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**SPAIN**  
death  
to the  
dictatorship!





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## schedule

The next issue of INPRECOR (December 18, No. 40/41) will be a special, 64-page issue devoted to the world economic situation. It will be the third of our twice-yearly special issues on the international economy. (The first, "The Generalized Recession of the International Capitalist Economy," was our January 16, 1975, issue, No. 16/17; the second, "The Recession and the Prospects for the International Capitalist Economy," was our June 5, 1975, issue, No. 27/28.)

Following the special issue, there will be a two-week year-end break. We will resume our regular fortnightly publication schedule with the issue of January 22, No. 42.

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# the dictator is dead...

The crown prince has assumed his throne, under the benevolent gaze of the representatives of the European chiefs of state who hastened to welcome Spain into the fold of "democratic" Europe lest it plunge into the "revolutionary chaos" of Portugal.

Only those who desire to hide from reality can believe that there can be any liberal orientation under the regime of the new king. Placed on the throne by the murderer Franco, closely watched by the hardliners of the Phalange, who maintain their grip on all the key posts in the state apparatus, Juan Carlos will follow the path of his political father. Those who doubt this need only look at the events that occurred on the day of the coronation itself.

During the first session of the Council of Ministers to take place under his leadership, Juan Carlos proposed a limited indulto (amnesty) for political prisoners. Essentially, this measure is aimed at covering the regime with a liberal veneer for the benefit of the masses of the Spanish state and the European governments. But while the governments may be satisfied with this restricted measure, the same is not true of the laboring masses and oppressed peoples of the Spanish state. In fact, the "hardliners" were on the scene, showing Juan Carlos the proper road of the "fundamental laws of the national movement" and making sure that the measure of "clemency" would be as limited as possible. The amnesty affects only those with sentences of less than three years; for the others, there are only reductions in sentences. The judges of the tribunals of "public order" that sentenced the prisoners in the first place will examine the "dossier" of each prisoner before deciding whether release is appropriate under the indulto. Prisoners condemned for "terrorist acts" or for links with "terrorist organizations" will not benefit from the amnesty. And it must be remembered that the word "terrorist" has a rather broad meaning in the minds of the masters of Francoist terror. Finally, prisoners who are awaiting trial and were threatened with the death penalty for acts committed before November 22 will no longer be subject to capital punishment.

The entire underground opposition denounced the extremely limited character of this indulto, which in no way settles the problem that is regarded as fundamental by the masses in the Spanish state: the opening of the gates of the Francoist prisons. On the day of Juan Carlos's coronation the workers commissions of the Madrid region organized a demonstration at the gates of Carabanchel prison, where many worker militants are held. The Francoist repressive apparatus intervened violently to disperse the demonstrators, who had come to demand the immediate release of their comrades in struggle. This proved — if any proof were needed — the real character of the "clemency" granted by Franco's successor. Twenty-one demonstrators were arrested and are still being held in the headquarters of the security forces. There were also demonstrations in San Sebastian and Barcelona.



Chile's Pinochet greets Juan Carlos.

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
## ... DEATH TO THE DICTATORSHIP!

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On the same day, the police violently attacked and arrested some French journalists who were "covering" the Te Deum of the coronation. The Spanish journalists threatened to go on strike and the arrested journalists were then released. These two events give the new regime a sort of "trademark" that is very little different from that enjoyed by the Francoism of Franco.

For the workers movement and organizations in the territory of the Spanish state, the central task of the moment is to demand total amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, as our comrades insist in the following article, translated from the November 15 issue of *Combate*, journal of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI (Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-Sixth Congress), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in the Spanish state.





# OPEN THE GATES OF THE FRANCOIST PRISONS



Among the popular masses, the idea of the liquidation of the Francoist dictatorship has always been identified above all with the moment that the gates of the Francoist prisons are finally flung open and the borders, sealed for so many years, are opened for the thousands of exiled fighters. This feeling is stronger than ever today. The disappearance of the person identified more than any other with the essentially repressive character of the regime is generating enormous mass sensitivity to the slogan demanding the immediate release of all political prisoners.

The fight to win this demand is at the very center of the present struggle to liquidate the dictatorship. The dictatorship is not unaware of the emotional outpouring that would sweep the country with the release of the thousands of political prisoners, among them comrades as well known as those condemned in the Burgos trials, the revolutionary militants, the workers leaders like Zalvide, Sabino, Sarasketa, Mojika Arregui, Fernandez Inguanzo, Camacho, or with the public appearance of exiles like La Pasionaria, Carrillo, and others. The dictatorship knows that this could touch off an uncontrollable dynamic. That is why it wants to grant only a limited amnesty, in an attempt to endow the inheritor of power with an aura of liberalism while at the same time trying to avoid being caught in the sort of situations that would arise if, for example, the returning political exiles were met at the train stations by tens of thousands of people. How could it then be maintained that the opposition is an insignificant minority; how could the failure to legalize the political parties, or at least certain political parties, be justified?

But any attempt to paralyze the combativity of the movement through partial concessions like the limited amnesty is condemned to failure. This amnesty means that the comrades under the heaviest sentences (and in the first place those who are accused of having responded to Francoist terrorism arms in hand) remain imprisoned or in exile. This measure can only be called a new trick, a new challenge to the masses' will to struggle. It only proves that "Juan Carlosism" is nothing but an extension of the corpse of Franco and of his regime of terror.

The mass movement must place no confidence in the promises of sectors that have decided to play the card of a hypothetical Juan Carlosite reformism. So long as the essential part of the Francoist state apparatus remains intact, any liberty will have to be won in struggle; it will in no case result from shadowy diplomatic pressure.

That is why we must not at all wait for such measures; we must begin right now to press for the broadest possible mobilization to win these liberties and, in the first place, for an immediate and total amnesty.

Rallies in front of the prison gates; vigils by relatives and friends of the prisoners and exiles; permanent agitation in the neighborhoods, factories, and schools; central demonstrations in each city; massive collections



(Drawing by a Spanish political prisoner)

of signatures — those are the sorts of initiatives that are needed now.

More than ever, the political situation requires that we reject any wait-and-see attitude and any sectarianism. The unity in action of the various existing bodies against repression and the coordination of all workers organizations to drive these tasks forward — that is what is needed. On the basis of these tasks and these orientations, it is necessary to prepare a centralized day of struggle throughout the country for immediate amnesty for all political prisoners and for the return of all exiles.



November 25, like April 25, September 28, and March 11, marks a new stage in the Portuguese "revolutionary process" that opened eighteen months ago.

After the victory of the construction workers (see IN-PRECOR, No.38, November 20), more than 100,000 people demonstrated on November 16. In spite of the efforts of the Communist party to avoid frontal attacks on the sixth government as such, the most commonly chanted slogans were directed squarely against Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo. In addition, the bakers threatened to use the same methods as the construction workers if the Ministry of Labor persisted in opposing their demands. They "gave" the government six days to come up with "a positive response on the question of our working hours and wage guarantees, . . . (otherwise) we will use new forms of struggle that will openly expose the fake socialist policy of this government, which is actually against the workers."

In the army the "revolt" of the Tancos paratroopers occupies a position of prime importance. After blowing up the Radio Renascença broadcasting tower, the Tancos paratrooper regiment itself exploded. The paratroopers elected a new commander and "placed themselves at the service of the revolution" with all the confused haste characteristic of a completely new radicalization. The government then went "on strike," on the grounds that the "armed forces can no longer assure the government the authority necessary to govern." On November 25, the government entered its sixth day of "strike."

In this context a polarization developed around the nomination of Vasco Lourenço (a member of the Council of the Revolution and one of the leaders of the "group of nine" of Melo Antunes) to the post of commander of the Lisbon Military Region (RML). In effect, this nomination meant that Otelo de Carvalho, who has been strongly supported by the CP in recent weeks, was to be deprived of command of the military region of the capital. Within the army, or at least within many units of the RML, a polarization then took place around this nomination and the consequent removal of Carvalho.

For example, the EPAM (Practical School of Military Administration), which occupied the television station on November 25, adopted the following motion in a general assembly: "We consider that the removal of General Saraiva de Carvalho must be viewed as a real purge of the left; if it goes through, it would open the door to a chain of purges of commanders of many progressive and revolutionary units, purges aimed at the establishment of a military discipline that, while repressing the organization of the soldiers, would allow the soldiers to be used against the workers struggles. The soldiers of the EPAM, united in general assembly on November 18, 1975, decide:

"1. To reject the attempted purge of General Otelo, declaring that we are opposed to this reactionary maneuver;

"2. To maintain ourselves on a state of alert in defense of the revolution;



# THE REVOLUTION IN A STATE OF SIEGE

by A. UDRY



"3. To demand that the maneuvers at the top cease once and for all and that there be no cabinet decisions before the soldiers in the units have been consulted;

"4. To alert the soldiers of all units, calling on them to offer a firm and united response to any machinations aimed at weakening the progressive and revolutionary forces both inside and outside the barracks."

Thus, in a deformed and dangerous way, the dynamic of politico-social confrontation tended to be reduced to the battle around the commander of the Lisbon Military Region. Such a battle resulted in a military confrontation not effectively linked to the mass movement or even to the independent movement of soldiers. At the beginning of September in Porto, the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão — Soldiers United Will Win) had approached a similar problem — the removal of General Corvacho from the Northern Military Region — from an entirely different angle (see INPRECOR, No. 35, October 9), an angle that permitted a stimulation of the organization of the soldiers themselves.

## Illusions and adventurism

But to locate the meaning of the events of November 25 and 26 more exactly, it is useful to recall the fundamental characteristic of the current period. In fact, the whole specificity of the situation lies in the lack of synchronization between the extremely profound crisis of the state apparatus (especially the army) and the degree of development and centralization of embryonic organs of dual power. Such a situation cannot persist for long. It has to be resolved either through a more or less partial restabilization of the state apparatus, or through a growing over toward a situation of dual power, whatever the intermediary steps. In addition, the deep crisis of the state apparatus, which allowed a workers upsurge to go on without meeting any major obstacles, gave rise to illusions in the bourgeoisie's capacity for political initiative and, even more important, in the operational possibilities of the military hierarchy. We have stressed these illusions on many occasions. At the beginning of October, for example, we wrote: "The outcome of this confrontation (the government's attempt to occupy the radio stations), which turned out favorably for the working class, is part of a process of step-by-step revolutionary upsurge in which the workers have won victories without meeting any great resistance from the class enemy. This could create the false impression that the bourgeoisie is politically impotent and that it is definitively incapable of reconstituting a military striking force. This illusion fuels an ultraleftism that is translated into adventurism by the PRP-BR (Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias — Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades), which claims that 'it is now time for the revolutionary forces and the workers to pose the problem of an insurrection.' . . . If the far-left groups continue to play this game, they could well be caught in the same trap the German Communists fell into in January 1919." (INPRECOR, No.35, October 9, p.29.) Once again, at the beginning of November, we pointed out:

"While the crisis in the army is extremely deep and while the progress of self-organization among the soldiers is important, in the present situation it would be erroneous and dangerous to believe that the disintegration of the army has gone so far that the hierarchy is incapable of taking any initiative." (INPRECOR, No.37, November 6, p.4.) Although the crisis of the state apparatus did not allow the bourgeoisie to confront the mass movement head on (without risking civil war), it certainly did not prevent the success of a military counteroffensive against an adventurist operation of the type launched on November 25 and 26.

In examining the initiative taken by the Tancos paratroopers on the morning of November 25, it is difficult to separate provocation, "mad adventure," and the application of a plan. At about eleven o'clock in the morning they occupied the base at Tancos, the bases of Montijo, and the installations of the first air force region at Monsanto and took control of access to the Montreal base. They then demanded the resignation of Marais e Silva, air force chief of staff, who was responsible for the operation against Radio Renascença and is one of the leaders of the "hardline" wing of the hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the links among these initiatives, the measures taken by various units to occupy radio (Emissora Nacional) and television stations, and the appearance on television of Durand Clemente, one of the heads of the former Fifth Division, indicate that the elements of a "military plan" reminiscent of putschism were being applied on November 25, even if the Tancos paratroopers carried out this plan in a precipitous and disorganized manner.

This sort of adventurism does not simply drop from the sky. For two or three months now, various centrist organizations, essentially the MES (Movimento de Esquerda Socialista — Left Socialist Movement) and the PRP-BR, as well as some radicalized sectors of the army, have been developing an adventurist conception that has taken the form of a putschist orientation, under the pretext of anticipating a "reactionary coup."

A manifesto distributed on November 21 entitled "Manifesto of the Revolutionary Officers to the Soldiers, Sailors, Working Class, and Tilling People" and signed by Tome (the major of the Lisbon Military Police), Durand Clemente, and Matos Gomez stressed the imminence of a reactionary offensive: "We are now seeing a desperate reactionary escalation; the parties and officers of the sixth government are joining in attempts to crush the powerful popular offensive." What is reflected here is the position of centrist organizations that confuse the desire of various sectors of the military hierarchy to carry out a reactionary coup, and even the preparation of the coup, with the establishment of the general conditions for doing so with any serious chance of success. The bourgeoisie is capable not only of preparing coups, but also of canceling them or postponing them; the fact is that it is impossible to artificially create conditions favorable to stimulating coordination and synchronization of the efforts of the major part of reaction.



## Centrists and ultraleftists

What do these revolutionary officers, most of them now arrested, in hiding, and hit by repression, propose to do today? Their response is unambiguous: "In face of this situation, the undersigned officers, conscious that their place can only be at the side of the workers, soldiers, and sailors in their struggle for emancipation, popular power, socialism, and national independence, consider that the only outcome for the Portuguese revolution lies in the establishment of a regime of revolutionary unity with an action program publicly defended before the popular masses with the central objective of the most rapid possible transfer of power to the workers organized in a structure that culminates in a National People's Assembly. . . . The outcome of the crisis lies in the construction of a revolutionary regime based on a program of revolutionary unity founded on the ideas expressed in the COPCON document."

This manifesto appeared on the front page of the November 21 issue of the weekly newspaper of the PRP-BR. On November 10, this same PRP-BR held a press conference during which Isabel do Carmo declared: "For us, at this moment, there is no solution except armed insurrection. As all history shows, the bourgeoisie unleashes a civil war every time it wants to defend its interests. Fortunately, the forces of the right possess no army in Portugal. To get one, they must resort to mercenaries based in Spain or to the armies of the United States or NATO." (A Capital, November 10.)

This position reflects the dominant orientation of the two largest organizations of the FUR (Frente de Unidade Revolucionária — Front of Revolutionary Unity), the PRP-BR and the MES (although the position is expressed much more cautiously in the writings of the MES), as well as of the sectors of the military around the signers of the manifesto.

This ultraleft and adventurist orientation takes shape around several points:

a) A considerable underestimation of the capacity for military initiative by the sectors controlled by the militarist hierarchy, which is combined, paradoxically, with a multitude of assertions about the imminence of the establishment of "an authoritarian regime that will assume fascist forms, that will rapidly resort to blood bath and terror in order that 'peace and discipline' may reign." (Revolução, PRP-BR weekly, November 17.) This latter assertion rests essentially on a simplistic conception of the relationship between the economic crisis and the establishment of "an authoritarian regime that will assume fascist forms."

b) A radical misunderstanding of the level of consciousness of broad sectors of the masses, of the grip of democratic illusions among significant layers of the working class because of the lack of an experience of dual power that would enable the legitimacy of bourgeois institu-

tions to be shifted to the organs of workers power, and an underestimation of the negative effects of the division of the working class and of the uneven development of struggles among various branches and regions. All this leads to the most impressionistic judgments about the conjunctural situation. For example, the MES declares: "The military, political, and economic conditions exist for the development of a popular offensive. From the military point of view, the right does not possess the soldiers to carry out a coup; from the economic point of view, the rising cost of living, unemployment, and the satisfaction of the most immediate needs are problems that cannot be resolved without a revolutionary regime; from the political point of view, illusions in bourgeois democracy, illusions in the reformists, are beginning to be clearly overcome and the workers finally understand that it will not be the politicians who will make the revolution in their name; only the masses through their organization and their struggle will be able to make the socialist revolution triumph." (Poder Popular, weekly of the MES, November 5-11.) On the basis of this analysis, the theme of the "popular offensive" is placed on the agenda, bolstered by the idea that the question of power has to be resolved before the bourgeoisie has created "a professional army, constructed its repressive apparatus, and assembled the forces needed to crush us, to demolish all our efforts." (ibid.) It is obvious that such an orientation, even if it does not utilize the PRP-BR formulation on "armed insurrection," implies seeing the revolutionary officers and the SUV as sources of a military instrument with which to resolve the question of the seizure of power, which is itself conceived of as a technical complement to the development of "organs of popular power" (which are, in fact, embryonic, non-centralized, organs of dual power). On this point, there is a striking analogy between the formula that serves as a governmental slogan in the manifesto of the revolutionary officers and the formulation used by the MES in its editorial in the November 19-25 Poder Popular: "We must create the conditions for the formation of a government of revolutionary unity that holds power until the creation of the National People's Assembly."

c) The mistaken view of the real relationship of forces among the "revolutionary left" (which the PRP-BR and the MES consider to be subsumed by the FUR) is equalled only by the illusions in the Communist party. The MES claims: "It is not the 'revolutionary left' that is being dragged in the wake of the Communist party, but the Communist party that, since giving support to the COPCON document systematically at decisive moments of the struggle, has been dragged in the wake of the revolutionary left. At the moment, there is an important new aspect of the civilian and military situation, which is that for the first time a dispute is unfolding between the revolutionary left and reformism for the leadership of mass struggle on the essential fields, in the factories, the barracks, the neighborhoods, and, above all, at the overall level of the political struggle of the working class and the toilers." (Poder Popular, November 5-11.) In reality, since the beginning of October the Communist party has taken the initiative again, after



having been routed during August and early September. Further, there is no need to insist on the confusion of the MES on the subject of the strategic orientation of the CP, a confusion that explains the group's lack of understanding of the nature and limits of the tactical turns made by Alvaro Cunhal's party. Finally, one of the very characteristics of the revolutionary upsurge in Portugal is precisely the spontaneous, partially spontaneous, and semiconscious movement, which is expressed, among other ways, in the relatively low degree to which the workers are organized within the revolutionary and centrist groups; this is, however, combined with powerful capacities of initiative and self-organization among broad sectors. This latter feature of the rise of the mass movement has stimulated a process of self-intoxication among the centrist groups, in spite of (or perhaps because of) their limited size. We would wager that after November 25-26, the MES will revise this position.

d) An ultraleftist attitude toward the Social Democracy, which is expressed in formulas and a line analogous to those of the ultraleftist currents in the communist movement during the years 1921-23 and is even reminiscent of the policy of the Stalinized Communist International during the "third period." The MES says: "Thus, the Social Democratic forces serve the advance of the fascist forces; consequently, we cannot separate our slogan 'Death to the ELP and those who support it' from the slogan 'Down with Social Democracy.' That, comrades, is why the MES says — and this is ever more correct and appears ever more clearly — that the Social Democracy is a phase in the transition to fascism." (Poder Popular, November 5-11.)

The classic themes of ultraleftism emerge here: gradual transition to fascism and the necessity of defeating Social Democracy in order to crush fascism. There is a risk that a direct confrontation with the state apparatus will flow from these types of assertions when it is simultaneously claimed that the Social Democracy holds military and political hegemony. Thus, the MES, like most of the organizations of the FUR, is incapable of grasping the real counterrevolutionary nature and function of the SP. The Socialist party, under the cover of the defense of bourgeois democracy, was and is aiming at disarming the workers, eliminating the soldiers commissions, and maximally reducing the role of the workers commissions, while not suppressing the democratic rights of the reformist organizations or challenging the functioning of the institutions of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism.

It is certainly true that this policy allows the bourgeoisie to stabilize the organs of state power, but it does not follow from this that the SP is the functional instrument for crushing the working class. This appears clearly when, after a success for the democratic counterrevolution led by the SP, the second phase of the direct offensive of the bourgeoisie opens up.

On the basis of their characterization of the SP, the centrists rejected any coherent policy of united front taking advantage, for example, of the tensions that

exist within Mario Soares's party because of his opposition to the movement for the demands of the construction workers and metalworkers. Hence, the centrist organizations not only consolidate the division of the working class, but also fail to offer any response to the uneven development of the mobilization in the North and the South, an unevenness that is linked to, among other factors, the varying influence of the SP among the workers of the two regions.

The events of November 25 and 26 must also be seen within the general framework of the ultraleft policy of the centrist organizations, which fuses with the extremely narrow technical-militarist conceptions held by a nucleus of revolutionary officers who have some influence in Lisbon.

### Too easy a victory?

For two days, November 25 and 26, slightly more than 400 commandos literally waltzed around from one area to another in the region of the capital. Colonel Jaime Neves emerged as a brilliant orchestra conductor capable of using a very small number of troops to whip several of the major military units of the Lisbon "commune" into line. Neves, firmly supported by the SP since the end of July, had already established order in his own unit, the Amadora commandos. The homage paid to him on November 20 by Captain Antonio Bras, who had just been "expelled" from the Tancos base, suffices to indicate the respect this colonel commands within the military hierarchy: "Intelligently, Colonel Jaime Neves was able, at the opportune moment, to once again lend the commandos their real function. . . . He was able to cut the disease at its roots. . . . He was able to energetically denounce the origins of this disease in the army. . . . He did so in order to preserve the unity and cohesion of the armed forces at any price." (Expresso, November 22, 1975.)

But on November 25 and 26 it was not fundamentally the strict military efficiency of the commandos that carried the day. In spite of the profound crisis of the state apparatus and of bourgeois political leadership, what was asserted during these two days was the capacity for centralized initiative still possessed by the bourgeoisie despite its weakness.

Militarily, the command of the counteroffensive was coherent and centralized. But we must also note Costa Gomes's cleverness and haste in making sure that the mass media, crucial instrument of centralization, would be in the hands of the government. The broadcasting towers of Portuguese national radio and television and of Emissora Nacional were silenced; Radio Clube Português shut down its transmitters on the night of November 25 under the threat of intervention by the EPC (Practical Cavalry School). By eight o'clock at night, the government was on the airwaves from Porto, broadcasting its orders throughout the country. The North was available as a more reliable base, and the government had certainly prepared in advance to transfer its radio centers there.



Finally, inscribing his response within the framework of the "democratic counterrevolution," the president of the republic took care to have the Constituent Assembly vote on the state of emergency. The motion was carried by a majority composed of the SP, the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático — Popular Democratic party), and the CDS (Centro Democrático Social — Democratic Social Center). The state of emergency allowed Costa Gomes to take command of all military units and to enact a series of measures aimed at facilitating the political utilization of the immediate military advantages that had been won. In fact, the state of emergency gives the authorities the right to conduct searches and arrests without warrants and to censor all forms of correspondence, including the press, publicity, and propaganda. Further, street demonstrations were banned.

The movement initiated by the Tancos paratroopers, the soldiers of the EPAM, the Lisbon military police, and the RALIS (Lisbon light artillery regiment) was totally disorganized in offering any military response to all this. The combination of the elements of provocation, spontaneous initiative, partial application of aspects of a putschist military plan, and the possible hesitations at the highest level of the military hierarchy go a long way toward explaining the unfolding of this adventure, which some people certainly saw as the beginning of an armed insurrection.

The soldiers of the units involved in this operation not only possessed no central command, but, above all, were not prepared to launch into a confrontation that would open the way to civil war. The hesitations in the ranks of these soldiers increased from hour to hour. In face of determined troops who appeared as defending "legality" against "rebellion," these vacillations inevitably increased, especially when the "dynamization commission" (linked to the former Fifth Division) gave the order to cease fighting at four o'clock in the morning of November 26.

As is logical, the working class took a wait-and-see attitude toward this obscure military confrontation, with the exception of some sectors among whom a mobilization took place (at Setnave, for example, where the PRP-BR has some influence).

Clearly, the Communist party did not join into the operation, contrary to the possible expectations of the centrist groups or the forces nostalgic for the Fifth Division. The CP was content to mobilize defensively in the work places. On November 27 the CP published a communiqué stating: "The left forces committed a grave error by overestimating their own strength and attempting this desperate act. . . . The attempt of the forces of the right to take advantage of a favorable situation to impose such hegemony would be dangerous. The solution must be political and negotiated." The CP was only reaffirming its orientation. For the CP, the false battle engaged around the nomination of Vasco Lourenço, even if its dynamic was very dangerous, fell within the general framework of the CP policy of exerting pressure for a recomposition of the Council of the Revolution and the government.

As for the "revolutionary left," and more precisely the MES and the PRP-BR, they of course called for "armed insurrection" and denounced the "betrayal" of the CP. Here again, there is continuity.

The counteroffensive decided on by the commandos of Jaime Neves and supported by the tanks of Salgueiro Maia (commander of the EPC) won very rapid success. Although this success has allowed the military initiative to pass back into the government camp, the real scope of this victory must nevertheless be measured carefully.

Some days before November 25, Melo Antunes described how he viewed the government's priorities. He said: "The army must be an instrument for action and not a political laboratory. We must correct this error today. We will do this by altering the structures and shifting personalities around. . . . The debate (in the Council of the Revolution and the hierarchy) is very lively right now. A struggle is going on, a struggle on which everything depends. For the only way to continue to be able to govern along with the CP . . . which is something we want to do . . . is first to win the battle in the army, a battle that is going on at nearly all levels. That is vital. A second imperative is nearly as important, though, and that is the battle over the news media." (Nouvel Observateur, November 24-30.)

The victorious military counterattack offers the Pinheiro de Azevedo government an opportunity to take the initiative again in the areas mentioned by Melo Antunes and to try to make a few tests in other realms as well. For the moment, the government is making gains, or trying to make gains, in four areas, while maintaining the state of emergency:

1. The measures of demobilization of the Military Police (temporary?); changes in the command of various units (RALIS, EPAM, Military Police); the return of the sergeants to the Military Police; arrests of many officers; the removal-resignation of Carvalho and Fabião all point in the direction of regaining a grip on the army and of attempting to homogenize the command structures. After the abortive attempt to construct the AMI (Military Intervention Group) on the basis of the example of the Amadora commandos, the hierarchy is now seeking to reconstitute a viable intervention force within the army itself, in collaboration with the police forces of the National Guard (GNR) and the Public Service Police (PSP).

2. The nationalization of Radio Clube Português, the handing of Radio Renascença back to the Catholic church, and, most important, the strict control over the national radio and television station and over Emissora Nacional are concretizations of the measures that the sixth government has been vainly trying to impose since September. These measures reflect a not inconsequential change in the political situation. Previously, because of the influence of the workers of these radio stations and because of their declared collaboration with the struggles of the working class, the working class commanded both a fan-



tastic tool for publicizing its battles and stimulating politicization and a possible instrument of centralization. The bourgeoisie understood this very well. It is thus trying to bring all the means of mass communication back into its camp. In addition, in the realm of written information, the administrative councils of the newspapers have been modified and right-wing editors who had been removed are retaking their posts. It is not at all impossible that the battle around República will come up again.

3. The searching of the headquarters of the MES and the PRP-BR may represent a first step in a policy of selective repression that will initially be carried out around the decree on the "obligation to return all arms" and the decree against "armed militias."

4. The suspension of collective contract negotiations until the end of December is undoubtedly extremely significant. In fact, in taking this measure the Azevedo government is trying to transfer its military advantage into the social and political spheres. More precisely, this decision implies a rejection of the victories that have already been won or appeared probable in many sectors (textiles, construction, bakers).

But once these measures have been taken, even if all of them have not yet been successfully applied, two central questions come up.

First, within the political and military institutions the right and the far right are trying to take maximum advantage of the favorable conjunctural situation. The bourgeoisie has recovered its confidence somewhat. CDS and PPD leaflets are screaming for blood, particularly since there is big panic right now. The Antunes group must be afraid that it will be outflanked on the right. If that happens, the government could be led to make decisions that do not correspond to the real relationship of social forces. And this in turn could precipitate a workers mobilization openly supported by the CP, which today is not frontally opposing the state of emergency and is instead seeking negotiations. Such a mobilization would highlight the presently precarious character of the victory on the government and military level. Antunes is quite conscious of this and has clearly proposed a different option.

He declared on television: "I think that the roads to the right can be definitively cut in Portugal and that the military men who now hold political leadership can be the bearers of an alternative left program, which is a historic bloc for the building of a democratic and pluralist socialist society. The participation of the CP in the building of socialism is indispensable." (November 27.)

Because of the present relationship of social forces and the tensions among the various tendencies within the government, the bourgeois crisis of political leadership has not yet been resolved.

Second, the working class as such has not been hit and the economic crisis is continuing. Of course, be-

cause of the many links between workers and soldiers that have been forged during past months, the success of Neves's counteroffensive has certainly produced some trauma among the ranks of the workers. But it would be an exaggeration to claim that the modification of the relationship of forces on the military field will be directly reflected on the social field. The capacity of the working class to break down the policy of the government and the employers in the realm of material demands remains the real test. The fact that 10,000 people turned out to a demonstration called by the Intersindical (the trade-union federation) and the SUV in Porto on the night of November 27 indicates that the potential for combativity is significant.

In addition, the victory on the military field is far from absolute. On the one hand, many units in which the CP and the far left have broad influence remained apart from the events and have not suffered the demoralizing effects of a defeat without resistance. Further, certain units are already reacting. For example, the RIOQ (Operational Infantry Regiment of Queluz) has decided to take over the functions of the Military Police. It is organizing patrols in Lisbon so that the GNR-PSP will not be able to operate alone during the state of emergency.

On the other hand, the military success of the right is going to permit the establishment of a striking force and the imposition of tight control over arms depots. That changes the situation. But it does not resolve the crisis in the army as a whole. Coming weeks will provide a basis for measuring the effects of November 25 and 26 more exactly.

The defeat suffered in this adventure by a part of the vanguard of soldiers can certainly not be compared to the defeat of the German proletariat in January 1919. The position adopted by the MES and the PRP-BR of creating a "united antifascist commando" goes back to the same orientation that led up to placing the armed insurrection on the agenda. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the blows that have been dealt will permit the bourgeoisie to take measures to reestablish the state apparatus, and this will modify the terms of future confrontations.

November 30, 1975

## CORRECTION

In the article "Portugal: Construction Workers Defeat the Government" in the last issue of INPRECOR (No. 38, November 20) an error appeared. The second sentence of the last paragraph of the first column on page 17 should have read: "The same is not true for the tenants commissions, which on the one hand are much more subject to divisions among the various political currents and on the other hand are very heterogeneous in terms of their real representativeness, the degree to which they function regularly, etc." The word "not" was inadvertently deleted in the text as published.



Today more than ever, during this "international women's year," which is above all a year of layoffs of women, the question of abortion is in the center of the crisis of social relations. After the United States and France, where the independent women's movement placed this question on the agenda during the late 1960s, the problem of abortion is now being posed in the most acute manner in political situations as varied as those of West Germany, Italy, and Britain. In these three countries, as in all countries in which women are struggling to win the right to control their own bodies, the right to decide themselves whether they will have children or not, the question of abortion is directly linked to the social and political crisis that threatens the regime of the bourgeoisie.

It is a crisis whose factors vary in importance according to the capitalist country concerned; but in all countries, these factors contribute, to one degree or another, to shaking the traditional foundations of bourgeois society and to challenging the position of women in particular:

An ideological crisis affecting the family and the church, which is reflected not only in a massive increase in the number of divorces, but also in the fact that broader and broader layers of youth are demanding their sexual liberation and are breaking with traditional morality, with the notions of duty and discipline the system attempts to impose on these youth.

An economic crisis, of which women are the first victims, involving massive layoffs and a drastic reduction in investment in social sectors like health, education, child care, etc.

A political crisis that, along with the weakening of the major parties representing the interests of the advanced bourgeoisie, is resulting in the emergence of reactionary and fascist currents, defenders of order and enemies of women struggling for their emancipation.

Finally, a crisis of Stalinism, which, along with the bankruptcy of reformism, is revealing the deficiencies of the workers movement in regard to the battle that must be waged against the oppression of women.

### Italy: the ideological crisis

As far as the crisis of the family and the crisis of confidence in the church is concerned, the example of Italy is most illustrative today.

In this country in which the percentage of women working professionally is the lowest in Europe (a result of the weight still possessed by the notion that "a woman's place is in the home"), in this country in which only a short while ago the word "abortion" was pronounced only with trembling lips, in which the 3 million women who get abortions each year do so in the most absolute secrecy and under deplorable hygienic conditions, it took only the victorious leftist vote in the divorce refer-



# ABORTION: AN INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE

by J. HEINEN



endum in May 1974 to shake up the strongest taboos of traditional morality one after another. In fact, after the failure of the Christian Democratic inspired referendum to repeal the law liberalizing divorce somewhat, thousands of men and especially women began to speak out and organize to do something about all the other aspects of daily life that maintain the oppression of women: the absence of education about contraception, the banning of abortion, etc.

Last spring, the Radical party, the Socialist party, and the organizations of the far left launched a petition campaign aimed at abolishing the Italian abortion law (which dates from the fascist period and prescribes a penalty of five years in prison for any abortion) and at protesting the arrest of Adele Faccio, director of a Florence information center on sterilization and abortion. This campaign assembled 70,000 signatures in less than three months.

But even more important has been the mobilization that has been going on for more than a year now in the factories, schools, and neighborhoods, with the emergence of women's collectives or mixed groups demanding both free abortion on demand and the state subsidies needed to implement this.

Anxious about this movement, the Italian bourgeoisie felt it had to jettison some ballast by passing a bill that had been held in reserve since 1971. This law makes Italian women and men equal before the law, if not before reality. Also, responding to the proposal of the *Unione delle Donne Italiane* (Union of Italian Women), an organization controlled by the Italian Communist party, the bourgeoisie agreed this summer to pass a law permitting the creation of family planning offices on a national scale. The movement for free abortion on demand reacted immediately to the ambiguity of this law. In effect, the law allows the authorities to allocate given sums to private clinics in the event that the reform of the hospital system proceeds too slowly for such centers to be incorporated into the public establishments. Coordinating bodies among various groups were organized on a city level to prevent financial speculation on the health of women and to bar private clinics from accumulating public funds. These coordinating bodies put forward a common platform demanding that the new law be used to create hospital centers for women themselves, centers in which women would have control of the sort of information given out and the quality of the care provided. This was intended to prevent the pharmaceutical trusts from taking advantage of the situation. Concurrently, women would be able to organize the struggle for the right to free abortion on demand under the best possible conditions.

An initial national meeting of all these groups was held in Bologna October 11-12. Some 500 women came to discuss the situation and exchange experiences. Of course, this initial discussion was unable to respond to all the problems that were posed: How to intervene in the consultation centers and the schools? How to reconcile the autonomy of the women's movement and the need to continue ongoing work with the mixed abortion

movement? How to create sensitivity to these questions within the workers movement? But the first meeting did provide for setting out the axes of the mobilization in the next phase: An international demonstration was called for December 6 in Rome; there was to be a prior day of national mobilizations, organized by regions.

The international demonstration is seen as a first step in forging links with other independent women's groups and with movements for abortion outside Italy; but it is also seen as a means of building the mobilization in Italy itself by having the movement acquire greater political weight in a confrontation with the bourgeois state.

The rapidity with which the customary ideas on sexuality, the family, and the status of women in society are being challenged in this country in which the grip of the church remains so strong indicates the depth of the political crisis racking Italy. And the effects of uneven and combined development are enabling a relatively young movement to quickly assimilate the gains and experiences of other European countries and to attack the foundations of patriarchal society with that much greater force.

## Effects of the economic crisis: the example of Britain

It is impossible here to analyze all the effects the economic crisis has had on women. On the question of abortion, however, we must stress the importance of the policy the bourgeoisie in most European countries is applying on the question of social investment in various sectors, primarily in the realm of health care. The example of Britain is the most explicit here, given the extent of the heavy "cutbacks" the Labour government made in public expenditures last January. This march to the rear represents a direct attack on the standard of living of the British workers, both for the employees in public services and for the users of those services. The nurses, who are among the poorest-paid workers of the entire working class, had to wage a struggle of several months to win pay increases of 38 percent; in the north of England, some 30,000 people were added to the waiting lists for hospital beds this past summer. Thus, it is easy to understand that the struggle against the reduction of expenditures in the public sector concerns all British workers. Further, it is easy to understand the link between this struggle and the struggle around free abortion on demand. The number of abortions performed in state hospitals as a percentage of the total number of abortions has recently fallen from 67 percent to 51 percent, because it is generally necessary to wait one month before seeing a doctor, and it is almost impossible to get into the hospital in time. The private physician makes his money during this time, and the government has agreed to aid the private physicians in order to further reduce the share of aid that goes to the public sector.

Since 1967, British law has authorized abortions up through the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy; the so-



cial security system pays for abortions that are performed in state hospitals. If a very large number of women have nonetheless decided to have abortions clandestinely under the worst possible conditions, it is above all because of the hospital surcharges and the very high cost of an abortion in a private clinic (a price that most workers cannot afford). Nevertheless, the reactionary position on abortion adopted by the government must not be seen simply as a desire to save some money. The cost of an abortion — especially by the Karman method — is not so high as to justify special attacks from the standpoint of the government. On the other hand, when Wilson says that he "does not agree with people who claim that a woman should be able to demand abortion as a right," he reveals his real attitude. For him, what is involved is an ideological battle that affects the role of the family, a battle that is directly tied to the uncomfortable position in which the Labour government now finds itself. This government can hardly even claim to be reformist; through its budgetary policy it is reducing the already very low number of child-care centers and establishments for old people, thus forcing women to take over certain tasks that have hitherto been partially carried out by the state. In doing this, women are compelled to renounce a bit of the liberty they have been able to win on the material level. In other words, this is not the time to grant women new rights!

What lies behind the specious arguments of the Labour MP James White, who last spring proposed an amendment to the 1967 law "in order to prevent abuses in the private sector," and behind the recommendations that have just been made by the ad hoc Select Committee set up to examine the White proposal, is obviously the desire to make women as vulnerable as possible and to make them bear the social consequences of the economic crisis. James White proposed to restrict the "social" clauses, to refuse to authorize abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy, and to prohibit any "publicity" about this subject, which amounts to a ban on any writings about abortion. As for the Select Committee, it proposed that any woman who wants an abortion be compelled to sign up in a specialized office; and the health department would have the right to set limits on the number of foreign women who could get abortions; these women could not be accepted in clinics without authorization.

Although they do not fundamentally alter the 1967 law, the proposals of the Select Committee nonetheless move in the direction of those who glorify maternity, those who are struggling fiercely against the independent women's movement and against the National Abortion Campaign (NAC — a national movement on abortion formed last spring). The right of women to freely decide whether or not they want children thus remains to be won in Britain as elsewhere.

The NAC has understood this. Last June NAC waged the broadest campaign of any European country and succeeded in organizing a demonstration of 25,000 people against the White amendments. The action was a partial success, for the amendments were not put to a vote in

Parliament. In addition, NAC organized a national conference of 1,000 delegates October 19 and 20. They set themselves the task of building the broadest possible mobilization throughout the country during the next few months, and especially at the end of November, when the Parliament is supposed to reelect the Select Committee. The first objective set by the delegates of the seventeen local and national trade-unions and sixty-nine local NAC groups represented was to prevent the committee from being reelected and to popularize the demand for free abortion on request adopted this autumn by the congresses of the TUC (the national trade-union federation) and the Labour party.

One of the main axes of the NAC campaign during the summer was intervention in the health sector. Pickets were organized in front of hospitals to protest the shortages of beds and the reactionary attitude of many doctors, who refuse to perform abortions in public establishments. This campaign got a very big response. Very often, it was the hospital workers themselves, both men and women, who organized the pickets on abortion, thus showing that for them the demand for free abortion on request is linked to all the demands around their working conditions and the needs of the working class as a whole.

## Reaction raises its head

The importance of this battle is especially great since wherever the independent women's movement or the mixed movement on abortion has become strong enough to force the bourgeoisie to partially yield to their demands, reactionary associations have emerged. Their names vary, but their proclaimed aims are identical, whether they call themselves "Laissez les vivre" (Let them live), Friends of the Fetus, "Oui à la vie" (Yes to life), or Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC). Nearly always, these associations are linked both to the most reactionary currents of the Catholic church and to the xenophobic and even fascist currents of the far right. As far as they are concerned, the desire of women to be recognized as equal to men is a direct attack on all their racist schemas, on their hierarchical vision of society, and on their will to maintain a set order. In spite of the exaggerated declarations and often ridiculous antics of these groups, neither their importance nor their audience, even within the workers movement, should be underestimated. The objective division of the workers movement, its lack of response to the question of the emancipation of women, the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie, the ideas implanted in the heads of workers from tender infancy, the fear of materialism and of anything that threatens to challenge the traditional relations among people — these are the factors that lend these currents some credibility. But their actual weight varies according to the greater or lesser and more or less official support they receive from the church and according to the depth of male chauvinist traditions and the weight of the racist current in the given country.



In Britain, the SPUC is very powerful. It is obvious that the 1970 SPUC demonstration of 70,000 and the more recent demonstration of 30,000 last April were not composed solely of priests or members of Enoch Powell's organization. Of course, this movement is supported by layers of the bourgeois elite, like reactionary doctors. In September, these doctors organized a supposedly "scientific" medical conference around the theme of "respect for human life"; the NAC responded by organizing a picket line in front of the Birmingham hospital where the conference was held. But it remains true that significant layers of the working class, and even of women, are influenced by this association. To the point that they listen with a straight face to statements like that of an MP and gynecology professor who asserted: "The fetus breathes just like a baby in his crib. . . . The only difference is that any attempt to cry is stifled by the water in which the infant is submerged."

That such obscurantism can have a grip on the working class shows how important are the propaganda activities of NAC, the information and education that must be carried out on all levels, from the schools to the trade-unions to the factories.

In the United States, a recent inquiry showed that half the women who wanted abortions in 1974 were unable to get them in hospitals because of the shortage of beds. These were primarily young women workers and rural poor who live in areas where the hospital infrastructure is very undeveloped. Thus, it is not surprising that reaction is taking advantage of this state of affairs to take some action.

The Catholic church is waging a hysterical campaign for the "rights of the fetus," calling abortion murder and encouraging, for example, the condemnation of Dr. Kenneth Edelin, a Black physician who heads up a gynecology clinic in a Boston hospital and is known for being one of the few practicing physicians in this hospital willing to perform abortions. Dr. Edelin was convicted of murder on the grounds that he had performed an abortion and had not attempted to save the fetus, which was alleged by the authorities to be "viable." Those in the Catholic church who defend the life of the fetus to the point of demanding that thousands of dollars be spent on trying to keep three-to-four-months-old fetuses alive artificially are the same people who stoned the buses carrying Black children to predominantly white schools. They are the same people who encourage the forced sterilization of Black and Chicana women in order to limit the nonwhite population.

In France, a problem is posed because the *Mouvement pour la Liberté de l'Avortement et de la Contraception* (MLAC — Movement for Free Abortion and Contraception) has lost much of its strength after the passage in January 1975 of a law authorizing women to get abortions up through the tenth week of pregnancy. Since then, organizations like "Laissez les vivre" have gained strength. Today they are trying to eradicate the gains made by the movement.

Because of the reluctance of the trade-union federations to do anything serious about the demand for free abortion on demand (although, thanks to MLAC's actions, this demand figures in the joint platform of the CGT and the CFDT, the main two national trade-union federations), reactionaries of all stripes have found it easy to wage their campaign. They propose to "isolate the abortionists of the nation by recommending that the public patronize only physicians who respect human life." Further, they want to "provoke civic awareness by initiating court cases requesting that the portion of tax money and social contributions allotted to 'the financing of legal abortions' be refunded." This movement, which claims to have more than 20,000 members today, intends to publish a list of approximately 1,500 physicians who are opposed to abortion. In addition, they proudly claim that since the formation of the group in 1971, they have prevented 5-6 percent of women who had wanted abortions from getting them, through the work of the "SOS-Future Mothers" association to which "Laissez les vivre" is linked.

In face of this situation, the task of revolutionaries is not to close their eyes to or minimize such a current, but to do everything to make the workers movement as a whole take up the defense of the elementary right, restricted as it is, that has been recently won. Wherever possible, debates must be conducted and actions must be carried out showing the link between exploitation and the specific oppression of women, between the reactionary aims of a section of the bourgeoisie and the overall interests of the employers. The employers would be only too happy to have at their command a malleable and enslavable work force unable to defend itself because of its lack of skill, its low level of organization in trade unions, and, nearly always, its submission to the idea that "women's work" is only secondary and does not deserve equal pay.

What is true in France is even more true in Switzerland. In this country women have not even won the right of abortion, and the trade unions did nothing except weakly support an initiative demanding freedom of abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. But the adherents of the "Oui à la vie" group have already organized a conference centering around the theme that "abortion is murder and decriminalization encourages the crime." In Geneva the MLF (*Mouvement pour la Libération des Femmes* — Women's Liberation Movement) occupied the office of the PDC (*Parti Démocratique Chrétien* — Christian Democratic party), designating it as "an enemy of women because the PDC blocked a debate on abortion during the last session of the Chamber of Deputies." The comrades took advantage of the occasion to use the PDC press to print a bulletin on abortion. But the impact of this action on the working class remains very weak, since the trade unions themselves will not agree to participate in this struggle. The conference of the women's division of the *Union Syndicale Suisse* (the trade-union federation that includes all the secular unions), which is to be held at the end of November, may provide an opportunity to take the first steps in this direction.



If the groups that are determined to fight against the right of women to control their own bodies have been able to partially develop in all these various countries (and many other examples could be cited), the reason is that the wing of the bourgeoisie that holds more enlightened positions on the question has felt no need to intervene against the reactionary current (or has had no means by which to do so). This proves one thing: When the bourgeoisie gave in and granted more or less progressive legislation, depending on the country, it was not because the bourgeoisie "sincerely" wanted the liberation of women; it was because the bourgeoisie wanted to hold back a movement of radicalization of women that was becoming dangerous. This movement was threatening to contaminate other layers of the population and, through its challenging of the oppression of women and the nuclear family, was threatening to expose the very foundations of patriarchal society.

### Policy of the «progressive bourgeoisie»

The governments that put up such resistance before agreeing to distribute the pill and are still extremely reluctant about any propaganda in favor of the pill nevertheless do not hesitate when it comes to granting financial aid to India so that the authorities in that country can force women to use contraception in order to limit the increase in the birth rate. Allan Barnes of the Rockefeller Foundation complains that women are constantly demanding improved means of contraception and goes on to add: "If the ideal contraceptive were discovered today, it would certainly not be introduced in the United States, but in a country like India, where there is a much larger and more eager market for this sort of product." By "ideal" contraceptive, this gentleman means a profitable contraceptive and not an effective one, as women have the insolence to demand.

What is important to the bourgeoisie as far as abortion is concerned is not so much the economic aspect of the problem (except in the case of what is called "overpopulation") as the political aspect: The question of the women challenging the status assigned to them in society. In countries like Spain, Portugal, or Ireland, where the influence of the Catholic church remains very strong, the bourgeoisie is still totally opposed to any liberalization. But one has only to look at the example of Italy to see that the bourgeoisie will not be able to maintain this attitude indefinitely. In all the other countries, most of the bourgeois parties have understood that they have an interest in making concessions if such concessions can avoid a deepening of the social crisis. In this sense, it is essential for them to prevent women from becoming really independent. What will become of the family if women become conscious of their rights? And if the family is shaken, what will become of moral order? And what will become of cheap labor when women become strong enough to demand wages equal to men?

The position of the reformists contributes a lot to preventing working women from becoming conscious of all this, for the reformists allow all the parliamentary illu-



sions to persist, making abortion a simple problem of laws. They do not move in the direction of challenging the status of either women or the family.

The position of all the European Communist parties is quite explicit on this subject. This position runs from the Italian CP — which during the campaign around divorce asserted, "No, divorce does not destroy the family" and which in its proposed law on abortion concedes that women should be punished if they undergo abortions without making a prior request — to the French Communist party, which has always refused to support MLAC and which declared very recently: "The family, where the future producers are born and grow up, is an indispensable factor for the existence of humanity and for humanity's constant march toward progress."

Fundamentally limited by an ideology that seeks to reconcile the traditional place of women in the home with women's right to work, the Stalinists always talk of "compensation" for women but never challenge women's role in the family. As for abortion, for them it is a last resort that must not be abused. In Switzerland the doctor who is the spokesman for the Parti du Travail (the Swiss version of the CP) on this question asserts with a straight face that he manages to convince one-third of all women who come to consult him to keep their children. If some representatives of the Communist parties are now beginning to make some timid criticisms of the traditional family structure, it is because of the pressure of demands put forward by the independent women's



# MOUVEMENT POUR LA LIBERTE DE L'AVORTEMENT ET DE LA CONTRACEPTION



movements, to which women Communist militants are sensitive; the CP leaders are afraid of being cut off from a section of their rank and file.

This is also true of the Social Democracy, although with some differences.

## Position of the SPD

While the small Italian Socialist party has taken a more progressive position than the Italian CP on the question of abortion in order to gain a little more credibility, the German SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands — Social Democratic party of Germany) has shown its real face: A government party applying a bourgeois policy derived from the right-wing positions of most of the SPD parliamentary deputies and from the positions of the SPD's bourgeois allies. During its latest congress (1973), the SPD formally came out for freedom of abortion. In fact, 80 percent of women in Germany have indicated that they support total abolition of Paragraph 218 of the legal code (introduced under Bismark), which makes abortion a crime. For the SPD this is not a small argument from an electoral standpoint, especially since it concerns a reform that is not very costly.

In spite of that, in June 1974, when the vote on the liberalization of the abortion law came up in the Bundes-

tag (the parliament), some SPD deputies voted against. And the party leadership did not react when, six months later, the Karlsruhe supreme court declared the new law unconstitutional. (It is true, however, that many rank-and-file militants and trade unionists of the SPD took to the streets to protest, along with thousands of other people.)

"The law is the law, and the law is made in the name of the people, even if the people themselves have not passed this particular law." It is probably this concept that has induced the SPD to make a new proposal for the new debate on abortion that is to come up in the Bundestag. There is no question of simply demanding the abolition of Paragraph 218, as is demanded by German women's groups and the "Abortion Action" organization formed this autumn. No, the solution proposed by the Social Democrats basically changes nothing. Abortion remains a crime; it will not be paid for by health insurance, and if the consulting physician refuses to grant permission for an abortion, the woman concerned will be unable to have an abortion clandestinely, because she will have been registered as a pregnant woman. If she has an abortion anyway, she will be subject to an automatic sentence.

Both the Stalinists and the Social Democrats are playing the game of the bourgeoisie: pass some reforms, try to coopt any developing movement, make the minimum concessions, challenge nothing fundamental.



Nevertheless, it is clear that both the Stalinists and Social Democrats can be compelled to make a left turn on this question: The position of the reformists is scarcely credible in view of the crisis of authority and the crisis of the family in particular, which is becoming more and more important among the youth, and in view of the impact of the women's liberation movement on all women, even if this impact still takes the form of rejection among many women. The reformists can remain as backward as they are only so long as the movement of radicalization around these questions remains marginal to the workers movement (which is still generally the case, although a change has begun in Britain).

## Importance of the coming mobilizations

It thus becomes essential not only that revolutionaries play an active role in the campaigns to win or defend the right of free abortion on demand, but also that they axis their intervention toward the workers movement. The examples of the radicalization of working women mentioned above show that it is beginning to be possible to effect a linkup between working women and the independent women's movement, which has up to now been largely composed of generally unorganized women intellectuals, students, and women of bourgeois origins who were radicalized after May 1968.

This linkup is proving to be possible even in the United States, where the class struggle is at a very low level, and even in Italy, where the dominant phallocratism is an even greater obstacle than elsewhere to the development of consciousness among women of the working-class.

The fantastic success of the strike of Icelandic women on October 24, a strike that was followed by 95 percent of women wage earners and was massively supported by housewives, is one more sign of the capacity of working women to organize to refuse to continue being the most oppressed and exploited. Totally paralyzing the postal system, the banks, and most offices, these women offered proof of their strength.

The many women's groups in factories that have recently been formed in France also show that the "women's liberation movement" now has a much more complex composition than it did a year or two ago. These women's groups, which have often appeared during or after struggles waged by all the workers around immediate demands, exist today because it is precisely during struggles that women become conscious of their specific problems, particularly by noting, for example, that they are the ones who have to leave the general assemblies to go home and take care of the children on the grounds that there is no child-care system. And the inequality between the male and female striker exists in the simple fact that it is always the men who take the floor. In organizing among themselves to try to break down this state of affairs, women are in fact joining the ranks of the inde-

pendent movement, even if they do not consider themselves "women's liberationists."

The women active in these groups clearly see the necessity of forcing the trade unions to take positions on all the problems that affect them. The unions' refusal or agreement to actively commit themselves to the battle for abortion will in large part depend on these women.

But this will also depend on the capacity of the revolutionary organizations, and revolutionary Marxists in particular, to build a strong movement around abortion, a movement that represents all the exploited and oppressed social layers, in which the workers organizations will be represented, but a movement that is also capable of incorporating all those men and women who are sensitive to this question and are prepared to act to force the bourgeoisie to retreat.

This is the direction in which our comrades of the International Marxist Group are working in Britain; through their work, they have stimulated the creation of dozens of NAC groups and have helped to coordinate these groups as well.

Likewise, the activity of our Italian comrades of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups) within the women's collectives and the mixed groups on abortion has contributed heavily to achieving the beginning of a centralization of the movement.

In Germany, where the movement has arisen more recently, everything must be done to make the movement so large that it forces the Bundestag and the Schmidt government to yield to its demands. The demonstration that took place in Frankfurt on October 26, although it drew an insufficient number of people (5,000-6,000), was a first step in this direction. The important thing now is to consolidate the campaign by winning over women's groups and trade-union groups to the perspective of this struggle in order to make the deputies give in when the parliamentary debate comes up and in order to bolster the confidence of those people who tended to get discouraged after the Karlsruhe court decision. They must be shown that the struggle can and must be continued on all fields relating to the oppression of women.

Revolutionary Marxists in all countries must work in this same direction, systematically advancing their own demands to drive the debate forward, but remaining attentive to the fact that the new aspect of the radicalization now taking place around the theme of the oppression of women, and more particularly around the theme of abortion, allows these questions to be discussed and taken up by the workers movement.

In this sense, the international demonstration in Rome on December 6 organized by the Italian coordinating group will represent an international gathering point for all the European movements struggling for freedom of abortion; it should also provide for working out the possibilities for common action in the future. ■





# *neoreformist strategy*

by LIVIO MAITAN

The joint declaration issued November 13 by the Italian Communist party (PCI — Partito Comunista Italiano) and the French Communist party (PCF — Parti Communiste Français), the importance of which cannot be overlooked, was inspired primarily by tactical political considerations internal to the international movement of Communist parties. There is no doubt that Berlinguer (of the PCI) and Marchais (of the PCF) wanted to further clarify their positions before the convening of the European conference of Communist parties, making it clear that their present course will not be altered by any resolution passed by that conference (or by any possible reticence or ambiguity in a compromise resolution). Taking such a stand was especially necessary because several months ago Pravda, expressing an interpretation of Leninism that had been immediately rejected by the leaders of both the PCI and the PCF, had made it known, even if only indirectly, that Brezhnev and company were watching the evolution of the two largest Communist parties of the capitalist world with some concern. The fact that this was done so sharply even by the PCF, which has traditionally been cautious in taking distance from the Soviet leaders, and the fact that the November 13 declaration came as a followup to the declaration of Berlinguer and Spanish CP leader Santiago Carrillo last July indicate that a pole has now been formed by the West European CPs, a pole that is determined to assert ever greater political and theoretical autonomy. (It may be noted in passing that during the same period the Soviet CP received an unhappy surprise from

the British CP, which took a formal position in favor of oppositionists who have been hit by bureaucratic repression in the USSR.) In a commentary published in the Paris daily *Le Monde*, Alberto Jacoviello, editor of the PCI's official daily, *l'Unità*, went so far as to affirm explicitly: "Up to now, the differences between the two most powerful Communist forces of West Europe had contributed in no small measure to maintaining foreign hegemony. The breach is now healed."

But the signers of the declaration also had more particular reasons for solemnly proclaiming their "agreement on the essential problems," as the PCF daily, *l'Humanité*, put it in a headline. Berlinguer obviously wants to put an end to the period of more or less explicit appeals to orthodoxy by his French colleagues, because then he does not have to worry about any possible utilization of such criticisms by opponents within the PCI itself. Marchais, who is threatened by the new rise of the Socialist party in France, has an even greater need for an official agreement, so as not to be periodically opposed by the orientation of his Italian comrades. He needs to combine tougher conjunctural tactical positions, more intransigent in appearance, with an ever more explicit affirmation of his "democratic consistency," of the organic unity of his strategic options.

But the principal mainspring of the declaration was most probably the present situation in capitalist Europe. The leaders of the Communist parties no longer utilize the



categories prerevolutionary or revolutionary situation (yet another sign of their theoretical decay and political regression). Nevertheless, they cannot ignore the reality of a crisis that is now racking many countries of the continent and "affects every aspect of economic, social, political, moral, and cultural life." They cannot ignore the fact that ever broader layers of the working class are posing not only problems of immediate political and tactical orientation, but also basic problems of the struggle for the transition to socialism. The Portuguese events of recent months have blown these problems up so sharply that they cannot be avoided.

The November 13 declaration was intended as a response to these new exigencies. Of course, the ideas and positions contained in the declaration in no way represent anything new in substance compared with other theses that have been approved separately by the two parties. But the important thing is that certain positions have now been reaffirmed more explicitly, not in documents that will be known only to party members and interested observers, but in a statement aimed at a broad international audience. The important thing is that the PCF has overcome the final obstacles and has decided to draw out all the implications of a conception that in the past it had sought to conceal behind a smoke-screen of stereotypic appeals to orthodoxy.

Thus, the declaration is intended as a sort of strategic outline for the Communist parties of West Europe. It is a neoreformist outline that, despite the proclamations of novelty and originality, repeats all the essential concepts, and sometimes even the terminology, of the Social Democracy of the Second International. The title of the article by Jacoviello quoted above, "In search of socialism that is possible," is in itself indicative of the reformist and gradualist inspiration of the document.<sup>(1)</sup>

The document begins by noting the "crisis that is hitting the capitalist system as a whole and this is affecting all economic relations on a world scale." The conclusion is not that the solution to this crisis requires breaking the very framework of this system and overthrowing an economic mechanism based on exploitation and profit, but rather that "the working class and the popular masses can, through struggle, . . . win new gains and open the way to new social and democratic progress" and that the PCI and the PCF, while "they wage the struggle for the immediate interests of the workers and the popular masses, at the same time act for a policy of deep democratic reforms that would permit solving the grave economic, social, and political problems of their countries." Thus, the perspective is not one of struggle for socialism but instead one of a struggle for an "advanced" democracy under which these reforms would be carried out. In this regard, one simple question may be put to the bureaucrats: Isn't there a massive contradiction between the fact that more than a half century ago, at the time of their founding, the PCI and the PCF claimed that socialist revolution was on the agenda and the fact that today, in the context of a much more profound crisis of the system both worldwide

and in Europe itself, they now talk about democratic reforms and do not advance the overthrow of capitalism as an objective to be attained in the current phase?

To remove all doubt about their break with "old" conceptions and schemas, the PCF and PCI explain: "The Italian and French Communists consider that the march to socialism and the construction of socialist society which they propose as a perspective in their respective countries must be realized in the framework of a continuous democratization of economic, social, and political life. Socialism constitutes a higher stage of democracy and liberty, democracy carried through to the end." The qualitative leap of the revolutionary break, the destruction of the state apparatus of the ruling class, disappears completely. The transition to socialism is conceived as a process of gradual transformation during which a permanent "democratic" framework is progressively filled with a new content. The real precursors of this "novelty" are clear: Bernstein and the other grand old men of reformist socialism.

For its part, the PCI had yet another opportunity to exhibit the conception that inspired the declaration, in a recent polemic against Pravda. "The new and essential fact that Zardov does not see," wrote Luciano Gruppi, specialist in ideological polemics and member of the PCI delegation in the meeting with the PCF, in the PCI weekly *Rinascita* (No. 41, 1975), "is that we find ourselves not only confronting but also within parliamentary democracy, of which we are a decisive component; this parliamentary democracy would not exist if it had not been won and defended by a struggle of the democratic forces in which the working class and its parties have played a preeminent role. Thus, the Marxist critique of bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism does not fall, but the task of going beyond their limits and defects is posed as a struggle within these institutions to assemble the people, the workers, in a new way in order to enrich, complete, and strengthen democracy, carrying it beyond its present limits, articulating it through decentralized and basic institutions, and filling it with a new economic and social content." It couldn't be more clear!

The declaration points in the same direction when, offering further explanation, it affirms that the proposed political and social transformation "requires the existence of democratic institutions fully representative of popular sovereignty, the guarantee and extension of the powers of these institutions, the free exercise of direct and proportional universal suffrage. It is in this framework that the two parties — which have always respected and will continue to respect the verdict of universal suffrage — conceive of the accession of the toiling classes to the leadership of the state. . . . Their attitude is not tactical but flows from their analysis of the material and historical conditions of their respective countries, from their reflection on international experience as a whole."

The differences in the present political lineup in the two countries have prevented the leaders of the PCI



and PCF from utilizing exactly the same formulas on the problem of the alliances needed to develop their strategy or even to unblock the present situation. Hence, after recalling the necessity of mobilizing the majority of the population around the working class, the declaration repeats the conception that the "main enemy" of the working class is not capital as such, but rather monopoly capital, from which flows the need for a "free entente among the various social and political forces within which the united working class must affirm its intention to fully play its leading role." Beyond the cautious character of the formulas, what is conceived is a policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie, or at least with some sectors of the bourgeoisie. The present orientation of the PCI, based on the perspective of the "historic compromise," which includes even the Christian Democracy, is an unequivocal confirmation of the real content of the formulas.

The call for peaceful coexistence as a "more favorable terrain for the struggle against imperialism, for democracy, and for socialism"(2) and the assertion of the need for a "democratization of the orientations and functioning of the European Economic Community in favor of the constitution of a democratic, peaceful, and independent Europe" constitute a sort of crowning point for the reformist strategy of the two parties. There is no doubt that as far as the Common Market and its institutions are concerned, the PCF has once again made an adaptation to the greater consistency of the PCI, although not without many hesitations and much reticence. That the democratization of the institutions of the EEC is a perspective that is no less nebulous and utopian than that of the well known democratic control of the EEC monopolies is another story.

It is a story that relates more generally to the perspective outlined in the joint declaration. Contrary to what is claimed by Jacoviello, who, as we have seen, speaks of "socialism that is possible," the strategy proposed in the declaration is based on assumptions that historical experience — Chile and, all proportions guarded, Portugal as well — has consistently shown to be without foundation.

In this regard, the articles by Berlinguer published in *Rinascita* immediately after the overthrow of the Unidad Popular government in Chile are perhaps the most explicit sources. Berlinguer's idea, expressed in an allusive rather than explicit manner, was that the Unidad Popular had committed maximalist and sectarian errors that worked against the establishment of the broadest possible alliances. The explicitly enunciated idea was that an electoral majority is insufficient in itself and that what is necessary is to seek to stabilize alliances and convergences even with forces standing outside the victorious electoral bloc. (In Chile, as in Italy, this means to seek systematic collaboration with the Christian Democracy.) As far as Portugal is concerned, the declaration is cautious in its formulations but nevertheless suggests a judgment that the PCI has openly and repeatedly expressed: that the Portuguese CP has committed adventurist and sectarian errors.

The first fact of life that the reformists try to ignore is that the interference of international imperialism is an inescapable fact, even when the relationship of forces prevents a direct intervention. It is totally illusory to think that this or that concession can induce the imperialists to accept the prospect of a peaceful evolution and to respect the rules of some sort of democratic game. Nor is it useful to take an attitude like that recently assumed by the PCI, minimizing the significance of the positions taken by Washington against any participation of the PCI in the Italian government, or, worse still, presenting the trip of an Italian parliamentary delegation to the United States in a completely false light.(3)

The second fact of life is that in a period of deep crisis of the system, a period during which situations arise like the one in Chile between 1971 and 1973 or in Portugal today, it is impossible to avoid the crystallization of conservative and reactionary forces and is extremely difficult, even if not impossible in the abstract, to prevent such crystallizations from drawing in some layers of the petty bourgeoisie that are forced to bear the burdens of a prolonged crisis. The Chilean experience actually indicated just the opposite of what the neoreformist bureaucrats claim: Allende and the Chilean CP set themselves on a course of continual concessions and tried not to push for a radical and revolutionary solution to the problems that were posed. Consequently, there was a progressive increase in the hostility not only of the big bourgeoisie, but also of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. A similar development has occurred in Portugal.

In such situations it is a disastrous illusion to believe that the class struggle can be confined to the channels of bourgeois-democratic institutions. A test of strength is inevitable on all levels, and what is decisive is the relationship of forces in action and direct mobilization. If there has not been a Chilean-type result in Portugal — and it is improbable that there will be such an outcome in the short term — it is not because the Portuguese process is more moderate or balanced or because the government that succeeded the Caetano dictatorship was less "maximalist" than the Allende government or conducted a more clever policy of alliances (in fact, one could rather say the opposite), but because the process of the disintegration of the state apparatus is much deeper, fully affecting even the military apparatus, and because the masses have succeeded in constructing embryonic organs of dual power much more than in Chile.

In reality, the Portuguese example, coming after that of Chile, demonstrates the substantial inconsistency of the strategic prospects of the PCI and the PCF. The assumption that with the line suggested in the platform the problems of the struggle for socialism can be posed in terms different not only from Russia in 1917 but also from Portugal in 1975 is radically false. When revolutionary crises occur, the "normal" mechanisms of the structures of bourgeois democracy break down, or tend to break down, and the demands of the class struggle of the workers cannot be satisfied, not even partially,



by a political program that does not infringe upon the framework of the system. The declaration makes no allusion at all to the crucial problems of real revolutionary processes like the one in Portugal today (or Spain tomorrow), concentrating instead on a political development that is held to be possible in the abstract. During periods in which the two parties have been involved with bodies of the sort that arose from the 1969 struggles in Italy, for example, or when they have adopted an orientation toward the army, they have conceived of the potential organs of dual power as auxiliary structures of bourgeois democracy and have posed the objective of a "democratization" of the military apparatus in terms not dissimilar from those employed by the Chilean Communists, who, right up to the last moments, continued to uphold illusions in the army and to offer potential cover to those who were preparing the coup and the bloody repression.

In its own way, the present positions of the Portuguese CP represent a verification of the inconsistency of the plans of the PCI and the PCF. The Portuguese CP today would not sign a document like the PCI-PCF declaration, and we do not rule out the possibility that the Portuguese CP will use the occasion to express a different point of view on the problems posed in the declaration. (It is likely that this has already been done internally.) Are these particular positions perhaps due to incurable Stalinism?

To answer affirmatively would be hasty to say the least. It is perfectly true that the apparatus of the PCP was less exposed to the events of destalinization and that this party has maintained a more orthodox attitude toward the Soviet bureaucracy. But this is not the factor that determines the specificity of the PCP positions. It must not be forgotten that after April 25, 1974, the ranks of the PCP were swelled with new adherents. The party is now composed of an overwhelming majority of militants and middle-level cadres that the old apparatus has not had sufficient time to assimilate through systematic Stalinist education. These militants and cadres entered the party not because they were Stalinists or favored a policy of class collaboration, but because the PCP appeared to them as the party that was most effectively and systematically struggling against the dictatorship and as the most credible instrument for an anticapitalist battle. These militants and cadres are not only subject to the daily pressures of a situation of revolutionary crisis, but also represent a vehicle through which this pressure is transmitted to all levels of the party. Second, the PCP, especially since the elections of April 25, 1975, has been caught between two fires: on the one side a strong Socialist party and on the other side a far left that, in spite of its divisions and its strategic and tactical inconsistency, constitutes an important force with growing impact among significant sectors of the proletariat.

In such a context, given the problems posed not by theoretical debate but by day-to-day reality, if the PCP limited itself to responses of the type offered in the PCI-PCF declaration, it would risk being completely

cast aside and this would facilitate operations that would quickly turn against the party. Hence, the PCP has been compelled to oscillate, to assume eclectic positions, to combine radical formulas and "revolutionary" proclamations with the strategic plan that was formulated under the dictatorship and was applied during a whole phase of the new regime, a strategy that is not qualitatively different from the strategy of the PCI, the PCF, and even the Spanish Communist party.

The conclusion is that the synthetic conceptions of the PCI-PCF declaration do not at all respond to the requirements that inspired the declaration in the first place. In prerevolutionary or revolutionary situations like those that exist or may come about before very long in some countries of capitalist Europe, a gradualist-reformist strategy is simply inapplicable and can only condemn the party that follows it to sterility, no matter how large that party's influence among the masses may be; and this in turn objectively opens the way for a reactionary offensive. Instead of abandoning themselves to declarations about the "originality" and "novelty" of their strategies, the bureaucrats of the Communist parties would do better to reflect a bit more on historical experience, both old and new, and to draw some more adequate conclusions. Not that there is any reason to hope that they will do so.

Can it be excluded that the neoreformist strategy may find application in some context? No, it cannot be ruled out a priori that in this or that country, after achieving some success in overcoming its crisis, the bourgeoisie, in order to consolidate the situation and to go beyond ephemeral readjustments, might propose reformist operations that could entail a place for the Communist parties. But independent of the probability of this variant, such an application of the neoreformist strategy in practice would then constitute a direct contribution to the restabilization of the system, to a new equilibrium based on new conditions. And that would not exactly prepare the transition to socialism!

November 21, 1975

#### FOOTNOTES:

1. *The Socialism That is Possible* (Il Socialismo Possibile) is the title of a pamphlet written several years ago by the Italian Socialist Antonio Giolitti, who left the PCI in 1956 on the basis of rightist positions and then became an open advocate of reformist conceptions and orientations.
2. There is a small difference here between the French text and the Italian one. The first says "un terrain plus favorable" (a more favorable terrain), the second "il terreno più favorevole" (the most favorable terrain).
3. The Communist members of the delegation spoke of positive relations between the "democratic" representatives of Italy and the United States; they also offered assurances about the PCI's desire to act in favor of international stability.



The great purges against the Croats in December 1971 marked a turn in Yugoslavia. Just after the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in May-June 1974, we analyzed the main measures that had been taken after late 1971 and outlined the main features of the orientation being pushed by the Titoist leadership, stressing the limits of the turn. (See INPRECOR, No.3, July 4, 1974, and see also the review *Quatrième Internationale*, No.3, July 15, 1972, and the article "Yougoslavie: capitalisme ou socialisme?" in the magazine *Critique de l'Economie Politique*, No. 7-8.) What was involved was primarily an attempt to regain a police grip on a socially explosive situation that resulted from the combined defects of a bureaucratic society and so-called market socialism. Now, some sixteen months after this congress, the leadership of the LCY has just launched a new and vast national campaign to denounce "enemies of Yugoslavia." The campaign is particularly directed against "neo-Cominformists" and their "foreign allies." Since the middle of October there have been increasing numbers of speeches and arrests. Trials are being prepared; in Zagreb it is estimated that there have been more than a hundred arrests in that city alone. (*Le Monde*, November 1.) Since the practice of slander, if not of frame-up trials complete with prefabricated evidence, is widespread in Yugoslavia, it is appropriate to consider the internal and international context in which this new wave of purges is unfolding.

### A serious economic situation

It is true that internal industrial production has developed considerably and has not shown any of the signs of recession of the capitalist market economies. (Industrial production was 10.7 percent higher in 1974 than 1973.) From this point of view, the central control of large-scale investments that was initiated in order to redress the negative effects of the 1965 economic reform is beginning to show results. The economic branches that had been sacrificed by decentralization and market mechanisms (raw materials, energy, nonferrous metals) have been given priority and have developed effectively, whereas during the period immediately after the economic reform of 1965 there had been an increase in imports of these basic products even though the resources of the country had not been exploited.

But Yugoslavia is suffering severely from the effects of the recession in the capitalist countries, especially the European countries with which Yugoslavia trades heavily. The deficit in the trade balance has grown steadily as a result of the fall in Yugoslav exports to these countries. (The trade deficit for the first eight months of 1975 was \$2,583 million, \$1,500 million of which was the deficit with the countries of the Common Market; the remainder results essentially from deficits with the oil-producing countries.) In addition, the threat of the return to Yugoslavia of the one million Yugoslav workers employed in capitalist countries abroad because of the severe recession in those countries is of considerable concern to the Yugoslav authorities. In 1974 some 80,000 workers returned from West Germany, and there is great fear that the rate of return is going to increase rapidly. If it is also recalled that internal unemployment is ap-

# YUGOSLAVIA

## a confused situation

by C. VERLA

proaching the figure of 500,000 (which is 10 percent of the work force) as a direct result of the application of the reform (which allows the "profitability" of enterprises to be governed by the laws of the market), it is easy to understand why the Yugoslav government has decided to launch a vast investment policy (increases of some 50 percent between 1974 and 1975) and is seeking foreign credits to finance this investment. Alongside this development policy, a series of measures have been taken to resolve the problem of employment: support to private investments of smallholding agricultural proprietors and aid to small-scale trade. (Nearly half of all Yugoslavs working abroad are peasants who have kept their land and have the right to purchase agricultural machinery with the money they earn abroad.) Finally, some cities have experimented with a new form of financing investment based on funds accumulated by the emigrant workers. These workers are allowed to participate by offering loans reimbursable with interest for the investments needed to open small factories in which these workers will have employment priority upon returning to Yugoslavia. These experiments are going on in the poorest parts of southern Croatia, from which there is a high rate of emigration. In Arzano, for example, the local authorities took the initiative and the workers council of the Pionirka textile factory succeeded in collecting 200,000 German marks from about a thousand Yugoslav workers in West Germany within the space of several weeks. (See *Ekonomika Politika*, January 20, 1975.)

Apart from these measures, there are three great problems requiring choices of political orientation that are now the subject of acute controversy in Yugoslavia: the contradictions of agriculture; the considerable increase in the cost of living (25 percent this year compared with last year), and the question of employment.

In 1947, in order to demonstrate his obedience to Stalin, Tito ordered the forced collectivization of land. After 1948, however, the break with the Cominform required that the regime strengthen the cohesion of its social base, which was cemented by the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasantry (the latter representing some 75 percent of the population in 1938 and some 38 percent today). The introduction of self-management, limited as it was, and the 1953 renunciation of forced collectivization, the effects of which had been just as dramatic as in the USSR after 1927, were the major internal measures taken to attain this objective.



Nevertheless, there was no question of fostering private property in the countryside. In order to prevent the development of a class of rich peasants, private property in land was limited to 10 hectares. In addition, and this was true until the economic reform of 1965, private possession of means of production in the private sector was very heavily taxed, while more modern investments were developed in the socialized sector. Thus, in 1963, although 80 percent of the land was privately owned, of the 45,000 tractors in the country, 40,000 were at the sole disposal of the public sector.

The economic reform fostered a certain degree of privatization of the economy. Taxes on the private sector were eased, but the 10 hectare limit was preserved and the number of workers who could be employed in a private enterprise was kept limited to five. But the result was that pressure to change the law grew steadily. After all, if it was now possible for a peasant to buy a tractor, what was the point if landholdings were still limited to 10 hectares? Thus, many peasants bought tractors and then rented them out to others. And there were many ideologues of the "socialist market" who claimed that the measures that had been taken were inconsistent and preached the extension of private property. As we have seen, the exodus of peasants leaving to seek jobs in the West was accompanied by measures aimed at holding down unemployment upon their return and at stimulating the productivity of their land somewhat. The number of private tractors thus increased formidably. By the end of 1974 there were 175,000 privately owned tractors and 200,000 tractors in the socialized sector.

Nevertheless, the Yugoslav leadership did not give in on the fundamental question. The leadership's objective remained eliminating the private sector, which is less profitable, and encouraging private peasants to join collective enterprises by demonstrating their superiority, thus winning the peasants to socialization. The measures taken in this direction were the extension of all the rights of the workers (social security, old-age insurance, political right of representation in the self-management bodies) to all those who joined collective farms or donated their lands to the public sector. In opposition to those who are against any interference by the central regime in the economy in general and in agriculture in particular, a five-year Green Plan was worked out (with great difficulty) in 1973, which was aimed at increasing productivity in the agricultural sector and at consequently diminishing Yugoslavia's dependence on imports.

But the 1975 results were disastrous (and not only because of climatic difficulties) and will rebound on the debate over orientation. The reality is that the peasants did not respond to the encouragement to join in collectivization. On the contrary, their attitude was to take advantage of all the measures favoring private property and hope for a further liberalization of the laws on land ownership. The result was a multiplicity of private plots. The average size of private holdings is 3.9 hectares and there is a tendency toward an increase in the number

of plots of less than five hectares, because the small plots are further divided up among children. At the same time, there is a diversification of the crops grown on each holding for the purpose of consumption by the peasant family, which means that there is an immense social waste. The decision of the central powers to increase agricultural prices in order to foster the development of agriculture only resulted in increasing the cost of living for the urban workers without permitting an increase in the productivity of the land. This year it will be necessary to increase imports of wheat, which will further inflate the present trade deficit.

The political tensions reflecting the various possible responses to this catastrophic situation can only mount.



For the moment, the Titoist leadership remains faithful to its policy, but the bureaucratic character of the regime fundamentally prevents it from convincing the peasants to support the leadership's orientation. Hence, two other choices are possible and are clashing behind the scenes and even publicly in the press. There are those who call for a more severe orientation moving in the direction of restrictions on the private sector (which in itself does not guarantee the redress of the other problems relating to employment and the wages of workers and entails the danger of sharpening conflicts with the peasants); second, there are those who clearly call for the end of any limitation on private property in the countryside in order to make the private plots more productive (which can stimulate the development of a layer of kulaks who in any case would not be won over to the regime any more than the kulaks in the USSR were won over during the 1920s).

The debate over orientation is not at all settled; it extends from agriculture to the whole of the social structure and involves the other political choices: economic centralization or not, and if so, what kind of centralization?



Along with the debates about agriculture, the various possible solutions to the problems of unemployment and the constant increase in the cost of living and social inequality are also subjects of sharp controversy. In reality, the 1971 turn settled nothing. The Titoist leadership tried to recentralize the LCY, which had been subjected to the combined effects of bureaucratization and decentralization at the same time. The conflicts among the various republics were — and remain — linked to the desire of each regional bureaucracy to grab the greatest possible share of power and to the growth of inequality of economic development because of the reform. The purges have been wholly provisional solutions. The more severe control of the party leadership over the membership, the discipline imposed on political and cul-



tural life, and the repression of any opposition were supposed to be accompanied by greater control by the LCY over the economy and an increased weight of the army within the state. The Tenth Congress of the LCY openly criticized those who "entertained the illusion that the market would resolve all problems by itself." (See the speech by Kardelj published in *Questions actuelles du socialisme*.) In addition, the "technico-bureaucratic and liberal bourgeois forces," which really exist in Yugoslavia, were roundly denounced, and the plan to legalize workers strikes against factory leaderships even came up again. (See *Vecernje Novosti*, Belgrade, March 18, 1975.) But there was no challenging of the determination of income on the basis of the results achieved by the enterprises on the market and thus on the totality of mechanisms that, in the name of immediate "profitability" in terms of market laws, provoke constant price increases and competition among "self-managed" workers and increase the weight of "specialists" in the enterprises, which are eager to introduce the most "modern" management techniques, which in turn creates unemployment.

Those who called for centralization on the basis of self-management and against the laws of the market were re-

pressed. They were the Marxist students and professors of the left, among others, the leaders of the philosophic review *Praxis*. For them, the dilemma of bureaucratic planning versus self-management and market laws was surmountable. But that implied the elimination of the political monopoly of the LCY and the introduction of real workers democracy giving the workers themselves the central weight and the means to collectively make essential choices and carry them out.

At the same time, the Titoist bureaucracy also rejected two other roads:

1. Suppression of self-management and a pure and simple return to compulsory and bureaucratically centralized planning of the USSR type. This would be very unpopular and would clash with reactions both from the workers and from the bureaucrats of the various factories and republics, whose weight has increased as a result of decentralization. In addition, that solution would mean challenging the very thing that symbolized the break with Stalin, which had to be explained as a break with central planning, which was equated with Stalinism.

2. The breakup of the federation. This would mean the loss of the centralized control. But here the Titoist bureaucracy finds itself confronted by conflicts among the various nationalities in Yugoslavia. The price that is paid for a regime that is simultaneously bureaucratic and decentralized is that the richest republics no longer want to "pay" for the others. The Croatian leaders in 1971 wanted to hold onto their currency because the federal banks (in Serbia) were not according credits on bases acceptable to the Croatian leaders. To respond to these tensions the Titoist bureaucracy combined a greater federalism in its institutions with a stepped up repression against opponents of the bureaucracy's policy. The republics and provinces will be represented much more equally in all state organs. After 1968, territorial armies under the command of each republic were even instituted parallel to the federal army. At the same time, however, the most nationalistic elements in each republic were ousted and new purges are now being organized against the "liberal" Croats. But the regional inequalities have still not been eliminated.

### The «Neo-Cominformists»

"We recently discovered several illegal organizations. They have Cominformist platforms . . . and have the backing of former Cominformists who were expelled from the party in the past. . . . The material that has been seized does not prove the existence of a strong movement of this type, but it does prove the existence of an orientation favorable to adherence to the Soviet camp, which would mean . . . constructing socialism on the basis of state property and belonging to all the organizations of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon." (Speech of Bakaric, published in *Vjesnik*, Zagreb, October 23, 1975.)




One initial comment must be made: No proof has yet been advanced showing links between the arrested groups and the USSR. It is highly possible that the people really being attacked in this accusation of "Cominformism" are all those who in one form or another call both for opposition to the present regime and for recentralization. Some of these people may even feel some nostalgia for Stalinist centralism without necessarily favoring links with the USSR today. One thing is certain: there is a flagrant disproportion between the scope of the campaign being waged and the size of the currents in Yugoslavia that could really be pro-Soviet.

It is certainly possible that there have been attempts by the Soviet leadership to infiltrate some groups and stir up trouble in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav newspapers have asserted — and there is no way of verifying these claims — that radio broadcasts from countries belonging to the "Soviet bloc" have been systematically beamed at the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to foment national troubles. And it is easy to imagine that the Kremlin is interested in what the post-Titoist period will be like and hopes that Yugoslavia will return to the Soviet fold after an increase in tensions and a victory of the centralist wing of the LCY. But twenty-eight years after Tito's break with Stalin, this is far from being achieved. Even a move by the Yugoslav army to control an explosive situation would in no way be synonymous with a return to the Soviet fold. As for a Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia, that would run up against the organized and armed mobilization of the entire population.

It is certain that Yugoslavia is one of the major obstacles blocking Soviet plans for a conference of Communist parties that would adopt a common declaration. But that is nothing new, and if Yugoslav tensions with the Soviet Union are increasing before such a conference, even this is not sufficient to explain the current "anti-Cominformist" campaign. The recent rapprochement of Yugoslavia with China and Albania and Yugoslavia's continuing opposition to any affirmation of a common policy of Communist parties and to any denunciation of any one party by the others are already so clear that the internal campaign only confirms what the USSR already knows. Thus, while it is marginally possible that this campaign is addressed to the Soviet Union or is aimed at repressing some pro-Soviet activities, the essential point is most likely a different one.

The most likely essential function of the campaign is to make an amalgam. It is not at all popular to be a "Cominformist" in Yugoslavia. Sounding the alarm about that danger is probably aimed at facilitating repression in general by preventing the debates on the future of Yugoslav socialism from breaking out more openly and stimulating a response among social forces. In fact, according to the official labels, it is the "oppositionists of all stripes," the "Cominformists, nationalists, liberals" who must be repressed. And the reason is that all the tensions generated by Tito's policies have not at all been resolved.

November 9, 1975



Whitlam

The Australian bourgeoisie appears to have made an important political miscalculation. Its immediate objective was achieved: the Labor party government of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was ousted and new general elections were called for December 13. But the manner in which the Labor government was brought down may well result in a prolonged new period of rank-and-file working class militancy and possibly even the reelection of Labor on December 13.

The removal of Whitlam was unprecedented in Australian history. For the first time, the government of a party still commanding a majority in the House of Representatives was thrown out before the end of its term. It was done through complicated parliamentary maneuvers that have been labeled by the Labor party leadership as amounting to a "bloodless coup." The Labor party held an absolute majority of 65 seats in the 127-member House of Representatives. In the Senate, however, the opposition Liberal-Country party coalition held 30 of the 60 seats, against Labor's 27. The Liberal-Country coalition used its strength in the Senate to block approval of the national budget drawn up by Labor, a budget that had already been approved in the House. The bourgeois opposition made it clear that it would allow the budget to pass only if Whitlam agreed to hold a gen-



# Australia the fall of the Labor government

eral election, the third in three years. Whitlam refused, stating that the Labor government would continue to function with or without a budget. He apparently expected to save his position by engaging in some parliamentary maneuvering of his own.

But the Australian ruling class had other ideas. On November 11 Sir John Kerr, the governor-general (formally the representative of the British Queen, a post to which he was appointed by Whitlam himself) dissolved both houses of parliament, appointed Malcolm Fraser, head of the Liberal-Country coalition, as "interim" prime minister, and called the new elections:

The factors motivating such precipitous action on the part of the bourgeoisie are clear enough. Australia is in a deep economic crisis. The annual rate of inflation is more than 12 percent; unemployment stands at more than 300,000 (better than 5 percent of the work force), an increase of 100 percent since last year; several large Australian firms have gone bankrupt and others teeter on the brink of bankruptcy. The Labor government has attempted to deal with the crisis by holding down wages, taking no action to reduce unemployment, and granting big handouts to capitalist companies in danger of going under. Meanwhile, social expenditures have been cut

and the standard of living of the workers reduced. There is some irony in the fact that the very budget the Senate refused to approve called for further cuts in public spending and increased taxes on workers.

Despite these policies by the Labor government, the economic situation has not improved. More important, Labor has been unable to prevent the workers from taking direct action in defense of their living standards. From the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, the Labor government has been a failure on two levels: economically, it has been insufficiently effective; politically, it has failed to keep the workers in check. What the bourgeoisie needs now is a strong government that can confront the working class head on, a task to which the Labor party government is unsuited. Hence the necessity of dumping Whitlam.

At the same time, the policies applied by the Labor government and the Labor party's open defense of capitalism have had the effect of drastically undermining support for Whitlam. "We came to power to save the system," Bob Hawke, president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, told a Labor rally in Sydney October 30. And Labor Treasurer Bill Hayden, speaking in defense of the Labor budget, explained, "recovery in the private sector is essential." This openly right-wing policy — applied with a lack of subtlety uncharacteristic of the labor bureaucracy in advanced capitalist countries — has given the Liberal-Country coalition hopes of being able to defeat Labor in a general election. Polls taken shortly before the ouster of Whitlam indicated that support for the government had fallen abysmally. Thus, the bourgeoisie apparently assumed that now was the time to get rid of Whitlam — by any means necessary.

But the brazenly bureaucratic and undemocratic procedure adopted shifted the focus of the political issues involved. The Australian workers saw Governor-General Kerr's move — correctly — as an attack not only on the Labor leadership but on the entire workers movement. The response was immediate. Within hours after Whitlam was deposed spontaneous strikes and rallies broke out. Some 3,000 people marched in Sydney; 5,000-10,000 turned out in Melbourne; 2,000 in Canberra; 3,000 in Perth. Three days later, on November 14, the largest political demonstrations in Australia since the height of the movement against the war in Vietnam were held. And this time the demonstrations were overwhelmingly working class in composition. An estimated 400,000 workers went on strike in Melbourne, the country's second-largest city. The port was shut down completely, as were the automobile and metal industries, as well as many other factories. Tens of thousands participated in a downtown rally. More than 12,000 people demonstrated in Brisbane, and more than 10,000 in Adelaide. In most cases, the mood of the crowds was notably more anti-Fraser than pro-Whitlam.

This was not surprising, for the Labor leadership's hostility to the mobilization of the working class continued, even when that mobilization was in defense of the Labor party itself. "I do not believe that a national stoppage and strikes are a wise move," Bob Hawke said after the





WHITLAM'S SUPPORTERS RALLY IN CANBERRA

first mobilizations protesting Whitlam's ouster. He went on: "We are determined to advocate law and order, follow traditions and accustomed practices — unlike the Opposition. We must not substitute violence in the streets and anarchy for the processes of democracy. Of course I am upset, but it is not just a question of a Labor government appearing to fall, my concern is about the future of this country. What has happened today could unleash forces in this country the like of which we have never seen. We are on the edge of something quite terrible and therefore it is important that the Australian people respond to leadership."

As for Whitlam, he seemed a bit stunned and disappointed with the performance of Her Majesty's representative. "I mean the Queen never would have done it," he stam-



Whitlam (left) and Fraser (right)

mered, "let's be frank about it, the Queen never would have done it."

But regardless of Whitlam's touching faith in Elizabeth and apart from Hawke's trepidation that he stands on the brink of something quite terrible, the Labor leadership — for simple motives of survival in office — has been compelled to launch a unusually vigorous election campaign, denouncing the Liberal-Country leadership as a band of thieves and putschists. The Labor campaign was officially launched on November 24 at a rally in Sydney. It was attended by 30,000 people, the largest election rally in the history of Australia. A poll released on November 23 indicated that 56 percent of "uncommitted" voters were leaning toward the Labor party and only 29 percent toward the Liberal-Country coalition. Significantly, the people polled cited the manner in which the government was thrown out and not the economic situation as the central issue — by a better than two-to-one margin.

GOVERNOR GENERAL SIR JOHN KERR



AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION SERVICE

The problem for the reformist Labor leadership is to wage a sufficiently active campaign to win return to office but at the same time to keep the militancy of the working class in check. This task will not be an easy one. It is not unlikely that the bourgeoisie's decision to throw Labor out through a brutal maneuver will have the effect of returning Labor to office with an even larger majority. But even if the ineptitude of the Labor leadership results in a Liberal-Country election victory — which would be a defeat for the working class — the polarization and working-class mobilization generated by the maneuver will leave lasting — and, for the bourgeoisie, extremely negative — effects on national politics. Therein lies the miscalculation of the bourgeoisie.





*news of the  
workers movement  
and the  
fourth international*

## ● SWITZERLAND legislative elections

Legislative elections took place in Switzerland on October 25. These elections were unusually important because they took place while, for the first time since the second world war, the Swiss "paradise" is being hit by the capitalist crisis and the workers are suffering from unemployment and reductions in their living standards. Also, another first, revolutionaries to the left of the Parti du Travail (the Swiss CP) presented candidates.

The results of these elections — which were marked by a very high abstention rate — represented a shift to the left, with the Socialist party gaining nine additional seats in the National Council. This strengthening of the SP was not due to this party's timid "anti-crisis plan," but to the support it received from the trade-union leadership, which enabled the SP to capitalize on the first class reflexes of the Swiss workers. It should also be stressed that these results are distorted from the outset, since 30 percent of the active population — the immigrant workers — are denied the right to vote.

As for the Parti du Travail, it lost ground, paying a price for its tail-endist policy toward the Social Democracy and its sectarian attitude toward the POCH (Progressive Organizations of Switzerland) and the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (LMR—Revolutionary

Marxist League), Swiss section of the Fourth International. In fact, the CP refused to join its lists to those of these two organizations. The results achieved by the POCH and the LMR were significant, several percentage points of the vote.

"Only one force will unseat the employers: the unity in action of all the workers!" It was around this slogan that our comrades of the LMR ran candidates in twelve cantons.

More than 10,000 people voted for the LMR candidates (0.5% of the total vote). In the cantons in which the organization is most strongly based the results were much higher than the national average: Geneva 1.1%; Lausanne 2.14%; Neuchâtel 1.3%; Tessin 1.4%. In Zoug, a tiny canton in German Switzerland, the LMR got 1.8% of the vote. In that canton the LMR ran a comrade who is a worker in the big Landis and Gyr company, while the bourgeois Parti Radical ran the owner of the factory! It was a very lively campaign.

Finally, certain LMR candidates who are especially well known got significantly higher votes. In Geneva Jacqueline Heinen got 3% of the vote and in Lausanne Charles-André Udry got 6%.

## ● GREECE

Since the beginning of September 1975 the MEL paper factory in Salonika has been on strike. This is yet another incident in the series of strikes and factory occupations that has unfolded in Greece since the fall of the military dictatorship (notably the strikes at National Can, Eskimo, the Elefthis shipyards, the Madem Lako mines, etc.) The strike developed out of efforts launched last summer to rescind the layoff of militant workers who had tried to organize a single union in the factory.

Launched on September 1, the strike centered mainly around demands for wage increases, payment for strike days, the removal of the chief of personnel, and the management of the cafeteria by the union. In spite of the intervention of the police, the strikers occupied the factory, prevented the sale of its products, and kept watch over the area around the factory; they also succeeded in extending the strike action to an MEL subsidiary in Patras.





The workers of the two factories tried to demonstrate in Athens in front of the parliament and the university. But they were isolated by the student association, which is controlled by the two Communist parties and the PASOK (the centrist organization headed by Papandreu) and were attacked by the police. Only the Trotskyists supported the workers in a continuous manner.

On November 11 the Internationalist Communist party,

Greek section of the Fourth International, organized a meeting to commemorate the fifty-eighth anniversary of the October Revolution (an event not commemorated by either of the Communist parties). A delegation of MEL strikers participated in the meeting, and the president of the strike committee spoke. In his speech, he praised the role played by the "socialist trade-union tendency" (a group inspired by our Greek comrades) in the struggles of the strikers in Athens and Salonika.

## ● W. GERMANY

# 50,000 march against unemployment

The recession has confronted the West German working class with a new problem, unemployment. The youth have been especially hard hit: There are now some 200,000-250,000 unemployed youth in the country. A good number of them are unskilled and have scarcely any chance of learning a trade. The increase of unemployment among the youth, the elimination of many apprenticeships, and the shortage of professional training stimulated action by trade-union youth as early as 1974. Tens of thousands of young people have participated in local and regional actions. Pressure built up for these actions to be combined into a national demonstration.

At first, the union bureaucracy tried to transform this project into a meeting in an indoor hall. But the massive protest by trade-union youth, who began to influence other sectors of the union movement, ended up forcing the bureaucracy to call a central street demonstration in the city of Dortmund.

The bureaucracy then tried a second maneuver: to strictly limit the number of demonstrators (to 20,000) and to make the problem of "co-management" the theme of the demonstration. The intent was to avoid any trouble with the Social Democratic chancellor and ministers. But the Dortmund demonstration had become such a pole of attraction for the most combative workers — who ever since the beginning of the recession have been straining at the bit because of the trade-union bureaucracy's successive capitulations to pressure from the employers and the government aimed at reducing real wages and increasing profits — that this maneuver also triggered a storm of protest.

In many cities local trade-union leaders mobilized participants in numbers that vastly exceeded the quotas

set by the central bureaucracy of the DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, the national trade-union federation). In areas where the local union leaders bowed to the orders of the central bureaucracy, groups of trade unionists took independent initiatives to get to Dortmund. In the end, some 50,000 workers participated in the demonstration, which was held November 8. They transformed it into a huge action against unemployment, against the strategy of the employers, and against the policies of the Social Democratic and liberal ministers.

The demonstration concluded with an indoor meeting; half of the demonstrators were unable to get in. Nevertheless, the speech given by DGB President Vetter, which was centered on co-management, did not receive an enthusiastic response. The workers know from experience that the plague of layoffs and short workweeks is being felt even in factories in industrial branches in which parity co-management exists (coal and steel).

The Dortmund demonstration was one of the most important trade-union actions in West Germany since the 1950s. It reflected the fact that in spite of the ebb in workers struggles during the past two years, the overall relationship of class forces has not deteriorated for the West German working class. It also represented the first massive response of West German workers to the recession. And at the same time, it showed that at the present stage the most combative elements of the workers vanguard in West Germany prefer to struggle with the support of the trade-union organization, even though they oppose the ultraconciliatory and even capitulationist orientation of the union bureaucracy.



# ● BELGIUM

The conservative Belgian government, which is implementing an antirecession plan that includes many anti-social budget cuts as well as threats of wage freezes, has once again limited credits for higher education. These measures involved cutbacks in university personnel and new steps toward capitalist selection and "profitization" of the mass of students.

There were strong reactions against this Humblet-De Croo plan (named after the two ministers of public instruction) among both the university personnel and the students. After a series of limited strikes and demonstrations, a united front was formed between the trade-

union organizations of higher education and the National Student Front. There were university occupations, notably in Brussels, involving both students and university personnel. A joint national trade-union and student demonstration drew nearly 15,000 people in Brussels on November 21.

There has already been a small by-product of this still limited unity in action: On November 27, in response to a call from trade-union delegates, the strike pickets of the employees of the central office of the Glaverbel trust in Brussels (the employees are on strike against layoffs) were joined by many university students.

# ANGOLA

cont'd. from pg. 32.

pression. On the other hand, the victory of the Democratic Republic, since it can be achieved only through a very deep mobilization of the masses, would create favorable conditions for the complete elimination of imperialist domination and for a socialist dynamic of the struggle of the workers and peasants.

letarian and communist. Alignment in the same camp and commitment to a common struggle are not in contradiction with the battle for political clarification necessary for a victorious outcome of the war and for the construction of a proletarian revolutionary Marxist leadership.



## UNITA troops

The Fourth International chooses the camp of the Angolan Democratic Republic against the holy alliance of imperialists, racists, and indigenous reactionaries. In the civil war the Fourth International stands with the masses who are mobilized to defend the independence that has been won through fifteen years of stubborn struggle, to defend their fundamental interests against all foreign and "national" exploiting classes, for the expropriation of the capitalists and landlords, and for the construction of a new state based on revolutionary democratic committees, direct expressions of the masses.

Such an attitude does not mean that the Fourth International and African revolutionary Marxists give up their criticisms of the leadership of the MPLA, which they consider to be petty-bourgeois nationalist and not pro-

Against the holy alliance of imperialists, South African racists, neocolonialists of Zaire and Zambia, and the reactionary leaderships of the FLNA and UNITA! Defend the complete independence of Angola! Defend the Democratic Republic proclaimed by the MPLA! Reject any attempt at Balkanization! Immediate withdrawal of all forces of American and European imperialism, of South African racists, and all neocolonial governments!

Organize an international campaign of solidarity! All workers states and all trade-union and political organizations of the proletariat must mobilize on the side of the Angolan fighters by assuring them political solidarity and material support! Boycott the sending of arms to the reactionary bloc of the FLNA and UNITA!  
November 23, 1975





# THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

## *Declaration of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International*

The peoples of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau dealt a serious blow to imperialist domination in Africa by overthrowing Portuguese colonialism. The struggle of the Angolan masses has opened a breach in the reactionary bastion of southern Africa, under the hegemony of the racist regime in Pretoria. The revolutionary rise of the working class in the metropolis prevented the Portuguese bourgeoisie from responding effectively and healing this breach through a successful neocolonialist operation.

Given this situation, and given the prospect of the dynamic of the mobilization of the Angolan masses developing toward objectives that are not simply anti-imperialist but anticapitalist as well — especially in Luanda, where the workers component has significant weight — all the partisans of colonialism, both old and new, and all the defenders of imperialist interests, both North American and European, have blocked together to crush the Angolan revolution and impose the establishment of a reactionary regime through a civil war. The leaderships of the FLNA and UNITA, which defend tribal and regionalist positions and the interests of bourgeois layers in formation, are taking part in this operation. They have established a common front with the imperialists,

the racists, and the neocolonial regimes in Zaire and Zambia, a sort of holy alliance, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, against the effective independence of Angola and the struggle of the Angolan toiling masses. The fact that China is aiding this reactionary front in practice through its long standing aid to the FNLA and its present attitude is additional proof of the nefarious consequences of a policy that regards the USSR as the main enemy and aims at reaching a compromise with American imperialism.

The workers and revolutionary movements of the entire world denounce the counterrevolutionary operation that has been launched in Africa. In the present civil war these movements stand in the camp of the Democratic Republic of Angola proclaimed by the MPLA on November 11. The workers states and all workers organizations must make sure that the Angolan fighters receive political solidarity and material support. A defeat for the forces of the Democratic Republic would be a serious defeat for the revolution in Africa; it would represent a strengthening of imperialism and neocolonialism and would be accompanied by a bloody recont'd. on pg. 31.