for genuine devotion to the cause of the social revolution, namely, one's attitude to the American section of the Communist International.

For the present it will suffice to adopt the policy of watchful waiting towards those elements of the former Workers' Council group that are still violently antagonistic to our party. We shall follow their actions and frame our policies accordingly. We believe, however, that the rank and file of the Workers' Council group are fundamentally sound. What they lack, perhaps, is a little more clearness of vision and tenacity of purpose both of which they are sure to acquire by coming into daily contact with the rest of the membership of the W. P. We say, therefore, that the quality of the predominant majority of the Workers' Party is proof sufficient that its program of action will become a living reality.

This decides our attitude towards the W. P. Being the revolutionary vanguard of the American Working class, the Communist Party of America is chiefly interested in the development of a political mass-movement of fighting workers. It sees its main duty at the present in promoting and influencing every sincere effort made in the above direction. The formation of the W. P. is the result of such an effort. The Communist Party of America can, therefore, have but one attitude towards it, which is active support of its program and activities.

Speech of Comrade Zinoviev at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Dec. 4, 1921

Comrades, as you know, we recently applied to the Amsterdam International on the problem of aid to the Jugoslav and Spanish proletariat and on the problem of the famine. We all feel that this step must again be carefully thought over and analyzed.

If one today scrutinizes the Communist press in the various countries, one finds that the struggle has reached a higher plane, that in general it is now a question of a united front of the workers. You will remember that already last summer we issued a manifesto on that subject in which with sharp words we branded the manouever of the 2 and 2½ Internationals for a united front. But already in this first manifesto we pointed out the fact that on this question of a united front two things must be kept separate. First, the diplomacy, one can even say the charlatany of

the leaders of the 2 and 2½ Internationals, who utilize this slogan for their counter-revolutionary purposes. Second, there is here a deeper question, pointing to the fact that in the lowest ranks of the working class itself a significant process is going on, which is very important in estimating the entire movement.

In general, the situation can be explained thus: During the Third Congress, perhaps also a few months thereafter, we had reached the slough of the revolutionary wave; indifferntism in the ranks of the working class had at this time reached its lowest level. To use a popular expression let us say that the sentiment of the working class was at that time inclined towards the right. Today we are standing at the beginning of another wave, where very slowly and not exactly in a straight line a new turn has come; a

turn towards the left in the sentiment of the working class. The deeper reasons for this are, of course, of an economic nature; the attack by capitalism along the whole front to reduce the wages of the workers and to bring their standard of living to a still lower level. After the end of the war there was one year during which the elemental passions of the workers still ran high. But later, from about the year 1920 we see a new reformist wave beginning. Reformism began once more to flourish. It was an Indian summer, but, nevertheless, it was a certain reblooming of reformism, because large portions of the working class, who were considerably exhausted by the many years of struggle, began to believe once more that the problem of their destiny might be solved by peaceful means, that it might be possible to avoid the terrible struggle.

At this time some parties, like the German in the March uprising and to a certain extent the Italian and others, who were only an advance guard of the workers in order to combat this growing indifference and reformism took heroic measures which sometimes savoured a little of adventurism and frivolity. But still, I believe that we are already able to judge the March uprising and similar uprisings in an entirely different light. It is now becoming clear to the masses that just as little can be accomplished by the Reformism of 1920 as was accomplished by it in 1914. Now the workers are beginning to estimate such episodes as the March uprising quite differently. They are beginning to see that the Communists at this time were doing battle while they were still indifferent and while they still believed that they would achieve their destiny by peaceful means.

I believe that historically such struggles will now be restored to a certain extent, and our parties must try and win back, so to say, this capital. Respect for the Communists in Germany is beginning to increase. The ordinary average worker understands that even if the Communists have made big mistakes, still they have been fighting for him, and that without fighting nothing can be accomplished. Such ideas are now becoming clearer and clearer. Therefore the first symptom of this epoch is a certain very slow but distinct turn of the working class toward the left, from reformism to the standpoint of the class struggle. Because the workers understand that otherwise nothing will be accomplished, that otherwise the conditions of life are impossible. That is the first symptom.

The second is a certain longing. Longing is too feeble a word. It is a pressure. We must have unity. We pointed out this fact in our manifesto of last summer. It can be explained historically. The working class was split by reformism; by the Bourgeoisie. Many battles were lost. The Communists made many sacrifices. The working class understands this elemental fact.

The average ordinary workingman who does not take part at all in politics, or takes only a passive part, understands this: We must operate as a mass, we must have unity. After everything that happened during the war and after the war, such a pressure towards unity is quite com-

prehensible. And we in Russia have often felt this pressure during the fifteen years struggle with the Mensheviks. Therefore, when we read the speeches of the gentlemen of the 2 and 2½ Internationals, with their demands for a united front, naturally we are right in being mistrustful; in laughing at the bigwigs. But that is only the superficial aspect of the matter. At the core the matter is serious. The inner process of development of the working class is a deep longing for a united struggle against misery. We must understand this longing and utilize it for Communism.

The third symptom is the following: I believe that the rumors which we are receiving as to the beginning of differences within the Amsterdam International and within the two and a half International and even among the leaders is a very serious matter, not because these people are suddenly beginning to scold each other, but because it also is the result of the whole situation. I believe that they are in the last analysis the same conflicts which we have in Washington. The same conflicts are now coming to the surface in the two and a half and the Amsterdam International. Perhaps they will not immediately become sharper. Perhaps only in one or two years, not in the same form but in general they will be the same. We know that these people support their own bourgeoisie and their own governments. We are now living in an epoch of new secret treaties which contain the germs of future conflicts and wars. After a certain time we will see all these things mirrored in the Amsterdam International and the second International. We must not overlook them.

It has also been remarked that already within the second and second and a half Internationals there are more tendencies to the left. I believe that this is a fact, but it is a consequence of this general process of which we have spoken. That is the general picture.

It has also been pointed out—in a private conversation Comrade Lenin called attention to it—that some sections of the working class who are now for the first time taking part in politics—and there are always such sections which for the first time are being forced into politics by the general situation—must outlive their reformistic illusions. They must test for themselves by their own experience, those methods which the reformists propose to them and which are new to them.

I begin with Germany, which is now the most important for the Revolution, because the revolution is most imminent there. During the past few years the party has undergone many transformations. When this occurs it is human that many of us do not see the general situation immediately but only concrete problems, partial problems, and many personal problems. One does not see the main tendency immediately. But it can be seen already that the struggle in the party was one of an important nature, of principle and not detail. These were also present to be sure but they were not the main problem. Now we have finished a certain phase of development.

You have all read the resolutions of the national com-

mittee, in which the German party takes a firm and decided stand for the slogan of the revolutionary united front and even consents under certain conditions to enter a Workers' government. On this occasion it was that Levi and his group opposed this policy if I am not mistaken. (Radek; No). No, not very clearly, but they tried to represent this policy as something unheard of for Communists; for our entire philosophy.

I am not going into details. Suffice it to say that the German Party—one of the most important sections of the Communist International has now with the great majority adopted this line of conduct and that the consequence is not—as Levi maintained—that Communism in Germany is beginning to decline. Every one can see that Communism and its influence in Germany is beginning to increase, not quickly, but the tendency is upward.

Therefore, this position is not the result of pessimism or desperation but just the contrary, because we have the feeling that the machine has started working once more, the party is forging ahead, and it is setting up this slogan urged by the certain movement of the masses.

This is the situation in Germany. Of other countries the situation is most characteristic. In Italy where the whole process is being worked out most clearly. There we have a young Communist party which has gone through many battles against Centrism, Half-Centrism, &c. It suffers from certain doctrinal ailments; it is very impatient against everything which is not pure communism, and many times it even makes mistakes in this connection. If one reads its papers, one will find that it theorizes too much. But, nevertheless, it is just this party which is esteemed much more highly now by all those comrades who were present at the Congress than it was during the Congress. This party which suffers somewhat from doctrinism has by means of the struggles in the unions, against the Fascisti, etc., arrived at the point—perhaps instinctively, of setting up as the central point of its whole agitation the slogan of a united front. Whoever will read the Italian papers will easily see how this came about. And all the agitation in meetings is carried on on the part of the Communist Party under this slogan: For a united front of the working class. And the battle which recently took place in Verona in the Trades Union Convention also proceeds along this line. This proves that this slogan is positively in the air; that it is not a figment of the imagination but has come about naturally. This is the situation in Italy.

In other countries where we have a majority and where it appears that we have a majority among those politically organized, the situation is different. The French comrades opposed a common working together in the famine question. This is not because they are better Marxists, but because we have there a certain majority. The situation in Checko-Slovakia and Norway is similar to that in France. Also in other countries in which we have a majority. In those countries they wish to proceed more directly. I do not believe this is a correct attitude. Even though we have a

majority there we must come out with the same slogan.

From England we have received a telegram, which notifies us that the London organization of the Labor Party, insists that the Communists shall be allowed to enter the Labor Party. During the second congress we advocated entering the Labor Party. A number of comrades, for instance Serrati, were opposed. We decided to enter when Henderson comes along and said he was not so stupid, he would not allow us to enter. But now suddenly comes this decision. It is very likely a manifestation of the same process. It is a growth of the wish for unity which manifests itself in various ways. We must advise the English brother party to set up the same slogan.

In Switzerland by means of an open letter published at the beginning of January, a Trades Union Convention was brought together under the same slogan of unity so far as I am informed from Platten's reports and the press. In America we have a remarkable situation. In America so far as one can see there is a unity movement based on the founding of a left wing in the unions and also in the political movement because the right wing under Gompers is so corrupt and there is so big a field for the Left Wing. I believe it is the same manifestation.

This is the situation in the various countries as far as we can perceive. Now a few words as to the Russian experience. Menshevism and Bolshevism are international phenomena. We in Russia during the fifteen years struggle with Menshevism were many times in situations similar to those which other countries now find themselves in. In 1903 the struggle began. In 1905 we had the first Unity Committee, in 1906 the unity convention in Stockholm. Then in 1912 and 1913 at the beginning of the pre-revolutionary crisis before the war we had a new unity wave. This is very characteristic. It was a situation in which the Menshiviks were calling from all quarters for unity. And indeed the masses were for unity. At that time we set up the slogan "Unity from below. Unity of the masses of the workers themselves against the Menshevist leaders, against capitalism and on the basis of a genuine class struggle." This is what we must now propagate in Germany under another name. Our enemies try to discredit us in the eyes of the masses as professional split makers. In a situation such as the present therefore we must make our demands for unity all the stronger and must understand how to utilize it for Communism.

A few words as to the parliamentary side of the situation. In Germany, in Thuringia, we had the following situation; the forming of a Socialist government was dependent on our votes and our party supported these Menshiviki. I believe that our comrades acted correctly.

In Sweden we have now a similar situation. Branting has a position which is uncertain, but when he wishes a Menshivist majority, he must appeal to our small group. I am of the opinion that they should not under certain circumstances refuse to support this Menshevist government. I believe that we must deprive Branting of the possibility

of arguing thus: "I would have done it differently but the Communists forced me to go with the Rights." We must make it possible for him to remove himself from the scene as soon as possible. Step by step we must expose him and criticise him. The more liberty of action he has the more quickly will he bring forth all his Menshivist bag of tricks and the sooner will he be compelled to bear the full responsibility for them.

I believe that we must now systematize this whole matter. The parties are proceeding emphatically along this direction. We have also on different matters, famine, Spain, etc., proceeded to take the same road. Many half-Centrist and Serrati elements within the Communist Party sometimes appear and say: "Yes, when it is a Russian question, the famine campaign, they immediately propose to work together with Amsterdam, but when it is a question of any other country the same should be done." This is a Nationalist argument, a false one. I remember that Lenin a year and a half ago in his "Infantile Sickness" said, "Henderson ought to be given a chance to remove himself from the scene as quickly as possible, and for this reason should be supported." That was not a Russian problem but an English one. It is therefore incorrect to say that such tactics are only proposed in Russian matters.

However, we must not overlook the fact that great dangers attend this policy. Our parties in part are not yet wholly Communist parties, they have not organized themselves well, have not yet crystallized themselves, have not yet completely divorced themselves from Centrist elements, have not yet sufficiently gained their intellectual bearings. Hence we must execute a very delicate manouever, not in the vulgar meaning of the word, however. In order to carry on strategy, in order to execute manouevers, the manoueverer himself must have a clear head, he must stand on firm feet and not on feet of clay. In a word we must have real Communist parties and I believe the better parties we have the more will we venture out on this road. Outwardly we can even make concessions but only outwardly, and in those countries in which we have weak parties this will be very dangerous. We should not overlook this fact. But as this is not a chess move devised by two intellectuals, but really the outcome of great mass movements, it is only necessary for us to add: If some parties have not yet learned that; then they must learn it. We must point out the dangers. We must clearly state the facts.

The Amsterdam crowd and the heroes of the second International will understand perfectly well anyway why we are setting up this slogan. It is not a question of deceiving them. They are also clever fellows, many of them perhaps cleverer than we are.

It is not a question of deceiving them but of going forward with the rising masses of the workers. We must of course clearly point out the dangers. We must set up certain conditions, must demand that every party keep us informed as to all these matters. We must collect all the material. The only clear final condition shall be this: That

the independence of our party shall in no way be left in doubt. There can be no question as to this. We must crystallize our party more. That is our main task because only the Communist Party represents the general interests of the working class. And we must also insist upon retaining full freedom to criticize the 2 and 2½ Internationals. I have read letters signed by Barth member of the Independent Socialist Party in which he says: "We are ready to help you in the famine, but we take it for granted that you will during his period modify your expressions a little and will not call us the agents of the bourgeoisie." I believe such requests must be refused. In many countries we may have to make compromises, but at the same time we must in no way allow our hands to be tied.

I believe in those countries in which we are still a small minority, but are increasing rapidly as in Germany, Italy, etc., these tactics will not present great difficulties. The comrades understand what is necessary and instinctively will take those paths.

In countries such as France where we have a majority, difficulties may perhaps arise if the split actually takes place. Nevertheless, we must propose a united Revolutionary front to the Federation led by Johaux even after the split takes place. This does not mean that we abandon the R. T. U. I. Of course it will be said: "If you want a united front, why do you insist upon your own trade union international?" We reply that the Amsterdam International is a bourgeois democratic organization and we are a proletarian organization. We wish to confer with that organization, work together whenever it is possible to do so, but we cannot give up our own organizations. In Norway where we have a majority in the Trade Unions we will of course instruct them to leave the Amsterdam International, but that will not prevent us from proposing to those reformist unions which still exist in Norway that they work together with us in strikes, etc. Likewise in France. The Party that is led by Longuet is a vanishing minority. But when for example demonstrations are organized against war or against Washington, let us say, then we will ask these gentlemen to work together with us. This does not mean that we will put up the same candidates for elections. We shall of course act alone in this matter and shall always support the lesser evil without allowing our hands to be tied by so doing. There can be no question of our continuing to exist as a party, but even when we have a majority we must not forget that we must win the workers of the two and two and a half internationals over to us.

This is a general axiom. It is observable in all countries. Of course we make allowances for individual countries. We must give the parties a free hand so that each one may take a position in accordance with the general situation. But we must keep in mind that it is necessary to proceed on an international scale and not only in Germany and in Italy. We have already taken a few steps. But the Amsterdam International makes no answer. Amsterdam will continue to sabotage us. They will set up unacceptable

conditions, for instance the liquidation of the Red Labor International. But because they remain silent we cannot say "the devil take them." We are dealing in this case with the mighty process of development in the masses, we must understand how to utilize this process for Communism. We must do this on an international scale on the Washington question. We must give out certain slogans, point to the perils with which Washington confronts us. We must follow events closely and must at every moment be ready to exploit a situation for all that it is worth. And with it all keep in mind the danger. In many parties which still have half-centrist leaders it will be said, "Haven't we always said that the two and the two and a half are not so bad? Why was it necessary to split?" That is a dialectic question which every Communist must understand. "Just because it was an epoch of splits and now that we have become a power, we can afford under certain conditions to work with the two and two and a half Internationals in order to draw the masses to the support of Communism."

But if we had not had the splits we of course would not be the factors we now are and we would not be able to

execute this manouver. It is possible that in the future we shall be compelled to accomplish more splits, but nevertheless we shall go to the Socialists and say "Yes, we want unity, unity on this platform, please. We are desirous that all Socialists shall support it. We will make all formal concessions. *But in so doing we remain an Independent Party.*"

In America unification of all left elements of the Trade Union and political movement has begun. This gives the Communists the opportunity of taking the central place in the unification, of penetrating the large mass of the American proletariat. While they are building up their Communist organizations everywhere there are Communists to be found, the American Communists must at the same time understand how, while in the fore front of this movement, to work for the unification of all revolutionary elements, and they must now with particular energy set up the slogan of a united front of the workers, for example for the protection of the unemployed, etc. The chief accusations against the Gompers Unions must be that they will not take part in the creation of a united front of the workers against the capitalists and thus hake part in helping the unemployed, etc.

Party Problems

By A. RAPHAEL

The biggest problem confronting our party at present is the working out of proper relations between our legal and illegal activities. This is substantially a problem of organization, but of a nature that will make the solution of it a pretty difficult and complicated affair. Which is to say that we have got to think hard and act carefully.

The nature of the problem is twofold. On the one hand we are interested in utilizing the existing legal possibilities to a maximum, that is to build up and develop the activities of an open political party to the widest possible extent. On the other hand we must be mighty careful not to allow our open activities in any way to interfere with or weaken the activities of our underground organization. In other words, we must so combine our open and underground work as to make them supplementary to each other. The question is, how are we going to do it?

First of all, by treating an open political party *as an organ of the C. P. of A.*; as one of its instruments for the conduct of communist work. No other treatment is consistent with the maintenance of the C. P. of A. as the American section of the Communist International. Any other treatment of an open political party that will give it the status of an organization parallel to the C. P. of A. would inevitably lead to the liquidation of the latter.

Second, by transacting under the name of an open political party as many of our political activities as can successfully be done in the open.

Third, by keeping our underground organization in perfect functioning order, constantly on the go, completing whatever is left undone or unsaid by an open party.

Of the three above-named conditions that will make for an ideal combination of our legal and illegal activities, the first one is the most important. It is no exaggeration to say that a proper understanding of the nature of an open political party forms the basis for the success of the entire experiment. Already certain sections of our party have come to regard an open political party as something parallel to and independent of the C. P. of A. Proceeding on the assumption that the C. P. of A. and an open party are to be two parallel organizations fulfilling one and the same function some of our members have begun raising a kick. Why this duplication of work? Why this artificial and harmful duality? If an open organization is to be a political party, then why should the C. P. of A. continue to exist as a party? Or, if the C. P. of A. is to continue as it were, why on earth a new political party?

The comrades reasoning in this fashion simply lack the imagination to visualize the working out of a new political experiment forced upon us by the hard realities of our present situation. Suppose we analyze this situation. But before we move an inch further, let's agree that the starting point for all our future excursions will be the Communist Party of America. Let us state right here, at the very outset, that whatever we undertake, wherever we go, we

do as a party. This truth must be accepted, in letter as well as in spirit, before there can be any discussion at all as to what we may actually decide to do within our party. This point is simply not debatable.

Now, then, having accepted this axiom, we find that we as a party—not as individuals—had a certain problem to solve, namely, the problem of getting closer to the masses. We found out, at a certain stage of the game, that we were completely shut off from contact with the daily struggles of the American workers. Which was very bad, indeed. But how would you account for it? One reason was advanced by the ——— group, which was the underground existence of our party. It was responded to sympathetically by some of our own younger comrades. But this reason, in spite of all its plausibility, is sheer nonsense. The underground existence of a Communist party does not by itself prevent that party from making contact with the masses. It prevents it only from growing in numbers. An underground Communist Party cannot become a mass-party, but there is no reason on earth why it should not be able to reach the masses through especially created open agencies. It follows from this that the explanation for our failure to make contact with the masses does not lie with our underground existence but with our failure to create the proper organs (any organs for that matter) for open activities.

This the majority of our party recognized definitely about six months ago. It was about that time that the (formerly) ——— group began agitating for an open Communist Party without telling us, however, exactly what they meant by it. For us an open Communist party meant taking our party-organization with its program undiluted, with its name, and affiliation with the Communist International and bringing it into the open. Could we do that? Yes, of course, but such an open Communist party would have been driven underground again before it could begin to breathe properly. And none of your "emergency apparatus" would save the party from destruction.

We could not, therefore, take seriously this childish talk of an open Communist party. We had to rest satisfied that for the present the Communist Party of America will have to continue underground, which meant getting down earnestly to the business of creating the proper organs for extending our activities above ground. This our party will realize by creating among others an open political organ which we shall call Organ P.

This new organ of ours is to be political in nature, it is to be a political party. But with no political existence independently of and separate from the C. P. of A. Its activities must be part of the activities of the C. P. of A., projected upon a wider canvas than the one covering our party-organization proper. It must be one of the reaching organs of our party extended into a new sphere. Our party acquired a number of such organs for various open activities. Organ P is to be one of these, and is to serve as much possible as our open political expression.

A distinction must be drawn, however, between Organ

P and the other open organs of our party. As our open political expression Organ P must by its very nature be our central and most prominent subsidiary organ. Because of this it must also stand in certain unique relation with our party organization. It is this that is probably giving so much trouble to our young comrades of the right, that is making them see visions of duplication and nightmares of dualism. A realistic view of the matter would only show this, that because of Organ P we are facing a number of new and complicated problems of organization that may very well wreck the entire project if we do not approach them with the proper tact and caution. And above all, if we fail to retain intact and in perfect functioning order our party-organization proper. Only when our party will be strong, healthy and sound will it be able to operate such new organ properly. Only then will it manage to use it most effectively and to the greatest advantage.

Special care must be taken to draw into the party ranks every class conscious worker within reach of Organ P. The importance of this work cannot be underestimated, which point we draw to the particular attention of those who fear dualism and duplication. Though we share none of these fears, we recognize, however, the possibility of friction between our party and some of the new elements that Organ P will bring us in contact with. The way to reduce to a minimum such possibilities and to ease the effects of those cases of friction which may prove unpreventable is to assimilate into our Communist party-organization all elements showing a capacity to go our way. Every active and class-conscious worker directly or indirectly affected by Organ P can be developed to become a member of our party. To this end must be directed our main efforts. And if we succeed in this, we shall have assured the success of the entire experiment, which will mean the development of a political mass-movement of the American working class led and directed by the Communist Party of America.

However, it cannot be denied that we are facing trying and difficult days. The new and complicated problems that we are bound to meet will throw into confusion and perhaps desperation many of our good comrades who still cherish the idea of short cuts and simple solutions. To these a word of warning at this moment will not be amiss. To them we ought to say: Comrades! The burden we have voluntarily placed on our shoulders is very heavy, indeed. It will tax all the resources of our intelligence, strength of will and physical endurance. It is a real, big job we have on our hands. To get this job done, impatience alone will not suffice; mere intellectualizing on communist problems will get us nowhere; and least of all will we be able to advance by taking pride—as many of us do—in remaining simple, honest-to-goodness rank and filers.

We must become a party of leaders, every single one of us. Only as such can we hope to gain the confidence of our fellow workers, who are very critical and suspicious nowadays. They have been fooled so often and on so

Decision by the Communist International

The Communist International was appealed to to settle the controversy between the Central Executive Committee (majority) of the C. P. of A. and the faction headed by the three former members (minority) of the C. E. C.

The Communist International acted upon (1) a report of the C. E. C. (majority) of the C. P. of A. and (2) a formal written appeal signed by Dow, Henry and Moore for the minority.

After hearing the case for both sides, the Communist International on December 8th signed a formal written decision, which has been received by the C. E. C. of the C. P. of A. from the hand of a special messenger.

The Decision states that *the Executive Committee of the Communist International has resolved to support the position of the majority of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America in favor of the immediate construction of a legal political party on a national scale, which will act as an instrument of the illegal Communist Party for participation in legal activities, such as electoral campaigns, etc.*

The Comintern Executive orders, for good reasons, that the document shall not be printed. However, it is available for unlimited inspection and study by the leaders of the minority faction and by any committees of the minority rank and file that may be appointed for the purpose, so long as no copy of it is taken out of the possession of the C. E. C. The so-called "emergency convention" called by the minority leaders, heard the document read by the messenger from the Comintern. The C. E. C. also arranged to give Dow, Henry and Moore an opportunity to study the document, with full liberty to make notes. Dow, Henry and Moore have used that opportunity for nothing further than to spread the most outrageous falsehoods. In the face of a ten-page, official and final answer to the minority's appeal, in which the E. C. of the C. I. declares its decision to *uphold the majority of the C. E. C. of the C. P. A. in favor of the immediate formation of a legal political party* these men have the dishonesty to issue a forged edition of the official organ of the party, containing evasive language intended to make the party members think that the Comintern upholds their position. In the meantime, when asked by the Comintern's messenger what they intended to do about

many occasions that it will take much more than a campaign of denunciation to get them follow our advice and leadership. Superiority in knowledge, in political wisdom, in courage and moral integrity—that's what we must produce in fighting the motley crowd of reactionary labor leaders, opportunists and centrists. Let us, comrades, devote ourselves patiently to acquiring these qualities. It is only thus that we can best serve the working class of America and the world over.

it, Henry and Moore replied: That they intend to disregard the decision on the ground that it is addressed only to that Communist Party of America that is recognized by the Comintern, whereas *they* have another Communist Party that is not recognized by the Comintern.

It is imperative for all the Party membership—and all who have lost their standing as Party members through actions resulting from the controversy—to know and understand the decision of the Comintern. This article is written to give as much as possible of the substance of the document without violating the order not to publish.

STRATEGY

The document issued by the Communist International to the American party is destined to be a part of the history of the Communist movement of this country and of the world. Its first chapter is an effort to wean the American Communists away from the primitive conception of revolutionary actions engaged in by Communists alone. To a Communist movement too youthful to have found the broad, directing viewpoint from which can be found the guide-posts for its various steps, the International explains that isolated actions participated in solely by communists will not suffice; that it is necessary to bring about common mass action of *workers who are not yet Communists*. It points out that the workers will develop consciousness as a rule only through the struggle itself and through experience in "*General Class Struggle Organizations*." We are told that we must unite the workers in such *General Class Struggle Organizations* and must join the various ones of these organizations into close relationships—that this, and not merely to attain Communist purity and perfection of program, is the task now facing the Communist Party of America.

The first portion of the message is a plea for us to cease striking around with our eyes closed, fighting as a little sect against the entire outer world. In short, it tells us that we will begin to be effective in the political struggle only when we adopt strategic aims, based upon a thorough examination of the facts.

LEGAL PARTY MUST BE FORMED

The Comintern ruled categorically that an instrument in the form of a *Legal Political Party* must be built. It instructs us that the means of public contact with the masses must be principally, a legal press, including (etc.), and organized groups of sympathizers within the Trade Unions, and an *Overground Political Party*.

The minority's stand, rather vaguely to the effect that legal activities at the present time should be carried on only through legal "organizations" not in the form of a political party, was overruled. The Comintern decision is:

That the Legal Organization must take the permanent form of a Party Organization, and that some other loose Organization Form would be very much more difficult to control and guide.

The Comintern Executive states that it is aware that the minority does not deny the advisability of taking advantage of legal opportunities, but that the minority opposes the rapid and energetic procedure of the majority in founding a legal revolutionary Party, and that this distinction is without good ground.

Dobin, Henry and Moore are violating the principles of Communist honor by taking advantage of the fact that the Comintern's document cannot be printed verbatim, to make their followers think that the Communist International accepts their stand for a legal "organization" not in the form of a political party. In their forged edition of "The Communist" they write that the Comintern "commands the C. E. C. of the C. P. of A. to call the convention of the illegal party before establishing the legal *Organization*." In every instance where they mention the Comintern's ruling as to whether there shall be a legal Party or only some other form of organization, these clever charlatans substitute the word "organization" where the Comintern decision reads: "Party."

The Comintern received and considered (in the written appeal of the minority) a proposition that at some future time a "legal political organization may be initiated by forming *Skeleton Branches* composed of C. P. members, such branches to be formed *with only a part* of the membership of the corresponding underground C. P. branch," etc. The Comintern decided on this point that—

The entire Communist Party membership must join the legal political party and become its most active element, and that—

The ruling of the C. I. must be accepted as obligating every member of the C. P. A., minority or majority, to work diligently in the immediate construction of a legal political party.

The order of the Comintern must not be misunderstood as minimizing the role of the Communist Party itself. On the contrary, it assures us that *the fundamental task is now (as we know it always has been) the organization and training of the Communist Party is leader of the revolutionary movement.* It further states that *it must always be remembered that the real revolutionary party—the American section of the Communist International—is the Communist Party of America, and that such a legal party would be but an instrument which it would use to better carry on its work among the masses. Only through membership in the American Section—the Communist Party of America—can American workers become members of the Communist International.*

But we are told plainly that *Communists must participate as Revolutionists in all general election campaigns municipal, State and Congressional, as well as Presidential. Not in the same manner as the Social Traitors and Centrists.*

Not in order to avoid violent revolution and substitute parliamentary activity for revolution, but, on the other hand, in order to use even the election campaigns to revolutionize the workers and lead them forward, to sharpen their class consciousness and to bring them together and unite them under Communist leadership.

We are reminded that the purpose of the Communists is not to reform the capitalist State. Nevertheless, the document tells us that the program of a legal party will have to be somewhat restricted, but at all times going as far toward the Communist program as is possible while continuing a legal existence. Very clearly the document explains how a legal party program can and must have the desired result, *objectively*. While refraining from dictating the specific partial demands that should be made, the C. I. gives examples by way of illustration of what *kind* of demands should be made. These cannot be given in this article; they will be read to the membership wherever requested. It is notable that these illustrations of demands are all such as to remain within the law, while framed so as to have the desired objective effect of developing the masses toward the desired result. It is made clear the demands upon the State for immediate concessions to the workers must be made, not after the fashion of the Social-Democratic parties which try to make those demands within the limits in which the State can grant them while retaining its strength intact. Communist demands for immediate concessions to the workers are formulated, **not to be "reasonable"** from the point of view of Capitalism, but to be reasonable from the point of view of the struggling workers, regardless of the State's power to grant them without weakening itself.

AS TO AN UNDERGROUND CONVENTION

In the hearing of the case, the Comintern had before it the written appeal of the minority which stated:

"We have urged the C. E. C. majority to call a convention of the party in order that the question now agitating the membership may be solved through intelligent discussion and action. This the C. E. C. *refuses to do*, claiming that it is acting under the direct mandate of the E. C. of the C. I., with the result that affairs in our party are becoming more and more critical. We submit to the judgment of the E. C. of the C. I. the fact that these conditions within the party are unfavorable to the immediate launching of a legal political party, and that hasty and ill-considered action will disrupt the C. P. A. and cause more harm than good to the movement in America."

In fact, the Comintern had before it *five speeches and two reports (including the written formal appeal of the minority)*, all of which dealt with the central theme that the C. E. C. majority *was already proceeding* in making a legal political party without calling an emergency convention of the C. P. to give it authority to do so; and the hearing before the Comintern had the *sole purpose* of deciding: "Is the majority of the C. E. C. right in so proceeding?"

The answer is as plain as language can make it that—

The E. C. of the C. I. has resolved to support the position of the majority—and that

The fact that the Party Executive is proceeding rapidly and energetically with the formation of the legal party organization is not a fault.

Throughout the document the Comintern emphatically and categorically upholds the C. E. C. (majority) in every respect, and shows that it sent the document for the sole purpose of sustaining the majority and compelling the minority to cease sabotaging the vitally necessary step demanded by the Comintern. Ballister and Carr made the mistake of telling the Executive head of the Comintern that Dow, Henry and Moore, being honest Communists, would cease their destructive work as soon as they received the Communist International's command to do so.

While making every effort to keep their following from assembling to hear the actual document of the Comintern read, Dow, Henry and Moore publish the statement that the Comintern:

"Commands the C. E. C. of the C. P. of A. to call the convention of the illegal party before establishing the legal organization."

This is one of that peculiarly contemptible sort of lies which seeks to make an effect by confusing two similar, but entirely separate points. The sick left minority tries to make it appear that the process approved by the Comintern was to be as follows:

First step: Call underground convention.

Second step: Then—if authorized by the underground convention—begin the formation of some sort of a legal "organization," not necessarily in the form of a political party.

The process really approved by the Comintern in the document was:

First step: C. E. C. completes the construction of a legal party up to the point of being ready for public launching.

Second step: After completing the construction of a legal party, call an underground convention of C. P. to make all preparation in the underground convention for the public convention at which the legal revolutionary party is to be launched.

What did the CI say about an underground convention? It said that it was very necessary to make all preparation in our underground Party convention for the public convention in which the legal revolutionary Party is to be launched. That is, preparation for the public convention is the purpose given by the Comintern in the only instance where it mentioned the subject of holding an underground convention before a legal convention.

Did the Comintern expect the C. E. C. to establish a legal political party structure before the underground convention? Most emphatically, it did. The Comintern states bluntly that the minority opposes the rapid and energetic procedure of the majority in founding a legal Revolutionary

Party, and that this is without good ground. The decision states categorically that the fact that the C. E. C. of the C. P. of A. is proceeding rapidly and energetically with the formation of a legal Party is not a fault. That is, the C. E. C. "is" proceeding and founding a legal party at that time, which is certainly to say before any underground convention.

In short, the whole issue before the Comintern was: The C. E. C. is now constructing a legal political party; is it right or wrong?

The Comintern replied categorically that the C. E. C. is right in doing so.

While the document was being written, telegrams from the American C. E. C. made plain that the C. E. C. intended to enter a legal convention without holding a preliminary underground convention of the C. P. The telegrams contained fairly complete information of plans, the different elements, the proportion, etc. Most of the members of the Presidium read these telegrams in the presence of Ballister and Carr, and all expressed their satisfaction and very great pleasure. Carr and Ballister called attention to one feature, however, in which the plan did not conform to the original plan reported by them; that is, that the C. E. C. now intended to enter a legal convention without holding a preliminary underground convention of the C. P. Ballister and Carr declared that they considered this a very bad mistake and asked that the C. I. send a telegram telling the C. E. C. that it must manage that the arrangements be delayed for a few weeks so that a preliminary C. P. convention could be held immediately before a legal convention. The members of the Presidium agreed that entering a legal convention without holding a preliminary C. P. convention would be "indiscreet" ("unvorsichtig" was the German word used), but they hesitated to authorize such a telegram, saying they thought that the time was too short to change the plan. Upon Carr's and Ballister's insistence they finally consented to the sending of the telegram, while reiterating that they doubted the possibility of changing the arrangements on so short time.

The telegram was sent, containing full approval of the plan, but ordering a few weeks postponement to allow for the preliminary convention.

The C. E. C. had received several previous telegrams from the C. I. demanding that it proceed immediately to construction of a legal party apparatus, and declaring that no delay could be permitted; and this late telegram was the first intimation the C. E. C. received that any delay would be permitted by the C. I. (The document itself was not received until very much later).

Since the above, the C. E. C. of the C. P. of A. has received another telegram from the E. C. of the C. I. stating that the C. I. exonerates the C. E. C. for failure to comply with the command as to a preliminary underground convention, on the ground that the command was given on too short notice.

THE QUESTION OF LIQUIDATION

While the written instructions for the CPA were being prepared, there arrived in Moscow a curious appeal. From members of the CPA in one of the Western districts, not having access to official Comintern channels, this document was sent to Petrograd by unofficial means, and was forwarded to Ballister in Moscow. It was an appeal for the liquidation of the underground Communist Party. Ballister and Carr immediately turned this document over to the Commission that was preparing the instructions for the CPA, with the request, in the name of the CEC of the CPA, that a vigorous condemnation of the liquidation tendency be included in the instructions.

Such an appeal is nothing new to the veteran revolutionists of Moscow. It is but a repetition of past developments in the history of the old Russian Bolshevik Party. Therefore the answer of the Comintern has some of the quality of reminiscence. It is to this effect:

That he who wants to liquidate the illegal activities is no Communist at all, and that in carrying out the instructions for legal work, the Party must guard itself against the tendency to neglect or repudiate the illegal work, the tendency to become legal in fact as well as in outward appearance. This tendency will be found especially among "intellectual" Party members who have little experience in the brutal physical phases of the class struggle, to which the rank and file workers are always exposed but from which the intellectuals engaged in legal political work are sometimes shielded. Upon finding themselves in the easier life of legal activities, many will forget that no matter what manoeuvres may be made upon the public stage, the final class struggle must be, until its end, a brutal fight of physical force. A certain element of the Party membership will inevitably forget this fundamental principle (which no humble worker in the class struggle is allowed to forget) and will come forward with naive proposals for the liquidation of the illegal machinery of the Party. Such a tendency is very dangerous to a proletarian revolutionary party. The actual liquidation of the underground Party would mean

the liquidation of the revolutionary movement. Party members who persist in such a view must be ruthlessly expelled from the illegal Party.

The underground organization of the Communist Party must not sink into disuse, but on the contrary must constantly extend its illegal machinery further and further. The document declares that the underground machinery of the C. P. is not merely for emergencies, but for constant and permanent use, and that every member, no matter what his duties in the legal Party, must also perform his duties in the underground organization.

This article cannot be a substitute for the original document issued by the Comintern. Certain delicate matters of very great importance, such as control, press, etc., are necessarily omitted here.

The Party Executive is determined to get the message in full to all of the Party membership, including ex-members who lost their standing through acts resulting from this dispute.

Dow, Henry and Moore, and their lieutenants, are making every effort to prevent the rank and file under their influence from hearing the Communist International's message read. Their plan is to evade the Comintern's decision, destroy the young Party and then go to the Fourth Congress of the C. I. on an appeal from the decision of the E. C. of the C. I., with evidence of a disrupted C. P. of A. to prove that formation of a legal party was premature.

Full opportunity to every Communist, whether in good Party standing or not, to hear the message, can be obtained by applying to the CEC through Party channels.

The duty of all is plain. The ruling of the Communist International must be accepted as obligating every Communist, minority or majority. The message closes with the hope that in our coming Party convention all of us will give evidence, in our resolutions and actions, of firm organic unity, and that our Party will prove its ability to measure up to the great responsibilities that stand before it.

Central Executive Committee of the C. P. of A.

(Written by James Ballister)

Our Prisoners

By ROGER GANLY

With much blowing of trumpets and beating of drums, President Harding released Gene Debs and several other prisoners who were indicted and convicted for war-time offenses. Liberal sentiment throughout the country was mobilized behind these men who were on some excuse or another thrown into the bastiles of the nation while that great political mountebank, Woodrow Wilson, was giving the world an example of what he meant by the New Freedom.

While every other country laying claim to even the civil-

ization of the capitalist system released those who could not join in the chorus for human blood which rose from the swelling throats of citizens of the United States during the war, this country, the boasted home of magnanimity, refused to release the war time offenders. Finally as a concession to public clamor, Harding released Gene Debs, the most conspicuous subject of Government persecution for opposition to the war, and several others, among them some members of the I. W. W.

During the campaign for amnesty, and in most of the appeals made by the liberal elements for the release of war objectors, the point stressed was that while the government was undoubtedly justified in putting them away while the war lasted, they were now sufficiently punished, and the ends of justice were served by what they had already suffered. Keeping them in prison longer might do the capitalist government more harm than good. Even the release of those freed at Christmas was made grudgingly and it was emphasized that there was no intention of extending amnesty to class-war prisoners, whose offense was not against the war as much as against the capitalist system itself.

Our class-war prisoners have received scant consideration in this amnesty campaign. They have committed the unforgivable offense. The sin of pacifism is only heinous while the war lords are clad in the armor of battle, and the workers must be imbued with the lust for murder while the warring capitalist bandits need their aid. But pacifism becomes a virtue once the tents are folded and the councils of peace take the place of the councils of war. Then the business of the Capitalist state is to send the workers back to the exploiting pens, so that the profits can be wrung from their toil. Peace is then the favorite song.

Communists are not pacifists. They oppose the pacifism that meekly submits to the will of the masters of society. They are militants. They believe in war—the class war. They oppose the militarism of capitalism which pits worker against worker in fratricidal strife, but they say that the capitalist governments can only be overthrown by the same kind of armed force that is now used by the ruling class to keep the working class in subjection. They believe in estab-

lishing the dictatorship of the proletariat by force and maintaining it by force during the transition period from Capitalism to Socialism.

There is a dangerous belief—dangerous in the eyes of the capitalist state because it assures victory for the workers. No silly reliance on the ballot as the effective weapon for the capture of political power; no reliance on the all-sufficiency of the general strike, the real Communist avails himself of every weapon to strike a blow at capitalism, but with the firm conviction that the final onslaught on the enemies' stronghold will be made not with ballots but with bullets; not by folding arms in a general refusal to work but by a mass attack on the part of labor, led by experienced Communists inured to the idea of sacrifice and trained to battle by constant skirmishes with the enemy in the everyday struggle of the workers.

Because Communist prisoners are not pacifists; because they favor a class war for the overthrow of the capitalist class our rulers put them in prison. They will keep them in prison until compelled to release them by the demands of the workers. Our prisoners have borne the brunt of the fight. We must not forget them. We must demand their release and arouse the workers in whose behalf they are suffering to take action. An active campaign should be initiated for the release of all class war prisoners. While capitalism lasts the problem of prisoners will always be with us, but as we march forward to the conquest of power the sacrifices of our comrades who fall into the hands of the enemy will inspire us. The campaign for the release of our prisoners must be carried on with renewed vigor. Our Communist fighters must be freed.

Legal and Illegal Activities

By JAMES BALLISTER.

It would be entirely useless, says the Communist International in effect, to quarrel over the question whether extensive or intensive methods are preferable in your Communist work. You must learn to make a practical combination of *both* these methods under all circumstances. All possibilities of both the legal and the illegal activities must be utilized by the Party energetically.

Nothing is more certain than that the Communist Party cannot have a legal existence in the United States at the present time. And yet there is now a legal possibility in the political field which we must utilize.

This legal possibility grows out of "certain indispensable accompaniments" of the highest developed form of capitalist society.

Modern Capitalism requires a proletariat that, in a certain automatic, sluggish way, co-operates in maintaining the State structure which is nothing but a jail wall around it.

Capitalism has been successful where it allows the working class to have (or to think it has) political parties of its own—parties wherein the thought is thoroughly *policed* but otherwise is allowed to pursue a warped and stunted existence within the stone sluice-walls of parliamentary reformism. Such a party's puny cries for half-measures only assist the bourgeoisie to choose which illusions are best to be fostered in the working class. Through its social-reform parties the proletariat participates in finding the forms for its own enslavement. Capitalism has grown to depend upon this help. Capitalism can no longer afford, as a general rule, to do without working class reform parties.

A recent event has made *critically* necessary that Capitalism should allow the workers to think they can find expression in this narrow sluice, to think themselves free to operate with their own political parties within the parliamentary channel. The Russian Revolution placed before the workers in startling contrast the choice: "Parlia-

mentary revolution" (which is a myth), or the violent overthrow of the State (which is reality). Capitalism must now persuade the workers to choose "parliamentary revolution," and cannot refuse them the hobby-horse political party on which to ride in pursuit of the illusion.

But while, in most of the advanced countries it has become the first need of capitalist politics to allow the workers a certain latitude to form political parties,—at the same time the State polices and terrorizes those parties as much as possible to induce them to choose the way of "parliamentary revolution" which is no revolution at all. The State tries to make an exception of such parties as choose the effective means, the violent overthrow of the State and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat,—tries to crush them by force (where and when possible), or at least to exclude them from the public existence in which they and their methods would come to the attention of the masses of workers.

The tactics of the State are:

(1) to exterminate the revolutionary party if possible, or

(2) to terrorize or corrupt it (especially its leaders) into subservience to capitalist law, to make it accept legalistic standards that would render it powerless as an instrument of revolution. But, if failing in these two respects, the State attempts at least

(3) to confine the revolutionary party's operations to the narrow sphere that can be reached secretly, where it is likely to wither away as a propagandist sect.

TACTICS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

Communist tactics do not consist in moralizing about what the State's tactics ought to be, nor in waiting for those tactics to change,—but in meeting the tactics of the State.

First, the Communist Party must defeat the attempt to exterminate it; second, it must defeat the attempt to terrorize or corrupt it into accepting capitalist legalistic standards and must urge the workers to the violent destruction of the entire legal machinery. And the Communist International says:

It is equally the duty of a Communist Party to defeat by any means that may be necessary the Capitalist Government's attempt to confine it to the underground channels in which it is even more concealed from the masses than it is from the Government.

How can we accomplish these tasks? Let us take them up as questions 1, 2 and 3, in successions.

(1) To prevent the revolutionary party's being exterminated, it is necessary to keep the Party's vital organs out of reach of the superior strength of the State. It is necessary to *maintain the underground structure of the party.*

This is a historically developed necessity and does not any longer depend in the least upon whether a Communist Party is permitted to exist legally or not. In the most "legal" and "easy" conditions, there is only one way to insure that the Capitalist State will not, during a crisis, sud-

denly strike down its mortal enemy, the proletarian revolutionary party. The idea of depending upon "legal conditions" or "laws" or "constitutions" that legalize the revolutionary party's existence, is a piece of simple-mindedness that must be eradicated from a Communist Party at any cost, as a fatal disease.

Laws and constitutions (with a little camouflage) exist as no more than a formal statement of the foreseen needs of the capitalist business world. Wherever Capitalism has a need that is not in accord with this formal statement,—to hell with the form, they take the substance. For instance, as a formal rule, the even course of capitalist commerce requires that persons shall not be dragged out of hotels and slaughtered at night by privately organized bands; and this is written into the law. But when there is a real capitalist need for murdering Karl Liebknecht in Berlin or Frank Little in Butte, Montana, the form is disregarded in favor of the substance. The State fully approves and co-operates in the breaking of the skull, and the cracking of the neck. When no previously written rule conforms to the need to kill Sacco and Vanzetti, or Mooney and Billings,—Sacco and Vanzetti are killed anyhow and Mooney and Billings are handled with the greatest degree of ferocity that will not disturb the sleep of the masses of Labor. Not the *law*, but only the danger of the heaving masses of Labor, sets the limit of Capitalism's ferocity.

To any working man with the slightest experience in the law, the idea that the Capitalist State will not strike down its enemies regardless of any law, appears as criminal folly. The Capitalist State will exterminate the revolutionary party whenever it safely can. The Communist Party must be protected by the permanent maintenance of the underground party machinery.

(2) For the second purpose—to prevent the Capitalist State's corrupting or terrorizing the revolutionary party into subservience to capitalist law—the Party must maintain its power to hold conferences (and intercommunication between the entire party membership) free from police knowledge and regulation. For the moment we say nothing of the freedom to *act* without police knowledge or permission. We refer only to the need of keeping clear the party thought and understanding, free from the reservations and evasive expressions that are inevitable under police restriction. The Party must avoid having its thought shrink into the mould of police permits.

This, again, means that the Party must maintain its underground structure. Especially at a time when an unlegalized Communist Party may begin to operate through a "legal political party," which necessarily avoids the direct and clear revolutionary expressions and conforms in outward appearance to capitalist law, the necessity becomes emphasized. The underground must be maintained to keep our thought from shrinking gradually into the forms and dimensions of what can be said legally.

(3) But a Communist Party faces the imperative necessity to defeat the Capitalist State's attempt to confine

it *solely* within the underground channels. To defeat this attempt we must resort to any means within our power. It is true that we cannot exist now in the open under our own name, as the Communist Party, Section of the Communist International. This is partly because of the peculiar present stage of Capitalism in this country, partly because of the long habit of non-solidarity of Labor in America, and partly because of the peculiar cowardice of the Socialist officialdom which, at the critical moment, prevented a united stand for revolutionary principles, leaving the revolutionists without an organization with which to withstand the onslaught in the open. In general it is because of our own weakness—that is, our lack of support among the masses. The early Communist parties attempted to stand in the open, but were unable to obtain mass support, and were attacked, partly destroyed and their remnants driven underground. But we do not intend to accept this as a permanent condition. We intend to fight for the right of a Communist Party to exist as such in the open with sufficient mass support to proclaim publicly its full revolutionary purpose as the American Section of the Communist International.

Finding the American party in its present condition, the Third Congress of the Communist International called the attention of the Communists of America

“to the fact that the illegalized organization must not only serve as the ground for collecting and crystallizing the active Communist forces, but that it is the Party’s duty to try all ways and means to yet out of the illegalized condition into the open, among the wide masses. It is the duty of the Communist Party to find the means and forms to unite these masses politically, through public activity, for the struggle against American Capitalism.”

And since the Third Congress, the Executive Committee has made numerous efforts, beginning somewhat informally, to induce the Central Executive Committee of the C. P. A. to carry out the decision of the Third Congress by constructing an instrument in the form of a legal political party. Later, messages came in a more official tone, reminding the C. E. C. that it must proceed immediately in this respect and declaring that no further delay could be permitted. Finally came the written, formal and peremptory command of the full Executive Committee of the Communist International, which carefully and laboriously explains to us the nature of the opportunity.

It is carefully explained to us that during the period when we cannot expose our party in the open, we must

create a “legal political party” as an instrument which can be projected into the open.

A revolutionary party must evade being excluded from public existence by forming a machinery “for participating in the democratic elections and parliament;” but it must utilize this “legal” machine to expose the parliamentary institution as worthless and to gain the workers’ attention for the violent overthrow of the State. This is the opportunity the Communist International has told us we must seize.

COMMUNIST CROUP AND MEASLES

But when we go to seize it, we find that we are afflicted with a whole nursery-full of children’s diseases. The order to form an open political party seems to precipitate a thousand quarrels as to whether the Party should be “underground or overground.” The assumption seems to be that “it can’t be in two places at once.” A few of the party members who have not yet been entirely cured of a former faith in “democratic institutions,” innocently want to obey what they think is an order to *liquidate the underground* “now that we are to come out into the open.”

Many poor lambs think that the order to form “a legal political party” means necessarily to form a legal *Communist* party; and these are having a great moral belly-ache at the suggestion of a legal party that would not be affiliated with the Communist International or, in fact, a legal party that is not all that the *illegal* Communist Party is.

The moralistic, subjective-minded “pure” Communists are the most troublesome, because they are the most numerous among the sick. They just won’t for anybody come out into the open politically until they can do it as a 100 per cent Communist Party affiliated with the Communist International; and the thought has never been able to trickle into their minds that coming out into the open could mean anything but liquidating the underground Communist Party. They are so “pure” that, if the Communist International does not uphold them they will rip its American Section to pieces and expose Radek, Bukharin, Zinoviev and Lenin as turning yellow, or, at least, as Morris Hillquit says, expose them as “not understanding American conditions.”

None of these croup-stricken or measles-stricken types seem able to perform the mental labor of understanding that the Party must at all times maintain *both* the underground *and* the legal existence if possible by any means whatever.

OLD LESSONS NEVER LEARNED

It seems strange that the Communist International should have still to contend at this late date with such rudimentary troubles. For *every phase* of this dispute was definitely decided at the Second Congress a year and a half ago. It seems strange that a muddle-headed notion that a Communist Party’s ability at a given time to function as a legal party would alter the question of the need of the illegal party machinery, can still occupy the minds of men who claim to have read and accepted the theses and statutes of the Communist International.

Let us recall the practical language of Item Twelve

of the Statutes of the Communist International page 8, American C. P. edition):

No. 12. The general state of things in the whole of Europe and America makes necessary for the Communists of the whole world an obligatory formation of illegal Communist organizations along with those existing legally. The Executive Committee shall be bound to see that this is carried out everywhere.

And the Theses of the Second Congress say (same edition (pages 18-19):

12. For all countries, even the most free "legal" and "peaceful" ones in the sense of a lesser acuteness of the class struggle the period has arrived, when it has become absolutely necessary for every Communist Party to join systematically legal and illegal work, legal and illegal organization.

In the most enlightened and free countries, with a most "solid" bourgeois-democratic regime, the governments are systematically recurring, in spite of their false and hypocritical assurances, to the method of keeping secret lists of Communists, to endless violations of their constitutions for the semi-secret support of White Guards and the murder of Communists in all countries, to secret preparations for the arrest of Communists, the introduction of provocators among Communists, etc. Only the most reactionary petty bourgeoisie, by whatever high-sounding "democratic" or pacifist phrases it might disguise its ideas, can dispute this fact or the necessary conclusion, an immediate formation by all *legal* Communist Parties of *illegal organizations for systematic illegal work*,* for their complete preparation at any moment to thwart any steps on the part of the bourgeoisie.

To make sure that no one will think the Communist International has changed its mind about it, I quote now from the *Third Congress' Theses*. After reviewing the bloody record of White Terror against workers by the Fascisti in Italy, the Orgesch in Germany, the American Legion, etc., the Theses say (page 60, American edition):

In the struggle of the proletariat against the capitalist offensive, it is the duty of the Communists not only to take the advanced posts and lead those engaged in the struggle to complete understanding of the fundamental revolutionary tasks, but it is also their duty, relying upon the best and most active elements among the workers, *to create their own workers' legions and militant organizations which would resist the pacifists and to teach the "Golden Youth" of the bourgeoisie a wholesome lesson that will get them out of the Strike-breaking habit.**

In view of the extraordinary importance of the counter-revolutionary shock-troops, the Com-

munist Party must, through its nuclei in the unions, devote special attention to this question, organizing a thoroughgoing educational and communication service which shall keep under constant observation the military organs and forces of the enemy, their headquarters, his arsenals, the connection between these headquarters and the police, the press and the political parties, and work out all the necessary details of defense and counter-attack. . . .

THE SPECIALIST THEORY

Such instructions, addressed to *legal* as well as illegal parties, do not look much like permission to liquidate the underground structure as soon as a Communist party can exist and function in the open.

Then there are certain naive party members who imagine that the illegal functions of the Party can be relegated to an auxiliary department. They want to hand over the illegal work to a small crew of "roughneck" specialists who would relieve the more genteel party members of this disagreeable and "passing" duty, thereby, presumably, enabling the gentle ones to pursue only the gentle trade of making speeches in bourgeois talk-houses. As a matter of fact, *Communist* parliamentary representatives will have to take the lead in doing the most dangerous of the illegal work.

4. A Communist representative, by decision of the Central Committee, is bound to combine legal work with illegal work. In countries where the Communist delegate enjoys a certain inviolability, this must be utilized by rendering assistance to the illegal organizations and for the propaganda of the party.

6. In the event of labor demonstrations in the streets or other revolutionary movements, the Communist representatives must occupy the most conspicuous places—at the head of the proletarian masses.

8. Each Communist representative must remember that he is not a "legislator," who is bound to seek agreements with the other legislators' but an agitator of the party, detailed to the enemy's camp in order to carry out the orders of the party there. The Communist member is answerable not to the wide mass of his constituents, but to his own Communist party—whether legal or illegal.

—Theses and Statutes (2nd Congress), American C. P. edition, p. 48.

The brand of semi-liquidator that we last described has a ridiculous similarity to the three leftist leaders. While he wants to divide the party into regulars and specialists and to set aside in the party a few specialist menials to do the illegal "dirty work," the leftist leaders want to set aside

*Our emphasis.

a few specialists to do the *legal* "dirty work."

The following from page 110-11-12 of the American edition of the Theses of the Third Congress ought to make the matter clear enough even for members suffering from that brand of political chicken-pox:

VII. LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

53. The Party must be so organized, that it shall always be in a position to adapt itself quickly to all the changes that may occur in the conditions of the struggle. The Communist Party must develop into a militant organization capable of avoiding a fight in the open against overwhelming forces of the enemy, concentrated upon a given point; but on the other hand, the very concentration of the enemy must be so utilized as to attack him in a spot where he least suspects it. It would be the greatest mistake for the Party organization to stake everything upon a rebellion and street fighting, or only upon condition of severe oppression. Communists must perfect their preliminary revolutionary work in every situation on a basis of preparedness, for it is frequently next to impossible to foresee the changeable wave of stormy and calm periods! and even in cases where it might be possible, this foresight cannot, in many cases, be made use of for reorganization, because the change as a rule comes quickly, and frequently quite suddenly.

54. The legal Communist parties of the capitalist countries usually fail to grasp the importance of the task before the Party to be properly prepared for the armed struggle, or for the illegal fight in general. Communist organizations often commit the error of depending on a permanent legal basis for their existence, and of conducting their work according to the needs of the legal tasks.

On the other hand, illegal parties often fail to make use of all the possibilities of legal activity toward the building up of a party organization which would have constant intercourse with the revolutionary masses. Underground organizations which ignore these vital truths run the risk of becoming merely groups of conspirators, wasting their labors in futile Sisyphus tasks.

Both those tendencies are erroneous. Every legal Communist organization must know how to insure for itself complete preparedness for an underground existence, and above all for revolutionary outbreaks. Every illegal Communist organization must, on the other hand make the full use of the possibilities offered by the legal labor movement, in order to become, by means of intensive party activity, the organizer and real leader of the great revolutionary masses.

(Note especially:)

55. Both among legal and underground Party circles there is a tendency for the Communist organization activity to evolve into the establishment and maintenance of a purely military organization isolated from the rest of the Party organization and activity. This is absolutely erroneous. On the contrary, during the pre-revolutionary period the formation of our military organizations must be mainly accomplished through the general work of the Communist Party. *The entire Party must be developed into a militant organization for the revolution.**

Isolated revolutionary-military organizations, prematurely created in the pre-revolutionary period, are apt to show tendencies towards dissolution, because of the lack of direct and useful Party work.

LIQUIDATION VALUES

Despite all of these unmistakable explanations, as soon as the concrete problem of forming a legal political party organization was placed forcibly before the American party by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, there arose a whole lot of muddle-headed discussion of "liquidation." There is too much inclination to make "liquidation" an epithet without looking into its meaning.

The Communist International requires that party members who persist in the view that the underground Communist Party should be liquidated, must be ruthlessly expelled from the Communist Party.

But before anyone takes this as an invitation to a general "witch hunt" against all persons except himself, he would better have a little earnest discussion and clarification. Many party members may be surprised to discover what their own views amount to, when examined.

It is easy enough to find the frank liquidators and to deal with them. But there are other kinds of liquidators who do not so frankly state or understand their own views. I have seen an example in the form of a resolution (never introduced before any party unit) which some party members fondly favor.

"Whereas the accusations were brought up again and again by the so-called leftists that there is danger of the liquidation of the underground Communist Party, we, the members of S. D. * * * District * * *, emphatically assert that we entertain no idea of liquidation until after the full program of the Communist Party can be advocated legally, and we hereby warn all liquidators high and low that we will fight any move in this direction to the bitter end."

Is *this* the position of the Communist? No, I think it is the position of a dangerous type of liquidator—the one who thinks he is an anti-liquidator, because he favors the liquidation of the underground C. P. only "when the full

*Our emphasis.

program of the C.P. can be advocated legally.”

If and when such a time comes during Capitalist rule, that we can advocate the full Communist program legally, should we then liquidate the underground machinery of the Party? He who thinks so is willing to trust the revolutionary movement again into the *power* of the Capitalist State to destroy it. After all his little excursion into the Communist party he really believes in “democratic free institutions” and in the permanence of any passing phase of “liberalism” in capitalist government. And, assuming that we could permanently advocate the Communist program, are we only going to *advocate* it? Can we put it into practice legally?

Not that I think we are going to overthrow the State secretly. We will leave the secret overthrow of the State to our leftist comrades. We believe in mass action, and mass action is public action. The overthrow of the State will be done openly. But the revolution is essentially an illegal process, and there are a thousand and one tasks leading up to the event of mass action, and relating to control, direction and communication during such actions, that can alone be accomplished by a secret organization. He who does not plan to *act* without the knowledge or permission of the police, is not planning for a revolution.

I notice another example of the same general kind of supposed “anti-liquidation” view as the one cited above. It is in a “Statement of the Three Minority Members of the C. E. C.” This statement, like the foregoing one, intends to be entirely against liquidation. But let’s see if it is:

“The question which the members must now decide is:

“*Can a Communist Party, affiliated with the Comintern, exist and function as an open legal political party in the United States?*”

“*If not—are our members ready to liquidate the C. P.* and join a new party which will be under the control and direction of known and outspoken centrists, with an opportunist policy and a program which will not conform to the Theses and Statutes of the Communist International?*”

This is very much the same sort of thing. Whether a Communist Party “can exist and function as an open, legal political party” is NOT the question upon which to determine whether the illegal Communist Party machinery should be liquidated.

The dangerous idea that “IF” the Communist Party could “exist and function as an open, legal political party,” then the question of liquidating the underground party might be *different* is the root of *all the fifty-seven varieties* of liquidationism. And the root is found always to grow in the same soil: The inability to conceive of doing BOTH the illegal work AND the legal work at the same time.

The words quoted here from the “Minority Statement” are written by a man who primitively thinks that to do either one means to give up the other kind of work. In that respect he is exactly like any other type of unconscious liquida-

tor. But his rather admirable (if too simple) revolutionary instinct of the left-sick type tells him (truly) that the liquidation of the underground party would mean the liquidation of the revolutionary movement. So he fights desperately against the formation of a legal party. The Communist International orders him to form a legal party. It is possible that he may finally agree to obey reluctantly and fearful that “*it is not yet time*” for the liquidation of the underground—never once conceiving of doing BOTH the legal and the illegal political work. His subjective thinking has led him to conclude that the underground Communist Party CAN be liquidated “IF” a Communist Party “can exist and function as an open legal political party.”

He raises two other points in the same sentence and goes wrong on each of them. He speaks of (1) “the control and direction of known and outspoken centrists,” (2) “an opportunist policy and a [legal] program which will not conform to the Theses and Statutes of the Communist International.”

Allowing for a little overstatement in the heat of debate, he means that “known and outspoken centrists” PARTICIPATE in the control and direction of a legal party. If he would not die of apoplexy in hearing it, we would tell him that the Comintern fully intends that persons who are not Communists (and who therefore are at least centrists) should participate in the governing committees of such a legal political party, as long as the Communists have at least a majority on all important committees.

In regard to the second complaint—that a legal party is planned to have “an opportunist policy,” etc.—let me say that none but a crazy man would expect an instrument constructed for the express purpose of reaching into the legal field, to announce the same policies and program that had already gotten the Communist Party itself outlawed. This boils down to a question of judgment as to whether any given legal party’s policy and program were so formed that they would OBJECTIVELY HAVE THE REVOLUTIONARY EFFECT upon the masses. Upon this point alone would the minority have a right to criticize. But the “Minority Statement” utterly and blindly misses this point. For it says, “an opportunist policy and program which will *not conform to the Theses and Statutes of the Communist International*”—!!

Who expects that a program of a legal party (expressly constructed for operating in a country where the Communist Party is outlawed for its own program) should conform to the Theses and Statutes of the Communist International as laid down for Communist parties? If the minority cannot think this out for themselves, let them at least learn that the Communist International has ordered, in effect, that a legal party that the Communist Party might construct in the United States at this time, SHALL NOT conform to the rules laid down by it for the *real Communist Party* itself. The Communist International says plainly that the program of such a legal party *will have to be somewhat restricted,*

*Our emphasis.

* Our emphasis.

and refers to such a program as *not stating the illegal Communist purpose, and as going at all times as far TOWARD the Communist program as is possible while maintaining a legal existence.*

The Communist Party of America will go straight ahead and complete the task which is set before it, not only by the Communist International, but by all the circumstances of life as well.

We don't make a dogma of the underground system. We don't want it for its own sake, as a small boy wants a cave to play pirate in. The underground system was brought about by historic necessity; the need of it was proven by a record of destruction of our organizations and very realistic imprisonment and murder of our best human material.

And when CAN the Communist Party cease to have an underground (that is, *concealed, illegal*) machinery?

ONLY AFTER THE CAPITALIST STATE SHALL HAVE BEEN OVERTHROWN AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE WORKERS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED. And then the underground machinery—which will theretofore have protected and largely contained the directing power of the revolution—will not be “liquidated,” but will leave its concealment. The leadership of the revolution must be composed of men known to the masses of the workers. At alternating stages the Central Executive Committee operates from the complete concealment of the underground, or, again, is partly out in the open. The relative predominance in the Party of the underground or the overground machinery, fluctuates with these periods.

Young Communist International

By WM. TURNER, Delegate Y. C. L. of A.

In considering the development of the Communist International, a great share of credit must go to its forerunner, the Young Socialist International (now the Young Communist International). This was the only revolutionary international organization that functioned as such after the outbreak of the World War. In every country it unceasingly propagated for the proletarian revolution, and at the same time fought a bitter struggle with the social-patriots and renegades who had become the handmaids of the imperialists in their respective countries.

After the foundation of the Communist International, again it was the young communists' organizations that played a most important part in forming the new Communist Parties. By their intense activity they swung into line the many uncertain, cautious and wavering elements; and by their merciless criticism of the policies and leaders of these newly formed Parties whenever signs of weakness appeared they steadied the organizations.

Now that the Communist International as a mass movement has definitely affiliated bodies in all countries, has adopted a set of conditions for admission, and has outlined extensive theses on tactical and organizational questions both of a national and international character, there is no longer a need for political autonomy of the Young Communist League. And once more the communist youth of the world showed their revolutionary understanding by deciding to subordinate the League to the Parties. Through their representatives at the Comintern congress a resolution was submitted and accepted which pointed out the new relationships that should exist between the C. I. and Y. C. I., and between the C. P.'s and Y. C. L.'s.

This decision was also made at the congress of the Y.C.L. but was dealt with more in detail there.

With the acceptance of this decision, which is of fundamental importance both to the adult and young people's organizations, a new epoch begins in the history of the Young Communist International. From now on there is but ONE revolutionary center, and that is the Communist International. From now on there is but one sub-center in each country to carry out the work of the C. I., and that is the Communist Party. The Union activities, work amongst the Women, and with the Youth, all have their special agencies to work through, but politically are subordinate to the party. Hereafter we shall have but one axis around which the proletariat of the world will rally in its struggles to end capitalist exploitation and establish a Communist Commonwealth.

To our American comrades the decision of the Y. C. I. in the above-mentioned question will not appear so important. This is due to the fact that at no time did there exist here a strong and revolutionary young people's movement such as were found in Germany, Italy, etc. Generally speaking, the young people of Europe have possessed strong, active and revolutionary organizations. They have continually fought any compromising or reactionary groups within the adult organizations. They have at all times possessed complete political as well as organizational independence—AND THEY HAVE USED IT. To give up all of this means a great change to them, but they realize the necessity of it at this time and are willing to yield first place to their logical successors, the Communist Parties.

THE CONGRESS OF THE Y. C. I.

Comrade Munzenburg, the veteran leader and secretary of the Y. C. I., officially opened the Second Congress of Young Communists of the World, on the evening of July 9, 1921, at the Zimny Theatre, Moscow, amidst the thunderous applause of the thousands of comrades, old and

young, who filled the hall to overflowing. It was by far the largest and most representative gathering of the revolutionary youth of the world that has ever taken place. About 150 delegates were present from 35 countries and representing over 40 organizations. From Korea to Mexico, from Iceland to South Africa, came delegates to this mighty gathering.

The opening night was devoted to speeches of greetings from the Russian Youth, from Soviet Russia, from the Communist International, etc. Zinoviev, Trotski, Lunatcharski, Losovski, Shatskin, Tom Mann and others spoke.

The regular sessions began on July 14th, taking place in the former throne room of the Czars—the same place where the Comintern had just held its third congress. The first subject on the agenda was Decisions of the Comintern Congress. Comrade Trotski acted as reporter. He gave an excellent outline of the work done, the decisions reached, and their importance to the international communist movement. Certain of our delegates, particularly the French, were not exactly satisfied with the work of the “big folks” (these delegates were suffering slightly from an infantile disorder known as “leftism,” but which has often affected adults as well, even in this country). Polano of Italy, Schuler of Austria and a few others also had criticisms to make, but Trotski, though physically a minority, completely annihilated them intellectually, doing it in such a pleasing yet thorough manner that every one of his opponents was glad to be vanquished by such a man.

The next question of importance was a discussion of the report of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International. Munzenburg reported on this, stating that despite great handicaps, the Y. C. I. had in less than twenty months grown from a rather loose organization of about 200,000 members to a quite firm one of over 800,000. Having limited forces to work with, they had succeeded in blocking the Second and Second-and-a-Half Internationals from developing any strong young people’s movements. They had devoted a great deal of attention to the up-building of the Communist Parties; and had published a vast amount of literature dealing with various phases of the young people’s movement. The international organ, the “Young International,” had been enlarged several times, and editions of it had appeared in French, Italian, Scandinavian and English besides the German and Russian.

The Russian Y. C. L. presented a resolution, which in effect was a censure of the Executive Committee for its failure to carry out its work properly. The chief argument of the resolution was that political directives had not been given to the various organizations. Shatskin of Russia (himself a member of the Executive Committee, though he had not actively served on it more than a couple of months during the whole time of its existence) was the main speaker for this resolution. The purpose of it was to pave the way for a new make-up of the Executive Committee, as well as to strengthen the position of those who desired the seat of the Executive Committee removed from Berlin to Moscow.

A long and heated debate followed on this question, with the American, English, Hungarian, Scandinavian and Finnish delegates opposing the Russians’ resolution. They instead supported one presented by the Norwegian comrades. Zinoviev also declared himself for the latter. After two days of struggle a compromise resolution, embodying certain points from both of the others, was presented and accepted. It gave due credit to the Executive Committee for the good work done by it in organization and propaganda, in combating the centrist young people’s organizations, and in carrying out the mandates of the Second Congress of the Comintern. At the same time it recognizes the need of a larger Executive Committee possessing greater powers, and the need of more co-ordination and discipline within the Y. C. I. To give practical assistance in this work, a series of directives for the new Executive Committee are incorporated in the resolution.

Following this came the question of relations between C. I. and Y. C. I. and between C. P.’s and Y. C. L.’s. No great amount of discussion was necessary on this point, the congress being almost unanimous as to what should be done. The resolution adopted explains the acceptance of a resolution on this question adopted by the Comintern congress; shows the historical basis for accepting such a position; emphasizes the necessity of developing the young communist leagues into mass organizations; and concludes with a series of concrete proposals to be used in the newly established relations between Parties and Leagues, and between the Internationals.

The remainder of the congress was devoted to discussions on theses regarding the Economic Struggle of the Workers and the Y. C. L.’s; Educational Work of the Y. C. L.’s; Methods of Organization; Agitation Among the Youth of the Colonial Peoples; Work Amongst the Peasant Youth; Amongst the Students; Organization and Development of the Children’s Groups; and directions for Anti-Military Propaganda. Lack of space prevents dealing with them here. The complete Theses on all of these subjects will soon be ready in the English language. There is a great deal of work to be done in each and every one of these fields. The theses adopted are of fundamental importance to the Young Communist Leagues of the World.

The new statutes of the Y. C. I. demand that each affiliated body to be known as the Young Communist League of —, Section of the Young Communist International. Only one recognized organization can exist in each country. The World Congress, the Bureau, and the Executive Committee are the executive organs of the Y. C. I. The Congress will convene every year, but extraordinary congresses may be called by the Executive Committee, the Bureau, or at the demand of a third of the affiliated organizations.

The Bureau consists of 17 members, one from each of the largest and most important Young Communist organizations, plus the Executive Committee. (The Y. C. L. of A. is entitled to a representative on the Bureau.) The

Bureau will convene at least once each year or at the request of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee consists of regular members and alternates, elected by the Congress. The seat of the Executive Committee is determined by Congress. This year Moscow will be the center, but a large part of the Executive Committee will be kept in Western Europe to attend to the practical end of the work, which can only be carried on successfully from there. There are eleven members on the present Executive Committee. Four alternates were also elected. (The United States has the right of electing an alternate to the Executive Committee.)

Munzenburg, Leo, and Shatskin of the old Executive Committee were re-elected. Besides them there are Zeigler of Russia, Schonhar and Unger of Germany, Schueler of Austria, Tranquilli of Italy, Voiuvitsh of Jugo-Slavia (Balkans), Larson of Norway (Scandinavia), and Sabiroff of the Near East as new members. The alternates are Doria of France, Bammatter of Switzerland, Lekai of Hungary and Tartaroff of Russia.

Comrade Lenin, who was to give the closing address at the congress, could not do so because of illness, so Bucharin

took his place. He delivered a remarkable speech. The spirit of the congress had begun to lag a bit after many days of discussion, but Bucharin's talk raised the enthusiasm to the highest pitch. His exposition of the tactics adopted by the Comintern since its very beginning was a masterpiece. Cheer after cheer swept through the hall at the conclusion of his speech. Then came the singing of the International; the parade through the streets by the entire body of delegates; more singing, whooping, yelling and snake-dancing. The spirit of youth, after the many days of caucuses, committee meetings, speeches, reports, debates, again manifested itself in its more common form. A great deal of work had been accomplished. The Young Communist International had shown itself capable of coping with the difficult tasks in the past. It had formulated plans at this congress by means of which it hoped to solve the problems of today and tomorrow. A new milestone had been passed. A new epoch of the Y. C. I. had begun. Each and every one of the delegates present agreed to go back to his respective country, filled with new life, new vigor, new ideas, ready and anxious to make the Young Communist International the rallying point of the working class youth of the world.

The C I Decision and the Minority Members

By G. LEWIS

In their appeal to the Comintern, the three minority members, Dow, Kelly and Curtis, declared that they would loyally submit to its decision and called upon their followers not to abide by the decision of the C. E. C., but to await the outcome of the appeal. Now the decision of the C I has been rendered and the majority position is unequivocally upheld. The minority comrades are told to subordinate their opinion to that of the party and all members are called upon to work unfalteringly for the organization of the legal activities. What do the minority members, Dow, Henry and Curtis, do? Do they like loyal soldiers of the proletarian army and like honest workers follow the mandate of the C I or abide by their own declarations? No—they instead prevaricate again. They declare that the decision is unsatisfactory, and that they do not intend to abide by it. They only show that they were never sincere in their appeal. They used this appeal to conceal their real intentions, to deceive those members who believed that the departure in the new tactics meant a possibility of compromise, and to organize their machine so as to make their individual positions stronger by the fiction of numbers.

But how long can they deceive their followers? Can these members of the minority further play upon the credulity of those members who in sincere devotion to a mistaken idea of uncompromising revolutionary tactics followed

those fabricators and split makers? We doubt it. Already hundreds of members of Districts 1, 2 and 4 are returning to the party satisfied with the decision of the C I. The Russian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian comrades will no longer be deceived by the propaganda of these unscrupulous misleaders who shriek that the majority was composed of compromisers and centrists.

All talk of compromise because of the new tactics of the American section is only cant. Because the party proposes to work among the broad masses instead of carrying on a barren factional fight within a sectarian shell, because it constructs a program of partial demands which has for its purpose to rally the masses for a struggle which is objectively revolutionary, and through this struggle to hasten the final contest for power, these are not compromising tactics. The immediate program of the party is the program for immediate action and no one who is a revolutionist can refuse to participate in the immediate struggle of the workers and construct a program of action for such a struggle.

But are not partial demands reformism? No—Reformists and Opportunists are those who make concessions to the capitalist class in order to retain them in power, and when we propose an immediate program—of immediate demands, an apparent concession from the viewpoint of the ultimate program—we do so for the preparation of

the forces of the proletariat, for the overthrow of capitalism, for building up the influence of the communists among the masses, for intensifying and not modifying the class struggle, for hastening and not avoiding the armed struggle. The history of the Bolshevik party of Russia, the history of the last two years, the experiences of the German and French workers proves this.

If this is so, what can our comrades of the Left Opposition want? Is it simply a case of skepticism? But, however skepticism may be of value to philosophers it has no place in evaluating tactics and deciding upon programs—it has no place with revolutionists. The Communist International in supporting the position of the majority has cleared away the skepticism which existed in our ranks

and dissipated the misgivings which were inevitable in the confusion arising out of the changes in the tactics of the American party.

The minority members must no longer be deceived by those whose only reason for leadership, in the party, was their subservience and manipulation to a machine, kept together by appealing. Today, the American workers need direction. They need the energy, self-sacrifice and clarity which the communists can give to their struggle. They need the united leadership of the solidified party. Your place, comrades of the left opposition, is in the Communist International, in the ranks of the American section of the C I—the C. P. of A. As soldiers of the revolutionary army, bow to the decision of the C I and take your place in the ranks.

In The Ranks

By R. GANLY

Some of our comrades who are suffering from the twitching pains of left sickness do not like the program of a legal political party unless it has machine guns bristling all over it. They are more concerned with affirming their revolutionary purity than getting in contact with the masses. It is a very pleasant form of recreation to sit down in some comfortable meeting place and argue until the wee small hours of the morning over some theoretical point that the great masses of the workers will never understand. It is not so pleasant to get into a reactionary trade union and show the workers by your conduct in fighting their battles that you are more capable for leadership than the bureaucrats.

Sticking the demand for the dictatorship of the proletariat into the program of a political party aiming at legality might tickle the fancies of our adventurous spirits whose conception of Communism is nothing more than accepting the twenty-one points and then put them away for safe keeping. To feature such a demand in a legal political platform in this country at the present time would be to exhibit a mental unfitness for tackling the problems that confront the workers. It would result in raids and persecutions before the new organization gathers strength and power.

When the workers are influenced in large numbers by the Communists and the Communist Party has the sympathy of a strong body of workers it will be a different matter. At the present time our work is hardly begun. Some comrades speak of going to jail as if it meant nothing in their young lives. Every real Communist is prepared to go to jail if necessary or even to die, but real communists can do better work outside of prison than inside. The capitalists would rather feed, clothe and shelter

the leaders of the Communist Party in prison than have them run loose, doing a lot of harm, if they could only get their hands on them. "Fill the jails" was at one time the slogan of the I. W. W. Filing the jails with workers is not good policy. We should aim at getting the power to put the capitalists in jail for a change.

"We should have a C. E. C. that could be recalled within two weeks," said a comrade who believes in democratic centralization with emphasis on "democratic." After holding 26 elections every year, the rest of the time could be spent overthrowing the capitalist system.

Movements are composed of men and men are tested by struggle. The struggle ahead of us will eventually produce the kind of leadership that is necessary to lead the masses for the final conflict and wrest control from the powerful capitalists that run this country. Merely attacking your leaders does not prove that you are more capable than they. Work for the cause, do not take yourself too seriously and you will be surprised at the results.

A sharp axe is a necessary part of the equipment of a well disciplined revolutionary organization, but discretion should be exercised in its use. It should not be swung on the necks of comrades who are merely suffering from a temporary grouch.

This does not, of course, mean that comrades are urged to tenderly nourish a grouch and watch it assume the proportions of a nuisance. Leave temperamental outbursts to the luminaries of the operatic stage. Geraldine Farrar, Muratore, et al., are engaged in the business of giving displays of artistic fire-works. We are too busy building up a machine for the overthrow of capitalism. Communists who cannot submit to party discipline have a poor conception of their duties.

"I would not touch that bunch with a forty-foot pole," says a comrade, whose conception of a pure organization is a committee of one, referring to the Workers' Council group. Communists must learn the art of strategy. Because fur overcoats are worn in cold climates you would not think much of the judgment of a salesman who would try to sell them to the natives of Central America. Because the sartorial equipment of those who live in the torrid zone consists of a strip of cloth around the loins is no reason why you would expect fig leaves to be popular in the Arctic Circle. The fact that you have accepted the 21 points is not sufficient proof that you are a Communist. Unless you translate

them into terms of everyday life and use them to puncture the inflated bladder of capitalism, they will only make you uncomfortable.

It is not a sin to be a good politician, provided political sagacity is used for a good purpose—for a Communist purpose. The capitalists have developed their politicians. Though only a small minority of society, they are adepts in the art of control. Lenin said the workers must develop their own politicians. Not the type who use their ability to serve their own selfish ends, but politicians who place themselves at the disposal of the revolutionary movement.

The Situation in the Lithuanian Federation

By EDWARD RILEY.

The disruptive activities of Henry, Moore, Dow & Co. find their reflection also in the Lithuanian Federation. But with us it was Leon, Zemotis and a few others who have been working conscientiously and to the best of their abilities to disrupt and break our organization. They have succeeded, of course, in demoralizing certain sections of our Federation, but the bulk of it—those comrades that concern themselves primarily with the welfare of the movement—repudiated the leadership of Leon and his like and have lined up solidly behind the party.

Here is how it happened. About 14 or so comrades of New York and vicinity met in a caucus, and then and there pledged themselves (1) to unceasingly engage in counter attack upon the pseudo-leaders and pseudo-revolutionaries within the Federation, and (2) to support the CEC in its legal activities.

The start was made, of course, without any connections with the outside towns, and without any treasury. Immediately thereafter the Lithuanian Language Bureau was reorganized by the CEC. Now the caucus was enlarged to about 30 comrades and made its best efforts to advise the CEC on matters pertaining to the Lithuanian Federation. The new Bureau extended its activities beyond the lines reached by the caucus. Special organizers were sent to various localities, covering their own expenses, for there was not a cent in the treasury.

The first significant unit that lined up with the new Bureau was the District 3 comrades. And thereafter the numbers of the followers of Leon began to diminish so rapidly that at this moment, which is the moment of the split, the insurgents search in vain for their "solid Federation behind them."

Three most important districts, namely Nos. 2, 3 and 5, declared unreservedly to remain in the party. Leon's own branch recently expelled him from its meeting; district 8, 9 and 12 are with the party though the membership is small

in those districts; district 10 if not 100% with the party, then 2-3 are more than assured; dist. 6, 50-50; dist. 4, 1-3 with the party; so is dist. 1. Dist. 11 is with the opposition; dist. 7 until recently was with the opposition, but now one half of dist. 7 has repudiated the disrupters of the party. Adding together the strength of the insurgents, we find that only most backward localities have followed the slogan of "pure revolutionaries," viz: Pittsburgh, part of Massachusetts and Connecticut, and scattered groups in the coal fields of Pennsylvania and Southern Illinois where there never was any effective movement nor can it be expected to develop one for some time to come. Now, if we bear in mind the fact that all the industrial centers (with the exception of a minority in Cleveland) are solidly opposed to the insurgents, we can easily perceive the quality of the element that went over to the opposition. Nor can the opposition get any credit for Cleveland. The best and most conscious element is with the party; When the opposition had a "majority," the following incident will show just what this "majority" consisted of: They held their conference of the district. Twelve "regular" and two "fraternal" delegates were present. A question was raised thus: "Suppose the Comintern instructs us to obey the CEC decisions regarding legal services. Shall we comply?" Yes—1; no—10; abstained from voting—1. Since then, the majority of the Cleveland membership has declared for us.

From the above incident it is obvious that, perhaps, the split in the Lithuanian Federation has only cleansed the party of some of the non-communistic elements. If, however, we would make a closer analysis of the quality of the whole material that bolted the Federation, we would find the following characters: (1) several leaders, semi-intellectuals, who lost their positions on account of reorganization of the Language Bureau; (2) few candidates for leadership who have memorized several sentences from the Theses of the Second Congress, including that of the "armed insurrection"; those fellows consider every one a counter-revolu-

Minutes of the C. E. C. Meeting, January, 1922

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Secretary read statement from the Executive Committee of the C. I. reporting that it holds the tactics of the majority of the C. E. C. to be absolutely correct.

M—To take all necessary measures for the transmission of this statement to the groups, and that as many of the groups as can be reached should receive this immediately. Carried.

Letter from Com. Carr reporting on the situation, read.

M—to inform the C. I. of the arrangements and proposals of No. 2 and of the Carter situation. Carried.

M—To wire Carter, through A. and M. parties, re decisions abolishing the agency and the provision for the disposal of its funds.

M—That Brn. be instructed to remain for the Feb. conference and return immediately thereafter.

M—To defer action until next meeting. Carried.

Com. Ballister reported on his negotiations with the opposition.

1. Read document to their "national conference" and reported to them as messenger from the C. I.

2. He then read the document again to Henry, Curtis and Johnson. They answered that they will not obey the decision of the Comintern and will fight the No. 2. They also informed Com. B. that they hold themselves to be the No. 1 and that they sent a delegate to R.

M—That a full report of the No. 2 be drawn up, advising the C. I. of the situation and of our plans. Carried. Raphael, Cook and B. nominated—elected.

ORGANIZATION MATTERS

The general Party situation was discussed.

M—That statement be issued to the membership dealing with the Party situation and problems. Carried.

M—That an appeal be issued to the membership of the opposition informing them that the C. E. C. will gladly recommend them back to the Party at any time they are ready to accept, the decision of the C. I. Carried.

M—That the Party have first call on the Theses and Statutes of the Third Congress and that all DO's be in-

tionary unless he shouts for armed insurrection at every nook and corner; (3) a group of working men who have the best of intentions but lack the understanding of even the primary aspects of the class struggle. The latter, for obvious reasons, can very well be led by any phrase-revolutionary.

All the conscious, intelligent element, true revolutionaries, remained with the party. It must be added that there are no tendencies of liquidation amongst the Lithuanian comrades. They have no liquidators, and they are confident that if there are such creatures in the party the CEC will take care of them as it did of those who were sick with leftism and pseudo-revolutionism.

structed to organize classes in the same, immediately to report their educational plans to the C. E. C. as soon as formulated, and to line up the whole organization in this drive. Carried.

That Comrade G. be engaged as an assistant on the editorial staff of the O. O. Carried.

M—That C. E. C. representatives tour the country and report on the conditions prevailing in the party. Carried.

M—That the Secretary shall have approval first of the Org. Comm. for expenditures of money over \$50. Carried.

DISTRICT MATTERS

D. 1—The DO reported resolution of protest from Secretary against the appointment of delegates to the No. 2 conference.

M—That D. 1 be informed that the C. E. C. left the choosing of delegates to the No. 2 conference in the hands of the DECs. The C. E. C. did not appoint the delegates.

D. 2. Letter received from Com. Funk submitting his resignation as DO because of the need of his active participation in the work among the Jewish Coms.

M—That the resignation be accepted and a letter of regret be forwarded to Com. F. Carried.

M—That the appointment of Com. Funk's successor be deferred until next meeting. Carried.

D. 4. Letter received from DO informing us of the general Party situation. DO reported that the Germ. coms. who had gone with the opposition are beginning to return to the Party and accepting the decision of the C. I.

That the Lith. coms. of the opposition are protesting against the plans of their leaders to lead them out of the Comintern.

M—That the DO be instructed to supply the C. E. C. with full information about those conditions and that he make all efforts to win back as many of the opposition as possible.

D. 5. Resolution received from D. 5 that the C. E. C. proceed with charges against com. L.

M—That the Org. C. request D. 2 for a copy of its charges against Com. L and that the same be referred to the next meeting of the C. E. C. for action. Carried. Resolution received from the Ex.-Comm. of D. 5 recommending that the conv. of No. 1 be held after 6 months from No. 2 conference and that if the C. E. C. should not accept this resolution it should be forwarded to the DECs for action.

M—That the resolution be printed in the forthcoming issue of the O. O. and that it be forwarded to the DECs for action. Carried.

M—That the case of Com. V. be reopened and that the DO 5 be instructed to get full memorandum on the case with the object in view of enabling the press to print the full findings: Carried.

D. 8. M—That the Secy. take up with Com. Shays the

question of giving his full time to national party work. Carried.

D. 10. M.—That DO 10 be asked to submit at once a full report as to the activities of his district and the general membership strength.

D 11—M.—That Com. Curley be asked to resign as DO and hold himself available for R paper.

M—That Com. Dner be appointed DO 11. Carried.

INDUSTRIAL

Indus Org reported plan to reconstruct the No. 1 nuclei machinery so as to adjust it with No. 2 activities.

M—To consider this plan as the first order of business next meeting. Carried.

Ind. O reported that in trade Union X our nuclei were sufficiently strong and organized to elect the Nat Org and Sec'y.

M—The said nuclei be advised to elect Com. Em and Com. Jay as Org and Sec'y of labor union X. Carried.

Y. C. L. RECOMMENDATIONS

M—That all members under 21 years of age should

join the Y C L and devote most of their time to Y C L activities.

M—That we recommend all members under 23 to join Y. C. L.

M—That Comrade A be representative of the CEC on the Y. C. L. Carried.

M—That Com. Carr be empowered to act as Y C L delegate at the Feb. session of the Bu. Carried.

RESOLUTION OF DISTRICT FIVE

The following resolution has been carried by District 5:

The D E C recommends to the C E C to call the next Convention of No. 1 not earlier than—months from now. Carried 7 to 2.

In case the above is not granted, we request the speedy transmission of our motion with the following reason for same to all DEC's so they may express their opinions.

(1) It is imperative to wait with the Convention until the present controversy within the Party is settled definitely by the C I (that is until the minority's appeal is answered) allowing the rank and file of the suspended members ample time to take action on the decision of the CI.

C. I. Decision on Minority Appeal

TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AMERICA

Comrades:

The appeal of the minority of your Committee against your decisions regarding the organization of a legal political party and your answer to the appeal have been received. Your reply is in perfect harmony with the Theses recently adopted on this subject by the E. C. of the C. I., and which you have undoubtedly already received.

There is no occasion to re-open the question here, since the Theses fully cover the subject. You must work out the details of the problem in accord with the provisions of the Theses and all party members must work in agreement with them.

The action of the minority in refusing to submit to the decisions of the Party Executive, pending their appeal, constitutes a serious and intolerable breach

of discipline, and it was proper for you to suspend those that interfered with the work. However, we should endeavor to enforce this necessary party discipline in such a manner as to leave as little permanent disorganization as possible. We advise that when you inform the minority membership of this decision you also convey to them your desire to reinstate at once with full membership rights suspended comrades willing to conform to the Theses on Legal Activities sent to you by the E. C. of the C. I. and to the decisions of your C. E. C. in harmony therewith.

With Communist greetings,
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

(SEAL) (Signed) O. W. Kunsinen
Sec. of E. C. C. I.