

NEW MASSES

September 28, 1943

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In Canada 20¢

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A SCHEDULE TO REMEMBER

To start the autumn season, we are proud to announce that the magazine will carry articles in forthcoming issues by the following well known writers:

EARL BROWDER

"Victory Has a Price." A discussion of the present phase of the war.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN AND EARL BROWDER

Dr. Meiklejohn is one of America's great teachers. Author of "Education Between Two Worlds," he made educational history at Brown University, Amherst College, the University of Wisconsin. He and Mr. Browder will discuss the issue of unity between Communists and liberals.

DOXEY A. WILKERSON

Former Associate Professor of Education at Howard University, will write a two-article series, "Why I Joined the Communist Party."

A. B. MAGIL

on a topic of concern to millions in this country: "What About Roosevelt?"

MIKHAIL SHOLOKHOV

The famous Soviet novelist has sent us an unforgettable chapter from his forthcoming book.

For these reasons we underscore what we have written the past two weeks: that at least 5,000 more NM readers must be added to our list. And, as we have suggested, we can get many times that total if every reader of NM gets just one subscription. So—need we say anything more? That new sub means five dollars, or a dollar down and the rest according to the schedule listed on the sub blank on page 30. We await your answer.

NM SPOTLIGHT

Politics vs. Strategy

CONFIRMATION of Earl Browder's recent charge that political and not military considerations have held up the opening of a genuine second front through a western invasion of Europe has come from an unexpected source—Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the *New York Times*. Though the *Times* in its editorial columns treats the second front as a "Russian" obsession, Baldwin, in the September 19 issue of that paper, declares that American military opinion "has long agreed with the Russian contention that a cross-Channel invasion is the best way to victory." He points out, furthermore, that "after careful weighing of the risks and the gains, the advantages and disadvantages, most American military thought seems to agree that the Channel invasion is the quickest and surest way to win the war in Europe. But the British have not agreed with this theory." They remember Dunkerque and Dieppe and "prefer other paths to victory."

But then comes this significant statement: "Political factors and postwar nationalistic aspirations complicate the judgment of military strategy." Baldwin tries to counteract this damaging admission by making it appear that the Russian desire for a western invasion is politically motivated since that area is farthest from the Russian "sphere of influence." But even if this were true, since, according to Baldwin, sound military judgment dictates a western invasion, what he is implying is that political fear of Russia has overruled this judgment. And he is even more explicit in the words that follow: "The British would probably welcome a Balkan invasion for both military and post-war political reasons. And American military judgment in turn must be influenced by such future considerations. . . ."

What a high American military man, basing himself solely on military considerations, thinks of the Italian invasion and a possible attack on the Balkans, was indicated in an interview with Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, commander of US Army forces in the Middle East, in the *Times* of September 5. "Speaking strictly from a military viewpoint," he said, "and not taking in political or humanitarian considerations, I believe that we must continue driving straight at the center of Germany without deviation. Lopping off the arms, such as Italy and the Balkan Peninsula, would be a process which in itself would serve to protract the war effort and delay our get-

ting at the other job because of the immense amount of shipping and manpower required."


Have the American people the right and the duty to insist that military and not reactionary political considerations guide our strategy? Have they the right and the duty to demand that the war be shortened through "driving straight at the center of Germany" by immediately striking across the Channel?

Rollback and Subsidies

THERE have been so many false alarms, false starts, and smoke-without-fire pronouncements in the realm of price-control that while the promise of OPA's general manager, Chester Bowles, of an immediate 3.3 percent rollback in food costs is welcome, we prefer to postpone all celebrations till the reduction is visible in the neighborhood markets and grocery stores of the nation. Moreover, *PM* has challenged the calculations behind this announcement. It charges that instead of a 2.3 percent rollback to be achieved through reductions on a number of food items (the other one percent is to come through stricter enforcement), the

actual reduction under the OPA program would be less than one percent. This would mean a saving to the average family of only \$3.17 a year. We don't profess to know whether the OPA or *PM* is right, but we do know that the public is interested in results, not mathematical subtleties. And it will not infinitely be patient with the failure to produce results.

The rollback of food costs is, of course, intimately related to the whole problem of subsidies. President Roosevelt conferred last week with the leaders of four national farm organizations, but as in the case of the OPA announcement there is a difference of opinion as to just what was decided. One report in the press quotes the leaders of three of the organizations, who represent the commercial farm bloc that has been spearheading the fight against subsidies and all other measures to assure maximum production and distribution of food, as crowing over the fact that the conference with the President agreed to ditch consumer subsidies. (This term is a misnomer; these subsidies go not to the consumer, but to the farmer to stimulate production.) According to another newspaper account, the farm bloc crowd were defeated on this question and agreed to



Victory: "Haven't you brought the wrong music?"

London "Daily Worker"

swallow subsidies under the face-saving name of "support prices." A third report states that the President presented the administration food program for 1944, which includes "support prices." The three farm bloc leaders gave no assurance that they would not oppose all or part of this program.

Here again, what consumers are interested in is not the device or the name, but results. A renewed campaign against subsidies by the National Association of Manufacturers, the US Chamber of Commerce, and Frank Gannett's National Food Conference emphasizes that this is no time for any relaxation of popular pressure for food, price-control, and rationing programs that measure up to the needs of the armed forces and of civilian health and morale.

Below the Belt



WE TRUST that President Roosevelt's first message to Congress on its return from a two-months' recess has a symbolic meaning that extends beyond the issue directly involved. In this message the President challenges the right of Congress, under the whiplash of the Dies committee, to encroach on both the executive and judicial branches of the government by ordering the removal from the government payroll of three outstanding public servants, Dr. Robert Morss Lovett, William E. Dodd, Jr., and Dr. Goodwin Watson. The real charge against these men was early and staunch devotion to the anti-fascist cause; and among their accusers were some of the seditionists now under federal indictment. The action of the House in attaching a rider to an appropriation bill and browbeating a reluctant Senate into accepting it was a blow below the belt of American democracy. It was direct aid and comfort to Hitler and his American abettors.

In his message the President declares flatly that this rider is unconstitutional and in his judgment is not binding. What further he intends to do to back up this statement is not known. The congressional rider forbids any government department or agency to employ Lovett, Dodd, and Watson after November 15 unless prior to that date they are appointed to office by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Dr. Watson has announced that he and his two colleagues intend to stay on their jobs beyond November 15.

A showdown, impends. The strength of all Americans who are against the importation of Axis methods into the national legislature should be thrown behind the effort to keep Lovett, Dodd, and Watson at their posts.

The UE Convention



IT WAS a story fit for the occasion: one of the St. Louis delegates to the recent convention of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine

Workers told how a local in his city back in 1861 adjourned its meeting and in a body offered its services to President Lincoln in the Civil War. The spirit of the 1861 unionists dominated the sessions of the UE: out of its ranks 110,000 members have gone into the armed services, and their brothers, over half a million strong, who have remained at home, constitute one of the staunchest sectors on the industrial front. Their pledge of total support to President Roosevelt for total victory was underscored by their performance since Pearl Harbor, and by their resolutions at this convention to better their already excellent record. It was indeed one of the most inspiring gatherings since the war: an example for all labor.

The delegates cut to the heart of the politico-military complex of today in their practically unanimous resolution—that the day be speeded when "the full weight of the military power of the United Nations will be brought to bear against the western as well as the eastern and southern gates of Hitler's European forces." They envisaged victory this year—1943—through genuine coalition warfare. Agreement on this paramount issue was reflected in other crucial questions of the day: national and international unity, adherence to the no-strike policy, increase of production via the means of incentive pay, absolute repudiation of the policies of John L. Lewis, whom they termed a traitor to the nation. They overlooked no issue of significance to the patriotic interests of the country, a glaring contrast to the archaic thinking of some other labor contemporaries, such as those on the Executive Council of the AFL. This was shown, most particularly, in the UE's approach to the vital issue of international relations.

In a five-pronged resolution this union struck deeper into the question than any labor body to date. The delegates pressed their officers to enter immediately into direct communication with their opposite numbers in Great Britain and the Soviet Union for an exchange of accredited delegates. This move will be urged upon other metal working unions in the CIO setup. Furthermore, they proposed the mutual exchange of rank-and-file delegates from union shops of Great Britain and the Soviet Union; they urged President Philip Murray to seek a conference among British, Soviet and Western Hemisphere trade unionists to establish collaboration among their respective trade unions, and finally,

proposed that fraternal delegates from these countries be invited to attend the forthcoming convention of the CIO.

Unity—that magic word of this war—did not remain on the lips of the delegates; it dominated UE thinking and actions, save for an isolated group of Trotskyists and America Firsters who clustered around the figure of James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer of the CIO and former president of the UE. This hysterically vocal minority sought to inject Red-baiting into the proceedings—their customary practice at conventions—but they got a thorough trouncing from the majority. One of their dodges this time was an effort to stampede the delegates into a vote of confidence in Carey, with an eye towards his reelection at the forthcoming convention of the CIO. Carey's record in the UE has been none too savory: his Red-baiting and covert sniping at the officers is well known. What the delegates thought was registered in the vote: it was 2,211 to 780—against Carey.

SPACE does not permit full discussion of two other union conventions being held as we go to press: that of the CIO Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, in Denver, and the United Rubber Workers of America, CIO, in Toronto. From dispatches published to date, it appears that both assemblies carry on in the spirit of the UE. The three conventions evidence a rapidly increasing awareness of labor's responsibility in this war. Dedicated to victory, they have come to realize that more is involved in that achievement than labor has hitherto recognized.

In all three gatherings, the question of unity is high on the agenda. Common to all, for example, is impatience with the reality that Negroes have not been totally integrated in the war effort. The non-ferrous miners, for instance, urged punishment for perpetrators of racial disorders, and sought the passage of HR 7, abolishing the poll tax. General Secretary-Treasurer Charles E. Lanning of the Rubber Workers, pleaded for unity of "all people, regardless of color, creed, or nationality." He advocated the unity of the United Nations, based on a rock foundation of international trade union unity. All three unions recognized the menace of disunity, spread by the John L. Lewis-Trotskyist cabals, and they minced no words in blasting the danger. The working man is rapidly learning that Hitler's secret weapon is the wedge of disunity.

In sum, the unions attest to one of the most significant factors of the day: labor knows that it constitutes the political, as well as the economic, keystone of the country, and it is not at all loath to accept that responsibility—which is one of the most hopeful auguries that the war will be won, and that the world will not be robbed of the peace.

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FEPC in Action



ONE of the most flagrant examples of racial discrimination is the gigantic American railroad industry. The discrimination hits Negroes and Mexicans, or persons of Mexican descent, particularly, but other groups too suffer from the "racial superiority" myth which permeates the entire industry. It injures every American, white or colored, for by holding back national unity it hinders our war effort. To their shame neither management nor the unions have taken the initiative in wiping out this blot upon national unity. In consequence there has been terrific pressure brought to bear upon the President's Fair Employment Practices Committee to investigate the industry in order to force compliance with Executive order 8802. Counterpressure from the industry itself and from other influences perfectly willing to compromise with victory over the Axis successfully postponed the hearings for nearly a year. At long last, however, the reconstituted FEPC has opened the hearings in Washington, D.C.

Twenty-two railroads and fifteen trade unions are involved. Both sides, management and labor, are guilty; their crime is now being exposed in all its dirty ramifications. Negro railroad workers charge collusion on the part of management and the unions in discriminating against them. Management seeks to lay the blame on the unions, which it claims have insisted on including discriminatory regulations in their work contracts. The phrase "non-promotable," appearing in many contracts, refers to Negroes; it prevents them from rising to the higher ranks of employment. Evidence given so far indicates a wide variety of discriminatory practices. Not only are equal promotion and seniority rights denied, but in instances which have been cited unequal pay for the same work prevails. In other instances Negroes are made to do a certain type of work while being classified and paid for a lower category. Witnesses have given evidence that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers and other brotherhoods have refused membership to Negroes and forced them to hire special white representatives to handle their grievances before management.

That this disgraceful state of affairs is grist in the Axis mill is self-evident. The way it is so used has been explained to the committee by Clyde E. Miller of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. "One of the strongest weapons in the hands of Hitler," testified Miller, "—and American propagandists consciously or unconsciously are following the Hitler pattern—was ex-

Our Manpower Quandary

IN DOING away with the arbitrary and dangerous attempt to treat the manpower and father-draft as separate issues, the Baruch report to War Mobilization Director Byrnes performed an extremely useful service. The disruptive attempt by Senator Wheeler and other defeatists to confront the reconvened Congress with the fallacious question of whether or not to draft pre-Pearl Harbor fathers, and to argue this question as though it bore no relation to any other part of the war effort, has for the moment at least been weakened. Actually Wheeler and his appeasing friends seized upon the father-draft as merely another way to undermine the fight against the Axis. Once the draft is viewed as an integral part of the larger manpower problem, a good deal of the confusion spread by Wheeler is overcome.

The country's manpower resources must obviously be mobilized to their maximum effectiveness to speed victory. The central need now, as it has been since Pearl Harbor, is to keep essential workers in production without in any way interfering with the building of a powerful army. Quite simply, family men, like everyone else in the population, must take their place in the war effort on the basis of what contribution they can best render, not on the basis of dependency. The selective service system is sufficiently flexible to defer fathers so long as single men in non-essential jobs are available. It is Congress' responsibility to provide families left behind with adequate support.


The Baruch report correctly stresses that even at this late date over-all centralized planning of production has still not been achieved. Employers hoard workers or use them wastefully. When Mr. Baruch accuses government agencies of failing to work harmoniously together, the blame for faulty cooperation must be visited most heavily on James Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization, who has refused to fulfill the task originally assigned to him by the President. It is Byrnes' job to see that inter-departmental rivalries and misunderstandings are eliminated, and that production is brought into balance. After six months, Byrnes has yet to act. His inadequacy is responsible for most of the present so-called manpower shortage.

The present crisis has been brought about not so much by insufficient numbers of workers as by employers' refusal fully to utilize women in industry, by hostility to incentive wage payments, by a failure to solve subsidiary problems like medical care, transportation, housing, shopping time, and other causes of absenteeism and inefficiency, by continued racial discrimination against Negroes, and other abuses for which solutions are obvious. Unfortunately, Mr. Baruch has failed to put his finger on the main reasons for dislocations. To talk of a system of "labor priorities" is meaningless so long as manpower shortages are ascertained solely from figures provided by employers. No attempt has been made by the War Manpower Commission to use the inspection powers granted it by Congress to check up on hoarding and inefficiency. Byrnes has exhibited a constant hostility toward labor-management committees. The Baruch report ignores the role of organized labor—a primary mistake which prevents any realistic solution to manpower shortages. Moreover, it is insufficient to bemoan inter-departmental conflicts without adding that Byrnes, whose task it is to see that conflicts are eliminated, has steadfastly refused to carry out the President's instructions to plan.

Manpower is part and parcel of the production picture. The Austin-Wadsworth labor-draft bill would substitute coercion for planning; Byrnes would substitute inaction and evasion for planning; and now, Baruch, with a far clearer understanding, attempts to save face for Byrnes instead of planning. It is time to call Byrnes to account. It is time to call in organized labor, which has pointed out where the weaknesses in production lay and in "solutions" to manpower difficulties. Only when labor is allowed to play its proper part in determining over-all policy can the confusion perpetuated by Byrnes be overcome and production geared to the demands of the war.

ploitation of what anthropologists call the myth of racial superiority." The Axis tells the people of the Far East that they "can have no faith in the promise of white Americans when they deny equal rights to their fellow citizens who are not white." This type of propaganda, Miller said, was "extraordinarily and almost immediately effective, dynamic, and dangerous."

Grist for Hitler



A LITTLE way up the Hudson River from New York City is the town of Hillburn (pop. 1,100). About half the population is Negro. The town has two school houses. One is an old fire-trap built before the turn of the century, the other is a modern public school structure, which, it is claimed, is large enough to accommodate all the town's school children. The School Board, headed by a man called J. Edgar Davidson has Jim-Crowed the town. The white children are supposed to go to the new school house, the Negro children to the fire trap.

Revolting against this obvious injustice, and supported in their efforts by a large section of the white community, Negro parents and children have this year determined to bring the little town of Hillburn back into the American orbit. The School Board, in an effort to counteract the threat of democracy, has redistricted the town with the intention of drawing the line so that all Negro children would fall into the area served by the fire-trap. Through some oversight, or the carelessness of the cartographer, the redistricting partly misfired. On the opening day of school it was found that thirty-two Negro pupils were "entitled" to attend the new school. And by the School Board's own regulation these children could not be denied entrance. To the other fifty-six Negro children in Hillburn, however, the school authorities staunchly refused the inalienable right of equality.

At least fifty of the children condemned to the Jim-Crow school have struck. They have refused to enter the fire-trap. They and their parents, the town's white children, and many of the white citizens are backing them. So is Miss Kate Savery, for the past twenty years principal of the Jim-Crow school and courageous fighter against segregation. Fortunately, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People has taken up the fight and has furnished counsel to the people of Hillburn against their own School Board. The case is being taken to the State Board of Education. The people of Hillburn, of neighboring communities, and of the entire state must stand firm against this wretched School Board clique.

The President's Message

IF THE President's accounting of the war to date harnesses the bucking broncos in Congress to a better understanding of their obligations, then it will have served a great purpose. His was an adroit message in which the tactic was not to meet the malicious opposition head on but to take them by the flank in a stirring review of what mammoth tasks have been completed and what new burdens have yet to be shouldered.

Of the rudimentary lessons which the President transmitted to the legislature the outstanding is that this "is all one war, and it must be governed by one basic strategy." That strategy has on several occasions been pronounced as dealing with Hitler first without lifting pressure on the Japanese. While there were doubts expressed in some quarters that the conference in Quebec may have shifted the emphasis so far as this basic strategy is concerned, the President inferentially reassured the nation that this is not the case by asserting that new landings on the continent, coupled with great blows from the air, have been projected.

His portrayal of the sweeping character of the Soviet offensive is welcome indeed, for it redresses the balance of his recent Ottawa speech where the achievements of the Red Army went totally unmentioned by him.

Our help has of course been a large factor. We are proud of it and the Russians, contrary to Admiral Standley, have never denied it. But it would be well also to maintain a sense of balance in estimating the quantity of assistance rendered the Soviet Union as against the opportunities which Soviet military exploits have provided us through this aid. The USSR has given us time to prepare means of converting what in the beginning looked like a protracted struggle into a much briefer one. One can get a good picture of how the Russians made the conflict easier for us by comparing what happened from the day we invaded Sicily to what happened during the same time in Russia.

The President in his report tells us that the casualties among the Germans and the Italians in Sicily were approximately 165,000 including 132,000 prisoners. But on the Eastern Front alone in the same period of time we know from Soviet communiques that about 1,500,000 Germans were put out of the fight. The Americans in the Sicilian battle lost 7,445 men in addition to 23,713 British and Canadians. Without knowing what Russian casualties were, it is safe to surmise that they were many times greater than those of the western allies if only because they met an immensely greater opposition in more intense fighting. In other words the Russians actually saved American, Canadian and British lives at the expense of their own. For eventually we should have had to meet these 1,500,000 Germans in battle if the Russians had not.

Lend-lease assistance, then, has been reciprocal in its effects, with the benefits weighted on our side. But lend-lease also represents a very early stage in the anti-Nazi struggle when it was paramount to keep the Russians supplied while they were withdrawing under the onslaught of the blitz. Today, however, as the President put it, the shoe is on the other foot and is pinching very hard. In other words we long ago reached a new stage of the war—a phase best exemplified at Stalingrad—that demands of us the kind of battle plan and coalition action not just to keep our major ally in the field but to embrace the tremendous advantages that ally has created for us by its smashing offensives.

It is at his point that the President's otherwise compelling message is disappointing. There is nothing in it which points to an immediate invasion of Europe. He states that the Red Army is still a long way from Germany. And the conclusion one may draw from that observation is that perhaps this is not the moment for attack from the west. But it is an army that we are fighting and that army for all its remaining strength has deteriorated to the point where it is not necessary to breach the walls of Germany proper before it collapses completely. In the last war the Germans were beaten in France. And the Red Army now in its battle for decision has made it possible for a huge pincer operation to bring the Wehrmacht to its knees miles before the German frontier.

The President, for all the hesitation engendered by advice to the contrary, must be shown that he has decisive support for an immediate attack in the west. It is not the President who obstructs a second front even if the cynics and faint-hearted think so. It is powerful counter-pressure, largely political in inspiration, that is doing the obstructing. He needs, to overcome this pressure, so huge an outburst of public opinion that there can be no doubt in his mind that the command to breach western Europe will have the strongest majority behind it.

The Oklahoma Trials

THREE years ago patriotic Americans were shocked at the bit of indigenous Hitlerism that cropped up in Oklahoma City. Ten thousand books and pamphlets were seized in police raids, and a veritable book-burning occurred in the heart of America. Criminal syndicalism laws were invoked against a number of men and women charged with membership in the Communist Party; the possession of Marxist literature as well as other books of social concern were presented as evidence by the state. That, in fact, was the sole evidence presented.

The cause of democracy was advanced, last week, when the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma reversed the conviction and ten-year sentence of Robert Wood and his case was remanded to the district court in Oklahoma City. The defense will

now move for final dismissal of the case against Mr. Wood, his wife, Mrs. Ina Wood, and three other persons. The International Labor Defense, in welcoming this decision, announced that literally millions of Americans, "trade unionists, writers, artists, religious leaders, lawyers, and professional workers joined with us in fighting against the Oklahoma criminal syndicalism persecution." Thus America acts, when it sees and realizes that our democratic structure is under attack. The courts of Oklahoma do not relish the reputation of propagating a Hitler-like way of life in our country.

Back That Attack

WE ARE quite sure that the news of what happened to our men on that fire-ridden Salerno beach-head must have given a fresh push to the sales of bonds in

this third war loan drive. It was one way of expressing our deep concern over their safety, of our gratitude for what they went through before their hold was finally secured. Salerno should awaken us to the hard pull ahead and how successful financing of the war will make it much easier to beat the cult of death. The biggest battles are still to be fought with the Nazi goliath. Every quarter, every dollar you can scrape together brings the longed-for end closer. We know that even if you have a larger pay envelope, living is much more expensive than it has ever been before. But we also know that no matter how much we do at home it doesn't begin to equal the sacrifices made by our troops, our sailors, our flyers. And particularly for those, millions who strongly urge our government to smash across the Channel, the purchase of bonds without stint is a token of how we mean to back that attack.



FRONT LINES by COLONEL T.

IS HITLER SHIFTING TROOPS?

DURING the first week in September the Red Army captured (counting from north to south) Navlya, (south of Bryansk) Khutor-Mikhailovski, Konotop, Sumy, Merefa, (southwest of Kharkov) Slavyansk, Voroshilovsk, and cleared the main railroad line down to Taganrog. The capture of these places, each of which was a key strong point, prepared the major push which has since carried the Soviet troops to between twenty-five and 110 miles west of that line.

The breaking of the line was greeted in our press by a chorus of bitter or, at best, sour comments, some of them based on half-cocked information from rather suspicious sources. One of the opening guns of the new "strategic" campaign against the Soviet Union came from that lone vulgarian on the staff of the elegant and gentlemanly New York *Herald Tribune*, Mark Sullivan. Wrote Mr. Sullivan (among a lot of other things in rather bad taste): "What we and Britain are doing in Italy and elsewhere in Europe represents our best judgment, to be followed regardless of criticism or complaint from any source, including Russia," and "It is enough to say that Britain, by the epic magnificence of its lonely stand in 1940, by its headship in the fight against Hitler, unquestionable and incomparable, is entitled to practice such military strategy as it deems best."

Well, that's that. A man who stood bravely in the storm without an umbrella and did not die of pneumonia is entitled to

practice medicine in the curing of pneumonia "as he deems best."


Mr. Sullivan tries to bolster his argument with Walter Lippmann's authority and quotes the latter on our military effort: "There is nothing embarrassing and nothing to apologize for (in that effort). In fact, there is every reason and ground for pride. . . ." Thus we see that Sullivan, the barker, and Lippmann, the journalist-statesman, agree that it is quite enough, after almost two years of preparation, to fight a maximum of six German divisions when our Soviet allies are fighting 212.

During the same week of September Cyrus Sulzberger of the New York *Times* bumped into Polish General Anders in Cairo and cabled the general's views on the situation in Russia. To bolster General Anders' authority, Mr. Sulzberger gives him the following recommendation (no sarcasm on Mr. Sulzberger's part was

seemingly intended): "He [the general] must be recognized as somewhat of an authority on the Russian front because he was there for more than six months as commander-in-chief of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union." Of course, Mr. Sulzberger does not mention the fact that General Anders' "front" was located somewhere back of the Volga, that he never even went near the real front, and that he deemed it more prudent to get out of the Soviet Union and take his army out when the going got tough for the Red forces. It would have been more charitable not to mention the general's "connection" with the Soviet front.

Mr. Sulzberger quotes the general's expert opinion thus: "I'm sure [says Anders] the Germans have taken many divisions from the Russian front for use in Italy and the Balkans as well as for a strategic reserve to meet other threats, and are in process of removing other divisions. I believe at least fifty divisions are thus affected, although of course, I cannot be absolutely certain. Judging from what is going on on the Soviet front, I think it is fair to state with absolute certainty that large numbers of troops are being withdrawn for reserve dispositions against Allied attacks." Thus speaks the "refugee from the battle fronts"—General Anders, who thinks "it is fair" to talk sheer nonsense.

Also during the first week in September, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, of the *Times*, picked up the Anders nonsense, but said that



General Anders' statement "seems to this observer to be far too optimistic" (of course in the case of Anders the word "pessimistic" would have been more appropriate). Well, this is quite nice of Mr. Baldwin, we must admit. However, still remaining under the spell of German "superiority," Mr. Baldwin says: "[The German] defensive lines are still strong . . . and the enemy appears to be retreating to *predetermined* positions . . ." (My italics—Col. T.)

WE HAVE quoted all these opinions, not only because they appeared as a far from casual rash on the fair skin of our press, but because they represent a fundamental attitude of certain circles that Russia must not be permitted to lick Germany without having been bled white.

In fact, Mr. Sullivan, General Anders, Mr. Baldwin, et al., all argue against fighting the Germans on a sizeable scale at this time. Mr. Sullivan simply says in fact that "mother knows best" and—"no arguments please!" General Anders says, with the typical *desinvolture* of the dashing Polish gentleman, that "*wszystko w porzondku*"—everything is in order—and that fighting three divisions in Italy is in fact a "second front." Mr. Baldwin intimates that the Germans are withdrawing according to plan, therefore—building up their strategic reserves and that (such is the inference), obviously, it would not be safe to open a second front because there might be casualties.

Now let us look at the facts about German "withdrawals." Messrs. Sullivan, Anders, and Baldwin may have access to the reports of our intelligence agents inside Europe. If they have not, then they are only talking through their hats. Assuming they have such access, we must not forget that the most reliable intelligence about the strength of the enemy is acquired by the *process of fighting him*. Prisoners are taken, corpses are examined, documents are captured. A digest of such firsthand information gives a picture of units facing an army incomparably more exact than all the reports of intelligence agents in the rear of the enemy.

The Russians being the only ones who fight the Germans on a grand scale, naturally have intelligence reports on the number and composition of the divisions facing them which are far more reliable than those available to Messrs. Sullivan, Anders, and Baldwin. Theirs are the only authoritative data, and they say that they are now fighting 212 German divisions, that no divisions are leaving the Eastern Front, and that on the contrary, there are some new arrivals at the front from the west. Against this information, there is not a scrap of evidence to the contrary. So much for the question of German "withdrawals from the Eastern Front to western Europe."


Now about other "German withdrawals," i.e., the German retreat in the east itself. It is claimed that it is being made according to plan and that the Germans will "choose" to stop here, there or somewhere else.

What kind of a *plan* for retreat can there be when this retreat entails the abandonment of all the objectives of the preceding strategy? Obviously, only a plan which has been forced by the opponent. The Soviet High Command forced the retreat on the Germans by means of the hammer blows of the Red Army. Neither Tunis, nor Sicily, nor Italy did it. It was done at Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, Taganrog, Novorossisk, and points west.

The Germans, as we pointed out three weeks ago in quoting Mr. Max Werner (whose book *Attack Can Win in '43* many an Allied chief-of-staff should keep

on his desk at all times) on the "area of strategic decision" in the Soviet Union, are being thrown out of the "area of strategic decision." Look at the appended map below which is a replica of one of Mr. Werner's maps (on page 93, *op. cit.*). You see that the "area of strategic decision," marked by the broken line, has been cut in half by the Kiev salient, that it has been better than half overrun, and that what is left of it is the bend of the Dnieper and the north-western fortified area, marked by the trapezium Vitebsk-Smolensk-Gomel-Minsk. All key points, except the latter, are in imminent danger. Thus the zone, containing either the keys to what the Germans went after, or those very things they went after (Donbas, Ukraine), has been practically lost.

Novorossisk is another example. This is what General-of-Artillery Paul Hasse says



The area of strategic decision on the Eastern Front

in the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, Vienna, June 29, 1943:

"The famous Kuban bridgehead was first formed for offensive purposes. . . . When the Soviet winter offensive made it necessary to withdraw from the Kuban region, the mission of the bridgehead became defensive, *providing security for the Crimean peninsula which in turn provides protection for the southern wing of the entire eastern front.*" (My italics—Col. T.)

A "planned retreat" from a place which "provides security for the entire southern wing of the eastern front" may only mean one thing: there is no more strategy for the Germans left (either *grand*, or other-

wise). Only tactics are left. And this certainly did not enter into German plans.

So much for that "strategy of withdrawal" which gives up everything that is of value. But what about those "brilliant detaching movements" the Germans claim they are performing? A detaching movement is designed to effect a retreat without loss. It means getting out of the fight under the screen of rearguards which periodically retreat faster than the enemy advances. Such a retreat does not presuppose stands-to-the-death in strong points. But this is what the Germans are doing everywhere. Novorossisk is one example where the Germans hung on until ejected. Practically all the strong points south and south-

west of Kharkov are examples (Merefa, Valki, Kolomak, Vodolaga, etc.). Priluki is an example. Or take, for instance, the Romny operation. Romny was outflanked and its railroad cut three days before it fell. This is no "detaching movement." This is a stubborn fight to hold important things. It means also yielding to superior force and skill.

Put all this together, and you will see that it is not the Germans who are going to "decide" where they will stand and fight. The question will be decided for them by the Soviet Command, by the weather and by future Allied action in western Europe. Strategy does not belong to Germany any more.



WATCH ON THE POTOMAC by BRUCE MINTON

WHAT ABOUT AIR POWER?

Washington.

A DESPERATE effort is being made in certain high and influential Washington circles to prove that a Western Front, capable of engaging fifty to sixty Nazi divisions, is now unnecessary. This latest attack against waging coalition warfare proposes that aerial bombing be substituted for a genuine land front. The argument, merely a renewal of the "Victory through Airpower" campaign, goes something like this: of course, Germany could not be knocked out of the war by planes based on England alone, but now the Allies can take over Italian airfields and bomb Germany from two directions at once. Thus German defenses will be divided, and the Nazis' ability to resist can be destroyed from the air.

Such arguments are designed to take advantage of misinformation concerning the past effectiveness of aerial bombardments against Germany, and of the general opinion that bombings are more devastating than they have actually proved to be in practice. These arguments, if they cause further postponement of a land attack against the main body of enemy forces, can only imperil speedy victory and prevent the attainment of genuine coalition warfare (with the inevitable deterioration of relations among the three leading anti-Axis powers). Not only will failure to achieve coalition warfare menace the perspectives of the postwar world, but it will also result in the needless slaughter of American boys, as well as the youth of the USSR, Great Britain, and the occupied nations.

I have recently learned the contents of a report based on a carefully compiled and

documented analysis of the military and economic results achieved by aerial bombardment of Germany to the beginning of September 1943. I cannot at present give the names of the group who compiled this study. Wherever possible, I give sources which confirm the conclusions. Yet I can vouch for the accuracy of all statements. Let those who glibly claim that "aerial bombardment of Germany will win the war cheaply," contradict the facts and conclusions presented here, if they can.

THE "strategy" offered as a substitute for coalition warfare and for the launching of a second land front in force rests on the following assumptions:

(1) There is no point fighting a major land war with Italy as a base, because the Alps constitute too difficult a barrier for an attack on Germany proper.

(2) Moreover, with the bulk of the Anglo-American forces committed to the Mediterranean area, the Allies have insufficient men and equipment at the present time to launch an attack across the Channel against northern France.

(3) Therefore, while aerial bombing from England alone cannot knock out Germany, the added impact from bombers based in Italy will so divide German defenses that aerial warfare will be decisive in a year's time, and Germany will then be a "pushover." This aerial bombardment will save thousands, perhaps millions of lives.

Backing up these assumptions, the proponents of exclusive reliance on air warfare predict that German industry can be so crippled by bombings as to render it in-

capable of supporting the Nazi war machine. But what does an examination of the effectiveness of Allied bombardments of Germany reveal? Do results to date permit the conclusion that if these raids are continued, aerial activity can of itself knock Germany out of the war?

A close tabulation of official reports, which can to some degree be checked against more or less accurate newspaper accounts, indicates that only in the second quarter of 1943 did the bomb loads dropped by RAF planes on Germany exceed the peak dropped on Britain in 1940. But it is officially acknowledged that the Battle of Britain had only a trifling effect on British production. True, at the present time, British bomb loads have almost doubled the peak load carried against Britain by the Nazis in 1940. *But considering the greater area that must be covered by Allied bombers, and giving full weight to the additional destruction dealt out by American raids, the intensity of Allied raids per unit of German industrial capacity has not yet reached the intensity of the German 1940 campaign per unit of British industrial capacity.*

As an example, the two cities most heavily bombed by the Allies have been Cologne and Hamburg. Privately, the British Ministry of Information has admitted that aerial reconnaissance over Cologne shows that at present writing the unrepaired damage in that city is minor. Most war industries are functioning, and those destroyed have been replaced in areas more difficult or even impossible to reach by bombers. A maximum of twenty percent of the buildings of Hamburg were de-

stroyed by raids. So far as RAF area bombing (night raids) goes, half of the bombs dropped fell outside the target area and of those that found their mark, eighty percent fell on dwellings. Thus, an overwhelming majority of hits did not affect German industrial production directly. At no time did the evacuation of population from either Hamburg or Cologne exceed about five percent of the population. In Hamburg, a city of 800,000, the most optimistic estimates have put the exodus at a maximum of 50,000 people, and this seems to be exaggerated.

RAF night bombings have not as yet seriously impeded German industrial production. Daylight precision raids by American Flying Fortresses are more accurate, but the forays are also far more expensive in personnel and equipment, and are far fewer in number. Defense against daylight attack is a great deal more effective than against British night raids, and lately Nazi defenses have stiffened markedly. In August American Flying Fortresses engaged in only one daylight raid over Germany proper. In the first ten days of September Flying Fortresses appeared over Germany only once, and dropped less bomb tonnage than in the August attacks. Because of weather conditions, both RAF and American bombing of Germany must be reduced in the winter—in the winters of 1941 and 1942, bombing raids were about half as many as in summer.

ASIDE from official records, the effect on German industrial production is further confirmed by figures cited by Harry Hopkins in his article appearing in the current *American Magazine*. Hopkins, who has access to detailed and accurate information, writes: "Generally speaking, Nazi war production is thought to be down by well over ten percent from raids and other causes." The "other causes" are many. Slowdowns precipitated by forced and slave labor have cut production; so has the drain of manpower to the Soviet front; so have the wearing down of basic equipment, the unsatisfactory performance of ersatz products, the shortages of critical materials. These "other causes" account for a greater reduction in German production than aerial bombardment. And despite the fact that the main Allied bombing concentration has been directed against submarine and plane production, Hopkins writes: "Her [Germany's] submarine and airplane production has not yet diminished much. She has probably stepped up her production of bombers. She is probably building more anti-aircraft guns to meet our bombing offensive."

A further argument advanced by advocates of winning the war by aerial bombardment of Germany is based on "evidence" contained in a recent speech by

James Byrnes. The Director of War Stabilization stated that the Red Army is engaging only forty percent of enemy combat divisions, leaving the remaining sixty percent to defend the rest of Europe. Byrnes concluded that the cost of challenging this immense army would be tremendous. (General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, proved Byrnes' figures to be fantastic when he declared in his report to the Secretary of War that the Red Army is engaging *four-fifths* of the Axis forces in Europe. General Marshall later amended this figure to two-thirds, without explanation).

In addition, advocates of aerial warfare report that the Red Air Force is engaging only one-third of the German Luftwaffe. The inference made is that Allied bombing of Germany accounted for the failure of the German summer offensive against Kursk, and also in large measure explains subsequent Soviet advances. Prime Minister Churchill in his Quebec speech also declared that the Allied air offensive over Germany had drawn most of the Nazi air force from the Russian front.

WHAT are the facts?

One way of determining where the German air force is located is to examine where the Nazis have sustained their air losses. The grand total of Axis planes destroyed by the Anglo-American allies in July and August amounted to 3,400, of which 1,400 were shot down by planes based in England, and another 1,000 Nazi planes were accounted for in the Mediterranean area. The remaining 1,000 planes were Italian, most of them destroyed while still on the ground. The sources of these figures are the Anglo-American official monthly communiques from England, General Eisenhower's summary of Nazi losses during the Sicilian campaign, and the daily communiques dealing with the Mediterranean theater.

Against this total of 3,400 Axis planes, Premier Stalin reported on September 8 that during the same July-August period, the Red Air Force shot down 5,720 German planes, about 100 planes a day. Accordingly, the Red Air Force accounted for sixty percent of the total Axis losses, and seventy percent of the German plane losses.

But the Red Air Force also destroyed bombers, while very few bombers were accounted for by the Anglo-American air force. In terms of total weight of air power eliminated, and of crews put out of action, the Red Air Force must be credited with a good deal over seventy percent of all Nazi planes smashed by the United Nations in Europe.

Consequently, General Marshall's statement that the Red Army is engaging only one-third of the Nazi air force is seen to

be wide of the mark. Nor can Churchill's assumption that aerial bombardments of Germany have forced the Nazis to withdraw most of their air force from the USSR be squared with the facts. Certainly, it is impossible to claim, on the basis of known losses, that Allied aerial bombardment accounts for the success of the Red Army counter-offensive, though of course it has helped. The reverse is more nearly true—Red Air Force activity largely explains the success of Allied raids over Germany.

But then, what will be the result on Germany of aerial attacks based on Italian airfields?

The most efficient bombing by planes based on Britain has been against the Ruhr, 300 miles from London. If the airfields at Florence were in Allied hands, the distance to Prague would be 500 miles, to Vienna 450 miles, to Munich 350 miles. Even if Italian bases farther north were used, the distance to German industrial centers still remains outside the 300 miles range. To get at German industrial centers, Allied bombers must cross the high Alps, which enhances the difficulties of such raids. Italian bases would undoubtedly prove extremely valuable in bombing satellite nations such as Hungary and Rumania, but such attacks would not knock German production out of the war or really prove decisive.

THE Red Army not only engages approximately three-quarters of the Nazi air force, but also is meeting at least four-fifths of the German land armies. It is only realistic to admit that just as Allied successes in the Mediterranean and Italy were predicated on the Red Army's ability to cope with the major Axis armies (including over a million Italians), so Allied bombings of Germany are predicated on the Red Air Force continuing to involve most of the Luftwaffe. This is vital to an understanding of the conduct of the war now and in the future.

Aerial bombardment alone will not bring victory. It cannot alone knock out Germany, or result in a Germany that will prove a "pushover" a year from now. Aerial bombardment is a highly effective weapon in conjunction with all other weapons of total warfare. Alone it cannot be decisive. By engaging the main forces of the Nazis now, the United Nations can end the war in Europe in the immediate future. Failure to attack in force, offers Germany a breathing spell, and the opportunity to bolster European defenses for a far longer and far more costly war. To accept the slogan of exclusive air warfare is to capitulate to the defeatists and the appeasers who desire a long war with all that spells in needless suffering and in danger to the subsequent peace.



WHAT BRITISH LABOR WANTS

THERE were several genuine achievements at the seventy-fifth meeting of the British Trades Union Congress. The general council, for example, agreed to withdraw its infamous Circular 16 known as the "Black Circular"—which barred Communists from holding office in local trade union councils. In a unanimous vote, which in effect means support of the industrial form of organization over the craft, the delegates approved a reexamination of the trade union structure to pave the way for amalgamation and so avoid overlapping and harmful competition. Whereas in 1942 the TUC convention supported the arrest of Indian Congress leaders, this year it demanded the release of India's political prisoners. Even more, it insisted on the formation of an Indian national government to be elected by a free vote and the granting of full dominion status for such a government.

The Congress also elected Arthur Horner, head of the South Wales Miners' Federation and a member of the executive committee of the British Communist Party, as fraternal delegate to the 1944 AFL convention. It was also for the first time in TUC history that a woman, Anne Loughlin, acted as convention chairman.

The convention also defeated a resolution that placed on the German people the entire onus of Hitler's crimes. The resolution had its origin in the campaign now being conducted by Lord Vansittart, who was permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs during the reign of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. The convention instead approved a resolution sponsored by the Miners Union which placed the guilt "upon the Nazis alone." Here was definite progress, inasmuch as at its meeting in 1942 the TUC voted for a Vansittart resolution, as did the Labor Party Congress this year.

These and a number of other votes represented not only a sharp defeat for the TUC's general council but also a fundamental shift of power within the TUC away from the general unions, which take in workers in upward of 200 different industries, toward the engineers, miners, and railwaymen's unions, which more than ever are organizing along industrial lines.

But not all that took place at the TUC meeting was satisfactory. For on the two pivotal subjects—international labor unity and the need for an immediate second front—the Congress fell far short of expectations or the desires of British workers

as a whole. Thanks to Sir Walter Citrine, the TUC's general secretary, the expansion of the Anglo-Soviet trade union committee was blocked. Likewise the second front issue was skirted through legal and diplomatic flummery. The final resolutions on both issues are vague and say practically nothing.

BEHIND both these sad resolutions on international labor unity and a second front is a sordid tale. It goes back to the 1941 TUC convention when British workers resolved to establish close ties with Soviet labor and agreed to set up an Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. The committee, composed of equal representation from the TUC and the All-Union Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, was to hold regular meetings where views and information would be exchanged.

In May 1942 Citrine came to this country, appeared before the AFL executive board, and urged that the AFL "give up its opposition to collaboration with the Soviet trade unions." He asked also that the AFL join in expanding the Anglo-Soviet committee into a tripartite affair that would include American trade unions. Led by Matthew Woll and William Hutcheson, the AFL Executive Council rejected Citrine's request and proposed that the TUC act as a liaison between the AFL and the Soviet unions. After some delay the TUC general council agreed. Under the arrangement the TUC recognized the AFL as the only legitimate American labor organization, thereby ignoring both the CIO and the Railroad Brotherhoods who vigorously protested their exclusion.

While in the United States Citrine spoke to CIO President Philip Murray. According to Murray, Citrine indicated that he did not care to deal with a delegation representing the CIO, because the CIO was an AFL rival. Later Citrine cabled the Brotherhoods that American participation on the committee was "a matter best dealt with by American labor organizations themselves." In effect, this meant

that the Brotherhoods and the CIO would have to wait until invited by the AFL to take part in relations with the TUC, and that the AFL was the only body with which the TUC would deal.

The whole problem came to a head at the July 1943 meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Committee in Moscow. There the question arose of working not only with the CIO and the Railroad Brotherhoods but also with the trade unions of Latin America, Canada, Australia, and India. It was also the suggestion of the Soviet trade union leaders that the committee be enlarged to include all world trade union bodies as well as those in the occupied countries.

Opposing such a broadening of the Anglo-Soviet Committee, the report of the TUC's general council to the 1943 convention revealed that the TUC was willing to work only with the AFL and that it had accepted completely AFL charges that the CIO was a "breakaway organization," that the CIO's membership was no more than 2,500,000, and that the Railroad Brotherhoods were relatively insignificant. In other words the TUC blindly accepted the AFL's rather silly notion that it was the only labor organization in the United States.

WITH this background one can get a clearer picture of what happened during last week's TUC debate on international labor unity. The debate centered around a proposal made by Nikolai Shvernik, secretary of the Soviet trade union council and the leader of the fraternal delegation to the TUC convention. He proposed that the Anglo-Soviet Committee be expanded to include the unions of the Western Hemisphere and of all countries fighting with the United Nations against the Nazis. Such an extension of the committee, Shvernik stated, would not only help the war effort of the United States, but would also "render active assistance to the peoples of the enslaved countries in their struggle against the fascist terror."

Taking the floor after Shvernik's speech, Citrine argued that while the TUC was anxious to expand the Anglo-Soviet Committee for practical reasons it was not possible to do so. Then along came Isidore Nagler, AFL fraternal delegate and vice-president of David Dubinsky's ILGWU. Nagler, who is part of the Dubinsky anti-Soviet coterie who used the Alter-Ehrlich case in an attempt to disrupt relations be-



tween Washington and Moscow, insisted that the AFL did not want to change its relations with the TUC because it did not want to perpetuate the divisions in the American labor movement. Having finished with this piece of hypocrisy, Nagler went on to say, according to an *Allied Labor News* report, that he hoped that the CIO would return to the great family of labor which represents the bulk of the American trade unions—meaning of course the AFL. Then, following the anti-Sovietism of Dubinsky, Nagler launched a bitter attack on both the Soviet trade unions and the Soviet government. He said that the Soviet trade unions were not free and that to become tied up with them would not help the war effort. As an afterthought he offered the Russians the cooperation of the AFL.

When Shvernik asked for permission to reply to this totally uncalled-for attack on an ally, Nagler insisted that he must also have the right to answer—in other words the right to continue his tirade. Citrine settled the matter by declaring that neither statement would be heard.

Then followed debate and passage of the vague resolution calling for a “world congress, representative of the organized workers of all countries, as soon as war conditions permit. . . .” This in contradiction to the feeling on the part of British, Canadian, Mexican, and American trade unionists that such a conference is a very practical and immediate necessity.

The debate on the second front also ended in fiasco. Shvernik paid “full tribute to the Anglo-American victories in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy,” and acknowledged the Anglo-American support given to the Soviets by “air force operations and supply of arms and foods. “But, he pointed out, the Soviet people conceive of a second front in terms of “joint blows against Hitler Germany—because Germany, not one of her vassals, is the main lair of fascism. . . . The sooner there is a second front, the sooner the war will be over and the lower the number of casualties of the Allied nations. Nobody can dispute that only the absence of a second front saved Hitler from defeat in 1942. . . . For two years the Soviet people have borne the main burden of the fight against Hitler Germany. The Soviet people cannot contemplate the opening of a second front with indifference. Millions of people have suffered for two years under the invader’s yoke. If Hitler had defeated the Soviet people, we would not be meeting in Southport today.”

Citrine replied with the usual sophistries about only the experts knowing what to do. But so strong apparently was the sentiment for a precise and clear resolution on the second front, that the desire of the delegates could be defeated only by a cheap trick, to which Citrine was not averse. Just before the vote was to be taken Citrine

announced that “a major amphibious operation,” a “landing,” had been made on the coast of France. Consequently the second front resolution was withdrawn in favor of one which said practically nothing. When the government announced the following day that the activity referred to by Citrine was not an “operation” but an “exercise,” that no landing had taken place, the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, sponsor of the original second front resolution, along with other delegates branded the Citrine action as “the biggest hoax” in TUC history. Only by this trick, they said, was Citrine able to prevent the convention from supporting an immediate land invasion of western Europe.

But British labor’s activities do not halt

with the TUC convention. The demand for a second front as for international labor unity is deeply rooted. And what the unions could not achieve at Southport they will achieve in their own locals and in the factories. One thing is certain, Nagler, as the AFL representative, spoke only for a handful of executives. He did not speak for American labor or the rank and file of the AFL. The CIO can help the majority of the AFL toward international solidarity by working closely with them. The stakes are too high to let the Red-baiters and the enemies of world labor unity pretend that they speak for the men and women on the production lines. The locals of the AFL must make themselves heard at the coming Boston convention.

The Week in London

(By wireless)

THE members of Parliament are converging on London from the countryside where the leaves mentioned rather long ago by Churchill fall thicker than ever amid massed evidence of the greatest accumulation of military power this country has ever seen. They and the Prime Minister are aware, even if for various reasons they do not express it, of the existence in Britain of a political atmosphere different from any yet experienced in this war. Certainly this atmosphere is extraordinarily different from that prevailing when Parliament recessed and the Prime Minister went to Quebec. One can make stupid mistakes trying to present a comprehensive picture of such a state of public opinion. But without contradiction from people who might draw varying conclusions about what they believe the situation to be, one can justifiably list the following among the main factors going to make it up.

(1) In Kiev they can hear the guns. And the advancing throb of those guns is the biggest single fact in all Europe, not excluding Britain. For weeks, as the Red Army advance has gone on, the consciousness that this is something which is breaking and unbalancing all previous pictures and calculations has grown in Britain hardly less than—say—in Sofia and Budapest.

(2) Resolutions and telegrams with second front demands coming in from factories show one side of British public response to this situation.

(3) An outbreak of unofficial strikes and strike threats on a somewhat larger scale is the other side of it. For this is the side expressing complacency over Soviet victories and a belief that the war is practically over, combined with a sharpened exasperation that certain groups of employers are also using victory possibilities for grossly provocative moves.

(4) Disappointment over the Quebec Conference and the consequent growth of a dangerous cynicism in some quarters; uneasiness regarding the apparent failure to take advantage of the popular movement in Italy at this critical moment; amazement that Mussolini was permitted to remain within reach of a spectacular enemy coup; disillusionment following early, inaccurate reports of offensive actions in Italy and France which so profoundly influenced the Trades Union Congress. All these so far as my information goes and in my personal estimation, have produced a certain sympathy so to speak between complacent optimists and cynics.

And one may as well face the fact that opinion is likely to continue to develop along these lines so long as people have a picture of Red Army fighting the mass of the German army alone and that the most gallant British and American troops are engaged in what is useful as a heroic sideshow in Italy. All this in face of the fact that while the mightiest Allied forces which could produce utter disaster for the Germans in the West are not put into full action in France.

CLAUDE COCKBURN.

OUR REAL NATIONAL INTERESTS

In a further discussion of Walter Lippmann's new book Morris U. Schappes points to the imperialist overtones that weaken its positive contribution. How this war differs from 1914-18.

FOR the past few weeks there has been widespread discussion about alliances with other powers. Some commentators were worried and some alarmed when the Soviet Union replaced Litvinov in Washington, and almost all recognized the act as a warning that the American-Soviet alliance was in danger of foundering, and that with that danger came a serious threat to our national interests.

Now Walter Lippmann's tightly reasoned book, *US Foreign Policy*, already excellently reviewed by Joseph Starobin in *NEW MASSES* for June 29, is an important and valuable contribution to the general discussion about alliances; how they should be made, with whom, when, and why. And the book's large audience is an index to the seriousness with which the reading public is taking this major problem. There has been applause from many sides of the win-the-war camp for Lippmann's main conclusion: that the foundations of a stable, secure, and therefore peaceful postwar order depend upon a "nuclear" alliance of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, and possibly also China, although Lippmann has many doubts and reservations about the last-mentioned country. It would seem that he had fired from his heights an intellectual aerial torpedo at Herbert Hoover's anti-national policy.

A few months of crowded events, however, have highlighted one major weakness in the structure of Lippmann's thinking on the subject of alliances and the national interest. Too many people are using his theories in a way that perhaps he did not intend but which he certainly invites. For instance, there was hardly an important figure at the Republican Postwar Advisory Council meeting at Mackinac Island early this month who did not reveal, in his public declarations, some indebtedness to and borrowing from Lippmann's book. The high tide of popular insistence on our taking part in international cooperation forced nearly every one there to acknowledge this tide even if demagogically. Governor Dewey of New York suddenly maneuvered into the tide by taking a bold, bold "stand" —for an alliance with Britain. Clarence Budington Kelland had already issued his manifesto of a newly acquired internationalism so strange that the *New York Daily News* headlined it thus: "Kelland Sees Russia Out of Postwar Pact" (August 26, 1943), and the *New York Times* account described it as "a program of American

imperialism in the postwar world." Vandenburg and Taft on the one hand and Gov. Raymond E. Baldwin of Connecticut, who fought them openly on basic issues, were both implicitly using Lippmann arguments, Lippmann examples, Lippmann facts. He has become too many things to too many men.

WHAT is this flaw in Lippmann's intellectual structure that makes it possible for polarizing forces such as the Hoover and Willkie groups both to use Lippmann's process of analysis for their own varying ends? There are two matters involved. First, Lippmann never adequately distinguishes between the national interests of our country and the interests of the imperialists of our country. Second, Lippmann's principal thesis is that "a foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power." Lippmann's way of measuring a foreign policy exclusively in terms of its "solvency" makes it possible for the unscrupulous to use the same theory for their own unscrupulous objectives. He puts it unmistakably: "In assaying *ideals, interests, and ambitions* which are to be asserted abroad, his [the true statesman's] measure of their *validity* will be the *force* he can muster at home combined with the support he can find abroad among other nations which have similar ideals, interests, and ambitions. . . . The statesman of a strong country may balance its commitments at a high level or at a low. But whether he is conducting the affairs of *Germany*, which has had dynamic ambitions, or the affairs of Switzerland which seeks only to hold what it already has, or of the United States, he must still bring his ends and means into balance." (My italics.)

Now this looks like stark, or "tough-minded," thinking, but there is unfortunately missing in it a sense of international morality as well as a guide to the definition of a *national* interest. Is the worst we can say about Hitler Germany that it is "dynamic" but "insolvent"? Jefferson and Washington, whom Lippmann does much to rescue from the false reputation of isolationism, surely had more democratic ends in view. They did not merely relate ends to means, without regard to the democratic quality of the ends. They sought a solvent policy to protect a *new, a better, world*.

It would be crude to say simply that

Lippmann is thinking only in terms of imperialist interests; the difference between Lippmann and Hoover, for instance, is the vital difference between patriotism and treason. Yet Lippmann, because he approaches the problem of trying to define the national interest through the habits of many years of reflection in terms of American imperialist interests, weakens the structure of his argument for a nuclear alliance. The problem was recently put sharply by Sir Norman Angell in the *New York Times Magazine* of August 8: "Yet if there had been neither a League nor a British Empire after the last war, no Gibraltar, no Malta, no troops in Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal, no British power in Africa and India, not merely would Britain itself have been compelled to follow France into surrender, but the whole of the Mediterranean world would have been under Axis domination. The Axis schemes would have succeeded. If the old imperialisms are to go, alternative securities must be devised."

WE NEED not dwell on the point that the Soviet Union helped save the British Empire: in whose hands would the Suez Canal now be if Hitler had blitzed his way south instead of east, and where would India be if Stalingrad had not been turned into a tomb for one of Hitler's biggest armies, thereby burying forever the Axis grand strategy of a German-Japanese military junction on Indian soil? But it is well to point to the broad road of "alternative securities." Those non-imperialist securities lie in the full right of self-determination for nations up to the right of secession from any federation plus the *collective* defense of each nation by all nations. Nations aware of the interdependence of their security (and Lippmann brilliantly shows that not only peace but security is the aim of foreign policy) will of necessity wish to see every nation as powerful as its size and resources allow.

A weak nation is in danger not only of losing its own security; it is a weakness in the system of defenses of every other nation. Today, obviously, strength depends upon both the patriotism of a people and upon a highly developed industrialization. Any postwar system of collective security must develop an operational plan for the rapid industrial upgrading of every nation. To revert to Sir Norman's nightmare-without-imperialism, I would therefore answer: make Egypt fully independent, help increase its national strength by aiding it to become industrialized, and then

The Underground

*To the anti-Fascists
of the Occupied Countries
of Europe and Asia.*

Still you bring us with our hands bound,
Our teeth knocked out, our heads broken,
Still you bring us shouting curses,
Or crying, or silent as tomorrow,
Still you bring us to the guillotine,
The shooting wall, the headsman's block,
Or the mass grave in the long trench.
But you can't kill all of us!
You can't silence all of us!
You can't stop all of us!
From Norway to Slovakia, Manchuria to Greece,
We are like those rivers
That fill with the melted snow in spring
And flood the land in all directions.
Our spring will come.
The pent up snows of all the brutal years
Are melting beneath the rising sun of freedom.
The rivers of the world
Will be flooded with strength
And you will be washed away—
You murderers of the people—
You Nazis, fascists, headsman,
Appeasers, liars, quislings,
You will be washed away,
And the land will be fresh and clean again,
Denuded of the past—
For time will give us
Our spring
At last.

LANGSTON HUGHES.

For Our Native Land

Our dear land, dearly won
With the blood of our fighters,
Our land with the multiplied strength
Of the free brother peoples,
Follows great Stalin's lead
Against the brutal enemy.

Can I, in my yurta huddled,
Hold back? No, all that I am
Shall follow him too. I too
Shall pace the energies
Of my Kazakh people.
Ho, saddle my horse!
Let my song march with Stalin!

The black fascist jackal
With dripping fangs hungers;
But well say our folk songs,
"The beast scents the hunter,
And, fearful, runs on the plains."
And steel-ringed are our plains,
Our bayonets await him.
Ho, saddle my horse,
Let my song march with Stalin!

Pour out your lead, Chimkent,
Pour out your copper, Balkash,
To smelt floods of death
For the guns of our fighters.
Give, valleys, your cotton,
Your bread to sustain them.
Give generously, Caspian,
Great boatloads of fish.
Let us launch from our steppes
The defeat of the enemy.
Ho, saddle my horse,
Let my song march with Stalin!

Two worlds are met in battle;
The world of envious age,
The world of generous youth.
The world of doomed decay
And the world of pioneers.
And well say our folk songs,
"The snake will be crushed
And the eagle will soar."
Ho, saddle my horse!
Let my song march with Stalin!

JAMBUL.

(adapted by Isidor Schneider).

it might be *Egyptian* and not British troops who will defend the Canal; stop shoring up the Franco regime, let Spain return to the control of its own people, help it become an industrial power, and Spain itself will protect Gibraltar as an international trust; let India grow to its full stature and industrial power, arm its people with the reality of national government, and it will become capable of self-defense and of participating in the collective defense of all other nations. Can these "alternative securities" cost even a fraction of what the world has paid in the past three decades for other kinds of insurance to the firm of Imperialism, Ltd.?

Now Lippmann's nuclear alliance is a big stride in the right direction, but there are these imperialist overtones in his approach that would reduce the power of our defenses. Lippmann's concept of the nation includes an indigestible element of oppression of other nations, and also a readiness to take on more commitments than necessary in the way of military defense of other nations. Lippmann of course must propose that we defend certain other countries for them if he is not going to propose that we build them up so they can the better defend themselves *and us* by their own increased strength. With reference to Latin America, for instance, Lippmann stresses that in self-defense *we* must keep an enemy from obtaining footholds, beachheads, strongholds in Latin American countries. The surest way to do that would be to help each of these nations develop its industrial and therefore its military power under proper democratic controls. Foreign policy, clearly, should not only define our commitments and select our allies; it should also help make the allies strong for their and our—that is, for the common good. But Lippmann hesitates to move toward that conclusion.

YET national interests are today globally interdependent. A proper concept of one's own nation's interests leads one to a respect for the rights of all other nations and to solicitude for the strength of all these nations. That Lippmann does not have such a concept can also be inferred from the fact that he has hinted that a Germany that has unconditionally surrendered should be de-industrialized (his fellow-columnist on the New York *Herald Tribune*, Maj. George Fielding Eliot, has similarly proposed the de-industrialization of a defeated Japan). It should be understood definitely that to *de-industrialize is to de-nationalize*. Nations are historically developed entities; they may come and they may go. There was a time when the people living in the territory of Germany did not constitute a nation. One of the factors that helped develop them into a nation was the growth of a *community of economic life*, and the industrialization of Germany was the motive factor in shaping that economic life into a national unity.

It was only the complex division of labor which industrialization required that made all Germans interdependent upon their own economic production.

Now, to de-industrialize Germany would not merely necessitate a reduced standard of living for Germans. To enforce in Germany (if it were possible) a return to agriculture and handicraft would be to destroy this interdependence of the economic life of Germans; it would be to destroy Germany's nationhood. To think in such terms is neither right nor safe. Goebbels uses this threat of de-nationalization to lift the flagging morale of the German people, thereby making our military victory more difficult. In the case of Lippmann it is clear that his program of de-industrializing our enemies and his failure to propose a program of industrializing our allies both stem from the same deficiency in the concept of the nation. It is in this light that Stalin discusses what is meant by a community, an interdependence of economic life, in his great work, *Marxism and the National Question*. Marxism connects the development of nations historically with the growth of capitalism and particularly of industrial capitalism.

LIPPMANN's view is deficient in still another sense. For instance, he does not see the positive value to our *national* defense of the national *independence* of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. We are as a nation proud of the fight against the Japanese put up by the Filipinos. The mere scheduling of independence achieved here what the British "old hands" were unable to accomplish in Singapore, Malaya, and Burma: a *people's* resistance. Had the Philippines been fully independent and better industrialized, and part of an alliance with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Australia (the old Pact of the Pacific proposed in 1938), would they not have been able to resist even more vigorously? Nor do we here even raise the question of whether Japan would have dared take on such a combination had it been formed in advance.

Lippmann furthermore glosses over past American aggression. Thinking only in the non-moral (therefore non-democratic) terms of the adequacy of means to ends, he accepts our *unjust* war with Mexico in 1846 as evidence of the "solvency" of our foreign policy. Also his criticism of our foreign policy in 1917 when we entered an unjust imperialist war is not that we had no business being in it but that we got in without adequate preparation. It is here that the confusion of national with imperialist interests is complete.

Now, unless Lippmann is willing to see that the last war was a futile slaughter of no benefit to our national interests, he will continue to fail to understand this vital fact: the problems that confronted the peoples of the world in 1914-18 could not be

solved by the imperialist war because the imperialists responsible for the war were not interested in a democratic solution; only the peoples of Russia solved their problems in that period, and they did so by fighting against the war. The failure of the other powers to achieve a democratic solution paved the way for fascism and another world war. And it is because the present war is a war of national liberation that many of these problems can be solved.

ONE relevant point of evidence both as to the character of the last war and to the fact that the Wilson government did not follow our national interests by participating in it is the way that government dealt with the infant Soviet government. Our national interests should have led us into an immediate alliance with it. But what did the Wilson government of imperialist interests do? When the Bolsheviks, eager to clear the advancing German army from the soil of their newly won fatherland, appealed to the Allies for material and military support, these Allies, guided by imperialist considerations of fear of socialism, abandoned the Soviet Union.

As Earl Browder says: "Brest-Litovsk was the result of the Allies deserting Russia, not the other way 'round." (*The Second Imperialist War*.) The record is clear and can be read in detail in Prof. Frederick L. Schuman's *American Policy toward Russia Since 1917* and in a book the author is trying to live down, Louis Fischer's *The Soviets In World Politics*. Lenin was negotiating with the British agent Bruce Lockhart, and with the American Col. Raymond Robins, trying to get Anglo-American assurance of real aid. When Sverdlov read to the Congress of Soviets (March 14-16, 1918), President Wilson's message that "the Government of the United States is unhappily not in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render," the Soviets proceeded to ratify the Brest-Litovsk treaty, since it could obviously not, in its exhausted condition, fight on alone. Yet Lippmann's only animadversion on this aspect of this period of our history is very sad: he would have us believe that Wilson sent troops into Siberia in order to help the new Russian power against Japanese aggression. But what aid to Lenin were our troops providing at the other end of the Soviet Union, in Archangel?

THE failure of Lippmann to distinguish between national and imperialist interests also mars his criticism of the weakness of United States policy in the imperialist phase of the present war. Since this error is so widely shared, especially in liberal circles, it ought to be confronted squarely. For example, in the recent primaries of the New York American Labor Party the Dubinsky-Counts-Antonini group of Red-baiters exclaimed in one of its campaign

proclamations: "The people of the United Nations including Russia may well be thankful today that there was only one Marcantonio in Congress!"

Marcantonio is being singled out of course because he was the lone congressional voice reflecting the attitude not only of left forces but also of many of the biggest unions in the country, that spoke out against war appropriations, conscription, and aid-to-Britain. The Dubinskys assume falsely, however, that a government following a policy advocated by Marcantonio, would have left this country defenseless and in a worse position to wage war when the Axis attacked us. Before demonstrating that such a premise is preposterous, it is worth exploring what would have been the logical consequence of the policy then being followed by the government, Hoover, the Social Democrats, and of Lippmann himself.

LIPP MANN demonstrates the necessity, in the operation of a foreign policy, of finding "dependable allies." Were the forces just named capable of locating even so indispensable a factor as our most dependable ally, the Soviet Union? Unwittingly the *New York Times* answers for itself and all the others in its editorial of Aug.

11, 1943 ("Finland: A Test Case"): "She [Finland] had American sympathy when Russia attacked her in November, 1939. Had it not been for geographical difficulties she would probably at that time have had the aid of a British expeditionary force. In view of subsequent events we can be glad that this did not happen." But a foreign policy demands foresight and not hindsight. If our government did not send an expeditionary force to aid Finland it was not for anything left undone by Hoover and Dubinsky and the shrill Social Democrats. Maybe our abstention from the felicity of an anti-Soviet war was due to the lone votes of Marcantonio and the voices of Earl Browder and of some trade union leaders who could tell a national from an imperialist interest, and a friend from a foe.

But the full logic of the policies of 1939 and 1940 can perhaps be better understood if we try to imagine what our national plight would be if today our boys in Italy still had to conquer and destroy not merely the more than 200 divisions of Germans the Soviet Union is relentlessly destroying on the Eastern Front but also the seven million German and other Axis soldiers killed and crippled in the past two and a quarter years on that Eastern Front. And


yet the logic of those who still denounce Marcantonio was to hustle us into a war either against the Soviet Union, or one without the Soviet Union as our ally. If we did not follow that imperialist path to national suicide, it is only because Hitler, by deciding to invade the Soviet Union, revealed to us where our natural, dependable ally was to be found.

Now what would a correct estimate of our national interest in 1939 have achieved, with the full support, in fact with the leadership, of the Marcantonios? First, it would have clearly defined our enemies and stopped appeasing and equipping them. Second, it would have sought out its dependable allies, and found them in the Soviet Union, China, and in a non-Chamberlain, non-Munich, non-appeasing Great Britain, as well as in the colonial countries and the peoples of the Axis powers themselves. Then, if that combination decided that they would all have to prepare to thrash the Axis aggressors, funds would have been appropriated, lend-lease arrangements developed, an army conscripted, and its armaments kept in such a state of readiness that we could not have been caught napping at a Pearl Harbor.

In short, Marcantonio and the others who saw the imperialist character of that phase of the war had an alternative policy that could be followed only as a whole. Explaining his lone votes in Congress on February 5, 1941, Marcantonio said: "I did so not because I am opposed to national defense. I am for national defense, but genuine national defense." Those who assume that opposing one program implies that you have no other positive foreign policy are either ignorant or malicious. The fact is, however, that the alternative program of the Marcantonios, which was based on resistance to the Axis in alliance with the Soviet Union, is now obviously being followed by the Roosevelt administration.

Imperialist interests have never been in the real interests of the nation. The fall of France, despite a large military force and accumulated armaments, has shown that the pursuit of imperialist interests to the exclusion of all others can lead to the defeat of an entire nation. To his theory, therefore, of solvency and the squaring of ends and means Lippmann will have to add the distinction between national and imperialist interests. But let no one think that whatever I have said in criticism of Lippmann's book in any way reduces the real merit of its contribution and objective: a genuine alliance of the key democratic powers. It should be read and discussed for its sense of urgency and for its outline of one of the major problems of our generation. It should be used as an antidote to the poison circulating in the "America First" press. That is its great value.

MORRIS U. SCHAPPES.



'Fighting Way to West' Nazis Say--Headline in the New York Times.

MEET CUBA'S BATISTA

Andre Simone, biographer of the "Men of Europe," adds a famous American to his list. The sergeant who became President. Why he has won the hearts of Cuba, and the admiration of the Americas.

YOU step down from the plane. No sooner have you taken ten steps than a waiter dressed in a white waistcoat balances a tray with gleaming light-yellow glasses under your nose. Courtesy of Bacardi & Co. Thus you find one of your previous conceptions about Cuba confirmed immediately upon arrival. For your friend, who thinks he knows a great deal about that island in the Caribbean, calls it the land of rum. Like all journalists, you are eager to reveal new aspects of Cuba; and that is why you firmly resolve not to write a word about the firm of Bacardi. Nor in fact do you have to write about it. Cuba is not the land of rum. The Cubans export a great deal but drink very little. In your wandering through residential sections and tenement districts you will not find a single Cuban drunk. On cafe terraces the Cubans sip all sorts of refreshing drinks and listen to women, accompanied by a female orchestra, sing "*Ay Jalisco, no te rajes.*" The only ones who order a Cuba libre are foreigners.

In Cuba, your friend said, the people aren't interested at all in Europe and are only slightly interested in the war. Sugar is Cuba's destiny and politics. You can read that in any book about the island. Your friend, always ready to quote figures, proves to you statistically that "*Zafra*"—sugar harvest—is the most frequently used word on the island. The taxi driver in blue slacks and coat, who drives you from the airport to the hotel, starts in on Europe and the war at once: "You're from Czechoslovakia? Your country has the biggest arms factory in Europe—Krupp." You murmur in embarrassment that its name is "Skoda" and he flashes a gleaming smile at you.

"Your president Dollfuss is a great man," he continues.

You murmur in even greater embarrassment that his name is Benes, and he smiles even more warmly. So begins your friendship. He confuses all the names but he knows that Czechoslovakia is a democratic country and that the Czechs are a brave people who refuse to bow down to Nazi terror. He explains the war in Africa and Sicily to you in detail and with enthusiasm; and when he speaks about the Russian front he is still more enthusiastic.

Between Sicily and Russia he asks you your opinion about the Atlantic Charter and tells you about his trade union. He mentions Batista repeatedly. Not until much later does he talk about sugar.

In the hotel you are right in the midst of domestic politics. The left wing of the hotel, the restaurant, is occupied by the

right wingers. For most of the waiters are *Autenticos*. The right wing of the hotel on the other hand, where the elevators are, is in the hands of the left wingers, for most of the elevator operators are Communists. Before you've been whisked up to the sixth floor you've already put your name on a collection list. *Radio Popular Dies Mil*, built by the Cuban workers with \$120,000 they collected, needs money to cover its monthly deficit. The elevator operators, one hand on the wheel, in the other a collection list, explain to the passengers how important the radio station is. If the deficit is covered they intend to collect for Russian War Relief. As you go up and down you learn much about Cuba, Batista, and about sugar; and many questions are put to you about the Latin-American Trade Union Congress which you are covering as a journalist.

You are anxious to find out something authentic about the *Autenticos* as the *Partido Revolucionario Cubano* is called. After a wearying two-week search you know that its party program is against Batista, against the Soviet Union, and against the trade unions. But the waiters who belong to it criticize Batista only mildly. They are enthusiastic about the Red Army and proud of their union. The talkative waiter tells you that the *Autenticos* will lower prices and put profiteers in jail. The lean seventeen-year-old youngster who puts ice in your drink every five minutes tells you that the *Autenticos* will sweep away all corruption with a new broom. The aristocratic looking head waiter who answers your Spanish questions in English informs you that only the *Autenticos* can get better prices for sugar. But all three let you in on the secret that their candidate for President, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, will do away with rents, gas, and electric bills. Haven't you heard that somewhere else before?

AFTER the fall of Machado in 1933 Dr. Grau San Martin was President for six months. During those lively six months the Cubans paid no rent, electric, or gas bills. A day before his fall Grau San Martin signed a law providing for compulsory collection of back rents and bills. As a result of his resignation the bill was never published, so the leader of the *Autenticos* is living politically on these unpaid bills. An *Autentico* journalist tells you that Grau San Martin is a brilliant doctor but a poor speaker, and that his closest collaborators call him Dr. Confucius. He advises you to interview the leader of the *Autenticos*: "Nobody has ever yet got a concrete an-

swer from him." But the interests backing the *Autenticos* are very concrete: American corporations, Spanish Falangists, and Cuban Trotskyites are behind the *Partido Revolucionario Cubano*, which is neither revolutionary nor genuinely Cuban. Its unbridled demagoguery follows the Nazi pattern, and although the party's program is not fascist officially, there are sufficient grounds for fearing that if ever it comes to power it will follow the road to a totalitarian state. But between it and power stands the government coalition uniting the Democratic Party, the Liberals, the Communists, and the conservative middle class ABC group. The leader of the coalition is President Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar.

THE first time you see him is at a mass meeting. Fifteen thousand people spring up from their seats: Batista has arrived! You always imagined him in a general's uniform, and now you see him, a broad-shouldered man of medium height in civilian clothing, wearing a well-starched white tropical suit. He passes you at a distance of two steps. He embraces Lombardo Toledano and Lazaro Pena, secretary of the Cuban trade unions, a Negro and former tobacco worker. Unruffled he goes down the stage from one person to another. Then good-humoredly he sits down in the first row on the stage and waves to acquaintances in the hall. He is a man of the people at a people's gathering. No police or soldiers are massed between the stage and the first rows of the hall.

For the first time in your career as a journalist you hear a Chief of State talking freely to a mass gathering of workers, unhampered by a barricade of manuscripts. Batista is a people's orator because he talks the language of the Cuban folk. He speaks easily, achieving his effect more in the content of his speech than in his emotional emphasis. His gestures fit his phrases. You notice what strength and suppleness he has. As his rich resonant voice addresses you, you get the impression that the speaker would rather convince than order.

"We are among ourselves," he declares in his opening sentences, "and the man talking to you is flesh and blood of our people. I'm talking extemporaneously so that my lips don't hypocritically hide what I mean." Yet he speaks very deliberately, very systematically, with well-ordered logic. In this extemporaneous speech he emphasizes the two problems which concern him and the Cuban people: victory and the right of self-determination.

"We placed no conditions," his resonant voice rings out, "when we declared war



Fulgencio Batista

on the Axis. We did it because the cause of democracy is our cause." His whole speech stresses that Cuba expects the victory to bring a just peace, freedom, and independence for all peoples. "Victory," says the speaker, "demands an all-out effort. Cuba is making that effort without reservation." A just peace, says his whole speech, can only be achieved by unconditional fulfillment of the pledges laid down in the Atlantic Charter. You have already heard that from taxi drivers, writers, tobacco workers, and from the Prime Minister, Dr. Zaydin. For them the Atlantic Charter is the fulfillment of a century-old dream, the right to determine their own destiny. To the peoples of Latin America victory over the Axis and the right of self-determination are but one. When Batista develops this thought, he speaks for an entire continent.

SINCE President Roosevelt proclaimed the good neighbor policy in 1933, the nations of Latin America have undoubtedly made progress toward the right of self-determination. But in Cuba the struggle

between this right and sugar is not yet over.

Seventy-five percent of Cuban economy consists of the planting and export of sugar. But only fifteen percent of the sugar plantations belong to Cubans. Eighty-five percent is American property, and almost three-quarters of the harvest goes to the United States. To Cubans sugar cane is the symbol of slavery. In the regions where it is cultivated, slavery persisted longest and most repressively. The Cuban problem is the problem of turning sugar into a friend and not an exploiter. It means cultivating more sugar, exporting more, and yet remaining politically independent of those who buy it. The road to that is the Atlantic Charter. That is why in Cuba people talk more about the Atlantic Charter than about sugar, although the sale of 100,000 tons more or less can influence profoundly the country's economy. This year the outlook for sugar exports is particularly favorable. Negotiations between Washington and Havana concerning the export quota for the coming harvest have been almost completed and it seems that it will be higher than ever before: more than 3,000,-

000 tons at \$2.65 a ton. That price, as a cabinet minister explains to you, is high enough to benefit even the poor peasants. In the three years he has been President, Batista has begun to break up the large sugar landholdings by means of his Sugar Coordination law. Twenty thousand peasants have received land.

YOU want to sketch a portrait of Batista. Unlike the painter, you must know the background before you begin with the sittings. Your head swarms with figures and statistics. You sit at a long round table to make some sense of the figures. This is where ministers sit during cabinet meetings. In front of you is a blotter with an inscription in gold: *Excelentissimo Senor Presidente*. Before you are a glass of orange juice and a cup of coffee, and next to you, in the Prime Minister's seat, sits a major in a blue and white uniform, with a narrow face and shrewd brown eyes. He is Batista's adjutant. He tells you of the fourth of February.

He means that date in the year 1941. An airplane took three Cuban colonels into exile to Miami, Fla. Jose Pedraza had been commander-in-chief of the army, Angel Gonzalez, head of the navy, and Bernardo Garcia, chief of police. The first two had been sergeants like Batista when their uprising put an end to the Machado dictatorship and paved the way to Batista's rule. Then these three colonels had conspired against Batista. On February 3, 1941, the President, accompanied by only two adjutants, appeared at *Ciudad Militar* (the Barracks section of Havana) and made a speech. In 1933 he had spoken at the same spot. Both times he must have spoken very well. At the end of the first speech the entire officers corps of the Cuban Army was removed and Batista became army chief. At the end of the second speech *Ciudad Militar* resounded with the cheers of three regiments for Batista. The three colonels were arrested. On both days no blood flowed. Since that time the three conspirators have returned to Cuba free men. Today there is not a single political prisoner in the jails of Cuba.

This is the man Batista, opposite whom you are now sitting in his office. He receives you twice, each time for two hours.

His face is vigorous yet relaxed. In profile it takes on unexpected sternness, a kind of Indian quality. In his gaze there is surprising keenness.

At his right there is an Underwood typewriter. "I write my most important letters myself," he says with quiet pride. He strokes the keys tenderly. "I clean it daily." As a sergeant he was a stenographer at regimental headquarters. Sometimes during cabinet sessions he enjoys taking down his collaborators' remarks in shorthand. He talks rapidly and you remind him that you are no stenographer.

From him you hear an emphatic pledge

of democracy. His four-year term expires in October 1944. "There is no reason," he emphasizes, "why I should remain a day longer in office. Democracy is rooted firmly in the people. My aim is to have the people's will expressed cleanly and honestly in these elections." With a quick movement he turns towards a statue of Jose Marti, the father of the republic, whose strong head carved in marble gazes down at us. Several times during the conversation he repeats this gesture, as if seeking Marti's approval.

His faith in democracy has not remained an empty word. He has stuck to democratic principles. When he was a candidate for the presidency in 1940 he resigned as commander-in-chief of the army. Parliament functions freely and his cabinet rests on the confidence of the people's representatives.

BATISTA passes in review the achievements of the last ten years since the overthrow of Machado. Unrestricted freedom of press. Unrestricted freedom to join political parties. He stresses particularly what his adjutant has already told you: no political prisoners in Cuba (this is not without its dangers, for Spanish Falangists working for the Axis in Cuba would do less harm under lock and key).

Batista's work rests on two pillars: on a model labor law, and on the village schoolteachers. The peasant boy who in his native village of Banes experienced the exploitation of the United Fruit Co., also worked in the sugar cane fields, was a salesman, and a locomotive engineer. He has never forgotten two impressions of his youth: illiteracy in the village and the dependence of the peasants on the United Fruit Co. His deep desire for knowledge dates from that period. Even after a most strenuous day of work he reads late into the night. He believes in democracy because its further development means freedom for all men.

During his three years in office illiteracy has decreased more than in the preceding thirty years. He had the government take over the village schools and thus freed the schoolteachers from the intrigues of local politics, gave them security, and raised their standard of living.

The labor law established under Batista provides for a forty-four-hour week, gives the worker a month's vacation with pay, pregnant mothers four weeks with pay, before and after confinement, and accident insurance. Before he quits his office the President also wants to establish old age insurance.

OUR conversation turns to Europe. In Batista's opinion, Mussolini's sudden fall reveals the structural weakness of fascism. "Finally," he says, "the people's will for peace has a chance to make itself heard. It may be a long drawn-out process. And

for the United Nations there is only one policy: all-out offensive until unconditional surrender."

He explains this term. According to Batista, unconditional surrender means that the Axis armies lay down their arms completely; it means disarmament and occupation of the Axis countries, and complete uprooting of fascism. Yet unconditional surrender is not in contradiction to the people's right of self-determination.

"Does that hold good for the German people as well?" I ask. He answers: "That holds good for the German people too, if they lay down their arms, if Germany is completely disarmed and Nazism destroyed root and branch, and if in a transition period the world is assured that Hitlerism, German imperialism, is done away with once and for all.

"The United Nations," he continues, "have solemnly undertaken to guarantee the rights of self-determination for all peoples. Any attempt to avoid this obligation would render a lasting peace impossible. This war is being waged so as to bring about a just and lasting peace in which the peoples settle their own fate and in which no state can trample on the principles for which the United Nations are fighting."

He conceives of the future as based on

collaboration between the United States, England, and the Soviet Union, together with the other United Nations. "The Russians," says Batista, "have by the magnificent resistance of their Red Army given the Americans and British time to prepare for the invasion of Europe. The Russian front is the most important factor in favor of the Allies." He speaks at great length and with profound admiration of the Russian offensives. "Collaboration with the Soviet Union," he repeats, "is essential for any lasting peace."

The man Batista to whom you now say good-bye, was ten years ago a sergeant. He became a good general because in him was the stuff of a good sergeant. He became a distinguished President because he had deep roots in his people.

The adjutant takes you under his wing and leads you to some colleagues waiting in the ante-chamber. Now the interviewer is interviewed.

The next day the poet Nicholas Guillen tells you that Batista's life is like a bad novel, because everything turns out well for the hero. As a matter of fact, Batista is a lucky man, a happy warrior. For if his life is a bad novel, for the land of Cuba it is a very good and very great page in history.

ANDRE SIMONE.



"Are you SURE that's him?"

SATURDAY MORNING

A short story by Barbara Giles

The following is a chapter from an unfinished novel by Barbara Giles. The setting is a bayou town in southern Louisiana and the action takes place in 1912.

ABOUT ten in the morning everyone said, "Let's pass by Serieux's for coffee." Michel came into the restaurant a little before then. He held a copy of the *Courier* so people could see the editorial on the front page, with the head in big type: "To the Voters of Bienville!" Last week, also, there had been an editorial on the front page. It was something new in Bienville; it had created a sensation. He was in a fine mood. His paper had come off the press last night and there was nothing to do over the weekend. If he found Peter here it wouldn't even be necessary to go to his office and show him the paper, to hear him praise the message to the voters that said so much about reform and so little—this time—about the sugar tariff.

The restaurant was only half full yet. There was no Peter, but a group at a far table signaled Michel and he went over. They were three young men around his age, friends of his. Friends—well, his father and theirs had been friends, he himself had drunk with them often. The first was more important: "the sons of . . ." That was really the way Bienville thought of them, the way Michel looked at them now. "Rene, the son of Mr. Gravelle the planter"—and so on. It sounded a little like a tombstone, and that was not so unsuitable, either.

"Monsieur the editor!" Rene greeted him with loud facetiousness. "Sit down! But where is your friend—your important friend, the candidate? It is funny, I can never remember his first name, only his last. Boudreaux, of course, you can't forget; there must be one to every square foot in Louisiana."

"Almost as many as there are Gravelles," Michel retorted pleasantly, feeling that the sly allusion to Peter's Cajun origin was too silly to be irritating. (These people—did they never forget anything!) He sat down and the waiter, as always, brought him *cafe au lait* without having to be told. The others, he noticed, were already drinking beer. Adolphe Fuselier had taken the copy of the *Courier* and was running over the editorial, reading some of the phrases aloud with an exaggerated show of interest and excitement. "Turn out the followers of the New Orleans Ring . . . establish flood control . . . manual schools for Negro children—" He looked up in astonishment.

"You spell it with a big 'N'?"

"A mistake," Michel assured him lightly, but the expression in his eyes defied them either to believe him or contradict him. They stared, and Etienne Levy whistled. "A mistake I should say! This will not do you any good with Pat Collins or old Mourein."

Michel shrugged, but before he could reply there was Peter at his side—he hadn't seen him come in—and the others, for some reason, all stood up formally as though he were a stranger to whom they were just being introduced. Michel clapped him lightly on the back. "Hello. I hoped you would come. Sit down, and I will show you the editorial." He was afraid it would be a little awkward. Peter was not many years older than they but Michel knew the others regarded him as a "serious" if not rather grim person—and a Cajun until only a few years ago. But he needn't have worried. They had scarcely sat down again before Rene was talking to Peter as though resuming a conversation that had been interrupted.

"Let me advise you! You will be up against a real orator when you debate with Alfred Mourein. I heard him speak in Ville St. Paul when he was running for Clerk of Court, and he is magnificent. His voice goes up and he makes motions—like this—and that—and people weep. It is a treat for the feelings, like having a glass of brandy! You must think what you can give them, after that."

"*Pousse cafe*," Peter smiled. His audience laughed in an outburst of surprised appreciation, and men at nearby tables stopped talking to look at them so that Michel became apprehensive for another reason. This frivolity might not look so well. People were already saying that Peter was too young for the office of State Legislator—as, indeed, he was. It was only luck, some unexpected circumstances, that had put him in the campaign at all. As Etienne was just explaining it to Peter himself—"You were fortunate: if it hadn't been for that Theodore Roosevelt and his new party, Mr. Mourein might have had no one running against him, or a different person anyway. But everyone gets 'progressive' and begins to talk of reform and putting the New Orleans Ring in its place, and then we have a Good Government League which is looking for candidates so they pick on you since old Jean Baptiste Lauve says you have 'ideals' and are the man to beat poor papa Mourein. And now Bienville has a Bull Moose candidate!"

To Michel it sounded a little as though Etienne meant Peter had slyly taken advantage of a situation in which he had no rights originally. He thought to answer him, but Adolphe, who never listened to anyone, got in his way. "What are you going to promise us, Mr. Boudreaux?" he demanded. "I will make my vote for you if you will promise—let me see—rain for the crops?"

"A good season for quail!" Rene suggested.

"A small price for whisky!"

"A big one for sugar!"

They laughed wildly at their own wit. Peter's face was white and glistening from the heat, and his eyes shone. Michel looked at him in surprise and some distaste. But it was not, he perceived, the conviviality of these pigheads that so pleased him. Rather, it was some element of triumph in his own thoughts, something perhaps that had been touched off by their good spirits. At least he was not laughing with them, not even paying them much attention.

"I believe in the Democratic Party myself," Adolphe suddenly declared with a sort of precocious sagacity that was comical and faintly repellent. "Nothing will ever make me change into a Bull Moose, whether you call it 'Progressive' or anything else. Now my Papa, who is a Democrat always except when it comes to the Presidency—and he turns into a Republican then for the sake of the tariff—is going to make his vote for Mr. Roosevelt. In that way he can always vote with the same party."

How strange they sounded, those words—Progressive, reform, Bull Moose—uttered in a Bienville restaurant. Michel felt in them a pleasure that was slightly possessive. They had a hardness and vigor that did not go with this place, with its bitter-sweet odor of *cafe noir*, its noisy good nature and stuffiness. He looked around the ancient red-brick walls scoured almost to brilliance, the glowing white linen, the statue of the Madonna which had been in that corner ever since he could remember. On every hand was the evidence of that meticulous attention to comfort, that orderly cushioning of existence with agreeable conversation, good food, and religious symbols; all worked into a smooth surface in which one might not detect any underlying bulges of tragedy or vice. Such words, Michel felt, belonged to Peter and himself (certainly, he had written them enough in his paper)—

and, yes, to that "better element" which wanted to keep the New Orleans Ring out of Parish politics, to be Bull Moosers and so avoid voting Republican once every four years and Democratic the rest of the time. A vague unpleasantness depressed his nerves, and he attributed it to the smell of burning grease which was sending a dark smoke through the open kitchen door. Rene's voice sounded, clarion-like, uncomfortably close to his ear.

"It will be fun to see him use that 'big stick' on some of those Yankee businessmen who think they are so smart! I, for one, will not mind if he breaks up a few big corporations; it is not fair to the rest of us, having that small number of people owning everything. That is what my father says." Michel, remembering that Papa Gravelle had a plantation employing more than three hundred laborers, smiled to himself and tried to catch Peter's eye. But the latter finished his coffee at that moment and said, "I have to go." He rose and dropped a coin on the table, then turned to Michel. "Are you coming?"

"Not yet." It would be better, Michel thought, for Mr. Boudreaux to walk out alone rather than with these donkeys who might leave also if he too should go.

"Well, he is not a bad sort," Rene remarked, watching Peter's progress through the crowded restaurant. "He does not talk much though, I suppose on account of his accent which is still a little Cajun. You can tell somewhat from his face that he is a Boudreaux. And his manner is not entirely agreeable—he holds something back."

"Yes, he is secretive," Etienne agreed. "But most Cajuns are, you know. You never can tell what they think about. At the same time, they have bad tempers. 'Bad tempers, strong stomachs, and violent passions'—that is the way my grandfather used to describe them." A single phrase from this speech had penetrated Adolphe's consciousness and he repeated it luxuriantly, "Violent passions!" tilting his head as though to catch a delicious echo. "Tell me something." He leaned toward Michel with a sudden affectation of comradeship. "Just how did Felicie LaGrange happen to marry him? I mean, was it really a case of love? He seems so serious—. Did she have a 'passion' for him? I thought you might know, being her cousin. You *are* her cousin, aren't you?" he demanded, mistaking the meaning of Michel's expression.

"Her grandfather and mine were brothers," Michel retorted as shortly as he ever permitted himself to speak. "But I know nothing about the matter you speak of." His manner silenced them into an exchange of glances, furtive and amused, and Michel took advantage of their preoccupation to look about the restaurant,

identifying people he knew. At first glance, they all looked alike, with the same darkness of sunburn and a great deal of beard or moustache, the same nervous animation which seemed to add to the heated atmosphere. Michel picked out the tired countenance of old Mr. Girau whose wife was dying of cancer. She was a woman of wealth who had used her money and her invalidism (which until recently had been of a very mild sort) to kill his ambitions toward a political career because it might take him from her bedside. Bienville's sympathy had been with him until she developed this dreadful malady which, it was now felt, was a sort of divine vengeance on Mr. Girau for even wanting once to cross her wishes. Michel shuddered to think of the remorse that would be demanded of him to the end of his life. Not far from him sat an overseer who had been

educated at a northern university and had been happy to forget his learning for the pleasures of "bossing" and drinking as heavily as he pleased. He was talking to that lawyer from Ville St. Paul who had made a small fortune off his "nigger practice," to the tragic disadvantage of his clients. Michel had heard him boast once of his methods. Etienne's father, Dr. Levy, who always looked as though he were rushing from or to the delivery of a baby, gulped some coffee and hurried out without seeing his son sitting only a few yards from him. He himself had studied in Vienna but since he had merely followed his profession, people did not recall his learning as easily as they did the overseer's. Besides, it was more interesting to remember that he had married a deRoux. In the shadow of the Madonna sat a teamster, defying the unspoken rule which



placed plebeians at the counter instead of the tables. With amused approval, Michel noted the distasteful way he handled his small cup of coffee; it was probably not nearly so good as the kind his wife made, putting in tiny drips every ten minutes or more so that the result was of incredible strength and bitterness.

The rest of the people here were mostly businessmen, shopkeepers, clerks or dealers in mules and plowshares. Michel knew them well, perhaps too well by now. It was a little tiresome, after all, playing audience to such a familiar set of figures. He was about to withdraw his gaze when, through the kitchen entrance, he caught sight of Joe Serieux talking to a little boy who was holding up a rabbit, evidently for sale. With a stirring of interest, Michel saw that he was one of the Charpentier family who had moved last summer to Beau Soleil, near Shadowdown. This child, he recalled, had asked him if he might sometimes kill rabbits on Shadowdown and Michel had said yes. But that was before he himself had sold his share of Shadowdown to his brother Alcee and moved into town. A good thing Alcee hadn't caught him!

"I am going to have another glass of beer," Adolphe announced. "And you too, Michel. It will be good for your malaria. Let me buy you some beer!" His voice asked pardon for the offense he had given, and Michel smiled obediently at him, though he refused the treat. "I have a ride in the country to make," he explained, standing up and feeling in his pocket for some change. He took his leave quickly and went out. But on the street, a blank indecision as to where to go next kept him standing under the little second-story gallery of the restaurant, looking idly about him. He had lived out the day too early, rising at five to ride crazily through the country as far as the Beaugard plantation. It was unthinkable to go home, to be indoors with evening occupations before noon. He dropped a half-smoked cigarette and watched the slow, noisy progress toward him of a man astride one mule and leading another, the latter a little handicapped by some lameness. As they drew nearer, Michel recognized Telesphor Villier, a tenant from several miles down the bayou, who had once weighed cane at Shadowdown. Michel stepped to the edge of the sidewalk to greet him: "*Bon jour, Telesphor!*"

"*Mais! Meest' Michel! Bon jour!*" Telesphor stopped the mule with a jerk and slid off, smiling his pleasure and surprise. His face was smoothly folded into deep wrinkles, and there was almost as much sweat on him as on the mule.

"What are you doing in town?" Michel asked.

"Looking for vat'nary. My mule lame, 'im."

"You walked him all the way from Belle Grande?"

"Goddog, yass! Eet cos' too moch to hev vat'nary pass by there. I take 'im to town, me."

"What's the matter with him?"

"Me, I don' know. 'E get lame."

Michel surveyed the mule without any hope of enlightenment but because it seemed the thing to do.

"Mebbe I work 'im too fass," Telesphor offered. "We cot wood thees week in the swamp. Feenish laying by the cane jos' a week ago. Meest' Gaudin tell us cot our wood now."

"Well, the crops are looking fine," Michel threw off cheerfully.

"Prooty crop, Meest' Michel!" A vibrant appreciation lifted his rough voice. "Var' prooty! Cane come up thees high and jos' enoff rain till two week' ago when it stop. But it come again soon. Meest' Gaudin look at my cane lass week and say, 'You hev prooty crop, Telesphor.'"

"That is splendid," Michel retorted. Although he meant it, the words sounded over-hearty and condescending, and he added quickly, "Maybe your affairs will be better now."

"Ah-h-h, I don' know." Telesphor smiled, shook his head and shrugged high all at once. "I steel owe, me," he confided. "Always the sem'—two 'onderd dollaires. Mebbe leetle more lass year. Always the sem'."

"Well, that is not so very much."

Telesphor shrugged again, briefly. "Eet is always the sem'."

They looked at each other with nothing more to say. Telesphor made a gesture to put on his hat—"Mos' find vat'nary. *Bon jour, Meest' Michel.*"

"*Bon jour, Telesphor. I hope the mule gets well.*"

"*Merci!*"

MICHEL watched him ride off, then turned in the other direction toward the office of the *Courier* where he had left his horse at the hitching post across the street. On the way there he decided to ride out to Des Roses and see Grandmere, perhaps stay for dinner. The encounter with Telesphor had put him in a happier mood. While he had stood there

talking to him he had felt a little foolish, rather as though he were too tall and thin and "hollow" physically; yet he was pleased to have seen him. It occurred to him now, regretfully, that he might have told Telesphor something about the political campaign and asked him what he thought of it. Not that it would have done much good. Michel imagined the answer: "Me, I don' know, Meest' Michel." A wary politeness, a shrug. That was all that he, Michel Durel, would have gotten and all that he deserved. Telesphor undoubtedly thought him a fool—standing there and saying polite thngs, not meaning them, such as that the two hundred dollars and more of debt to Mr. Gaudin "was not so very much"! But one couldn't always say what one wanted. . . . He shook off this weary conclusion, guiding his mare carefully through the traffic of the business section and past a succession of lawns brilliantly disharmonious with roses and zinnias, the houses already shuttered against the sun. If Telesphor considered him a fool he had reason to, and there was curious comfort in that, in his own ability to recognize and understand this sort of contempt. It was not nearly so depressing or irritating as when people like his relatives accused him of having wasted his advantages, of being his brother Alcee's inferior—not even so depressing as his own dreary self-knowledge.

"I HAVE more respect for Telesphor," he thought suddenly. The idea impressed him as remarkable and somehow pleasant, full of incomprehensible promise, and for a moment his mind hovered eagerly over it. Then the meaning receded and was lost entirely. He rode swiftly out of Bienville, his mare's feet striking softly in the thick dust of the country and going into a gallop under his urging. It was good to be in motion, good to be riding away from the town. Yes—as a shadow raced ahead of him across the cane field, he thought with a light mockery for himself—it was a relief to leave behind him those people about whom he had wanted to know so much. For he had learned nothing, after all, that would give him any more respect for them than he had been able to feel for himself.

BARBARA GILES.



TO THE PIN-STRIPED TROUSERS

THE smart men of diplomacy are tireless little fellows who have a fondness for the endless repetition of their failures. For some reason what is clear to you and me and the dog is totally beyond them. When they gain the green baize tables of peace some of them will again dedicate themselves to the protection of stocks, bonds, and rates of interest not knowing or caring that this ancient technique produced Munich, precipitated a war in which some 20,000,000 of their fellow human beings have lost their lives, and threatened the independence of their country. They will not have learned the obvious truth that Munich was an effort to save a class at the expense of national independence—even France cannot teach them—nor will they have even faintly discerned that moves favoring reaction destroy the present world order to such an extent that they will, in the last analysis, even destroy the reaction they are trying to defend.

This column is addressed to the men in the pin-striped trousers and spats. I explain this so that if I repeat the obvious like a refrain you will understand. I like to play with the fancy that Mr. Berle will read it and then go tell Mr. Hull. Like Cromwell I entreat Mr. Berle "by the bowels of Christ to consider it possible that you may be mistaken." Therefore I say to Mr. Berle with all the earnestness at my command that the world has got into such a complicated mess that only democratic, progressive action will save it, while any move short of such action will inevitably increase the mess. A diplomat who can't level out to real, basic democracy merely adds to the complexity, which can only be solved and will only be solved by real democracy. A diplomat who believes that it is his function to thwart the will of the people, to delay the will of the people, to change, modify, or subvert the will of the people will not be contributing to a solution of world affairs, but will be contributing to revolution and civil war. A diplomat who is reluctant to recognize democratic exiled governments of European peoples puts difficulties in the path of American troops who will increasingly need the aid of those peoples offended by such diplomats. Those who refuse progressive liberal action will commit political suicide, as witness the class in France which gave its country to reaction and in doing so not only destroyed its country but itself.

THERE'S nothing special in this situation of France. *It is a general rule of the modern world that anything short of honest, progressive action threatens the independence of the country which practices it.* If anyone doubts it let him think of what would happen to the United States if a brand of America Firsters came into power. If through a selfish misconception the United States reverted to isolation (which to certain people would seem at least morally harmless) nothing could prevent it from finally occupying the place in the world that Hitler Germany does now.

One can take the postulate that *only* progressive programs can succeed at the present juncture of world history, that selfish

subterfuge for special interests leads to national ruin on any level and it still proves true. The American labor movement, for example, benefits the entire country, and its policies will increase the national welfare, the welfare of all classes, because its program is progressive and therefore serves the needs of the nation, even employers, at this stage of world history. Such a statement is beyond cavil when one realizes that the program calls for real coalition warfare, a centralized plan of war production which rations materials and manpower, incentive pay which increases production as it relieves the real distress of shrunken pay envelopes, international labor unity, all-out, militant prosecution of the war, and the backing of the President's anti-inflation proposals. Labor can be and is successful only to the degree that it acts for the entire nation, and labor is the only force, because history's circumstances, that can consistently forward the progressivism needed for national survival.

On the other hand, the program of the National Association of Manufacturers would bring the nation as a whole, even including the manufacturers, to ruin. It is not only that many of their members might favor a negotiated peace, that more are hostile to the coalition warfare needed for victory, that most would smash the most progressive force in the country, the labor unions, that many oppose the President's anti-inflation program. It is more that the sum total of their policies are so inimical to the national interest that if pursued over a period they would lead to fascism and death to the American republic as we now know it.

OR INVESTIGATE the theorem on quite a different level. If Czarist Russia had not been overthrown by a progressive socialism, Russia would not now possess its independence. The weak corruption that was the common denominator of all phases of the Czarist regime would have been smashed by the Nazis in the six weeks so often prescribed by the military experts. The point is that progressive action saves the whole country, saves national independence, and is the only thing that can save it, while reactionary moves threaten it in a very real way. This is not to say that a socialist revolution is the answer under all circumstances. To advocate one here and now, for example, would for many reasons be a reactionary pro-Hitler maneuver. But it does mean, let me repeat, that only actions that are progressive within the current scene can serve the nation and the world.

If some little shyster, for instance, succeeded, in company with other little shysters, in fastening a reactionary government on the people of France, it would guarantee violence, and if the shysters were American, their act would have important repercussions in this country. But if the people of France are allowed to follow their naturally progressive course, a sound solution and the *only* solution will have been reached. There may have been a time when progressive action served only a class, benefited only labor, for example. That time is past. Progressive action now serves the nation and reactionary moves threaten it. They are no longer a luxury which a nation can stand while certain industrialists rake in the gravy.

It is to be hoped that the smart little men of diplomacy will realize as they gather around the green baize tables of peace that Munich-like shenanigans will merely complicate a problem that can only be solved by progressive, truly democratic measures. If they don't realize it, the future will be glad to teach them.

READERS' FORUM

Heroic Stalingrad

TO NEW MASSES: Not enough has been said of that superb film *The City That Stopped Hitler*, for in its overwhelming presentation of the facts of Stalingrad, even the most skeptical must be convinced of the character of the war our Russian allies are fighting, and of how great a debt we in America owe the Red Army for its unparalleled destruction of the Nazi army on the Volga. Every day we read words testifying to the bestiality of Hitler's armies, to their once vast accumulated striking power, to the incredible monomania that guides their actions, but it takes a film such as this to make you feel the sharp impact of their meaning.

Even after you know the outcome of Stalingrad, you watch the approaching Nazi army with dread. The steppes west of the city are black with tanks and motorized units. The menacing plague from horizon to camera eye rumbles forward endlessly. The sun is blotted out with the thousands of droning enemy planes. The city waits; the city of parks, playgrounds, wide boulevards. But not for long. Soon the boulevards are reduced to rubble, the parks to desert, the playgrounds to cemeteries—and then you know the anguish and heroism of Soviet citizens in and out of uniform. They hack, shoot, and blow up the soldiers of the swastika, but like a nightmare—and you feel that it is a nightmare pressing down upon you with all its suffocating weight—the brown-grey horde keeps relentlessly coming, outnumbering the Russians in tanks, men, materiel, planes, and all the engines of war.

The deadly menace of the invader is transmitted from screen to audience. They must be stopped. The defenders throw themselves bodily at the tanks, stop the Hitlerites, hot for the kill, with their very bodies. The Red Army finds new stamina, greater strength, added courage. And then as you sit in the dark theater, watching this horror of destruction and indomitable defence, you are made aware that you are being saved from this nightmare by a valiance never before equalled in history. The slightest weakness, the most momentary wavering, might have meant defeat in this most crucial of all engagements. And your gratitude for this heroic people at least equals the relief felt in the diplomatic quarters of the various United Nations.

This is the value of the picture as a documentary. But in addition *The City That Stopped Hitler* possesses all the fine cinematic qualities of a carefully staged film. Scene after scene contains a sharpness and clarity that are almost unbelievable in the face of the most intense shock and crossfire of the war. One can select endless examples of the craftsmanship of the cameramen, but there is one scene that sums up their brilliant achievement—the meeting of the Soviet encircling armies. At first they show us the vast background of snow. Then some figures appear at each end

of the screen. Soon the individual figures become a stream, then a torrent of shouting men, as the soldiers of the northern and southern armies meet to clasp and hug each other. The greatest military entrapment in all history is complete. It is felt in the exultation of the commentator's voice and the applause of the audience mingles with the roars of the Red Armymen. In the recording of this historic moment, the "crowd" is handled with a dexterity found only in the work of master directors. And in no film has there ever been a dramatic climax equal to the one so expertly caught by the photographers of *The City That Stopped Hitler*.

This record of a heroic people fighting the battle of civilization is indeed the greatest film of our era, and one need look no further for the most persuasive argument for the immediate opening of a second front.

New York.


JOSEPH FOSTER.

Subway Encounter

TO NEW MASSES: Standing almost elbow-to-elbow next to me in the crowded New York subway car, a young fellow was reading *NEW MASSES*. When he looked up from the page, I remarked, "It is a pleasure to see someone reading worthwhile literature instead of these tabloids about us here in this car."

I didn't wish to interrupt his reading, but he seemed interested to talk about *NEW MASSES* and the social situation in general. One of his remarks was that in the labor union to which he belongs, some of his fellow members who are Roman Catholics declare it is a good thing to have some Communists in the organization, because they "keep things pepped up." He finds that *NEW MASSES* brings him something he can "get his teeth into," in contrast to the kind of reactionary propaganda in some other publications. He said he expected to enter the armed forces soon; his younger brother had already been inducted.

It still seems to me a remarkable coincidence, that a few days later, again in a crowded subway car, and in a city of so many million inhabitants, I should find myself once more standing near this same young man! We had another talk, and as we parted, after I left him my card, he promised to communicate with me.



These two meetings occurred several months ago, and on this September 1, while he was on furlough from a camp in the South, he called on Mrs. White and myself, looking healthily brown and alert in his trim uniform. We had a talk long to be remembered. Continuing to be an intelligent reader of *NEW MASSES*, he is all the more loyal a member of our armed forces, determined to help end Nazism and fascism and all their detestable works, as is evident from both his earnest words and very likable personality.

So from this writer, a cordial "Thank you!" to *NEW MASSES*, for thus opening the door to so valued a friendship.

New York.

ELIOT WHITE.

Jim Crow in the North

TO NEW MASSES: I have been following the Hillburn segregation case with great interest. There is much in the news to disturb the sleep of any decent citizen, but this New York discrimination case has first claim on one's peace of mind. When you live in the South, as I have for the past twenty-five years, you get to realize how each new provocation in Jim-Crow can take hold of otherwise honest people and pervert their whole social viewpoint.

So far as I know, this is the first case of Jim-Crow in the educational system north of the Mason-Dixon line, and the dealers in Negro misery down here are hoping hard that the Hillburn School Board maintains the policy of separate schools. They realize as people in the North may not, that a victory for reaction in Hillburn will cause the teeth of Jim-Crow to sink deeper into the flesh of the South. For years we have been trying to point out to the more enlightened men of our community that it was part of our responsibility to eliminate the conditions that in President Roosevelt's words made the South the nation's number one problem. But when the anti-democratic elements in the rest of the country can get away with the same brand of social custom, the results of our educational efforts are all but wiped out.

Just one more thing. If the attempt at Jim-Crow in New York sticks, then the same business may pop up in almost any spot that has a large Negro concentration—Connecticut, Ohio, Michigan. The Hillburn case is the serious concern of the entire country.

New Orleans.

LOUIS VERNIER.

On Anti-fascism

TO NEW MASSES: Read your favorable review of *The Farm Bloc* by Wesley McCune. It recalls my newspaper days at one of the big California football colleges when I was removed from the staff as being too anti-Nazi (1939). At that time McCune in his column in the University of Colorado *Silver and Gold* exposed the NAM and other fascist tendencies in the land. It was no wonder that he and his courageous staff were badgered by the Dies un-American committee and the local American Legion.

Also, extend my compliments to writer I. F. Stone on his resignation from the National Press Club in protest against their Jim-Crowism, particularly the Judge Hastie case. [*NEW MASSES* published Mr. Stone's letter of resignation.]

Los Angeles.

MATTHEW STEVENS.



INDIA AND THE WAR

A political deadlock threatens United Nations operations in Asia. Starvation in a land of undeveloped wealth. R. Palme Dutt's new book reviewed by Albert White.

ALTHOUGH the Quebec Conference was undoubtedly prompted by the rapid march of events in Europe, we now have it on the authority of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that much of the military deliberations was concerned with the problem of stepping up offensive operations against Japan and getting increased aid to China. The appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten, chief of Britain's famed Commaridos, as head of the newly created Southeast Asia Allied Command is evidence that an Indian-based offensive against the Japanese in Burma is in preparation. A re-examination of the Indian situation is therefore timely, for in both the military and the political spheres United Nations operations in Asia are being seriously hampered by the continued political deadlock in India.

All evidence indicates that the continuance of the policy of repression and sequestration against Indian nationalists has produced a sense of bitterness and frustration among the Indian people which is not only preventing the full mobilization of India's resources for war, but is also providing dangerously fertile ground for the operations of Axis propagandists and fifth columnists. For some time the Japanese have been waging a strong propaganda offensive against India, aided and abetted by such renegade Indian leaders as Subhas Chandra Bose, who arrived in Japan from Germany early in June and has since devoted himself to broadcasts calling upon the Indian people to rise against Britain and welcome their Japanese "liberators." Bose is now reported to be organizing an Indian army in Burma, under Japanese auspices, while continuing to appeal to his former followers in Bengal to sabotage the British war effort.

The work of Bose and other fascist agents has been facilitated by the fact that India is now experiencing one of the gravest "man-made" famines in her history. Acute food shortages have already caused riots and disturbances in many parts of the country. As a result of unchecked hoarding, speculation, and profiteering by large grain merchants, food prices in general have risen 185 percent, while the cost of flour—mainstay of the Indian diet—has risen 300 percent. Half of the population of Bengal

is now living on one meal every two days, and conditions in Bombay and other important centers are equally alarming. Thus famine adds fuel to the fires of political unrest, and renders the people of India increasingly apathetic, if not actively hostile, to the United Nations war effort.

But despite the fact that conditions in India are certainly no less critical than they were a year ago, American concern over the Indian crisis appears to have subsided from the high point reached during and immediately after the Cripps mission. This slackening of interest is presumably due in part to the fact that with Japan on the defensive, the danger of an invasion of India now appears remote. It may also be attributed to the widespread though erroneous belief, encouraged by official British

statements, that nothing further can be done until the Indians compose their internal differences, and that since the Indian situation is now "under control," the resolving of the present deadlock can be safely postponed until after the war.

THE publication in this country of R. Palme Dutt's *The Problem of India** is therefore particularly welcome, in that it should serve to dispel this unwarranted complacency regarding the present Indian situation. Mr. Dutt is well known as a brilliant political analyst, the editor of the British *Labour Monthly*, the author of such

* THE PROBLEM OF INDIA, by R. Palme Dutt. International Publishers. Trade Edition, \$2. Popular Edition, \$1.50.

The Cities

War was on the sea, they said, mainly cannonade in the alien mountains.

The school term is over, the examination passed, the romantic salvo

On the last page of the burned book. War is in the street, In the neighbor's house, at the door of the child's splintered room.

History will be simple: the names of battles and the cities Merge in stealthy smoke. They will be cited for standing in the iron rain,

For women in helmets, for old men with weapons, for children tearless in debris.


Warsaw's fallen masonry was blown up in Madrid. London is a torn poem of defiance: in her empty squares, Peasants from Chungking are sowing tomorrow's grain.

North of Manila the foxholes come to light in Moscow and Smolensk.

The Thames welcomes the airmen returning; the Volga Curves like a mother at Stalingrad, the plain that became a mountain.

The colors on the maps have run together in the iron rain. The borders are drawn from the veins of dying men; They cannot tell Guernica ends and Coventry begins.

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Marxist classics as *World Politics* and *Britain in the World Front*, and a frequent contributor to the *NEW MASSES*. In the first three sections of his latest book Mr. Dutt presents an incisive, closely knit analysis of India's political and economic development under British rule, based on original Indian and British material. These sections are a condensed and up-to-date version of his larger study, *India Today*, published in England in 1940, but not in this country. The introductory chapter as well as the final section dealing with the present crisis and possibilities for its solution, are entirely new.

In his preface to the American edition, Mr. Dutt stresses the important point that the Indian problem should not become a "source of misunderstanding and conflict between democratic opinion in Britain and the United States." And yet, although his book is addressed primarily to the people of Great Britain, who "hold the immediate power of decision, which can open or bar the road to Indian freedom and equal partnership in the alliance of the United Nations," he believes that a constructive solution of the Indian problem is also a matter of immediate concern to the American people and that "our common interests require that the path of unity and cooperation shall be found."

THE central theme of his book is that Indian freedom is not only essential for victory in the war against fascism, but that in the interests of both the Indian and British peoples and the advance of world democracy, it was "long urgent and overdue" even before the war began. In support of this contention, he shows that though India is a land of great potential wealth, most of her resources remain undeveloped, while the vast majority of her people live in abject poverty. He acknowledges that British rule performed a valuable service in uniting India and giving her the material basis for modern economic development — roads, railways, communications, irrigation works, a modern banking system, etc. But he also demonstrates conclusively that India's status as the colony of a highly industrialized power was responsible for the artificial arresting of her industrial development at a low level, which in turn caused the severe over-crowding of agriculture which constitutes the basic cause of Indian poverty. British control over the Indian economy has thus ceased to be constructive, and furthermore, the bureaucratic government of British India can never be expected to deal with the basic causes of Indian poverty and backwardness, because its chief concern is to maintain "law and order" and not to uproot the reactionary elements in Indian society, such as the princes and great landlords, who are among the staunchest supporters of British rule and who can exist only in a land of guaranteed "law and order."

In an extremely important chapter dealing with the agrarian problem of India, he analyzes the evils of the prevailing system of land tenure and land revenue, and describes with a wealth of corroborative evidence the rapid increase in the number of landless peasants and the crippling burden of debt under which the average peasant must labor. His conclusion is that "far-reaching changes are essential, reaching to the whole basis of land tenure . . . no less than to the technique of agricultural production," and that these changes can be achieved only "by the people of India themselves under the leadership of a government of their own choice."

In his discussion of India's political development under British rule, Mr. Dutt shows both how and why the Indian National Congress developed from a small body of moderates, fully loyal to the British government, into a broadly representative mass organization, fighting for complete independence from British rule. He also refutes the British contention that the main aim of British policy has been to train the Indian people for self-government. This he does by an analysis of successive British legislative measures, from the Charter of 1833 down to the Constitution of 1935, in which he shows that the real aim and effect of these measures have been to enlist the cooperation of "moderate" Indians in various branches of the British-controlled administration—a very different thing from real self-government.


Mr. Dutt discusses in some detail the alleged obstacles to Indian unity, notably Hindu-Moslem antagonism, the Princes, the Untouchables, etc. Though not denying that serious internal differences exist, he maintains that they do not constitute an insuperable obstacle to Indian unity and, moreover, that they are being perpetuated by the existence of an External Power to which all Indian factions can appeal for protection of their special rights. It cannot be denied that a self-governing India would be confronted with many complex and difficult problems. Such an India would be obliged to deal with a primitive, over-



burdened, and usury-ridden agricultural system, as well as industrial backwardness; with malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy; and with outworn religious customs and reactionary groups in Indian society that obstruct the initiation of measures for social and economic reform. Mr. Dutt makes clear that only an Indian government, chosen and trusted by the people, could or would undertake to solve such basic problems.

A GAINST this political and economic background, Mr. Dutt discusses India's role in the war, the Cripps mission and its aftermath, and the possibilities for an early solution of the present crisis which will make possible India's participation in the war as a free and equal partner of the United Nations. He fully supports the argument of Indian leaders that the most urgent problem is the mobilization of the Indian people for war, and that this can only be accomplished by a government of Indian leaders in whom the people have confidence. The Cripps proposals represented no basic change in British policy on this all-important point, since they provided for the retention of power in British hands for the duration of the war, and granted India's leaders only the right of consultative cooperation. It was this refusal to consider any immediate transfer of power to a provisional Indian government that caused the failure of the Cripps mission. It also tied the hands of such sincere and militant anti-fascists as Nehru and Azad, who had repudiated Gandhi's pacifist attitude toward the war, and enabled Gandhi to reassert his leadership over the Congress Party. This Mr. Dutt considers "a heavy liability for the Indian nationalist movement." But while he deplores the "suicidal blindness" of Gandhi and his supporters in threatening a civil disobedience campaign when India was menaced by an Axis invasion, he nevertheless recognizes that it was an understandable act of desperation, provoked by the repeated rejection of their plea that Indians could only be aroused to fight for their country by a government of their own leaders.

In Mr. Dutt's opinion, "the continuance of crisis and conflict, with the diversion of the forces of the ruling power to tasks of repression, and the passivity, non-cooperation, or active hostility of large sections of the population and their political leaders," are dangers which cannot be ignored and which render an early solution of the Indian deadlock imperative. Such a solution, he believes, can be accomplished only by a reopening of negotiations between the British government and the Indian people, and in his concluding chapter he outlines the three general principles which should govern these negotiations. These principles are: (1) recognition of Indian independence; (2) establishment of a provisional national government representative of all



political sections and leaders willing to cooperate in the common task of armed resistance to fascist aggression as an ally of the United Nations; and (3) provision for the effective military cooperation of India and the United Nations.

Similar proposals have been voiced by many Indian leaders and other competent observers of Indian affairs. What lends particular weight to Mr. Dutt's development of these proposals is his penetrating analysis of India's political and economic problems on which they are based, and of which they form a logical and convincing conclusion.

"THE PROBLEM OF INDIA" is a *must* book for everyone interested in world affairs and the problems involved in winning the war as well as in postwar peace and progress. Unfortunately, historic developments do not wait upon publishing schedules. Much has transpired since Mr. Dutt's book was first published in England several months ago. Among other events, a new Viceroy of India has been appointed. It may help in part to bring history up-to-date by quoting the last few paragraphs of a recent letter addressed to Lord Wavell, the new Viceroy of India, by Mr. Harry Pollitt, on behalf of the Communist Party of Great Britain:

"The Communist Party therefore strongly urges that you should consider the desirability, on the occasion of the inauguration of your Viceroyalty, of a new departure in policy with a view to ending the deadlock. For this purpose, we would urge the following proposals.

- (1) To release the Congress Working Committee and all democratic anti-fascist leaders.
- (2) To permit negotiations between the representative leaders of all political sections in India, with a view to their reaching agreement on their immediate proposals.
- (3) Following these steps, to open negotiations with the Indian leaders with a view to reaching a settlement.
- (4) To take energetic measures to meet the present food crisis, both by increased

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"We believe that such measures and such a new departure in policy, expressing confidence in the Indian people and in their ability to solve their problems, could rapidly transform the situation in India. It would remove the serious weakness which the Indian situation at present represents for the United Nations. It would open the way to enormously raising the level of Indian recruiting and military training, and enormously raising the level of Indian production. It would strengthen the confidence of all peoples of Eastern Asia in the cause of the United Nations as the cause of their own freedom.

"We believe that such measures would correspond to the wishes and feelings of the overwhelming majority of democratic opinion in this country, as recently evidenced by the unanimous vote of the National Union of Railwaymen urging the government to open up negotiations with the principal national representatives of India with a view to the establishment of an Indian National Government.

"Such a resolution is, we believe, typical of the trend of democratic opinion in this country.

"We earnestly hope that you will give serious consideration to these proposals."

ALBERT WHITE.

Before Munich

CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN EUROPEAN HISTORY, by S. Harrison Thomson. Princeton University Press. \$3.75.

MR. THOMSON apparently had the best of intentions when he set out to write this book on "the pilgrimage of the Czech (and Slovak) people through history." But unfortunately his book is far from satisfactory even if we approach it with the most modest expectations. The central difficulty is that the author sees historical developments solely through the media of political and cultural processes and ignores entirely economics and the analysis of social movements. Mr. Thomson, for example, fails to appreciate the elementary and important fact that the Hussite revolution had its deep economic and social roots; that the Hapsburg counter-reformation had considerable effect on such matters as property; or that the so-called Czech renaissance was closely tied to the birth of a new era of industrial awakening.

One would also assume that in a book which in its introduction claims to use "historical analysis and quiet explanation" rather than the haste and partiality of a "journalistic essay," there would not be such blatant blunders as one finds in the chapter on the internal affairs of Czecho-

slovakia from 1914 to 1938. Here the events of December 1920 are described as an "attempted *coup d'état*" of the left wing of the Social Democratic party. Every student of the official reports, the newspapers, the historical studies of that period knows that the general strike was proclaimed as a defensive measure against the provocative seizure of the "worker's home" and the printing shop of the Social Democratic party by a handful of old guard leaders with the aid of the police. All this in open defiance of more than three-quarters of the party's membership. Apart from this distorted picture of the labor movement, there is hardly any mention of the important role labor has played in Bohemia and Moravia (in the Czech parts as well as in the German) throughout the last eighty years.

In dealing with the Munich chapter of Czechoslovak history, Mr. Thomson displays a more than generous attitude towards Lord Runciman, never mentioning that this right honorable gentleman had some business connections with powerful Nazi-controlled trusts. The son of the noble lord became one of the international directors of the Goering-sponsored trust controlling Sudeten soft coal interests after the occupation of 1938.

While devoting too much space to a description of the stillborn Polish-Czechoslovak plan of federation, the author neglects entirely the history of the formation of national unity among Czechoslovak emigres as well as inside the occupied country. It is exactly this feature of Czechoslovak policy and history of our time that provides the clues for future development. And what a strange thing it is to find in a book by an American published in 1943 an acknowledgment of thanks to a man who became a supporter of Henlein and Hitler. I refer to Prof. Wilhelm Wostry of the German University of Prague. An accident? Lack of information? Well, one would suppose that even an academic mind with an ample disdain for journalistic methods would from time to time consult a newspaper in order to learn what is going on.

P. S. KUDRNA.





FOUR STARS AND MORE

Hollywood hails the proud of Bataan and Corregidor. Virtuoso players in a virtuoso production and a letter as great as the men who wrote it . . .

"SO PROUDLY WE HAIL" has what it takes. And if you think it doesn't take much to make the grade after *Edge of Darkness*, *Hangmen Also Die*, *Mission*, *Action in the North Atlantic*, and *Watch on the Rhine*, you just haven't been around very long. To give you an inkling of what was involved in making *So Proudly We Hail*: first, you needed expert craftsmanship; then, the selfless efforts of a virtuoso cast, including three of Hollywood's most glamorized players, Claudette Colbert, Veronica Lake, Paulette Goddard, and a tear 'em down newcomer, Sonny Tufts; a producer-director like Mark Sandrich who was willing to take his lumps in case of failure; you needed a fresh approach to the treatment of women on the American screen and above all you had to have genuine savvy about the character of the war. The last two requirements were brilliantly supplied by Allan Scott, scenarist of the film. Add them up and you've got something for the books.

The film has a flash-back structure. A group of nurses (their experiences on Bataan and Corregidor are the substance of the story) land in Australia. One of their number, Lieut. Janet Davidson (Claudette Colbert) is borne out of the transport plane on a stretcher. Shocked, hovering between life and death, will to live gone. How to get her back? The US physicians are stymied but one of them has a letter addressed to Davidson that he thinks will help get to her consciousness. First he must know everything that happened. Every detail. Then the nurses give out and you get the body of the movie.

There's too much to tell for this review: the sensitively individualized roles, the top-notch bombardment scenes, a most remarkable passage—the Caesarian operation performed under a storm of bombs and shrapnel—and more of the like. We'd prefer instead to give the reader the substance of the film's conclusion. The nurses have finished telling their end of it. Then the physician reads Lieutenant Davidson the letter. It has been written to her by her husband Lieutenant Summers (played by George Reeves) just before he was about to leave on a mission from which there was little likelihood he'd ever return.

"My darling: I'm writing this from Cebu. We leave in the morning for an

unknown destination in the outer island on the track for quinine. I write with no so-called premonitions. As a matter-of-fact, I'm writing this in a pleasant bar on the outskirts of Cebu. I've ordered two daiquiris—one for you and one for me. I shall drink them both. Sorry. You wanted to know why I volunteered. I couldn't have told you then.

"I was bewildered because we seemed to be fighting for nothing. Or only because we were attacked. But I learned from you and the others, and all the men on Bataan that they were not fighting merely for survival. There was something new in this war. This is not just a war of soldiers. You were not soldiers in the strict sense. You were kids from all walks of life—all classes—all kinds of people. You could see it—this new thing—even in their hungry, tired faces as they took courage from one another.

"This is not a people's war because

civilians also get killed. It's *the* people's war because they have taken it over and are going to win it and end it with a purpose—to live like men with dignity, in freedom.

"That's what we must be careful about. Those people who brought the war on us are still there. They're in hiding now, ready to strike treacherously at us again.

"And the peace. They'll try to take it from us when we've won the victory. They'll want to go back, put everything back the way it was . . . the way it used to be. We must watch out for them.

"There's a small voice whispering now around the world, and although the people have not yet talked to each other across the boundaries, they hear each other talking. And this voice will grow in volume until it thunders across the world. It is the rage that made Kansas cry. It says: 'This is our war now, and this time it will be our peace.'"



From "So Proudly We Hail"

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That's a passage for our memory. This reviewer can recall nothing like it in films with the exception of Chaplin's concluding speech in *The Great Dictator*.

Before leaving *So Proudly We Hail* we must mention a slightly intra-mural matter. It seems that NEW MASSES in its July 13 issue carried a review of the film. To say the least, Miss Davidman, among whose admirers you can number me, had quite a contrary opinion of the picture. To my mind she was glaringly off the beam. For all things to attack the film for its handling of the woman question, which is one of its strong points! We'd back her up one hundred percent on *Woman of the Year*, or *Forest Rangers* but why the film under consideration? If anything *So Proudly We Hail* is a positive trail-blazer on the woman question.

There may be several things in the film you can legitimately cavil at but we warn you (readers won't mind—this is a warning I always give myself), don't make the mistake of being thrown by the first tree you hit only to miss the entire forest.

Footnote: *So Proudly We Hail* is "socko" all over the country.

MGM's Technicolor Hit! *Thousands Cheer* . . . thirty stars . . . three bands. . . . "It's super-duper" (*Mirror*) "Magnificent" (*Times*) Popular Prices, continuous from 9 A.M.

Who are we to disagree? There's a lot in the handbills MGM is throwing about town. Kathryn Grayson gives out with the high notes (we hope it was her own voice because it's a good one). Iturbi makes with the baton and pianoforte. Gene Kelley and Eleanor Powell make with the taps (good taps). Mickey Rooney makes with the teeth (good teeth). Red Skelton ditto with the jokes (some good). Lena Horne does things to "Honeysuckle Rose" (nice things). A fine chorus. A symphony orchestra to end all orchestras, etc. And there is at least one sequence when Grayson meets up with Gene Kelley for the first time that we can guarantee as a house bringer-downer. There's even a plot (why tell it to you, you've seen it many times). The film ends with an elaborate, much too elaborate, production of Shostokovich's "Song of the United Nations." We'd prefer it in simpler form, but if that's the only way for the present, okay.

The true heroes of *As Thousands Cheer* are the film technicians who put the picture together. For one, you never heard such cracker-jack sound recording. Remarkable fidelity and range that's fantastic. Good camera-work and technicolor that you can enjoy save for a few passages that are cloying.

Conclusion? *Thousands Cheer* is an enormous genial dinosaur of a film. You will undoubtedly like a great deal of it but we're more or less convinced that after

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some reflection you'll decide that like the dinosaur the film isn't too intelligent.

★
THE Legion of Decency again takes the spotlight. It must be said immediately, to reassure our more hopeful readers, that the Legion is as disgraceful an anachronism in American life as ever. Its latest act has been to find *The City That Stopped Hitler—Heroic Stalingrad* "objectionable because it tends to incite hatred of the persons of the enemies and to be excessively gruesome." We can only wonder where the Legion keeps itself. Exactly where are the hermetically sealed chambers in which it resides? Obviously not in this world. Does it ever read a paper? "Tends to incite hatred of the persons of the enemies"? Tell that to the Americans on the beach-heads of Italy. Does it believe the German Wehrmacht derived its code from Tennyson's *Idylls of the King*?

This department regards the Legion fiat as insulting to the intelligence of the American people, the Americans whose moral "purity" is supposed to be the ordained bailiwick of the Legion. Now consider the matter in so far as it concerns our Russian allies. Not an hour goes by but that the Russian people see before their wounded eyes new evidence of the invader's bestiality. Horrors that words and images on film can never really approximate. What cold-blooded mockery of a great people's suffering, then, is this "excessively gruesome"?

In the background of the Legion's position there lurks something sinister. Either the Legion believes that the Nazis are Nature's gentlemen and that the thousand-times corroborated stories of their crimes are fabrications devised for reasons of military expediency, or even worse, it doesn't really care. Perhaps it is the hope of the Legion that after the war all will be forgiven and forgotten and that the world will return to the pleasant ways of Munich.

DANIEL PRENTISS.



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
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
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