

International VIEWPOINT

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Irish fighters adopt new political strategy
The underlying changes in South Korea
South African discussion of « dual power »

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
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Cover photo: British troops in the North of Ireland



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CORRECTION

An erroneous statement inadvertently slipped into the article on page 2 of *IV* No. 106 concerning your current fund drive. It stated that donations had been received "from 22 individuals and two groups, the Danish section of the Fourth International and the Fourth Internationalist Tendency in the United States." Though we in the FIT support *IV* to the fullest, reactionary legislation in the US would make any contribution we as an organization might make to your fund drive of questionable legality. For this reason we have refrained from actually sending money. Of course we have let our members and others who support our political outlook in this country know that the English language publications of the Fourth International, *IV* and *International Marxist Review* are extremely important to our political work and are well deserving of financial contributions from individuals. No doubt, this support is what your article was referring to.

Fourth Internationalist Tendency

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Two steps forward

IN THE 100th issue of *International Viewpoint*, at the end of May this year, we launched a subscription and fund drive for the magazine. Our targets were to win 100 new subscriptions and 4,500 US dollars in contributions before the end of this year. We need just a small last effort by our supporters to achieve these modest targets.

HILARY ELEANOR

By the first week of November, we were able to record an increase of 85 subscriptions and 4,000 dollars (£2,750) collected for *IV*'s fund drive. We have had an excellent response to our appeals, particularly

from readers in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the USA, in addition to many contributions from readers all over the world.

As we said when we launched this promotion campaign, these are difficult times for an internationalist, revolutionary magazine. In the absence of any other source of aid, we have to rely on our supporters to maintain the magazine and win new readers.

International Viewpoint is currently distributed to 52 countries in the world, but in the overwhelming majority of these the standard of living of the mass of people is well below any Western notions of "poverty line". To continue to extend our circulation in the so-called third world, we depend heavily on readers in the West.

Within the limits of our resources, we are constantly trying to improve the look and readability of the magazine, and hope that you will continue to send in your suggestions for improvements.

In the first half of 1987, thanks in good part to the contributions to our fund drive, we will be able to make a qualitative advance through the purchase of new computerized word-processor and pagemaking equipment. Not only will this help us to cut costs and save valuable time, but computerized page layout should enable us to be much more flexible in terms of the magazine's content and design.

Of course, all this doesn't herald the demise of our campaign for new subscribers and funds. We will need continued support in the new year to offset the costs of our new technology, and to continue improvements to *IV*.

In order to give a last minute boost to our current campaign, we are making a special offer for one year subscriptions that come in before January 31st of a free copy of the *Resolutions of the Twelfth World Congress of the Fourth International*. This World Congress was held in January 1985, and all the major resolutions are reproduced in this 110-page special issue of *IV*, with an introduction to the debates that were held.

Subscribe now to save money

We hope that our readers will use this special offer to win new subscribers over the next two months. Current subscribers whose sub runs out later than January 31st can take advantage of this offer by re-subscribing earlier than usual. A further 21 issues will be added to the remainder of your present subscription. And of course, this special offer would make an ideal Christmas gift!


There is an additional reason for taking advantage of this special offer now. Unhappily, mainly due to the wild fluctuations of the capitalist money markets, from the first issue in February next year we will have to make some small adjustments to our cover price and subscription rate. Although there will be no changes in our prices in French francs, our sterling cover price will rise very slightly. Both the subscription rates and the cover price in dollars will rise, but for our readers in the Americas this will be the first time *IV* prices have risen for four years.

Knowing that *IV* is not cheap in comparison with similar size national publications, we will do our best to keep these increases as low as possible. But with most of our income coming in sterling and dollars, the wild cavortings of the international exchange rates have hit us particularly hard. Alongside this, our printing and postage costs have both increased this year making price changes inevitable.

But we think *IV* is well worth the extra cost. It offers a unique opportunity to keep up with news and analysis from correspondents all over the world in a way that national journals, by their very nature, cannot.

With your continued support, we look forward to an even better new year. □

Special Xmas subscription offer . . .



International VIEWPOINT

Take out a one-year subscription before January 31st, 1987, and we will send you a **FREE COPY** of the *Resolutions of the Twelfth World Congress of the Fourth International!*

This 110-page special issue of *International Viewpoint* is worth 50 francs.

Just complete the subscription form on page two to receive this free offer. And don't forget to tell your friends!

FREE!

An historic step for Sinn Fein

A GREAT DEAL more was at stake in Sinn Fein's decision in November to drop its policy of refusing to participate in the Irish parliament than an electoral or political tactic.

In his address to the Sinn Fein congress, the organization's president, Gerry Adams, explained quite clearly what was involved:

"We should not reject participation out of hand, but we should always be aware that such rejection may become essential. It depends on the objective reality and conditions of the time. It is merely a problematic, deeply-rooted and emotive symptom of the lack of Republican politics and the failure of successive generations of Republicans to grasp the centrality, the primacy and the fundamental need for Republican politics. This truth must be grasped. It is a difficult one for many to accept given the conspiratorial and repressive nature of our own past, our distrust for 'politics and politicians' and a belief that 'politics' is inherently corrupt. But once it is grasped then everything else follows logically, especially the need to develop our struggle at the level of people's understanding."

GERRY FOLEY

Thus Adams explained that tactics have to be based on material conditions and adjusted to the understanding of the people. He acknowledged that this was a difficult concept for the movement to accept and that successive generations of Republicans had failed to grasp the need for a political program of their own.

But how could a revolutionary movement wage such a long fight without an understanding of ideas that are basic for most other revolutionary movements in the world today? The answer points up both the strengths and weaknesses of the Republican movement.

It is a very old movement with roots in a revolt against the moralistic pacifism of Ireland's first mass movement, the movement for Catholic emancipation. Daniel O'Connell and his clerical associates made non-violence into an abstract principle. Their Young Ireland left wing made armed struggle, therefore, into a principle, divorced from politics and concrete reality.

That established a pattern whereby the militant nationalist movement

tried to keep its eyes fixed on the perspective of preparing for armed struggle for independence, to keep this apart from all other issues. This meant in practice that its actions tended to become symbolic, designed to arouse by inspiring example rather than to win concrete objectives as part of a general program for organizing the masses of people. The material difficulties of the struggle reinforced this attitude.

Radical social conclusions

This conception did not prevent the militant nationalists from being drawn behind mass campaigns led by bourgeois politicians. In fact, as Adams said in his speech, it made that inevitable because the fighters did not have a political program of their own. Conversely, the fighters always tended to come to radical social conclusions. But this process was always stopped short. Moreover, repeated opportunist degenera-

tion of advocates of political action conformed to the militants' rejection of politics.

In the 1916 Dublin uprising, the radical leaders were executed. The radicalization that was developing in the 1918-21 war of independence was halted by the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish treaty that sold out the struggle. The pro-Treaty forces managed to isolate the militants politically and crush them militarily.

In the 1930s, there were major attempts to give the Republican movement a radical political-social program. They failed, because of the incapacity of the left and because of the powerful pressure the reactionary Irish clergy was able to bring to bear, both directly and indirectly. After the Second World War, a progressive Republican leadership around Sean McBride tried to undertake political action, but got lost in parliamentary coalitionism.

Campaign for civil rights

After the disastrous defeat of the IRA guerrilla campaign in Northern Ireland from 1956 to 1961, for the first time the majority of the Republican leadership embarked on a course of left-wing political action. It made an historic breakthrough by giving impetus to the campaign for civil rights for the oppressed Northern Catholics. That movement created the basis for the mass struggle against oppression that has continued for 18 years.

But most of that leadership, the "official" Republicans, became afraid of what they had unleashed. An important factor in this was a stagist theoretical framework they took over from Stalinist political advisors. They did not expect a "democratic" movement to lead to a violent crisis of the Northern society. And so they failed to prepare either the oppressed population or their members for a blowup. They immediately faced a rebellion from those who saw them as militarily weak, who formed the Provisionals, the present Republican movement. The Officials feared the Catholic revolt was "setting Protestant worker against Catholic worker." And so they tried to retreat from the struggle. That being impossible, they more and more tried to impose their concept of politics by bureaucratic means, leading to enormous bitterness and a violent split. Their organization was destroyed as a political force and became a pro-imperialist sect, now called the Workers' Party. This experience became a major obstacle to politicization in the Republican movement.

The Provisionals, however, turned to radical ideas and political forms of action out of their own experience. When the armed struggle became isolated, by the mid-1970's if not earlier, they turned to mass action to defend imprisoned Republicans threatened with very long sentences under inhuman conditions. Impelled by a hunger strike to the death of Republican prisoners, this movement became really massive and opened the way for the first successful Republican election campaigns in our time.

Now, with the dropping of abstentionism, this process of politicization has reached a new stage. The way this change has been carried out indicates a high level of political maturity and skill of the leadership that has emerged from 18 years of violent struggle. This Republican leadership is the first in 60 years to succeed in making a political turn without a devastating split (at least so far). Its political adeptness and principled approach in conducting a democratic and educative debate offer hope for new steps forward for the Irish revolutionary movement.

The abandonment of abstention comes at a challenging time for the Republican movement. The Anglo-Irish Accord has both created illusions of negotiated progress among the oppressed Catholics and enraged the pro-imperialist Protestants.

Pressure on the nationalist population has increased. At the same time, in the last elections in the North, Republicans suffered setbacks. The electoral polls in the South also show that illusions in the agreement pose dangers for the anti-imperialist movement. Unless the masses in the South can be shown the link between the fight against imperialism and their growing social problems, the effects of the economic crisis could increase weariness with the Northern conflict.

Sinn Fein's decision shows that it has understood that the South is decisive, that it cannot win in the North alone. It remains to be seen if they will be able to make the necessary political and organizational breakthrough in the South. The upcoming general elections will be an important test.

In view of the importance of this development, *International Viewpoint* will be devoting a good deal of attention to the Republican debate and political moves. In our next issue, we plan to publish major excerpts from Gerry Adams' speech to the Sinn Fein congress, along with other material. The following article represents an initial analysis of the Sinn Fein congress by John McAnulty, a leader of the Irish section of the Fourth International, People's Democracy. □



Sinn Fein votes to end abstention policy

IN A HISTORIC decision, the main revolutionary current in Irish politics, Sinn Fein, the organization politically associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), decided at its Ard Fheis (conference) of November 2-3 to end a policy of abstention from the neo-colonial Irish parliament (the Dail), and in future elections in the 26 counties of Ireland to stand prepared to take their seats in the Dail.

JOHN McANULTY

Sinn Fein's president, Gerry Adams, argued for the change as "the only feasible way to break out of our isolation, to make political gains, to win support for our policies, to develop our organization and our struggle."

Since this position had to be put as an amendment to the constitution, which had barred participation in the Dail, it needed a two-thirds majority to be passed. It cleared that hurdle by only 10 votes, getting the support of 429 of the 628 delegates.

Opposition to the change was led by former president Ruairi O Bradaigh. A minority of delegates (about 30) left the Ard Fheis with him after the vote and split to form a new organization, Republican Sinn Fein.

The minority suffered from a

notable inability to offer concrete alternatives to the proposed change. This was illustrated by one delegate who said, "If resolution 162 is passed, I will blame myself and my comrades for not presenting an alternative strategy."

This strategic weakness was underlined in the major minority speech by O Bradaigh, which dealt with legalistic interpretations of the constitution, appeals to the primacy of armed struggle, the irreformably pro-imperialist and pro-partitionist nature of the Dail and its corrupting influence on the revolutionary principles of Republicans.

O Bradaigh did throw out one strategic idea — calling for an all-Ireland constituent assembly in which Sinn Fein would collaborate



The sharp end of British imperialism's intervention in the North (DR)

with other anti-imperialist groups, but this was left isolated and undeveloped in a case that was overwhelmingly traditionalist, legalistic and moralistic. As a delegate from Roscommon [O Bradaigh's county] put it, "If you lie down with dogs, you get up with fleas."

Abstentionism has been a principle of Republican politics since the second Dail of 1921-22 -- the last body to claim de facto jurisdiction over the entire island. Its removal is a result of the political evolution of Sinn Fein since the hunger strikes.

Broadening the programme of Sinn Fein

A new leadership under Gerry Adams has attempted to build the organization as a developed political party and broaden its programme to include social and economic aspects of imperialist domination. Since the hunger strike it has taken 40 per cent of the nationalist vote in the Six Counties and elected over 60 local councillors, as well as establishing Gerry Adams as MP for West Belfast.

In the same period, support in the South has actually declined since the hunger strikes, and stands at about 2-3 per cent of the vote. Sinn Fein militants see a pressing need to end their isolation and to begin to organize the majority of the working class.

For example, Jim McAllister, Sinn Fein councillor in South Armagh [a border area of Northern Ireland where IRA activity has been particularly strong], said: "I'm fed up with the Republic as a plaque on the wall. I want to live in the Republic."

The majority posed the necessity of a policy change concretely, outlining the opportunities that a new policy offered. This, however, did not amount to the presentation of a general strategy. Strategic discussion during the debate suffered from a great deal of political vagueness and a number of more than dubious propositions that threaten to cause problems for the future.

One such problem is the conception of the role of the military struggle. Historically this has been seen as the central element of Republicanism. Only the most ebullient of Republicans believe that a direct military victory is possible, but a majority seem to believe that it can force Britain to the negotiating table.

In fact, the pressure of imperialist oppression, the collaboration of bourgeois forces in Ireland and the decline of the mass struggle have eroded the capacity of the IRA. A campaign that in the 1970s was able to kill hundreds of British soldiers today is aimed mainly at native forces in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), and civilian contractors engaged in work on building projects for the police and military.

It was the failure of IRA actions to defeat British plans to criminalize Republican prisoners that forced the turn to mass struggle led by the H-Block movement and to the Sinn Fein of today.

Sinn Fein moved from being a support organization for the IRA to being a political movement in its own right. The new relation with the IRA was symbolized by the phrase "with an armalite [automatic rifle] in one hand and a ballot in the other."

In fact, the latest decision in essence resolves this question by an assertion of the primacy of politics, but this is not a conclusion that was explained to the delegates, nor was it apparently understood by a majority of them.

Relationship between Sinn Fein and the IRA

The leadership responded to the charges that they were abandoning the armed struggle by trying to outdo the abstentionists in the vehemence of their support for the IRA. There are two dangers in this. The immediate danger is that the IRA may try to reassure dissidents by stepping up armed actions at a time when the British forces are ready and waiting. Avoiding that trap while still trying to maintain a high military profile could lead in the direction of "soft" targets, such as civilian contractors, and weaken popular support.

The longer term danger is that this stance leaves the acceptance of the primacy of politics without a full conclusion. The debate at the Ard Fheis demonstrated a thoroughgoing democracy within Sinn Fein, but the Republican leadership found it necessary to call an army convention, the first in 17 years of struggle, so that the military organization could endorse the new turn in advance of the Sinn Fein decision, and it was to that military authority that delegates appealed to convince the Ard Fheis of the legitimacy of the turn.

Sinn Fein's vice president, Martin McGuinness, summed up this position when he said that to reject the new policy on abstention was to reject the Army Council statement of support and thus to reject the armed struggle. Sinn Fein still have to come to terms with the fact that the political militants in the organization cannot develop policy and strategy while looking over their shoulder at a superior military authority.

The abstentionists stressed the dangers of opportunism and reform, pointing to the split with the "Official" Republicans at the beginning of the 1970s and the degeneration of the latter into corrupt reformists, standing far to the right on the national question.

To underline their point, the minority booked the same room in the same hotel that saw the birth of the Provisionals to announce the present split. The weakness in their argument is that they state the dangers of degeneration as absolute laws. An assertion of inevitable corruption means that no political project is worthwhile and that Republicans

should be engaged in a search for inner purity, rather than victory over imperialism.

Martin McGuinness' reply also suffered from a certain weakness. He declared that Republicans will be entering Leinster House [the Irish parliament building] "while maintaining unapologetic support for the right of the people to oppose with arms the forces of British occupation."

Presenting the armed struggle as a guarantee against reformism is a mistake. History, including recent Irish history, records plenty of examples of reformists willing to support armed struggle. It obscures the problem of real safeguards, such as the development of a revolutionary program, involvement in the mass struggles of the working class, party control over representatives and the right of recall.

It is also important to understand the concepts of class war. The conception expressed in Martin McGuinness' statement "we are not at war with the 26 county state" obscures the question of war between the working class and imperialism and the central role Republicans have to play in that.

Involvement in the mass struggles and mass organizations of the working class is a key factor. Discussion about policy would be beginning to lose the flavour of internal debate and link up to the real strategic battles of the working people and the existing body of experience of trade union militants, youth and women.

Just how difficult a task this will be was indicated by the debates around key areas of struggle. There was wide support for liberation struggles around the world, a decision to strengthen links with trade union and Black groups in Britain, protests at proposed anti-union laws and solidarity with striking workers.

However, there was not any overall indication of a deep involvement in these struggles. Reports were largely organizational with appeals to members to become involved in trade union work. There was no discussion of recent IRA threats to workers collaborating by providing services to RUC stations in the North nor any suggestion that a political battle against collaboration should be waged in the trade union movement.

Discussion on the Anglo-Irish deal was restricted to the need for educational meetings in the South.

But it was around the issue of women's rights that Sinn Fein took a step backwards. A resolution supporting a woman's right to choose on abortion was pushed through last year's Ard Fheis by Republican

feminists. This year a resolution by the Ard Comhairle (National Committee) led to the resolution being deleted.

The strategy of the leadership was one of "damage limitation," attempting to preserve a limited support for the right to choose in the face of a right-wing backlash. But such a course is only possible if one is confused about the leading role the question of women's rights must play in the Irish revolution.

Power of the Catholic church

The danger of confusion leading to opportunist error was indicated by the statement by a radical Republican and Irish language activist, Martin O Milleoir, who said: "The party has already reaped the political consequences of ignoring the moral view of the people." But the "moral view of the people" reflects the power of the Catholic church and its influence over the state — an influence that is enshrined in the Irish constitution and a barrier that the Irish revolution must face and overcome.

All the limitations of the debate and the step back on women's rights, however, cannot obscure the historic progress made at this Ard Fheis. The ending of the abstentionist ban opens up many opportunities, establishes the primacy of political action and makes an all-Ireland strategy and policy a real possibility.

What made the deepest impression on me was the sight of hundreds of young militants sitting immobile in a packed hall and listening intently to

every word in four hours of solid debate. This, and the preconference discussion were apparently their first experience of such a public confrontation of political ideas.

The immediate task for revolutionary socialists is to convince both Republicans and militants in the workers' movement that the debate flowing from the Ard Fheis involves them together. The present Irish government is expected to collapse in the new year. At the moment, the view that Gerry Adams has expressed is that "the election after the next one will be the first serious test of our ability to win major support."

In reality the coming election is crucial. Sinn Fein will be standing in an election marking a major political crisis, with all the capitalist parties committed to further offensives against the Irish working class, and the Labour Party on the point of collapse because of its coalition with the right-wing Fine Gael party.

No one will blame Sinn Fein if they do not achieve power, but they will suffer if they do not contest for it, do not look for the electoral alliances that will unify and organise the central forces for revolution in Irish society.

History is a harsh judge. This Ard Fheis has taken a giant step. A thoroughgoing debate has convinced the majority of a broadly revolutionary materialist analysis, and the leadership showed real skill in launching a unity drive that isolated the wing led by Ruairi O Bradaigh and Dave O'Connell. Now the benchmark must be not the organizational needs of Sinn Fein but the political needs of the Irish revolution. □



Lessons from the Hormel strike

THE STRIKE at the Hormel meatpacking plant in Austin, Minnesota, has become a symbol of opposition to the policy of surrender of the US union bureaucracies to the capitalist offensive. The Hormel workers went on strike in September 1985 and fought for almost a year, until their union local [branch] was taken away from them by the United Food and Commercial Workers' Union.

The strikers organized their own independent union, but the national union was able to create a split and give the authorities an opening to isolate the strikers. The Hormel strikers have not, however, given up, and a broad network of solidarity has been built up around their fight. The following article, from the November issue of *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism*, assesses the impact and lessons of this exemplary strike.

FRANK LOVELL

Last July, after losing control of their local union, P-9 of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), to the International officialdom, the strikers at the Hormel plant in Austin, Minnesota, formed a new union — the North American Meatpackers Union (NAMPU). They petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a certification election. The NLRB received their petitions, but they are still waiting for the election. No date is yet set.

On August 28, the International officials of the UFCW announced that they had reached a settlement with Hormel, covering workers in eight of the company's plants. The contract is company dictated and conforms in wages to the industry pattern, reaching 10.70 dollars per hour in September 1988. (In 1980, workers at the Austin, Minnesota, plant were making 10.69 dollars.)

In the wake of the settlement, the debate about the merits of the P-9 strike built up steam. This debate is not limited to the various groups in the radical movement or the left wing in the unions that initially supported the strike. The employing class continues to take a keen interest in the strategy and tactics of the strikers. In a Labor Day editorial, September 1, the *New York Times* comments: "Organized labor is in deep trouble on Labor Day 1986. For most unions, however, it's still business as usual. The economy has been remade by deregulation,

automation and imports. Rather than facing such realities, unions lunge for protectionist laws to hold back the tide or circle the wagons and battle it out to the end, as happened with the suicidal strike of Hormel meatpackers in Minnesota."

What the *Times* fears is the end which might come about if the union movement as a whole embarked on a course similar to that of P-9. It advises labor to take the route of the GM/Saturn concessions pact with the United Auto Workers; to endorse the School Reform Program which eliminates teachers' jobs and introduces incentive pay, following the example of Albert Shanker and the American Federation of Teachers. "No less is required . . . if labor is once again to lead," says the *Times*. What they are talking about is the leadership of the Judas goat that leads the sheep to slaughter. That pretty well sums up the attitude of the employers today — at least those who are willing to sign contracts with the unions at all.

A senior vice-president and chief lawyer for Hormel, Charles Nybert, said Hormel was more willing to negotiate with the UFCW than with Jim Guyette, president of P-9, because the International had a more reasonable approach to the talks. "With the UFCW it was not an all-or-nothing proposition," Nybert said. "But they are hard bargainers. This is no sweetheart contract."

The labor bureaucrats themselves

are likewise anxious to dispel the notion that their "concession bargaining" is nothing more than the signing of sweetheart contracts. The *AFL-CIO News* (September 6) reported the Hormel contract in a story that was headlined: "UFCW recovers lost wages at Hormel and Oscar Mayer." The story reports that the UFCW succeeded in "returning the base labor rate to 10.70 dollars an hour by September 1988."

It also says that the settlement carries with it "a guarantee that Local P-9 members who remained on strike after the plant reopened earlier this year will have seniority-based preference as jobs become available at the plant." This is made up, a lie. There is nothing like this in the contract.

The same story reports that the UFCW has filed a suit in Alameda, California, to block a buy-out of Safeway Stores there. Safeway owes its employees 750 million dollars in wages, vacation pay, and severance pay — according to the UFCW. They hope Safeway can become profitable again and pay the back wages. This deep concern for the financial future of the employers was expressed by Lewie Anderson, the UFCW vice president who negotiated the settlement at Hormel. He said, "There's just so much you can do. We believe that as business expands, [the P-9 strikers] will get their jobs back. That Austin plant has the capacity for 2,000 to 2,500 jobs."

This is one issue in the debate within the radical movement as well: Can the union movement protect its members if the system cannot provide jobs? And if it can and should, how will it get started?

The AFL-CIO bureaucrats such as Lane Kirkland argue that concession-bargaining is, and must be, labor's basic strategic approach at this juncture. It is labor's duty to help resolve the problems of the capitalist system.

But Kirkland hasn't a clue as to what's really wrong with the system: "Today we suffer from the consequences of one-way foreign trade — and the steadfast refusal of the Reagan administration to speak up for the interests of the American working people." That's what he told the Steelworkers' convention on August 25. He went on: "Unions understand the need for cooperation where it is essential. We only ask that employers in turn cooperate with us. Unfortunately," he said, "we find too few examples of the latter form of cooperation."

This is true. Kirkland has been unable to find any segment of the employing class that will endorse

his demands for protective tariffs. He pretends not to know that the "cheap goods" imported to this country are the product — in large part — of US capitalist investment abroad.

The so-called radicals — including the Communist Party and other Stalinoids — accept the premise that the well-being of the working class depends on the economic prosperity of the bosses, and that one of the ways to get this is through labor-management cooperation. The difference is that the Stalinists and the self-styled "labor left" argue, against the entrenched bureaucrats, that an aggressive campaign against give-backs, employing the proper strategy, will in the long run show the employers the evil of their ways and force them (once again) to collaborate with the unions.

In the case of the CP, they have carried this approach to the extreme so that they now find themselves in the camp of the UFCW against the P-9 strikers. The CP's line is "labor unity at all cost." A *People's Daily World* staff writer, Bill Dennison, got so carried away with this that he wrote the following about the P-9 strike:

It has exposed the "divisiveness of 'phoney left' organizations centered around a group called 'Rank and File Against Concessions,'" he said. "They used the legitimate struggle of the Hormel workers to launch a campaign to split and undermine other meatpacking locals, the UFCW and a number of other unions.

"The ultimate aim apparently is to break away a section of the trade union movement. Coming at a time of unprecedented attacks against unions by the monopoly corporations and when unity is essential, many view their activities as suspicious at best and at worst a conscious part of the Reagan-era union busting."

This slander is a small reminder of what Stalinism really is and how it functions, an echo from the past when it was an influential political current in the union movement. This time it netted Dennison a temporary writing assignment on the new *Unionist*, put out in Austin by the UFCW.

Supporters of the P-9 strike — and the organizers of the North American Meatpackers Union — respond that far from "splitting the union movement" they are trying to prevent the atomization, the shattering, the disorganization of the union movement. This certainly does not mean that the new meatpackers' union seeks to replace the present union movement, either. It is not a "dual" union. The program of this new union, if and when it is finally and properly formulated, can serve as an essen-

tial feature of a genuine class-struggle left wing within the AFL-CIO.

There are growing signs that the time is ripe for a program of change in the US union movement. The year-long Austin strike and the broad support it received from workers across the country could not have happened four or five years ago. There is a general restiveness in the unions, and a growing dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy. Increasingly there is interest and participation in the affairs of the union by their memberships. In Detroit this year 165,000 turned out for a Labor Day parade; and 50,000 marched in Chicago, where [AFL-CIO head] Lane Kirkland spoke. (Perhaps if Kirkland hadn't been present, the Chicago turnout might have matched Detroit's.) We also see, increasingly, genuine rank-and-file movements around important issues — such as union democracy.

These changing attitudes — the new militancy and advances in political consciousness — indicate that the North American Meatpackers Union has a chance to stay alive and make a valuable contribution. Its future will depend largely upon the kind of program it develops for the union movement as a whole. This can evolve in collaboration and consultation with other left-wing forces in the unions such as New Directions in the UAW, or Teamsters for a Democratic Union. The NAMPU has a chance to begin to influence the development of a genuine class-struggle program for US labor's left wing.

Most of the discussion within the unions — in particular during strikes like that of the P-9 workers or the Watsonville Cannery workers in California — has been about strategy and tactics. This, of course, is essential for any union leadership engaged in strike action. But beyond this there is the basic social program of the union movement. What should it be?

There are a few, main points which become very clear in light of what has happened in Austin and in the course of other battles over the last few years:

* Democracy in the unions. The better understanding of what this means in practice may be the most important contribution of the P-9 strike. There the membership not only made the decisions but mobilized their own forces to carry out those decisions. This is the essence of union democracy (working class democracy as opposed to the bourgeois variety).

* Independence of the workers from the bosses. The P-9 strike certainly contributed to a better understanding of this concept. In this respect the very first decision of the Local P-9 leadership and the member-

ship was the most important and far-reaching; to fight Hormel and not appeal to its goodwill; to organize the struggle and carry it through to its conclusion; to win back their rights as workers.

(Of course, they had to conduct this struggle according to the rules prescribed by the labor laws of this country, in particular by Taft-Hartley, and by the established practices of the union movement. But in doing this they advanced the consciousness of themselves and their supporters to the point where they can now challenge some of the unjust laws and most of the self-defeating union practices.)

* Mass unemployment dictates the demand for jobs. It is the responsibility of the union movement to present a program to create jobs, to put the unemployed to work at union wages. This can be done through a public works program to provide the many social necessities which are now sacrificed to the war budget, as well as through a reduction of the workweek with no loss in weekly pay so the available work is divided equitably among those who need jobs.

* Defend the union movement. This means organizing legal defence committees to launch a major public campaign to defend workers and union leaders victimized in the courts and on the picket lines. But it also means the beginning of a campaign to educate — both the general public and the union movement — about the necessity for workers' self-defence against police and national guard attacks.

* Working class political action. The unions must begin to prepare the way for the organization of a labor party as the result of the struggle for jobs — a political struggle — and through running union-sponsored candidates as independents in elections. Again, a major campaign to educate and explain the need for a new political party, one which would advocate a government run by and in the interests of working people, a government which would not call out the national guard to protect scabs or break up picket lines, must be begun by the left wing of the labor movement.

This modest five-point program is a place to begin our discussion. Other points will have to be added as we go along. The militants who have today formed the NAMPU, who exist in a less well organized form in many other unions across the country, need to adopt and begin to advocate this program, or one like it, in order to meet the goals which they are setting for themselves and in order to live up to the promise which the current wave of militancy in the US labor movement holds out. □

Left socialists at a crossroads

IN SCANDINAVIA, as in the Netherlands, there is a long experience of parties standing to the left of social democracy and yet exercising a certain parliamentary influence. This experience is most extensive in Denmark, where the social democracy was seriously discredited by wartime collaboration and where the Communist Party suffered a major split in the 1950s. Led by Aksel Larsen, a historic CP and trade-union personality, the Socialist People's Party that came out of this split absorbed some other left currents and became a significant minority force in parliament, which it remains.

After suffering losses in the 1966 parliamentary elections, the Social Democrats accepted a coalition with the Socialist People's Party. Within the "workers' majority" coalition, the Socialist People's Party made parliamentarist concessions. In protest against the party accepting a social-democratic austerity policy, the left wing broke away at the end of 1967 to form the Left Socialists, Venstresocialisterne (VS). The new party very quickly became divided between a left parliamentarist wing and the so-called Blomsterboerne ("Flower Children"), that is, the post-1968 radical generation. Some of the parliamentarists left. The VS has remained a multi-tendency party and kept a foothold in parliamentary politics, getting just over the two per cent minimum for representation in parliament. In the January 10, 1984, general elections the Socialist People's Party got 11.5 per cent of the vote; the VS, 2.6, and the Social Democrats 31.6 per cent.

Because of its dependence on foreign trade, Denmark has been hard hit by the international capitalist crisis. But its strong union and welfare-state traditions have made it difficult for the bourgeoisie to apply an austerity policy. In 1985, the attempt by the bourgeois government of Poul Schlüter to push austerity further provoked massive protest strikes (the "Easter Rebellion").

Therefore, there are rising pressures on all the workers' parties, and the VS in particular has been experiencing considerable internal tensions over policy. It held a special congress at the beginning of October in an attempt to resolve its problems. Tom Gustafsson attended it as a representative of the Fourth International and wrote the following report in the October 16 issue of *Internationalen*, the paper of the Swedish section of the Fourth International.

TOM GUSTAFSSON

It was a bewildering experience to attend the Danish Left Socialist Party (VS) congress that was held on October 4-5 in Fredericia, Jutland. Bewildering because of the type of meetings conducted at the congress, but even more because of the sort of political positions taken there.

A VS congress is sometimes thought-provoking and sometimes an overwhelming mixture of introductory

speeches, plenary debates, question times and "revolving microphones" in the sea of delegates, culminating in an endless half-day-long process of voting — with amendment after amendment to the main resolution presented by a whole spectrum of various currents and loose tendencies in all the colors of the political rainbow.

But the most bewildering thing was to see how a broad majority of the

congress delegates could march with their eyes open straight into a trap.

The congress was a "special" one. It was supposed to make some clarifications of VS policy that the regular congress in the spring could not handle.

The starting point for the entire debate was two hypotheses. One was that the workers' parties (the Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party and the VS) would get a parliamentary majority in the next elections. The other was that the VS would hold the balance of power and therefore be able to sit in the driver's seat. The VS would then put pressure on the other bigger parties and force through reforms for the benefit of the "workers' majority."

These hypotheses are, to say the least, shaky. The election has not yet been announced, although most think that it will in fact be held in 1987. Both the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party are on a rightward slide. For the Social Democrats, that means that the party's "profile" as an alternative to the ruling right-wing coalition is becoming more and more blurred.

The longer this rightward course continues, the more difficult it will be for both parties (the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party) to mobilize the discontented working-class voters and the youth, who want a radical break from this whole political establishment.

Even if the VS manages to continue to attract an important part of this discontent, it is not yet certain that it will top the 2 per cent threshold for representation in parliament.

It was the "right-center" current that emerged victorious from the congress — although it did not move as fast as the most pronounced right wing, the "Phoenix" group wanted. But in an eagerness to play an important role in Danish working-class politics, this current made a classical error throughout the congress.

The political debate was focused on the political adjustments and compromises that the VS could consider going along with so that some of its main proposals would be accepted by a future government based on a "working-class majority."

* The congress voted that jobs should be "given priority" over "full pay," if the VS manages to push through a shortening of the work-week, but that compromises would have to be made on working conditions.

* The congress advocated an incomes distribution through wages and taxes, and also among wage earners in order to conduct an "responsible" economic policy at the municipal level, with — if possible — balanced budgets.

* The congress came within a hair's breadth (even now) of buying the conception of a "defensive" military policy (that is a modification within the framework of the bourgeois military) as a substitute for withdrawal from NATO and for a definitive rejection of nuclear weapons in Denmark.

That means that instead of focusing the discussion around the initiatives that the VS must take to begin to change the relationship of forces, to counter the rightward turn in the workers' movement in general and create an attractive left pole, the congress was already bargaining over the price of the bear's skin long before the bear was shot.

And this was done on the basis of a clear over-estimation of the weight that the VS can bring to bear at the parliamentary level.

This course did not go unchallenged, to be sure. But the left opposition, which had the backing of a lot of authoritative workers' leaders and of a fourth of the 120 delegates, was also unable to lay out a consistent overall alternative to the adjustments that were made.

Something more was needed than oppositional contributions to the debate and critical statements about the impossibility of pushing the VS's new line in the workplaces.

What was needed was an offensive proposal for a practical unity initiative that would build on the experience of the recent years' struggles and growing mobilization around unifying workers' demands -- for an end to social cutbacks and a state incomes policy, freedom to bargain and the right to strike, a 35-hour workweek with no cut in pay, protection for wages against increases in the cost of living, and so on.

VS is facing a decisive crossroads. It has taken a big step in the wrong direction. But the final destination is not yet irrevocably determined.

The VS is a party with many roots and tentacles in Danish society. That also made the debates -- despite the critical comments made here -- concrete and meaningful. The VS also has, despite its organizational jumble, a positive, non-sectarian attitude to the other Danish left organizations.

Thus, the VS is strongly affected by broad social developments. If the contract negotiations that have now begun develop into a new mass protest against the government's anti-labor policy the VS, along with the entire left, will again be thoroughly shaken up.

That would mix up the cards and then, we have to hope, the result would be a new deal at the next VS congress, whether it is a "special" one or not. □

Crisis of the "radical left"

IN THE MAY 21 parliamentary elections, the right again got a comfortable majority. With 81 out of 150 seats, the Christian Democrats of the CDA and the "free enterprise" right of the VVD embarked on their second four-year period in government.

The fact that the government of millionaire Ruud Lubbers could continue after the elections was a shock to a lot of the left. But it was as much of a shock that the social-democratic PvdA grew primarily at the expense of the parties to its left. (1)

ROBERT WENT

The three parties generally classed together as the "radical left" lost five of their eight seats in parliament. The Communist Party (CPN) disappeared from the lower house of parliament for the first time since the 1920s. It lost every one of its three seats.

The Peace Socialist Party (PSP) lost two seats, retaining only one. And the Political Party of Radicals (PPR) held two seats but lost tens of thousands of votes. These losses by the radical left on May 21 are not an isolated event. In recent years, the CPN, the PSP and, to a lesser extent, the PPR have lost thousands of members. The PSP now has about 6,000 members, 4,000 less than three years ago.

Moreover, the ability of these parties to mobilize and their role in action have declined dramatically. In the course of a few years, the CPN lost the bulk of its intervention in the working class and the trade unions. All three parties have the greatest difficulty in mobilizing their members and their branches.

The results of the May parliamentary elections confirmed what had been clear for a good while. The radical left parties are in a grave crisis, one that is both organizational and a crisis of perspectives. And no end is in sight.

Next March, there are regional elections. And despite the government's brutal attacks on education, social services, social security, the health services, the elderly and public workers, it is expected that the radical left will suffer further losses and be unable to profit much, if at all, from the broad resistance to the government's policy.

There are various reasons for the crisis of the radical left. In recent years, the room for left-reformist answers, for militant reformist policies, has shrunk. This is because of the crisis, because there are less possibilities for getting results and due to the pull of the PvdA on the radical left voters.

After a few years of crisis management by a right-wing majority, the indignation against the government's policy has tended to polarize strongly around the biggest opposition force.

Even though there is little confidence that a PvdA government would change much, many people vote for the party in the hope of getting a bit of change. They choose to do that rather than cast a more principled vote, since the radical left has no chance of getting into government.

Failure of national collaboration

This attitude is a product of the hard times. There is greater will for collaboration, for unity and for moving in a powerful way because it is very difficult to get results with actions and in struggle. The radical left has not managed to combine its forces. For years, closer collaboration has been discussed. Locally, cooperation got off the ground in many cases, although for the most part this did not go much beyond the local elections (a common slate, a common fraction after the elec-

1. See "How the right got back," by Richard Bastiaans, 'International Viewpoint' No. 103, July 14, 1986.

tions). But nationwide it got absolutely nowhere.

In fact, the discussions about cooperation on the national level themselves led to two splits. The VCN (Verbond van Communisten in Nederland — League of Communists in the Netherlands) split off from the CPN. In the parliamentary elections, this “new Communist Party” formed on the Moscow line got less than 5,000 votes.

The PSP also suffered a split. The PSO (Partij voor Socialisme en Ontwapening — Party for Socialism and Disarmament) was set up by PSP members who thought that there was a threat that the party’s principles would be too watered down. The PSO blew apart within three months, and did not participate in the parliamentary elections.

In recent years, the CPN has rapidly lost its base in the working class and in the trade-union movement. (2) The traditional industries, where the CPN had support, have been hard hit by the economic crisis. In the new industries, such as petrochemicals and chemicals, the CPN has failed to gain any foothold. Moreover, the attention given within the party to trade union work has been steadily declining.

The PSP never had much of a base in the working class but rather drew its primary support from the youth radicalization.

The PPR — which came out of the Catholic People’s Party (KVP), one of the parties that set up the CDA in 1980 — has from its outset had some links with sections of the Catholic workers’ movement. But these ties have always been fairly minimal.

All in all, this means that the radical left does not have much of a presence in the industrial workplaces or the trade-union movement and does not play much of a role there. There may well have been changes in the working class, but the radical left has no answer for that.

In the CPN, PPR and PSP there are few workers to be found from the key sectors of the economy. That is even more true for the leaderships of these parties. The result of this is that the CPN, PPR and PSP are more and more vulnerable to the moods in the mass movements that are having to contend with enormous problems.

The possibilities for the radical left to build campaigns and actions in the working class that could throw the greatest weight onto the scales are minimal.

Altogether this led in recent years to the radical left being less and less able to play an important role in the struggle. That also has a lot to do with the discussion over the perspective that the radical left has to offer. Because actions are producing little

and because it is very hard to get the members of the CPN, PSP and PPR themselves to go into action, the attention given by these parties to struggle and mobilizations has sharply declined.

Together, the CPN, PSP and PPR still have around 20,000 members, but nothing is being done with this potential. No initiative has been taken for a campaign or action against the government’s policy. Even when the radical left gets itself in gear, it pays no attention to building the movement in the working class or for strengthening the critical currents and groups within the trade-union movement.

Parliamentary work dominates the radical left

For the radical left, the gap between working in parliaments (national, regional, and local) and action has become very wide. Work in local councils and in the national parliament is more and more becoming the main activity of the radical left parties.

With regard to the political perspective it offers, the radical left is in no better a position. Social democracy has shifted to the right, and the radical left has followed. It is becoming more and more “realistic” in its propositions, that is, more and more social democratic. The gap between the fine speeches about socialism and day-to-day practice is getting wider and wider and it is not in any way being bridged.

Strategically, these parties aim to be a sort of left-wing of social democracy *outside* the social democratic party. The PvdA is seen as an “ally” that “must be pushed further to the left” by the radical left. In practice, this often leads to adaptations to social democracy.

For example, at the end of September, the CPN leadership published its resolutions for the party congress to be held at the end of November. In them, it says that the CPN must orient more to the PvdA because in recent years the party has shifted to the left! So, the goal is no longer to build an alternative to social democracy. For the CPN, social democracy is an ally that can be pulled further to the left by good arguments and initiatives.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the radical left has not been able to profit from a new wave of radicalization, because there has not yet been one. Where there have been some signs of a new radicalization, as in the peace movement for example, it has let the possibilities for making gains actually slip through its fingers

because it has followed a policy of tailoring the social democrats who predominate in the leadership of the peace movement.

The way the radical left looks at the moment raises the question of whether, with its present policy, composition (the 1960s generation mainly) and its nostalgia for the good old days of the 1960s and 1970s, it will be able to profit from new radicalizations among the youth and the working class.

The radical left’s chance to play a role in the radicalization of new layers with new concerns and new characteristics seems, given the crisis of these organizations and the underlying causes of this crisis, to be very small.

The Socialistische Arbeiderspartij (SAP — Dutch section of the Fourth International) is taking part where it can in the discussions of the radical left about where to go from here. In Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second largest city, the SAP participates in the city-council fraction “Links Rotterdam” [“Left Rotterdam”], which is made up of the CPN, the PPR, the PSP and the SAP. In general in elections, the SAP is for combining forces with the radical left. Initiatives have also been taken in this direction in anticipation of the 1987 regional elections.

But unity with the radical left is not an end in itself. It has to serve to reinforce the struggle, to improve the position of the left wing in the workers’ movement.

In substance, in discussions and initiatives, the SAP proposes the following guidelines:

- * An orientation toward action, taking initiatives for struggle.

- * Building a base and campaigns in the working class, in the workplaces and in the trade-union movement.

- * For class independence on all levels, in action and in parliamentary bodies, for socialist answers to problems.

The SAP’s perspective in actions and discussions is to build a *socialist* alternative to the right *and* to social democracy.

The political approach of the SAP has produced results through a growing role for the party in action and through a successful parliamentary campaign. And that has attracted attention in some quarters of the radical left. □

2. See “Dutch CP splits,” *IV* No. 69, February 11, 1985.



On the question of dual power

AFTER MORE than two years of tumultuous struggles by the oppressed population, debates have now opened up in the major political leaderships of the mass movement on political goals, which raises questions about the class nature of the South African revolution. The following article analyses one of these discussions in the ANC's press and its implications.

PETER BLUMER

The state of emergency decreed in June 1986 has seriously disrupted the mass movement. However, its effects on the resistance struggles have been contradictory. It has seriously obstructed the possibilities for struggle in the townships. But, at the same time, it has favored new forms of unity and organization. Insofar as the state of emergency was aimed at defeating the Black movement, it has not achieved its objective. On the contrary, events such as the strike of 300,000 miners on October 1 have confirmed the level of combativity of the oppressed population. But this does not remove the problem of the heavy blows the various organizations and their leaders have been suffering in the last five months.

The government sought to disorganize the movement by striking at its head, by jailing thousands of intermediary leaders and making the functioning of the mass organizations precarious and complicated. Now the legality of the United Democratic Front (UDF) is under threat, with the government obviously linking this affair to the sanctions voted by the US congress and the financial aid coming from the United States. (1) In these circumstances, it is no simple matter to assess the present phase of the revolutionary and democratic struggle. The state of emergency, combined with the objective difficulties facing the mass movement, makes it difficult to gauge the relationship of forces. It is in this context that we have to situate the positions taken by the African National Congress (ANC) and the variations on the theme of "dual power" that have been appearing in its press.

There is no way of knowing at

the present time whether a debate over orientation is in progress within the leadership of the ANC. For the moment what appears is a discussion on the evaluation of the movement of self-organization and what slogans should derive from it. However, while it is impossible to tell whether this debate involves the real practice of the ANC within the country and, if so, in what form, positions on the question are appearing outside the country in the exile leadership. The articles considered here, which were signed with pseudonyms, cannot be known to a broad public of activists on the home front, and cannot legally be quoted in the press.

Discussion in the ANC press

The debate, therefore, is important insofar as it involves the leadership structures. On the other hand, it is impossible to speculate on what consequences it might have in the short run in actions undertaken by the ANC. To define still more precisely the framework of these exchanges of arguments, it is useful to note that both the press of the South African Communist Party and of the ANC are simultaneously reflecting the same concerns. Thus, substantial articles expressing the same concerns appeared a few weeks apart in *Sechaba*, the bulletin of the ANC, and in *The African Communist*, the organ of the South African Communist Party.

Most interesting, however, is that the subjects discussed in this debate raised both the questions of the relationship of forces and the forms of self-organization, as well as future perspectives for the South African

revolution.

The end of 1985 and the start of 1986 were marked by new advances in the base organizations of the mass movement. Actions such as the boycott of white shops (the consumer boycott) and the boycott of the schools gave new responsibilities to the community organizations. The levels of activity varied considerably from place to place, but these actions were all tests for the ongoing discussions over structuring the national liberation movement as a whole.

The offensive struggles in 1985 tested forms of organization (trade unions, community associations, youth organizations), which after all were quite new. The degree of solidarity and internal democracy, the level of regional and national coordination and the link between communities and unions are all points being discussed in an attempt to chart a way forward.

The disturbing rise of "vigilante" groups attacking the progressive organizations and executing their activists led finally to a search for new forms of self-defence.

In this context, higher forms of organization appeared in the townships. In several cases, the first forms to appear were street committees. Their objective was to better organize the whole population of a neighborhood and, if possible, to coordinate the political campaigns. Such committees popped up in rather widely varying circumstances in the Port Elisabeth region, in Port Alfred and in the Alexandra townships.

Outside of these cases, coordination of already existing civic associations and the improvement of their relations with the COSATU unions has often made unity at the base more real. But this evolution has remained very uneven, given the repression and the disparity of the political situations in the different regions.

First of all, there were the problems in the Cape, where the dramatic outcome of the clashes in Crossroads, in the view of many observers, dealt a blow to the mass movement as a whole in the peninsula. (2) But there were also prob-

1. The South African government recently envisaged the possibility of banning the UDF, which includes a good part of the currents that sympathize with the ANC and religious and democratic currents in the community associations. The government wants to make a pretext of the funds that the UDF has received from many institutions and organizations abroad, in particular the US, for threatening the UDF.

2. On the test of strength at Crossroads between the young activists of the UDF and the local "vigilante" groups, see "New state of emergency assails the mass movement," in 'International Viewpoint' No. 103, July 14, 1986. See also 'Work in Progress', No. 43, August 1986,

lems in Natal, where Buthelezi's Inkatha movement continues to organize a section of the Zulu population and to threaten politically and even physically the people's movement. In this region, the UDF has been severely weakened and COSATU needs to demonstrate a great political adeptness to defend its authority within the Zulu working class.

In other regions, on the other hand, where it has been possible to reinforce coordination at the base, new forms of self-organization have appeared. Thus, most often on the initiative of youth organizations, surveillance organizations and "people's tribunals" have emerged, responsible for settling the conflicts and abuses that arise in the daily life of the townships.

The struggle against the collaborators and the attacks on Black members of local institutions have led to the disappearance or quiescence of a great many structures linked to the government.

Finally, in clashes with the army in some townships youths have been seen equipped with grenades and Kalashnikov rifles and, according to some journalists, have displayed a real military adeptness.

It was in these circumstances that the government decreed the state of emergency and jailed thousands of activists for more or less lengthy periods. This has not failed to have an effect on the movement's capacities for mobilization, especially those of the civic associations. The most politicized activists have been arrested and often been seriously impeded in their mass work.

Assessment of forms of self-organization

It is from a precise evaluation of all these elements that an analysis of the relationship of forces could be based. It is true that in the most recent period, new forms of self-organization have appeared in some localities. But, in addition to the question of the real geographical extension of these activities, there are three other problems that have been explicitly raised by the debate in the ANC press:

* What function and political end should be assigned to the self-organization structures in the townships?

* Can the forms of organization in question be termed "dual power"?

* If it were judged that these advances were still far too embryonic and far from a situation of dual power, should not the stress be put

on much more modest intermediate tasks, rather than keep up the illusion of dual power?

On January 8, 1986, Oliver Tambo, the ANC's main leader, delivered a message in the name of the organization's National Executive Committee defining the movement's tasks. He judged on that occasion that "the Botha regime has lost the strategic initiative. That initiative is now in our hands." And he added: "In a heroic struggle, we have virtually lifted the ban on our vanguard movement, the ANC."


After giving this assessment of the relationship of forces at the start of 1986, Tambo laid out clearly and emphatically what he thought was the democratic aim of the people's movement in the communities:

"The establishment of people's power in these areas, however rudimentary and precarious, is of great significance for further advancement of our struggle. In the past, as part of our rejection of apartheid community councils, management and local authority committees, we correctly put forward the demand for democratic, non-racial municipal councils. We must take up this demand once more For every town and every city, there must be one local authority, elected by all residents, both black and white, on the basis of one person, one vote. We shall have to engage in struggle to achieve this goal and will have to consider such actions Now is the time to take action to realise the objectives of one democratic council for each municipality, elected on the basis of one person, one vote."

This declaration by Oliver Tambo raised interesting problems. It implied that, on the basis of the present relationship of forces, it was possible to get representative and non-racial institutions on the local level. Moreover, it posed this objective as an immediate democratic demand without reference to the oppressive nature of the state apparatus as a whole. It therefore implied that it was possible to make tactical use of certain openings in the local institutions.

What could have been the concrete basis for this political perspective in January 1986? First of all, there was the movement for boycotting white stores. In certain localities, this movement brought real pressure to bear on sections of the white bourgeoisie.

In the May 1986 issue of *South African Labour Bulletin*, Rolan White described what he thought flowed from this protest movement. He stressed first of all that the boycott "pressurizes a wide range of middle-class interests within the ruling bloc," especially because "the most numeri-



Oliver Tambo president of the ANC (DR)

cally preponderant element in the category of 'white retailers' — the white petty bourgeoisie — is also the most economically vulnerable."

So, according to him, the mass movement was setting up instruments for vigilance in the boycott and thereby laying the foundations for people's control in the townships. Then he specified that in the Port Elisabeth region: "Most obviously the Port Elisabeth Chamber of Commerce and the Midlands Chamber of Industries have become increasingly disillusioned both with respect to the state's handling of uprising and consumer boycott. . . . More significantly, though, business in Port Elisabeth has conceded in principle to the demand for a non-racial municipality."

In fact, during the boycott in Port Elisabeth and Port Alfred, business institutions and also Nationalist Party members of parliament entered into discussions with the local leaderships of the UDF. The liberal Cape city also put out some feelers about non-racial local structures.

The *Weekly Mail* of August 29 noted that "the development has led some liberal observers and business leaders to the conclusion that local-level leaders are prepared to negotiate local solutions to local prob-

and 'Weekly Mail,' July 18, 1986. On the experiences in Mamelodi township, see 'Work in Progress,' No. 41, April 1986.



lems — the so-called 'local option'"

These contacts and discussions, however, were not independent of a broader debate also running through the government apparatus over redefining urban policy and reform of Influx control. (3)

That was the context of Tambo's declaration. The objective he set for the movement was clearly democratic, although that in fact opened up another debate over whether the municipal structures and the liberal lobbies in the country had any real autonomy, or whether this was just a fiction. But Oliver Tambo confirmed at least in his message the importance he gave to such tasks, which could perhaps serve a tactical purpose.

Dual power or not . . . ?

In *Sechaba* of April 1986, quite another perspective was presented under the signature of "Alex Mashinini" in an article entitled "Dual power and the creation of people's committees." This time the emphasis was no longer put on immediate democratic or tactical objectives. The author asked:

"What, then, are the immediate tasks of the vanguard movement at the present stage of our revolution?" He answered: "We shall con-

fine ourselves here to the issue of the emerging embryonic forms of self-government and popular power and the creation of people's committees."

While Tambo pointed out the still rudimentary and precarious character of the people's organizations, Mashinini judged that "apartheid is increasingly becoming unworkable, and the country is rapidly degenerating into a state of complete un-governability."

There is a lot of room for discussion on a judgement like that. It is one thing to say that "the enemy can no longer rule in the same old way" and quite another to go on to say that the state as a whole is beginning to be paralyzed.

But Mashinini maintained a certain caution in his judgement. "As a result," he says, "there has emerged (but not yet on a national scale) a peculiar form of dual power, not in an administrative, but a political sense. . . . we are far from implying that *two* [original emphasis] governments exist in South Africa today."

Contradicting his initial assessment of the relationship of forces, he specifies that these organizational experiences in fact represent "no-go areas," and that it is necessary in the future to make them into "mass revolutionary bases" in order to form "people's committees, as a rallying slogan, and also as organs of self-government and popular power, and as organs of insurrection."

Not everyone in South Africa has that assessment of the level reached by the people's movement. But this in no way detracts from the fact that forms of self-organization are *objectively* posing the question of power. Alternative power experiences can develop through ad-hoc structures set up to solve day-to-day problems, and a real situation of dual power would arise from an accumulation of experiences of this type. A perspective of setting a central political objective for such structures is correct, if only on the level of propaganda, because it in fact poses the question of seizure of power and insurrection.

For years, the anti-apartheid movement has mulled over the means for weakening the regime. So it is natural now that the new situation should stimulate very wide-ranging thinking over the strategy for the seizure of power.

One might think, unlike Alex Mashinini, that the country is still far from "ungovernable." But it is nonetheless possible, on the basis of these last two years of intense struggles, to discuss the forms that a seizure of power might take. Such a discussion is not outside the realm

of reality.

However, in pursuing this discussion, you cannot avoid also entering into a discussion on the social content of the "people's power" in question. That, in fact, is what Alex Mashinini does.

The social nature of "people's power"

Inasmuch as Oliver Tambo stressed strictly democratic and immediate objectives, he could avoid this aspect of the problem. But from the moment one starts to talk about the existence of dual power, even circumspectly, it is necessary to make clear who the social protagonists are.

In this case, how can you define socially the premises for a counter-power from the standpoint of the nature of the present state power? These are the questions raised immediately by any reference, justified or not, to a situation of dual power.

It would in fact be very difficult to portray the present self-organization structures as revolutionary instruments of the people and at the same time assign to them only the tasks of representative democracy for a future state that, while reformed, would remain bourgeois.

This is why Mashinini poses the question: "Should we call them People's Communes?" In other words, is this a proletarian power in formation? He answers his own question: "No . . . while we value the rich experience of the Paris Commune, we should, at the same time, not live in the memories of the past."

He somewhat sidesteps his own question by replacing the question of the class nature of the emerging power with that of the immediate tasks that this power will have to accomplish:

"We will call them," he says, "Revolutionary People's Committees, precisely because they address themselves to the very essence of the popular and democratic nature of our revolution, which seeks to establish a People's Power . . . and seek to implement the democratic provisions of the People's Charter — the Freedom Charter!"

If the answers flowed so naturally from the question, why did he have to raise the problem of terminology and the term "People's Commune," which has *no precedent* in the literature of the ANC? In order to understand this, it is necessary to look at

3. "Influx Control" is the body of laws that govern the movement of Black populations within the country in connection with their jobs and places of residence.

the debates initiated by the Communist Party itself.

The CP has never specified the class nature of the future new state that is supposed to accomplish the most immediate national and democratic tasks. The alliance that it has made with the ANC — and within the ANC — has always been justified by the democratic character of the present stage of the South African revolution. But the question has become much more complicated as struggles and political events have progressed.

First of all, the question of the social nature of the state is not only an academic question in this country discussed by a few circles of initiates. Hundreds of activists in all the mass sectors, starting with the trade-union movement, are today debating this problem and posing the question of a struggle for socialism.

Second, the CP is not merely an ally of the ANC. It is an integral component of it. Its general secretary, Joe Slovo, for example, is a member of the top leadership of the ANC. These political relationships obviously raise new *theoretical* problems, in particular about the respective roles in the present phase of the struggle of

Life in the Transkei bantustan (DR)



a movement like the ANC and a party like the CP.

Resolving this problem requires making a judgement about the relationship between the classes in the people's movement. In 25 years, the CP has never modified its formula of a national and democratic revolution, but it has never ceased to present itself as the only vanguard party representing the working class either.

Therefore, whatever the limitations attributed to the present revolutionary struggle, the concrete growth of the mass movement had, at one point or another, to give rise to a "complementary character" of the ANC and CP leaderships.

On the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the CP, in fact, the ANC journal ran the headline "African National Congress and South African Communist Party, leading the people in action" in order to represent a sort of two-headed leadership.

This is the framework in which the discussion is developing on the "People's Communes." But it is also the source, as we will see, of a sort of upping the ante in the analysis of the relationship of forces.

This summer, the Communist Party

journal published an article signed Sisa Majola and entitled "The beginnings of people's power — a discussion of the theory of state and revolution in South Africa." A few weeks later in the ANC journal *Sechaba*, an article entitled "Building people's power" and signed Mzala appeared. The latter article also indicated from the outset an intention to center the debate on "the theory of the state." Both articles in fact had the same tenor, took up the same questions and came to the same conclusions.

While Mashinini's article might seem to have greatly exaggerated the relationship of forces at the beginning of 1986, the articles I have just mentioned for their part considered that assessment a serious underestimation now.

Appealing to "up-to-date writers," Mzala, for example, envisaged turning the clock forward. He argued: "People have now turned towards themselves in order to govern themselves . . . These 'liberated' districts are a kind of re-creation, in the South African context, of Karl Marx's Paris Commune." Therefore, he expressed explicit disagreement with Mashinini's article.

Where do the differences lie? Mashinini had specified that there was a sort of dual power in the "political" but not the "administrative" sense. Thus, he held that the population was not running its own affairs but to a large extent paralyzing the present state apparatus.

Mzala thought to the contrary: "There is a form of dual power in an administrative sense." He added, moreover, that the context of the Freedom Charter was in the process of being applied. He also thought that Mashinini paid too much attention to the more backward sectors: "The calling for creation of People's Committees, however, only has relevance to those areas of our country where none exist as yet, and where there is still direct rule [by the racist regime] in the townships."

Without qualification, Mzala went on to say, "one power is the actual government of the racists and the other is the People's Communes . . . already linked (even though indirectly) with MK [Umkhonto we Sizwe], the People's Army."

If Mzala thought that Alex Machinini had so profoundly underestimated the situation, what might be said of Oliver Tambo's remarks about democratic municipal councils? And what finally are the tasks of the day?

In any case, few people in the leadership of the UDF, the unions, the National Forum and all the other organizations share the following view expressed by Sisa Majola:

"The time will soon come, if it

has not come already, when we shall have to measure the level of development of our revolution no longer by the number of strikes the workers have had per year, nor by the number of military battles we have waged during any given period, but instead by the number of people's communes we shall have helped organize in both town and countryside, building them on the ruins of the apartheid structures."

On the contrary, the people's movement is going to have to count up a lot more strike days to measure its strengths and its weaknesses. No real leadership in the entire democratic movement has yet come out with the analysis that there has been such a change in the South African political situation.

It would be interesting, moreover, to know the facts on which these leaders, whose signatures have an authoritative weight in the ANC and CP press, based such a prognosis. It seems, in any case, that despite the development of a form of self-organization in the townships, the tasks of the day remain centered on factory strikes, boycotts and mass democratic actions.

Which theory of the state?

The parties to this discussion all say that they are basing themselves on a correct theory of the state. But at the end of the day they leave the impression that this "dual power" was created by the simple and sole fact of neutralizing the community councils and the local committees linked to the state. While I would not want to underestimate this victory by the people, the situation has, however, to be judged in a more measured way.

The isolation of the dummy councils in the townships and the recent strikes have not yet led to an absence of the central power. It is still definitely there. The "no-go areas" reflect an initial and partial crisis of the state, but are not the expression of an alternative to the central power.

Perhaps, in this connection, we should re-examine the CP's positions about an "internal colonialism," which tends to juxtapose two different societies (an oppressor society and an oppressed society) without defining the social relations in the overall society, which is controlled by one and the same apparatus.

In fact, the semi-neutralization of the administrative power in the townships is not a semi-liberation of the Black "colonized" society. On the contrary, the mass of the oppressed will have to cut deeply into the "society of the oppressors"

(to use the CP's terminology) in order to start liberating itself.

It is, moreover, possible to pose the debate in another way by raising other questions.

Could a situation of dual power in South Africa take a merely territorial form, that is, of liberated zones existing for a prolonged period? Or is there a strong possibility that it would *also* take the form of urban dual power, which is necessarily of shorter duration, since it rapidly poses the question of insurrection and military organization and combines with forms of workers' control in the factories?

No one has yet moved forward in this debate in South Africa. The question is obviously not so simple if you try to base yourself on the experiences underway and not on speculation. But there is an additional reason to approach all these stories about "liberated zones" in the townships with caution.

Sisa Majola even attributed to these "liberated zones" a capacity for self-reliance, specifying: "Our immediate task is to provide administration for our newly liberated districts And when we have built people's power in the whole of South Africa, having expropriated all foreign monopoly industrialists and bankers of the people's wealth, we shall also have enough money in our coffers to hire skilled technicians and scientists to keep our industries going."

After that, he went on to say: "People's Communes aim at seizing control of every facet of life in their district. Schools, rent offices, clinics, sports stadiums, beerhalls and other such state-owned infrastructures as exist in the townships should be transferred into the hands of the community, so that these services will cease to operate under the aegis of the apartheid state."

Again on the social question

The more you talk about the existence of a dual power, the more you have to specify what its class nature is. That is why Mzala returns to the same question posed by Mashinini about the term "commune" in its meaning as a "dictatorship of the proletariat," as Marx saw the Paris uprising.

In the end, Mzala answers in the same way that Mashinini did, despite their apparent terminological difference. "We deliberately use the term 'Commune' not to imply 'communism' or deny the national democratic socio-political character of these township organisations."

In other words, this dual power that is supposed to be emerging now

in South Africa is to set to work organs of a democratic character representing all layers of the oppressed population without distinction, and not any special proletarian social power.

This conception of things merits a serious debate. In fact, if you just take the case of the UDF, it is unquestionable that its most visible leaderships include broad layers of professionals, teachers and clergy. But such leaderships cannot be presented as organs of counter-power in the poorest townships!


On the other hand, even a cursory analysis of South African society shows that a great part of the unemployed poor, women and youth who live in the shantytowns alongside the industrial workers have more in common with the proletariat than with petty-bourgeois staff or traders. Thus, the best experiences of street committees, as in Alexandra, pointed up the social hegemony of the working class in the broad sense of the term.

The most dubious point in the debate I have referred to is not, finally, the talk about a multiclass counter-power. It is rather that dual power is discussed without even mentioning any social class. A revolutionary situation in a country such as South Africa will combine various forms of self-organization. But in any case, it will be impossible to avoid the question of the self-activity of the Black proletariat in the factories and the neighborhoods.

Therefore, a discussion of dual power cannot avoid the question of workers' control over the workplaces, even if we are far from that today. It is strange to see a debate on this whole business that has not made any reference to the workers in the factories, the working-class population in the townships and the workers' and trade-union movement in general.

Mzala and Sisa Majola, moreover, implicitly raise these questions: "If these People's Communes remain within the confines of these ghettos, and if they will have to constantly put questions to the white city councils about electricity, about water . . . then they will remain a plaything and will amount to very little in the equation of revolution. Two powers cannot exist permanently in a single state."

Not only does this caution bring the relationship of forces back to modest proportions but it also shows that the question of the proletariat in general cannot be avoided. Likewise, it shows that new, more complex and daring tasks lie ahead for the mass movement before it will be possible to talk about a genuine "second government."



The example of the Catholic ghettos in Northern Ireland indicates the difficulties rather well. It shows that "no-go areas" can last rather a long time without state power really being put into question.

In these cases, there is neither a real territorial dual power, making it possible to lay the foundations of an alternative state, nor an insurrectionary dual power making it possible to prepare for the final military phase. The Irish case is very interesting for the discussion in South Africa.

However, reference to dual power also raises the question of the political leadership of the people's movement. Mashinini, for his part, pointed out that "the creation, consolidation and development of Revolutionary People's Committees [will] serve as indicators to . . . how loyal the people are to democratic ideals, programme and leadership of the vanguard movement, the ANC."

Mzala, who on the other hand speaks of an already established dual power, fails to mention the role or place of his organization in the "embryos of our future democratic state." The only organization mentioned in his article is Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, and everything else is brought back to the question of building up "decentralised and autonomous communes to a fully fledged people's government."

The ANC's orientation today

In his January 1986 message, Oliver Tambo laid out quite a modest democratic perspective for the base organizations in the townships. He did this, moreover, in a period where the mass movement was on the offensive. But eight or nine months later, the situation has evolved, and no one can seriously think that the state of emergency has led to a qualitative leap in mass organization. But it is in this

new context that ANC and CP cadres are talking about dual power.

Obviously, we cannot formally counterpose the two theses put forward. Oliver Tambo, because of his special responsibilities, could make a speech directed in part at democratic and liberal circles. The ANC leadership might leave to others the task of providing a more combative and subversive line. There could be a sort of division of labor.

However, some passages in *The African Communist* are not unrelated to the debates within the UDF. An example is when Sisa Majola says: "Today, our approach to the theory of state and revolution in South Africa must proceed far beyond an abstract projection of a remote 'democratic' future in the coming years. Our method must establish guidelines for immediate revolutionary practice, because our revolution has already called forth organs of popular self-government."

Another example concerns the question of local objectives: "People's Committees must refuse to be corrupted with agreements by the neighbouring white municipal councils, some of whom have already realised the impossibility of destroying these communes and are suddenly showing eagerness to render them politically sterile, seeking to incorporate them into their petty administrative strategy. . . . Our demand is no longer to participate in the present Johannesburg, Cape Town or Durban City Council . . . We are not fighting just to liberate and control Soweto, Gugulethu or Lamontville. Our final intention is to form a people's government in the whole country . . . that makes us different from the liberal democrats and reformists."

The attack on the liberal current is made quite clear a little further on in the article when the Progressive Federal Party, the main liberal party, is described as an ally of Chief Buthezi. The same article, moreover, denounces any reformist solution: "Without some of these fundamental

changes in South Africa's property relations, racist rule will remain intact in all its essential features. Such an outcome (to which our Congress can never be a party, of course) would fall far short of a natural democratic revolution." (4)

The fact remains that the Communist Party has never made clear what changes in property relations it considers necessary, at least not in Marxist terms of *social relations*.

Deliberately leaving aside the possibility that a deepgoing debate may be in progress in the ANC, we are left perplexed by certain formulas and analyses in the articles mentioned. No one thinks that the ANC's own capacities within the country have been seriously impaired by the state of emergency and the repression. It is, moreover, possible that the movement is preparing to wage a new political and military offensive.

The sharpening of sanctions against the South African economy no doubt also opened up new political opportunities inasmuch as it divides the white ruling class a bit more. But no one today thinks that it is reasonable to expect a general offensive by the mass movement in the short term.

Already in 1985, the ANC radio hammered away at the themes of making apartheid "non-workable" and South Africa "non-governable." This made a widespread impact on the youth and found an outlet in some actions in the school boycott. However, by the end of 1985, the UDF leaderships were trying to get the movement back in hand and stop certain disorderly actions.

The discussions at the National Conference on Education held in December 1985 in Johannesburg were precisely over a more temperate and reasonable analysis of the relationship of forces. The main slogan of the youth movement, "no education before liberation," was strongly challenged. This slogan in fact was based on the feeling that victory was possible in the short run.

The conference decided to send the youth back to classes, which was however in contradiction to the analysis that the country was then ungovernable. So, the articles in the ANC press are very important if they condition here and now the ANC's concrete activities in South Africa.

The coming months may provide an answer to this question. Such a judgement of the situation would have to involve new and special tasks, in particular in the military field. The situation in the coming months will be a test for assessing the relationship of forces and the tasks of the mass movement. □

4. This refers to the ANC.

A fragile "miracle"

SOUTH KOREA has often been in the news in the last year. The regime of President Chun Doo Hwan has been opposed by mass mobilizations, unprecedented since 1980 when Chun Doo Hwan was carried to power by a military coup d'etat. This put an end to a period of instability following the assassination of Park Chung-hee in October 1979, who had led the country since the last military putsch in 1961.

DAVID CAMERON

The coming to power of Chun Doo Hwan was accompanied by the crushing of a popular uprising in the town of Kwangju by the army in May 1980, which left more than 200 dead and marked the end of the popular mobilizations of 1979-1980. Chun, like Park before him, legitimized his taking of power by adopting a constitution (approved by a referendum in 1980 with a 99.5 per cent "yes" vote), and winning the following presidential elections.

This constitution became the target for a protest campaign launched in spring 1986 by the main opposition party, the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP). The NKDP was founded in 1984, and its two principal leaders are Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. They demand that the constitution is revised before 1988, the end of Chun Doo Hwan's period in office, so that the president is elected directly and not by an electoral college as at present. They also attack the methods of election of the National Assembly, because of the considerable advantage it gives to the present ruling party, Chun Doo Hwan's Democratic Justice Party (DJP).

The legislative elections of 1985 saw a growth in the NKDP's audience. On February 12 this year, the anniversary of those elections, a petition campaign was launched to change the constitution in Seoul. In the following months, a series of rallies mobilized tens of thousands of people in a series of large towns. What was striking in these demonstrations was the independent presence of the student movement that was putting forward radical slogans such as "Down with the military dictatorship", against

the presence of the 40,000 US soldiers in the country and for a "popular constitution".

At Incheon on May 3, 10,000 students and workers demonstrated around these themes, confronting the police for six hours. This demonstration indicated the existence of an opposition much more radical than that led by the two Kims, and which was no longer limited to the universities.

Since July, the government and the opposition had respected a truce while they tried to find a solution to the constitutional problem. These negotiations not having been successful, the NKDP has just announced a new campaign of mass rallies.

At the same time the ASEAN games were being held in Seoul from September 30 to October 5; Seoul airport was attacked on September 14 with five people killed and 31 wounded in the crowd; and the discussion around the possibility of the two Koreas co-organizing the Olympic games brought to the fore the still burning question of the partition of the country.

The student movement did not observe any truce and, during the ASEAN games, held some of the most violent demonstrations against the government and the United States.

The situation therefore remains tense, and the future of Chun Doo Hwan's regime far from assured. The social forces that are pushing toward democratization in South Korea — the working class, middle layers and students — are powerful. But so are the obstacles. The South Korean bourgeoisie and its state apparatus are stronger than their counterparts in the Philippines. They

are capable of weighing up the pros and cons of a controlled democratization of the present regime and acting on the outcome.

The character of the present crisis facing the Seoul regime and the nature of the democratic movement can be understood more clearly in the context of analysing the evolution of the country, the origins of the South Korean state and the tremendous economic growth experienced by the country in the last 25 years.


The South Korean state was born out of the partition of the country in 1945. After having suffered direct colonial rule in an extremely brutal form by Japanese imperialism since 1910, Korea found itself liberated from the colonial yoke by the defeat of the Japanese empire at the end of World War II. But the form of this liberation was largely determined by the geo-political situation of the country, in the framework of the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the Yalta accords of February, 1945, and in particular the section that fixed the conditions for entry into the war of the USSR against Japan, Korea was to be occupied by Soviet troops north of the 38th parallel of latitude, and by the Americans south of this line.

Combined character of the North Korean liberation

The Soviet and American interventions in Korea differed both in form and content. The Soviet troops arrived in the north in August, 1945, relying on a movement of popular resistance and on a network of popular anti-Japanese committees that were to constitute the basis of a new state apparatus after the destruction of the Japanese colonial state. Within this mass movement, the South Korean communists were only one component, even if they were to have a particular weight due to Soviet support and to the role they played in the resistance to Japanese colonialism.

In effect, from the beginning of the 1930s, the communists had led a guerrilla movement that fought against the Japanese in Korea, and following that in Manchuria, before finally being obliged to withdraw into Siberia. The liberation of the northern part of the country, therefore, had a combined character, resulting from both the exterior intervention of the Soviet army and a genuine mass mobilization. The state that developed out of it showed itself capable of rapidly instituting a series of national, democratic and anti-capitalist reforms.



South Korean shipbuilding: second only to Japan (DR)

In the south of the country, events unfolded in an entirely different way. The Americans only landed on September 8, 1945, six days after the capitulation of Japanese troops and two days after a national assembly of popular anti-Japanese committees had proclaimed a Korean People's Republic in Seoul. Before the Americans arrived this new state power had already disarmed the Japanese, freed political prisoners and arrested collaborators.

The American authorities refused to recognize either this republic or the popular committees, and at once installed a military government. It was only in February 1946 that they installed a civil government under military tutelage. This was presided over by Syngman Rhee, a right-winger who returned to Korea in October 1945 in the wake of the American occupation, after having spent 39 of the 41 previous years in the United States.

Apart from Rhee himself, this government was largely composed of former collaborators of the Japanese. The apparatus of the new state in large part kept the personnel of the colonial state, notably in the repressive forces.

The American intervention therefore played no role in the country's liberation, which had already been affected by the mobilization of the Korean masses. On the contrary, the Americans refused to recognize the national assembly which resulted from this mobilization.

Finally, far from destroying the apparatus of the colonial state, they used it to construct their own administration. They would show themselves to be resolutely hostile to any reunification of the country, which would have implied the disappearance

of the semi-colonial state that they had established. Therefore, since the beginning, the state born out of the American intervention in Korea was anti-national and anti-popular. It was to remain marked by this origin.

The decisive period of Korean history between 1945 and 1950 is still little known, but the major developments are clear. The establishment of the semi-colonial state and its social content led to important demonstrations of popular opposition in the south, not only from the communist movement. There had been protest movements against Syngman Rhee's regime, taking the form of mass uprisings in 1946 and 1948 in favour of independence, unity of the country and for agrarian reform — a central question at a time when Korea was still essentially an agricultural country.

Tensions around the agrarian reform question grew following the radical agrarian reforms adopted in 1946 in the North. Syngman Rhee's regime reacted by systematic recourse to repression.

Thus, in August 1949, the United Nations commission on Korea pointed out that in the eight months preceding April 30, 1949, 89,710 people had been detained by virtue of the "Decree for the protection of national peace". Rhee's Minister of the Interior, Kim Huo Suk, who went to the North when war broke out, estimated that between 1945 and 1950, 250,000 people were killed by the regime and 600,000 imprisoned. (1) Even if he exaggerated for propaganda purposes, and in reality the figures were half of this, they remain impressive in a country which had less than 30 million inhabitants at that time.

When the country was divided

in 1948 with the creation of the Republic of Korea in the south, a very large majority of the country's political forces, right across the spectrum, opposed it. This has to be underlined for two reasons. First, because it demonstrates clearly the absence of popular support and the isolation of the Syngman Rhee regime. Second, because it helps in understanding the relations existing at the time between the opposition to the Seoul regime and the Pyongyang government in the North.

The grey and monotonous image that the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK) has today, and the grotesque personality cult around Kim Il Sung, should not be allowed to erase the achievements of this regime and the role that it played as a vehicle for the aspirations for unity of the Korean people between 1945 and 1950.

As opposed to the regime in Seoul, the one in Pyongyang was established on the basis of the destruction of the Japanese colonial state apparatus, and it was composed of militants who had fought against Japanese imperialism. The social and economic reforms of 1946 in the North, in particular the agrarian reform, exercised a considerable power of attraction over the masses in the South. The Pyongyang regime was moreover not really "northern" — many militants from the South went to the North and the frontier between the two parts of the country largely stayed open until 1948.

It is therefore not surprising that the political platform of Pyongyang for the reunification of the country met with the support of the majority of political forces in the South. It is in this framework that the US decided to organize — in the zone under its control, and under cover of the United Nations — elections for a Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Korea in May 1948. This decision stirred opposition from the Indian, Australian and Canadian governments. The North Korean government, for its part, proposed the reunification of the country on the basis of free elections organized in the whole country after the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

During two conferences held in April and June 1948 in Pyongyang and Haeju, "the South Korean delegates were comprised of nearly all the eminent men of the country, with the exception of Doctor Rhee." (2) "The platform of the PDRK . . . got strong support from the representatives of the leaderships of the over-

1. These figures are cited by Wilfred Burchett, in 'A Nouveau la Corée,' Paris 1968, p. 121.

2. John Gunther, 'The Riddle of MacArthur,' London, 1951.

whelming majority of the Korean political spectrum, North and South." (3)

Here is just one example that illustrates the importance of this phenomenon and the reaction that followed on the part of Rhee. Kim Ku, an old and respected Korean patriot, a right-winger but a nationalist, presided over the provisional Korean government established during the war at Chongqing in the Chinese province of Sichuan, under the protection of the Kuomintang. He took part in the Pyongyang and Haeju conferences and called for a boycott of the May 1948 elections. Kim Ku was assassinated in a Seoul street in 1949 by a lieutenant in Rhee's army, who was never prosecuted for this crime. A number of other political personalities opposed to Rhee met the same fate, notably You Un-hyong, president of the short-lived republic of 1945, assassinated in July 1947.

When the PDRK was proclaimed in 1948, it was done by an assembly that had been elected publicly in the North and clandestinely in the South. (4) War broke out in Korea in June 1950, in a context of mass resistance and governmental repression in the South; strong legitimacy for the Pyongyang government; and a war that had been simmering along the border since 1948. It started out as a civil war, aggravated by the intervention of American imperialism and later of Chinese forces.

The swift advance of the North Korean forces was only partially for military reasons. It was in reality much more due to the absence of popular support for Rhee's regime. According to the official history of the Korean war published by the American army, the South Korean army "disintegrated". (5) There were mass desertions. Popular committees were re-established and the reforms of the North applied in the South. After the massive intervention of American troops and the destruction of the new government in the South, a large guerrilla movement survived for a time. (6)

It is not possible to look at the Korean war in depth here. It is enough to emphasise that if the war was costly in terms of human life and material destruction, still more significant was the tearing up of the social fabric of the country.

In addition, the repression against the left signalled a rupture in the political history of the country with the destruction of the opposition that had been in favour of reunification during the 1940s. This rupture expressed itself in terms of the physical disappearance of the cadres who had personified this opposition.

According to one American source, the recapture of the South by the

American forces was accompanied by 100,000 executions or assassinations of militants opposed to the Seoul regime. That is to say nothing of the massacres that took place during the temporary occupation of the North before the intervention of the Chinese at the end of 1950. (7)

Breadbasket of the Japanese empire

Thus, the Syngman Rhee regime started off in 1953 from a massive destruction of the country's economic base and a social and political normalization. At the end of the war, the per capita national income was on the same level as that of Chad. However, over and above that immediate reality, Korea remained clearly less underdeveloped than many other countries in the third world. That is the initial element for explaining its later economic growth.

In the period of Japanese colonization, Korea underwent a not insignificant economic development. Over the three decades of direct colonization, industrial production increased at a rate of 10% per year, and already in 1940 the proletariat in the factories and mines numbered 300,000.

The country's essential industrial base was in the North (mines, metal industry, fertilizer production), while the South was much more agricultural, industry there being limited to textiles and food processing. But the agricultural sector was a modern one.

Kim Dae Jung (DR)



Korea was the breadbasket of the Japanese empire, its consumption of fertilizers, mainly produced locally, increased 60-fold between 1916 and 1930. There was, moreover, a fairly well-educated labor force. In 1945, Korea already had nearly 6,000 trained engineers. (8)

It was from this starting point that South Korea, which at the time could be described as a semi-colony of the United States, began its economic growth in 1953. Moreover, while the real takeoff began at the start of the 1960s, the foundations for it were laid in the 1950s.

The fact that this economic growth could be based on Korean national capital can be explained by two factors. First of all, before 1945, 91.2% of total investment in the Korean economy, aside from agriculture, was held by the Japanese. The South Korean state was, therefore, able to expropriate the Japanese capitalists and distribute their holdings to Korean capitalists.

Moreover, in agriculture, where 40% of the land under cultivation was in the hands of the Japanese, the state carried out an agrarian reform, simply expropriating the Japanese landowners and using the proceeds to compensate their Korean counterparts.

The economic development of the 1950s was essentially geared around producing import substitutes to meet the needs of the domestic market, notably in textiles and agriculture-related industries. These two sectors accounted for 55% of industrial production in 1955.

At that time, industry was centered around the processing of cotton, sugar and rice flour. But this first phase of economic growth quickly reached its limits. In 1955, the manufacturing sector accounted for only 10% of the GNP. The annual rate of growth in industrial production was 25% in 1955, 9% in 1958 and 3% in 1961. Thus, this was a modest industrial growth to meet the demand of the internal market and the needs of reconstruction. Moreover, this de-

3. Jon Halliday, "The North Korean Enigma," *New Left Review*, No. 127, May-June 1981.

4. On these elections, see Burchett, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

5. Roy E. Appleman, 'South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,' Washington, 1961, p. 18.

6. Halliday, *op. cit.*

7. The figure of 100,000 dead is taken from the book by Gregory Henderson, a diplomat in Korea at the time, 'The Politics of the Vortex,' Harvard, 1968.

8. All these figures are taken from Jean-Raphael Chaponniere's study, 'La Republique de Coree, un nouveau pays industrialise,' notes et etudes documentaires, mai 1982, la Documentation francaise. Unless otherwise noted, I have taken the statistics for the present article from this source.

velopment was based on small and medium-sized companies.

It was only after Syngman Rhee's fall in 1960 and the setting up of a military regime headed by Park Chung-hee the following year that the real boom of the South Korean economy started. While it did not represent a radical break from the Rhee regime, the change was not without importance. The Park regime's economic policy based itself on the gains of its predecessor, but it plunged into a new and ambitious project for economic development.

The motor-force of economic development after 1961 was an extremely interventionist policy conducted by a strong state. The role of the state in the economy was decisive, right down to the most minute details.

The fundamental aim of the Park regime's economic policy was to create a powerful export-oriented economy at the same time as conquering the domestic market sector by sector. This project was to be accomplished through a series of five-year plans, by which the South Korean state laid down the main strategic axes of national development, and then acquired the means for enforcing respect of these guidelines.

State-controlled industrial development

Starting out by establishing the necessary infrastructure for a modern economy (transport, communications, energy) through state investment, these plans focused on developing whole industries. During the first five-year plan from 1962 to 1966, priority was given to developing energy, fertilizers, textiles and cement. The second plan concentrated on synthetic fibres, petro-chemicals and electrical equipment. The third plan focused on steel, transport equipment, electrical utensils, ship-building and some other industries.

The export orientation of the economy was reinforced by the devaluation of the South Korean currency, the *won*, in 1964, and by setting up a system of preferential credit for export. By presenting proof of export contracts, Korean firms could get loans at 6% interest, whereas the normal rate was 24%.

So it was the state that on every occasion decided the major options in economic development. It imposed its choices on the individual capitalists, who would have wanted to put to the fore individual interests liable to conflict with a process of "building up" a real native capitalist class. This was accomplished through the state-controlled credit system, until 1980,

and by other mechanisms of control.

The case of the textile industry can be cited by way of example. Having already taken over the internal market, this industry was well placed thanks to cheap skilled labor at the outset of the 1960s to break into the world market. In the short term, on the other hand, the domestic market could assure the best profits.

At that point, the government forced the textile companies to turn towards exports. It set up a mechanism by which, in order to import intermediary products necessary for production, these companies were obliged to export a part of their finished goods.

The economic growth of the last 25 years took place under the aegis of the state but also through the intermediary of the *chaebol*, highly diversified conglomerates numbering about 50. These are big private trusts, generally run by the owners and their families, whose origins often go back to the links their bosses enjoyed with the regime.

The great majority of the *chaebol* have been established over the last 20 years. A typical example is the Dae-woo group, which was described in the following way in an article in *Croissance des jeunes nations* in 1984:

"It employs all of 70,000 people, although it was only formed 17 years ago on the basis of a small textile company. Thanks to the support of Park Chung Hee, Kim Woochong built an empire in commerce, ship building, construction, auto, textiles, finance, telecommunications, electronics and clothing. In Pusan he has the world's biggest textile mill and in Oskpo, an ultramodern naval yard. He is starting major building projects in the Middle East. Today, he is investing in semiconductors." (9)

The extent of the growth of Korean capital in the form of the *chaebol* is also pointed up by the fact that in 1980 the list of the world's 500 biggest non-American firms included 10 South Korean companies and only 20 others in all the other third-world countries. (10) The *chaebols'* activities are closely regulated by the government. The government often even decides what part of the market for a given product goes to each of them.

The result of this voluntarist policy of economic development has been that South Korea has succeeded in carrying through an impressive industrialization over the past 25 years. Between 1960 and 1980, the country experienced an annual growth of 10% in its GNP, as against 3.7% for the advanced capitalist countries.

During the same period, exports of South Korean manufactured products multiplied 150-fold. South

Korean companies thus became competitive with those of the imperialist countries in a series of industries.

South Korea holds second place in the international market for ships, after Japan. It produces automobiles and machine-tools. It has its own steel industry, whose production has come up to the level of internal demand in 1978. Today, South Korea exports entire ready-made factories, in particular for textiles. And this growth has been very largely based on national capital.

The emergence of a "New Japan"?

Is South Korea, then, emerging from underdevelopment, or at least from dependence on imperialism? Are we seeing the emergence of a "New Japan"? The conditions that made possible the economic rise of South Korea are quite specific, and despite its growth, the country remains largely dependent on American and Japanese imperialism.

The existence of a national-capital base and a statist economic policy are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the development of the South Korean economy. This experience reflects an original combination of relative autonomy flowing from a certain degree of economic and military, and therefore political power, and an extreme dependence on the world market, and therefore on the imperialist powers that dominate it. Now let us look more closely at a series of external factors in the growth of the South Korean economy.

The first thing that has to be recognized is that South Korea has been one of the world's biggest aid recipients since the second world war, coming after Israel and US-occupied South Vietnam. This level of aid obviously flows from its geopolitical position in the confrontation between US imperialism and the workers' states.

Between 1946 and 1976, South Korea received aid amounting to 15,000 million US dollars, including 8,600 million dollars in economic aid and 6,900 in military aid. This military aid mainly increased the militarization of South Korean society. But in the purely economic sphere it had not inconsiderable consequences.

First of all, this volume of military aid removed a burden from the state budget, freeing resources for other

9. Pierre Rousset, "La Corée du Sud, second Japon?", in *Croissance des jeunes nations*, No. 265, Paris, October 1984.

10. 'Fortune,' August 11, 1980.

investments. Secondly, the high level of military spending had the by-product of developing infrastructures useful for industry (roads, ports and so on) as well as the building industry.

Korean firms began, moreover, to sign contracts with the US army in Korea and were able subsequently to extend their activities to other countries where there were often US bases. Finally, hundreds of thousands of Koreans received training in the army, either in production or management skills.

As for the directly economic aid, 5,700 million dollars of it came from the United States, 1,900 million dollars from the international organizations (World Bank, Asian Bank for Development, the United Nations), and 1,000 million dollars from war reparations paid by Japan.

At the end of the 1960s, direct aid gradually declined in importance (8% of GNP in 1953-1962; 6.5% in 1963-64; 4.4% in 1965-1974). This public aid was replaced by private foreign capital, not as a rule in the form of direct investments, which represented only 5% of industrial investments in 1970, but in the form of banking credits.

It was through banking credit that foreign capital intervened in the Korean economy. This was particularly true of Japanese banking capital after the conclusion in 1965 of a treaty normalizing relations between the two countries.

These credits went essentially to the *chaebol*. The South Korean regime very consciously chose this policy, preferring to go into debt up to its neck rather than allow penetration of the country's economy by "wildcat" imperialist investment.

The consequence of this was a massive increase in the foreign debt. South Korea is one of the world's biggest debtors. In 1983, it was in fourth place, with 40,100 million US dollars in foreign debts, behind Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, but it has a per capita debt higher than that of Brazil. The service on this debt amounted to 13.5% of the country's exports and the liabilities on it amounted to 53% of GNP in 1981.

In direct foreign capital investment, the United States and Japan are dominant. These two countries alone provided 78.8% of direct foreign investment in South Korea between 1962 and 1980. While US investments were centered on production for the Korean internal market, those of Japanese companies were oriented toward re-export, either to the home country or to Europe and the United States.

An important part of Japanese investment comes from small and medium-sized companies. In fact,



Insurgents in Kwangju, May 1980 (DR)

Japan, the only advanced capitalist country that did not import migrant labor in the 1960s and 1970s, has rather tended to export uncompetitive sectors of its economy to its periphery, to South Korea and Taiwan, in order to take advantage of lower wages. (11)

The industrial free zones, the first of which was set up in 1970, have played a rather marginal role in the South Korean economy. In 1981, they employed less than 3% of industrial labor.

Direct foreign capital investment generally takes the form of joint-ventures, that is joint subsidiaries set up by Korean firms and imperialist companies. But the setting up of such subsidiaries was strictly regulated by a series of laws on foreign capital adopted between 1966 and 1981.

In the joint-venture agreements concluded between 1962 and 1978 between Korean and foreign firms, foreign capital had a majority of the stock in only 28.5% of the cases, while these accords represented only 42.9%

of total investment. At the beginning of the 1980s, such investments accounted for a little more than 20% of manufacturing exports. Only in two industries did direct foreign investment account for more than 10% between 1962 and 1980 — chemicals (22%) and the electrical and electronics industry (16%).

The degree of control that the South Korean government continues to exercise over the activities of foreign capital in the country constitutes a source of tension and frictions between imperialism and Seoul.

For example, at the present moment, the government is dragging its feet about opening up the South Korean stock market's operations to foreign firms. At one time, it promised to do that in 1987. Presently, only 2.63% of stocks traded on this exchange are owned by foreigners. And the government is now trying to

11. Jon Halliday, "Capitalism and Socialism in East Asia," *New Left Review*, No. 124, November-December 1980.

find a formula to give foreigners entry into stock market operations while limiting the percentage of stocks that can be held by non-Koreans.

Moreover, the economy is so dominated by the *chaebol* which are in general private companies, that the total value of stocks traded is only equal to 12% of the GNP (the corresponding figures are 75% for Japan and 100% for Hong Kong). (12)

Despite the autonomy that South Korea enjoys thanks to the existence of a national capital and to the role of the state, despite the industrial growth it has experienced over the last 25 years, it remains a dependent country. This dependence comes from having an export-oriented economy, that is, one oriented toward a world market where the terms of exchange are dictated by the imperialist powers, in particular by the United States and Japan, through their control of the world market for raw materials, sources of financing, international trade and technology.

In 1981, foreign trade accounted for 77% of South Korea's GNP. For the same year, trade with the United States and Japan accounted respectively for 47.1% of imports and 43% of exports. South Korea's trade deficit has become structural. In 1981, it was 5,000 million US dollars (26,100 million dollars in imports as against 21,200 million dollars in exports).

There is also the question of South Korea's technological backwardness, or more precisely of its lack of technological autonomy. For example, in the electronics industry in 1978, 43% of products exported came from assembly units operating on the basis of components imported by foreign companies and joint ventures.

The country's lack of technological autonomy can be confirmed by considering the level of scientific and technical training. In 1979, South Korea had 418 scientists and engineers assigned to research and development per million inhabitants.

TABLE 1

1982	
Principal imports	
Fuel & lubricant	31.3%
Machines & transport equipment	24.8%
Non-food raw materials (exc. fuel)	13.9%
Manufactured products	10.8%
Chemical products	8.6%
Food and animals	6.4%
Others	4.2%
Principal exports	
Chemical & heavy industry products	47.7%
Food & non-durable products	5.6%
Raw materials & fuel	3.3%

Source: 'Sudestasie', February/March 1984.

TABLE 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH KOREA OVER 20 YEARS

	Structure of the economically active population			Urban Population	Breakdown of the GNP		
	Agriculture forestry and fishing	Industry and mines	Services		Agriculture forestry and fishing	Manufacturing industry	Services
1960 or 1961	63	11	26		47	8	45
1965 or 1966	59	10	31	34	45	11	44
1970 or 1971	50	15	35		32	16	50
1975 or 1976	46	19	35	51	26	27	47
1980	34	23	43	55	17	34	49
1981	34	21	45		20	34	46

Source: Roland Benabou, "La Corée du Sud ou l'industrialisation planifiée", *Economie internationale* No. 10, 1982. La Documentation française. Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière "La République de Corée, un nouveau pays industriel", *Notes et études documentaires*, Mai 1982. La Documentation française.

This is comparable to the figure for Italy (674 in 1976), but far below the level of Japan (3,608 in 1979) and the United States (2,854 in 1980). (13) In the high-tech industries, South Korea is a junior partner of Japanese and American capital rather than a competitor.

Technological dependence is compounded by dependence on imperialism for sources of financing. On top of this, Korea is dependent for sources of raw materials. The latter represented 62.5% of imports in 1981, as against 23.3% for equipment, 11.1% for food products and only 3.1% for non-food consumer goods. (See Table 1 for the details about the country's imports and exports.)

The 235.4 million dollars' worth of Korean foreign investments represent essentially an attempt to control part of the country's supply of raw materials.

Korea also suffers from a relative dependence in commercial services.

Social consequences of rapid industrialization

The Japanese trading companies, the *sogo shosha*, control about half of the country's foreign trade (and a comparable percentage of its internal trade). This is significant, even if the other half is controlled by the commercial houses of the *chaebol*.

The social consequences of the rapid and major industrialization that South Korea has undergone since 1962 have obviously been considerable. First of all, urbanization has occurred at an accelerated rate. The urban population went from 28% in 1960 to 55% in 1980. Between 1964 and 1970, the population of Seoul doubled, going from 3 to 6 million inhabitants. Today, it has reached 10 million inhabitants in a country with a total population of 40 million. Table 2 shows the changes that have come about in the composition of the GNP and the structure of the economically active population.

The growth of the industrial proletariat has obviously been substantial. In 1963, the country had 600,000 workers in industry. In 1973, it was 1.4 million, and in 1980 more than 3 million. What is more, half of this last figure is accounted for by skilled workers.

However, the social conditions of this working class are dramatic. It is subjected to brutal exploitation, without social protection, respect for safety on the job and paid vacations, working six or seven days a week up to ten hours a day. It is, moreover, these working and living conditions and the very low level of wages (see Table 3) that explain the competitiveness of some Korean products on the world market.

Such exploitation is made possible by a series of special mechanisms. For example, in some industries, as in textiles, labor is made up essentially of young women who are physically and mentally worn out in a few years, and then they are replaced by new recruits. In any case, this level of exploitation is maintained not only by the absence of political and trade-union rights and by the militarization of society but also by the constant pressure put on wages and working conditions by the rural exodus.

In 1966, the average income in the South Korean countryside was 83% of incomes in the cities; in 1970, it was 59%. (14) This steady migration has been swelling the industrial reserve army. In 1981, 5.2% of the economically active population was classed as in search of work. That did not include the millions of people who work at part-time and unsteady jobs.

12. On the question of the opening of the South Korean economy to foreign firms, see the dossier "South Korean Economy - Still under Command", in 'Far Eastern Economic Review', 21 August 1986.

13. UNESCO, "Statistics relating to science and technology", 1982.

14. Figures cited by Suzanne Haig, "Korea: Two Contrasting Social Systems," 'Intercontinental Press,' Vol. 20, No. 9, March 15, 1982.

In 1981, it was estimated that 30% of the economically active population worked less than 40 hours a week. (15) This percentage is higher in the capital, where hundreds of thousands of people coming from the countryside live in shantytowns outside the city.

While it is clear that the average standard of living in South Korea has improved with industrialization (the per capita income was 1,998 US dollars in 1984), this average conceals considerable inequalities. (16) In 1976, the South Korean Labor Bureau calculated that the minimum income for an average family was 142 dollars a month. In 1977, 84% of non-agricultural workers were below this threshold, according to a report prepared for a conference of Japanese and American legislators on Korean problems held that year.

In this situation, the regime has so far managed, at the cost of constant repression, to keep the South Korean workers from organizing an independent trade-union movement (the confederation that exists, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, FKTU, is an agency of the regime) and from carrying out any major strikes. On the other hand, workers are making up a larger and larger part of the demonstrations against the regime.

The growth of the proletariat is not the only consequence of the economic development of the last two decades. There is also the emergence of urban middle layers. In 1980, South Korea had 100,000 engineers and 130,000 technicians. In addition, there were numerous executives in commerce, the services and public administration, sectors that accounted for 43.4% of the employed population in 1980.

Also to be noted is the spectacular expansion of the school and university student population, which increased from 3,763,000 school students in 1955 to 9,086,000 in 1975. Today, the country has 5,295,000 primary school students, 4,866,000 in the secondary schools, and 1,177,000 in higher education.

In a way, the reappearance of a mass movement demanding democracy is at once a result of the success of the economic policy the regime has followed since 1961 and of the political and social consequences of this success.

Economic growth has created a numerically strong working class, as well as new urban middle layers and a massive student population. The absence of any social protection and of trade-union and political rights, the restrictions on political democracy and the domination of the country by US and Japanese imperialism have fueled resistance and protest.

TABLE 3

HOURLY SALARY COSTS IN 1979 (US dollars)

United States:	9.09	Mexico:	2.31
West Germany:	11.33	Brazil:	1.80
France:	8.17	Hong Kong:	1.25
Italy:	7.38	South Korea:	1.14 (0.37 in 1975)
Spain:	5.82	Taiwan:	1.01
Japan:	5.58		

Source: JR Chaponnier: "La Republique de Coree, un nouveau pays industriel", Notes et Etudes Documentaires, La Documentation francaise nos. 4667-4668, 19 May, 1982.

However, the present movement also fits into a long tradition of popular rebellions. From the strong resistance to Japanese colonization before and after 1910 to the mass movements of the 1945-1950 period, this tradition persisted. The social and political break that came in 1953 had the consequence of shifting the social axis of resistance.

Students at the fore of fight for democracy

Between the popular movements in the essentially rural society of pre-war Korea and the entry onto the scene of the working class at the end of the 1970s, it was the student movement that was the protagonist of democratic and national demands. This was the case at the time of the demonstrations that led to the overthrow of Rhee in 1960, as well as those against the Japanese-Korean treaty of 1965 and against the constitution of 1972.

Again it was student demonstrations in Pusan in October 1979 that unleashed a crisis of the regime that culminated in the assassination of Park Chung-hee on October 26 by the chief of the Korean CIA. But this time the working class and popular layers picked up the torch, notably in the Kwangju uprising in May 1980. And today, the composition of the demonstrations for democracy is more

and more working class and plebian.

The main opposition force today, the NKDP, is a bourgeois party based primarily on the new middle layers. This party seems to be succeeding at something that was never before accomplished, that is, unifying the bourgeois opposition to the regime. One of the party's main leaders, Kim Dae Jung, said recently: "We need the support of the middle class. These people want democracy but they don't like disorder." (17)

That is the problem. Both the middle class and the bourgeoisie itself are terrified of disorder. And when Kim Dae Jung used this word, he was certainly thinking about the student movement. The latter is more and more standing out as the radical pole of the movement for democracy.

Moreover, within the student movement currents are appearing that are influenced by Marxism. And they are starting to pose the basic questions: a workers and peasants government, imperialist domination, reunification of the country.

Insofar as these currents manage to extend their influence in the popular strata — where Christian currents have held sway up till now — the terms of the political situation in South Korea could be altered.

For the moment we are seeing a crisis of the form of bourgeois domination in South Korea, not of bourgeois domination as such. But that can change if the working class comes to the fore, with its own demands, its own organizations, and its own methods of struggle, thereby making a "democratic transition" much more dangerous for the bourgeoisie. The mobilizations in the coming months will make it possible to get a better picture of the evolution of the opposition to the regime of Chun Doo Hwan. □



15. Article by Gavan McCormack published in the 'Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,' December 1981.

16. The figure for per capita income comes from 'Asia Yearbook 1986' published by 'Far Eastern Economic Review.'

17. Cited in the 'International Herald Tribune' of April 7, 1986. [Re-translated from French.]

AROUND THE WORLD



Mozambique

Renamo links with USA

THE US embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe has recently admitted that the South African backed guerrilla organization in Mozambique, Renamo, have recently opened an office in Washington. Renamo, whose full title is the National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (RNM), was originally a creation of Portuguese colonialists, strongly supported by Ian Smith's Rhodesian regime. [See issue 108 of *International Viewpoint*.] Since 1980, South Africa has become the main paymaster of Renamo, which has been waging armed warfare against the ruling party in Mozambique, Frelimo, since independence in 1975.

It was Zimbabwe's information officer, Nathan Shamuyarira, who first revealed that Renamo had opened an office in the USA. The US embassy in Harare said that it was OK for Renamo to have an office because it was run by an "American citizen claiming to represent the RNM", and that "such an office does not require the approval of the US government".

The setting up of the Renamo office in Washington coincides with moves by the far right in the US to reverse the presently friendly relations with the Frelimo government, by putting Renamo on the same footing in US foreign policy as the reactionary UNITA guerrillas in Angola. The US State Department has justified its good relations with the Mozambiquan government in terms of "trying to wean Mozambique away from the Soviet Union".

But there is a good deal of opposition to this policy in the US Congress, a policy that appears to go against the grain of President Reagan's anti-communist crusade. Thus plans in 1984 to provide Mozambique with "non-lethal" military aid were frustrated by right-wing congressmen.

A series of articles praising Renamo have been appearing in magazines of the American right, including *Soldier of Fortune*, a house-magazine for American mercenaries and their admirers. *Soldier of Fortune* also functions as a recruiting organization for mercenaries, and held a mercenaries' convention in Las Vegas. Here were gathered together representatives of Renamo, UNITA, the Nicaraguan

contras, the Afghan mujaheddin and other "defenders" of democracy and human rights around the world.

Rumours are now circulating that Renamo's "supreme commander", Afonso Dhlakama, is planning a trip to the USA. Before too long we may be treated to another spectacle of Reagan shaking hands with a "freedom fighter" who is no more than a hired agent of the South African regime. □

France

Anti-Botha demos

IN EARLY November, all over France demonstrations were held to protest against the visit of South African Prime Minister PW Botha, who came to inaugurate a South African memorial to World War 1 at Longueval on November 11.

At Longueval itself, in the north of France, demonstrations and motorcades culminated in a counter-rally of 600 people, while Botha carried out the inauguration surrounded by Front National thugs and paratroopers.

In Paris, on November 6, 5,000 people demonstrated their opposition to Botha's visit at a demonstration called by the Anti-Apartheid Movement (MAA), SOS-Racisme, the CFDT, UNEF ID (a national student organization), the Socialist Party, Unified Socialist Party and the French section of the Fourth International and its youth organization, the LCR and JCR, along with other organizations.

In spite of an appeal for a united demonstration the Communist-led union, the CGT, decided to organize a separate demonstration, and refused all approaches for unity. In total, over 10,000 people demonstrated on the two marches in Paris. □



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THE PLACE OF MARXISM
IN HISTORY

•
ernest mandel



Illustration by Frans Massem

Regional meetings

IN SEPTEMBER and October two important regional meetings of the Fourth International were held. The first was of members of the IEC (International Executive Committee) in Latin America, and the second brought together representatives of the political bureaus of sections of the Fourth International in Europe.

The Latin American meeting considered a number of different issues. First, it examined the situation in the Dominican Republic after the electoral victory of Joaquin Balaguer. It focused particularly on the consequences of these elections for the left, and the present divisions in the Dominican Left Front (FID), the split within the Dominican Workers Party (PTD) and the debates in the Socialist Bloc (BS).

The discussion of the Latin American debt was continued with an analysis of the various economic measures and austerity plans being implemented in different countries — notably the Cruzado plan in Brazil and the Azteco plan in Mexico. In this context, the process of industrial modernization in certain sectors on the one hand, along with impoverishment of large sections of the population on the other, was discussed. This was followed by an analysis of the stages of development of the sections of the Fourth International in the continent, in Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia.

Finally there was a preliminary exchange of views on Cuba — both on internal developments in this workers' state, and on the various aspects of foreign policy of the Cuban Communist Party. This discussion on a question of fundamental importance for the development of revolutionary organizations in Latin America will continue.

Comrades from Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, France, the Spanish state, Portugal, Denmark, Luxembourg and Britain participated in the European meeting.

The first report looked at the socio-economic situation in Europe. It highlighted the depth of the crisis in the capitalist countries, and the problems which face the workers' movement in such a period.

There was also a discussion on perspectives in the Federal Republic of Germany on the eve of the legislative elections, which stressed the importance the struggle of unions like IG Metal and IG Druck und Papier

would have. Other reports considered the situation in Britain — and in particular the problems facing the Labour Party and its left wing — and the crisis of the French Communist Party.

A final discussion took place on some of the current problems of the women's movement. This looked at the bourgeois ideological offensive, attempts at integration of the movement into state institutions, and relations with workers' organizations. □

Britain

Justice for miners

"TODAY, 16 months after the end of the 1984-85 miners' strike, 480 of our people are still locked out by the National Coal Board; six are still locked up in jail, political prisoners whose crime was to stand by the principles and ideals on which the British labour movement was built." Arthur Scargill, president of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), thus summed up the fight still facing the NUM and the labour movement in Britain to win justice for the miners.

Scargill's article is included in the first issue of a new broadsheet called *Justice*, the newsletter of the National Justice for Mineworkers Campaign.

The Campaign's aims are the following:

- * To rally support for the NUM resolution on victimised miners passed at the 1985 Labour Party conference and the Trade Union Congress (TUC);

- * To raise support for the sacked and imprisoned miners and to raise money for the NUM's National Solidarity Fund;

- * To publicise the "Justice for Mineworkers Bill" [a parliamentary bill to gain amnesty for all sacked miners];

- * To call on the TUC and Labour Party to refuse all recognition to, or to have dealings with, the breakaway Union of Democratic Mineworkers [UDM — the scab union formed in opposition to the NUM during the strike].

Around this platform the Campaign has organized meetings at national trade union and labour movement conferences and major fundraising efforts for the victimised miners.

To receive copies of *Justice* and other Campaign news write to: NJMC, 26 The Avenue, Durham DH1 4ED enclosing a donation. (Cheques payable to the National Justice for Mineworkers Campaign). □

Ireland

AAM conference

A CRUCIAL year for the struggling people of South Africa and important advances for Irish solidarity against apartheid were the major themes at the annual general meeting of the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement (IAAM) in Dublin on October 18-19.

The banner at the head of the conference room proclaimed the clear message that went out from the meeting: "Solidarity with the African National Congress".

Founded in 1911, the ANC this year celebrates its 75th year of fighting racism and imperialism in Africa. To mark the occasion, a magnificent banner honouring the ANC was presented to the IAAM executive to give the ANC during the anniversary celebrations. The banner bears the words of Pádraig Pearse from the poem *The Rebel*: "Beware of the thing that is coming; beware of the risen people."

As well as resolutions saluting the struggle of the ANC and SWAPO, the meeting passed important motions on sanctions, the cultural and academic boycott of South Africa, and on the organization of the IAAM.

The IAAM called on the Dublin government to take independent action to impose a total ban on all imports from South Africa and on exports of a strategic nature necessary to the maintenance of apartheid.

In the wake of the pathetic failure of Conor Cruise O'Brien's lecture tour of South Africa, a motion was passed supporting the cultural and academic boycott and condemning those academics such as O'Brien who break it.

Newry, one of the newer branches of the IAAM, proposed a motion which called for a review of organizational structures in order to expand membership (especially among the unemployed) and activists. This is now being worked on by the executive.

The meeting condemned the detention of Brendan Barron under the Prevention of Terrorism Act by British police in Birmingham two weeks ago. Barron was suspended from his job in Dunnes' Stores in Crumlin for refusing to handle South African goods and was travelling to an anti-apartheid meeting in Coventry when he was detained for an hour under the PTA. □

[From An Phoblacht/Republican News, October 23, 1986.]

Protests grow against murder of Rolando Olalia

THE TORTURED BODY of Rolando Olalia was found on Thursday, November 13, in a suburb of Manila. This murder has aroused consternation in the Philippines. Rolando Olalia, commonly called "Lando," was in fact a central figure in the Philippine workers' movement. His father Felixberto, who died in 1983 shortly after being released from detention, was one of the main figures in class-struggle trade-unionism in the country. He founded the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU - the May 1 Movement), the independent trade-union confederation.

Rolando Olalia, in turn, became chair of the KMU. (1) In August, he was elected chair of the Partido ng Bayan (the People's Party), a new far-left political formation. (2)

The National Democratic Front announced, following this assassination that it was suspending the ceasefire negotiations with the government. An initial protest demonstration took place on Friday, November 14. Thousands of people demanded the resignation of the minister of defence, Juan Ponce Enrile, a hard-liner in the Marcos regime, who has been held responsible for the murder. Other actions will be held in the coming weeks.

International Viewpoint joins in the protests against this assassination and assures the Philippine workers' movement and people of its full solidarity. We publish below the text of a letter sent by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International to the KMU and to the Partido ng Bayan.

Defence minister Juan Enrile (centre) - thousands have demanded his resignation (DR)



Dear comrades of the KMU and of the Partido ng Bayan,

It was with consternation and deep sorrow that we learned of the brutal murder of Rolando Olalia, chair of the KMU and of the Partido ng Bayan. We would like to reassure you in this sad hour of our full and complete solidarity. We ask you to communicate to the family, friends and comrades of "Lando" Olalia our most sincere condolences. We call on all working-class, progressive and democratic activists to join in the protest actions undertaken in response to the murder in many countries of the world.

Rolando Olalia was tortured and struck down because he had become a symbol of the Philippine workers' movement, of class-struggle unionism, as well as of the Philippine militant left. Many cadres of the workers' and people's movement disappeared and are still disappearing after he has fallen.

Crime of capitalist reaction

But this new crime of capitalist reaction is especially grave because it is the first time that a national leader of the legal left has been kidnapped and killed in this way in Manila itself. This action comes in the wake of many provocative actions staged by the military, in particular the arrest of Rodolfo Salas in October. (3)

The objective of this is clear: to block any extension of democratic rights, to put in question what the workers' and people's movement has gained by its struggle since February 1986, to recreate a climate of terror and prepare the way for a return to a dictatorial order.

The murder of Rolando Olalia must not, and will not, go unpunished. His fight for the working class and the other poor masses of the Philippines is continuing without letup. Today, more than ever before, it is essential to build active solidarity with the Philippine workers' and people's movement. □

November 14, 1986. United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

1. *International Viewpoint* published an interview with Rolando Olalia, then chair of the KMU, in its issue No. 68, January 28, 1985.

2. *International Viewpoint* will publish an interview in its next issue with Jose Maria Sison, which represents the positions of the Partido ng Bayan.

3. Rodolfo Salas was arrested by the military as he was leaving a hospital in Manila. Salas is accused of having been the chair of the Communist Party of the Philippines from 1977 to mid-1986. This arrest took place at the very moment the ceasefire negotiations between the government and the NDF seemed to have entered a new phase. The same is true today with the murder of Rolando Olalia.