

YOUNG

SOCIALIST

The Banks Strike

VOLUME 4

NO: 1

The Plantation Workers' Strike

The United Committee
of Ceylon Trade
Unions

WHOLE NO:

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Factors in the Working of
Parliamentary Institutions

by Dr. A. J. Wilson

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YOUNG SOCIALIST

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Editorial Notes

THE BANKS AND ESTATES STRIKES AND THE ROLE OF THE UCCTU

In our issue No. 14 (Oct. 1965) we drew attention to the UNP-led Coalition's dependence on the big bourgeoisie to whom considerable concessions had been given in its first budget for the capitalist development of the country. We then stated:

"This shift of the bourgeois apparatus rightwards will widen the gulf between bourgeoisie and proletariat and also between the bourgeois state and the basic elementary needs of the economy and the living standards of the people, and will thereby create the conditions for a new upsurge of the working class movement.

"Just as the urgent task of the bourgeoisie is to repair the capitalist economy at the expense primarily of the proletariat, so also is it the urgent need of the proletariat to close its ranks in preparation for the struggles ahead.... The means of unifying the presently divided and disoriented working class is the United Front of Working Class organisations on an agreed list of anti-capitalist demands."

The strike on the plantations led by the **Democratic Workers Congress (DWC)** and the strike at Grindlay's Bank which has been forced to expand into a general strike of bank employees under the leadership of the **Ceylon Bank Employees' Union** are forerunners of the new upsurge that will

soon make the working class abandon class-collaborationist politics and return to **revolutionary politics**. What is most significant is that the two organisations in the forefront of the struggle, the CBEU and the DWC, are constituents of the **UNITED COMMITTEE OF CEYLON TRADE UNIONS (UCCTU)** which was set up on 4th April this year together with the Ceylon Mercantile Union and the Ceylon Estates Staffs' Union as a **successful beginning of the necessary rallying of working class organisations irrespective of race, nationality, religion, language or political affiliations**.

The earlier JCTU which was organised round the now defunct '21 Demands' was sabotaged by the leaderships of what have now come to be called the 'coalition unions' when the reformist LSSP leaders bartered the 21 Demands for 3 portfolios in Mrs. Bandaranaike's government and the opportunist CP leadership soon after hitched themselves to the Coalition government even without the bribe of a portfolio. With the working class deceived and betrayed and incapable of giving the necessary leadership to the toiling masses it was inevitable that the UNP should have been returned to power. And it was also inevitable that the UNP in power should, while making overtures in order to deceive the proletariat also simultaneously show that it is determined to keep the working class on its knees. The victimization of the teachers (Jathika Guru Sangamaya) for alleged partisanship in the Elections and then the victimisation of participants (and even sympathisers) in the January 8th token strike, where in both instances the 'coalition unions' were powerless to take any **class action** to defend their members, completed the demoralization of the working class at the hands of the Left Fakers.

It was in this context that unions like the CBEU and the CMU which had pre-

served their independence in the general swing to class-collaboration, sought to rally as many trade unions as possible with the hope of reviving and re-uniting those sections which had felt the brunt of the Government's repression. The CBEU summoned a conference of all major trade union organizations to discuss a campaign to protest the victimization of the January 8th strikers, the continuing Emergency and restriction of democratic rights and civil liberties, and the appointment by the Government of a Commission to advise on amendments to the trade union laws, with the obvious intention of giving the state a greater measure of control over the trade unions under the guise of protecting them against 'undue influence by politicians'. Most of the major trade unions sent their representatives except Thondaman's CWC and the CP (Moscow)-controlled federations.

But when it came to considering specific proposals for joint action the 'coalition unions' displayed a natural shyness. It was left to the CBEU, the CMU, the DWC and CESU to form the nucleus of what must, under the joint pressure of the Ceylon bourgeoisie and their international financial backers acting through the UNP-led Coalition, sooner rather than later become expanded into a **United Front of the Working Class**. Either that, or the complete emasculation of the trade unions—such is the choice before the working class today.

The trade unions under the banner of the UCCTU organised and celebrated a very successful May Day. The resolutions adopted at this Rally are published elsewhere in this issue. Elsewhere also we publish a letter from the UCCTU to the Prime Minister on the Plantation and Bank Strikes.

While the 'coalition unions' have kept out of the UCCTU, it is noteworthy that the coalition plantation unions, both LSSP and CP-controlled, have been compelled to join in the DWC-led strike for the 17/50 Special Living Allowance (SLA). The very union leaderships which sponsored the January 8th strike against language concessions to the Tamils and who until recently were shouting, 'Indian workers, get out!' are at this moment on strike for the SLA of the Tamil plantation workers. Such is the power of the working class when it goes into action on behalf of its class interests. It must also be noted that it was only after the plantation and banks workers went into action that the 'coalition unions' could pluck up sufficient courage to hold a public meeting (Hyde Park, 8th July) to protest the victimization of the January 8th strikers. As the class struggle develops the working class will throw off its back the Left Fakers who have been blunting its class consciousness with their class-collaborationist politics.

In order to co-ordinate the plantation strikes and assist them to exert their maximum force it is necessary to have a **united front of the trade union organisations involved**. If any of the unions reject unity for action then it is clear that they are in the struggle not for victory but to head it

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off without harm to the estate owners whose agents they will prove to be in deeds for all their militant words. As for the bank employees strike, this is a test for Dudley Senanayake. His imperialist financial backers want him to prove his bona fides as their loyal bailiff. Only the active assistance of the workers in the industrial and mercantile sectors to the courageous struggle of the bank employees can counter the pressure of the UNP-led Government's imperialist overlords.

YOUNG SOCIALIST salutes the UCC TU and calls upon all sections of the working class to rally round its banner. The working class is once again on the march. There must be no turning back. FORWARD TO VICTORY !

THE BANK STRIKE

As we go to press the CBEU has decided to call off its strike unconditionally and the Minister of Labour has appointed a One-man Commission to report on the procedure and criteria for promotions to staff grades in the commercial banks.

This strike has exposed the utter impotence of the UNP-led Government to "persuade" the management of National and Grindlays Bank to agree to voluntary arbitration, or even compulsory arbitration under emergency powers, or to include in the terms of reference of the One-man Commission a probe into the bona fides of Grindlays management in the case of the 'stooge promotions' over which the strike started. It is not a matter for surprise that Grindlay's Bank, as the biggest single subscriber to the promised loan to the UNP-led Government by the International Banking Consortium, should have been able to resist all attempts and even the personal intervention of Dudley Senanayake to settle the strike on terms which the Government itself admitted to be fair. "Ceylon's most popular golfer" has been unable to do otherwise than play ball with his financial underwriters.

In an attempt to avoid a blatant display of partisanship in favour of its international underwriters by resort to extreme measures under the emergency powers, the Government was willing to let the strike drag on and damn the consequences to the country's economy. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the Government had placed itself on the side of the international bankers, and a prolongation of the strike, would sooner or later, have brought the Government directly into conflict with the strikers by the use of its emergency powers under the pressure of the local capitalist class.

In these circumstances, rather than expose its membership to further hardship and possible repression the CBEU has decided to call off the strike. The CBEU has we think acted with discretion in refusing to be provoked into a conflict with the Government in alliance with its imperialist overlords. Such a struggle would have needed the active assistance of the entire Ceylon working class, and this is a task that it is at present not in a position to shoulder thanks to the disruptive politics of the Left Fakers and their stooges in the trade unions. It was wise to have avoided any adventure which could have jeopardised the regroupment of the working class forces which has just commenced under the banner of the UCCTU.

The CBEU has withdrawn from this first engagement with its forces intact. Although the struggle has been inconclusive, the bank employees now go into negotiations for the Collective Agreement with their hands strengthened by their display of solidarity. Whatever the outcome of those negotiations it will strengthen the solidarity of the CBEU and thereby increase the influence of the UCCTU on the further development of the class struggle which is now on the order of the day. The Banks Strike has once again demonstrated the necessity for a United Front of Working Class Organizations irrespective of caste, creed, nationality, and race along the lines of class struggle as distinct from class collaboration in order to overcome the united forces of the Ceylon capitalist class and its imperialist overlords. Long live the UCCTU !

VIETNAM

There is nothing contradictory about Johnson's escalation of the war and his professed desire for a negotiated 'peace'. He only seeks to compel the NLF to come to the bargaining table by making it impossible for the Vietcong to carry on fighting any longer. All parties concerned are agreed about a negotiated settlement. Where they differ is on the nature of the bargain. The US imperialists cannot carry on indefinitely placing the escalating burden of the war on the American masses. The Vietcong cannot carry on their heroic struggle indefinitely paying the bloody price of their resistance in isolation from the revolutionary movement in S. E. Asia and the rest of the world. To the bargaining table both sides must eventually come-failing the timely intervention of the international proletariat.

The NLF demands as a condition for peace the setting up of a coalition interim

government. This is the familiar formula of compromise that has led revolutionary movements to ruin recently in Algeria, Indonesia and the Dominican Rep. However, the US imperialists fear that a coalition government may lead to the kind of overturns that took place in Eastern Europe and bring S. Vietnam within the Soviet bloc. The NLF fears any settlement that will leave the US troops in occupation either directly or indirectly through a UN 'peace-keeping force'.

The setting up of a coalition government can take place only on the basis of the preservation of capitalist relations in the country. It needs no stressing that such a government will be incapable of solving the problems of the toiling masses. It will have to be replaced either by a genuine workers' state or by a military coup in the face of mass unrest, following the pattern of Algeria, Indonesia and the Dominican Rep.

The only way to counter Johnson's intentions in escalating the war is to end the isolation of the Vietcong struggle by **escalating the revolutionary struggles of the workers and peasants of Asia, Africa and Latin America and of the working classes of the advanced capitalist and imperialist countries, particularly the USA.** This is the only way in which the workers and peasants of Vietnam who have heroically borne the brunt of the anti-imperialist struggle can be assisted to place their own impress on the outcome of that struggle.

TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE

THE Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana during the first half of January 1966 has achieved notoriety for Fidel Castro's scurrilous attack on the Guatemalan guerrilla movement (MR-13), on Trotskyists and the Fourth International, and on Adolfo Gilly whose first-hand report on the MR-13 was published by *Monthly Review* in its issues of May and June 1965. Composed as this Conference was of Stalinists and their fellow travellers representing so-called revolutionary and anti-imperialist organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America it was not surprising to anyone but the sycophants and admirers Castro can sway with his 'revolutionary' and 'anti-

imperialist' fulminations, that the Leader of the Cuban Revolution could get away with his anti-Trotskyist aspersions which placed him unmistakably on the side of the Kremlin bureaucracy.

The reader is referred to *Young Socialist* No. 14 for extracts from Gilly's report on MR-13 and our comments. The program of MR-13 indicates that it has learned from its own experience in struggle that the national liberation struggle can develop and grow over into the proletarian socialist revolution only if the proletariat preserves its political and organizational independence—that is, rejects completely the Stalinist formula of the bloc-of-four-classes alias peoples' front—and fights consciously to establish its own class rule. To this extent at least it agrees with the position of the Fourth International in accordance with the theory of permanent revolution. Now it is for this programme that Castro, in his closing speech, castigated MR-13 asserting that it was Trotskyist dominated and had "copied from head to tail the program of the F.I." which he denounced as "this discredited, this anti-historic, this fraudulent thing which emanates from individuals so known to be in the service of Yankee imperialism".

Revolutionary socialists are accustomed to the spectacle of both protagonists of the Moscow-Peking dispute hurling the epithet 'Trotskyist' at each other as their final argument. But now along comes Castro—the unique petty bourgeois revolutionist who, with a handful of guerrillas but without any of the ideological dissention and organizational gimmicks like proletarian revolutionary parties and Soviets resorted to by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, made a unique 'socialist revolution'—and this Fidel Castro too "copies from head to tail" the attitude of both Moscow and Peking towards any signs of deviation from the generally accepted Stalinist formula for the national liberation struggles.

By denouncing the programme of MR-13, which is based on an acceptance of the theory of permanent revolution, Fidel Castro has come out in his true colours and shown himself for what he really is: as still the same petty bourgeois revolutionist as he always was; that his lining up

with his Kremlin friends is a manifestation of the desire of the Cuban petty bourgeoisie to rest on their laurels and come to terms with the imperialists; and that this implies the halting of the Cuban revolution at its present stage and an alliance with the counter-revolutionary Kremlin bureaucracy (themselves seeking to do a deal with imperialism) to prevent the further development of the revolution to the stage when the workers and peasants will attempt to organise their Soviets, seize power and establish a genuine workers' state. Castro knows that any movements like MR-13 if not nipped in the bud will spell the doom of all other petty bourgeois nationalist cliques in Latin America seeking to ride to power on the backs of the toiling masses as well as his own Bonapartist regime itself and his own megalomaniac pretensions.

While both the US imperialists and Castro will continue to make belligerent noises, it is now unlikely that the former will intervene militarily in Castro's Cuba unless both of them are faced with the threat of a workers' Cuba.

Castro has not stopped at words, or rather, his denunciation only confirms his action when he encouraged a Major Turcios to break away from MR-13 and organise "The Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala with other progressive and revolutionary sectors", as he himself approvingly described this rival organization, when he presented Turcios to the Conference as the "saviour of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement". The 'prolonged applause' which greeted this announcement was a clear indication of the political nature of the Conference as well as of Castro himself.

Castro is now assured of the complicity of his petty bourgeois ideologues in the 'Left' movement in Latin America for the institution of a Castroite version of the Stalinist Inquisition which will frame-up and witch-hunt as 'trotskyites' any proletarian revolutionary leaders who try to emulate MR-13. In fact *the witch-hunt for which he gave the signal at the Conference has already started.* Francisco Amado, the editor of 'Socialist Revolu-

tion, the organ of MR-13, whom Castro accused of copying the program of the F.I., has been assassinated along with another comrade by the Guatemalan police. Adolfo Gilly who was pin-pointed by Castro as one of the arch-villains responsible for criticism of the Castro regime, has been arrested in Mexico City along with seven comrades for inciting student strikes at the University. A Mexican student, Aguilla Mora, has been arrested and tortured in a Guatemalan jail and his life is in danger. Castro's protegee, Turcios, has proved his bona fides by betraying two leaders of MR-13, 'Estefano' and 'Paco'.

YOUNG SOCIALIST appeals to all working class and student organisations to condemn this Castro-inspired witch-hunt by the Stalinist thugs and assassins in the pay of the Latin American bourgeoisie and their imperialist overlords seeking to block the revolutionary struggles of the workers and peasants of Latin America.

THE BRITISH SEAMEN'S STRIKE

After six and a half weeks, the most militant strike in Britain since the end of the war has been called off. The rank and file of the NUS are justifiably incensed at what they call a "sell-out". But the real culprit is Wilson's Labour Cabinet which has taken its strike-breaking orders from Wall Street and the international bankers. The 'red' scare raised by Wilson accusing the CP of being an instrument of outside political interference also contributed to weakening the strike. This accusation was only a pretext for smashing the strike. The role of the CP during the strike was one attempt after another to confine the strike to the seamen and prevent the dockers (among whom the CP wields influence) from joining in. The fact is that a sell-out has been forced on the leadership of the NUS by Wilson and his Labour Government acting as the tool of the most reactionary forces in the world today, the international bankers of Wall Street and Zurich.

The international financial guarantors of the Labour Government forced Wilson to a show-down on the seamen's demands as an earnest of his bona fides in pushing

through his Prices and Incomes Bill which will hamstring the trade unions. The right wing Labour Party and CP leadership in the trade unions has been responsible for confining the strike to the seamen and making them bear the entire burden of what was but the first battle for the right of the trade unions to independent existence. That the lessons of the strike are being assimilated by the rank and file in the trade union movement is clear from the surrender of his portfolio of Technology by Frank Cousins, leader of the million strong TGWU, as a protest against the Prices and Incomes Bill.

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1966 May Day Resolutions

The United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions

Adopted by the Rally at de Mel Park, Colombo

1. This United May Day Rally of the Ceylon Mercantile Union, The Ceylon Bank Employees' Union, The Ceylon Estate Staffs' Union and the Democratic Workers' Congress takes note of the fact that the working class movement in Ceylon has been seriously divided and weakened by the differences that exist within it and that this state of disunity is not only harmful to the interests of the working class as a whole but has already resulted in serious damage to important sections of workers specially in the Government and Local Government Services and in State Corporations.

This United May Day Rally accordingly welcomes and endorses the formation of the United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions in terms of the resolutions adopted by the joint trade union seminar held by the Ceylon Mercantile Union, the Ceylon Bank Employees' Union, the Ceylon Estate Staffs' Union and the Democratic Workers' Congress at Kandy on 4th April 1966, and calls upon all other trade union organisations to join with the UCCTU to defend and carry forward the interests of the workers of Ceylon, without distinction of race, nationality, religion, language or political adherence.

2. This United May Day Rally calls upon the Minister of Labour to bring legislation immediately before Parliament to make it a criminal offence for any employer or agent of an employer to induce any person to leave or refrain from joining a trade union or penalise any person for doing so.

3. This United May Day Rally denounces the attempt of the Government to impose further State control over the Trade Unions in Ceylon and to place further legal limitations upon their democratic rights of association and action, which has been manifested by the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry by the Minister of Labour.

This United May Day Rally warns all sections of the trade union movement and the working class in general that whatever recommendations the Committee may make in accordance with its terms of reference cannot be beneficial to the trade union movement, since its terms of reference relate almost entirely to matters that have been agitated upon by the most reactionary vested interests in Ceylon for several years.

This United May Day Rally points out to the Government that if it has any regard whatsoever for the point of view of the overwhelming mass of the organised trade union movement, which has boycotted the Committee of Inquiry, and if it has any desire to promote the development of the trade union movement in Ceylon on democratic lines, its plain duty is to scrap the Committee forthwith and to consult directly with the trade unions on matters which call for improvement in relation to them.

4. This United May Day Rally records its strong protest against the mass victimisation of leaders and members of trade unions that participated in the one-day strike of 8th January 1966, even though the unions participating in this United May Day Rally were not participants in the January 8th strike and in no way subscribe to the aims and objects of that strike.

This United May Day Rally points out that the 8th January strike was a token strike in protest against a contemplated act of the Government and that, however strongly the Government or anyone else may have felt that a protest strike was not called for in that matter, there was absolutely no justification for the mass dismissals by the Ceylon Transport Board, the numerous interdictions effected by the Government, Local Government Services' Commission and various State Corporations, and the punitive fines generally imposed in consequence of that strike. This Rally accordingly calls for the cancellation of all punishments imposed and disciplinary proceedings instituted in relation to the strike of 8th

January 1966. This May Day Rally also calls upon all trade unions, irrespective of whether they participated in the January 8th strike or not, and not withstanding the different view points that they hold in regard to that strike, to come together in defence of those sections of the trade union movement that have been victimised on account of it.

5. This United May Day Rally fully endorses the view that no scheme of profit sharing can be substituted for an adequate wage, and points out that the most urgent economic need of the workers of Ceylon at the present time is an all round and substantial increase of wages and salaries, since there has been and there is no likelihood of any reduction in the high cost of living, despite all promises of the Government and the empty press propaganda about bringing down or even adequately controlling prices. This United May Day Rally further stresses that the rates of Dearness Allowance of Government Employees and most categories of workers who are paid Dearness Allowances have remained fixed since 1955, whilst the vast mass of workers on the plantations and in certain other sectors have not even been granted the Special Living Allowance of Rs. 17/50 that was granted in 1957 to Government Employees and in 1958 to all other categories of workers with regulated wages. This United May Day Rally accordingly declares its support in general of the demand of the workers in the public and private sectors for immediate and adequate increases in their wages and salaries and expressly supports the demand of the plantation workers for the immediate grant of their Rs. 17/50 demand.

6. This United May Day Rally reminds the Government of its own promise to defend Democracy and to grant political rights to public servants and demands the grant without further delay of full trade union, political and civic rights to all workers who are denied such democratic rights.

7. This United May Day Rally of the United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions condemns the Government for the imposition of a State of Emergency on 8th January which continues up to date.

The State of Emergency continues in the context of an ever rising cost of living, scarcity of many types of goods and increasing unemployment enabling the Government to stifle any legitimate criticism on these burning issues and govern through the suspension of the Democratic rights and liberties of the People.

Accordingly, this May Day Rally calls for the immediate withdrawal of the State of Emergency.

8. This United May Day Rally extends May Day Greetings to the world's toilers and expresses its solidarity with the struggle of workers' organisations and mass organisations all over the world against exploitation and oppression and for the advancement of the interests of mankind.

This United May Day Rally hails in particular the grimly sustained struggle of the heroic people of Vietnam against the totally unjustified occupation of their country and the powerful and criminal onslaught upon them by the armed forces of the United States of America with the support of some of its allies. This United May Day Rally wholeheartedly endorses and supports the demand that has been raised throughout the world for the immediate cessation of imperialist, military intervention of the United States and its allies against the people of Vietnam and the withdrawal of their troops from Vietnam so that its people may be free to decide their future in what ever manner they deem fit.

We call upon all trade unions and persons interested in promoting the unity of the working class in defence of its rights and the advancement of its interests to join us in our United May Day Rally.

- *WORKERS UNITE FOR WORKERS' POWER*
- *NO STATE CONTROL OF TRADE UNIONS*
- *DEFEND JANUARY 8th VICTIMS*
- *FOR AN ALL ROUND WAGE INCREASE*

THE UNITED COMMITTEE OF CEYLON TRADE UNIONS

Prins Rajasooriya,
Secretary.

LETTER OF THE UCCTU TO THE PRIME MINISTER

221/1, Upper Chatham St.,
Colombo 1.
11th July, 1966.

The Hon. Dudley Senanayake,
Prime Minister,
Colombo.

Dear Sir,

Plantations and Banks Strikes

The United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions (UCCTU), of which we are the four constituent unions, was formed on 4th April 1966, in order that the four unions might consult together and collaborate with each other in a regular manner in relation to the problems and interests of the trade union movement and the working class of Ceylon in general and to take suitable joint action on any matter which calls for such action in the view of the four unions. What unites us is our common desire to act together in the interests of the workers of Ceylon without distinction of race, nationality, religion, language or political adherence.

Since the UCCTU was formed, two of our constituent unions, the Democratic Workers' Congress (DWC) and the Ceylon Bank Employees' Union (CBEU) have become involved in general strikes of their respective memberships, and each of these strikes affects a vital sector of our country's economy. In the circumstances, we feel that it would be most helpful to all concerned if representatives of our United Committee could meet you at a very early date, so that we may acquaint you directly and fully with our point of view in relation to both the strikes and the issues that have led to or arisen from them, before either or both of them lead to a situation in which all four unions may become directly involved.

We have thought it necessary to address you in this matter since we have reason to think that the powerful vested interests,

particularly those with centres in London, that are opposing any settlement of the two strikes, consistent with the interests of the workers of our country, appear to be utilising or seeking to utilise the dominant position they hold in our economy in order to force your Government to take action against the workers on strike which may result in a direct confrontation between the forces of the State and the forces of the organised trade union movement in this country. That such a situation may pave the way for an attempt to be made to set up a totalitarian regime in the open service of imperialist and capitalist vested interests in Ceylon is not unlikely. That it is already fervently desired by various reactionary groups within this country and outside it we have no doubt.

We, as organisations of the working class, are deeply convinced that it is absolutely essential to the interests of the workers of Ceylon that we preserve and extend the democratic rights and institutions of our people. It is for this reason that we are opposed to the continuance of the present State of Emergency, and will in any case resist to the utmost any attempt from any quarter to suppress the present strikes by the use of Emergency Powers.

Whatever may be the differences between your view-point and ours as to what is meant by the term "democracy", we appreciate the fact that you have not, up to now, acted in a manner which suggests that you intend to rely on Emergency Powers rather than on democratic methods to settle the two major strikes of the moment.

What disturbs us in relation to your Government's present handling of the general strike in the Banks is that pressure is being openly brought to bear upon your Government for the use of Emergency Powers to uphold nineteenth century notions of British employers as to their prerogatives, which they now describe as "unfettered discretion", and which they

insist is unquestionable. May we point out that a fundamental function of a trade union is to question and even to oppose by strike action any exercise of the legal rights of employers, however "unfettered" they may be in law, whenever such exercise is discriminatory or unfair or detrimental to the interests of the members of the Union.

In relation to the dispute of the CBEU with the Trincomalee District Co-operative Bank, we must point out that the Directors of the Bank have, in effect, refused to recognise the right of the staff of the Bank, who are members of the CBEU, to strike in pursuance of their legitimate demand for redress against the Manager of the Bank and for improvement in their terms and conditions of service. We cannot understand why your Government continues to tolerate this attitude.

In the matter of the plantations strike, what disturbs us is the fact that your Government appears to be following a policy of doing nothing to settle the strike, presumably in the hope or the belief that it will "fizzle out" through the financial exhaustion if not starvation of the workers involved.

The strike on the plantations is the first general wage struggle ever launched by the plantation workers in the history of this country. It is also a struggle which raises fundamental questions with regard to the exploitation of the resources of our country and its people by the immensely rich and powerful imperialist interests in Britain that dominate the tea and rubber trades and also the production of tea and rubber in all former British colonies.

You, yourself, found it necessary to point out recently that the whole pattern of international trade today was making the "richer nations richer and the poorer nations poorer". It may interest you to note, in this connection, the following report that appeared in the Financial Times, London on 7th November 1964:

"Pointing out that profits of the past three years have been in the £5m., £6m., and £7m. range, Mr. John Brooke Chairman of Brooke Bond & Co., says that pace is 'too hot to last and we shall be lucky' if present performance figures can be maintained".

You are no doubt aware that Brooke Bond (Ceylon) Ltd. purchases between one-third and one-half of Ceylon's total tea crop, and mainly the island's best teas. It was this Company's principal in London that was raking in profits at a rate of increase of a million pounds sterling an year in the period 1962/64 while the plantation workers of Ceylon were being denied any wage increase on the ground that the tea industry in Ceylon was declining in profitability.

The demand of the plantation workers for the grant of the Special Living Allowance of Rs. 17/50 is so eminently just, that even the Ceylon Estates Employers' Federation (CEEF), which serves as the mouth-piece of the companies that dominate our tea and rubber production, has largely limited its arguments against the grant of the demand to the argument that the cost of granting it cannot be borne by the tea and rubber industries. We are in possession of enough knowledge as to the actual operations of the so-called but essentially fictitious tea and rubber "market", as well as of the profits derived by most of the companies that operate in or through that market, to be able to challenge this argument with confidence. Furthermore, we are constrained to point out, in any case, that the Wages Boards are not the proper forum for a discussion of the real issues relating to the question of the grant of an adequate wage increase to the plantation workers on any basis. This fact is recognised even by the CEEF to the extent that whilst it insists that the proper place for a discussion of the demand for the Special Living Allowance of Rs. 17/50 is the Wages Board, it nevertheless has been engaged in protracted negotiations outside the Wages Board with the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) in regard to a demand, amongst others, for much bigger increases of the wages of plantation workers than the modest Rs. 17/50 demand for the Special Living Allowance. The fact that the C.W.C. has publicly opposed the strike and that its President, Mr. Thondaman, has not only got large proprietary interests in the tea plantations but is also a member of your Government Party may explain the preference of the CEEF to deal with his Congress alone, outside the Wages Board; but this is hardly consistent with its arguments
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FACTORS IN THE WORKING OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS IN CEYLON

by Dr. A. J. WILSON

THE NATION

MORE than any other independent state in South Asia among the former parts of the British Empire, Ceylon can justly claim to be a nation in a more complete sense than a mere geographical expression or an administrative entity. It is true that in the recent past there have been issues that have caused serious rifts between the different communities that constitute Ceylonese society. The contention here however is that despite these, and the differences that prevail in regard to race, language, culture, religion and caste, there is a basic loyalty among the different constituent elements to the concept of a Ceylonese nation. Controversial legislation has been enacted by various Governments since independence against Indian Estate Tamils, Ceylon Tamils, the Christians especially the Roman Catholics, but none of these important units of the Ceylonese nation has tried to look beyond Ceylon for a solution to its problems. All of them insist that they have a stake in the country and the solutions they seek are within the scope of the national framework. This fact augurs well for a constitutional system of government—presidential or parliamentary. The argument is that the parliamentary system is more fitting because discontent can make itself felt at the centres of power through pressures taking various forms, most important of which is the continuous fear that Cabinets face of a collapse of their majority should they fail to reconcile all these diverse and at times warring elements within the national framework. The national parties belonging to the Right, the Centre and the Left have realised this fact. Recent experience indicates that the policies they have attempted to frame in relation to race, language and religion have had to be more in the nature of compromises than the adoption of extremist positions. A presidential system which implies a fixed executive may not have been as successful in

effecting the subtle balances that the cabinet system has been able to achieve in the Ceylonese setting.

Almost every controversial national issue that has beset the country since independence has been decided by the adoption of a compromise. The problem of the Indian estate Tamil population was the first of these issues. Stringent legislation was framed by the D. S. Senanayake Government to impose rigorous conditions on those Indian estate Tamils seeking to obtain citizenship. The matter was however not considered closed due to agitation on the part of the organisations representing the Indian estate Tamil population, the Tamil Federal Party and most important of all, the refusal of the Government of India to accept the unilateral legislation of Mr. Senanayake's Government. As a result, the succeeding Prime Minister, Mr. Dudley Senanayake tried without success to come to a settlement with Mr. Nehru whereby the Government of India would have absorbed a little less than half the Indian estate Tamil population in the Island. His successor, Sir John Kotelawala came to an understanding with Mr. Nehru in 1953 to expedite the granting of citizenship to those Indian estate Tamils who were considered qualified, and to allow such qualified persons to elect four persons to the House of Representatives on a separate all-Island register. Mrs. Bandaranaike for her part despite the Sri Lanka Freedom Party's known opposition to the presence of Indian estate Tamils in Ceylon, recently concluded a Pact with Mr. Shastri to grant citizenship rights to 300,000 of the Indian estate Tamils. It might be remembered that Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike had once remarked that he would not rest satisfied till the last Indian had left the shores of Ceylon.

On the Tamil demand for federalism, the path followed again has been one of

compromise. All the major parties (even the United National Party which had once strongly opposed what it called the "division" of the country on racial lines) have now to come to accept the principle of some form of regional autonomy for the Tamil areas of north and east Ceylon. The differences between the Parties are now on the plane of the extent to which powers should be devolved.

It has been the same with language. The two major parties, in particular the United National Party, had originally envisaged a policy of Sinhalese as the only official language of the country and the relegation of the Tamil language to a very subordinate status. Now both (the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party) have veered round to the position of accepting the need to grant almost a demi-official status to the Tamil language.

In regard to religion, Roman Catholic opposition dissuaded the Sri Lanka Freedom Party Government from framing legislation to make education the sole monopoly of the State. Even the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party when it made a bid for power at the General Election of March 1960, perhaps in order not to antagonise the lower income salariat (many of whose members were Christians) compromised on the question of state monopoly over education. It was willing to permit private schools to exist but they would receive no financial assistance from the State.

None of the major parties have up to date accepted the demand that Buddhism should be made the State religion and its adherents be given favoured treatment. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and its coalition partner, the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party have however agreed to grant legislative recognition to the fact that Buddhism is the religion practised by the majority of the people. But at the same time they have said that they would guarantee freedom of worship to all alike and that there will be no discrimination on religious grounds.

In every one of these instances it might have paid better dividends to the major parties to have followed a policy of ex-

tremism. But there were other important considerations that had to be taken note of and the eventual policy was one of moderation.

THE ELECTORATE

The Ceylon electorate is the oldest democratic electorate in South Asia. It has enjoyed universal suffrage since 1931 and has up to date had experience of eight General Elections, all conducted in an orderly and constitutional manner. On three of these occasions, the electorate turned out Governments to instal others. It has come to appreciate the use of the vote as an instrument capable of exercising the sovereign will of the people. The national political parties for their part have also come to appreciate the maturity and political consciousness of the electorate.

The electorate has shown its maturity in that at every General Election since 1947, barring the exceptional circumstances which produced an inconclusive result in March 1960, it has realised the necessity of returning to Parliament a party with a clear mandate and an adequate majority to govern, despite the fact that there have been a multiplicity of parties at each General Election seeking as it were to distract the attention of the voter from his primary task. In 1947 it was the United National Party that was unmistakably indicated as the Party which the electorate wanted to be its Government. In 1952, the same party received more than a mandate. In 1956 it was the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (the People's United Front) which obtained a landslide victory. In July 1960 the electorate made amends for its lack of decision in March 1960 by giving the Sri Lanka Freedom Party a clear directive to form a government in its own right without recourse to coalition with any of the smaller parties. In 1965 the results were again unclear but the United National Party was in a strong lead.

The major parties have on many an occasion deferred to the wishes of the more articulate political forces in the electorate, abandoning a position they held earlier for another which the agitating majority demanded. Thus the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party up to 1955 were in favour of Sinhalese and

Tamil being the official languages of the country. They changed their stand when Sinhalese nationalist opinion made up its mind that Sinhalese alone should be the official language of the country. The Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party which until the other day stood for Sinhalese and Tamil as the official languages of the country has now changed its position, again, in deference to the volume of majority opinion expressed on the subject and has fallen in line with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party's stand on language.

On the question of the Indian estate Tamil population, the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party which had earlier advocated a liberal attitude to the problem now lauds the policies of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which are, incidentally, hardly different from those of the United National Party. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party had earlier made itself unacceptable to the Sinhalese rural electorate in view of its advocacy of the rights of the Indian estate Tamils and the Ceylon Tamils.

It has been the same with Buddhism. Parties which formerly insisted on following a policy of non-interference have changed to one in favour of granting special recognition to the religion of the majority. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party Manifesto at the General Elections of March and July 1960 did not propose any legislative measures to accord recognition to Buddhism. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party Government in 1965 in its last Throne Speech along with its Trotskyist allies, who had up to that time refused to involve themselves in the politics of religion proposed legislation for granting special recognition to Buddhism.

In economic matters it has been no different. One of the reasons for Mr. Dudley Senanayake's resignation in 1953 was the left wing organised revolt of the people against his Government's attempt to increase the price of subsidised rice. Sir John Kotelawala's Government became unpopular for, besides other reasons, the cuts it imposed on the social services. Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike resigned his portfolio of Finance in 1963 because the backbenchers of the Government Parliamentary Group who were under pressure from their

electorates refused to accept his proposal to tamper with the rice subsidy.

The way in which constituencies are demarcated, as prescribed in the Constitution, however seems to prevent the parliamentary system functioning in a truly democratic manner. This accounts in a way for some of the sudden changes of policy by the important parties referred to earlier. The basis of demarcation is one designed to provide weightage in representation to the backward and sparsely populated areas, in some of which the dominant population belongs to the minority groups. The system was deliberately devised so as to provide additional representation to the minority communities without the need to have recourse to separate communal electorates which it was felt would only emphasise divisive tendencies and inhibit the growth of a unified Ceylonese nation.

But the system in its actual working has been found to be disadvantageous to the "progressive-minded" urban voter as well as to the densely populated left-influenced western seaboard and the areas to the south of the Kelani Ganga, which have also been under left influence. The principle of one man one vote is not followed generally. The voting strengths of the various constituencies at General Elections provide evidence of this. At the General Election of 1947, out of 95 constituencies, there were 23 which returned members to Parliament with a voting strength of between, 40,000 to 60,000 while on the other hand there were 26 having between 5,000 and 25,000 voters. At the General Election of 1952, the disparities in voting strengths were more emphasised, as the Indian estate Tamils had, by the citizenship legislation of the D. S. Senanayake Government been taken off the voting lists and there had been no fresh demarcation of electorates. There were 25 constituencies having between 40,000 to 60,000 voters while there were as many as 31 constituencies with a voting strength of between 5,000 to 25,000. At the General Election of 1956, 38 members were returned from constituencies of between 40,000 and 60,000 voters and 25 were returned from constituencies having 5,000 to 25,000 voters. At the two General Elections of 1960, the number of

constituencies had been increased to 151 but here again the Delimitation Commission which was appointed in 1959 to undertake the demarcation of seats was directed to take into account the Indian estate Tamil population resident in the various Kandyan Sinhalese electoral districts when apportioning seats according to population. These Indian estate Tamils, however, did not have the right to vote.

This basis of demarcation has handicapped radical and left wing parties considerably. The rural voter has been suspicious of their economic programmes and their non-communal approaches to matters like language, religion, culture, race and caste. It placed the conservative United National Party at an advantage in the first General Election. Thereafter the Sri Lanka Freedom Party with its nationalist policies on language and religion proved a serious competitor to the United National Party. In later years this bias towards ruralism led even left wing parties to discard their marxism for a type of national socialism (not to be confused with Nazism). Thus Mr. Philip Gunawardene who was once the foremost Trotskyist in Ceylon politics now leads a Sinhalese Buddhist Socialist party. The Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party which until recently refused to get involved in the chauvinism of language and religion, having been admitted to the seats of power has now for electoral purposes accepted the policies of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party on language, religion and the Indian Question. In Ceylon therefore the rural voter has proved to be a conservatising influence on radical and even marxist parties.

Under our electoral system adequate opportunities have also been denied to the economic forces in the country to obtain their fair share of representation. This has again tended to interfere with the proper working of the parliamentary system. Foreign investors for instance control the most important sectors of the domestic economy but their representation in the House is hardly in proportion to their economic strength. The result is, as a commentator has remarked, "Parliament is often a stage where Hamlet is acted without the Prince—who lurks off-stage and prompts some of the actors." It is the

same with the wage-earners. They (this includes also the disfranchised Indian estate Tamil population) are responsible for producing approximately half the national wealth though they number only about one-eighth of the total population. But they do not have representation in Parliament even in proportion to their population strength. On the other hand the rural sector which contains roughly seventy per cent of the total population but produces less than half the national wealth has almost one hundred per cent weightage in the matter of representation.

Though the territorial principle is the basis for electoral demarcation (as opposed to the communal principle), in practice community, religion and sometimes caste are the dominant factors which determine the result in a constituency. Thus in the Tamil and Muslim majority areas of north and east Ceylon only a Tamil or a Muslim can hope to be returned to Parliament while in the South except in those electoral districts specially demarcated to help the Muslims, it is a Sinhalese who has the best chance. In certain constituencies, caste is a weighty consideration and the Parties nominate candidates with this fact very much in mind. No attempts have been made to get Sinhalese to contest seats in Tamil areas (except in a few marginal constituencies) or vice versa so that race is not a vital factor when a constituency has to make a choice. On a national basis, however, racial and religious considerations may sometimes play a part in persuading the electorate to choose one particular party in preference to another.

Communalism in the Sinhalese and Tamil electorates has been more a defensive weapon than an instrument of aggression. It has therefore not caused irreparable damage to national unity. There have been conflicts between the communities but time and sometimes political leadership have produced solutions.

POLITICAL PARTIES

It was unfortunate that at the time of independence there was only one well organised political party seeking the confidence of the electorate—the right of centre United National Party. It was more un-

fortunate that its only worthwhile opponent was the Left (the left wing parties contested a total of 51 seats out of 95 at the General Election of 1947 but they did not present themselves as a united front and in fact clashed with one another in a few constituencies, for between them there were fundamental differences and these prevented the working of the parliamentary system in the way it should have. The Right felt that no purpose would be served in co-operating with the Left because the Left's views on parliamentary democracy were only known too well. The Left on the other hand complained that the parliamentary system was not being worked in a democratic manner by the "over-confident" Right. So that even if there was some basis for co-operation, it was destroyed by the mutual suspicions of the two groups.

The emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in 1951 was therefore fortunate for it provided a democratic and parliamentary alternative to the United National Party. Besides, the rural voter who had been deprived of an effective choice in 1947 owing to the near monopoly position that the United National Party then had, was now presented with the opportunity of making a decision. Though at the General Election of 1952, he preferred the United National Party, in 1956 he voted in the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (the People's United Front) of which the Sri Lanka Freedom Party was the major component. In March 1960, he decisively rejected the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party which was for the first time in its history making a bid for parliamentary power, as well as the Buddhist socialist grouping led by Mr. Philip Gunawardene (this grouping took unto itself the name of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna) and veered towards the United National Party without however showing signs that he had made up his mind decisively. In July 1960 he chose to elect the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. In 1965 the United National Party was preferred.

Up to 1956 the major parties maintained their national character. Their policies and election manifestos provided adequate evidence of this fact. 1956 however proved a dividing line. At the General Election of that year, the United National Party abandoned its national standing when it opted for a policy of Sinhalese as

the only official language of Ceylon to the exclusion of the Tamil language. By 1958 however the Party re-established its position as a national party when at its annual sessions, it decided that in its language policy, provision should be made for the use of Tamil. Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party too changed its stand from Sinhalese and Tamil as the official languages of the country to Sinhalese as the only official language but it stated that provision should be made for the "reasonable use of Tamil". Mr. Bandaranaike later agreed to the principle of some form of regional autonomy for the Tamil areas of north and east Ceylon. The United National Party until the other day strongly opposed this as a step towards the division of the country on racial lines. It has however now accepted the principle.

On religion, both parties have tried to steer clear of the demand that Buddhism should be made the state religion. Both recognise however the need to take note of the fact that Buddhism is the religion practised by the majority of the people in the country, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party to a greater extent than the United National Party.

The Left has accepted the position that the Tamil language should be granted an adequate measure of recognition. It had earlier refused to get involved in religious matters but has now accepted the Sri Lanka Freedom Party's stand on Buddhism.

Thus the major political forces in the country though at times adopting policies which might be described as biased in favour of the Sinhalese have nevertheless tried to preserve their national character by recognising the fact that there are other groups in the country whose claims have to be given some consideration.

There are communal forces too in both communities. The Jatika Vimukthi Peramuna (the National Liberation Front) and Mr. Philip Gunawardene's Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (the People's United Front) stand for a policy of extreme Sinhalese Buddhist communalism. But they have so far not made any impression on the electorate. This is evidence at any rate of the fact that the electorate is national-minded at least to some extent.

It is the aggrieved Tamil minority however which has come to rely on the Federal Party to express its disapproval of the communal policies of the major parties. The Federal Party has on occasion employed extra-parliamentary methods of protest to obstruct the Governments which have been implementing communal policies. This does not help the parliamentary system. The major parties have taken note of this and have tried to evolve policies which might not lead to the permanent alienation of the Tamil minority.

THE GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

Next to the Cabinet this is the most important policy-deciding and policy-confirming agency, more important in fact in many respects than the executive committee, working committee or the annual sessions of the Party in power. It does not merely include the members of the majority party in the legislature but also the six Appointed Members (under the Constitution they are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister, after a General Election to represent unrepresented or inadequately represented interests in the House of Representatives) who in theory are supposed to be independent but in fact have, except on one or two occasions, always supported the Governments in office, and those Independent Members and the smaller parties which have decided to throw in their lot with the Government.

In 1947 the United National Party obtained 42 seats in a House of 101 members. The six Appointed Members provided the Government with some stability. A fair number of Independent Members who had successfully contested United National Party candidates at the Elections also joined the Government Parliamentary Group to give the Government the overall majority that it needed. Later the majority section of the Tamil Congress decided to co-operate with Mr. D. S. Senanayake and entered the Government Parliamentary Group. When Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and a few other supporters of the Government crossed the floor of the House in 1951, it seemed as if the Government's fate was in the balance but the support of the Appointed Members enabled it to maintain its majority.

In 1952, the United National Party obtained a majority of seats in the legislature, but the Government Parliamentary Group continued to have in it members of the Tamil Congress, a few Independent Members and the six Appointed Members.

In 1956, the Government Parliamentary Group comprised the members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Mr. Philip Gunawardene's marxist grouping, a few Independent Members and the six Appointed Members.

In July 1960 the Sri Lanka Freedom Party obtained 75 of the 151 seats in the House of Representatives but the Government Parliamentary Group provided the majority with the six Appointed Members and a number of Independent Members.

Generally at the beginning of each week during which the House meets the Government Parliamentary Group assembles to discuss Government business for the week. The members of the Cabinet and very often the Prime Minister are present and are called upon to explain important policy matters and proposed legislation. Resolutions are usually moved by the more active members and if passed are acted upon by individual ministers or the Cabinet, as the case may be. Not seldom ministers are criticised for not implementing the Group's decisions or for inefficient handling of their departmental affairs.

Proposed legislation is an important item of discussion at the Group's meetings. During 1947 to 1952, when Mr. D. S. Senanayake was Prime Minister, the Group tended to accept the decisions of the Prime Minister on controversial issues, once he had explained the reasons for the Cabinet's decision on such matters. With Mr. Dudley Senanayake, there were occasions when the Group asserted itself but this did not happen very often. Under Sir John Kotelawala, the Cabinet at times made its decisions after ascertaining the views of the Group. This was because on controversial issues there had been occasions when the Group had differed with the Cabinet. During Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's premiership, the Government Parliamentary Group tended at times to revoke the decisions of the Cabinet.

The original draft of the Official Language Act had the approval of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet but was rejected by the Group. The Cabinet had therefore to present another draft which was more in accordance with the wishes of the majority of members in the Group. The Paddy Lands Bill and the Cooperative Development Bank Bill both of which were the handiwork of Mr. Bandaranaike's marxist Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Philip Gunawardene and had the support of the Prime Minister were modified as a result of the intervention of the Government Parliamentary Group. There has been the same tendency in the case of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party Government elected in 1960. There was however an important change in the Cabinet's way of handling the Group. Before the Cabinet made up its mind on important matters, it sought the views of the Group. Individual ministers had therefore to present their proposals before the Group before putting them up to the Cabinet. The various drafts of the Press Bills that were the responsibility of the first Minister of Justice in Mrs. Bandaranaike's Government were all rejected by the Government Parliamentary Group for various reasons. The decision of the Minister of Finance to tamper with the rice subsidy in 1963 was severely criticised by the Group. This was however a cabinet decision which had the strong support of the Prime Minister. But faced with a growing revolt from members of the Parliamentary Group, the Cabinet decided to drop the proposal when the Group, by a majority vote expressed its opposition to it.

THE OPPOSITION

The country has been fortunate in having a vigilant and capable Opposition able to make the best use of parliamentary techniques to expose, criticise and at times seriously embarrass the Government. One distinct advantage from the point of view of parliamentary government is that the office of Leader of the Opposition is recognised under our system. The Leader is provided a salary and has rooms in the House of Representatives. By convention the leader of the largest group in opposition has come to be recognised as the Leader of the Opposition. Members of the different Opposition groups however formally meet and elect the Leader.

For a few years after the General Election of 1947, the Opposition could not make up its mind about electing a leader and this created difficulties for the Government, especially in the matter of the arrangement of parliamentary business. The delay in deciding on a Leader was because the three marxist parties in the Opposition, the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party, the Trotskyist Bolshevik Sama Samaja Party and the Stalinist Communist Party were not able to come to any agreement on the subject. The Speaker had his own problems as a result of this deadlock and on a number of occasions stated that he would take on himself the responsibility of nominating the Leader. By 1950 the two Trotskyist groups had composed their differences and on 23rd June (1950) the Speaker announced to the House that the leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party had been elected Leader of the Opposition. The situation was however somewhat anomalous because the Leader of the Opposition is expected to be the alternative Prime Minister. At the General Election of 1947 however the Lanka Sama Samaja Party had contested only 28 seats in a House of 95 elected members and had thus not made a clear bid for power. Even after the General Election when sections of the Opposition were conferring on the possibility of forming an alternate Government, as the United National Party had not obtained an absolute majority of seats in the House, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party leaders declared that they would support any progressive measures that such a Government might put forward but that they would not participate in the formation of that Government. Their position was that they would prefer to wait till it was possible for them to form a workers' and peasants' government in their own right. The Party was also not certain in its own mind as to whether the parliamentary system was the one which it would utilise to implement its policies should it succeed in winning the confidence of the electorate.

This unwillingness to respect the parliamentary system caused frustration and anger in the minds of the United National Party Government. As a result, the Government showed reluctance to accommodate members of the Trotskyist Opposition even in regard to non-controversial

motions that its members introduced in the House. The Chief Government Whip issued a directive that all motions of the Trotskyist or Stalinist members should be opposed irrespective of their merits. If they were useful, they could be introduced in a subsequent session by a member of the Government Parliamentary Group.

In the 1952 Parliament, the situation improved considerably. The Leader of the Opposition was the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party which had made a bid for power at the General Elections having campaigned on a nationwide basis and contested 48 seats in a House of 95 elected members. Besides the Sri Lanka Freedom Party was a party of the Centre and was committed to working the parliamentary system of government. The United National Party Government was therefore in a better frame of mind to grant the leader of the Opposition any reasonable requests that he made. What is more, the Prime Minister in 1953 had consultations with the Leader of the Opposition before he went to New Delhi to negotiate a settlement with Mr. Nehru on the question of the stateless Indian estate Tamil population in Ceylon. There was less of acrimony and more of give and take between Government and Opposition during the period of this Parliament.

After the General Elections of 1956 an anomalous situation presented itself again. The leading opponent of the Government had been the United National Party. But though it had polled many more votes than any of the other parties in the Opposition, it had obtained only 8 seats and was therefore out of the running for the Leadership of the Opposition. If looked at from a realistic and practical angle, the leader of the United National Party should have been the Leader of the Opposition. The largest groups in the Opposition were the Tamil Federal Party and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party had however contested the election on the basis of a no-contest mutual aid electoral alliance with the governing party. Its proper place was therefore not on the Opposition benches. Besides, again, as in all the preceding General Elections, the Party had only contested a minority of the seats. However, the Lanka Sama Samaja

Party decided to sit in opposition and its leader staked a claim for the Leadership of the Opposition. An attempt was also made on behalf of the Tamil Federal Party to have its leader elected as Leader of the Opposition, again an anomalous situation—for the leader of the Federal Party was the leader of only a communal minority party which had no aspirations whatsoever of wanting to obtain the reins of government. The leader of the Federal Party however withdrew from the contest and the leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party was eventually elected Leader of the Opposition. It should be noted that the Lanka Sama Samaja Party had contested only 21 seats at the General Election and won 14, polling in all 274,204 votes. The United National Party on the other hand contested 76 seats winning 8 but polling a total of 738,551 votes. During this Parliament, there was a friendly atmosphere in the relations between the Government and the Opposition. Although the leader of the Opposition was a marxist, the Prime Minister, Mr. Bandaranaike, was mindful of the fact that he had won the election as a result of the cooperation that the Leader of the Opposition had extended to him during the General Election campaign.

In the short Parliament of 1960, the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Mr. C. P. de Silva was Leader of the Opposition. When the minority United National Party Government of Mr. Dudley Senanayake was defeated, Mr. C. P. de Silva staked a claim for the premiership, as the leader of the next largest national party. He was summoned by the Governor-General and was consulted about the possibility of a stable alternate government being formed.

In the July 1960 Parliament, the United National Party as the largest party in Opposition had its leader as the Leader of the Opposition. The Leader of the Opposition showed considerable skill in dealing with the Government during this Parliament, choosing the correct moment to move votes of censure on the Government and to cause it maximum embarrassment. During this Parliament too there was accommodation of the Opposition by the Government. The Prime Minister had consultations with the Leader of the Opposition

when she concluded a Pact with the Indian Prime Minister on the question of the stateless Indian minority. In fact she claimed that before she signed the agreement she made known its terms to the Leader of the Opposition.

THE MINISTRY

This comprises the members of the Cabinet and Parliamentary Secretaries who are appointed to assist Ministers in their departmental functions. All Ministers are members of the Cabinet.

Given the multi-communal conditions of Ceylonese society, the Ministry of necessity must be a representative body. In fact up to 1956 it was national in character in having in it, representatives of all the important groups in the country. The United National Party Governments made certain that there were at least two members of the Ceylon Tamil community in the Cabinet. From 1956 to 1965 due to the enactment of the Official Language Act, no Ceylon Tamil has served in the Cabinet or functioned as a Parliamentary Secretary. In 1965 however with the formation of Mr. Dudley Senanayake's Government, a Tamil was once again appointed to the Cabinet. Every Ministry up to date has, however, had in it representatives of the Kandyan Sinhalese, the Muslim Community, the Christian faith (sometimes Roman Catholics, on other occasions Protestants) and of the more important caste groups in the country. This method of Cabinet construction enables the Government to draw support from as wide a source as possible. Besides, there is the danger to the Government that if any of these communities are ignored, its (the Government's) rivals may exploit the situation and persuade the entire community to vote against the Government at the next General Election.

The ascendancy of the Prime Minister is an established fact in Ceylon politics. He is a national figure. Though he might at times be responsible for implementing sectarian policies, he is nevertheless looked upon by every section of society as a possible arbiter. The United National Party Prime Ministers were in this sense more representative than those of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike despite his language policies was regarded as one who could rise above the

communal conflict. Mrs. Bandaranaike did not however enjoy the same standing among members of the Ceylon Tamil community. Besides, she became too closely identified with the Kandyan Sinhalese community in view of the bias she displayed in favour of members of that community when making important appointments (she herself belongs to an important Kandyan Sinhalese family). There was criticism that the low-country Sinhalese were not being given the consideration that was their due.

The Prime Minister enjoys a fair amount of patronage in the political sphere and he exercises this to the advantage of his party, his government and also to improve the national character of his government. In selecting men for ministerial office and parliamentary secretaryships and when advising the Governor-General to make appointments to the Senate and to the House of Representatives, he has these facts very much in mind. Some Prime Ministers have been known to preserve their small majority in the House of Representatives by deliberately increasing the number of ministers and parliamentary secretaries in their administration. The clearest example was Mr. Bandaranaike. In his second administration, when his majority had dwindled considerably, it was noted that a little less than half the members of the Government Parliamentary Group had one office or another. Mr. D. S. Senanayake had also an inflated administration due again to the slimness of his majority.

It is the Prime Minister who advises the Governor-General to summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament.

Prorogation was a device often employed by Prime Ministers after 1956 to give them the opportunity in the interval to re-coup their falling majorities. What was objectionable was that the period of prorogation was for an unusual length of time. The Opposition alleged that the Government did not wish to face the House for fear of being defeated, and that important business which had to be dealt with was being unduly postponed. The Government's spokesmen on the other hand argued that Ministers had to get through important departmental work and they needed breathing space for this. In fact Mrs. Bandaranaike explaining the reasons

for the long period of prorogation of Parliament in the early part of 1964 said that the time of the Government was being wasted in procedural wrangles and obstructionist tactics by the Opposition in Parliament when there was a great deal of urgent work to be done. The real reason however was that the Government's majority had become precarious and time was needed by the Cabinet to take stock of the situation and to explore the possibilities of coalescing with one of the smaller groups. Mr. Bandaranaike too prorogued Parliament on a number of occasions when his majority seemed to be at stake. The United National Party Prime Ministers in the period 1947 to 1956 on the other hand did not need to have recourse to prorogation for they either had stable majorities or made certain that they built up their majority by a wise use of the patronage at their disposal.

The weapon of dissolution has sometimes proved an effective means of disciplining the House. In 1947, when Mr. D. S. Senanayake had only the support of 42 United National Party members and the 6 Appointed Members in the House of Representatives (which had a membership of 101), it was said in political circles that he was contemplating a dissolution if he was defeated in the House. The mere threat however served to persuade the fairly large number of Independent Members to support Mr. Senanayake. Even a minority Prime Minister has presumably the right to be granted a dissolution. In April 1960 when Mr. Dudley Senanayake's minority administration was convincingly defeated in the House, he was granted his request for a dissolution. Earlier, in December 1959, when it seemed clear beyond all doubt that Mr. Dahanayake was losing his majority in the House and the confidence of his own Sri Lanka Freedom Party, he decided to appeal to the country, and the Governor-General acceded to his request for a dissolution.

The Cabinet in many ways depends on the Prime Minister for leadership, for the settlement of differences between Ministers, for the laying down of policy on controversial issues and for the solving of national problems relating to matters like language, religion and even major trade union disputes. In 1953, it was Mr. Dudley Senanayake, the

Prime Minister of the time who was called upon to deal with the grave situation resulting from the Government's decision to increase the price of rice. In 1955, Sir John Kotelawala had to resolve the crisis caused by the United National Party's stand on Sinhalese and Tamil as the official languages of the country. In the period 1956 to 1959, Mr. Bandaranaike had to placate the Tamils and handle the forces of Sinhalese extremism. Many strikes during this period were only settled after his intervention.

The Prime Minister for his part enforces discipline among his colleagues and expects loyal service from them. Most Prime Ministers however have not been successful in enforcing discipline.

Mr. D. S. Senanayake had a problem in Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike when he functioned as his deputy in the Cabinet. Mr. Bandaranaike was out of step with the rest of the Cabinet and made no secret of this. But Mr. Senanayake could not discipline him because of Mr. Bandaranaike's standing at that time in the Government Parliamentary Group. The Prime Minister finally issued a note on the principles of collective responsibility to all the members of the Cabinet but this did not improve the situation.

Mr. Dudley Senanayake found it difficult to manage Sir John Kotelawala who had been an unsuccessful candidate for the premiership at the time of Mr. Senanayake's appointment.

When Sir John Kotelawala became Prime Minister, the unsuccessful candidate for the premiership at the time, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene did not appear to give his fullest cooperation to the Prime Minister. Besides, during his premiership, there was clear evidence that the Cabinet was not functioning as a team. Many of the ministers did not appear to be impressed with the Prime Minister's abilities as a national leader.

Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike enjoyed a certain pre-eminence among his colleagues but since his Cabinet was a coalition, he had to settle the differences that very often arose between the marxist wing and the Sri

Lanka Freedom Party wing in his Cabinet. Mr. Bandaranaike too had to circulate a note on collective responsibility when the rival groups in his Cabinet began making contradictory public statements. In 1959, he was confronted with a strike organised by the majority section in his Cabinet. This section refused to attend cabinet meetings unless the Prime Minister dismissed his marxist Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Philip Gunawardene. The Prime Minister failed to break the deadlock and had to eventually give in to the demand of the majority section.

Mrs. Bandaranaike too had difficulties with her ministers. During the earlier part of her premiership, an influential group of ministers presented her with a petition requesting her to dismiss her nephew, Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike who was the Minister of Finance. These ministers seemed to have apprehensions about Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike's rapid ascendancy. During the crisis in August 1963 over the proposal of Mr. Dias Bandaranaike to tamper with the rice subsidy and when the Prime Minister insisted on supporting him, the majority of her ministers indicated to her that they were prepared for a showdown. The Prime Minister then had to accept the views of the majority of her Cabinet. In December 1964 the

Prime Minister suffered a defeat in the House on the Throne Speech because her deputy, Mr. C. P. de Silva disapproved of the coalition that she had entered into with the Trotskyists.

On balance however, it might be said that despite all these shortcomings, the Cabinet has functioned satisfactorily as an instrument for carrying out the policies of the party in power. Most of the ministers who served in the pre-1956 cabinets had had a long period of apprenticeship starting from the period of executive committees under the Donoughmore Constitution, which was the Constitution under which Ceylon was governed from 1931 to 1947. These ministers were therefore able to discharge their responsibilities efficiently. Mr. Bandaranaike's first cabinet suffered from inexperience. But the succeeding Sri Lanka Freedom Party Cabinets have had the necessary training to enable them to carry out their duties satisfactorily. It is true that not all Cabinets have functioned as a collective entity but here again the dominant role of the Prime Minister in our political life has resulted in the electorate and Parliament looking to the Prime Minister for policy statements when there have been differences among his cabinet colleagues.

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| | The Revolution Betrayed, Pioneers p. 292 | 452. Speech to Moscow Soviet, April 23 1918. CW XXVII, pp 231-2 |
| | The Permanent Revolution p. 115 et seq | 453. Chief Tasks of our Day, Mar 11-1918 |
| 439 | Revolution Betrayed p. 292 | 454. 3rd Intl. and its place in Hist. On Britain. p. 394 |
| 440 | <i>Lenin</i> : Development of Capitalism in Russia, Moscow Edn. p. 659. | 455. The National Liberation Movement in the East p. 223 |
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| 446. | Ibid VIII 208 | 461. CW 23-79 |
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| 448. | Ibid VII 206 | 463. <i>Trotsky</i> : History of the Russian Revolution p. 1246 |
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| 450. | Ibid X 254 | 465. Ibid p. 308 |
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SOME IMPRESSIONS OF BULGARIA

by Dr. GEORGE WICKREMANAYAKE

To form a correct idea of the progress made by socialist countries one must travel not only in the socialist countries but also in the most highly industrialised capitalist countries. I had the good fortune of being able to travel in August last year (1965) from the Federal Republic of Germany (which I shall, for convenience, call 'West Germany') to Bulgaria and Odessa. Next to USA West Germany is the most highly industrialised country in the capitalist sector. Bulgaria is one of the more backward countries in the socialist sector; it is, for example, not so highly industrialised as Rumania or Poland. Odessa is a sea-port in the Soviet Union which, next to Czechoslovakia is the most highly industrialised country in the socialist sector.

In this article and the next I shall record my impressions of Bulgaria and Odessa, comparing them sometimes with West Germany and sometimes with Ceylon.

Even before the 20th congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union East European countries exported their agricultural products to western Europe. I remember eating Bulgarian tomatoes and Hungarian paprika in West Germany in 1955. After the 20th party congress the Soviet government, which had prevented countries like Czechoslovakia from accepting Marshall Aid soon after the end of the second imperialist world war, began to relax its grip on its satellite countries. The satellite countries began to enter into closer cultural and trade relations¹ with industrialised capitalist countries and to increase their exports into these countries in an attempt to earn enough foreign exchange for buying the machinery and raw materials which they need for industrialisation.²

A socialist country can also get foreign exchange by the 'import' of tourists from capitalist countries; and the USSR and other countries in the socialist sector (including China) now compete with each other in trying to attract tourists. About 1958 Bulgaria began to build hotels along its Black Sea coast with the aim of turning it into the Riviera of Eastern Europe. Literally dozens of hotels, some of which are ten or twelve-storeyed buildings, have come up, and new hotels are still being built, in places like Sonnenstrand, Druschba and Goldstrand.

Thousands of tourists are flown from West European countries to Bulgaria every month during the six months of the year in which it is warm enough to bathe in the Black Sea. It is only a small minority of tourists who travel by car to Bulgaria.

I flew with a party of West German tourists from Hannover to Varna which is a sea-port in Bulgaria. My trip was arranged by a West German travel-agency to which I paid a lump sum to cover the cost of a room, food and visa.

Immediately on landing at Varna I was given a visa. With it I could travel anywhere within Bulgaria or go on an excursion to Bukarest (in Rumania), Istanbul (in Turkey) or Odessa, provided that my tour was arranged by a West European travel agency or by the Bulgarian Government Tourist Bureau or by a travel agency called Balkan Tourist. It is possible, and much cheaper, to travel on one's own. But if one wants to go alone from Bulgaria to another country in the socialist sector one is required to get a separate visa. A German woman who booked a passage to Odessa on a Russian cargo-boat was required to apply for a Russian visa which she thought would not cost her more than ten West German marks.

On landing at Varna I was given enough money in Bulgarian currency to pay for my food. I was therefore free to eat anywhere I liked.

There was no customs examination when I arrived at Varna from Germany or before I left Varna for Germany.

I was taken by 'bus from the air-port at Varna to Druschba where I had booked a room in a new hotel which had been opened only a month before my arrival. The fittings and the paint-work were not as good as in West German hotels but each room had its own balcony, bath-room and lavatory. There were at least ten other hotels in Druschba. But Bulgaria had so many tourists last year that some of them had to be accommodated in the rest-homes that have been built for workers. There are also camping-places for those who want to sleep in cars, caravans, tents or in the open air.

In addition to hotels Druschba has also shops, a cinema, a hospital, a post office, a night-club and four large restaurants. Druschba is relatively quiet. Other health resorts have many more cinemas restaurants and night clubs, and Goldstrand has also a casino.

Tourists who come by car are allowed to drive wherever they like. There are also cars for hire. A tourist who does not want, or is unable to drive is given a driver. The driver is paid a fixed salary by the state and the tourist has to pay only for his lodging and food.

Facilities are provided for playing tennis and volley-ball and for hunting and fishing. But the favourite occupations of the majority of tourists are sun and sea-bathing.

Druschba has not got a long broad beach like Goldstrand. But it has four large bays in which tourists bathe. Changing rooms, showerbaths and lavatories have been built in each of them. In all of them there are sun-shades, air-mattresses and boats of all kinds for hire: sailing-and rowing-boats, dingies, canoes and boats for pedalling

with the feet like a bicycle. One of these bays has two enclosed spaces in one of which men sunbathe naked and in the other women.

Druschba, like some of the other health-resorts in Bulgaria, has hot springs. The water is made to pass upwards through a pipe and come down like a large fountain under which people stand or sit. German and Austrian tourists believe that these hot springs are beneficial for those who suffer from rheumatism, and a Bulgarian doctor told me that they cure skin-diseases.³

One could breakfast in one's hotel but lunch and dinner could be had only in the restaurants. Most tourists preferred to have their breakfast also in the restaurants where they could meet tourists from other hotels—tourists from the capitalist sector as well as from the socialist sector. Tourists from the socialist sector, if they had travelled together in a group, were required to eat together always at the same restaurant and had to be satisfied with what was given them. Tourists from the capitalist sector could eat in any restaurant they liked and order any dish that was on the menu.

Germans from West Germany did not live in the same hotels as Germans from the German Democratic Republic (which I shall, for convenience, call 'East Germany'). Exchange rates are more favourable to the West German than to the east German mark, and tourists from East Germany cannot afford to live in the better hotels. East Germans generally travel in large parties. An East German can travel alone to Bulgaria only if he or she receives an invitation from a Bulgarian.

Food was cheaper than in West Germany. Fish was scarce. But one could, if one liked, order eggs, beef, mutton, sausages, pork and chicken for every meal. The Bulgarians eat plenty of bread but very little rice or potato. All the vegetables and fruits that are found in Europe, except citrus fruits, were available. Yoghurt,⁴ which is made from milk and resembles our curd, could be had even for breakfast.

Coffee is imported from Israel and Cuba and tastes differently from the coffee that is drunk in West Germany. One can drink either English or Russian tea. I first tried the English tea and found it to be weak. After that I drank Russian tea with lemon.⁵ Tourists are allowed to bring with them the tea and the coffee they are accustomed to drink at home. The waiter brings them a pot of hot water and they pour their own tea or coffee at table.

With one's lunch or dinner one can drink aerated waters, lemon juice or wine or beer. Beer imported from East Germany or Czechoslovakia is better than Bulgarian beer. But Bulgarian wines, white as well as red wines, are very good.

The money that tourists receive in Bulgarian currency at the air-port is enough only for their food. If they want to drink beer or wine or buy anything in one of the shops they have to change some of their foreign exchange into Bulgarian currency. But before they leave the country they are allowed to change any Bulgarian money they have left back again into their own currency.

Waiters in the restaurants speak English, French or German in addition to Russian. Pupils of secondary schools and university student, who have a knowledge of modern languages work as receptionists in hotels or as interpreters in restaurants during the summer vacation.

The lavatories of restaurants built in health resorts for tourists are tolerably clean but lavatories in other restaurants are very dirty. The lavatories of even small restaurants in West Germany are cleaner than the lavatories of restaurants that have been specially built for tourists in Bulgaria.

A band plays in each restaurant in the evening and one can dance not only foxtrots, waltzes, and tangos but also the chachacha, twist, shake and a community dance, called the Penguin dance, from one of the Scandinavian countries.

I once shared a table with a Russian, Bulgarian, and a Hungarian. The three of them conversed in Russian. As I know no Russian I spoke English to the Bulgarian, German to the Russian and French to the Hungarian. The Bulgarian and Hungarian were students. The Russian had finished his studies and was doing research on electronics. He said that Mrs. Bandaranayake was a great stateswoman and that it was a pity that she lost the elections. I tried to draw him into a discussion on Vietnam. But all he said was that the situation in Vietnam was difficult.

A Bulgarian woman told me that it was the general practice in Bulgaria to buy a piece of land and build a house. But though she had worked as a doctor for fourteen years she had not been able to save enough money to buy a piece of land. The government tells the people to work harder and make contributions for Cuba and the Congo. The result is that she has not got very much money.

I once sat to dinner with a Bulgarian lawyer and a woman who was a school-teacher. She told me that she taught Marxism-Leninism in school. I asked her: "Are you really interested in politics?" and she replied: "One has to be interested in politics if one is to be a school teacher". I then said: "In East Germany not only school children and university-students but also factory and office-workers are compelled to attend classes on Marxism. But the experience of East Germany has taught me that the compulsory teaching of Marxism does not make a man a Marxist any more than the compulsory teaching of scripture makes a man a Christian". She laughed and said: "You are right".

When I ordered grapes for dessert the lawyer said: "One of my relations has a piece of land on which he grows grapes of all kinds". I asked him: "Can a person buy and own land in Bulgaria, and, if so, how much?" "Yes", he said, "one can buy and own anything up to five dekar's".

A Bulgarian woman had told me that materials like nylon and helanca are made in Bulgaria. The lawyer also said that Bulgaria produces textiles some of which, according to him, are exported to Britain. Cotton is grown in Bulgaria. But as Bulgarian cotton is not very good textiles are made from a

mixture of Bulgarian cotton and imported Egyptian cotton.⁷ Bulgaria, he said, has all the metal⁸ it needs for industrialisation, produces its own agricultural machinery and builds ships.⁹

I visited the town of Varna which is only nine kilometers¹⁰ away from Druschba. It is a sea-port in the Black Sea and has shipyards in which ships are built. In the middle of the town is a large park which stretches for about three kilometers on either side of the main road. Varna has a Marine Institute, a university and an aquarium with a good collection of coral and other animals that live in water.

I went round the shops at Varna. The metal-work was good, particularly the necklaces, bangles and brooches made in the ancient Bulgarian style. Very little of the jewellery was made of gold, silver and precious stones. I bought a metal ashtray which had one of the traditional designs engraved on it. The pottery¹¹ was on the whole better than ours. I saw tumblers and liqueur—and wine-glasses and jugs made of pottery. They were not glazed but had been painted over in different designs. There were also fruit-bowls, dishes and plates made of wood and attractively painted with a thin paint. One could also buy cushion-covers, table-cloths, serviettes and handkerchiefs made of hand-woven cloth and beautifully painted or embroidered.

Textiles made in Bulgaria are not as good as textiles made in West Germany. Clothes and shoes are neither durable nor elegant. A Polish woman looked at the clothes I was wearing and said: "West Germany is very modern". Fur-coats were cheap. A Polish woman said that fur-coats in Poland were better made but cost three times as much as Bulgarian fur-coats. A West German woman told me that fur-coats made in West Germany were superior to those made in Bulgaria.

Not only clothes but also cigarettes and cosmetics made in USA and Western Europe are better than those made in Bulgaria. There are special shops which sell goods from western countries. But they have to be paid for in dollars, sterling, francs or West German marks. One Bulgarian woman said that she needed thirty West German marks to buy a bathing costume. Another said that she did not have enough foreign exchange to buy cosmetics and cigarettes. Some Bulgarians get foreign exchange by changing money for tourists, or receive gifts of foreign exchange from tourists.

Industrial products are scarce, expensive and not of a very good quality. But agricultural products are plentiful and cheap.

Because I could not find a seat on a plane I was not able to visit Sofia which is today the capital of Bulgaria. But I went on an excursion with other tourists to the former capital Tarnovo. As it is about 250 kilometers away from Varna I was able on this trip to form a good idea of the Bulgarian countryside. Since the road is too narrow for large buses and has a number of hair-pin bends we were taken to Tarnovo in six small buses. One of them was a Volkswagen bus. The engine of the bus

in which I travelled had been made in Italy and the body in Jugoslavia.

The country is predominantly agricultural. I saw vineyards and fields of wheat and maize. Maize is eaten by men but is chiefly used for cattle-food. After the wheat is harvested the stubble is burnt on the fields. I saw large areas planted with sugar-beet and sunflower from which cooking-oil is made. Sugar-beet is grown in Ghana, can be grown in Ceylon and, unlike sugar-cane, does not need to be protected against elephants. Sunflower seeds are roasted and sold in packets. They taste rather like pea-nuts but are much smaller. Potatoes, fruits, vegetables and tobacco are also extensively grown. Though cigarettes are made from the tobacco Bulgarians told me that they prefer smoking imported cigarettes, chiefly because no filter-cigarettes are made in Bulgaria.

I saw carriages and carts drawn by horses.¹² Horses are also used for farm work and for riding. Sheep are kept for mutton and for wool. I also saw men riding on donkeys or travelling in small carts drawn by donkeys. Donkeys are bred not only because they can be used as beasts of burden but also because their flesh is used for making sausage.

On the way to Tarnovo we saw a small industrial township where factories had been built. Our guide told us apologetically that Bulgaria is still very backward and did not have very much industry as it was only after the victorious revolution against fascism in 1944 that a beginning had been made with industrialisation.

A Bulgarian woman told me: "We are a poor country". I replied "I know why you are poor. Your country was first plundered by the Germans and then by the Russians". "Yes", she said: "and before that we were ruled by the Turks for five hundred years".

I had the opportunity of visiting a collective farm not far from Varna. I was told, but cannot remember, the size of this farm. It had a few horses and a large number of pigs, cows and hens. The cows, I noticed, were being milked electrically, as in Mahaberiyatenne. The hens were chiefly white Leghorns.

The collective farm had tractors and a husking-machine. The equipment used was on the whole simple. Many of the cages in which the hens laid their eggs had been made of packing cases. The doors of the cages were kept in place not by a bolt or a lock but by a long bent nail. A German tourist told me: "Everything here is primitive. We have even conveyor belts on our poultry farms". But though the equipment was not modern the hens laid their eggs.

The manager of the collective farm informed us that the peasants who had given their land to the collective were each allowed to keep back five dekar (i.e. half a hektar) and a couple of cows for their own use. They could cultivate these five dekar and sell the produce, at a profit or at a loss as the

case may be, on the free market. Each peasant had sold his livestock to the collective which paid him a fixed wage.

I could not ask the manager from where the collective got the money for buying the livestock from the peasants who entered the collective. A collective in Czechoslovakia, which I visited about ten years ago, had paid for the livestock with money which it had borrowed from a bank and then paid it back to the bank in instalments.

The manager told us that there had been thousands of small farms before the revolution. But they now had in Bulgaria a few hundred collective farms and a few dozen state-farms. The difference between a state-farm and a collective farm, he explained, is that a state-farm is owned by the state while a collective farm is owned, not by the state, but by the collective, i.e. it is jointly owned by those farmers who have each given up a piece of land and agreed to combine and farm as one unit the land which they have contributed. A collective farm, I might add, is smaller than a state farm. But even a collective farm is large enough to make the use of machinery worthwhile, and collectivisation has in Bulgaria led to an increase in production.

I asked the manager: "How much land on the average did a peasant own before the revolution?" "Five hektars", he replied. A hektar it must be remembered is equivalent to about two and a half acres. At the time I left Ceylon, in 1960, the average size of a peasant holding was about one third of an acre. A average farm in West Germany, taking West Germany as a whole, is today about fifteen hektars in extent. As there is almost full employment the small farmers have sold their land to large farmers, or, if it was not fertile, to individuals or societies who wanted to build houses, and have gone to work in factories. But in some parts of West Germany (e.g. in some parts of Bavaria) the average holding is about 5 hektars in extent.

In Bulgaria a person can own anything up to five dekaras of land (i.e. half an hektar), and some shops, restaurants and hotels are still privately owned. But banks, mines, factories, the import-and export-trade and the big shops, restaurants and hotels have been nationalised. The predominant mode of production is therefore socialist. But there is no workers' control of nationalised concerns which are bureaucratically managed. The large restaurants, for example, have state-appointed managers and are not run by the workers themselves, as they were in Algiers when I was there in June 1964 (i.e. before the Boumedienne counter-revolution).

I should like to make two further points before I conclude this article on my impressions of Bulgaria.

It is, in my opinion, a mistake to permit by law an individual to own (i.e. to possess, buy, sell or leave as a legacy to some one else) even five dekaras (i.e. half an hektar) of land as such a law increases the inequalities that must inevitably exist in the years immediately following the replacement of the

capitalist by the socialist mode of production. Those who owned land before the revolution would have been allowed to keep anything up to a maximum of five dekaras. Those who owned no land are free to buy five dekaras of land. But if a woman who has worked as a doctor for fourteen years has not been able to save enough money to buy a piece of land it is not likely that the proletariat would be able to do so. It is in reality the top bureaucrats (high government officials, party-functionaries and managers of nationalised concerns) who would be able to buy land, which they can farm at a profit or on which they can build houses. No one should be allowed to own land. The peasantry should be given the land for use, i.e. they should be allowed to cultivate it and sell the produce at a profit, but the ownership of the land should be vested in the state. A law has to be passed making all land the property of the state. Such a law can be passed only by the proletariat.

Over the greater part of the cultivable land agricultural production is carried on in collective farms. But the end of the proletarian socialist revolution is the establishment of state farms, and collectivisation, which shows the peasantry the advantages of large-scale mechanised farming, is only a means to this end. It is also an aim of the proletarian socialist revolution to break down the difference between town and country (by laying out parks and gardens in cities and building factories, schools, universities, hospitals, hotels, cafes, restaurants, cinemas and theatres in the countryside) and, as Marx and Engels say in the Communist Manifesto, to 'rescue the rural population from the idiocy of rural life'. This aim has not been realised even in the Soviet Union where, to judge from reports that I read, because of the attractions of city-life there is still an influx of people from the countryside into the towns.

FOOTNOTES

1. East European countries and countries of the Middle East had very close cultural ties with Germany before the war. Students went from these countries to study in Germany. There were German universities in some of these countries. Prague, for example, had a German university which was closed in 1945. Even Kant's university at Konigsberg was closed after the occupation of East Prussia by the Russians. There were, and still are German schools in some of these countries. There is still a German school, for example, in Varna in Bulgaria and in Cairo in Egypt. The countries of Eastern Europe have, by being cut off from Germany after the war, suffered a loss that is comparable to the loss that we would suffer if we were compelled to send our students only to India or China and not to Europe or to USA.

2. An employer of the West German steel firm Krupp, whom I met in Bulgaria, told me that his firm had received a contract from the Hungarian government for building factories in Hungary and had also entered into negotiations with the government of Rumania. In December last year (1965) Krupp concluded an agreement with the government of Czechoslovakia for equipping a tyre-factory in Czechoslovakia. In spite of protests from USA

German steel firms are now (April 1966) planning, with financial aid from the German Federal Government, to set up steel-works in China.

3. Water from the Keeramalai tank and the hot springs near Trincomalie should be analysed to see if they have medicinal properties.

4. Bulgarian yoghurt is considered by some to be the best in Europe but does not taste as nice as our buffalo curd. Yet our best hotels, as far as I know, do not serve buffalo curd even to tourists from continental countries. I saw a buffalo in Bulgaria. It was black and smaller than our buffalo. I was told that no yoghurt is made in Bulgaria from buffalo milk.

5. It looks as if Ceylon tea is not imported direct to Bulgaria or to Poland. A Polish woman told me that the English tea she gets in Poland is not very good and that she would like to buy pure Ceylon tea.

6. Ten dekaras make up a hektar and a hektar is equivalent to about two and a half acres.

7. In West Africa a coarse cloth is made from kapok which is used in Ceylon only for stuffing cushions and pillows. Kapok trees can easily be grown in Ceylon. One should therefore explore the possibility of producing textiles from a mixture of kapok and cotton.

8. I do not know whether a comprehensive geological survey of Ceylon has yet been made. Where did our ancient metal-workers get their metal from? Was it all imported? Research should be done on this question. There are modern methods of detecting the presence of metals in the soil.

9. Ceylon has neither ships nor a ship-building industry and is dependent mainly on ships belonging to imperialist countries. Ghana does not build ships but has a shipping line.

10. A kilometre has 1000 metres and is equivalent to about 1094 yards. About 1600 metres make up a mile.

11. West German pottery (vases, ash-trays, tumblers, tea-pots and tea-cups) is better designed and has a better finish than Bulgarian pottery.

12. There are no horse-drawn carriages in West Germany. The horse-drawn cart has been replaced by the lorry and has become such a rarity that it attracts attention and is therefore used by some firms (e.g. breweries and laundries) for advertisement. Horses are still bred for riding. But the big-made horse used for drawing carts and for doing the farm-work has been made redundant by the introduction of agricultural machinery and is gradually becoming extinct.

(Continued from page 12)

about the Wages Boards being the proper forum for the discussion of the wage demands of the plantation workers. We are aware, furthermore, that the tea and rubber companies are trying to force your Government to accede to a reduction of the export duty on tea and rubber if they are to grant an increase in the daily wages of the plantation workers through a deal with the CWC.

We are in a position to prove that vast acreages of the very best tea and rubber producing plantations in this island have been severely affected by the present strike, if not put completely out of production. The Companies affected are rich and can no doubt afford to bear the heavy losses involved, even for several weeks to come. Their sole concern is to wear-out the strikers, irrespective of the loss to themselves, to the workers, to Government's revenue and to our country's export income. Can the same be said of you and your Government? This is a vital question which we would like to clarify with you, in any case, in order that we may determine our own future course of action in support of the elementary but long denied demand of the plantation workers for due recognition and

adequate improvement of their miserably low living standards.

We venture to think that what we have had to say in this letter, as well as your own understanding of the problems that are pre-occupying us and all those who are concerned with the welfare of the people of our country, will lead you to agree to a very early meeting and a full discussion with us on the above matters, which we earnestly request.

Yours faithfully,

THE CEYLON MERCANTILE UNION,
(Sgd.) P. B. Tampoe
General Secretary.

THE CEYLON ESTATES STAFFS' UNION,
(Sgd.) G. Rajagopal
Actg. General Secretary

THE CEYLON BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,
(Sgd.) W. E. V. de Mel
President.

THE DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' CONGRESS,
(Sgd.) A. Aziz
President.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARXISM (IX)

by R. S. BAGHAVAN

Lenin on Uneven Development

In the 20th Century the uneven development of the backward countries became more striking than it had been in the time of Marx and Engels.

Imperialism was transforming the world so rapidly, and unevenly, that the recognition of the law of uneven development runs like a red thread through the works of Lenin and Trotsky.

The law of uneven development was given explicit recognition by Lenin in his development of the theory of imperialism in 1916.

As we have seen, the law recognizes:

(a) The changed or different rates or tempos of development and evolution of societies in general, or of certain aspects, sectors or segments of societies in particular.

(b) The skipping of stages by societies developing at later historical periods, the passing over of certain phases of development recognizable in the evolution of societies that had developed earlier.

"The skipping of stages (or remaining too long at one stage)," says Trotsky, "is just what uneven development consists of...." (437).

(c) The retardation or regression of development in certain societies or certain aspects of societies.

In passing we must note that it would be wrong to state, as Stalin did (438), that Lenin discovered the law of uneven development and that Marx and Engels were unaware of it. As we have already seen, Marx and Engels were clearly aware of the law in all its aspects.

Even certain non-Marxists, for example Georg Vollmar, recognized the law,

drawing from it, of course, their own inferences (439).

Let us glance through the works of Lenin and note his explanations and illustrations of the law.

As early as 1899, in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* Lenin discussed the rate of development of capitalism:

"As to whether the development of capitalism in Russia is slow or rapid, it all depends on what we compare this development with. If we compare the pre-capitalist epoch in Russia with the capitalist... the development of social economy under capitalism must be considered extremely rapid. If, however, we compare the present rapidity of development with that which could be achieved with the modern level of technique and culture as it is in general, the present rate of development of capitalism in Russia must be considered slow..." (440)

In 1908 Lenin pointed out:

"The international revolutionary movement of the proletariat does not and cannot develop evenly and in identical forms in different countries.. Every country makes its own valuable contribution, adding new features to this common stream, but in every country the movement suffers from one or another form of one sidedness, from the theoretical and practical shortcomings that are peculiar to the individual socialist parties.." (441)

In the same article he speaks of the "conflagration spreading" to Asian countries which "only yesterday were in a state of deep slumber.."

In 1910 he wrote:

"..The pace of development of capitalism varies in different countries and in

different spheres of the national economy..” and emphasized that:

“..life and development in nature include both slow evolution and swift leaps, breaks in continuity..” (442).

In 1915, he said:

“Uneven economic and political development is an unconditional law of capitalism.” (443).

In the same article he pointed out that:

“After 1871, Germany grew three or four times faster than England and France, Japan about ten times faster than Russia..”

Throughout his *Imperialism*, written in 1916, Lenin stresses the uneven development of capitalism, especially in its finance-capitalist stage.

“The uneven and spasmodic development of the separate enterprises, separate industries, and separate countries, is inevitable under capitalism...both uneven development and a semi-starvation level of existence of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production..” (444)

“The unevenness in the rate of expansion of colonial possessions is very great,” he says and cites examples. (445)

He repeats:

“Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in the overseas countries..” (446)

He criticises the “mistaken idea”, that “the rule of finance capital lessens the unevenness and contradictions inherent in world economy, whereas in reality it increases them..” (447)

“Finance capital and the trusts,” he says, “do not diminish but increase the differences in the rate of growth of the various parts of the world economy..” (448)

He rules out the possibility of the even development of capitalism:

“..The even development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country as far as her capitalist strength was concerned, compared with the strength of England at that time; Japan was the same compared with Russia. Is it ‘conceivable’ that in ten or twenty years’ time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained *unchanged*? Absolutely inconceivable..” (449)

After pointing out that imperialism intensifies the inherent contradictions of capitalism, he says:

“It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the possibility of the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a more or less degree, one or other of these tendencies. On the whole capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before. But this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general; its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (such as England).” (450).

In the same year, referring to the Easter Rebellion in Dublin, Lenin wrote:

“The misfortune of the Irish is that they rose prematurely, when the European revolt of the proletariat had *not yet* matured. Capitalism is not so harmoniously built that the various springs of rebellion can immediately merge of their own accord, without reverses and defeats. On the other hand, the very fact that revolts break out at different times, in different places, and are of different kinds, guarantees wide scope and depth to the general movement; only in premature, partial, sporadic and therefore unsuccessful, revolutionary movements do the masses gain experience, acquire knowledge, gather strength, get to know their real leaders, the socialist proletarians, and in this way prepare for the general onslaught in the same way as separate strikes, demonstrations, local and national, mutinies in the army, outbreaks among

the peasantry, etc., prepared the way for the general onslaught in 1905." (451).

"We are a revolutionary working class contingent that has advanced to the forefront...solely because we were one of the most backward contries in the world Our *backwardness* has thrust us forward..." he said. (452).

After the October Revolution Lenin had occasion to repeat and emphasize the uneven development of Russia.

"In the space of a few months, we passed through a number of stages of compromise with the bourgeoisie and stages of shaking off petty-bourgeois illusions, for which other countries have required decades." (453)

In 1919, Lenin wrote:

"There has never been nor could there ever have been even, harmonious, or proportionate development in the capitalist world. Each country has developed with particular salience now one, now another aspect or feature or group of attributes of capitalism and of the working class movement. The process of development has been uneven." (454)

In the same year, addressing the 2nd Congress of Communist Organizations in the East, he said:

"Owing to a number of circumstances—among them, the backwardness of Russia and its boundless area, and the fact that it is a borderline between Europe and Asia, between the West and the East—we were called upon—and we regard that as a great honour—to bear the whole brunt, to be the pioneers, of the world struggle against imperialism." (455)

In 1912 Lenin had written:

"In very many and very essential respects Russia is undoubtedly an Asian country and, what is more, one of the wildest, most mediaeval and shamefully backward of Asian countries." (456)

Seven years later he drew attention to the fact that Russia's skipping of stages created new problems:

"Is it surprising that the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat has brought about primarily the 'contradiction' between the backwardness of Russia and her 'leap' *across* bourgeois democracy?" (457)

In 1920, he repeated his view of the skipping of stages by backward countries. In his Report to the 2nd Congress of the Comintern on National and Colonial Questions, he said:

"..Is the capitalist stage of economic development inevitable for those backward nations which are now winning liberation and in which progressive trends are to be observed since the war? We replied in the negative..The Communist International should advance and theoretically substantiate the proposition that these backward countries can, with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, pass over to the Soviet system and, through definite stages of development, to communism, without having to go through the capitalist stage.." (458)

Two years later he had occasion to refer again to the acceleration of political developments.

"Only ten years!" he wrote on the tenth anniversary of the publication of *Pravda*. "But measured in terms of our struggle and movement they are equal to a hundred years. For the pace of social development in the past five years has been positively staggering if we apply the old yardstick of the European philistines.." (459)

Needless to say, Lenin was not interested in purely abstract historical speculation. Marxist dialectics was important for him as a method of concrete historical analysis. And the problem to which he devoted his entire mature life was the Russian Revolution.

What would the consequences of the uneven development of Russia be for the Russian Revolution? When would it take place? What would be its nature and scope?

In 1915 he wrote:

"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism:

Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even one capitalist country taken singly. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of their countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." (443)

This quotation served later (in 1925, after Lenin died) as the corner-stone of the theoretical justification of Stalin's theory of "Socialism in One Country".

We cannot here go deeply into the matter and readers are referred to the discussion of this question in the works of Leon Trotsky. (460).

Suffice it for the purpose of the present article to point out that there would be confusion if, by "the victory of socialism" we understand Lenin as referring to the victory of the proletarian socialist revolution. This is amply borne out by a perusal of Lenin's other writings on the same subject.

The next year, Lenin wrote:

"The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in different countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. From this it follows that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for sometime remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois..." (461)

He added in the same article:

"It would be utterly wrong and utterly unrevolutionary—for us to evade or gloss over the most important thing: crushing the resistance of the bourgeoisie—the most difficult task and one demanding the greatest amount of fighting in the transition to socialism".

In January 1917, he said:

"The Russian revolution—precisely because of its proletarian character—is the

prologue to the coming European revolution. Undoubtedly, this coming revolution can only be a proletarian revolution, and in an even more profound sense of the word: a proletarian socialist revolution also in its content..." (462)

As Trotsky points out, Lenin viewed the Russian Revolution as only one link in the chain of international revolution. (463)

In 1919, Lenin wrote:

"For the continuance, and completion, of the work of building socialism, much, very much is still required. Soviet Republics in more cultured countries, where the proletariat has greater weight and influence, have every chance of surpassing Russia once they take the path of the dictatorship of the proletariat..." (464)

Lenin was convinced that all countries, however uneven their development, would arrive at socialism. But he did not envisage this development as a mechanical or automatic process.

In 1916, at the height of World War I he predicted:

"All nations will come to socialism; that is inevitable. But they will all do so in not quite the same way. Each will contribute something specific in this or that form of democracy, this or that variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this or that pace of socialist transformation in the different aspects of social life. Nothing is more wretched theoretically and more ridiculous practically than to paint 'in the name of historical materialism', the future in *this* respect a monotonous grey." (465)

His perspective was dialectical:

"World history is marching unswervingly towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, but is doing so by paths that are anything but smooth, simple and straight." (466)

REFERENCES

437. *Leon Trotsky: Permanent Revolution* p. 117 New Park Edn.
438. See *Trotsky: History of the Russian Revolution* Gollancz Edn. p. 1246

(Continued on page 23)

UPHEAVAL IN GREECE

AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT

On July 10, the Greek peasantry wrote yet another page of bloody struggle against the oppression of the state and the Agrarian Bank of Greece, which is reducing the countryside to starvation. This bloody Sunday on the Macedonian plain proved once again that Greek capital and its government can no longer count on anything but the brute force of guns for its survival.

The complete technological backwardness of agrarian production in Greece and the unbearable exploitation of the peasant masses have developed the peasant movement into a volcano ready to erupt at any moment; each dispute between the capitalist state and the farmers is bound to lead to violent clashes.

The demand of the July 10 demonstration was for three drachmas a kilogram as a minimum guaranteed price for wheat as opposed to 2.20 drachmas set by the government. This difference is of such great significance to both sides that neither will retreat from their positions.

Behind this lies this fact: The 1964-65 wheat production greatly surpassed the required volume of wheat stocks. The surplus and the inflationary pressures on the economy made the state hold an unyielding position towards the wheat producers.

On the other hand, this year's decreased production gives a meaning of life or death to the price of wheat for the peasants.

Second Phase

The violent July 10 clash was inevitable and further clashes are bound to spread, involving even greater numbers of peasants and workers. So, the second phase of the crisis, which erupted in July 1965, is beginning to develop.

On the morning of Sunday, July 10, huge numbers of tractors, towing great trailers full of peasants armed with black flags and banners in Greek and English,

moved on Salonika, the northern capital, from all the surrounding villages.

Five miles from the city, police forced the convoy to halt, having blocked the road with a heavy road-building machine. They then charged with tear gas and truncheons.

Demonstrators, determined to get through, hit back with rocks and sticks, captured the roadbuilder and beat back the police.

When they found another roadbuilder blocking a bridge further down the road, they still refused to disperse, as ordered by the police, and a fierce battle of fists, truncheons and stones broke out.

At that moment a truckload of police armed with automatic rifles arrived. They started firing on the unarmed crowd, forcing the peasants back.

The clashes at the Dendropotamus bridge went on all morning, the peasants finally surrounding the city and bringing all traffic to a standstill.

At 1-30 they stopped a Salonika-bound train and were attempting to overturn it when the police attacked again, this time with rifles and bren-guns. They mowed peasant youths to the ground, but failed to disperse the demonstrators.

Around 2 p.m., peasants from Kilkis riding 60 tractors managed to break through the police lines and triumphantly entered the city, immediately heading for the east end.

Police Scattered

There, in the working-class district of Phoenix, a large force of peasants had been isolated by the police.

Attacked from the rear by 60 tractors, from the front by the rest, and from above

by a shower of flower pots and bricks from workers' flats, the police scattered. Moving scenes followed with peasants embracing each other. With triumphant shouts they moved toward the city centre, cheered by workers. In the meantime another group had broken through from the west of the city and arrived at Phoenix, joining up with the rest to form a large convoy through the main streets of Salonika. Workers and students lined the pavements chanting 'We stand by you'.

Unable to stem the mighty tide, the police withdrew and the army was called in. Five heavy tanks (M.47's) blocked the road and faced the tractor convoy menacingly. Their awe-inspiring sight held the crowd momentarily. But history once more repeated itself and the instinct of the masses proved correct. Workers and peasants roared out the slogan of the moment: 'The soldiers with the people!'.

A few peasants ran forward. The troops did not shoot. They hesitated, then smiled! Workers and peasants rushed to embrace the soldiers, many with tears in their eyes, and the tanks moved aside to let the peasants' convoy through.

With the two captured road-building machines in the lead, the peasants moved on, perched on tractors and on foot, while workers cheered them from the pavements. Suddenly, scores of police reappeared, showering tea-gas grenades on to the demonstration.

One young peasant attempted to drive a road-builder into the police barricades. He was hit in the chest by a grenade, brutally hauled off the machine and then dragged along the ground to a police van.

The merciless tea-gas bombardment forced the peasants to scatter, abandoning 150 tractors in the Vardari district. Many others were abandoned in other parts of Salonika.

Throughout Salonika, clashes continued till evening. Weary and exhausted peasants slowly drifted away and workers returned to their districts.

Although 150 arrests were made—40 working men, seven women, three students and one tourist. The rest were peasants.

'Typhoon'

One hundred and twenty were wounded and in hospital—15 had bullet wounds and four were gravely injured by machine-gun fire. Many more stayed away from hospitals, fearing arrest.

The streets appeared as if they had been hit by a typhoon. Rocks, sticks, police hats, peasants' caps and spent shells littered them. Police roamed the streets in armoured cars while others guarded key points of the city with fixed bayonets.

City people stayed away from the streets and there was complete calm—'law and order' had been imposed.

'Leaders' Ran

In fact, as soon as the first clashes broke out, the bourgeois-democratic and fake-left leaders ran for their lives. They reappeared in a series of conferences with ministers and police for the 'restoration of order'. On July 10, the peasant leadership was tested and was wholly rejected by the peasants.

The Minister for Public Order, Apostolakis, tried to explain away the clashes as a result of the intervention of 'anarchist elements', and declared his intention to present a Bill to outlaw all left-wing, youth organisations within a week.

So, the government that carried out last year's July coup moves on in the execution of its anti-working class plans. The banning of the youth organisations is part of the plan for castrating the anti-capitalist struggle and for heaping the economic crisis on to the backs of the toilers.

Step by step the dictatorship advances. 'Democrats' and Stalinists have already capitulated unconditionally, and the struggle of the masses, spurred on by a spontaneous dynamism, passes over the heads of the corrupt leadership. But in order to bring results, such spontaneous action must be disciplined and led by the revolutionary vanguard of the working class.

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