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**SPAIN: FREE ALL
POLITICAL PRISONERS!**

*EDITORIAL: AGAINST THE PARK DICTATORSHIP *SPAIN: FREE THE POLITICAL PRISONERS! *DECLARATION OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ON THE DEATH OF MIGUEL ENRIQUEZ
*THE UNSTABLE STABILITY OF THE CHILEAN JUNTA *THE BRAZILIAN DICTATORSHIP . . . CHANGING THE MODEL? by Ruy Mariano *ISRAEL: ONE YEAR AFTER THE "EARTHQUAKE" by Michel Warshawsky *INDIA: FROM CRISIS TO CATASTROPHE by Pierre Dupont *FROM THE FOUR CORNERS: 37,000 WORKERS ON TRIAL IN DENMARK; SWITZERLAND - NO TO XENOPHOBIA

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against the Park dictatorship!

Since the end of September, open demonstrations in opposition to the bloody dictatorship of Park Chung Hee have been going on in South Korea. The student movement has again raised its head, resisting police charges on several occasions, as on October 10, 14, and 15. On October 5, some 20,000 South Korean Catholics (including thirteen bishops) transformed a "prayer meeting" into an antigovernment demonstration. The movements have not been restricted to Seoul, the capital, but have extended into provincial towns like Pusan, Kwangju, and Inchoo. All the actions have demanded a new constitution and the release of the many political prisoners, often condemned to heavy sentences, including the death penalty.

This new rise of demonstrations came after Park's abrogation of two of the most repressive decrees instituted in 1974. The first, passed on January 8, forbade any criticism (even verbal) of the constitution, under penalty of fifteen years imprisonment; the second threatened the death penalty for any person linked with the outlawed student organization National Federation of Democratic Youth and

Students. The demonstrations proved the vigor of the opposition -- despite the intense repression -- and manifested the depth of the crisis of the South Korean regime.

Since the coup that brought him to power in 1961, Park has systematically introduced all the elements of a dictatorship of rare brutality, based on the army and the South Korean CIA. In 1969 he imposed a constitutional reform. He had himself fraudulently elected president in 1971; he proclaimed a state of emergency in December 1971, and martial law in October 1972. A new constitution went into effect in November 1973 giving him autocratic powers. On August 8, 1973, he had the South Korean CIA kidnap Kim Dae Jung, the main liberal opposition leader, who was then in Tokyo. Finally, at the beginning of 1974 he issued the two decrees aimed at crushing any possible action by the opposition.

Some 200 trials were held on the basis of these two decrees (with more than 1,000 defendants); about twenty death sentences were declared (the most recent'd. on pg. 31

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FREE THE POLITICAL PRISONERS!

The general upsurge of struggle against the Francoist dictatorship in Spain has extended into the prisons. Political prisoners have launched hunger strikes to protest their living conditions. Some of them have managed to smuggle out declarations explaining the conditions they are subjected to and the demands they are fighting for. Three such statements have been collected and published as a brochure by the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist Front), the French Trotskyist organization. We are publishing below the introduction to

the brochure and two of the statements of the prisoners. Both come from the Segovia prison and were signed by members of the following organizations: ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna -- Basque Nation and Freedom), PCE (Partido Comunista Español -- Spanish Communist party), FAC (Forces d'Alibérement de Catalunya -- Liberation Forces of Catalonia), and the LCR-ETA(VI) (Liga Comunista Revolucionaria-ETA(VI) -- Revolutionary Communist League-ETA, Sixth Congress, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). — INPRECOR

● REPRESSION IN FRANCO'S PRISONS

Zaragoza, Martutene, Basauri, Pamplona, Carabanchel, Segovia . . . The political prisoners in the main prisons of the Spanish state are in struggle. Any struggle under the brutal Francoist dictatorship requires determination and intense combativity. But under the tragic conditions imposed on the prisoners in Franco's jails, this determination and combativity becomes heroism. These are the same comrades who fought so hard when they were outside prison; today they are continuing their struggle, our struggle, the struggle of the masses against exploitation and repression, inside the prison gates.

But the success of their struggle depends on the external support we can extend to them in order to

break the criminal isolation the dictatorship is trying to impose on them. All the comrades on hunger strikes have been placed in special "punishment cells," where they are continuing their action under even more tragic conditions. Their demands are part of our struggle, the struggle of the working class and all the oppressed. In all of our battles, in the factory assemblies, on the campuses, and in the neighborhoods, the demands of the political prisoners must be added to our specific demands.

In this brochure we are reproducing three documents produced by the political prisoners themselves in which they explain their situation and the reasons for their fight.

Throughout its whole existence the dictatorship has not ceased to offer proof of its tyrannical and repressive character. Confronted by the working class, the high-school students, the university students (most recently after the passage of the law on selection and education), the physicians and professors, the peasants and popular sectors, and the nationalities oppressed by the centralism of the Spanish state, the dictatorship has found no response other than repression: prison, assassination, military tribunals, the Civil Guard, and the politicossocial brigade. It is an exploitative regime granting no political freedoms, dominated by a reactionary oligarchy

that has imposed systematic terror to keep itself in power.

In the repressive context of the past several years, the dictatorship has opened a new public-order tribunal to step up persecution of social-political "offenders." Sessions of the war council are held on a daily basis, with sentences of twenty and forty years in prison being handed down. Two new prisons for political prisoners have been opened (Zaragoza and Pontevedra). Demonstrating workers have been assassinated (recently it was workers in Carmona, who were demanding water), and so have Basque revolu-

tionaries. Some are murdered "legally," like Salvador Puig Antich. The repression is also manifested in the firing of workers in the factories and shipyards and the removal of professors and students from universities and other institutions. We must call special attention to the repression in Euzkadi (the Basque country), which is under military occupation, with hundreds of prisoners, torture, trials, and police controls, where the Civil Guard abandons itself to frenetic manhunts.

The repressive character of the regime also extends to the prisons, where a completely primitive life is created for the inmates. The whole wave of struggles in the prisons since last summer (hunger strikes, revolts, and so on) has been marked by the struggle of the political prisoners against the inquisitional regime imposed by the DGP (Dirección General de Prisiones -- General Prison Administration). Examples of this are the struggles led by the comrades of Zaragoza, who went on a hunger strike, by those of Martutene (in San Sebastian), who were taken on a night transfer without being guaranteed any security or given any information about where they were going, by those of the Bausuri prison, some of whom were released only in order to be seized by the police again, tortured for five days, and returned to prison.

We give here a brief account of the living conditions of the political prisoners:

*A fundamental point is the dispersion of the political prisoners throughout various penitentiaries on the peninsula. In addition to the provincial preventive-detention prisons, there are a dozen prisons through which the political prisoners are scattered. The comrades convicted in the Burgos trials are held in Cáceres, Cartagena, and Córdoba, isolated from the other comrades and subjected to especially miserable conditions. Cartagena is a prison for "hopeless cases" and Córdoba for offenses during which blood was shed. The other political prisoners are divided among nine prisons: Soria, Segovia, Jaen, Lerida, Palencia, Zaragoza, Pontevedra; the Zamora prison is reserved for the clergy, and that of Alcala de Henares for women comrades. The sole aim of this dispersion is to avoid concentrations and thus to prevent general responses to the injustices committed in the prisons.

*The other, more important, aspect is censorship and denial of communication. Periodicals, reviews, and books that are freely circulated in the country are censored in the prisons. In many prisons the daily press is selected or forbidden completely. Further, there is an "inquisitional index" of banned publications. These are, notably, the reviews Cuadernos para el Dialogo, Trionfo, and Mundo Social.

*Communication, both oral and written, is restricted to immediate relatives. Communication is interfered with by functionaries, a situation that becomes intolerable. When they are asked to alleviate these conditions, some prison directors shamelessly assert that when we were condemned, "logically" so were our wives, children, relatives, and friends. The use of the Catalan, Galician, and Basque languages is strictly forbidden. It is recommended to the prisons and to the officials in charge of censorship to add extreme religious criteria set down by reactionary priests to the political basis for the censorship.

*As for the sanitary, hygienic, and food conditions, we can say that they conform to the general characteristics of the prisons. Health care amounts to being given vaccinations against typhoid and smallpox in order to avoid the outbreak of epidemics in the prisons. Medical assistance is deficient, with only one doctor per prison who must treat dozens of patients in one hour. Hardly any prisons have a dentist or optometrist, with the result that cases requiring special attention become extremely grave. The general prison hospital, the only one inmates can go to, in every case is small and is short of beds and postoperative facilities; medical care varies according to the financial situation of the prisoners. Thirty-five pesetas a day are allotted to each prisoner, and when the general costs of lighting and cleaning and the effects of inflation are deducted, the result is poor nourishment deficient in proteins and vitamins, with no green vegetables or fruits. The diet is based on water and starch. This often produces illness after some time.

*The system of classifying the prisoners according to how "dangerous" they are, the shortening of sentences on the basis of work done, and the possibility of conditional release are applied as means of blackmail and repression. Reduction of sentences is supposed to operate on the basis of two days' labor counting as three days' imprisonment, so that a three-year sentence can be worked off in two years. Conditional release requires serving the last quarter of the sentence under administrative control. All these forms of sentence reduction are conditional on the "good behavior" of the prisoner and on whether he "offers guarantees of leading an honest life outside." Since the political prisoner cannot remain passive before the injustices of the prison system and will not abandon his struggle against the dictatorship, he is deprived of these measures, which could ever so slightly ease the monstrous sentences.

*Prison life is especially miserable. The cells are not taken care of. You suffer from the heat in the summer and freezing temperatures in the winter. The toilets are inside the cells, which results in

bad odors that are often made worse by deprivation of water. The cell blocks, which are very small, accommodate about fifty political prisoners each. The right of personal and family privacy is ceaselessly violated by censorship, intervention, and surveillance. Punishments in special cells are frequent and inflicted for minor reasons. This situation gets even worse when the prison administrations violate their own rules of repression, creating subhuman conditions of punishment. Most of the time they forbid prisoners to leave their cells, take away the beds and mattresses, and forbid smoking and reading.

* The prisons also have workshops which are supposed to rehabilitate people through labor and contribute to reductions of sentences through the system just mentioned. In reality, the workshops are transformed into real factories of exploitation and forced labor, in which salaries are beneath the minimum and discipline is draconian; the slightest infraction or mistake sends a prisoner to the punishment cell or to the hole. The work goes on with no security measures; accidents are frequent, as is shown by the workshop fire that killed a dozen people in the Alcala prison.

It is against this situation that we are struggling. Against dispersion, censorship, discrimination, banning of original languages, the hole, the terrible treatment. In a word, against repression in the prisons.

We ask for active solidarity in this struggle. We ask

that all people committed to democratic rights, to socialism, to the development of Catalonia, Galicia, and Euzkadi contribute however they can to the common fight against the misdeeds of the Francoist regime in the prisons. We are fighting repression where we find it. No provocation by the dictatorship (sentences, firings, assassinations, murders in the prisons) must go without a response.

Finally, the general characteristics of the repression, along with the specific features of the prisons, only demonstrate the weakness of a dictatorial regime with no social base, a regime that has transformed the country into a concentration camp in which any demand or idea of progress is persecuted and banned. This regime is passing through difficult moments. Not only is it facing a spectacular rise of class struggle, it is also awaiting the death of Franco, the dictator for thirty-five years, and is hastily preparing for perpetuating the existing situation by means of the Juan Carlos monarchy. It is trying in vain to maintain a system based on denial of democratic rights, on national oppression, capitalist exploitation, and prisons and exile, with a king taking over Franco's job. Today more than ever it is necessary to redouble our efforts to win an amnesty, the release of political prisoners, and the return of the exiles, in order that we may be rid of the dictatorship once and for all.

October 1974. Signed by political prisoners of the Segovia prison belonging to the ETA, the PCE, the LCR-ETA(VI), the FAC, and three independents.

OWHY WE ARE ON HUNGER STRIKE

Last month the political prisoners of the prisons of Zaragoza, Bilbao (Basauri), San Sebastian (Martutene), Pamplona, and now Madrid (Carabanchel) went on hunger strikes against the repression imposed by the dictatorship in the prisons:

ZARAGOZA: inhuman living conditions, with an especially severe military regime and internal regime.

BASAURI: where three comrades were sent by the prison director, with the complicity of the judge, to the Social Brigade, where they were tortured for five days in a police station before being returned to prison.

MARTUTENE: with totally repressive living conditions, where at 3:00 a.m. twenty comrades were dragged from their cells naked and threatened with machine guns without knowing where they were going or why.

PAMPLONA: under conditions analogous to those in the other prisons and in solidarity with Zaragoza. **MADRID:** against the division of the political prisoners into different cell blocks and the isolation of some prisoners, like Antonio Durán.

We, political prisoners of the Segovia prison, members of the ETA, FAC, LCR-ETA(VI), PCE, and independents, want to add our own hunger strike to this list of struggles. We are fighting for our general demands and in solidarity with the other political prisoners for:

- a) Reassembling of all political prisoners. Against the brutal dispersion that the comrades of the Burgos trials were subjected to.
- b) Automatic application of conditional liberty from the tribunal. No increase in penalties by administrative means!

- c) Elimination of censorship of oral and written communications! No intervention by prison officials! Respect for personal and family privacy!
- d) Free entry of books, reviews, and daily newspapers circulated in the country legally.
- e) No retributions!
- f) Establishment of a status for political prisoners!

Our action is in solidarity with all the comrades in the hole, for their demands and against repression in general; against the murders committed by the Civil Guard and the special brigades; against Francoist tyranny and its attempt to prolong itself through the Juan Carlos monarchy. We feel the deepest solidarity with the striking workers of General Electric, Hispano-Olivetti, FASA-Renault . . . who through their just demands are acting against the capitalists and the dictatorship, for a future of freedom and progress for the peoples of the Spanish state.

We appeal to all workers, high-school students,

university students, doctors and lawyers, professionals, and all people today oppressed by the dictatorship. We call for solidarity with the political prisoners, with the struggle against repression in the prisons, against the repression in the streets, against the dictatorship. Active solidarity of all workers and all peoples!

For the right of association, strikes and demonstrations!

For the release of the political prisoners and the return of the exiles! Amnesty!

For the dissolution of the repressive bodies!

For the freedom of the Catalan, Galician, and Basque peoples crushed by Francoist centralism!

Down with the dictatorship!

Issued by political prisoners of the Segovia prison, members of the ETA, FAC, LCR-ETA(VI), PCE, and independents. □

October 6, 1974

Declaration of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

miguel enriquez



Comrade Miguel Enriquez, general secretary of the MIR, has been murdered by the hangmen of the Santiago military junta. Carmen Castillo, who was with Enriquez during the attack of Pinochet's gangsters, was seriously wounded and is now being held at the mercy of the repressive forces.

The disappearance of Miguel Enriquez from the political scene is a heavy blow to the MIR and to the whole Latin American revolutionary movement. Enriquez made an essential contribution to the creation and development of the MIR ever since its 1967 congress, at which he was elected general secretary. He tried to create a combat organization based above all on the experiences of the Cuban revolution and the heroic struggle of Che Guevara.

Miguel Enriquez died in combat and his sacrifice is testimony to the combative spirit of the Chilean revolutionary vanguard, which has rejected all compromise with the dictatorship and is prepared to plunge into the hardest battles. His declarations after the coup never fell into mindless optimism; on the contrary, they stressed the enormous difficulties that revolutionaries and all militants of the workers movement confronted and would continue to confront. At the same time, they revealed a lu-

and awareness of the thorny political problems that were posed for his party and the revolutionary left, faced on the one hand with brutal repression and the extermination of so many cadres and militants and on the other hand with the pressures exerted by the reformists of the SP and the CP, who have earned nothing from the tragic experience of September 11.

The name of Miguel Enriquez is inscribed in the roll of martyrs of the Latin American and world revolution. His sacrifice will be an example for the new generations who will continue his fight, the fight of Che Guevara and all the martyrs of

the workers movement, from Mexico to Argentina, from Bolivia to Guatemala.

The Fourth International shares the grief of the militants of the MIR and pledges itself to continue the fight against the murderers of Enriquez and their allies and patrons throughout the world.

MILITANT SOLIDARITY WITH THE MIR!

LONG LIVE THE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIALIST REVOLUTION!

October 8, 1974

CHILE

THE UNSTABLE STABILITY OF THE JUNTA

We are publishing below an interview granted to Jean-Pierre Beauvais by one of the members in Chile of the Liga Comunista (Communist League). It deals with the present situation in Chile and the activities of the LC. The Liga Comunista is a revolutionary-Marxist organization that maintains fraternal relations with the Fourth International. It was formed shortly before the 1973 coup and held its first congress several months ago, in Chile.

* * *

Question. More than a year has gone by since the overthrow of the Unidad Popular government. On September 11, as the junta was "celebrating" its first anniversary, Pinochet gave a speech designed for foreign consumption in which he spoke of "liberal" measures. Is there any indication that such measures are going to be taken?

Answer. None. The statements made by Pinochet after a year of bloody dictatorship are nothing but a sinister farce. At the time of his speech, not a single political prisoner had been let out of the many concentration camps in which they had been held for a year. Furthermore, the abolition of the "state of internal war" and its replacement by the "state of siege for internal defense" means nothing but the maintenance of the existing situation. The military has exactly the same powers and prerogatives.

The curfew is maintained. Not that a curfew is necessary for keeping the repression going full blast; but its purpose is to maintain a latent state of collective terror. The shots fired for no reason every night and the military trucks' squealing to a halt in front of this or that house in the poblaciones (shantytowns), where only military trucks are allowed to travel, serve the same ends.

In fact, what is going on now is a new wave of massive searches. Almost every night the military surrounds a población and arrests a thousand or two thousand persons. Very often "stop and frisks" are carried out in the movie theaters. Streets are often blocked off to run identity checks on everybody in the block. Concurrently, a more selective repression against the left is going on. Every day, for a growing number of militants, there is torture and death.

Judges still refuse to grant habeus corpus when someone disappears into the hands of the executioners of the military intelligence services. Trade-union, political, and democratic rights continue to be totally denied. Basically, nothing has changed, and there is no sign pointing to any sort of evolution in the methods of the dictatorship or the aims of those who compose it.

* * *

Q. Why can't the dictatorship make the slightest concession or overture to all the internal and ex-

ternal pressures? Or why doesn't it want to?

A. Because any breach, however small, in the present rule by terror would immediately be seized on by the masses to implement a very rapid process of reorganization and development of struggles. The dictatorship is deeply aware of this. The Chilean proletariat and popular masses have a great tradition of struggle and combativity. The defeat of September 11, 1973, and the savage repression that followed have not wiped this out. The dictatorship does not possess the political stability necessary to deal with the situation through any means not based on massive and bloody terror.

The reason is that the dictatorship today has lost a big part of the social base it had just after the coup. Its economic policy has directly affected not only the popular masses but also the petty bourgeoisie and even certain layers of the bourgeoisie. The considerable decline in the buying power of a good part of the population, the successive devaluations of the escudo and the consequent increase in the price of imported goods, the rise in interest rates, and so on have bankrupted a large number of merchants and small and middle-sized industries. Public employees and white-collar and supervisory workers in the private sector have been fired by the thousands, and the wages of those who can still work are ridiculous. The growing malaise among these social sectors is expressed politically in the break in relations between the dictatorship on the one hand and the most reactionary sections of the Christian Democracy (like Frei and Alwyn) and other bourgeois political groupings on the other. This has considerably reduced the dictatorship's maneuvering room.

It is only by continuing its policy of massacre, blind torture, and crushing of any sign of opposition that the junta can hope to attain the objectives it has set itself.



Q. What are those objectives? And what are the chances that they will be attained?

A. The dictatorship wants to consolidate the system of capitalist exploitation in Chile on a new basis. On the political level, it wants to "depoliticize" society. The new draft constitution goes in this direction. It aims at replacing the traditional form of the "democratic" bourgeois state with a corporatist structure. On the economic level it is trying to develop a process similar to the one developed by the Brazilian military since the coup against Goulart in 1964. The Chilean military's identification with their Brazilian counterparts is total. The people

now in charge of economic policy never miss an opportunity to point this out. Their plan clearly corresponds in the first place to the interests of North American big capital but also to those of European capital and the sectors of the Chilean bourgeoisie that are intimately linked to Europe and the United States.

By driving down the buying power of the masses, creating an enormous reserve army of unemployed (700,000 are now unemployed, that is, 20 percent of the active population), and thereby creating a crisis of unprecedented gravity among those sectors of the small, middle-sized, and even big bourgeoisie whose interests are tied to the internal market, the dictatorship wants to create a dynamic pole of capitalist development through building a durable consumer goods industry essentially oriented toward the export market.

This plan will fail completely. The characteristics of the Chilean economy and the way it has been linked historically to the world capitalist market deprive Chile of all the specific conditions that made the so-called Brazilian miracle possible.

Moreover, conjunctural factors work against fulfillment of such a plan. The world capitalist system has entered a period of acute crisis, the effects of which are more visible every day in the imperialist metropolises. In the framework of increased competition, they have more and more difficulty selling their products in already saturated markets.

Transitory solutions of the Brazilian type are not possible now. Brazil itself is beginning to enter into crisis. It now appears impossible for it to maintain the economic growth rate in coming years as high as it has been during the past six years. The assumption that Chilean industry can make gains on the already saturated regional markets of Latin America is totally utopian. The dictatorship considers the countries of the Andes Pact to be the privileged terrain for a breakthrough by Chilean industry. But the facilities that have been granted to big imperialist capital are incompatible with the terms of this pact and have created a crisis between Chile and the other member countries.

The greater and greater difficulties the dictatorship is experiencing in carrying out its economic objectives are reflected in the absence of any significant foreign investment in spite of the advantages that have been offered. Essentially, what has been obtained is credit for buying weapons. And the immediately political character of such credits is obvious. Thus, all the pillars on which the dictatorship thought it could base its delirious project of "Chile, gran nación" (Chile, great nation) have collapsed.

The only thing to be expected from the dictatorship's maintenance in power is progressive degradation of the situation of the Chilean popular masses and even of considerable sectors of the owning classes themselves.



Q. Presented in this way, the situation appears rich in possibilities.

A. The political and social contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and even within the bourgeoisie itself are considerable. Nevertheless, for the moment they do not challenge the stability of the junta. There is a chasm between the degree of "latent opposition" to the dictatorship among the Chilean masses and their ability to organize and mobilize. Even the opposition bourgeois sectors are not now in position to structure a strong and credible movement.

This is one of the consequences of the form taken by the defeat of the working class and the popular masses on September 11, 1973. The vacillations of centrism and the open and cynical betrayal of reformism permitted the forces of the military dictatorship to carry off a crushing victory. It was an extremely tough coup. Confronted with it, the working class, which had no real leadership, was not even able to organize the beginning of an orderly retreat leading to a defensive reaction.

With an unheard-of rapidity and brutality things went from a situation eminently favorable for definitively destroying the system of bourgeois rule to a situation in which the worker and popular masses found themselves totally disorganized and unable to deal with reactionary violence of a bestiality unprecedented in Latin America. No important organization of the workers movement was still in position to act after the coup. Thus, after a heroic but very brief resistance, the dictatorship was able to do whatever it wanted to do to attain its goals.

In reality, the great majority of people, of militants, who were assassinated did not fall in combat but were defenseless victims torn from their work places during the day and from their homes after the curfew. That is why in the months following the coup combativity was very weak, if not nil, and the demoralization was very deep. This demoralization especially affected many militants, who began to leave the country. The parties of the traditional left, and to a lesser extent the revolutionary organizations, notably the MIR, were hard hit, although in most cases the dictatorship did not achieve its declared objective, which was to destroy them totally. Under these conditions, a collapse of the military regime

in the short run is totally excluded. There is absolutely no point in sowing illusions on this score. The road to be traveled toward overthrowing the regime will be long and difficult. You have to start from that.



Q. What is the perspective of the Liga Comunista in this situation?

A. Any discussion of the tasks to be accomplished today must begin with an analysis of the defeat, of its character and extent. There is nothing to be gained by trying to hide the extent of the defeat or by mystifying the real state of the resistance and the forces that revolutionaries now command. On the contrary, that would lead to serious errors that would retard the process of recovery of the workers and popular movement even more.

The problem of reorganizing the workers and popular movement -- or more exactly, taking the first steps toward this reorganization -- must start from that realization, and from a number of other factors: the long tradition of struggle and combativity of the exploited masses of Chile, the growing rejection of the dictatorship among very numerous social sectors, the essential failure of the political and economic projects of the military. But it is not easy to concretize this in practice. In the present situation any demonstration of combativity or opposition to the policy of the junta, no matter how modest, is met with the most savage and violent repression. Further, since the exploited masses today have no ability to respond to the brutal repression of the military, we must be especially cautious as to the specific forms of struggle that we propose or push for. All the more so in that the junta is not especially concerned with the effects its criminal practices may have.

When any manifestation of resistance occurs, even the most modest, the repression comes down quickly and brutally on the place of the conflict, whether it be a factory, a población, or whatever. In the face of that, the masses are completely isolated and have no way to extend the struggle beyond the place where it starts, or even to make it known. The atomization on the one hand and the repressive apparatus on the other are such that it is nearly impossible to establish links with other factories, other industries, other poblaciones. Also, there is no significant means of propaganda (press, etc.) that could be used to support a struggle or to publicize it and thereby denounce the repression and organize solidarity.

If to this we add the enormous unemployment we mentioned before, we can see that the conditions



under which the first workers and popular struggles must go on are extremely difficult. Although formally the social laws on working conditions have not been abolished, in reality they are no longer respected by the employers, who do whatever they want. We have seen many cases in which an employer, faced with a modest demand for wage increases, simply fires all the workers and hires new ones the next day, drawn from the reserve army of 700,000 unemployed; in fact, he even hires them at even lower wages. When one worker is fired, hundreds are prepared to take his place under any conditions at all. Just to survive.

Let us take just one example to illustrate the difficulties the workers meet in mobilizing even for very modest objectives. The most obvious and even easiest form of struggle when the workers want to win something is the strike. And there have been some (especially during the months immediately following the coup). They were isolated and spontaneous strikes. Not a single one had a positive result. Immediately informed of a movement, the military would arrive at the work place to repress it. In some cases those workers identified by informers as being responsible for the strike were arrested and they often disappeared. In other cases a group would be selected at random and shot on the spot as an example. Conclusion: Not only were the demands not won, the increase in terror was such that the refusal to organize and hesitance about any proposal to struggle became even stronger than before.



Q. Is there any way out of such a situation?

A. We believe that the proposals for struggle that the most advanced sectors of the revolution must

make to the masses have to have a concrete possibility of success. In the present situation failure means demoralization and more steps backward. This does not mean that we propose a struggle only when we are 100 percent sure of success. For one thing such guarantees are impossible, and for another, that would lead us to a completely passive if not conservative attitude.

But it does mean that we must work with the perspective of very modest and partial victories through which the workers can again develop confidence in themselves and in their own strength. It is only through such a process that conditions can be created allowing greater forces of struggle and organization to develop.

How can we move in this direction? There is a limit beyond which the dictatorship cannot go, in the criminal and bloody manner it is accustomed to, without calculating whether what it loses politically can be gained back by bringing the repressive potential into play. That is the source of the (very narrow) room for maneuver that the masses must use to concretize their initial forms of struggle. For example, in the case of wage demands, the only examples of successful struggle are those in which the workers succeeded in organizing systematic but scarcely visible sabotage of the rhythms of production. The multiplication of "mistakes," creation of bottlenecks in the productive process, slowdowns, waste of raw materials and energy, and a thousand other forms of obstruction that the workers can devise led to a reduction in productivity and production, thus increasing the costs and reducing the profits for the capitalists. Confronted with such a situation, the employers may think about the possibility of increasing wages or satisfying other demands put forward or made known in a clandestine manner, through leaflets left in the factory toilets, for example.

In some cases in which employers have been faced with such a form of resistance they have called on the armed forces; but when they arrived everything was functioning "normally" in the factory. In those cases, the intervention of the soldiers did not go beyond a violent threatening speech delivered by the officer in charge of reestablishing order.

But it must be clear and no illusions should be developed. While it is possible under some sharply determined conditions to avoid direct repression against the workers as a whole, that does not prevent the dictatorship from working intensely, and by all possible means, to root out "ringleaders." Hence the necessity for absolute clandestinity even on the level of such modest activity.



Q. Have these tactics produced success in some specific sectors?

A. Yes, in some industries requiring highly skilled workers. The chances of success are directly related to the workers' indispensability. In places where it takes the employers two years to train a worker and get the most out of him, the possibilities are much greater than in places where workers can be replaced from one day to the next. In those cases, the possibilities in the present context are virtually nil.

The place the factory occupies in the national economy is also an element in determining possibilities for success. The dictatorship cannot afford paralysis in the copper mines, for example, because copper exports are the main source of currency income. It is on the basis of such criteria that we are organizing our intervention, modest though it may be, even though it is particularly difficult to penetrate such sectors.



Q. Can you give us other examples of struggle?

A. In some poblaciones soup kitchens have been organized to feed the unemployed; the supplies are given by those who are working. At first glance, such actions could appear as purely humanitarian gestures. In reality, however, they have a clear meaning of opposition to the dictatorship's policy, and they are seen as such by all the pobladores. Proposing an objective of this type first of all assures breadth to the movement, because the masses can participate and collaborate without running great risks of being imprisoned or murdered. But to make a soup kitchen function on a daily basis a more or less stable organization is needed (to collect funds, organize rotation of the voluntary kitchens, etc.). Such organization represents a big

step forward if it is kept in mind that since September 11, 1973, no sort of mass organization whatsoever has existed.

Beginning from organizing such elementary demonstrations as the soup kitchens, another problem begins to be resolved: the reconstruction of nuclei of natural mass leaders, on the población level, for example.

The policy of the dictatorship consists in assassinating or imprisoning the most combative leaders. In many cases it has attained its goal. It is through such forms of organization as the soup kitchens, such modest struggles, that the most advanced workers, pobladores, peasants, and students have linked up with the masses to make the first experiments of organization and to direct the initial forms of resistance to the dictatorship. Beginning from that, these most advanced elements find themselves in position to organize and lead new struggles. In a few cases these most advanced sectors are grouped into stable clandestine organizations allowing them to prepare new forms of struggle in a continuous manner.

That is the function of the Committees of Popular Resistance. The program of these committees is derived from the requirements of the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship. All those who are ready to struggle for that goal can participate in the committees, provided the necessary security measures are observed. In every struggle the problem immediately arises of extending the struggle further. It is necessary to begin preparing conditions that will make such extensions possible. That is why we are making use of the experiences we had under the Unidad Popular with the cordones industriales and the comandos comunales to direct our efforts toward creating centers of coordination among the various cells of the resistance belonging to given sectors or specific fronts.



Q. Has progress already been made in this regard?

A. The development of these organizational structures and the struggles we have just been speaking of have been purely embryonic up to now. The organization of resistance has been stabilized only in a few areas.



Q. What is the importance of these forms of struggle and of democratic demands and wage demands?

A. For us revolutionary Marxists they have a purely tactical dimension. Like the struggle for the over-

throw of the dictatorship, the struggles of the proletariat must never be dependent solely on economic and democratic demands. Whenever conditions permit, they must be pushed in the direction of demands that have an ever higher content. We can never forget that only the victory of socialism (and not the development of progressive bourgeois sectors) will resolve the problems of the exploited masses. We are struggling for socialism, and this struggle demands full political independence of the exploited masses.



Q. Finally, do you have a policy of alliances?

A. We call on all workers, pobladores, peasants, soldiers, students, and civil servants, regardless of party affiliation, to join the organization of the resistance. We call for the rejection of any sort of alliance with the bourgeoisie or its parties. We call upon all the workers parties to form a front against the dictatorship. We call on the whole revolutionary left -- and in particular the MIR -- to strengthen a united pole able to take the first steps of resistance by the Chilean masses, under the banner of the socialist revolution. □

BRAZIL

the dictatorship ... Changing the "model"?

BY RUY MARIANO

Since the coup in Chile, Brazil has ceased to occupy first place among bloody regimes in the international bourgeois press. Confronted by an incomparably more conscious mass movement than their Brazilian counterparts are facing, the Chilean gorillas have unleashed a massive repression never before seen in Latin America. In this they have taken the place previously occupied by the Brazilian rulers. Other factors, however, have also emerged in the past several months that have contributed to "changing the image" of the Brazilian dictatorship in the international press. Every day news comes out that is apparently "in contradiction" with the reactionary character of the Brazilian regime. General Geisel promises "new flexibility" and "the re-establishment of democratic norms"; statements are made in favor of a "national industry" based on Brazilian capital and the development of Brazilian technology. The government itself is taking up (even if only implicitly) one of the burning themes of its opposition, the notion that a more

equitable distribution of income is needed in order to step up consumption among the people. Even on the diplomatic field, Brazil is coming forward with an apparent "change" in its policy. It has significantly increased commercial relations with the workers states; it has recognized independent Guinea-Bissau ("to which we feel linked by bonds of blood and culture," as the Brazilian delegate to the UN put it); it has renewed diplomatic relations with China (after signing some good trade agreements, of course). Very clear economic interests have led the regime to cease aligning itself with the bloc of the most reactionary countries. The government calls this policy "responsible pragmatism." Even on the question of Cuba's readmittance to the Organization of American States, Brazil has taken an attitude of flexible resistance.

Naturally, the reformists of all stripes, from the Stalinists to some unimportant sections of the bourgeoisie assembled in the MDB (Movimento Democrá-

...ico Brasileiro -- Brazilian Democratic Movement), the only authorized opposition party, are hastening to overestimate these "openings" and "changes," exaggerating their significance and dynamic and attributing them to the pressure of a "powerful social force" -- the "progressive and anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie," that half-mythical figure that is always present in reformist schemas. Within the revolutionary left, however, tendencies toward blind skepticism are being manifested. Because they correctly reject the myth of the "democratic national bourgeoisie" that the reformists are trying to peddle, these sectors refuse to analyze the meaning of the real changes that are now occurring in the Brazilian scene, changes that are a result of the economic and political problems that have built up during past years.

What is the Brazilian "economic miracle" all about? What factors have led the military officers to change their foreign policy and take up hitherto forbidden themes like "national industry," "Brazilian technology," "a better distribution of income," and so on?

The dictatorship's character and function

To correctly understand the problems confronting the Brazilian bourgeoisie today, it is necessary to fully grasp the meaning of the 1964 military coup and the transformations it produced in Brazilian society. The Brazilian Communist party has concocted an involved schema aimed at accounting for the debacle of its strategy of class collaboration in 1964. This theory claims that the military dictatorship was imposed by North American imperialism and a minority of the Brazilian nation, the latifundistas, against the great majority of the people. Included among this great majority is the national industrial bourgeoisie (since Brazilian society was allegedly feudal). This minority was terrified by the structural reforms the Goulart government claimed to be applying. In 1964-65 the Stalinists also added that the dictatorship was isolated and would soon fall. This interpretation had the drawback that it required its advocates to close their eyes to reality and refuse to see who had carried out the coup and why, and refuse to recognize the deep changes the officers were to make in Brazil in order to bring about capitalist development. But what was this autonomous national capitalism the reformists were dreaming about when they preached for the front of the working class and the industrial bourgeoisie in order to press for application of Goulart's basic reforms? It was a capitalism integrated into imperialism, which is the only form of capitalist development open to dependent countries.

Ever since the 1950s the bourgeoisie has been seek-

ing a way to give a new impetus to the process of industrialization. Since 1937 the bourgeoisie had been ruling in tight association with latifundistas linked to the export of agricultural products (especially coffee and sugar); it had drawn the capital for its investments from currency produced by foreign trade. Beginning in the 1950s (during the second Vargas government) this association started to lose its effectiveness, and a period of intense contradictions within the bourgeoisie opened up. It was an unstable period of recomposition of the economic and political system during which the industrial sector already held economic hegemony (even though it was narrowly dependent on the agri-export sector) without yet holding political hegemony. It was a period during which the political hegemony of the old latifundista sector acted as a brake on the system's functioning in the service of industrial development. To change this situation, the bourgeoisie several times tried "progressive" and "autonomous" formulas having two basic axes: first, agrarian reform aimed at breaking the power of the latifundistas by redistributing the land and adapting agriculture to the exigencies of feeding the growing city population; and second, an "independent" foreign policy based on diplomatic contacts aimed at opening up new markets and breaking the narrow dependence on the United States. Toward this end, the bourgeoisie made use of the politico-organizational schema of the populism of Vargas and Goulart, seeking to base its "progressive" policy on mobilizations of the working class (which was locked into unions organically dependent on the Ministry of Labor) and, in certain periods, on peasant and student mobilizations.

Progressive national bourgeoisie?

That was the foundation on which the Stalinist reformists based their theory of the progressive role of the national bourgeoisie and elaborated a program subordinating the popular masses to the interests of the bourgeoisie. But the 1964 coup clearly exposed the illusory character of these theories. The "progressive" plan of bourgeois reforms had been accompanied by a severe policy of wage reduction, as is proved by the well-known three-year plan worked out by Celso Furtado, Goulart's minister, and presented in 1962. And this in the context of the acute inflation then prevailing. Thus, while the bourgeoisie based itself on working-class support, it could continue to do so only as long as Goulart's populism was able to contain the workers' mobilizations for better wages, thus preventing wage increases from causing a fall in the rate of profit, which was the key requirement during this phase of industrialization.

But the force of the rise of the mass movement blew the reformist scheme to pieces. By 1963 it became clear that Goulart was incapable of controlling the workers movement: Agitation spread among the peasants and students; even sectors of the armed forces were affected. This created an atmosphere of agitation on a national scale, which made it easier for the bourgeoisie to grasp its own historic interests. Faced with pressure from the masses, the bourgeoisie understood that it was the working class rather than the latifundistas and North American imperialists that was doing the damage. It then opted for the military dictatorship and economic integration into imperialist capital, casting off its "progressive" and "nationalist" veneer.

Contrary to what the Stalinists thought, the military government set up in 1964 was not the representative of the conservative, retrograde latifundista minority tied to the interests of North American imperialism and destined to hold up progress. In reality, the officers were representatives of the historic interests of the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie. They took power to try to succeed where the bourgeois parties had failed in developing capitalism. They thus took up the defense of the strongest national bourgeois sectors, those most capable of offering advantages for foreign investors, the aim being to advance industrial capitalism.

The first measures taken by the military dictatorship indicated that its goal was a process of structural change in the economic and political system in order to modernize it and adapt it to the needs of industrial development. If such development was not "progressive" as the reformists had hoped, it is because capitalist development on a world scale has long since been effected at the cost of deep distortions of the most backward economic sectors and of dependent countries like Brazil. From the first moment, the government sought to accelerate the process of monopolization of industrial sectors and their integration into imperialist capital. A series of fiscal arrangements were established to open the door to foreign investments. Naturally, these investments flowed toward big enterprises and this accelerated the crisis of the weakest industries, which began to shut down. This tendency was strengthened by a selective credit policy and by a campaign "against corruption," the objective of which was to prosecute sectors that did not pay taxes. To be sure, the targets protested, and the CP was able to use such complaints as "proof" that the "national" bourgeoisie was against the military regime. What the CP and all the other sectors of the left that spread the myth of the "national bourgeoisie" failed to see was that only a part of the national bourgeoisie was involved -- the weakest part, generally composed of small enterprises producing nondurable consumer

goods, the famous "traditional sector" that depends on consumption levels of the masses. This sector did not succeed in integrating itself into imperialism and it has always been crushed by the "Brazilian model." Taking the decade 1960-1970 as a base, it can be seen that while the growth of "traditional" branches was very small (1.6% for the textile industry, 3.4% in the food industry), that of the "dynamic" branches was much higher (12.3% in the metal industry, 11% in the chemicals industry). Four years after the coup, the industrial sector had already been restructured on the whole and was adapted to the general level of monopolization. The protests then were squelched.

But on its own, this measure would have been insufficient for creating conditions for development. The real problem that the Brazilian economy faced after 1962 was the fall in the rate of profit, which was caused mainly by the fact that the chronic inflation which had been accelerated in previous years had been accompanied by wage increases won because of the enormous pressure of the mass movement. Without resolving this problem it would have been impossible to obtain imperialist investments in sufficient quantity to stimulate the development of the country. The solution was the policy of "wage freeze," that is, the illegalization of strikes and the creation of a system of annual increases according to category of labor, the rate of increase being set by the government (without any interference from the unions or the employers) on the basis of the rate of inflation during the previous year and the estimate of the rate of increase in productivity for the coming year. This system, completely manipulated by government technocrats, crushed the real wages of the working class. It is estimated that among the workers of greater São Paulo real wages fell nearly 70% between 1958 and 1973; for the workers of Rio de Janeiro, the fall was nearly 50% over the same period. It is quite clear that such a policy is possible only on the basis of severe repression of the mass movement and the vanguard. After the coup, the trade-union leaders of the PTB and the CP were persecuted, arrested, or exiled from the unions, and the corporatist-type unions, which until then had been an instrument for the policy of a populist government, passed into the service of the military dictatorship. It can be said that the main feature of the "Brazilian model," the factor that serves as the mainspring of capitalist growth today, is the combination of compression of wages and severe repression of the masses. It is this resource that enabled the economy to get out of the phase of stagnation it had been caught in. Gross internal product, which had had a low growth rate from 1962 to 1967 (5.3% in 1962, 1.5% in 1963, 2.9% in 1964, 2.7% in 1965, 5.1% in 1966, and 4.8% in 1967) went through a rapid increase beginning in 1968, with

rates of 8.4% in 1968 and 9% in 1969. The policy of compression of wages, with its corollary of repression, torture, and death, became a fundamental element of the policy of the dictatorship without which it could not have been viable.

This opened a period of economic, especially industrial, development that was carried out without the structural reforms that the populist and reformist Stalinists had believed indispensable for such industrial growth. Contrary to what the reformists had thought, this growth was not based on a better distribution of the national income, but on a greater concentration of it. (In 1960 the average salary of the petty bourgeoisie was approximately twice that of the workers; by 1969 it was four times as high.) The problem of the market for consumption of industrial products was resolved in a different manner under the "Brazilian model." Growth of the internal market through increasing the purchasing power of the poorest layers (especially in the countryside) clashed with the need to increase the rate of profit by increasing exploitation of wage labor. The military government's solution to this problem can be summed up in three points. The first was a policy of easy credit for the petty bourgeoisie, so as to allow it to consume durable goods on a grand scale, exactly those goods produced by the industrial sectors that the government had encouraged the most, those that were considered "dynamic" and "profitable," the places where foreign capital was concentrated. The second point was the transformation of the state into a large consumer. This was done through development plans for an infrastructure for transport, electrification, and equipping of the armed forces. The third point was export. This was the most difficult part of the program, because an underdeveloped country (no matter how "developed") has very little ability to compete on the world market in manufactured goods. The government resorted to several elements in its patient attempts to enlarge its share of the world market: an aggressive diplomatic policy; export of agricultural products and semi-industrial raw materials; attraction of foreign investment with the aim of producing manufactured products or parts for export; small-scale sale of non-durable consumer goods (like shoes).

The years 1968 and 1969 were the "golden age" of the Brazilian economy. The economic upswing enabled the main bourgeois sectors to rally around the Costa e Silva government. In 1968 there was a revolutionary upturn: student agitation on a national scale, important and aggressive workers strikes at Osasco (in São Paulo) and Contagem (in Minas Gerais), the first armed initiatives of the vanguard, and the rebellion of certain populist members of parliament. Bourgeois support enabled the government to respond with Institutional Act No.5, a real "coup within the coup." The period opened by passage of

this act in December 1968 was a period of political, organic, physical, and even moral destruction of the organizations of the left and of vanguard sectors of the mass movement. It was also a period of unprecedented economic expansion. The economic structures of the country changed profoundly; the vanguard was broken; the masses were exploited in a deepgoing an extensive fashion; the process of accumulation of capital was accelerated on a grand scale.


First 'breaches' in the 'model'

The "golden age" ended in the second half of 1973. The effects of the world crisis of capitalism (and especially the "oil crisis") erupted on the Brazilian scene, unsettling the plans of the dictatorship's technocrats. Inflation, control over which had been one of the axes of the government's economic plans, rose to a rate higher than the expected 12 percent. The inflation rate could not be concealed; it showed up in daily household experience. Delfin Neto, the minister of finance and "architect of the model," whose prestige had risen very high during the previous four years, fell into a state of relative demoralization, dragging President Médici after him. There was a shortage of certain industrial raw materials like steel and concrete; the construction industry, a very important element in the economy, was paralyzed. The government became more demoralized. There was a shortage of basic foodstuffs in the cities; meat and coffee (!) had been exported in enormous quantities and the government had to import supplies to satisfy the internal market; beans, the traditional basic foodstuff among popular layers, were lacking, because they had been replaced by soya, which could be more profitably exported since the world market price was higher. This was the end of the "miracle" for some sectors of the urban middle class that had previously benefited from the economic expansion. The result was the first cracklings from sectors integrated into the consumer market; the first criticisms and demands were raised against the government.

Naturally, what was involved was only the most superficial form of a more general problem that confronted the economic "model" beginning at the end of 1973. The greatest concern of the Brazilian ruling classes was to maintain the annual rate of increase in the gross internal product above 10 percent. (The record increase, 11.4 percent, had been set in 1973.) This growth rate, combined with the high profits that could be drawn from Brazil because of the low wages, had in the course of four years transformed the country into a paradise for foreign investors. In other words, without the high growth rate, Brazil would cease to be such an attractive field of

investment. Moreover, it is clear that the continuity of economic growth depends mainly on foreign investment. While it is true that there has been a big accumulation of capital in the country, by both the bourgeoisie and the mixed state enterprises, this accumulation is still insufficient for "financing" continuing development. The big economic problem for the Brazilian bourgeoisie today is to maintain the growth of the gross internal product above 10 percent a year, and this requires a much greater volume of capital than that provided by the annual investments of the past several years. All the growth during the years of the "miracle" was based on utilization of the hidden capacity of the industrial structure set up during the 1950s (particularly in the automobile industry). Today this capacity has been exhausted. To continue the expansion at the same rate as in previous years would require capital to set up new units of production -- large units extremely profitable and compatible with the technological level attained by world capitalist production. The problem is precisely to offer foreign investors fields of capital investment that have a guaranteed market.

There is no need to dwell on the fact that the exhaustion of the first phase of the Brazilian "model" ("deepening" of the market for durable consumer goods through offering credits to the petty bourgeoisie, works on a national infrastructure funded by the state, and export), combined with the worldwide crisis of capitalism, can only complicate things for the Brazilian bourgeoisie. We can see this clearly in the case of oil. Brazil imports 70 percent of the oil it uses. At the end of 1973 when the "oil crisis" broke out, the government began subsidizing oil in order to prevent the price increases from having repercussions on the sale of automobiles, which is a major area of production. In 1974 this policy was no longer possible. The government let the price of oil go up, and this had repercussions on the sale of automobiles. The consequence was simple: Brazil could no longer contemplate investing in the automobile industry. That resulted from a number of factors: (1) the exhaustion of the internal market for durable consumer goods, because the sectors that had been left out of the "miracle," that is, the peasants, agricultural workers, urban proletariat, and the lowest layers of the petty bourgeoisie, generally get paid less than the vital minimum (in spite of a tendency of workers wages to increase during the past few months); (2) the world crisis, which led the imperialist powers to take protective measures, thus making the government's export plans more difficult; and (3) the problems that maintaining importation of such a quantity of oil created for the balance of payments (which for the first five months of 1974 ran at a deficit of \$2 million). The bourgeoisie itself became aware that investment in many of the basic pillars



of industry -- automobiles for example -- had to be diverted toward other products and other markets. But at the end of 1973 the government was still in a euphoric mood and decided to promote unlimited expansion of "dynamic" industries. Examples are the plan to build a new Volkswagen factory at Taubate in São Paulo with a capacity of 3,000 units a day (the present factory produces 1,700 a day) and the million-dollar contracts signed between the provincial government of Minas Geiras and Fiat. But today the repercussions of the international crisis (and the consequent reduction in export plans) clearly require that the government reorient the economy anew. The question is, Reorient in what direction?

All these economic problems, which broke to the surface at almost the same moment, inevitably had consequences for the political rule of the bourgeoisie. In 1964 the strongest and most important sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie were faced with the rise of the masses and chose the road of military dictatorship; in 1968, convinced of the effectiveness of the economic policy of the military, which was just be-

ginning to bear fruit, they permitted the promulgation of Institutional Act No.5; during the four following years they demonstrated an unlimited political docility, ceding all power to the dictatorship that was serving them. Today the bourgeoisie is beginning to relax its total support to the government.

The relative demoralization of the Médici government and of public opinion gave rise to the first dissensions within the ruling classes. We are not referring here to the fictitious political struggle between the two parties that are allowed to play the game of the dictatorship, the official ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional -- Alliance for National Renewal) and the opposition MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro -- Brazilian Democratic Movement). Up to now the MDB has been just a puppet composed of a gang of professional politicians who succeeded in escaping the military witch-hunt; the group lacks any social base and represents the general ideas of the "old national bourgeoisie" that used to express itself through the PTB. It does not represent any important bourgeois sector. Beginning with the latest presidential elections, with the campaign of the "anticandidate" Ulisses Guimarães, it can be said that the MDB became the channel of expression of the petty bourgeoisie's general aspirations toward greater liberty and of the rather formal demands of weak bourgeois sectors linked to "traditional" industrial branches that had been crushed by the "model" and deprived of the exercise of power.

Thus, when we speak of political dissensions within the ruling classes, we mean conflicts among the high-ranking officers, within the bodies of the state administration, and even within the ARENA. These conflicts were expressed through muted struggles over ARENA's choice of candidates for president (Médici was seeking reelection), for minister of finance, and posts as governors (especially governor of São Paulo, a key post in the system). These struggles were not completely meaningless, for they had a rather interesting ideological content that illustrated the insipid political life of the country. The problem confronting the Brazilian ruling classes is an economic one: How can the economy be reoriented in the present situation? But it is political as well: Is it now necessary to maintain the same level of political centralization, or is it possible and desirable to move to greater decentralization in the decision-making bodies? It is quite clear that the military dictatorship, however technocratic and impersonal it might be, is not the ideal mechanism for the exercise of bourgeois power. For a certain time it was needed to confront a danger and overcome a crisis; later it was needed to set to work on a task of the dimensions of the economic expansion of the past several years, something that only a centralized leadership could do. But is it necessary now?

The ruling class is divided on this point. It is not a matter of structured currents or clearly delineated tendencies within the ruling bourgeois bloc. It is much more a general dilemma about the continuity of the "model." Two sorts of responses have been given. One, presented by conservatives, proposes maintenance of a hard line (the same level of repression against the masses and the vanguard) and of the same political functioning of the parties (occasional debate in a rump parliament, prettified by bilateral and informal consultations between ministers and industrial interest groups). The other sort of response is concerned with making the necessary changes: a more selective repression striking the (clandestine) vanguard as before and "legally" halting sectors of the masses; a better distribution of the national income; elimination of the scandalous dimension of inequalities; and creation of certain institutional channels allowing ruling bourgeois sectors to make their opinions known in a direct and institutionalized fashion. Roughly it can be said that Médici and Delfin are conservatives and Geisel and Simonsen (the present minister of finance) are advocates of changes. But things are not that simple in reality.

When Delfin was a superpowerful minister, he said that "the internal market can be developed only through expansion of the external market." But he talked a different line when he was trying (unsuccessfully) to convince Geisel to name him as ARENA candidate for the post of governor of São Paulo province. At that time he said, "I therefore state that the revolution (he refers to the 1964 coup -- IN-PPRECOR) has accomplished its work on the economic plane but not on the political and social plane," a reference to the lack of popular representation and the high degree of concentration of income. In sum, we can say that the entire bourgeoisie is facing real problems for which it has not yet found adequate solutions. The skirmishes and the varying ideologies are expressions of these problems.

It is quite obvious that at the time that these contradictions rose to the surface all social sectors, so long prevented from expressing their economic and democratic demands, took advantage of these breaches to make their discontent public, even if in a timid, spontaneous, and disorganized way. The total lack of political organization among all social sectors (even the bourgeoisie) and of trade-union traditions resulted in these first demonstrations being somewhat precarious, not yet serving to accumulate forces and attain a consistent level of functioning in the sense of breaking down the sentiment of self-censorship that dominated broad sectors of the population. Since there was no other vehicle, the MDB channeled this discontent. The campaign of the anticandidate was one such occasion; today, during the campaign for legislative elections in November,

the MDB in many areas (particularly Rio Grande do Sul, but also Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) is trying to attract new generations that see this party as the only place in which they can discuss the national political situation.

The working class begins to raise its head

The student movement, which had traditionally been a sounding board for the major events in the country, was not left unaffected by all these changes. In various provinces (São Paulo, Minas Geiras, Rio Grande do Sul) the students slowly began to raise their heads and seek out embryonic forms of organization. The student movement, which had an important tradition of struggle and clandestine organization, had been totally decapitated during the worst years of the repression (1970-71). Today, new generations have begun to emerge. They are slowly seeking to re-create room to develop their action. The demands that have most often mobilized the student milieu are those calling for democratic rights and opposing the repression. Nevertheless, a will to politicization has also been manifested (after the purge from the universities of all nonreactionary professors in 1969). This is shown in both the quantity and quality of the student organizations that have appeared.

But the most interesting feature is the beginning, although very modest, of clandestine reorganization of workers sectors of the vanguard. During the years of the "miracle" and the intense exploitation of wage labor, there were relatively few spontaneous and explosive struggles for immediate demands; most of those that did take place were savagely repressed. In general, these struggles developed in superexploited sectors not fundamental to the economy: garbage collectors, taxi drivers, construction workers on the São Paulo subway, etc. But at the end of 1973 we began to see struggles of a very different sort, which expressed the first steps in the reorganization of the workers vanguard. These were "legal" strikes that sought to take advantage of the very special situation of the labor market at the time. The application of the wage freeze from 1964 on produced a decline in real wages of 50-70 percent compared to the previous period. At a certain point, overtime became generalized. For the workers, this meant a possibility of increasing their income enough to feed their families; for the employers, it was an advantage not to have to pay social benefits to new employees. The spread of overtime became so extensive that in greater São Paulo the normal work day in all industrial branches was ten to twelve hours. The increase in productivity and the expansion was based principally on this system of overtime. But industrial growth had been so rapid that during the previous three to four years a conjunctural phenom-

enon of relative labor shortage had developed. Although it was conjunctural, this phenomenon acquired a certain intensity, to the point that it raised the value of manual labor. The explanation for the relative labor shortage is that industrial expansion was more rapid than the exodus from the countryside to the cities (which is the usual way new labor is provided). In addition, the very bad working conditions -- unhealthy surroundings, long hours, bad food -- brought about a process of "selection" that eliminated many workers who came from the countryside but "could not adapt to conditions in the city." The sum of these elements created a situation that the workers intelligently utilized in the "legal" strikes, which were legal because they were simply refusals to work overtime; the actions were not considered to be "strikes" since the overtime hours were supposed to be voluntary.

These strikes took place in the "dynamic" industrial branches, like Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, General Motors, and Aco Villares (an elevator company). They were carried out so as to partially paralyze certain sectors in such a way as to disorganize and thereby lower daily production. The employers were eager to negotiate with the strikers and did not call out the police. Not all these strikes were victorious (in some cases, the unions intervened as "mediators" and managed to get the workers to go back to work and "discuss later"), but the big victory lay in the fact that the police did not intervene. In some factories the employers granted wage increases, even though this was "illegal" under the existing wage-freeze law. When Geisel took over as president, Simonsen, the new finance minister, declared that this law would remain in force and that any transgressions (increases that had been granted by employers) would be punished. Finally, in mid-1974 he declared that the law "was still in force," but that certain increases granted as payment for "promotions" would be allowed. The process of industrialization had raised the value of labor beyond the expectations of the dictatorship, and that did not fail to stimulate a new rise of the working class.

The main negative element that remains to be overcome is the immense sentiment of defeat, which has given rise to a generalized self-censorship of the masses, including the working class. Nor does the situation of the vanguard organizations facilitate overcoming that sentiment. We can say that the Brazilian vanguard was thrown completely off balance by this process. Today only a few nuclei remain of what was once the revolutionary left. Most of these nuclei have lost their vanguard character and are instead groups following after the masses (or "study groups" within the student movement). The Brazilian CP is using this situation to try to reassemble the remains of Castroism and reestablish

the CP's capitulationist policy. Due to its ties with the Soviet Union and the few roots that it has preserved within the working class, and, most important, because of the confused policy of the revolutionary left, the Communist party may be able to begin to become a pole of attraction again, in spite of its present weakness.

The bourgeoisie tries to plug holes

All the elements we have enumerated should not lead us to characterize the situation as one of economic crisis. The bourgeoisie stands at a crossroads; it has serious problems to resolve and has to transform the mechanisms that functioned so perfectly in the past. But it has no adequate solutions. It is obvious that the crisis of world capitalism and the structural problems typical of an "underdeveloped" economy -- which were only intensified by the "miracle" -- can combine to make the problems facing the ruling class more difficult and can cause a crisis to ripen. Nevertheless, that has not yet happened and it would be an illusion to believe that it has. Four years of economic growth and increases in the strength of the ruling class cannot be simply written off. The exhaustion of this accumulated strength will require more time and more difficulties.

The bourgeoisie is fighting to resolve these problems. The first months of the Geisel government were marked by audacious attempts in the realm of the international economy (which led to some changes in Brazilian foreign policy) through which the regime sought to establish various bilateral import-export accords (with Arab countries, Japan, West Germany). The aim was to get investments to finance its projects, often by associating them with state capital. In general the target sectors of investment were those enterprises making semifinished manufactured products, extracting agricultural and mining raw materials, and financing a process of semi-industrialization for the export market. This conformed to the government's general concern with improving the balance of payments, either by diminishing imports or by increasing exports. In this process, what the government has hitherto done on a relatively small scale -- setting up big capitalist enterprises in the countryside -- may be developed in an extensive fashion under the pretext of utilizing all the country's natural resources. This could lead to important changes in the social structure of the countryside, with a tendency to diminish the number of small peasants and incorporate the mass of peasants as wage labor into the large enterprises. The ruling class knows that the place it occupies in the world market depends and will for a long time continue to depend on export of its raw ma-

terials. The present world crisis, which has engendered both a protectionist policy by the advanced capitalist countries seeking to protect their manufactured products and a rise in the prices of raw materials, strengthens the "agricultural inclination" of the underdeveloped countries. But the government intends to transform the countryside into a profitable concern from the standpoint of the capitalist employers. In Brazil this means not so much modernizing the process of exploiting the land as "rationalizing," that is, extending and deepening the exploitation of wage labor, even leading to systems having some characteristics similar to those of slavery.

As for the changes in Brazil's general diplomatic stance, although they are significant, they simply show that, given the problems it is faced with, the ruling class has resolved to mediate its anti-Communist struggle in favor of its commercial needs. Behind the recognition of Guinea-Bissau and China stands an economic interest in trade with the African states and China. This also explains the government's still frigid attitude toward Cuba. The island is neither a market nor a supplier of raw materials or essential products for Brazil. On the contrary, in the sugar market it is a competitor. It was also the philosophy they call "responsible pragmatism" that led the Brazilian officers to abandon their previous totally pro-Israel position at the UN; they were seeking alliances and accords with the Arab states, and imported oil, most of which comes from the Middle East, has more weight than "principles" for the gorillas.

In the same way, it is absurd to interpret the timid experiments at changes in internal policy as "democratic openings" and fruits of the "pressure of the national bourgeoisie" as the reformists and other sectors of the left do. All the timid changes, which are real, correspond to an attempt by the ruling class to change its tactics to deal with its new problems. The government's concern for "national industry" is an example. There is no strong and organized national bourgeoisie bringing pressure on the Geisel government to take measures in its favor. National capital is in general concentrated in commerce, construction, and production of some nondurable consumer goods (food, textiles, shoes); in the industrial sector it is concentrated in small and middle-sized industries. In 1969, the last year for which statistics are available, these small and middle-sized enterprises (those employing 1-100 workers and 101-500 workers, respectively) employed 63 percent of the work force and produced 56 percent of generated industrial value (production, minus salaries and raw materials). In the same year, these enterprises accounted for 98 percent of the total number of establishments. Since that date, more

than 3,000 small and medium-sized enterprises have closed down and a significant number of middle-sized enterprises owned by national capital have been taken over by foreign capital. A real picture of the structure of production in the country can be obtained by looking at the ten leading enterprises in each industrial sector. In the sector of production of means of production seven are foreign-owned and three are owned by national capital; in the durable consumer goods sector all ten are foreign; in the nondurable consumer goods sector six are foreign, three are national, and one is a state company; in the semimanufactured sector, five are foreign, one is national, and four are state-owned. Thus, there is no national bourgeoisie as a strong class bringing pressure on the government.

The government's current concern with "national industry" has a different origin. It is aimed at limiting the present weight of imports of machinery and technology in the balance of payments. Geisel indicated this quite clearly in a speech delivered in March 1974. After having observed the "stagnation" of national private enterprise, he said that it was "urgent to try to strengthen this sector of industry so that it can assume its appropriate role, which includes supporting and stimulating other sectors (foreign and state) with which it is virtually directly confronted today." The concern about national industry does not imply any change in attitude toward foreign investment, which continues to be vital for the economy of the country. That is why Geisel declared in another part of the same speech: "It is desirable to maintain the same policy of egalitarian treatment and even favoritism toward foreign capital in the nonstrategic sectors." The concrete measures the government has adopted in favor of "national industry" do not amount to a grain's worth of the enormous advantages foreign capital commands. They only fit into the earlier policy and are aimed above all at reducing the present dependence on imported machinery, technology, and equipment. The government proposes to extend financial support to those industries of national capital that "present satisfactory economic-financial indices." This will be done through the Investibras, a recently created body. Through the Embramec (Mecânica Brasileira -- Brazilian Mechanics), another recently created body, it will finance expansion plans of national industries producing machinery and equipment. A detailed analysis of these timid measures has led economists to declare that they are incapable of counteracting one of the "natural" tendencies of the "model": Dependence on foreign capital conditions new investments in terms of import of machinery, equipment, and technology. Nevertheless, whether these measures are viable or not, what must be stressed is that the objective of the Brazilian bourgeoisie (of its strongest sectors, those most clearly integrated

into imperialist capital) is to diminish the tight dependence on the oscillations of the world market.

This is necessary in view of the significant weight of imports (whether machinery, equipment and technology, or raw materials like oil, wheat and grain) and the disequilibrium of the balance of payments, correction of which is a key element in maintaining the current rate of growth. In taking such measures the government is responding much more to the pressures and difficulties of the world crisis than to the pressure of national bourgeois sectors of the small and middle-sized enterprises.

This response is oriented above all toward the interests of the strong sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. Those are the interests the military officers have been representing ever since they came to power. □

September 1974

Correction

Because of an error in typography, a sentence in an article published in INPRECOR No. 10 (October 17) was incomprehensible. In the article "An Arab and Iranian Finance Capital Emerges," by Ernest Mandel, page 12, paragraph 6, sentence 5 should read: "It has also acquired control of two maritime companies, one linking Cyprus and Britain, the other linking England and Ireland. In the Arab countries themselves Arab finance capital, associated with big imperialist monopolies (with the Arabs often holding financial and political control), is engaged in a whole series of major industrial projects."

One year after the "earthquake"

BY MICHEL WARSHAWSKY

The effects of the October War throughout the Arab region -- substantial strengthening of local reactionary forces and accelerated penetration by American imperialism into countries in which it had been restricted by the rise of the Nasserist movement -- have tended to push to the background the deep crisis that continues to rack the number one bastion of imperialism in the region: the state of Israel.

The Israeli press uses the term "earthquake" to describe the impact of the crisis of Zionist society provoked by the October War. But unlike an earthquake, which is generally extremely limited in time, the general social crisis in Israel has not eased up one year after the war. On the contrary, it has intensified.

First on the economic level: The restructuring of the army, the costs of its new, modern equipment, and the decline in production caused by the six-month mobilization are bearing down on the Israeli economy with an immense weight. The total cost of those three items is estimated to be 40 thousand million Israeli pounds, which is more than the Gross National Product. The loans and gifts from American imperialism, extensive as they are, have been less than what the government expected. The period of prosperity that had been opened by the 1967 war was coming to an end in any case; the October War only deepened and accelerated the economic crisis that was building up. Inflation has reached a rate never before seen in Israel. Last year it was more than 40 percent! The government, less inclined than ever to strike at profits and at sectors privileged by Zionist policy (like the army or the immigrants) was obliged to present a budget in which social expenditures (health, education, and so on) have been drastically reduced. If to all this it is added that the Histadrut (the so-called trade-union, actually one of the country's largest employers and a pillar of the state) has done everything it can to reduce cost-of-living bonuses to the lowest possible level and that all indirect taxes have been raised, it is easy to see that it is the workers who are footing the bill for the October War. The least favored layers have suffered a loss in buying power on the order of 30 percent!

Concurrently, the government has had to take economic measures (restriction of credit, limits on subsidies, freeze on public construction) that have caused bankruptcies and thrown many workers out of work. A whole series of financial scandals have broken out in recent months (Palestine-British Bank, Society for Israel, various sorts of corruption). The Israeli economy is sick, and the crisis, which has only just begun, is going to shake it very violently.

Up to now, the government has been able to rely on one important factor: the lack of response from the working class, due above all to the absence of mass organizations able to raise a response. To be sure, the demonstrations of the Black Panthers (an organization of Sephardic Jews, Jews from Arab countries, who constitute nearly half of the Israeli-Jewish population), the local strikes that have occurred, and the formation of some committees against the high cost of living have showed that sooner or later a response must be expected from the Israeli working class to the attack on its buying power. That explosion will be all the more violent the longer the Histadrut succeeds in holding it back. Up to now, however, the Israeli working class has not yet had its say about the crisis opened by the October War.

But it is on the political level that the earthquake has reached its most intense level. The October War placed on the agenda the implementation of an overall accord aimed at stabilizing imperialist rule in the Arab region. For Israel this means the end of a seven-year period of an arrogant and aggressive policy based on occupation of the Arab territories conquered in 1967 and on permanent attacks on the neighboring Arab countries.

Much has been said about the psychological effects of the October War on the Israeli masses, drunk for seven years on the victory of 1967. Much has been said about the protest movements that developed around the cease-fire, about the mass criticism of the political conceptions of the old governmental team of Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan. But this development of consciousness -- very limited -- has not given rise to an alternative political leadership

capable of applying a more realistic policy in closer conformity with the overall project of U.S. imperialism. The Yitzhak Rabin government has only tried to gain time; it applies the U.S. policy as soon as Kissinger deprives the Israeli leaders of any choice.

The first stage of the overall accord was reached rapidly, in the form of the "disengagement" in Sinai and the Golan Heights. Today Kissinger is pushing to move to the next stage. This is a vital necessity for American imperialism if it is to make its policy credible to the Arab bourgeoisies. Kissinger's trip to the Middle East and the United Nations' recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization are the first signs that the second stage has been broached.

The Israeli government is unable to counterpose an alternative policy to Kissinger's project and the pressure of American imperialism. All it can do is quibble about "details" (the pace of withdrawal from the occupied territories, choice of the immediate negotiating partner, and the limits of the territories to be given back). It is clear that in the present context -- and this will not change unless there is a change in the overall policy of quieting the area down -- Israel can only follow Kissinger's orders. But -- and this is the main problem for the Rabin government -- a very significant part of the Israeli population is determined to do everything to prevent withdrawal from the West Bank of the Jordan River. For nearly seven years the government has been speaking of historic rights, military considerations, and anything else it could think of to justify Israel's permanent occupation of the Arab territories: investments, declarations on the eternity of the Israeli presence in the "historic sites," education of the youth about the right of annexation. Today the government is faced by tens of thousands of Israelis who are committed to non-withdrawal from the "historic territories."

'Wildcat colonization'

The recent attempts at "wildcat colonization" of the West Bank must be seen in that context. This is a question of a mass movement enjoying real popularity, a movement whose objective -- assertion of the definitive presence of Israel throughout the West Bank -- is considered a just cause by a good part of the population and many of the political parties, including the entire Dayan wing of the Labor party. These forces intend to respond to the "threat" of the Kissinger plan by taking initiatives that can sabotage the accords now being worked out and simultaneously mobilize the Israeli masses against any "government capitulation."



Israeli soldiers carry off "wildcat colon."

The bloc that has organized the wildcat colonization has two components with different political programs. The first is the youth of the National Religious party, educated for years in the spirit of holy war to preserve the territorial unity of Palestine and Israeli domination of the "holy places." The political program of this component, founded on the mystical hysteria fostered by certain religious authorities, would have no practical consequence if another leadership were not also entrenched in this movement, a leadership that has a precise political plan that is not necessarily identical to the motivations and objectives of the masses it is leading. That second component is the leadership of the far right, often high-ranking military officers, whose objective is to take power and establish a new type of state from which the last remnants of democratic rights will be eliminated. For the far right, possible Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank is only an opportunity to create an atmosphere propitious for an overthrow of the regime.

As the revolutionary Marxists have explained in their leaflets, the two components of the wildcat colonization movement are complementary. Sabotage of the Geneva agreements and annexation of the West Bank imply a new war in the near future; that would necessitate rapidly overcoming the social crisis now shaking Israel; it would thus necessitate an even more brutal strong state able to reduce all opposition to silence and reestablish the

military apparatus and "national consciousness," both shaken since the October War.

The Labor government has great difficulty in reacting to this offensive by the far right. It cannot let these groups organize wildcat colonization; but to send the army against them would raise the threat of civil war. On the other hand, the government has no means of opposing this movement effectively. The whole policy of the Zionist movement was founded on "wildcat colonization" of Palestine. For the past seven years, the Labor government has systematically refused to educate the population in preparation for a more realistic policy based on withdrawal from the occupied territories. In addition, an effective response from the government would require that the Histadrut call a mass mobilization, especially of the decisive layers of workers, on a clear basis that would engender a split in the Labor party and a dangerous dynamic among the mobilized masses. That is why up to now the government has been content to hold back the effects of the wildcat colonization as discreetly as possible, taking care to keep confrontations with the "colons" and their ideology to a minimum.

The opposition to the wildcat colonization movement has thus been led by the left Zionist organizations (primarily Hashomir Hatzair and Moked). But as Zionists, their opposition is necessarily limited to the "illegal" aspect of the colonization. Their opposition is placed in the context of putting pressure on the government to put an end to the excesses of the wildcat colonization. Their main slogan was "Colonize the Negev, not the West Bank." Moked, which was able to organize occupations of the firm of General Ariel Sharon (one of the unofficial leaders of the wildcat movement) and of the central headquarters of the movement, was not even able to exploit the fact that arms were discovered in that office. They were aware of the explosive import of the discovery. The flagrant contradiction between the desire to effectively oppose the fascist moves of the right and the Zionist basis of their own ideology and practice makes it impossible for groups like Moked and Hashomir Hatzair to really counter the Zionist right.

No compromise with Zionism!

That was the central theme of the intervention of the revolutionary Marxists of Matzpen-Marxist. In leaflets that were massively distributed in all the big cities of the country, we explained that "there is no such thing as legal colonization," that the "wildcatters" drew the justification for their actions from fifty years of Zionist history,

that the government was incapable of effectively countering the moves of the wildcat colons, and that there was no point in putting pressure on this government, which in any case had spent seven years creating the contradiction it is now trapped in: having to submit to American pressure to withdraw from the West Bank after having asserted the inalienable right of the Jews to keep control of this territory. We added that only a mass response on the basis of unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories and defense of the rights of the working class -- its right to organize to defend its own interests -- could block the fascist aims of the wildcat colons.

In reality, it is the working class that is the target of Ariel Sharon and his group. It is the working class that will have to bear the costs of the war he is consciously preparing, costs that would be paid both in human life and in loss of democratic rights. It is therefore in the interests of the workers to struggle against the wildcat colons, and the only objective capable of creating the preconditions for new relations with the Arab environment is not submission to the Kissinger plan but rather unconditional withdrawal from all the Arab territories seized in 1967.

In spite of their numerical weakness, the revolutionary Marxists were able to intervene in a massive and diversified way into the conflicts over the wildcat colonization: leaflets, high-school demonstrations, participation in the occupations organized by the left Zionists, participation in an initiative (temporarily unsuccessful) aimed at "colonizing" Arabs into a village from which they had been expelled. Our intervention was based around the only real answer to the dilemma "wildcat colonization" or "legal colonization": Down with the occupation! Unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories! Our presence was especially noted in the demonstration of the Black Panthers demanding the release of their leader Charly Bitton, in which we explained the relationship between the release of Bitton and the struggle against colonization.


The abstention of the other currents in the anti-Zionist left from this struggle only reaffirms the critical situation into which they have been thrust by the October crisis. The spontanéists of the Tel Aviv Matzpen and especially the Revolutionary Communist Alliance have accepted the Kissinger plan and thereby the existence of the state of Israel. They are thus incapable of presenting any alternative slogans to those of the Zionist left and can only tail after the movement and directives of the left Zionists.

As the social crisis deepens and as Kissinger's moves

provoke significant cleavages within the Zionist state itself, it is more than ever crucial for the anti-Zionist alternative to be heard. That is the only alternative that can put an end to the conflict that pits the Israeli-Jewish masses against the Arab masses. It is more than ever necessary to raise a body of transitional slogans and a clear anti-Zionist propaganda that say No both to the Zionist far-right, which by calling for the annexation of Arab territories is preparing a predatory war, and to those who accept the Kissinger plan, which is aimed at stabilizing the region at the expense of the Pales-

tinians and all the workers of the Arab region. The only progressive and durable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is the destruction of the Zionist state and the development of an anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggle by all the workers of the Arab region. The only solution to the crisis racking Zionist society is a clear break by the Israeli working class with Zionism, with its practice, its parties, and its ideology. It is for this reason that the role of the Israeli revolutionary Marxists, in spite of their numerical weakness, is crucial in the unfolding of the present crisis. □

INDIA



FROM CRISIS TO CATASTROPHE

BY PIERRE DUPONT

The Indian bourgeoisie experienced its first deep crisis in the middle of the 1960s, just after the death of Nehru. It was produced by a combination of food shortages and growing discontent born of the frustrated hopes of the post-independence period, the persistence of massive unemployment, underemployment, impoverishment, and indebtedness of the village poor. The spectacular setbacks suffered in the conflicts with the Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan intensified the political malaise. The Congress party was suffering a resounding crisis of leadership. The workers parties seemed poised for a leap forward, especially in the two main centers of popular agitation, West Bengal and Kerala.

Five years later, the situation seemed to have changed from top to bottom. The bankruptcy of the coalition governments with the bourgeoisie in West

Bengal and Kerala had thrown the workers parties, which lacked a clear perspective, into disarray. The main leaders of the Congress party seemed to be gaining new prestige after cleverly separating themselves from the most discredited right wing of the party. Their "socialist" demagoguery appeared credible, particularly in view of the support extended to them by the pro-Moscow Communist party of India (PCI), led by Dange. The so-called Green Revolution seemed to promise a considerable increase in food production. Industrialization seemed assured. In the 1971 parliamentary elections Indira Gandhi's Congress party won two-thirds of the seats.

But it was especially on the international field that the Indian bourgeoisie was gaining ground. Like Nehru, Indira Gandhi used international success above all as a means of diverting attention from

unresolved internal problems. The 1971 crisis in what was then East Pakistan provided her an opportunity to take revenge for the Indo-Pakistani war of 1966. This time the Pakistani army was crushed. The Indian army entered East Bengal clothed in the garb of a "liberating" army.

The recent successful atomic-bomb test conducted by Indian scientists further strengthened the impression of total Indian hegemony on the subcontinent. Sikkim was incorporated into the Indian union. New Delhi threatened to impose its tutelage over Nepal, and even over Burma and Sri Lanka, which provoked sometimes tumultuous reactions, even in India itself (among the Nagas, for example). Relations with imperialism, which had deteriorated during the Bangladesh war, were straightened out, with the Indian bourgeoisie continuing its clever balancing act between Washington and Moscow. Moves were undertaken with a view to normalizing relations with Peking. In the Western press, as in the press of the Far East, Indira Gandhi began to be called "the empress of India."

But before long, everything changed. Neocolonial Indian society was far from having found any durable stability. All the features of the crisis of the mid-1960s rose to the surface again, some of them with increased explosive force.

The food crisis is more serious than ever. The failure of the Green Revolution is patent. After a few years of good harvests, Indian agriculture is stagnating or declining. In 1974 it is likely that only 100 million tons of grain and vegetable pods will be harvested compared to 107 million in 1971, 104 million in 1972, and 100 million in 1973, and this with a population that increases by millions a year. The government's plan had called for a harvest of 118 million tons in 1974. Per capita disposable grain production, which had reached 439 grams per day in 1965, was down to 425 gr. in 1972 and has been declining ever since.

About ten states, among them the "rich" ones of western India, have been stricken by drought. Losses in the summer harvest (the *kharif*) are estimated at 30% in Punjab and 85% in Rajasthan. Virtual famine conditions prevail in entire zones of Gujarat, Orissa, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. But West Bengal has been hit worst of all. The state government there admits that 15 million people are either without food or eat less than one meal a day on the average. In the northern part of Bihar floods have caused a famine as severe as the one caused by drought in the southern part of the state.

Already in 1973 there was a severe food shortage; some 200 million Indians were underfed. But the

gap between rich and poor was more striking than ever in "socialist" India. Christmas dinners offered in the big hotels cost 150-350 rupees apiece (about US\$17.50-35)! At the same time, 40 percent of the population lives on less than half a rupee per day, that is, less than 12 US cents!

The increase in the world market price of oil has been a terrible blow to the Indian economy, which suffers from a lack of independent energy resources. The balance of payments deficit for this year threatens to hit \$1.5-2 thousand million, more than the net amount of "aid" received from abroad. This deficit is compounded by an already exorbitant weight of foreign debt: 25 percent of annual export product is marked for servicing of previously accumulated foreign debts.

This was followed by a forced restriction of raw materials imports, which has combined with the food shortage to create a general atmosphere of shortage throughout the country. It is no longer simply food that is scarce (even in the big cities); oil, fuel oil, matches, and even wood and paper are also lacking. The venerable Times of India, which is printed on paper so yellow that it is virtually illegible, was pleased to note in a recent editorial that the life of a housewife (of the middle class and up, understand) had acquired a new dimension. She now "lives dangerously," for "going shopping" has become a "daily adventure that involves new surprises every day."

Indian industry has been hit very hard by the shortage of raw materials and the effects of the international economic recession. Industry now works at a fraction of its productive capacity. After having stagnated in 1972, it may even decline in 1974. Several major industrial branches have been hit by partial unemployment and layoffs. A number of investment projects, such as a new steel factory in Salem (in the state of Tamil Nadu), have had to be halted.

The 'new congress' discredited

It is no longer necessary to expose as illusory all the promises of the "renovated" Congress party made by the Indira Gandhi group after it got rid of the right wing, the well-known "syndicate." In reality, the administration of the "New Congress" has turned out to be just as venal and corrupt as that of the "syndicate," which was universally rejected with contempt only a few short years ago.

In several states -- particularly Gujarat, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh -- accusations of corruption raised against the local chiefs of the Congress party were so clear and well-founded that vast popular

mobilizations broke out against the state governments, which were deeply shaken. In Gujarat the regional parliament was even forced to resign. To get out of its jam, Gandhi's central government had to launch a huge operation against smugglers, gangsters, and black marketeers. The persons arrested under charges of being the chiefs of a real Indian mafia had been well known for a long time -- as the financial backers of all the bourgeois parties, beginning with the New Congress of Indira Gandhi herself.

But there is an essential difference between the crisis of leadership the Indian bourgeoisie is going through today and the one it suffered in the middle of the 1960s. At that time, the opposition workers parties, especially the most powerful of them, the Communist party (Marxist), had the wind in their sails. A not inconsiderable section of the peasant masses, not to mention the majority of the working class, considered them an alternative political solution to the rule of the Congress party, worn down by a quarter of a century of exercise of power. Today this is no longer true. The Communist party (Marxist), weakened by the departure of its Maoist wing (the Naxalites), has been profoundly discredited by its participation in coalition governments with the bourgeoisie in West Bengal and Kerala, by the way it protected the interests of private property during these experiences, and by the demoralizing and massive use of violence within the left movement, for which the CP(M) bears the major responsibility. The use of such violence has now rebounded against the CP(M).

Dange's Communist party of India (CPI), which "stuck with" the New Congress and handed out the latter's "socialist" demagoguery like small change, has emerged as Gandhi's closest ally and suffers intensely from the discredit heaped on the ruling group. As for the Naxalites, their aberrant strategy, which combined a "people's war" waged through assassination of individual landed proprietors or kulaks in the villages with dogmatic maintenance of a line of "revolution by stages" and "bloc of four classes," resulted in their ranks being decimated by a ferocious repression. They were unable to root themselves among the poorest layers of the rural and urban populations.

Under these conditions, the political vacuum created by the crisis of the ruling party and the lack of credibility of the parties of the left and the far left threatens to be filled by the right, or at least by politically confused operations that the right can take advantage of.

The various mass mobilizations against corruption and the black market, touched off by student ex-

plosions, are now being led by Jai Prakesh Nahrain. This old leader of the left wing of the Congress party during the time of Mahatma Gandhi was the founder and principal spokesman of the Socialist Congress party, which later became the Socialist party. He is known in India primarily as an organizer of nonviolent movements, either civil disobedience or charitable distribution of land to the untouchables and the other disinherited. The mass movements he is organizing today along the lines of nonviolent civil disobedience have had an uncontested impact on the masses. This is true to such an extent that the pro-Moscow CP has been forced to join in the demonstrations initiated by Jai Prakesh even in the areas where it supports the state governments of the Congress. But the platforms of these movements are most confused. This allows the parties of the right opposition -- led by ultraconservative and chauvinist, if not outright semifascist Jan Sangh -- to support them as well. Since the right is much better organized and more solidly implanted than are the left parties that participate in these new types of "coalitions," the threat is that the right will be the chief beneficiary of the increased prestige of Jai Prakesh Nahrain, whom certain bourgeois forces would like to "push" to become a "typically Indian" alternative to Indira Gandhi.

Disarray in the workers movement

There is no better expression of the disarray of the Indian workers movement than the fact that in the midst of a severe economic and political crisis the Indian bourgeoisie has been able to afford the luxury of unleashing a great offensive against the working class without courting any big risks, at least in the short term. INPRECOR (No. 4, July 18) reported on the big spring strike of railway workers, which reflected both the combativity of the Indian workers and the impotence and betrayal of their traditional leaders, who led this magnificent struggle to defeat.

The consequences of this defeat were not long in coming. In July 1974 the government proclaimed a freeze on wages in order to "struggle against inflation," which is now running at an annual rate of 30 percent. (The essential cause of the inflation is the steadily mounting budget deficit: 2.6 thousand million rupees in 1968, 3 thousand million in 1969, 3 thousand million in 1970, 4.3 thousand million in 1971, 6.4 thousand million in 1972, and 8.1 thousand million in 1973.) A system of forced savings was enacted; the cost-of-living bonuses the workers were scheduled to receive were halted; instead the funds were frozen in savings banks. The leaders of the central trade unions and the opportunist-

ist workers parties reacted very mildly to this clear attack on the buying power of the workers. They accepted the principle of an incomes policy, confining themselves to the demand that it be applied "less unjustly," that measures be taken to impose "control over prices and profits." It is scarcely necessary to add that this "demand" produced only vague promises and contemptuous reactions from the government.

One fact illustrates the degree of opportunism into which the "official" Indian workers movement is plunging today. In an increasingly explosive social situation marked by intolerable mass misery, Tridhib Chaudhury, leader of the only so-called far-left party represented in the central parliament, the Revolutionary Socialist party (RSP), a man who not so long ago proudly paraded his "Trotskyist sympathies," not only agreed to become the "sole candidate of the left" for the post of president of the republic, but even agreed to be put forward as the sole candidate of the left and right opposition (far right included) and solemnly declared his desire to respect and apply the Indian constitution, which would involve protecting private property and safeguarding the repressive apparatus. While there is a small "Trotskyistic" opposition in the RSP that is indignant about this ultraopportunism, for the mass of militants of this party, not to mention the mass of cadres of the big workers organizations, Chaudhury's action is only one more variant of the "Indian road to socialism."

Inevitable mass explosions

Nevertheless, the situation remains rich in revolutionary potential. The impatience and despair of the most impoverished masses is growing ceaselessly. Already, as in West Bengal ten years ago, there have been many incidents of the hungry masses assaulting trains loaded with food, trying to seize stocks of food hoarded by speculators, forcing big merchants or industrial enterprises to distribute their products at the official prices or even free.

There have been rural and urban riots. Centers of rebellion have broken out against the rule of the large proprietors, the big peasants usurers, and the big merchants. In various villages poor peasants, sharecroppers, farmers, and agricultural workers have refused to hand over the shares of their

harvests that the owning classes usually appropriate. All this confirms that the Indian crisis is a product neither of blind fate nor of a population explosion; it has its roots in the social structure of the country.

Vast movements of striking agricultural workers can link up with these movements of revolt; there can be strike movements that important sectors of the urban working class support, as was the case this year in Bombay. An upturn and radicalization is underway in the factories as well. Trade-union division, which benefits the employers and the bourgeois state, is tending to be spontaneously challenged or overcome by a movement toward the election of delegates and sometimes even unitary rank-and-file committees. Further, the failure of the Naxalites has touched off a broad theoretical debate among the politicized vanguard, a debate that for the first time in such a broad sector is starting to challenge the classical Stalino-Maoist schema of "revolution by stages." The idea of the inevitably socialist outcome of the Indian revolution, and even the conception of the permanent revolution as opposed to that of revolution by stages, is being discussed today by various groups and subgroups of the far left, which are emerging everywhere as a product of the disintegration of the Naxalites.

The multiplication of these vanguard groups -- which in general do not at all limit themselves to theoretical discussion but rather seek local and regional links with the mass movement of the workers and peasants -- undoubtedly shows that conditions are ripening for an important strengthening of the revolutionary Marxists in India. But it also shows that no existing organization in the country is yet capable of functioning as a pole of attraction, even in a modest manner, for all these critical elements.

From all evidence, such a role requires not only constant theoretical and political participation in the debate, in defense of the programmatic theses of the Fourth International, but also initiatives in action and a practical activity that make the organization attractive to those seeking an alternative to reformism, Stalinism, Maoism, and centrism, all of which have failed in India. The Indian Trotskyists will have to orient toward accomplishing these two categories of tasks if they want to seize the present opportunity to build a serious revolutionary organization in their country. □



from
the
four
corners

● DENMARK

37,000 workers on trial



Danish capitalism has been hit very hard by the economic stagnation and general recession that is spreading throughout the capitalist world. The Danish inflation rate, 16 percent, is one of the highest in Europe. At the same time, official unemployment figures run as high as 9.1 percent, which means that more than 76,000 workers are idle. And the outlook for the workers is gloomy. The unemployment figure is expected to surpass 100,000 this winter and spring. The influence of world economic stagnation is primarily responsible for the recession in Denmark, but the government's policies, which have centered on trying to ease the balance of payments deficit (more than 5 thousand million Danish kroner for the first half of 1974), have contributed heavily to deepening the crisis. The government has been carrying out a deflationary policy and has tried to use the increase in unemployment to crush the workers' resistance.

But the workers have responded actively and in so doing have changed the entire political situation of the country. Last spring the government passed a tax reform that reduced tax levels but also cut social-welfare spending, the result being that the living standards of the most ill-paid workers de-

clined. The workers answered the government decision with a spontaneous strike wave (see INPRECOR No. 4, July 18). Some 300,000 workers walked off the job. There were several demonstrations of about 75,000 people in front of the parliament building; the marchers demanded the dismissal of the government.

Once one of the quietest countries of Scandinavia, Denmark has now joined the ranks of European countries in which decisive class confrontations are in the offing.

The bourgeoisie recognized the May strike wave as an important test and decided to respond by bringing 37,000 workers to trial for having engaged in "illegal" strikes. The workers are to be tried before the Labor Court, a body composed of three members representing the employers, three representing the trade unions, and one serving as a "neutral" chairman. The Social Democratic trade-union leaders declined to withdraw from the Labor Court to protest this provocation and refused to mobilize the workers against the trials. In fact, they participated in the first trial, which was held on October 17. As a result, 400 workers of the Svendborg shipyard

were found guilty and fined 70,000 kroner (about US\$11,000).

The workers throughout the country followed the trial very closely. Sympathy strikes erupted when the court's decision was announced. On the very evening of their "conviction," the Svendborg workers themselves went on strike. At an assembly attended by all the shipyard workers, they voted a resolution stating in part: "We urge all the workplaces of the country to support us in the struggle against the capitalist system." That same evening, 400 workers of another shipyard went on strike.

During the following day (October 18) more than 25,000 workers walked off the job. The workers of the B&W motor factory demonstrated in downtown Copenhagen, blocking traffic on one of the major avenues. The mobilization was stimulated by the action of an opposition to the Social Democracy that has developed within the trade unions. The opposition called on the workers to move against the Labor Court and to refuse to pay the fines. This stood in sharp contrast to the attitude adopted by Thomas Nielsen, national chairman of LO (Landsorganisation -- National Trade-Union Council), who said: "It is wrong to attack the decision of the Court, for the decision was juridically correct."

On Monday, October 21, the solidarity strikes were joined by many workers, especially harbor and shipyard workers. As of this writing, the outcome of the strike wave is not yet clear, but it is quite likely that the employers will now attempt to negotiate an arrangement with the trade-union leaders whereby the trials will not have to continue on a factory-by-factory basis. Instead, they will seek to use the first decision as a precedent and then judge the rest of the 37,000 workers at one

stroke.

The extremely right-wing policy of the Social Democratic and trade-union leaders has produced a strong organized opposition within the unions. This opposition has been principally shaped by the Communist party, which has consequently strengthened its position within the working class. The increased force of the CP was reflected in the latest municipal elections in Copenhagen, in which the CP got 18 percent of the vote. While the CP has maintained its purely parliamentarist perspective, it has developed a more militant line on trade-union questions and is now seen by many workers as an alternative leadership for the union movement. The strength of the CP was clearly seen at the October 5-6 meeting called by the Formandsinitiativet (Chairmen's Initiative), which attracted 900 local union leaders.

The October 5-6 meeting decided to call for a day of action on November 26. It is expected that as many as 2-3 million workers will respond to the call and will strike and demonstrate on that day. The central slogan for November 26 is "Down with the Hartling Government!"

While the May strike wave won little in the way of specific gains, the workers have not become demoralized, as is shown by the breadth of the current solidarity strikes. If the government nevertheless sticks to its present policy and if the union leaders continue their open advocacy of an incomes policy and a coalition with the bourgeois parties, it is likely that big changes will occur in the workers' movement. It is possible that a radically strengthened Communist party or a split in the Social Democratic party, with the left wing trying to catch up to the radicalization of the workers, will develop. In any case, November 26 will be an important target date for the struggle of the Danish workers. □

● SWITZERLAND

NO to xenophobia

On October 19 and 20 Swiss citizens were called upon to vote on a referendum proposing the expulsion from Switzerland several hundreds of thousands immigrant workers. (1) About 70% of those eligible voted; of the votes cast, about 34% were in favor of the proposal. In 1970 the vote in favor of a similar referendum was 46%.

To understand the stakes involved in the vote, one must consider the decisive importance of the immigrant workers in the development of Swiss capitalism. The total number of immigrant workers (seasonal workers, annual workers, residents) rose from 175,000 in 1950 -- the time of the beginning of

the protracted growth of Swiss capitalism -- to 886,000 (essentially Italian and Spanish) in 1972. In 1950 immigrant workers accounted for 1% of the active wage-earning population; by 1970 the figure had risen to 31%. Nevertheless, as of 1969 immigrants received only 17.7% of total wages. These figures indicate that it was possible to accomplish the expansion of capital in Switzerland only on the basis of a massive influx of immigrant workers; they also give an idea of the superexploitation to which these workers have been subjected.


The trade-union movement in no way tried to integrate the immigrant workers into its organizations

-- quite the contrary. Thus, capital found it easy to use the immigrant workers to hold down wage increases. The way was left open for numerous forms of discrimination in all areas: wages, social security, professional training, education of the children of the immigrants, etc. Moreover, the trade-union movement (essentially represented by the Union Syndicale Suisse, tied to the Social Democracy, which has served in the government since the second world war) developed a fundamentally xenophobic policy in the tradition of the social chauvinism that characterizes the Swiss workers movement. It began in the 1950s with many attacks on the immigrants who were members of Communist parties (mostly the Italian and Spanish CPs). Then it demanded a limitation on the number of immigrants allowed into Switzerland, hoping in this way to provoke shortages on the labor market that would favor wage increases being won without any struggle. (In 1937 the metalworkers union reached an agreement with the employers that involved total renunciation of strikes.)

the more true in that, because of the confusion fostered by the traditional organizations of the workers movement, various workers were expressing a distorted opposition to capital by coming out against the employers' and government's policy on immigration.

The discrimination and the limitation or outright elimination of political, civil, and trade-union rights of the immigrant workers serves a very precise function for the bourgeoisie: preventing a quantitative strengthening of the working class from being expressed on the social and political plane. Hence, marginalization of the immigrants, depriving them of all the rights that the European workers movement has won through long struggle, simply on the grounds that they are immigrants is an essential objective for the bourgeoisie. During the latest referendum, the bourgeoisie missed no opportunity to insist that the motivations of those who had initiated the vote were admirable; it was only that their conclusions were irrational (economically).

contre la division des tra- vailleurs !



The perpetual appeals by the unions to limit the number of immigrant workers, the separation of the immigrants from the unions, and the support of the unions for the crudest forms of discrimination prepared the ground for the xenophobic far-right.(2) At the beginning of the 1960s the far right launched vigorous campaigns against immigration. The audience for this sort of propaganda among the native working class was, and still is, large. This was all

The Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League), Swiss section of the Fourth International, had waged a vast campaign against xenophobia during the 1970 referendum. On the occasion of this second vote, the LMR stood at the head of the greatest part of the actions that came out of the workers movement in response to the campaign of the far right. The LMR did not simply intensify its work in the factories; it also stimulated many

demonstrations that united immigrants and native Swiss vanguard workers and youth. Thus, in Lausanne more than 2,000 workers, immigrants and young Swiss, demonstrated their opposition to the policy of the far right. In Tessin (the Italian-speaking region) in cities with a population of a few dozen thousand, thousands of demonstrators, both immigrants and Swiss, asserted their will for a united fight against the employers' policy. In addition, for the first time in decades, more than 150 trade-union militants belonging to different federations came together to organize a campaign for the unity of all the workers and the elimination of discrimination and against the social-chauvinist policy of the trade-union leaderships.

It must be stressed that the government denied militants of some of the European sections of the Fourth International the right to speak at the international meetings held by the LMR. Thus, comrades Tariq Ali (Britain), Edgardo Pellegrini (Italy), and S. Robichon (France) could not express themselves directly. But they managed to do so through television and taping equipment.

The Parti du Travail (Labor party, the Swiss CP) kept its campaign to a minimum, because it was afraid of losing the votes of some workers in the coming elections. (This produced certain tensions within the ranks of the Italian and Spanish Communist parties.) Like most of the far left, the Swiss CP refused to put forward elementary and essential slogans like "Equal political and trade-union rights for all who work in Switzerland" and "Free movement for all workers." Thus, the only organization to develop a campaign of propaganda and agitation

around these slogans was the LMR, along with the Comités Unitaires de Travailleurs Suisses et Immigrés (United Committees of Swiss and Immigrant Workers).

While the xenophobic referendum was rejected relatively strongly (in comparison to 1970), it must nevertheless be stressed that the "yes" vote was dangerously high in some workers districts. Moreover, since it is facing an economic outlook less brilliant than in the past, the bourgeoisie will combine its attack on the incomes of the workers with intensification of its policy of stabilizing the immigration and selectively integrating immigrants (which means repression, among other things). It is therefore clear that strengthening the systematic campaign in the unions, factories, and neighborhoods against xenophobia, against discrimination, and for the unity of the workers remains a priority task for revolutionary Marxists in the current period. In addition, the Swiss revolutionary-Marxists will have to act in conjunction with other sections of the Fourth International to strengthen initiatives on these questions on a European scale. □

Footnotes:

1. Swiss law provides that if 50,000 citizens sign a petition proposing a change in the constitution (called a "constitutional initiative"), the proposal must be voted on in a referendum. To be approved, the proposal must carry both a majority of the total vote and a majority of the cantons.
2. Two far-right organizations have been built on a xenophobic basis: Action Nationale (National Action), which launched the present initiative, and the Mouvement Républicain (Republican Movement), the group led by Schwarzenbach, which organized the referendum in 1970.

EDITORIAL

cont'd. from pg.2
cent against Mme. Chae Soo Jung on October 16 and against Mun Sekwang on October 19; Sekwang was responsible for the assassination attempt against Park on August 15.)

In spite of all these measures and the action taken by the South Korean CIA, which has gone so far as to occupy university campuses, Park did not succeed in breaking the struggle against the dictatorship and on several occasions has had to make a few tactical retreats, which he is doing today. His predecessor was brought down after a series of student riots that broke out in 1961. In 1965 the university movement launched a campaign against penetration of South Korea by Japanese imperialism. In the April 1971 presidential elections he was unable to prevent Kim

Dae Jung from getting 46 percent of the vote, despite the obvious fraud, and in February 1973 he got a majority in parliament only because one-third of the members are appointed. The end of 1973 saw new explosions of struggle protesting the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo and the severe torture of the militants in prison.

These protests became so broad that Park was forced to fire Lee Hu Rak, the detested chief of the CIA, and to reorganize his cabinet. Then he intensified the repression again. On August 15, 1974, Park's wife was killed during an assassination attempt directed against the dictator by a Korean citizen who had been living in Japan. The regime found itself obliged to pay prisoners to publicly cut off their little fingers in front of the Japanese embassy -- an

attempt to create the impression that the regime had popular support. A regime that feels that it must do such things after the death of the wife of its president is not a strong regime.

The development of opposition movements is not the only manifestation of the essential weakness of the South Korean regime. The repression, which goes beyond the student movement, is an additional indication. The repression has struck the intellectual elite (an example being the poet Kim Chi Ha), the Christian hierarchy (the Bishop of Wonju, Mgr. Daniel Chi, and pastor Pak Hyong Kyu have each been sentenced to fifteen years in prison), professional circles (Lee Sung Hee, a teacher at the university of Chonju, was sentenced to death). Journalists and lawyers have also been hit. The crisis has even extended into the regime itself. Since the beginning of 1973, many high-ranking members of the army have been fired and sometimes condemned to fifteen-year prison terms (like General Yoon Pil Yong, who was made the scapegoat for the generalized corruption); two former directors of the South Korean CIA were discharged or fled to the United States; the special presidential assistant for security affairs "drowned" during a fishing trip.

Nevertheless, the regime will not crumble very easily. It is supported by an army of several hundred thousand men, political police, and an atmosphere of terror that makes it very difficult to develop opposition movements. Above all, it is tightly linked to imperialism, especially to American and Japanese imperialism. The "chill" that crept into U.S.-South Korean relations this past summer should not give rise to any illusions. The American Congress did threaten to reduce credits to South Korea. And the Tanaka government had no choice but to protest the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung (as it was carried out on Japanese soil), the sentencing of two Japanese citizens in Seoul, and the anti-Japanese demonstrations that were organized after August 15. But that does not change the fact that the Park regime is imperialism's creation. After September 11, accord was reestablished between Tokyo and Seoul, and Tanaka promised to intensify surveillance of active anti-Park organizations in Japan.

More fundamentally, South Korea occupies a key place in the Western imperialist system in the Far East; it is a country largely dominated by Japanese imperialism. Seoul is now trying to diversify its economic relations, looking toward Europe (especially France and West Germany); it is supported by a broad consortium of imperialist powers. For example, it gets credits from the IECOK (International Economic Consultation on Korea), created

in 1966 under the aegis of the World Bank. IECOK includes nine countries: the United States, Canada, Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Australia, and Britain.

But the United States and Japan occupy a decisive place. The United States is South Korea's largest customer and second-largest supplier. Japan is the second-largest customer and largest supplier. Together they account for 87 percent of South Korea's exports and 67 percent of its imports. Japanese investments in South Korea are considerable, for the country provides political stability, very cheap labor, extreme ease in exports of goods and capital, and special industrial zones reserved for foreign capital; it also permits Japan to move its most polluting industries there.

On several occasions the American government has shown how capable it is of making sharp changes in personnel when a crisis becomes too serious. The overthrow of Diem in South Vietnam in 1963 and of Thanom Praphas in Thailand in 1973 are two examples. But the stakes are too high for Washington not to seek to guarantee the security of its investments in South Korea and maintain Seoul within the system of imperialist domination of the region. By presenting a UN resolution defending the Lon Nol puppet regime in Cambodia against the GRUNK and by vigorously supporting programs for multilateral aid to Saigon proposed at the recent meeting of the World Bank, the Tanaka government has offered new proof -- if any were needed -- of the crudely counterrevolutionary role it is prepared to play in the region. The example of Thailand is there to show that a change in personnel, or even in regime, does nothing more than open a new phase in the struggle for socialism.

The most immediate task today remains the struggle to save the lives of the political prisoners in South Korea and to obtain their release from Park's jails.

The very dependence of the Park regime on imperialism means that it is sensitive to the development of international solidarity. The case of Kim Chi Ha, who was initially condemned to death but had his sentence commuted to life imprisonment (along with three other prisoners) after many protests around the world, is an example of what can be done.

The Fourth International reaffirms its support to the struggle against the Park regime and for saving the lives of the South Korean political prisoners. It calls upon all anti-imperialist militants to join that struggle. □

October 22, 1974