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How to Win the War in 1942




**SPECIAL
ISSUE**

NEW MASSES

MAY 26, 1942 15c

IN CANADA 20c



THE CASE FOR THE WESTERN FRONT

In this issue: Maj. George Fielding Eliot, Maj.-Gen. Stephen O. Fuqua, Lt.-Col. W. F. Kernan, Richard O. Boyer, Col. T., Tacticus. With maps, charts, articles, interviews

Welcome . . .

The sun was shining when Earl Browder came home. And there was sun in the hearts of millions of Americans. They had worked to set him free—steel workers, seamen, builders of tanks and planes, stenographers, doctors, lawyers, garment workers, teachers, writers, artists, ministers, men and women from all walks of life. And now at last “the quiet man from Kansas” was free. A great day for American democracy. A great day for the war against Hitlerism.

The White House statement hit the bull's-eye: Browder's release “will have a tendency to promote national unity.” And it was characteristic of this great anti-fascist that the first statement he made on gaining his freedom was: “I hope everyone interested in my release will make it the occasion to intensify every effort to weld unbreakable national unity under our Commander-in-Chief for victory in the war.”

Congratulations to President Roosevelt for this great act of justice, this vital contribution to national unity in the spirit of all that is best in America. Congratulations to the four million men and women, the vast majority of them non-Communists, who courageously spoke up and made possible Browder's freedom. Congratulations to the officers and members of the Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder, which organized the fight in his behalf. Congratulations to those newspapers and magazines that upheld the best traditions of a free press by urging Browder's release.

Let the defeatists and fifth columnists growl. The freeing of Earl Browder is the counterpart of the suppression of *Social Justice*, of the jailing of George Sylvester Viereck, Laura Ingalls, and William Dudley Pelley; it is part of the offensive against the enemy within.

The editors of *New Masses* warmly greet Earl Browder on this happy occasion. His leadership will be a powerful weapon in the fight against fascist barbarism. Years ago he warned the country, urged American participation in a world front against Nazi and Japanese aggression. And more than three years ago, on April 2, 1939, he expressed the faith which today animates all Americans:

“There can be no longer any doubt of the final destruction of fascism and its elimination from the world. The only question is how long it will take and how much it will cost. The people of the United States, among the first ranks of the peoples of the world, have set their feet upon the path to that end, and nothing will stop them.”



Between Ourselves

Thank You!

Yes, it was YOU who made this issue possible. It was you, our readers, who came to our rescue with the amount needed to make up the \$5,000 demanded by our printers as necessary to the continued publication of the magazine. Last week we gave you the granite truth of the situation—that only \$2,473 of that \$5,000 had come in, and we had just five days more to raise the remainder. Tuesday was the deadline, and you made it. You sent us more than the \$2,527 needed. That, and only that, kept us from having to sacrifice all the planning and work which went into this special Western Front issue. And so we thank you—as a homely American phrase has it—"from the bottom of our boots."

The immediate crisis has been surmounted. But what of the future? Remember, that \$5,000 to the printers was simply payment on account. There is more owing—and there are other bills. We can't get away from the highest publication costs in New Masses' lifetime. Neither can we chisel down our budget any further. Our obligations to our readers, to keep the magazine to a standard commensurate with its function, is more demanding in these times than ever before. Figuring it to the penny, \$40,000 is the least we must have. So far we have received just \$17,152 of that sum. Whether the magazine survives or not: that is for you to decide.

NEW MASSES—461 Fourth Ave.,
New York City, N. Y.

Enclosed please find as my contribution towards meeting the \$40,000 deficit.

Name.....

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City..... State.....

MASTHEADS are not exciting reading but we should like to call your attention to the new name on ours this week—that of Herbert Goldfrank, who has joined NM's editorial board, in especial charge of the magazine's promotion activities. Besides his long experience in that particular field, Goldfrank has been active in both editorial and executive positions. He

was for several years an editor of *Soviet Russia Today* and national secretary of the American Friends of the Soviet Union. A native New Yorker, Goldfrank has lived in Texas for several years and has worked in many parts of the country. We are very proud to welcome him as a fellow worker.

To Joseph Starobin, NM's foreign

editor, goes particular credit for the planning and editing of this Western Front issue. A "special issue" of this kind—and this is our fifth in the past three years—takes plenty of planning, to say nothing of the leg work, editing, writing, and so on. But we may as well admit that we enjoy it. There's the thrill of the "special"—and what is more absorbing, more vital today than the topic which gave rise to *this* special issue of NM? We are printing extra copies this week, and making them available in bundles of ten or more for ten cents a piece. Here's your chance, if you want to introduce NM to relatives and acquaintances and at the same time provide them with the most salient facts for winning the war in 1942. Just send us a list of ten or more names and addresses, with ten cents for each, and we will mail the copies out. Or better still, prevail upon your prospective subscribers to sign up, starting with this special

issue. The subscription drive still goes on; subs are the lifeblood of the magazine, never so important as now. And remember—the Quiz Book is out and it's yours free if you just send in two new yearly subs.

Our discussion of the Western Front will be continued in the next issue with the publication of articles by one of Europe's greatest writers, Heinrich Mann, and by General Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros, who was chief of the air force of republican Spain.

Better make your reservations right now if you want to be in on NM's Weekend at Plum Point, N. Y., May 22-24 inclusive. It's a delightful place above the Hudson, fifty-five miles from New York. In addition to the usual sports, the entertainment will include a theater program and music recital. Joseph Starobin, NM's foreign editor, will conduct a Sunday morning forum. Further details will be found on page 29.

THIS WEEK

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May 26, 1942

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Two weeks' notice is required for change of address. Notification sent to NEW MASSES rather than to the post office will give the best results.

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THE CASE for the WESTERN FRONT

The greatest battle the world has ever seen is raging on the Eastern Front. Will an invasion now of Europe finish Hitler? Is it necessary? Is it possible? *New Masses* editors present the evidence and examine the arguments pro and con.

NOW that the long-heralded spring fighting has begun again in Russia, millions of Americans are thinking about the possibility of opening a Western Front against Hitler. In the minds of most Americans, the issue of opening a second front in Europe this spring and summer boils down to two main questions: Is it necessary? and is it possible?

The instinct of every patriot is for the attack, for carrying the war to the enemy, to meet him and beat him as soon as possible. But in face of the fact that the war must be carried on by our High Command, and cannot be fought out in the front parlor, the average man is prone to leave the issue of strategy to his superiors. That is okay as far as it goes, but the experience of this war over several years has shown that the issues of this kind are not merely technical. They are broad political issues, on which the understanding and self-expression of the people as a whole is vital, and that in no way contradicts the authority which our military leaders have vested in them.

Clemenceau once remarked that "war is too serious a business to be left to the generals." Today we would

not put it that way, for there is no lack of faith in our generals, and the war is producing really great ones, such as MacArthur, Stilwell, Timoshenko, and others. But it remains true that on such a grave political issue as opening a second front, on which there are differences of opinion in high quarters, an aroused, intelligent, alert public is necessary to bring the nation face to face with the realities. Winston Churchill, in his broadcast on May 10, welcomed the strong expression of public sentiment regarding a second front. NEW MASSES thinks it can be shown that a Western Front in Europe this spring and summer is not only necessary, but vital and crucial for the whole future of our fight. And the evidence that already exists, available to the layman, convinces us that it is possible.

Is the Second Front Necessary?

Yes, we think it is, and for the following reasons:

1. America's national interest, as well as the interest of all the United Nations, urgently requires the opening of a Western Front through a land invasion within the next weeks and months. Unless such a front is opened, we risk losing the war on all fronts, including the Far East. This would mean not only the total enslavement of all Europe and Asia by the fascist Axis, but the end of the United States as a free nation.

2. A Western Front offers the possibility of greatly shortening the war through a decision this year.

3. The smashing of the Nazi war machine through a two-front war would constitute the heaviest blow that could be dealt to the Japanese. It would create the most favorable conditions for undertaking a large-scale offensive to regain all the lost positions in the Pacific and Asia and to end once and for all the bloated dreams about a Japanese "co-prosperity sphere."

4. The Western Front would stir to renewed and intensified action the inner front of the conquered peoples of Europe and Asia. It would end any lingering doubts the smaller nations may have about the readiness or ability of the United States and Britain to aid them in decisive fashion.

5. A joint British-American invasion of western Europe, coordinated with the tremendous efforts of the Red Army on the Eastern Front, would have a shattering effect on the morale of both German soldiers and civilians. It would hearten and strengthen the underground opposition to Hitler, as well as deepen dissension among Germany's "allies" and within the Nazi cabal, thus hastening fascism's downfall.

6. Elementary considerations of morality and justice require that the United States and Britain do not leave the brunt of the fighting and dying to the men and women of Russia.

LET us consider some of these points in greater detail. Taking the last one first: this is a war of great moral objectives, and every one of the participants is being put to the test. The idea that there is a division of labor in which the Russians and Chinese do most of the fighting, while we do not much more than produce the implements of warfare and transport

them to the battle scene, is an immoral idea, repugnant to every healthy instinct. It is all very well to be amazed at the Russians, who have given over 1,000,000 of their best men thus far; it is all very well to applaud them and congratulate what General MacArthur has called the "greatest military achievement in history." But after all, this is everybody's war: it is a war of all democratic peoples against the barbarians. The fact that Hitler has been successful in concentrating his blows against one democratic country after the other ought not blind us to the basic truth: that he is fighting all of them, that he is aiming at the very idea of democracy, at the basic idea of equality on which the American republic was founded, at the moral values and aspirations of mankind.

But actually the idea of letting the Russians bear the brunt of this war is not only immoral, but suicidal; it works in the interests of Germany and against our own interests. What was Hitler's great failure last year? It was the failure to bring about an anti-Soviet crusade such as he hoped would have given him victory over Russia and would have spelled ultimate defeat for the rest of the world. But if we and our British allies continue to stand away from gripping Hitler in a two-front struggle, that is almost as bad as if we had cooked our own goose by falling for his anti-Communist propaganda. Only the discredited appeasers and defeatists, the pro-fascists in this country, have urged such a course. If we have come to realize that they are traitors, if Coughlin, Pelley, Viereck, and others have been silenced and some of them jailed, then certainly we whose aims are so completely opposed to theirs ought not to follow the course that they urged.

IMAGINE the effect on the smaller nations allied with us if we persist in failing to open a Western Front. Munich and what followed after did incalculable harm to the relations between the small nations and the two leading capitalist democracies, Britain and the United States. After what happened to Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Albania, after the inability of the western powers to save the other European nations overrun by the Nazis, the confidence of the peoples of those countries was greatly shaken, a confidence that began to be restored with the great fight of the British people against invasion. A similar lack of confidence undoubtedly contributed to our defeats in the Far East: the peoples of Malaya, of Burma and Java, perhaps of India, after watching us play ball with Japan for so long, and not doing much for China beyond words, simply weren't convinced in time of our will, as well as our immediate ability to fight, and fight together with them as equals.

Now don't let anybody say that the United States is so great and powerful that we don't need our smaller allies. Yes, they need us, but we need them. One of the peculiarities of the American position in world affairs is that while we have had a great economic superiority over other nations and geographically have been relatively secure by contrast with them, nevertheless, once attacked, we can only exercise our strength and translate our economic superiority into effective military terms through the strategic bases and positions of other nations, many of them small. For example, we can't get

to Australia, and secure our routes there except via New Caledonia and Tahiti, which the Free French happen to control; we can't get bombers across the belt of Africa, except by courtesy of Dutch Guiana, and free Belgium's control of the Congo. Many more of our ships would have been sunk this spring, and many more good men would have gone down with them if it were not for the cooperation of the little country of Iceland, from which our convoys can be protected. And so it goes for Egypt, for Iran, and many other small nations. As a matter of fact, even China is watching our attitude toward helping Russia by opening a front in the West. As the New York Herald Tribune correspondent Richard Watts reported last summer, the attitude in China was that if Russia were let down by the western nations so China might also be let down. In other words, the second front is a great test of our relations with all the smaller nations, with China, and with the Soviet Union itself.










ABOVE all, the evidence is that failure to create a Western Front would risk losing the whole war, just as failure to act for collective security prior to September 1939 risked and in fact brought about the loss of the peace. Why? Because if Hitler were able to defeat the Soviet armies this year, or even if they were rendered less effective by being pushed back to the Urals and the mouth of the Volga, if control of Murmansk and the Leningrad area were lost, Hitler would have gained what is known as the cradle of the world. That lies within a radius of some 500 miles from

Mt. Ararat in the Caucasus. If Hitler can win full control of this region, it would open up the rest of Russia, all of the Middle East, the northeastern gates of Africa, and the highways to India. It would close the Mediterranean, and enable Hitler to move through the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. It would pave the way for a junction of the forces of Germany and Japan—and the problem of prying the Axis lose from such positions, of beating the Germans and Japanese back, and then defeating them in their own ground would be well-nigh impossible. And especially since the impact on Russia, on England, on all the peoples of the continent, on China, on Latin America would be terrific.

Then where would the United States be? The truth is that if we risk a German-Japanese assault against the cradle of the world, where our Russian and British allies are holding the fort, we are not only risking the war for our allies, but we are risking equally grave disasters for ourselves.

BUT can Germany deliver this desperate blow against our allies? Isn't it true, says the timid soul, that Hitler has already been gravely weakened, didn't he admit in a speech of April 26 that Germany had barely escaped "disaster" last autumn and winter?

Yes, granted that Hitler has been gravely weakened. But far from being an argument against the second front, that's an excellent argument for it. For if Hitler cannot deliver the knockout punch this year, then the way to finish him off is to deliver the knockout blow

	GERMANY	HITLER'S EUROPE	USSR	BRITAIN	USA	ALLIED TOTAL
 IRON ORE	3,100	19,818	14,600	3,615	14,630	35,845
 STEEL	23,208	40,404	18,000	10,565	46,898	75,563
 COAL	186,179	336,014	132,188	230,658	354,463	718,009
 OIL PRODUCTS	2,143	15,872	22,219	11,921	145,426	179,566
 WOOL	20.2	178.5	137.4	497.1	207.6	842.1
 Cu COPPER	68.8	231.9	98.0	450.2	570.8	1,119.0
 Pb LEAD	185.2	444.1	69.0	373.3	348.1	790.4
 B BAUXITE	93.1	2,068.1	230.1	958.1	427.0	1,615.2
 Al ALUMINUM	165.6	268.5	43.8	89.4	130.1	263.3

THIS CHART GIVES YOU AN IDEA of the problem facing the United Nations. The precise figures are now out of date, based as they were on the League of Nations yearbook for 1939-40. But they do prove, before Hitler conquered Europe, the USSR might have been expected to face Germany, economically speaking, alone. But Hitler gained vastly by his conquests, assuming that in some lines his production was damaged, in others it increased. Notice also, that only when British

and American production are combined with Soviet production, do we begin to match Hitler's economic power. Of course, by now, Soviet production has changed. One would have to include the rest of the British Commonwealth and Latin America, as well as the vast increase of British and American economic strength, to get a true picture for the present moment. But the main point remains. [Figures are in thousands of metric tons, that is, add three naughts to each.]

ourselves. And now that he has launched a new offensive against Russia is the time to do it. What a crime and a shame it would be, if Hitler were given the chance of recuperating from his wounds through our inaction.

But the truth is that we have no right to assume that Hitler has been weakened to the point where he is no longer dangerous. Secretary of the Navy Knox warned us on January 14 that "Germany still has the greatest military machine in the world." If we want to err on the side of caution, we have to assume that our enemy

is still very powerful, and perhaps a more desperate beast precisely for having been so seriously wounded. Hitler is tightening his grip on his people. He has brought in Pierre Laval in France, and executions of hostages are now a daily matter. The same goes for Norway and Holland; in Yugoslavia, a wide offensive has begun against the forces of Draja Mihailovitch, who has been forced back into the hills.

And let us always remember the hard, real facts. The war production of Germany and German-

Here's How Others Feel About a Western Front

FRANCE

General Adolph Sice

N. Y. TIMES
MAY 2

FREE FRANCE AIDE ASKS INVASION NOW

Gen. Sice, Axis Foe in Africa, Urges United Nations to Strike at His Homeland

the territory.

"Would Not Dare Fight Back"

On the other hand, General Sice declared, an Allied invasion of France itself would have the immediate and substantial support of an embattled French people. The "reasonable cabal" of Marshal

HOLLAND

Prince Bernhard

N. Y. TIMES
APRIL 23

He declared himself "all in favor" of an Allied land offensive against the German-held continent, adding there was no doubt that such a drive would be undertaken. As for the fight now being waged by the suppressed peoples within Europe, he said the attitude of all the occupied countries could be summed up this way:

"We don't want your pity. We want your help. We are fighting just as hard as you are, but under much more difficult conditions."

POLAND

General Wladyslaw Sikorski

N. Y. TIMES
MARCH 31

Russia's sincerity must be trusted and she must be helped to the utmost, he said, insisting that "an Allied offensive on the European continent is indispensable at the right moment." While not underestimating the importance of the Pacific front, General Sikorski maintained that when Hitler crumbles "the other satellites" will fall.

ENGLAND

Lord Beaverbrook

N. Y. TIMES
APRIL 23

Strike out to help Russia! Strike out violently! Strike even recklessly! But in any event such blows that really help will be our share and contribution to the Russian battlefield.

Well Equipped No

I believe in the Russian system which holds to the faith that the best form of defense is attack. And I believe that Britain should adopt it by setting up somewhere along the two thousand miles of coastline now held by the Germans, a second front in Western Europe.

ITALY

Count Carlo Sforza

THE NATION
MAY 9

No hope, then, from Italy?

On the contrary there is hope, more perhaps than from any other invaded country; but it can be turned to account only if a moral atmosphere is created not only in Italy but in the world as a whole. Thanks to the heroism of the Russians, time is, for the present, working for us. But we have not a moment to lose. If it is essential that we open a new military front to aid the Russian resistance, it is just as important to create a moral front.

NORWAY

Premier Johann Nygaardsvold

N. Y. TIMES
APRIL 24

April 10, 1941, that "98 or 99 per cent of the people" were ready to turn against the invader as soon as the United Nations opened a western front in their homeland.

Editorial

NEW REPUBLIC
APRIL 6

The time to crush Hitler is now. The means to crush Hitler is a combined, as well as coordinated, United Nations effort. The place to crush Hitler is on the European continent. That is where his armies are, that is where his industries are, that is where his bitterest opponents—the conquered peoples of Europe—are. That is where the United Nations already have their greatest army in action—the Russian army.

occupied Europe is still vaster than Russia's alone. Even if we add the supplies which Britain and the United States have sent to the USSR, it is probable that Hitler still has the edge in this respect. Russia alone cannot be expected to take care of the whole continent's armies, backed by the whole continent's productive capacity. Why should we leave it entirely to another country to defend us? It is too great a gamble.

But is there any alternative except the risk of being

defeated this year? Well, there is the alternative that, having escaped actual defeat, we would face a long-drawn-out and difficult struggle that would be far more costly than it need be. If we don't make this war decisive for us this year, we may have to fight, not from bases that we now control, but for bases that the enemy will control. That will mean not only the sacrifice of millions of English, Yugoslav, Dutch, Norwegian, Polish, Czech, Chinese, and Russian lives—but the lives of millions of our fellow-Americans as well.

Heads of the governments in exile want it. Dorothy Thompson says the Russian position is vital. Beaverbrook, Max Werner, Donald Mitchell, Wendell Willkie, Henry L. Stimson on "the offensive."

Dorothy Thompson

N. Y. POST
MARCH 30

Anybody can understand Sun Tzu, anybody can understand Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, who had a few measured words to say in London on Wednesday last. Mr. Maisky thinks that 1942 and not 1943 is the year. The place is Russia, the time is now, and the strategy is not to let the enemy concentrate but strike him with all we have in the place he least expects it, while he is tied up in the place where he is compelled to be.

Mr. Maisky points out that we know the situation now, the initiative now is ours, and that may not be true a year from now. And, in his mind, that fact is more important than whether we will have more tanks and planes in 1943.

Wendell Willkie

N. Y. TIMES
FEB. 26

aggressive action in the war against the Axis. "Let's begin to strike" and "let's begin to win," he said.

Mr. Willkie, who spoke at the annual awards dinner of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, said he was "sickened" by the emphasis put on purely defensive war, and declared:

"We will not win this war on the defensive."

America must strike, he held, think in terms of attack and rephrase its slogans from defensive terms to such words as "victory rallies" and "bombardment bonds."

Mr. Willkie admitted that the Japanese attack on Pearl

Max Werner

NEW REPUBLIC
MARCH 23

these factors must be calmly taken into account.

The British army and the American land forces hurled against the Third Reich may become decisive factors even in 1942. A BEF and AEF may under certain circumstances occupy key positions this year. Strategic initiative on the part of Britain may bring about the turn. In the camp of the United Nations there today two large armies

Donald Mitchell

THE NATION
MARCH 28

In fact, the major feature of our 1941 plan for total war was the formation of a monster A. E. F. to invade the continent of Europe. This was not intended to be ready before July, 1943, though Russian resistance was expected to be liquidated a year previous.

The unexpected strength of the Red Army and the possibility of victory thus opened up have laid upon us the necessity of invading Europe, if possible, a year earlier than the date fixed in the original schedule. Since our forces should, by preference, operate near those of Russia and as far as possible from the main center of German power, Norway is clearly the battlefield indicated. Norway, moreover, offers numerous possible land-

Alvarez Del Vayo

THE NATION
APRIL 25

SPAIN

But can anybody seriously think that a British-American expeditionary force, disembarking in 1943 or 1944 at the best imaginable point in Europe, could accomplish the job of an army trained in a life-and-death struggle with the Nazis, operating from its own soil with a whole nation behind it? Once the Russian army is destroyed, there will be no serious chance of opening a second front in Europe. On the other hand, with the Russian army at its full strength and with the United Nations throwing their entire weight into the battle, there is a chance not only of stopping the Axis drive but of breaking Hitler sooner than many people think possible. Under one condition: that they strike this year and wherever it is possible to strike. Because in my conception a second front does not mean a single second front. If it is practicable to strike at the same time through Portugal and Spain, along the French coast, and through Norway, so much the better. To open a second front means to utilize all the present resources of the United Nations at the moment when Hitler launches his next blow, to provoke a diversion and division of his forces, to give him hell from one corner of Europe to another.

Joseph Curran

THE WORKER
APRIL 19

"Every seaman who has kept the ships sailing under the most dangerous conditions is willing to run any risk which will make it possible to bring the war to the enemy and avenge the atrocities to his shipmates. A Western Front must be opened immediately if the war is to be prolonged indefinitely. It must be done now, at once."

And it would involve a more overwhelming transformation of American society than we have had thus far. Rationing of everything; a greatly lowered standard of living; more stringent controls over business; much higher taxes. Not that Americans are not ready to do everything they must for victory. But why make it so much longer and harder and bloodier—and risk, in addition, complete failure? If we threw everything we have into the battle, compelled Hitler to fight on the continent, cut the communications among the Axis powers, isolated Japan and upset her coordination with Germany—then even if all the fighting were not over this year, at least the decision would be ours. Not only in Europe, but in Asia and the Pacific as well.

As between victory this year and defeat, which would you choose?

As between a relatively short war and a long-drawn-out, difficult one, which would you choose?

BUT what we have said thus far isn't the opinion of **NEW MASSES** alone. In arguing for the second front now, we aren't talking merely ourselves, nor do we have partisan motives or the interests only of Russia at heart. The fact of the matter is that the second front is not solely a Russian interest, even though some of its strongest and ablest advocates have come from Russia, such as Ambassador Maxim Litvinov, the am-

bassador in London, Ivan Maisky, and the "warrior leader," Joseph Stalin.

When you hear people say the second front is just for Russia's sake, remember back a few years when people would say that collective security was just a Russian interest? Remember the days when some people said that the movement to prevent this war was just an instrument of Russian foreign policy?

Ask the people of Spain, of St. Nazaire in France, ask the 20,000 dead in Rotterdam, the millions transported from Poland, the men who lived on Corregidor Island. Ask the schoolteachers and bishops of Norway—how clear it is now that the fight for collective security was a common interest of all the democratic nations, and the fight for a collective military participation of all free nations in winning the war this year is likewise a common interest of all the democratic nations. We were late in the thirties. We cannot afford to be late in the forties.

As Ralph Parker, the New York Times correspondent in Moscow, reported on May 11: "A second front is desired not as a means of helping to liberate invaded Russia—the Red Army believes it can handle that task itself—but as the only means by which the United Nations can bring about a speedy victory."

And in this opinion, **NEW MASSES** doesn't stand alone.



New Posters are coming from all the United Nations. Here are two of them, on the left from Canada, on the right from Great Britain. And both portray the offensive spirit that the second front involves. They're currently on exhibit at the American Advertising Guild, 15 East 40th St., New York.

Possible, Says Major Eliot

Interviewed, he says Russian effort is decisive for the Allies. Thinks main blow must come from Britain, with our help. Feels shipping is not decisive bottleneck. Front must come as Nazis are fully engaged in the East.

IT WAS a sunny mid-morning, must have been close to noon, and sitting in Maj. George Fielding Eliot's study, you can see east and north over the rooftops of mid-Manhattan. The major is tall, kind of heavy, and a somewhat older man than I had expected to see. He was in shirt sleeves, collar open, very much at ease and relaxed in the spacious leather chair that fronts a wide desk in the center of his room. Bookshelves reach from floor to ceiling on three walls; the desk, shelf-tops, almost every bit of available space is stacked with the latest volumes on the war, with a profusion of magazines, academic journals, newspapers. This is obviously a library and a workroom both; the major commands it from the center, and sits sort of back to back with one of his secretaries, who seems to be not at all disturbed by visitors except to acknowledge the introduction graciously.

I had a list of questions in writing, but it seemed out of keeping with the atmosphere to actually read them off. So I started at random.

Did the major believe that a second front on the continent could defeat Germany this year?

"No," he replied without hesitation. "These Germans, you know, are tough fighters. Wouldn't say they would crack at the first blows. Remember where they had us the last time."

Suppressing a desire to argue the point, I fired the next question:

"Do you nevertheless believe a second front is justified?"

He answered "Yes" with almost the same precise forthrightness of his previous "No." In his mind, the function of a second front was essentially diversionary, to relieve the pressure on the Russian armies, which were today the decisive armies on the Allied side, and must in the interest of all the Allies be sustained. Another way of putting it was "to prevent the enemy from ever again getting close to defeating us one by one."

And the way to do that, he phrased it almost as a formula: "If you can make the other fellow draw away from what he is trying to do, and force him to react to what you are trying to do—why, then that's the thing to do."

As to where the front should come, Major Eliot thought that should be at any point where it would threaten the Nazis most seriously. Anywhere from Norway to Spain, perhaps even North Africa might be considered, but obviously the French-Belgian area would be best. Later on we came back to this problem and he put the matter somewhat differently: "A second front should be opened at whichever place, by virtue of its geographic or strategic position, would threaten the Nazis but make it difficult for them to get at in full force."

How did he think the attitude of the conquered peoples ought to influence military judgments in opening a second front? He asked me to repeat that.

Well, it would depend on the degree to which these peoples had already been disarmed, or could readily be armed again. Frankly, he didn't know. There was certainly active hostility to the Nazis in Norway; how much arms the boys up in the hills there had was hard to say. He doubted whether France was ripe, whether people would rally to the invading armies.



Maj. George Fielding Eliot "... Not the cost, but the upkeep"

(As I think about it, this was before the news of how the St. Nazaire population assisted the Commandos.)

As for Spain, he was dubious. For one thing an Allied landing in Spain might not be considered of vital menace by the Germans. "After all, once you are in Spain, where are you? Mostly threatening the frontier of France." He was afraid the health of the Spanish people had been undermined: disease and general hopelessness must have taken a heavy toll. Again I had to remember that this was an interview and not a debate.

We went on to the problem of just what a second front would amount to. He swung round in the chair, peered over his clasped hands in the general direction of Harlem. Whether it should be a full-fledged front, or a series of hit and run raids that might ultimately become a front, depended altogether on their relative effectiveness in drawing pressure off the Russians. As this war has taught us, of course, air power alone could not be decisive. But raids of the size of those over Rostock and Luebeck must have the Nazis really worried, or raids of the scope of those over Pilsen and Augsburg. "It is as though cities the size of Scranton or Camden were being bombed day after day, thirty or forty percent of them just wiped out. They just can't laugh that off." And if sustained, it would certainly force the Nazis to take special defensive measures or retaliation such as must weaken their effort in the East.

He thought the British already had air forces for the continent. With American help, they certainly had. As for naval support, he didn't foresee any special problems. The British have enough of a navy on hand, although there is the question of giving these forces a continual blanket of airplanes.

The chief obstacle would be merchant shipping. Now how did that shape up? Well, shipping is needed for transport of troops and supplies to all the far-flung lines of the United Nations, the north Atlantic, Murmansk, the Persian Gulf, when the rail-lines are completed, and then there's Australia, which, for example, now depends on us and South America for all its oil.

So shipping is a headache. But the way to overcome it was, first, to build more ships, second, to take better care of the ships we have, not only in loading and so forth, but in better protection of our convoys, and third, by attacking the bases from which enemy ships, subs, and planes come over.

I interrupted to suggest that maybe if all normal shipping uses were curtailed for the sake of the Western Front, that would help.

"Just what do you mean?"

Well, if we just stopped getting coffee from Brazil, or bananas from Costa Rica, and if we just asked the British people to do with even less than they were for the sake of the attack. He cut in quite sharply and brushed the idea off. "No,

that would take too long. Too much confusion. That would be the way to prepare for a second front in '43 rather than '42." The thing is to use what we have, with absolute air cover. After all, "it's not the initial cost that counts so much as the upkeep," and you also have to figure what the cost would be if the initial attempts fail. But a better use of ships, plus air cover, plus the taking of chances, and "after all, war is a matter of taking a chance"—and a front would be possible.

As to expected German counter-measures, they had probably taken what precautions they could by now. Naturally you can't fortify a whole coastline. You have to base yourself on key points considerably to the rear behind the coast. But actually, if a second front were opened—and it should come at the moment when the Germans are fully engaged in the East—its most important effect might very well be on the German General Staff. A conflict of opinion was bound to arise on all sorts of things. Decisions would have to be made for shifting troops, using of air squadrons that had been earmarked for other purposes, etc. That would cause acute difficulty in Berlin. The dilemma of reserves is what cracked the Germans the last time, as General Hoffman describes in his book *The War of Lost Opportunities*. That's a book you ought to read, he said. And what happened then might very well happen again.

Who's going to open this front? was the next logical question. Well, the British would have to bear the brunt of it, "having more trained manpower at hand than we could pos-

sibly get over it we made it our major war effort." But American planes and crews and certain troop units would certainly be necessary. But he quickly rejected any suggestion that the American public was in any way reluctant to attack on the grounds of risking our manpower.

"With the exception of a few home-grown isolationists, there's no reluctance about the attack in this country," and he said it firmly and with considerable pride.

Just where might the Germans move this year? Hard to say. All the newspapers have been covering that. Most likely, he thought a big German drive to knock out Russia, combined with what he thought was a very probable Japanese attack in Siberia. The Red Army, he was confident, could sustain that, but that moment would also call for action by us. At the same time, we would have to attack northeast of Australia to take advantage of the Japanese operations northwards and secure our communications.

Finally, I asked whether he thought there would be a front this year?

Well, did I really want an answer to that, or just a guess?

No, not a flat answer of course, but what did he think?

Yes, he thought the second front was called for, and as a guess, he thought there very well might be one.

The secretary turned round from her typewriter and said goodbye, too. And the major accompanied me to the door.

JOSEPH STAROBIN.

Maybe, Says General Fuqua

It depends upon what happens on the Soviet front. The war will be decided on the European continent. Germany can be defeated more quickly than Japan.

THAT the war will be decided upon the European continent is the opinion of Maj. Gen. Stephen O. Fuqua, USA Retired, military analyst for "Newsweek." On March 23 he wrote that Germany "in her present plight can be weakened more easily, more quickly, and more effectively than Japan." He sees Europe as the locale where the United Nations can best effect the juncture of all their strengths. "Our geographical proximity to our strongest allies—Britain and Russia—makes it possible," he wrote, "to combine the might of their land, sea, and air power in one huge one-purpose offensive against the Hitler forces."

In the May 4 issue of "Newsweek" he wrote: "In evaluation of the vantage position held by the Red Army, great importance must be given to the ever growing reports of a British-American offensive in Western Europe. Every commander knows the disturbing and depressing effect of an attack from the rear upon troops in battle. The mere threat of such an undertaking may halt Hitler on his present lines in Russia, while the opening of a second front somewhere along the Norway-Low Countries-France coast might give to the Russians just that additional weight that turns the balance in the scales."

The following is the statement the general gave **NEW MASSES**:

"**T**HE question of the opening of a second front is dependent upon many factors, consequently it involves the use of many ifs. By the employment of an if almost anything can happen to



Maj.-Gen. Stephen Fuqua ". . . The continent is decisive"

Hitler this year, ranging from his total defeat to his complete victory over the Russians and the absolute dominance of the continent. For example, if the Russians can hurl Hitler back to his own border, which they claim to be their present objective, no second front will be necessary for ensuring the defeat of the Fuehrer. However, if a second front is opened and another Dunkirk should arise, then such an opening may not only give no great help to the Russians but would be a real victory for Hitler. However, if a second front was opened and was successful in inflicting out and out defeat to the Hitler forces, then of course, a second front would be most helpful to the Red Army. In any event, it is my feeling that the decision to open a second front on the part of the Allies will be deferred until the situation on the Eastern sector is clarified. And this seems to me to be a very wise procedure, as I can easily imagine, at this time, that Hitler must be deeply interested in where the Allies are to attack and certainly would like this information before he launches his main offensive on the Eastern Front and thereby commits his reserves to a definite course of action.

"It is highly probable that the intensity of the recent RAF raids may be increased in their own right and by American

participation to such an extent that the coming air offensive could well be called a second front. In this connection it is of interest to note that the recent raids of the Commandos have covered five widely separated coastal sectors extending from Norway to St. Nazaire. Therefore, it is highly probable that this wide dispersion of attacks has forced Hitler to distribute his defense forces accordingly. Again, it is barely possible that assistance to Russia in aviation attacks and in giving her priority in our distribution of tanks and planes might be an alternative plan

We Must, Says Lieut.-Col. Kernan

He pleads for proper direction of the offensive. Believes Italy is the best place. Urges concentration of United Nations' forces. "Our opportunity is now."

DURING the first quarter of the twentieth century, the art of war in the western democracies became afflicted with a "fortress complex." The classic strategy on which our civilization was built—the strategy of David and Joshua, of Alexander and Caesar, of Belisarius and Napoleon, of Ulysses S. Grant and Nathan Bedford Forrest—began to suffer a sort of degradation. It was thought that wars could be won by defense alone, that machine guns in pill boxes, entrenched infantry, emplaced artillery and concrete strong points, had a superiority of four to one over the attack. It was thought, by men old enough to know better, that sea power—the battleship and the sea blockade—could be counted upon to protect certain favored nations to the end of time. And the result of all this was that peculiar military concept—you might call it strategy without risk, or war without fighting—which brought about the disasters of Sedan, of Dunkirk, of Singapore.

Now the American people seem to have made a remarkably quick recovery from this malady of "defense thinking." Every citizen is beginning to realize that wars are won, not by sitting still behind the ramparts, but by advancing upon the enemy and destroying his centers of power. There is a rising demand for an offensive against the Axis, and with this demand we return to the classic strategy which is really nothing but common sense applied to war. It should not, therefore, be so very difficult for us to reduce to strategic hardpan the principles we have invoked. And I think that now we are ready to face up fairly and squarely to the all-important question: "How Should America Take the Offensive?"

Now, there are three principles here which we must apply; three ways in which we can reduce, you might say, to strategic hardpan, the principles which this offensive idea involves:

First: Our thrust at the Axis should have the proper *direction*.

The strategic direction given our main effort (and in war there can only be one main effort) should be such that our victory, when it comes, must be decisive. Now there is only one theater that satisfies this condition of decisiveness, and that is Europe. Therefore, our main effort should be directed toward the destruction of the Axis center of power in Europe. We must strike down Adolf Hitler. There are many points where our landing may be made, but none, in my opinion, is equal in strategic value to Italy, where we gain at one time the entrance to Germany's back door and the domination of a great strategic area—the Mediterranean.

Second: We must concentrate our forces.

This principle demands that we strike where we can bring

in lieu of the actual opening of a second land front. On the other hand, the situation in the East may require an actual landing of troops on the continent. And if this latter contingency should arise I'm sure the so-called second front will be opened.

"To sum up—I believe the Allies' estimate of the situation is in a fluid state and is being brought up to date daily and that the final decision of opening a second land front will rest on the results of what is now happening in the Eastern theater of operation."



Lt. Col. W. F. Kernan "... Direction, Concentration, Timing"

a preponderance of force against that center of power which we have selected for destruction, namely, Germany. And here again the right recognition of a magnificent strategic opportunity indicates Germany to be our main objective. For Hitler is now tied down, overextended in his Russian campaign. By concentrating against him, we force him to take a dose of that same bitter medicine which he has been dispensing to the world for the last two years. Hitler, in his turn, must be made to pronounce the fatal word "dispersion," which, as the Great Calculator knows only too well, will place his armies at our mercy.

Third: Our blow must have the proper timing.

The three great strategic variables which, in their proper combination bring victory, are time, space, and force. And in this fight to the death in which we are now engaged we must realize that the time element is all-important. We must not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security by the wishful thought that the war can be won in 1943, or 1944, when we can launch an overpowering array of force at the Axis, and that this will be time enough. Our opportunity is now, and we must strike soon and strike hard.

Therefore I say to you now: Let our armies come to grips with this enemy with the proper direction, with the preponderance of force, and with the time element on *our side*—and let us see what happens. Let the enemy's forces, for once, be too little and too late. Let us hear the enemy wail about how nobly he fought—before he retreated; let him enumerate what terrible losses he inflicted on us—before he surrendered. Let us, in short, accord the enemy the privilege of licking his wounds and prating of his heroism against overwhelming odds—while we cherish the solid and substantial reward of a decisive victory.

The above is an address made by Lieut.-Col. Kernan on April 2 before America's Town Meeting of the Air as part of a symposium on "How Should America Take the Offensive?" It is published by permission of America's Town Meeting of the Air and Columbia University Press.

THE TASK IS CLEAR TO THE LAYMAN. —Ambassador Litvinov



FITZPATRICK THE CHICAGO SUN

THE FACTORY GEN. MacARTHUR DEPENDS UPON



FITZPATRICK THE CHICAGO SUN

"JUST ABOUT THE RIGHT DISTANCE AWAY"



RAY KANSAS CITY STAR

"MAKING A BIG STIR"



COOP NEWS OF THE WORLD, LONDON

What Would a Second Front Look Like?

We've shown that it's necessary. The military men think it can be done. Clippings on pages 8 and 9 show what other people think. So do these cartoons. And *Tacticus* visualizes in words how a Western Front might be opened.

SOME time this summer or fall the United States and Great Britain must undertake the urgent task of landing in force on a shore held by a determined and cunning enemy. Details of this operation, invasion of Europe from the West, cannot be outlined in advance, of course. Its character will be molded by a hundred events between now and the zero hour, some in far off theaters, some in Europe itself, whose precise shape cannot be foretold. But the broad picture can be worked out easily enough.

Under exceptional circumstances, land and sea forces with only limited air support might suffice for the establishment of United Nations bridgeheads in western Europe. Because of the Gulf stream, for example, the northern half of Norway is shrouded in almost continuous fog from October to April, effectively grounding the German air force. The fjords are also ice-free. Landings in Norway at the right times in the year would follow the classic military pattern. Otherwise, however, we must prepare to gain control of the air—to flatten the enemy defenses preparatory to landing, guard our transports en route, and permit the use of air-borne troops—while deny-

ing it to the Nazis by force. Water-borne, plane-borne (both passenger and glider), and parachute troops must all be used to establish our footholds.

This means that the invasion must come within 200 miles of the British Isles. For control of the air can be won only by land-based fighter planes of the RAF and US Army Air Forces, for which Britain is the only possible base. Perhaps tomorrow fighter planes will be able to do battle 1000 miles from their bases. In 1942, however, 200 miles is the effective operations limit of almost all the fighter craft in service.

Carrier-based aviation can't be used to wrest control of the skies from the Nazis, for ship-based planes are unable to meet the Nazis' land-based craft on equal terms. Half the British and American navies' thirteen to fifteen aircraft carriers are required in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and for such other duties as protecting the supply line to Murmansk.

THE coming invasion will be heralded by a sharp stepup in the pace of Commando and air raids days or weeks in advance. The raiders will attack not only the coast defenses

but key rail junctions and transport centers leading to every part of the European coast. (If we only bomb those leading to the area in which we intend to land, we will tip our hand to the Nazis, so all must be raided.)

The attacks will be carried out chiefly by daylight for the sake of accuracy (although the cost will be much higher, too) and in order to coax the Nazis off the ground, thereby depleting their fighter reserves before the main event begins. Enemy airfields will be particular targets. The purpose of this is not only to destroy planes on the ground and interfere with the enemy's air activities generally, but to reduce his use of planes for reconnaissance—in other words, to *blind* him and keep down his information on our preparations. The Commando raids will seek out the Nazis' soft spots.

Preliminary destruction of German transportation centers is vital. The Nazis speak frequently of their "impregnable" coastal defenses, implying that the bulk of their troops in Occupied Europe are strung out along the 2,000 mile shore from North Cape to the Pyrenees. This is so much eyewash—for coasts are not defended that way. (Continued on page 18)



The All Out, All In!

WERNER THE CHICAGO SUN



GROPPER DAILY WORKER



ELLIS THE WORKER



SHINING EXAMPLES

ROLLIN KIRBY NEW YORK POST



Most feasible alternative in opening a western front. Offensive would be coordinated from Iceland against Norway, from the British Isles to the Low countries and northern France. Has advantage of striking toward the heart of German strength, over the nearest lines from Allied bases. Note possible coordination with Soviet offensive.

THREE WAYS TO ATTACK: PICK ONE

Possible areas where the second front could be opened. Northern, Middle Eastern, and Iberian routes have been projected, in conjunction with a Soviet all-out offensive. First one strikes us as most feasible.

Alternative most favored by Col. W. F. Kernan. Theoretically, it would jibe with Yugoslav guerrillas and southern Soviet drive, to knock war-weary Italy out of war. Strikes us as difficult since it presupposes long period building up Middle Eastern supplies, manpower and bases, as well as involving Turkey in the war.

Would combine British drive into Low countries and France with stroke through Portugal and Spain. Might also include offensive action from Iceland toward Norway and would coincide with Soviet thrust in central zone. This alternative has much to recommend it, though shipping lines are longer than alternative A.



(Continued from page 15) Actually, only delaying forces are placed along the shore. The bulk of the defending force is concentrated at inland points, ready to be rushed to the areas in which the invader's attack develops. Otherwise the invader would have no difficulty gaining superiority wherever he chose. For no one can possibly have enough troops and arms to be able to scatter them and still be stronger at any single point than an enemy concentrated at that point. Most German army units in western and northern Europe are at back-of-the-coast rail junctions like Paris. Air attacks can thus limit the dispatch of reinforcements for the units stationed on the shore.

Parachute troops are not generally used on sacrifice missions where there is no possibility of withdrawal or support. Just before the invasion is launched, however, it is not unlikely that swarms of Allied paratroopers, and perhaps other airborne units, will descend from the sky to carry out demolition work of a kind which cannot be done 100 per cent efficiently from the air—destruction of the locks on the innumerable canals which crisscross Europe and are a valuable transportation resource; putting wire switchboards out of action, etc.

Tricking the enemy into dispatching his troops to the wrong place is another way to dispose of his reinforcements. To this end, we are likely to send out many small forces, as well as invading forces which are complete fakes—large numbers of barges with escorting planes and warships, but no troops.

The area for our main landing probably will not be selected in advance. We may send out as many as half a dozen fairly strong expeditionary forces, with our main units in reserve. Then, when we see where the Nazis have committed their troops and/or where we are making the most progress, the bulk of our forces will be dispatched there as quickly as possible.

Besides the Nazi landings in Norway and Crete, both of which involved unusual circumstances, there have been only two large-scale invasions of hostile shores since the Gallipoli campaign in the last war. Those two are the Red Army operations in the Murmansk area and the Black Sea, and the Japanese operations in the Far East. The Soviets have said little about their techniques, while Japan's have been witnessed by many. Hence, we will use the Japanese system as our model.

At about the time that the half-dozen main invasion fleets leave, smaller invasion units (air and water-borne) land near an enemy airport (spotted by previous reconnaissance) roughly within fifty miles of each objective of the main landing forces. Seizure of the airport drives defending enemy aviation further away from the areas it must defend, and makes possible much closer support of the landing forces. Each captured airdrome, of course, is rapidly converted (a matter of hours) into a base for capturing the next airport, chiefly by the use of air troops.

In the meantime the invasion forces are approaching their

objectives (traditionally in the middle of the night, although the Japanese have shown that dawn landings are advantageous because of better air support). The air-borne troop units are taking off from their home bases, and constant relays of dive and low-flying attack bombers keep up a drumfire attack on the target beaches.

The Japanese invasion force generally consists of one or more aircraft carriers, two to four cruisers, six to twelve destroyers, and an appropriate number of troop transports. We are likely to omit the carriers and include battleships. As the invaders approach, the escorting warships lay down a barrage, using regular land-type artillery shells instead of their customary naval projectiles which are relatively ineffective against land targets. The guns are fired at a high angle to imitate the destructive effectiveness of howitzers.

The troops land in barges under the protection of this air and sea barrage. In practice, we will undoubtedly use almost any kind of barge we can lay our hands on. Best would be either the air propeller-driven type used by the Japanese or an equivalent American type, the Higgins landing boat. These are able to operate in extremely shallow water. The Higgins boat, in addition, can be driven directly onto the beach or rocks without damage.

The landing craft either will be armored or will depend on high speed for protection. In any case, they will have machine gun turrets forward to cover landing of the first men, for the air and sea barrage must move back of the beach to avoid hitting our own troops. The first men will be armed only with what they can carry on the run—submachine and light machine guns. They are a sacrifice unit to cover the landing of others with heavier fighting equipment. Our invasion fleet will include special barges, probably with dropdown apron fronts (like the rear end of a dump truck), to facilitate landing of heavy weapons. As soon as possible, however, the invaders will seize a port with facilities for handling large quantities of arms and supplies with greater ease.

Casualties will not be small while these units are on the water. For the enemy can use many devices to make the invasion attempt costly almost before it begins: shallow water mines, well placed gun posts, submerged oil tanks for the release and ignition of oil on the surface of the water. No great prize, however, can be won without cost.

If the Allies plan well, their landings will be accompanied by a series of risings throughout Europe, aided by the dropping of other sacrifice parachute units far inland to disrupt the German defenders in every way possible. And if all goes well, the invaders will then move toward the inland areas on which depends control of the continent. The second front will be a reality at last.

TACTICUS.

It Worked Before

Colonel T. recalls the campaign against East Prussia in 1914 and Brussilov's offensive in 1916. How Paris was saved. What the two-front war did to Napoleon.

IN ORDER to understand the importance of the Western Front, just imagine that two men are dueling. Each one of the fighters has his eyes, nerves, and entire attention riveted on the sword, arm, and eyes of his opponent. The bodily balance of the fighters is attuned to the exigencies of the thrust and parry. Now imagine that a wasp stings one of the fighters between the shoulderblades. The wasp is not a deadly insect. Its sting looks like very little in comparison with the flashing sword of the man's opponent. But the sting causes a nervous shock, a muscular contraction, a shift of balance which at the crucial moment puts the stung man off guard and creates an opening for his adversary. The wasp does not have to be big, neither does it necessarily have to be deadly. Its very presence

does the trick. The stung man may crush it by a backhand stroke. But still he has been thrown off guard and off balance.

This simple, nay, puerile—fable can be illustrated by military examples. Let us select three from Russian history. It seems appropriate because several million Russian and other Soviet lads are carrying the hopes of civilization on their battle-banners. Let us look back 130 years.

In those days the Peninsula Front, in Spain, was actually a "second front" against Napoleon invading Russia. True, it had not been formed to help Russia. It had already existed for four years when Napoleon crossed the Niemen. But it did affect the Russian campaign because Napoleon had 250,000 men in Spain, a fact which Wellington learned in December

1808, by intercepting a dispatch from Marshal Berthier to Marshal Soult.

During the advance upon Smolensk, Napoleon dallied repeatedly, anxiously awaiting reports from Spain where Wellington and Marmont were jockeying around Salamanca, Wellington inflicting a crushing defeat upon the Duke of Ragusa on July 22, 1812, and entering Madrid in triumph on August 12. And it is quite possible that the delays caused Napoleon to fail to prevent the junction of the Russian Armies of Barclay-de-Tolly and Prince Bagration at Smolensk.

Be this as it may, there is little doubt that the presence of the 250,000 French troops which were immobilized in Spain would have turned the tide of battle at Borodino, where Napoleon had about 130,000 men against the Russians' 120,000.

The Peninsula War in itself was not a factor of first magnitude. It was drawn out and inconclusive, but it became an important factor the moment it began to serve as a "second front" for the Russian campaign.

The two other examples are of a reverse character. They illustrate services performed by Russia to the Allied cause in 1914 and 1916. We mean the campaign of East Prussia and the Brussilov offensive.

FIRST, a few words on the Russian General Staff's war plan as effective at the outset of the first world war. This plan had two variants. In case Germany attacked France variant A (Austria) was to be applied with the center of gravity of the Russian forces in the south for an all-out attack on Austria-Hungary. In case Germany attacked Russia, variant G (Germany) was to be applied with a concentration of Russian forces on the northern wing, against Prussia. Right from Aug. 1, 1914, it was clear that the German attack was unfolding against Belgium and France. Therefore, Russian variant A became operative.

But on August 5 (the sixth day of the Russian mobilization) the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Paleologue, told Emperor Nicholas II: "The French army has to withstand the onslaught of twenty-five German army corps. I implore Your Majesty to order your troops to attack immediately. Otherwise the French army will be crushed."

Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Czar let Paleologue know that he had ordered the Commander in Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, to "open the road to Berlin immediately and at all cost." He said he now considered "operations against Austria as secondary" (mind you, this while variant A was still operative! What terrific chances were being taken to help the Allies!).

Eager to relieve Russia's ally, Grand Duke Nicholas gave orders for the First and Second Russian Armies (Rennenkampf and Samsonov) to invade East Prussia. The armies were far from ready. The mobilization plan had been partly upset. The supply service was not yet organized. The divisions were not at full war strength. But relief had to be given to the hard pressed French. The Russian armies invaded East Prussia.

After the victorious battle at Gumbinen (August 20) the commander of the German Army in East Prussia, von Prittwitz, got very cold feet. His nervous condition was communicated to the Chief of the German General Staff von Moltke (the Younger, nephew of the "Grand Old Man").

The German GHQ decided to send several army corps East (the Chief of Operations Tappen says that six corps were allotted on August 25). Two army corps—the Guard Reserve and 11th Corps, plus the 8th Cavalry Division—sped East.

The strategic consequences of this shift are explained by one of Joffre's assistants, General Dupont:

"... Two army corps removed from the French front. The 'double' of the German Guards taken from von Bulow's Army and the 11th Corps taken from von Hausen's Army. The 8th Cavalry Division goes with them. This measure (taken by the Germans) may be our salvation. Just imagine the Guards Reserve Corps in the place where it belonged, i.e. on September

7 between Bulow and von Kluck, and the 11th Corps with the Saxon Cavalry in von Hausen's Army on September 9 at La Fere-Champenoise. What consequences! This mistake of the German GHQ must have made von Moltke—the other Moltke, the Uncle—turn in his grave. . . ."

These army corps arrived in East Prussia on September 2 and 3. On August 31 Hindenburg (who had superseded von Prittwitz before the battle of Tannenberg-Soldau) advised Kaiser Wilhelm of the great victory over General Samsonov.

THE creation of this diversion which saved France on the Marne cost the Russian Second Army 92,000 prisoners and 70,000 killed and wounded, as well as 300 cannon. The Russian command knew that it was making a sacrifice when it crashed into East Prussia without the proper preparations. The two German Army corps never arrived in time. But *they were not at the Marne*. This is what turned the course of the war. The Russians had created a "second front" for the French and British allies. It ended in disaster, but it saved the common cause.

In 1916 Russia was again called upon to save the Allies. On May 24, 1916, the Commander-in-Chief of the southwestern front, General Brussilov, received a telegram from Imperial Headquarters which said that the Italian Armies had been so badly beaten on the Isonzo that they "did not hope to stop the enemy." At the same time the Verdun mincing machine was grinding away at the French Army which was losing more men than the Germans who were the attackers. Briefly General Brussilov was ordered to attack on his entire front, although at a previous conference (in April) it had been decided not to give him any reinforcements because his front was expected "to remain passive during the coming campaign."

The other front commanders-in-chief—Kuropatkin in the North and Ehvert in the Center—were supposed to support Brussilov (but never did, somehow). This was a complete reversal of the whole strategic plan on short notice. (Brussilov was ordered to attack on June 1, six days after receiving the order which actually was turning everything upside down).

Brussilov's armies were then facing 450,000 Austro-German infantry and 30,000 cavalry, behind positions which were considered "impregnable" sheathed with ferro-concrete, scores of rows of barbed wire, etc.

GHQ advised Brussilov subsequently to retard his attack by four days on the grounds that Ehvert was "not ready." Brussilov waited. On June 3 he was called to the direct wire again and told to change his plans for a rolling attack at several points simultaneously and strike only at one point. Brussilov sent GHQ to the devil and told them that he was going to attack immediately and according to his own plan.

There is no room here for a detailed description of this magnificent operation conducted under such terrific odds. Suffice it to say that between June 4 and Nov. 14, 1916, the enemy lost 450,000 prisoners to Brussilov. One and one-half million Austro-Germans were killed and wounded.

All calculations show that 2,200,000 men were moved by the Central Powers to bolster the front against Brussilov. These men were removed from the various sectors of the Western Front. The Austrians had to discontinue their offensive against the Italians. The German machine at Verdun faltered and stopped grinding. The counter-blow planned by the Germans to forestall the Somme offensive had to be canceled. Rumania made up her mind and joined the Allies. The Allied cause once more had been saved by Russia's "blood-donation."

LEAVING sentimental considerations of gratitude and fair play aside, we still come to the conclusion that in all tight corners the Allied cause was saved by a sort of "second front." *A combination of powers operating on external strategic lines can offset the advantage of the block operating on inner lines only by striking at several points simultaneously. This is an axiom of military science.* And that's what must be done today.

COLONEL T.



It's happening in Norway every day. People risk their lives to harass the invader in all corners of Europe, waiting and working for the second front. Here's a lad that risks his life too, next to a wall on which an unconquerable Norwegian has written "Long Live H 7" (King Haakon VII), symbolizing the people's resistance to the traitors and the invaders. So the story goes in France, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, in the Serbian hills, and the Greek mountains—a second front could count on millions of deathless heroes that daily risk their lives for us.

SECOND FRONT WORRIES NAZIS

Evidence of the great fear Hitler has of a two-front war. The telltale diplomatic documents. We can "expose his country, his party, and himself to ruin and defeat."

WHILE we have been arguing the pros and cons of an offensive in Europe, one of the elements that hasn't been fully appreciated is how the Nazis look at it. The fact of the matter is that if there is anything the Nazis are afraid of, and have been afraid of in their entire criminal career, it is a two-front war.

In the summer of 1939, when Hitler was debating the problem of a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia, we have diplomatic documents to prove that what he feared more than anything else was a front of the western powers and Russia. For that would have involved him in a two-front war, which he knew at that time he could never win.

For example, there is a volume known as the "French Yellow Book," a collection of official documents published by the French government in the winter of 1939-40. On page 171 of the American edition, published by Reynal and Hitchcock, the French ambassador in Berlin, Robert Coulondre, is reporting to his government. The date is June 1, 1939. He says that the higher authorities in Berlin know that,

"If war broke out with Poland over the question of Danzig, a general war would result.

"The Fuehrer has asked General Keitel, Chief of the General Staff, and General von Brauchitsch, C in C of the Army, whether in their opinion, under existing conditions, an armed conflict would turn in favor of

Germany. Both replied that much depended on whether Russia remained neutral or not. In the first case, General Keitel replied 'yes' and General von Brauchitsch (whose opinion has greater value) replied 'probably.' Both declared that if Germany had to fight against Russia, she would not have much chance of winning . . ." and then Coulondre continues:

"The prevalent opinion at the Wilhelmstrasse is that, if Poland does not yield, Herr Hitler's decision will depend on the signature of the Anglo-Russian pact. It is believed that he will risk war if he does not have to fight Russia, but that if, on the contrary, he knows he will have to fight Russia as well, he will give way rather than expose his country, his party, and himself to ruin and defeat."

Now this is significant, not only for the light it throws on that period but especially for the present. Today Hitler is fighting Russia, and has his hands full. Is it not clear that if he has to fight in the West as well, then the chances are that we can expose "his country, his party, and himself to ruin and defeat?"

Or take der Fuehrer's statement, the day he attacked Russia last June. He announced that he was compelled from August 1940 onward to concentrate more and more forces in the East, and that he could not attack Great Britain because of a "tying up of such powerful forces in the East that the radical conclusion of the war in the West, particularly as regards

aircraft, could no longer be vouchsafed for by the German High Command."

In other words, Hitler gave every evidence on the day of the attack on Russia of his fear of a two-front war, by admitting that his decision to stake all in the East arose from the fact that Russia's presence prevented him from staking all in the West.

But an even more dramatic proof of how a two-front war has haunted the minds of the German General Staff was unwittingly given on October 2, the day Hitler proclaimed that Russia was already beaten. Everyone remembers his famous Order of the Day: "I can say that this enemy is already broken and will never rise again." And the very moment that Hitler made this idle boast, his press attache, Dietrich, was reported by the New York "Times" to have flown into Berlin with a flamboyant statement, radioed and reprinted throughout the world.

What did Dietrich say?

"The military decision has already fallen. The rest of the operations will take the course we wish them to. For all purposes, Soviet Russia is done with. The British dream of a two-front war is dead."

Notice that last phrase: the "British dream of a two-front war is dead!" In other words, at the moment he announced his victory (prematurely as it turned out) Dietrich was nevertheless thinking of the possibility that the British might open a second front. He taunted the British that their dream of a two-front

war was dead, but what he really reflected was the nightmare that was haunting the Nazis—the nightmare of being involved in a war on two fronts.

As for how the peoples of Europe would react—we have enough evidence already, in the way they are sabotaging the Nazis, suffering death by the firing squad, to realize that a second front would be the signal for a vast upheaval in Europe. The sober commentator Walter Lippmann, observed in discussing the resistance of the peoples of France (New York "Herald Tribune," April 18):

"The degree of French national resistance will be, we may be certain, a direct reflection of the power which Britain, America, and Russia can concentrate in Europe against the German Army—that is, against the power which dominates France. French action will respond, more or less proportionately, to the action of the United Nations. The French will acquiesce in Laval if we acquiesce. They will resist only passively if the Allies fight only defensively. They will come forward to meet us as we go forward to meet them. They will take the risks which are somehow commensurate with the risks we take. The developments in France leave us no choice other than to decide that the main immediate theater of the war for us is the peninsula of western Europe, of which France is the center, as it thrusts itself out into the narrow Atlantic. This theater of the war is of paramount importance in the year 1942." Now, as for the German people:

It Could Create Revolt in Germany

Richard O. Boyer, who was in Berlin after France fell, as PM's correspondent, believes a second front could transform the German people into Hitler's executioners. His reasons.

AUTHORITIES have almost universally held that the German people will not, indeed, perhaps cannot, successfully revolt until Hitler has been dealt an overwhelming military defeat. While history does not inevitably possess the nature of a theorem in which if certain steps are taken specific results are bound to follow, there is enough evidence inside Germany itself to indicate that a second front will release a sequence of events that will turn the German people into the executioners of the Nazi regime.

I base this on conversations with dozens of Germans in all walks of life, conversations which took place in the summer and fall of 1940, at the very apex of German military glory and success.

A German captain, for example, showing me through the conquered Maginot line, gave it as his positive opinion that Germany would have been defeated in the fall of 1939 if the Allies had struck from the West while a large part of the Nazi army was occupied in Poland.

"You can't imagine," he said in an English so Oxfordian that it seemed rather startling, "how fearful the German people were of war. They almost universally feared it and regarded its beginning in Poland with grave misgivings. They expected the French and British to strike across the Rhine. And their memory of the last world war told them that a war on two fronts was inevitably a war of defeat."

He was a pleasant, pudgy little man, this German captain, and he had been a chief bookkeeper in a large German factory before the war. He was pleased and yet puzzled over Germany's lightning success. He took a map of the Maginot line from the cuff of a sleeve of his green military tunic and opened it.

"Look here," he said, "this map was drawn two years ago. It shows the immediate sector of the Maginot line my battalion was assigned to take. We found there wasn't a single detail in the map that was incorrect. My major told me today that the information came from French contractors who had built the fortifications."

He was silent for a moment, and as we stood looking down at the green countryside that rolls to the Rhine at Strasbourg he slapped the map against his thigh. "They say it was a great victory," he said, evidently referring to the capture of the fortifications. He laughed. "The only casualty in my battalion was one man. He stepped on a nail. The French fired only a few shots."

Again he looked over the pleasant countryside and again he spoke. "If the French and British had opened a second front while we were in Poland, we might have collapsed as quickly as the French did." Perhaps I seemed surprised, for such a statement was surprising at a time when the whole world regarded the Nazis as invincible. At any rate the captain said, "Oh yes, it seems strange to say that now. But when the war began, even the General Staff, or at least part of it, feared a war on two fronts and was against starting the war. Everyone in Germany was tense while we were attacking in the East. We didn't breathe easily until the Polish campaign was over."

I give this conversation at some length because it is typical. The fear of a second front, so often expressed by Hitler, is not the Fuehrer's exclusive possession. Rather it is a national possession; one might call it a national obsession. It is, too, a national inheritance, possessed by every German and bequeathed by the last war when Germany's gigantic losses on the Eastern Front fatally weakened her on the Western.



Richard O. Boyer. “. . . *Revolt against Nazism within Germany will grow in ratio to military successes on the Western Front.*”

that Nazism must go. This evidence, so long withheld, will strengthen the hands of all those inside Germany who see that Germany's salvation lies in the execution of Nazism.

Is there the stuff of revolt against Nazism in Germany? I believe there is. I believe it will come actively into being, that it will progress and move forward in ratio to military successes on the Western Front.

I base this assertion on an extraordinary social phenomenon which I witnessed and which has never been adequately emphasized. I entered Germany in June of 1940 just after the Nazis had scored one of the greatest military victories of all time. Yet even at this hour of supreme triumph the German people were gloomy, morose, depressed, and were constantly complaining. Grumbling and complaints were the common rule, not the exception. Foreboding and worry over the future was general not exceptional.

Even then I was told repeatedly by clerks, barbers, taxi drivers, bus boys, hotel managers, teachers, stenographers, and others, “Germany can't win. America will come in again. It will be like in 1918.” Even then the German people took the British bombings very badly and the bombings in the fall of 1940 are almost as nothing compared to those they are now undergoing. Even then the German people, at least those who remembered the last war, had an instinctive understanding that a second front would once again come into being and once again result in defeat.

A second front will release this discontent, which undoubtedly has been silently pyramiding since I left Germany. With military action released from the West, there should be action, too, on the propaganda front. For if the German people are often dispirited, if many of them hate the war, many are also prone to inaction because they see no alternative but to fight on in an effort to avoid a peace which they fear may be more costly than war. Wilson's Fourteen Points, no less than the Allied drive in 1918, helped oust the Kaiser. Assurance of self-determination, with the proviso that fascism must be forever abolished, might go far in ousting Hitler.

The second front is the dominant factor in the world situation. If one is formed, all other factors combine with it to save the world. If one is not formed, the war, and the peace too, remain a dangerous, contradictory jumble. But if a Western Front is opened—and it must be—it will not only end in the defeat of the Nazis but, before it does that, it will set into motion forces that will attack Hitler's rear in Germany itself.

RICHARD O. BOYER.

THE importance of the second front as a factor in the defeat of Hitler within Germany, itself, is threefold. One of the great fears of Germans in 1940, almost a common denominator of all Germans no matter what their class or opinions, was that the United States would enter the war. It has, but the Germans are so insulated from world events that the full impact of our participation in the war is not yet appreciated.

Not until American soldiers meet Nazis on a Western Front will the devastating impact of American entry into the war, with all its deadly parallels to 1918, be brought home to the German people. When the first American troops drive toward Germany from the West, the fear of defeat through American entry will harden into conviction and be a part of a general process of disintegration of the Nazi regime that may come fast after it once begins.

Perhaps of almost equal importance is the fact that belief in Hitler and the Nazis will be struck a deadly blow by the formation of a second front. For more than a decade Hitler has not only promised the German people protection from such an assault, but has diagnosed Germany's defeat in the last war as a result of such an attack, has repeatedly implied that its repetition in this war might be fatal. For the first time Hitler's bankruptcy will be definitively demonstrated. Until now Hitler, through censorship and terror, has been able to conceal or minimize his defeats, even succeeding to a certain extent, evidently, in minimizing his reverses in Russia. But he cannot conceal a second front, and his own words in warning against such a front will glaringly reveal his fatal failure.

Finally such a front will dissipate any notion of a negotiated peace which will avoid defeat. It will give conclusive evidence that Britain and the United States are as determined as Russia

Here's How American Labor Feels

AMERICA's organized workers, who are building the tanks, planes, ships, guns, and other munitions to crush the Axis, are speaking up for a Western Front. They know how important it is to put the squeeze on Hitler without delay. Here are some of the unions that have recently adopted resolutions calling for a Western Front:

Minnesota CIO, New Jersey State Industrial Union Council, Greater Detroit and Wayne County CIO Council, Greater New York Industrial Union Council, Greater Buffalo Industrial Union Council, Pennsylvania CIO, Chicago Industrial Union Council,

Local 1114 (Chicago), United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 719 (Chicago), United Automobile Workers, Local 453 (Chicago), United Automobile Workers, shop stewards of Local 65, Wholesale and Warehouse Workers, Baltimore Industrial Union Council, Local 16 (New York), United Office and Professional Workers of America, Local 105 (Chicago), United Farm and Equipment Workers, Spencer Kellogg local of District 50, United Mine Workers, executive committee of CIO Packinghouse Workers Union (Chicago), Wisconsin State Industrial Union Council, Local 735 (Cleveland),

United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, General Motors Subdistrict 4 (Indiana), United Automobile Workers, National Maritime Union, International Fur and Leather Workers Union (Fur Division).

Joseph Curran, president of the National Maritime Union and vice-president of the CIO, spoke the feelings of millions of American working men and women when he recently wrote to Frank Knox, our Secretary of the Navy:

“A Western Front must be opened immediately if the war is not to be prolonged indefinitely. It must be done now, at once.”

AND HERE'S PROOF IT'S POSSIBLE

You've seen the proof that it's necessary, that millions want it, that outstanding leaders call for it. But have we got the stuff? All available facts about manpower, naval power, shipping, air strength, show we've got it.

WE HAVE now come to a stage of our discussion in which all the evidence has been accumulated that a second front is necessary.

But the question that may still remain is: whether the invasion is possible. Of course, nothing is impossible where the will is there; every heroic action of humanity in the long annals of mankind has proved many times over the ancient adage that "where there's a will there's a way."

But that is too general. Actually, we have evidence, from the daily press, that the materiel for an invasion of the continent is already at hand, is being produced from day to day in the arsenals of our own country and Great Britain.

Manpower: Various estimates have come from Britain on how much of its force is available for fighting. Some figures have been as high as 3,000,000. In a speech on March 18, Lord Halifax disputed that, pointing out that two million of England's troops are Home Guards, part-time soldiers who spend most of their time in the war industries. Only 1,500,000 or thereabouts, Halifax claimed, are troops of the regular army. In an informal address before a Home Guard unit at Westminster Palace, the Associated Press for May 13 reports Prime Minister Churchill as saying: "Now we have the best part of 1,750,000 men trained to use arms."

It can be argued of course that a large force will always have to be retained in Britain, that the island cannot be denuded of troops, and that is true. But from any reasonable viewpoint, it is clear that anywhere above a million Englishmen are available for offensive operations. That's a lot of men, apart from the Commandos.

And the United States can certainly contribute a substantial share. Estimates are that we have almost 4,000,000 men in training. In his last radio address the President said that several hundred thousand Americans are on friendly soil. So that perhaps up to a million are already in a position for active service. If we remember that there are millions of people who know something about fighting waiting for us on the continent, then even if the Germans have 1,000,000 men in the West, which is doubtful—most commentators say about thirty divisions or a little more than 500,000—insufficient manpower can't be considered an argument against a second front.

Naval Forces: True they are dispersed on the seven seas. But in the opinion of George Fielding Eliot on page 11, England has enough of a navy around her shores. She is after all the most powerful naval base in the world. Together with the air supremacy which Churchill told us as early as last

winter the RAF had attained, naval units to support an invasion cannot be considered a big problem. Especially if the ships now patrolling British waters defensively were viewed as the spearheads of offensive operations. And after all, even if the second front were not immediately successful, even if there were losses, the Germans don't have a navy to worry us. The idea that England would be vulnerable to invasion, assuming an unsuccessful effort at a front, cannot be based on the assumption that the enemy would have gained absolute naval supremacy.

Air Strength: Churchill himself tells us that the Royal Air Force has supremacy in the West. President Roosevelt has told us that soon American Flying Fortresses would be operating over the continent. Almost any day, you can pick out of the newspapers items like this. Geoffrey Parsons, Jr., writing for the New York Herald Tribune, April 23, from London says:

"Great Britain is now making four-engined bombers at such a rate that even if the heaviest losses suffered so far in mass raids of Germany were incurred over a sustained period, Britain's bombing fleet would continue to grow.

Or take the statement of the House's speaker, Samuel Rayburn, at a Texas Unity Rally on April 9:

"The United States is already making more than 3,300 planes a month. Administration leaders have every confidence that the President's schedule of 60,000 planes in 1942, including 45,000 combat planes, would not only be met but exceeded."

Production: Almost any day, you can pick out items like this from the newspapers:

Frank Kelley, staff correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, reports from Cincinnati May 13:

"The aircraft engine industry is producing more than enough motors to meet President Roosevelt's goal of 60,000 warplanes this year, and 125,000 in 1943, and the nation's machine tool industry, foundation of the war effort, will outstrip the Axis powers this year with an output worth \$150,000,000,000."

Or take some general information we have recently been given on our and Great Britain's production. In his address to the House of Commons, January 28, Winston Churchill declared:

"We are producing more than twice as many far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of the 1917-18 war period, and also of service rifles . . . Tank production has doubled in the last six months . . . Small arms production is more than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have doubled in the last six months. These are not doubling from early very small totals, but from

totals we boasted about as far as we dared six months ago. . . .”

On April 12 at a meeting of the American-British war strategy board, England's Minister of Labor, Ernest Bevin, declared that Britain was now producing as many planes as Germany and “within five or six weeks, the United States would be turning out as many planes as Germany, Italy and Japan combined. . . .”

On February 12, when Lord Beaverbrook took over the Ministry of War Production in Britain, he was quoted by the New York Times as having revealed:

“1. A new, very powerful tank or anti-tank gun, ‘better than the German 4.2,’ had been developed and put in large-scale production; British output of these heavier guns was going forward at a rate of 30,000 annually in December and 33,500 annually in January.

“2. During 1941, Britain sent abroad to all war theaters, including Russia, 9,781 planes while receiving 2,134 from abroad, that is, from the United States.

“3. During last year Britain sent 3,000 tanks, while receiving 200 from abroad; and, Lord Beaverbrook said, ‘it must be remembered that large numbers of tanks from the United States and Canada went directly to the Middle East.’”

From the United States we have had many similar statements, notably, that of Donald Nelson to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, on April 17 that the combined production of the United States, Russia and Britain is already much greater than Axis production. And William Green, reporting to the Executive Council meeting of the American Federation of Labor in Washington on May 12, spoke of the “amazing increases in the output of planes, ships, guns, tanks, and ammunition since December 7,” declaring that “America is now truly the greatest arsenal in the world.”

Now obviously, if all this production were approached from the viewpoint, not of scattering it, but of concentrating it for the decisive blow in the West this year, it's clear that the job could be done. But in any case, from these figures alone, it's apparent, that production can no longer be considered the obstacle to the second front.

Shipping: As for the bottleneck, which is supposed to be shipping: Admittedly, this represents a problem, but as Maj. George Fielding Eliot points out, it is by no means insuperable.

For one thing, according to the United States Maritime Commission, we are now turning out two ships a day, and may be turning out three a day by the fall. That is probably below the rate that the President desired, but it is also undoubtedly more than the rate at which the ships are being sunk. The Navy Department has announced that 191 United Nations merchant ships have been sunk since Pearl Harbor in Atlantic waters. But from January 1 to May 10 the United States alone launched 120 new merchant ships. Which proves that while the shipping situation isn't all it should be, the bottleneck must not be exaggerated.

Let it be recalled that Great Britain inherited the

vast merchant shipping tonnages of Greece, Norway, Yugoslavia, Holland, Belgium, and a good share of the Baltic tonnage. Recall too that the United States took over a substantial tonnage of Axis ships in our ports last summer. Then on top of the fact that between Britain and ourselves we hold a wide edge over Germany and Italy (the important shipping tonnage member of the Axis is Japan) it is clear that if properly protected and concentrated for use toward opening a Western Front, shipping obstacles can be overcome.

In *NEW MASSES* for May 5, our Washington editor, Bruce Minton, assembled evidence to prove how much could be done to improve the shipping situation. Basing himself on reports which the National Maritime Union, CIO, has repeatedly made to the government, Mr. Minton showed that ships could be saved in the short runs to Latin American and Caribbean countries, if countries like Cuba were encouraged to grow their own foods. Ships could be used better than they are now if foreign seamen, like Greeks, Yugoslavs, etc., were permitted to man ships of any nationality instead of just their own. Ships could be saved if arrangements were made to use their cargo space both coming and going from the West to the East Coast. Ships could be operated more efficiently if such men as Rhea Whitley, former Dies committee agent, were not in authority to discharge radio operators on account of union affiliation, a shocking thing that happened last month and resulted in the idleness of ten vessels in New York harbor in April alone. And all this is apart from the problem of better protection, more rapid arming, better convoying of our vessels on the high seas.


FINALLY, certain drastic changes from shipping-as-usual could accomplish a great deal. Here's an obscure Associated Press news item for May 7:

“The Office of Defense Transportation has ruled that all grain ships on the Great Lakes must cease carrying their usual cargo and load iron ore instead. Effective on May 15, the order brings 340 ships with a gross carrying capacity of 3,000,000 tons under the control of Transportation Director Joseph B. Eastman.”

It is true that this doesn't necessarily add a single ship for transport of supplies to western Europe. But it strikes us as an example of a relatively simple measure for speeding the war effort generally. Three million tons is three-eighths of the total tonnage the President wants to build this year, a lot of tonnage. Similar abandonment of shipping-as-usual could work wonders for the specific trans-Atlantic job that has to be done.

The point has to be made that in landing on the continent this time, too many people are still thinking in terms of the last war and failing to see the realities and opportunities of the present. If we have our memory fixed on the fine landing harbors of Brest, France, and the bands playing “Mademoiselle from Armentiers,” or “Tipperary,” and the generals saying, “Lafayette, we are here”—then of course, the problem of getting on the continent seems difficult. But if, as the Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky suggested in London, we don't think of this invasion as one in which the last button on each uniform has to be buttoned, or the last shoe lace tied in a bow, if we realize that it's a problem of fighting our way in—even recklessly, as Lord Beaverbrook

MAN OF THE HOUR: One of America's soldiers on the production front putting the finishing touches on a howitzer. Every day American workingmen send resolutions urging that a second front be opened. The attitude of the men in the shops is that they'll produce the stuff *this year* for the boys at the front to use—and bring victory in 1942.



A WESTERN FRONT TO WIN THE WAR

phrased it, losing some units in order to make possible the success of others, then the question of getting on that front in western Europe will not appear quite so forbidding as it does now.

Three hundred thousand men were evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk in June, 1940, because it had to be done. All kinds of ships from outboard motors to destroyers took part. It had to be done. Men waded down the beaches under murderous enemy fire to do it. In the same spirit, it can be done in reverse. Only this time, we have, as all the evidence demonstrates, the available and growing might of our own country and Britain to back our soldiers up.

So We Have the Stuff to Attack, But There Are Still Some Questions

BUT what we have said so far covers only part of our problem. A lot of people will agree that the second front is necessary, and the second front is possible. But they still have a number of questions.

For example, there's the argument that a second front can't be risked because the defense of Britain would be jeopardized.

Well, we agree, the defense of England is vital not only for the 40,000,000 Scottish, Welsh, English, Irish people who live there, but for all the United Nations. But let's ask ourselves, how it was that Britain got into the terrible, defensive position of the past two years. Why is it that Britain has been under such fear, and legitimate fear, of invasion? Obviously, because the British lost their front on the continent of Europe, which in this war, as in the last war, was their classic line of defense.

So it stands to reason that the best way to defend England today and tomorrow, as yesterday, is to maintain a line of defense against Germany—not at the water's edge, but well on to land. And those who fear that England would weaken her defenses by thrusting forward on the mainland of Europe forget that at the same moment Russia would be thrusting forward against Germany. So that even if the front were costly—or at worst unsuccessful—the chances are that the Nazis would have been weakened so as to make an invasion of England beyond their strength. The conditions of the fall of 1940 no longer obtain. Russia and America are now Britain's allies. Germany is weaker, although dangerous. England's best defense is to attack and reestablish a front in Europe.

BUT how about the Middle East? Well, granted that the Middle East is important. Granted that it would be a disaster for all the United Nations if Hitler could break through the Libyan, Turkish, Caucasian salients. But to avert that danger, the second front is still our most logical alternative. Why? A glance at the map, and the barest knowledge of strategic realities, will show that it would be easier to draw Hitler away from the Middle East than to meet him, and fight him there.

To send arms and men and munitions to the Middle East requires today a long voyage around South Africa; the Mediterranean is virtually closed. To get planes there requires a long flight through Africa; a long hop across the south Atlantic from the United States. And once you get to the Middle East, all your



THEY ASK FOR IT ON TRAFALGAR SQUARE. *This is the great demonstration Churchill welcomed in his recent broadcast. "We want a Western Front," they demand in England. Britain's heroic millions have gone through bomb and fire and are ready to do anything to invade the continent. And their American brothers are saying "Count us in."*

supplies have to come from England, from the United States, or from India. Whereas, operating from Britain against the continent you are closer by thousands of miles; you have vast arsenals behind you; America and Canada are nearer; your population backs you right up.

The principle of building up bases and supplies in Egypt, Libya, Palestine, and Iraq is all right within certain limits. But instead of scattering our planes and men and tanks and guns, in the expectation of meeting Hitler there in a struggle where the advantages would be his, we should be thinking of concentrating everything we have to jab him in the rear—that more than anything else would save the Middle East.

AND then the question comes up of the relation between the second front and the Pacific theater of the war. Thousands of Americans have gone to their death in the war against Japan. How can we best avenge their death and bring the swiftest retribution to their murderers? To answer this question we must face the realities of this global war. The United Nations are operating in the Pacific at very definite disadvantages, which cannot be blinked. Japan has won the first round. Japan controls the seas from Tokyo to Point Moresby off Australia to Akyab in Burma. We have only three main bases from which to get at her, except from China and the Soviet Union. We have Alaska, Australia, and India. All three of these areas are yet to be developed as securely held positions; none of them is as yet ready to

serve as the basis for the kind of offensive warfare that could bring us a decision against Japan. They are each largely dependent on water-borne supplies over many thousands of miles.

Moreover, the chief Axis partner, the decisive force in the drive for world conquest, is Nazi Germany. Defeating Japan alone would not defeat Germany. But defeating Germany would automatically isolate Japan; the full attention of all the United Nations could be turned against her. And whether the Japanese militarists continue their offensive, or are forced to go over to the defensive, depends not only on the resistance of Alaska, India, China, and Australia, but on what happens in Europe.

So we come to the conclusion that we have to hit at Japan and hit her hard wherever we can, as we did in the Coral Sea and by bombing Tokyo and other cities. We have to delay her and counter-attack as did our Chinese allies in Burma. We have to improve the political and military position in India, to rally her vast millions for active resistance. But none of these can be decisive for the war as a whole; whereas, a second front against Germany would be decisive for the war as a whole. And nothing would help China, Australia, India, and the whole struggle in Asia and the Pacific so much as the opening of a second front against Hitler in Europe.

Does the present air offensive in western Europe substitute for a full-fledged second front? Such is the position of Alexander de Seversky, and of commen-

tators like Maj. M. Wheeler-Nicholson. This type of thinking has gone so far, evidently, that some people are saying that a second front already exists: namely, the air front in which the Royal Air Force has done so splendidly. But such reasoning strikes us not only as fallacious, but actually confuses the problem.

Of course, the airplane is a most powerful weapon in this war, and admittedly it has been under-rated in the past. Admittedly also, the Nazis have shown that the airplane can be used semi-independently, as the Stukas, to provide a sort of air artillery. But the German experience has also been that the airplane by itself cannot bring a decision—and it is with a decision that the whole argument over a western front is concerned.

The air offensive alone cannot win the war: otherwise the Nazis would have defeated Britain in the fall of 1940. Otherwise, the Russians would not have had to crack the Mannerheim Line in March 1940 after their great air offensive over Finnish communications a month earlier. In China the Japanese have bombed Chungking year after year without gaining a decision.

Naturally, the air offensive is vital—not as a substitute for a front—but in preparation for it. The air offensive in western Europe not only forces the Nazis to draw off their squadrons from the East, but if it is to really achieve its purpose, it should be integrated with naval, psychological, political, economic, and every other type of offensive action that must accompany the landing of men and machines in Europe. Maj. Eliot agrees that air power alone is not enough.

In fact, this theory of the exclusive and self-sufficient character of the air offensive seems to us to be just as bad as the discredited doctrine that sea power alone is decisive in modern warfare. As we see it, coordination of all weapons, concentration, and timing—flowing from the basic conception of our participation in this war with our allies is the way to victory.

THEN there are those who say: let's wait and see what will happen. Perhaps the Red Army will be able to drive back the Nazis singlehanded and no second front will be necessary. This seems to be the position of Maj.-Gen. Stephen O. Fuqua in his statement to *New Masses*, published on page 12, though earlier, in an article in *Newsweek*, he appeared to favor a Western Front. General Fuqua concedes that "almost anything can happen to Hitler this year, ranging from his total defeat to his complete victory over the Russians and absolute dominance of the continent." If this is true—and it is—then why take the chance of a Hitler victory, which would be no less disastrous to the United States than to Russia and Britain? Why wait and see when Hitler's goose can be cooked by action?

But, counters General Fuqua, suppose a second front is opened and it results in another Dunkirk. The evidence we have presented makes us feel that the chances of another Dunkirk are extremely remote. It would no longer be an isolated Britain, shorn of most of its weapons, facing an all-powerful Germany, but the combined forces of Britain and the United States, magnificently equipped, hurling themselves against numerically and morally inferior troops while the bulk of the Nazi army is engaged on the Soviet front. And even if the worst should happen and the invasion end in de-

feat, as Colonel T. points out in his article on page 18, it could still, by diverting part of the German strength from the east, prove fatal to the Nazis.

BUT some readers will undoubtedly reply that perhaps we are too confident; we have our minds too fixed on one particular way of winning this war. For example, Maj. M. Wheeler-Nicholson, author of the article in the May issue of *Harpers* "Where to Take the Offensive?," complains in *PM* for May 13 that the one trouble with the second front idea is that it assumes that once we have it, the fighting will be over. That is not our assumption at all. Yes, a second front might end the war and crack the Nazis this year. Premier Stalin thinks the chances are that it will.

But suppose there were fighting left to do next spring, even in Europe, and almost certainly in the Pacific. The whole point is that the decision would have fallen. As Dorothy Thompson put it in a recent column, "The fighting wouldn't be over, but the war would be won." Hitler would be on the skids and could not possibly put us in the danger he is putting us this year.

It's something like that next-to-the-last game the Dodgers played in the famous World Series of 1941. When Mickey Owen dropped that ball in the ninth inning of the fourth game, the decision had fallen. The series wasn't over, and in fact it lasted another full game. But the heart had been taken out of the Dodgers. They were through. That's what a second front would do to the Axis this year.

FINALLY, people are dubious whether we have the right to urge a second front. After all, if what we've said is true, our High Command ought to know as much about it as we do. Therefore, the argument goes, it isn't proper to urge people to get aroused about a second front; the High Command will take care of it.

Well, we don't deny that the High Command has got to make the military decision; to say otherwise would be presumptuous in the extreme. But the second front has become a question of broad strategy for the United Nations. And on such questions, popular feeling can and must play a vital role.

After all, military commanders have been wrong before. For example, many of them were dead wrong about Russia. It's an open secret that high American officers were sure that Russia would collapse, that the Nazis would win in from one to sixteen weeks. The fact is that in this people's war the people have got to get up on their hind legs and demand what they think is best for defeating the Axis. For sometimes, as in this case, the instinct and understanding of the masses outstrips even the best-intentioned leadership. The issue is one of life and death. We shall either win this war, together with the Russians—who would much prefer to win it with us rather than without us—together with all our allies, or else, we shall let our allies down, and in so doing pave the way for our own defeat. That is the question. On this every man has a right to speak. As things are now, too many people are for the offensive in an abstract sort of way—too few realize the crisis that is upon us. The offensive must not become like the weather—something that everyone talks about, but does nothing about. And for this an aroused democratic opinion is what the country and the war needs.

We think we've proven the case for a Western Front. The pages of *NEW MASSES* are open for further debate. But for those who agree, we urge letters to our President, and congressmen. A Western Front to win the war in 1942.



BROADWAY DROUGHT

Alvah Bessie laments a poor theatrical season. Why many plays failed to make the grade. Opportunities not to be missed for drama.

YOU do not need me to tell you that this season on Broadway has been one of the worst in years. Worst in the sense that relatively fewer plays were produced, and that of those produced not one—with exceptions to be noted—amounted to very much.

The exceptions were the revivals of plays by three fairly talented and well established authors: William Shakespeare, Henrik Ibsen, and George Bernard Shaw. I did not see *Candida*. But I saw the bad production of Ibsen's *Hedda Gabler*, the fair to middling Maurice Evans' *Macbeth*, and the excellent Michael Chekhov production of *Twelfth Night*. Of which, more later. That brings us to a breakdown.

The breakdown runs as follows: NEW MASSES has commented on fifty-one productions this season; of which eight were revivals. Current on Broadway as I write this are eleven "dramas," of which *Arsenic and Old Lace*, *My Sister Eileen*, and *Life with Father* are held over from last season. The remaining eight divide up as follows: there is one "serious" drama—*The Moon Is Down*; there are two medium-serious plays: *Guest in the House* and *Yesterday's Magic*; and there are five frankly escapist efforts: *Angel Street*, *Blithe Spirit*, *Cafe Crown*, *Junior Miss*, and *Spring Again*.

From this breakdown you might suspect that something in the nature of a "trend" is visible—the theater's attempt to divert the public from serious contemplation of the war—but you would be wrong. For of the thirty-four defunct plays that opened and closed this season, twenty-one were definitely serious—in the sense that their authors tried to say something significant about important human affairs; six were medium-serious, and only seven were the veriest piffle, if you don't mind including *Twelfth Night* among the piffle, despite its charm and the genius of its author.

What have we left? Of the twenty-one serious plays that did not survive very long, at least thirteen dealt with themes directly related to the war, the Nazi threat of world domination or the problems of democracy in action. Number among these such plays as *The Wookey* (strictly a mild success and hold-over from the previous season), Maxwell Anderson's *Candle in the Wind*, George S. Kaufman's *The Land Is Bright*, Sophie Treadwell's *Hope for a Harvest*, Clifford Odets' *Clash by Night*, Marc Connelly's *Flowers of Virtue*, and John Bright's and Asa Bordages' *Brooklyn, USA*.

So it is not true—as yet—that the theater is attempting to pander to something people really do not want—escapism, although there are indications of such a tendency. It is true, however, that most of the new plays which were of a distinctly anti-Nazi flavor or a pro-democratic flavor were failures. And by and large they were failures because their authors failed of comprehension or distinction, or both. Number among such failures Odets' *Clash by Night*, which its author apparently felt was an allegory about fascism but which failed to achieve vitality because he had neither deeply explored nor adequately projected his characters. Yet in his failure Odets revealed a deeper understanding and a finer talent than any of the other notable authors who attempted comparable themes.

We found variant depths of comprehension of fascism and democracy in Sophie Treadwell's *Hope for a Harvest*, where again honesty of intention failed through inadequate comprehension of the problem: in this instance, the status of the Italian-Americans in California and the native prisoners of the impoverished land.

We found it in John Bright's and Asa Bordages' *Brooklyn, USA*, which went further than any other play of the season in attempting an evaluation of certain native fascist tendencies. Here an interesting thing happened—or rather two. One: the authors did not go quite far enough in putting the finger on those responsible for gangsterism and black-shirt tactics on the waterfront; and they fell into the trap of easy sensationalism. But *Brooklyn* was in many ways a brilliant genre picture; it had some characterization and more atmosphere than most of the season's offerings.

Marc Connelly, in *The Flowers of Virtue*, attempted a miniature drawing of the fascist pattern, as expressed through a local Gauleiter in a small Mexican town. He seemed to understand that pattern fairly well, although it was a distinct surprise to see the forces of democracy centered exclusively in an enlightened industrialist and scarcely, if at all, in the working people of the countryside.

But to return to what is on the boards and the paucity of really vital dramatic material. There are reasons to believe that the theater is likely to see a flood of purely escapist drama, and the only way it can be averted is for the public to make it manifest that it will greet anything that has substance and reject anything that hasn't. Certainly

"pure" entertainment can raise morale, if only in the negative fashion of "taking our minds off our troubles." But the sort of morale we will need to win this war in 1942 can best be developed and augmented by the theater if the theater will search for, stimulate, and produce plays that have an immediate bearing on the struggle, that state in terms of character and emotion the human, social and economic background of this war. We need to see the face of fascism on our stage, both in its native and international manifestations; and we need to see our democracy on the stage—its origins, its strength, vitality, and ability to overcome oppression.

It may be true that many of our leading playwrights have been struck all of a heap by the events since Pearl Harbor and do not know what to write or how to write it. But it is time they pulled themselves up by their boot-straps, and got on the job. The world of today, hideous as it is in many ways, is enormously fertile with dramatic ideas—ideas that can help to win the war and that are capable of projection in the form of really great theater works.

America has developed a corps of heroes, men and women, at the front and behind the lines, that is increasing every day. The Eastern Front, the Pacific, the European underground are producing material for drama by the very hour. Let us have plays about our allies that will help our people understand the Chinese, the British, and the Soviet peoples. Let us have plays with roots in American history, past and present, that will demonstrate the vitality of the American tradition. Let us have topical plays (that need not be inevitably *only* topical) about the men of the army, navy, and air corps, about the men on the production lines and in the merchant marine; about the American family (father, mother, children) who are far from the resounding battle lines but who are also soldiers in the battle.

The material is at every hand. It needs only an Odets, a Connelly, a Hellman, an Anderson, a Treadwell to seize upon that material and transmute it into theatrical terms. There is work for these established writers and work as well for the hosts of the unestablished. It is literally true, of course, that the grip which Hollywood exercises over Broadway is strong. It is literally true that money cannot be found to finance a play unless a moving picture sale is practically guaranteed in advance. We will have to break that grip, just as Hollywood

will have to smash its own boy-meets-girl tradition in favor of films that deal with the real world instead of the dream world.

So the dramatists of the country will have to produce plays that are immediate, moving, and significant. The *Cafe Crowns* are quite adequate to induce an easy smile, and they have their place in the scheme of things. *The Moon Is Down* deserves commendation as an honest, if bolixed-up attempt to deal with a central reality—the Nazi threat to the world and the people's determination not to submit to international gangsterism. But playwrights, novelists, and screen writers all have an obligation today to be playwrights, novelists, and screen writers more and more intensively. To come to grips with those problems central to this people's war, that will illuminate the war and stir the people to accomplish its rapid end. This year. In 1942.

ALVAH BESSIE.

A Superb Concert

Noted artists join in "Music at Work."

THE most interesting and unusual concert of the year was presented under the title "Music at Work" for the benefit of Russian War Relief. Participation in this benefit by such disparate figures in the musical world as Aaron Copland, Harold Rome, and Woody Guthrie (or duo-pianists Ethel Bartlett and Rae Robertson from the concert field, Ray Block's chorus from radio, and Teddy Wilson's band from Cafe Society) indicates a broad understanding that every aid possible must be advanced to our fighting allies.

Marc Blitzstein directed the production and also acted as commentator on the program. The musical and entertainment value of the numbers was extremely high; so high, the concert could unquestionably be repeated to similarly packed houses for weeks. And that old saw about "absolute music" being the only music that matters got some more of its teeth kicked out by examples of music for the theater, the film, and the dance that received tumultuous receptions.

To begin with, Earl Robinson and Woody Guthrie (guitars, work clothes, and all) seemed to step out of the pages of Carl Sandburg's *The People, Yes* from which they selected words and songs that served as settings for dances by Sophie Maslow and the New Dance Group—and I will personally guarantee to fill a medium-sized auditorium if Robinson and Guthrie will bring their guitars along and read aloud from Sandburg's book for two hours.

Pas de Trois, composed and played by Theodore Chandler and danced by Mary Ellen Moylan and Nicolas Magallanes, was delightfully devoid of the ballet's usual insipidities, infantile hi-jinks, or dead-pan solemnity (thanks to choreographer George Balanchine), and enchanted the audience.

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Aaron Copland's "Piano Concerto," written in 1926 when the composer wished to write something especially "American" after his extended musical studies abroad, has as its superstructure "The St. Louis Blues." W. C. Handy takes plenty of musical teasing in the composition, but the composer's performance of his work (assisted by the vigorous and knowing pianistics of Leonard Bernstein) revealed that Copland now has a much greater understanding of jazz than he had in 1926. After that, Teddy Wilson's band came on to play the kind of jazz that is so right, the response is immediate and full.

Henry Brant provided a musical introduction for a short anti-Nazi play by Bert Brecht, Harold Rome divulged some of his music and lyrics from the forthcoming musical play "Caleb Catlum's America" (a smash hit, if the sample heard is an indication), and Marc Blitzstein previewed one of the scenes from *Native Land*, since acclaimed a masterpiece among documentary films. The scene—a transitional one in the film showing America awakening to another work-day—has Paul Robeson speaking, annotating the film against Blitzstein's music, until he apparently can contain himself no longer and joyously, buoyantly bursts into song that is a paean to early morning, dew-fresh air, bustling households, boiling coffee, and "... the kind of a morning that starts out any old way but turns out to be a wonderful day!"

The concert was superb and a credit to everyone associated with it. Only one point was left unresolved: did the concert demonstrate music at work "strengthening the spirit of a fighting people" by the "jobs composers are doing in these crucial times"? True, there was Stanley Bates' over-dressed "Overture to the Concert," which had buried in it the strains of two Red Army songs. And then there was Earl Robinson's and John La Touche's "Battle Hymn" (which resembled their "Ballad for Americans" though lacking, perhaps, the "Ballad's" inspiration and effectiveness) based on President Roosevelt's message at the opening of Congress. But are these enough to express the urgent issues of our time?

I don't mean that composers should limit themselves to the writing of "war songs"—Dmitri Shostakovich wrote a symphony while actively participating in the defense of Leningrad. But one wonders whether there isn't rather too much music-as-usual. Perhaps the relationship of composers to the war effort will be more clearly articulated when they have formulated a program of action.

ELLIOTT GRENNARD.



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