A MARXIST QUARTERLY

SPRING
1955

Fourth International

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by Tom Kerry

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Automation -- Threat or Promise? by Harold Robins

Behind the Fall of Malenkov by M. Stein and J.G. Wright

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Glancing over our cumulative index for the past year or so, we noted that **Fourth International** has eight new names listed among its authors. Most of them have been in the revolutionary socialist movement for years but either did not feel at home as writers or felt that something on "theory" required perhaps more in the way of study than they had yet achieved. How well they did in their first contributions to **Fourth International** can be judged by our readers:

Milton Alvin wrote "Does 'Co-Existence' Mean Peace?" (Fall 1954); Trent Hutter, "The American Motion Picture Today" (Winter 1955); Frank Lovell, "Lessons of the Square D Strike" (Winter 1955); Lynn Marcus, "Automation — The New Industrial Unionism" (Winter 1954); David Miller, "The Role of Statism in the Colonial World" (Fall 1954) and "The Character of the State in China" (Winter 1955); Art Sharon, "The Opposition to McCarthyism" (Spring 1954); Myra Tanner, "Sternberg vs. Karl Marx" (Winter 1954); and Murry Weiss, "McCarthyism: Key Issue in the 1954 Elections."

In this issue two more new names appear in FI's list of authors: Joyce Cowley and Harold Robins. Both names are undoubtedly familiar to most of our readers — Joyce Cowley is one of the most popular writers of the Militant and Harold Robins has carried the banner for the Socialist Workers Party as a candidate for various offices in the New York City municipal elections.

Having broken the ice, Joyce Cowley is now preparing another study to follow the one on the suffragist movement. Dealing with the problems faced today by youth in a delinquent society, it is scheduled for early publication.

In the next issue we plan to commemorate the memory of Leon Trotsky, who was assassinated 14 years ago by an agent of Stalin's secret police. This will include a review by Murry Weiss, editor of the Militant, of the second volume of Trotsky's **First Five Years of the Communist International.**

A highlight in the Summer issue will be "The Year 1923," three absorbing letters in the series by James P. Cannon which began last year under the title "Letters to a Historian." Comrade Cannon's observations on the events and figures of the early years of the American communist movement have proved popular with our readers. As one of the founders of the movement, Cannon speaks with unusual authority as an eyewitness and participant in the struggles that shaped the Marxist movement of today in the United States. For young socialists striving for an insight into the problems of leadership, the entire series is must reading, and we particularly recommend the next installment.

Also ready for publication is a study of the African peoples' struggle for independence. By George Lavan, staff writer of the Militant, it is based on material contained in such books as **The Gold Coast Revolution, Africa: Britain's Third Empire,** and **How Britain Rules Africa** by George Padmore.

Which reminds us that our book review section got caught in the squeeze this issue and we had to hold over some excellent items, including one by Trent Hutter on William Faulkner's latest novel **A Fable.** We hope to do better next time despite the limitations of 32 pages. (If you would like to help overcome the dollar shortage that ropes us in so severely at present, you can win a friend and influence our Business Manager by sending in a contribution.)

Besides this, the next issue will continue the next installment of Plekhanov's essay on Belinsky, which appears for the first time in an English translation. It gets even better as it goes along.

In addition, articles dealing with key issues of today will give the Summer number the timeliness as well as the theoretical interest that makes **Fourth International** the kind of magazine you like to pass on to your friends.

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The Political Meaning Of the CIO-AFL Merger

by Tom Kerry

IF ONE THING can be said to be most characteristic of the modern American labor movement, it is that its major leaps ahead have been impelled by dire necessity. It was not until the concluding quarter of the last century that the American working class, driven by the stormy economic development of this country following the Civil War, surged tumultuously forward to overcome its previous limited, local and isolated character, establishing a federation of unions on a national scale. Scarce 70 years old, the American Federation of Labor was born in 1886, the year of the Haymarket massacre in Chicago and a high point in the resistance of the capitalist class to the eight-hour day.

After the AFL — the product of the most bitter class struggles — became dominant among workers organized along craft lines, its conservative leadership, concerned primarily with maintaining the position of a layer of relatively privileged workers, lagged behind economic developments and became a barrier to the organization of the millions of workers in the mass production industries. It required the deepest economic crisis in American history, plus the irresistible pressure of the mass of unorganized workers in the giant mills and factories of the twentieth century, plus a split in the AFL to pave the way for the appearance of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Now, after 20 years of division, the leading bodies of the AFL and CIO have reached an agreement, subject to the formality of ratification by their respective conventions, to merge into one national federation.

Does the merger, assuming it goes through, foreshadow another gigantic leap forward by the American working class?

The answer to that question, as well as the related one of the direction and goal of such an advance, will not be found in the stated aims of the union leaders who agreed to the merger. But it can be found by analyzing the split, why it could not be healed before, and why merger now looms as a certainty.

A Victory for the CIO?

The contention by some not-too-bright commentators that the merger agreement constitutes a "victory" for the CIO does not hold water. The CIO entered the negotiations under unfavorable conditions. It was smaller than its rival, with no prospect of overtaking it, was beset by factional strife and bedeviled by centrifugal tendencies following the no-raiding pact with the AFL. It comes into the combined organization as a subordinate industrial "department," with the old-line, craft-union leaders — in some instances the same and in others little different from their counterparts of the 1930's — in a commanding position.

Couldn't a comparable merger agreement have been gained years ago under more auspicious circumstances for the industrial union group? Matthew Josephson, in his biography of Sidney Hillman,* discloses that in October 1937 a committee representing the AFL and CIO met to discuss reunification. "The principal demands of the CIO," he pointed out, "were that the Federation declare its support hereafter of industrial unions for workers in certain specified industries; establish a CIO Department that was to be autonomous within the AFL; reinstate the CIO unions with full rights; and work out and ratify this program at a joint convention of affiliates of both labor bodies."

These demands of 1937 were included in essence in the agreement of 1955. But in 1937, when unity looked promising, the conference was blown up by John L. Lewis, who questioned the authority of the AFL committee to conclude an agreement. "The terms of affiliation tentatively agreed upon," asserts Josephson, "at a time when the CIO claimed the larger membership, might well have resulted in the industrial-union faction becoming the preponderant force."

But John L. Lewis was not too much concerned about "unity" in the year 1937. He was convinced that the CIO would absorb most of the AFL and elbow the remnant into a corner. Lewis spoke of a CIO movement of 20 to 30 million members. And it seemed, in 1937, that nothing could stop the phenomenal growth of the new unionism. At the time of the unity meeting with the AFL in October of that year the CIO claimed 3,700,000 members to 3,400,000 for the AFL. Since the original group of unions constituting the CIO in 1936 included less than one million members, Lewis' optimism appeared more than justified.

A Beneficent Split

The split of the CIO from the AFL involved far more than an academic disagreement over the relative merits of industrial versus craft unions. The forms of organization that suited the needs of the American working class in 1886 were hopelessly inadequate 50 years later. The advance of technology had outmoded the craft union in the mass production industries. Since the turn of the century the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) had preached and organized industrial unions. The socialist and later the communist movement were vigor-

* **Sidney Hillman: Statesman of American Labor. 1952.**

ous advocates of the industrial form of organization. These efforts had great effect on the advanced elements in the mass production industries. But the leaders of the AFL remained unmoved. Neither argument nor experience convinced them.

Preliminary skirmishes in the early Thirties demonstrated over and over again that only the industrial form of organization combined with militant methods of struggle could successfully topple the hitherto impregnable citadels of the open shop in auto, steel, rubber, etc. But the old mossbacks ruling the AFL remained unmoved. They feared the influx of millions of mass production workers organized along industrial lines and had no heart to lead the kind of battles required to bring the arrogant and powerful lords of industry to terms.

The more astute labor leaders, who participated in forming the CIO, repeatedly warned that unless the conservative union leadership took the initiative in promoting the industrial organization of workers in factory, mine and mill, it would be done under more radical auspices. They were more in tune with the times. The industrial organization of the American mass production worker had been too long delayed. This invested the movement with an explosive character. The stock-market crash heralded the depression which plunged the country into the profound social crisis that generated the pressure soon to erupt with volcanic force.

The split in the AFL eliminated a formidable obstacle to the successful organization of the industrial unions of the CIO and gave tremendous impetus to union organization in general. In the true sense of the word, it was the most progressive union split in American labor history. In the relatively short period of 20 years the American labor movement took a great leap forward, adding some 12 million members to its ranks, tremendously increasing its social weight in the nation and creating a potential force of incalculable power. The split in the AFL was an inevitable prerequisite to this advance.

Another signal result of the split was the sharp break from AFL political policy which, following the line laid down by Samuel Gompers, had kept the American workers politically atomized and impotent. The deep-going social crisis of the Thirties was shaking the capitalist system to its foundation. Such labor leaders as Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Dubinsky of the Garment Workers, Zaritsky of the Cap and Millinery Workers, etc., looked upon the reform administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the only alternative to social revolution.

Break from Gompers' Policy

Heading unions composed largely of foreign-born workers with a strong socialist tradition, they were keenly sensitive to the radical mood of the workers. They set out deliberately to "contain" the turbulent militancy of the CIO within the capitalist two-party system. Hillman, the outstanding "labor statesman" of the period, had proclaimed the CIO as "the beginning of the real labor movement." By that he meant that organized labor in this country for the first time on a national scale was to engage not only in economic but in political action. But unlike the labor movement of Europe which functioned through its own political parties, Hillman and his colleagues gave a peculiar American twist to their creation which they named Labor's Non-Partisan League.

Hillman's biographer explains that "the name 'Labor's Non-Partisan League' was chosen to indicate, as Hillman explained later, that it was 'non-partisan' only in that it sought the support of the two wings of labor, but not at all with regard to the re-election of the New Deal President." To bolster the "non-partisan" character of the League, George Berry of the AFL Printing Pressmen's Union, was designated chairman. Hillman's new approach to labor politics, his biographer points out, was motivated by the fact that "Many of the union members, especially in New York and Chicago, had grown up in the tradition of supporting the Socialist Party, and shunning our Tammany Halls. What Hillman advocated now was a distinctly *opportunistic* approach. The new League, unlike La Follette's Progressive Party of 1924, was to function mainly through one of the two major parties, and particularly the Democratic Party, in order to ensure Roosevelt's re-election."

The object of the LNPL was to mobilize the labor vote for Roosevelt. The tremendous prestige of the CIO was utilized by its leaders for this purpose. While doing so, the CIO leaders disclaimed any support to the Democratic Party as such, thus keeping up the pretense of "independent" political action.

Where necessary to corral the labor vote for Roosevelt, Hillman and his cohorts did not hesitate to go a step further. Matthew Josephson tells about the "decision of the CIO leaders to launch the American Labor Party in pivotal New York State as a local affiliate of LNPL. The thought was to channel the 'regular' Socialists into the Roosevelt camp. This was done in hasty fashion on July 16, 1936, principally on the initiative of Hillman, David Dubinsky of the Ladies' Garment Workers, and Alex Rose of the Millinery Workers. Joseph P. Ryan, the conservative leader of the International Longshoremen's Association, brought to the American Labor Party the support of the AFL's Central Trades and Labor Council of New York City, which he then headed; while George Meany also helped the new party through the AFL's state body. The new grouping included the right-wing faction of the Socialist Party in New York, but also enjoyed the support of Governor Herbert Lehman, A. A. Berle, and Mayor La Guardia — all in all a remarkable amalgam of AFL and CIO unionists, as well as Republican Fusionists, New Deal Democrats and Socialists."

The "remarkable amalgam" that launched the ALP in New York City to garner the socialist vote for Roosevelt in 1936 was typical of the labor-liberal-Democratic coalition which, together with the Dixiecrat wing, kept the Democratic Party in power under Roosevelt and Truman until 1952.

The CIO leaders, all established bureaucrats of long standing in their own unions, were determined to steer the new union movement into the channel of political class collaboration.

None were prepared to carry through the logic of the class struggle from the economic to the political field. Instead of preaching reliance of the workers on their own organized strength, the new "labor statesmen" advocated increased reliance on the New Deal administration in Washington.

They assiduously fostered the myth of Roosevelt as the great "friend" of labor in general and the CIO in particular. They built him up until he became the most influential leader in the labor movement; and Sidney Hillman became his right-hand man. All paid homage to Roosevelt, including the Stalinist lickspittles who were then in their Peoples Front period. All, that is, except the political maverick John L. Lewis after he had demanded payment from Roosevelt for labor's support, especially in the bloody Little Steel strike of 1937 and was rebuffed by Roosevelt's callous "plague on both your houses" statement. The rift between Lewis and Roosevelt continued to widen thereafter until it led to an open break in 1939 and Lewis endorsed the Republican candidate Wendell Willkie in 1940.

Vying for Roosevelt's Favor

The defeat suffered by the CIO in the Little Steel strike was due primarily to the policy of depending on Roosevelt instead of on the militant methods of struggle devised by the workers in the course of their successful battles in auto, rubber, etc. Although a severe setback, it did not halt the forward momentum of the CIO. In the two years from its first conference in October 1935 to the unity conference of October 1937, it grew from the 900,000 members claimed by the original founding unions to 3,700,000.

In the following two years only 400,000 members were added. The CIO lost its crusading spirit. The limited aims of its leaders had been largely accomplished. Both federations settled down to intensive competition, relying primarily on NLRB collective bargaining elections for new members, fighting and raiding each other's jurisdictions, and competing for the favor of the New Deal administration. As Leon Trotsky pointed out in his penetrating study, "Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay,"* "The struggle among the tops between the old federation and the new is reducible in large measure to the struggle for the sympathy and support of Roosevelt and his cabinet."

This contest between the labor leaders for the favor of the administration in Washington continued throughout the Roosevelt and Truman regimes and was even extended into the Eisenhower administration. It was this rivalry and the uncertainty over which would emerge as the dominant group that undoubtedly proved a great obstacle to the earlier unity negotiations. The odds seemed to favor the CIO. It was the more dynamic movement; it had greater attractive power; it had developed a more effective medium for political organization and action; it had a more progressive policy on social questions and greater appeal to minority workers; it appeared to have the inside track with the Roosevelt administration.

The AFL Buries Gompers

Another barrier to unification between the AFL and CIO, and not the least, was the prevailing difference over political policy. The CIO's decisive break from the Gompers policy of the AFL, which the establishment of LNPL signified, was no passing phase. The CIO leaders were irrevocably committed to the new policy. They were quick to see the advantage of maintaining the political fiction of "independence" in garnering the labor vote for Roosevelt and the Democratic Party. They were also astute enough to discern the advantage of dealing with the regular Democratic Party machines which their organizational independence gave them. The AFL, on the other hand, persisted in maintaining the old policy. Where the CIO lined up solidly behind Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, the AFL continued to declare its "neutrality" as between the two capitalist parties. Their policy of "no politics" in the union applied, of course, only to the rank and file. The leaders were in politics up to their ears. In national elections Hutcheson of the Carpenters regularly appeared as head of the Republican "labor" committee and Tobin of the Teamsters as head of the Democratic "labor" committee.

The LNPL, on the other hand, as Hillman so carefully explained, was "non-partisan" only in the sense that it sought to rally both wings of labor in support of Roosevelt and the Democratic Party and not at all in the sense of being neutral in relation to the two capitalist parties. There could be no compromise on that score.

It was not until the year after adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act that the AFL broke decisively with the Gompers policy by setting up their own version of the CIO Political Action Committee which they dubbed Labor's League for Political Education. It was only in 1952 that the AFL for the first time officially endorsed by convention action a candidate for the presidency. That was the Democrat Adlai Stevenson. Even after that they went through one more experiment in "non-partisan" politics by sanctioning the entry of Plumbers chief Martin Durkin into Eisenhower's millionaire cabinet as Secretary of Labor. The experiment turned out badly as was inevitable. The AFL break with the Republican Party was signalized by Durkin's demonstrative resignation over the dispute on amending the Taft-Hartley Act.

The Republican Party took power as the unabashed representative of Big Business after 20 years of the labor-Democratic coalition. The Eisenhower administration could not make even those piddling concessions the top AFL bureaucrats asked as the price of their support, or at least neutrality. The experience destroyed any hope the AFL "labor statesmen" might have had of weaning Eisenhower from his dependence on Big Business.

An incidental consequence of the dispute was the disclosure that it was Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce and former head of two large corporations, who was making labor policy for Eisenhower's millionaire club. In an interview published in U.S. News and World Report, April 9, 1954, Weeks summed up the ad-

* See **Fourth International**, Feb. 1941.

ministration's labor policy in a one-sentence reply to the question: "What are you really trying to do with all these (Taft-Hartley) amendments?" Answer by Weeks: "To make the labor unions safe for democracy."

"To make the labor unions safe for democracy!" That was the slogan under which the labor-hating cabal was pushing its union-smashing "right to work" laws through the legislatures of the various states. The lesson was not lost on the union leaders. In 1954 they went all out for the Democratic Party candidates. Collaboration between AFL and CIO political units was closer than ever before. Despite a few exceptions like the split in the California AFL where the majority supported the Republican candidate for governor, this was an indication that the unity negotiations then in progress had the best chance of completion since the split 20 years ago.

The Taft-Hartley Act

There can be little doubt that the most compelling motive driving the two federations toward merger was politics. The tremendous growth of the unions following the split continued throughout the war. With the end of the world conflict, Big Business decided to test the mettle of the unions. In the strike movement of 1945-46, it became convinced that the organized employers could not stem the growing power of organized labor without the direct aid of the government. They seized the first opportunity after the 1946 elections to mobilize their friends in Washington for adoption of the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act which was jammed through Congress by a majority vote of Democrats as well as Republicans.

The Taft-Hartley Act effectively halted the expansion of the trade unions. This was admitted by George Meany in an interview in U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 6, 1953:

(Q) "Have your organizing efforts the last few years been as successful as they used to be?"

(A) "Oh, no!"

(Q) "What has impeded that?"

(A) "The Taft-Hartley Act."

(Q) "Could you tell us just how that has happened?"

(A) "Well, because any employer who wants to resist organization and is willing to make his plant a battleground for that resistance can very effectively prevent organization of his employes. There's no question about that at all. Any employer who is willing to sp the money and the time and the eff- can, under Taft-Hartley, resist organization indefinitely".

Meany neglected to add that the same can be said about any employer wishing to rid himself of an established union. The labor leaders have expressed over and over again the fear that the employers will utilize the union-busting provisions of Taft-Hartley during an economic depression or at any time they consider favorable. Fear of Taft-Hartley was especially noticeable in the union press and at union conventions during the 1954 recession. It undoubtedly contributed greatly to the pressure for merger.

Taft-Hartley practically froze union membership. It settled the question that was implicit from the beginning in the split: Which would prevail? A labor commentator writing in Fortune magazine (April 1953) observed, "U.S. labor has lost the greatest dynamic any movement can have — a confidence that it is going to get bigger. Organized labor has probably passed its peak strength . . . Since 1946 the working population has expanded but union membership has remained stationary."

In a report published a few years ago, the union leaders disclosed that an enormous amount of money and energy had been expended in raiding each other but at the end the gains were balanced by the losses. It was their most effective argument for the AFL-CIO no-raiding pact that proved to be the prelude to the merger agreement.

Under Eisenhower the Taft-Hartley Act has become even tougher — not through amendment but through administrative interpretation of its onerous provisions. In addition, under Taft-Hartley the various states responded to the go-ahead sign for adoption of restrictive labor legislation under the misnamed "right to work" laws. These measures have proved to be particularly harsh on the conservative AFL building trades unions. Seventeen states have already adopted such legislation, the latest being Utah where a "right to work" law has been pushed through the state legislature and is now before the Republican governor for signature.

The several attempts made recently on a state level to repeal such union-

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The Ohio Republican Senator died in 1953 but his infamous anti-labor law is still on the books.

wrecking laws have failed. At its recent meeting in Miami the AFL Executive Council admitted that there "is little likelihood of getting these states to repeal their laws." They announced that they would concentrate on the national level to change the provision in the Taft-Hartley Act giving state "right to work" laws precedence over the federal statute. Twelve of the 17 states having such laws are in the South. The labor reporter of the New York Times, writing from Miami on Feb. 6, said there was not too much optimism about getting such a change through Congress as "AFL officials recognize that they can count on scant help from the dominant Southern Democratic bloc in getting rid of the 'right to work' laws."

The leading labor spokesmen agree that the unions are on the defensive; that the anti-labor legislative offensive of the employers has the unions backed up against the wall; that organized labor will have to fight on the political field if it is to survive. "We are never going to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act until we put into

Congress men and women friendly to the ideals and principles of this great labor movement," George Meany declared in 1951.

Similar declarations have been made on innumerable occasions by the top leaders of the AFL and CIO. Small wonder then that the first question reporters put to Meany and Reuther when they announced the merger agreement was, "Does the merger herald the formation of a national independent labor party sponsored by the united organization representing over 15 million members?"

Both "labor statesmen" hastily and emphatically disclaimed any intention of sponsoring such a political party of labor.

Their Real Political Aims

But what then were the aims of the leaders who concluded the merger agreement? The diplomatic statement of aims issued over the signatures of Meany and Reuther is a compendium of meaningless generalities about "service to the public," "democratic ideals," building "a better nation and a better world," etc., etc. What of the Taft-Hartley Act and the "right to work" laws which threaten the very existence of the unions?

Both agreed that action on the political field was the only effective remedy. But what kind of political action? Meany answered the question in an article written for Fortune (March 1955) just before the merger agreement: "I do not think the membership of the A.F. of L. is thinking now in terms of a national political party sponsored by labor. Yet if the action of the two major parties leaves us no alternative in our efforts to safeguard and raise the living standards of the workers, labor will go as far as it must down that political road."

If Meany in this way makes a concession to history, Reuther on the other hand maintained at the CIO convention last December that a party of labor was distinctly un-American. In this he stands to the right of such arch-conservative labor leaders as Dave Beck of the Teamsters, who, in a speech at a National Press Club luncheon, reported in the Oct. 21, 1953, New York Times, declared: "Those who seek to put the chain of the Taft-Hartley Act and other anti-union legislation around labor, will live to see the day when American labor will follow England's and tie progress to political action."

Whatever lip service this or that top labor bureaucrat may occasionally pay to the idea of building a labor party in order to frighten the Democrats or to soothe the feelings of union militants fed up with the capitalist parties, it is plain enough that the real political objective of the Meany-Reuther combination is a triple one — (1) to shape the labor vote into a more cohesive and active block, capable of putting the Democratic Party back into the White House in 1956, (2) to win a voice in Democratic machine politics, (3) to gain as a pay-off at least some concessions of New Deal coloration.

Clearly, insofar as the top bureaucracy wields political control over the rank and file, the labor movement is in for another experience of coalition politics with the Democrats. What fruits can be expected in the event of victory can be gauged pretty well from 1948. The Truman election was proclaimed as the greatest of all labor victories. The CIO leaders even split the organization by expelling the so-called "communist-controlled unions" so as not to embarrass the Truman administration, then deep in its cold-war adventure. Yet they got neither repeal of Taft-Hartley nor amendment of its worst provisions. All they succeeded in doing was to pave the way for the Eisenhower victory in 1952.

The political course of Meany and Reuther has even more ominous implications when fitted into the drive of American imperialism toward a third world war. They have already signified their willingness, even eagerness, to act as traveling representatives of the State Department in meeting criticisms and objections abroad to Wall Street's global moves and aims, especially objections that take the form of working-class revolutions and colonial uprisings. That means, of course, a similar perfidious role at home.

The top AFL and CIO bureaucrats hope to make big political gains through the Democratic Party. Their own illusions play a role in this, but more important is their function as labor lieutenants of the capitalist class. This impels them again and again to try to prevent the American working class from taking the road to independent political action.

The need to form a cohesive labor bloc, organized for electioneering on a precinct level, in order to wield greater influence in the Democratic machine, is, however, not without its political dangers to the AFL-CIO top bureaucrats. The logic of their own course can take them much farther than they expect. In addition a united labor movement can bring to the rank and file a new realization of the strength of the American labor movement and a new growth of self-confidence. The consequences of this can shake the whole structure of American politics.

The narrow, limited aims and objectives of those who support, defend or engage in apologetics for an outlived social system do not determine the course of history. When objective necessity required more effective forms of organization, the American working class smashed all barriers and the CIO appeared. Today the American working class has gone about as far as it can within the limits of the policy, leadership and organizational forms so far developed. Objective necessity has now posed before the American workers the need to organize their own political party.

How soon this need will find organized expression on a mass scale cannot be foretold; but one thing is certain, when the American workers lose patience with the timid, conservative, class-collaborationist, coalition politics of the Meanys and the Reuthers — as they surely will under the impact of a crisis like the one that gave birth to the AFL 70 years ago or the one that gave us the CIO 20 years ago — the result will be a major political explosion. Fifteen million organized workers represent a potential power of irresistible magnitude. Armed with a correct program and able leadership, nothing can stop them from fulfilling their historic destiny.

Bureaucrats in Crisis

by M. Stein and J. G. Wright

SOVIET developments are followed closely by the entire world, the international bourgeoisie especially. Fearful of the 1917 Revolution, of its vitality as expressed in the economic successes at home, and above all of its spread to other countries, they have kept vigilant watch on Soviet internal struggles ever since their 1917-23 failure to crush the first workers' state through intervention and blockade. To this day Churchill, speaking for the most farsighted section of the imperialists, laments this failure.

They speculate on a personal struggle for power within the bureaucracy, their hopes aroused by the admitted Soviet economic difficulties, and by the shift in regimes from Malenkov-Beria-Molotov to Khrushchev-Bulganin-Zhukov in the 23 months since Stalin's death. But they dread the real struggle of the Soviet masses against bureaucratic rule which finds a distorted reflection in the conflicts at the summits.

With the ruling caste they can reach agreements, and from time to time cohabit. But they can glean neither comfort nor profit from a regime of workers' democracy. This would tumble the existing barriers between the Soviet masses and the Western working class, including that of the U.S.A.; fuse the delayed workers' revolution with the surge of the colonial people. The overthrow of Stalinism by the Soviet workers would signal the doom of U.S. and world capitalism, just as the extension of the 1917 Revolution to the West would spell the end of Stalinism.

To follow Soviet events without an analysis of Soviet economic life, its history, its singular set of social relations and antagonisms is as false as it would be with regard to capitalist or colonial countries. For Marxists this is the ABC of political science.

The difficulties and convulsions of the post-Stalin days, just as the purges under Stalin, are rooted in the economic contradictions that have faced the USSR since the 1917 Revolution. They have become more complicated, have multiplied and compounded because of the false policies of the bureaucracy, because of the country's heritage of backwardness, and the prolonged isolation of Soviet economy from the reserves of the world economy.

A brief review of the past will shed light on the present. The first workers' state inherited a backward Czarist industry and agriculture, a backwardness that was the product of peculiar Russian development and beyond anyone's power to have altered. In world economy, Czarist Russia played a subordinate role, that of a semi-colony of Western capitalism. Economically, she was closer to China than to the advanced countries of her times, such as Germany, the U.S.A. or Britain. Consequently the antithesis between the city and the village; and the antagonism between mental and manual labor were drawn to their extremes in the Czarist empire.

But the 1917 Revolution could not avail itself of the full resources of this economy, retarded as it was. It was left with an industry and agriculture ravaged by the First World War, by the years of Civil War, imperialist intervention and blockade, and the resulting famines and epidemics. Moreover, capitalist Russia had access to the reserves of world economy in the shape of financial "aid," i.e., foreign loans and investments and the help of trade treaties, so decisive for the development of backward countries. Lenin and Trotsky's government was cut off from the world market by the imperialists.

With the stabilization of the revolutionary government in 1923 attention was turned to economic tasks, the first of which was — to reconstruct. For the backward, war-ruined industry and agriculture had been geared to supply five million Red soldiers who defended the revolution.

The year 1923, when Soviet construction started, also marked the opening of the historic debate among the Soviet leadership. It first broke out over the issue of workers' democracy and the struggle against the spread of bureaucratism through the party, state and administrative machines. This was an anticipation of the conflict that was later to develop over domestic economic policy, over the tasks of the revolution at home and abroad.

Stalinism vs. Trotskyism

Two warring tendencies crystallized in the course of this struggle. On the one side stood the proletarian tendency, headed by Leon Trotsky, the *internationalist* tendency. On the opposing side rallied the machine politicians and careerists, the *nationalist* tendency.

The internationalists stressed that there was no way out for Soviet economy and the workers' state except on the world arena, except through the extension of the revolution. The platform of the nationalists was summed up in Stalin's infamous theory of "socialism in one country."

Stalin's policy was based on building a self-sufficient industry within Soviet borders. The internationalists fought for an economic policy which stressed a balanced interrelation between the city and the village. More than a quarter century ago, Trotsky summarized it as follows:

"Between industry and agriculture, based on individual peasant households, there is a dialectic interaction. But industry, by far the more dynamic element, constitutes the motor force. In exchange for grain the peasant needs and wants manufactured goods. The democratic revolution, under the Bolshevik leadership, gave land to the peasants. The socialist revolution, under the same leadership, still supplies fewer goods and at

higher prices than capitalism used to offer in its day. This is exactly why a threat hangs over the socialist revolution as distinct from its democratic base. To the scarcity of manufactured goods, the peasant replies by a passive, slow-down strike in agriculture.

"He withholds his own grain from the market and refuses to plant more. The Right-Wingers propose to give more elbow-room to the capitalist tendencies in the village, to take less from the village, and to lower the tempo of industrial expansion.

"But, after all, this means that the volume of agricultural products would increase while the supply of manufactured goods would be further decreased. The disproportion between the two, which is at the bottom of the present economic crisis, would become more pronounced. . .

"The platform of the [Trotskyist] Opposition excludes, first and foremost, the line of a shut-in, an isolated economy. It is senseless to try to disengage the Soviet economy from the world market by a wall of stone. Soviet economy's fate will be decided by the over-all tempo of its development (including agriculture) and not at all by the degree to which it gains 'independence' from the world division of labor." (Bulletin of the Russian Opposition, Nos. 1-2, July 1929, page 22.)

Recent Soviet developments, the admitted economic crisis in particular, bring into sharp focus the original dispute. The Kremlin oligarchs are more aware of it than all of the capitalist publicists, Russian "specialists," foreign correspondents, historians, biographers and assorted would-be sociologists. The post-Stalin era is marked by repeated references to the old conflict. Thus, Malenkov, when making his bid to don Stalin's mantle, made pointed reference to the "Bukharinite Right Wing" and to the "Trotskyites." When Malenkov was selected Scapegoat No. 1 for the farm crisis and other troubles, his fall was accompanied by a barrage against the "Bukharinites," against the "Trotskyites."

Why do the echoes of the dispute of the Twenties reverberate in 1955? Because there is a close connection between the old, supposedly outlived struggle and living Soviet reality.

Stalin, leading the decisive cohorts of the bureaucracy, was allied in the Twenties with the Right Wing (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) against the proletarian tendency. The line of this bloc was to "give more elbow-room to the capitalist elements in the village, to take less from the village, and lower the tempo of industrial expansion." Their thesis was that "in this manner the kulak would 'grow over peacefully into socialism'," and, as a result, socialism would be built, even if "at a tortoise pace." The concessions to the capitalist elements in agriculture not only failed to solve the farm crisis of the Twenties, but aggravated it. Each concession only whetted the restorationist appetite; meanwhile the industry was unable to provide any more manufactured goods to the well-to-do peasants who were profiteering.

The clash between the kulak and the state came to a head by the end of 1929, when the kulaks cut off supplies of grain to the cities, and seized control of the rural Soviets. In panic, Stalin broke with the Right Wing. From the policy of economic opportunism, he turned to adventurism. From the building of "socialism in one country" at a tortoise pace came the switch to a forced march to build socialism by the end of the First Five-Year Plan. Yesterday's slogan of "Kulak Grow Rich!" was replaced overnight by the call to "destroy the kulak as a class." By naked force the peasants were driven into collectives, without any mechanized equipment. A protracted civil war gripped the countryside. Millions of peasants died while other multitudes were uprooted and deported to Siberia and Central Asia. To this day Soviet agriculture suffers from the slaughter of livestock during the "wholesale collectivization." Many scarcities that the workers endured in the Thirties, and have to endure in 1955, can be traced to the same period.

The Problem Persists

Much has changed since then. Twenty-five million individual peasant holdings have given way to collectivized, mechanized agriculture of "94,000 amalgamated collectives" (Khrushchev). Soviet industry has become the second largest in the world, showing the power lodged in nationalized property and planning. The bureaucracy has extended its rule and privileges over the Eastern half of Europe. The Soviet Union has gained an ally in revolutionary China. But none of these changes have solved the domestic problem: the interrelation between industry and agriculture, between the city and the village.

The key to this problem remains the overcoming of the consumer goods famine, which has persisted from one Five-Year Plan to the next. The growth of Soviet industry bears the indelible imprint of Stalinist misrule and mismanagement. Industry has been expanded without regard to mass consumers; heavy industry disproportionately developed at the expense of agriculture and the light industrial sector. As a result Soviet economy just as that of the buffer countries suffers from acute scarcities in precisely those commodities of which there is a periodic glut in the advanced capitalist countries.

The solution eludes the bureaucracy because along the nationalist course there is no solution. The zigzags in economic policy — from economic opportunism to adventurism, and back again — underscore the blind alley in which the bureaucracy finds itself; and, concurrently, the paroxysms at the top express the growing mass pressure of workers and peasants, demanding the solution the bureaucracy cannot supply.

The liquidation of individual peasant holdings, by bureaucratic terror, has transformed Soviet agriculture, but has not supplied the population, increasing annually by three millions, and the cities, whose population has grown by 17 millions in recent years, with any more food per capita. After more than a quarter century of Stalinist "collectivization" Soviet agriculture is in a crisis whose "solution" has now been postponed officially to 1960!

The stormy growth of industry, at the cost of mass privations and under the bureaucratic lash, has supplied neither the villages nor the cities with more manufactured goods per capita. In fact, the scarcities of foodstuffs and of consumer goods have become more acute in 1955. The farm crisis is becoming converted in 1955 into a crisis of the current Five-Year Plan and of Soviet economy as a whole.

Stalin's nationalist course required, above all, that the status quo be

maintained. To this end the bureaucracy sabotaged and betrayed the revolution in the West as in the East. It was confident that thereby it could curry favor with the world bourgeoisie and "neutralize" it. And indeed, the world bourgeoisie regarded the Stalinist policy, in economics as in politics, as the acme of realism. With true class instinct they feared and hated



KRUSHCHEV

the program of the internationalists. As the struggle between the internationalists and the nationalists deepened in the USSR, the bourgeoisie saw its main enemy, as did the bureaucracy, in the Trotskyists.

Stalin's theory of "neutralizing" the world imperialists is a component part of his theory of "building socialism in one country." They stand and fall together. The hoax that the Soviet Union and the capitalist environment could peacefully co-exist thus became substituted for the struggle for world socialism.

The bureaucracy, in return for diplomatic deals, prevented the extension of the revolution to the advanced countries which alone could have integrated Soviet industry with that of the developed countries, and in this way fully opened the reserves of world economy to the Soviet people. Meanwhile the growth of Soviet industry has not lessened Soviet dependence on the world market but has greatly increased it.

This dependence has been aggravated by the emergence of revolutionary China. The rise of this new world power, despite and against Stalin's policy and "advice," has imposed on the Kremlin an alliance with the most populous agricultural nation on our planet, which urgently needs capital goods, heavy equipment for industry, for transportation, mining and agriculture plus — equipment to modernize her armed forces. After decades of Stalinist efforts to compress Soviet productive forces within narrow national limits, the bureaucracy is suddenly confronted with the need to plan in accordance with its new *interstate* obligations, in the first instance, to China! Such is history's unexpected vengeance upon the architects of "socialism in one country"!

One of the chief products of the nationalist course has been the rise at home of a machine of coercion and parasitism, of vested power and privilege, which implants inequality and requires constant reinforcement, on a scale hitherto unknown. The multi-millioned caste devours and wastes a huge portion of the annual national income. Its methods of rule and of management dislocate the economy not only of the Soviet Union but of the East European countries. Its methods kill mass incentives and initiative, sow not only discontent and hatred but also cynicism and demoralization.

One of the pre-conditions for the bureaucracy's rise — the scarcity of necessities and consumer goods — has turned into a permanent feature of its rule and continues to determine its despotic nature and methods. The dominant contradiction governing Soviet life, as that of East European countries, is the irrepressible conflict between this caste, its needs and interests, and the masses, their wants and aspirations.

With the economic successes the chasm has widened between the Stalinist rulers and the masses. Caste privileges have multiplied, as have the stratifications within the caste itself. The war and post-war years have seen the rise of a military caste, exceeding the Czarist or Prussian militarists in size, influence and privileges. Their specific weight in the ruling circles increased following the Beria purge, particularly with the latest shift in regimes and the elevation of Marshal Zhukov.

These same economic successes have spurred the growth, numerically and culturally, of the Soviet working class. Their spontaneous urge is to resume their rightful place on the political arena. This is irrefutably proved by the millions in forced labor camps, political prisoners in their overwhelming majority; by the rise of the Leninist Youth in the intellectual centers of the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa); the mass sympathy and support for the political prisoners who, under the leadership of the Young Leninists, organized the Vorkuta strike.*

The bureaucracy, universally hated, feels itself beleaguered. Over the decades its giant propaganda machine tried to deify Stalin. But who mourned when the despot died? And who grieved over Malenkov's disgrace or cheered Khrushchev to power? Within their own ranks, conditions of perpetual martial law prevail. A semblance of freedom of thought and criticism is a luxury they cannot afford even to their most pampered layer: the artists, writers and scientists.

Among the latter-day converts to Stalinist "realism" as against the "fatal admixture of illusion" in Trotsky's internationalist line, was Isaac Deutscher, British journalist and biographer. He became overawed by the "successes" of the bureaucracy just at the moment it found itself in straits. He promised the "self-reform" of the bureaucracy at a time when mass revulsion against bureaucratic rule reached the point of explosions — the East German uprising, the ferment in the buffer countries, the Vorkuta general strike of forced laborers in the Arctic region. Amid a succession of purges, he prognosticated no more purges "along the old Stalinist models" and with "the old Stalinist routines." The Deutscher school, which was riding high after Stalin's death, fell on its face with "liberalizer" Malenkov's downfall.

* * *

Events have repudiated "socialism in one country" as an utopia in the

* See the series of articles by Brigitte Gerland in the Militant, Jan. 17 to March 7, 1955.

service of the counter-revolution. The international struggle for socialism, on the contrary, has been confirmed as the living reality.

The dominant fact of the international situation today, as it has been since the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, is the death agony of capitalism. The year 1914 gave the signal that capitalist rule was obsolete because private ownership of the means of production had turned into an absolute brake upon a development of productive forces adequate to meet global mass needs and wants.

The Betrayals

The 1917 Revolution came as the first successful attempt of the world working class, on the soil of Russia, to rationalize the world productive forces on the only foundation possible, that of collective productive relations and institutions. It opened the first stage of the world revolution. By 1919 the German, Italian and other European workers, spurred by the victory of the Russian workers and peasants, made their bid for socialist power. They were beaten back because they were betrayed by parties that called themselves socialist but sided with the counter-revolution. The Social Democracy saved bourgeois rule in Europe after World War I.

The way was thus opened for the emergence of fascism in the West. But even this unleashing of reaction caused the first wave of the world revolution to recede only temporarily. There was no lack thereafter of revolutionary situations either in Europe or in the East (Hungary, the Balkans, Germany in 1923 and again in 1931-33, China in 1925-27, the Spanish Revolution 1931-36, the revolutionary situation in France 1937-38, and finally the Civil War in Spain 1936-39).

But by the end of 1923, a new counter-revolutionary force began to enter the world arena — the Stalinist bureaucracy. It exploited the temporary reflux of the revolution to expropriate the workers politically at home, and then to become itself the main force inside the world labor movement for the temporary stabilization of capitalism. Like the Social Democracy, it saved bourgeois rule in Europe and the colonies, and paved the way for World War II.

European capitalism, rotted to the core, with the mass of the people turned against capitalism, as post-war elections were to show repeatedly, survived only because of Stalinism. In return for a power deal (Yalta and Potsdam) which gave the Kremlin Eastern Europe as its sphere of influence, Stalinism guaranteed the resuscitation of capitalism in Western Europe. Upon orders from the Kremlin, the armed workers of France and Italy, the only armed forces of any consequence in these countries at the time, were disarmed and disbanded. The Greek revolution was betrayed. Stalin sought to crush the Yugoslav revolution. This by no means exhausts the list, but it suffices to illustrate how the crimes of the Social Democracy following World War I were repeated and compounded by Stalinism following World War II.

Stalinism saved capitalist rule in decayed Europe. It could not save imperialist rule over all of the colonies. Not that they did not try. In India and Ceylon the Stalinist parties sided with the British colonial despots; they helped bring back the French occupation troops to Indo-China; and in China Stalin "advised," as late as 1948, that Mao continue to cohabit with Chiang Kai-shek. The colonial revolution nonetheless erupted over the heads of the imperialists and of the Kremlin. It could not be contained on the one hand because of the explosive nature of the agrarian problem, and on the other, the refusal of colonial people to submit any longer to the foreign oppressors.

The reward for these and other betrayals has come in the shape of the "cold war," the arms race, the nuclear weapons race and the war threat to the USSR and to all of mankind. Such is the price paid for Stalinist "realism" by the Soviet and world working class.

After more than four decades of capitalist death agony, and over three decades of Stalinist rule, mankind in the meantime has arrived at the nuclear age. The destructiveness of the new weapons points up the urgency of the socialist solution; and, at the same time, illuminates the meaning, necessity and power of liberating ideas.

The world bourgeoisie, with the U.S. monopolists in the van, are ideological bankrupts. Barren of ideas as against socialism since 1914, they have had in their arsenal only the weapons first of the Social Democracy and then of Stalinist despotism. Today their main weapon, apart from naked force, is to smear the liberating socialist struggle by identifying it with Stalinism, promoting the myth of the omnipotence of the bureaucracy, and misrepresenting the choice before mankind as that between their rule and that of Stalinism.

Humanity's problems can be solved only as a world whole, to which all of the national or regional parts are subordinate. In 1923 the platform of the internationalists was based on the world socialist revolution as the sole way out for the USSR. This applies with even greater force in 1955. The only theory that has withstood the test of events is Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution.

BULGANIN

Trotsky's Theory

This theory embraces three basic propositions unified in a single line of thought.

The most fundamental proposition from which the other two derive, deals with the world character of the socialist revolution. This results from the condition of modern economic life and mankind's social structure.

"Internationalism is no abstract principle. It truly mirrors, in theory and in politics, the global nature of present-da economy, the international developmen of the productive forces, the internatio sweep of the class struggle. The socia revolution begins on national soil. E it cannot be completed there. The preservation of the socialist revolution within a national framework can lead only to a provisional regime, even though one, as Soviet experience shows, of long duration. . . Its way out lies exclusively in the victory of the working class of the advanced countries. From our stand point a national revolution is not a self-sufficient whole; it is simply a single link of the international chain. The world revolution is a permanent process, notwithstanding temporary ups and downs" (Trotsky.)

The second basic proposition deals with the transition into socialism of colonial and semi-colonial, and generally backward countries whose democratic revolutions have been historically delayed. They cannot belatedly solve their democratic tasks, in the first instance their agrarian problem, in any other way except through the methods of the proletarian revolution, except by transgressing the framework of capitalist relations. The dynamics of a belated bourgeois revolution, Trotsky said, inexorably leads to the proletarian dictatorship. Historically this is determined by the correlation of class forces in such countries.

Finally, Trotsky characterizes the Socialist revolution as such:

"For an indefinitely extended interval, and through constant internal conflict all social relations are overhauled. Society uninterruptedly undergoes a moulting process. One stage of transformation flows directly from the one before. This process retains, of necessity, a political character, that is, unwinds through collisions among various groups of the society that is being overhauled. Explosions of civil war and foreign wars alternate with periods of 'peaceful' refor Revolutions in economic life, in technology, the sciences, the family, every day life, and in morality unwind in complex interaction, without allowing society to reach an equilibrium. Herein lies the permanent character of the socialist revolution as such."

The only theory that truly expresses the reality of our times, and points the way out of the crisis of mankind, is the theory of the permanent revolution.

The Suffragist Movement

Women Who Won The Right to Vote

by Joyce Cowley

WOMEN got the vote in the United States in 1920. The amendment to the Constitution granting women that right was the climax of a struggle that began almost a hundred years earlier. Suffrage leaders were ridiculed and persecuted while they were alive. Today they are either forgotten or contemptuously referred to as disappointed old maids who hated men. This concept of the woman's rights movement as a war against men by sexually frustrated women is even accepted by some modern psychiatrists. But it is historically inaccurate and a great injustice to a number of truly remarkable women.

The status of women in society began to change with the breakdown of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England, women first entered trades. They were frequently partners in the husband's business; widows and daughters carried on the family business. There are records of women pawnbrokers, stationers, booksellers, contractors and even shipowners. In the seventeenth century there were three women to every man in the woolen industry and many women were employed in the silk industry. They also worked in the fields and the agricultural labor of women was an important factor in the new American colonies.

The "woman question" was discussed as early as the Elizabethan period but this talk did not develop into an organized movement. It was in 1792 that Mary Wollstonecroft wrote the *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* which, historically, marks the conscious beginning of the struggle for woman's rights. This book was a direct reflection of Mary Wollstonecroft's sympathies with the French and American revolutions, a demand that woman's rights be included in the rights of man for which the revolutionists were fighting.

It was in America, not England, that the woman question first developed into an organized movement rather than a subject of discussion in literary circles. This reflects the more advanced position of women in the American colonies, which was strikingly different from that of women in Europe. The laws of the colonies, modeled on those of England, gave women few legal rights. But the realities of pioneer life, particularly the scarcity of women and the appreciation of their skills, meant that they actually had a great deal of responsibility, engaged in numerous occupations that were supposedly "masculine" and consequently enjoyed rights and privileges, and a degree of freedom, unknown to women in England.

The Puritan concept of work further influenced the general attitude towards women's activities. In their moral code, work was something you could never get too much of and they did not disapprove of women working, on the contrary they encouraged it. It made no difference whether the woman was married or not; the more she worked the better, and the less likely she was to succumb to the temptations of the devil.

In the colonial period women could vote, and sometimes did vote, as the right to vote was based on ownership of property and not on sex. They were gradually disfranchised by laws prohibiting women from voting — in Virginia in 1699, New York 1777,

Massachusetts 1780, New Hampshire 1784 and New Jersey 1807.

At that time men engaged in agriculture and women in home manufacture. Women made most of the products used by the colonists that were not imported. The preponderance of women in the earliest factories in the United States is due largely to the fact that their work was transferred from the home to the factory. This was particularly true of the first major industry, the spinning and weaving of cotton, and accounts for the prominent role of women in early labor struggles, especially the fight of cotton-mill workers for the ten-hour day.

The woman's rights movement, however, did not grow out of the trade-union struggles of women. It was never closely associated with trade-union activities nor particularly interested in the problems of working women. This may seem contradictory unless you keep in mind that the woman's movement was primarily a fight for legal, not economic rights. The legal battle of the suffragists has been won, but in the Twentieth century women still face severe discrimination in wages and job opportunities.

The woman's rights movement *did* spring directly from the abolitionist movement. Every prominent fighter for woman's rights was *first* an abolitionist; and the two movements were closely allied for fifty years, although the "woman question" frequently caused division in the abolitionist ranks, as the Negro cause became more respectable and more popular than that of women.

Just how did the anti-slavery movement give birth to the struggle for woman's rights? There is a simple explanation for what may seem at first a surprising evolution. Women who started out to plead for the slave found they were not allowed to plead. They were ridiculed when they appeared on a speakers' platform, they were not accepted as delegates when they attended anti-slavery conventions. Within a short time, most of the women prominent in abolitionist circles spoke up for their own rights, too, although a formal organization advocating complete legal equality and suffrage was not formed for another twenty years.

The Early Leaders

A number of misconceptions about the pioneers for woman's rights are prevalent. In the first place, it is assumed that they were all women — women united in a war against men. The truth is *men* were in the forefront of the struggle for woman's rights, notably such spokesmen as William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass and Wendell Phillips. They were attacked even more viciously than the women and labelled "hermaphrodites" and "Aunt Nancy men."

Furthermore, none of the women in this movement were exclusively preoccupied with sex equality and women's problems. They were, as I said, invariably abolitionists and frequently advocated a great many other reforms — the Utopian variety of socialism, trade unions, atheism, temperance, free love, birth control and easier divorce. Many of these causes were not too popular in the early part of the last century and this accounts to some extent for the common opinion that these women were freaks and probably immoral.

It is not true that most of the feminist leaders were either libertines or embittered virgins. With the exception of Susan B. Anthony, the best known — Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, Carrie Chapman Catt — were happily married. Mrs. Mott and Mrs. Stanton, founders of the movement, were mothers of large families. They did *not* marry weak husbands who were dominated by their crusading wives. The husbands were generally men of outstanding ability and achievement, enthusiastic supporters of the woman's cause. The only reason they were to some extent overshadowed by their wives was that the unusual activities of the wives attracted a good deal of attention.

Frances Wright was probably the first woman to speak publicly in this country and to advocate woman's rights. She was Scotch, coming to America in 1818. Brilliant and courageous, she was also one of the extremists, exactly the type who were slandered and laughed at but never ignored. Among numerous other activities, she founded a colony primarily intended to set an example of how to free slaves and give them economic independence. But she was an opponent of marriage and her colony became more famous for its open repudiation of this institution than for any service to the Negro cause.

Opposition to marriage was common among the early advocates of freedom for women. They saw in it — quite correctly, in my opinion — an institution designed for the subjugation of their sex. In those days a married woman had no right to own property, her wages belonged to her husband and so did her children. The simplest way to avoid these evils was to stay single.

In spite of their audacity, these women frequently surrendered to local pressure. Mary Wollstonecroft gave birth to one illegitimate child; but when she became pregnant a second time by another lover, she found the struggle too difficult and married him. Frances Wright and her sister both married for the same reason — they were pregnant.

The sex question explains a lot about the notoriety associated with the first feminist leaders. As the movement grew and became more respectable, it attempted to dissociate itself from advocacy of "free love," but was never completely successful.

About the same time that Frances Wright founded her well-publicized colony, Lucretia Mott became a Quaker minister. She is one of the most striking personalities in the woman's rights movement. Of unusual intellect and breadth of vision, she studied intensively and was an active lecturer and organizer for fifty years. She supported trade unions when they were almost unknown and generally illegal, which was rare among abolitionist leaders, who seemed to think there was some kind of conflict between the two movements. She also raised six children and apparently enjoyed domestic activities like cooking and sewing, although you wonder as you read her biography how she found time for them.

She was at the meeting held in Philadelphia in 1833 where the first anti-slavery group was organized and from which the American Anti-Slavery Society developed. Although she spoke several times during the convention and played an influential role, it did not occur to her to sign the Declaration that was adopted. Samuel May, in his reminiscences, wrote: "Men were so blind, so obtuse, they did not recognize the women guests as members of the convention."

Lucretia's next step was to form a Women's Anti-Slavery Society, but the women were so ignorant of parliamentary procedure that they found it necessary to get a man to chair the meeting — James McCrummel, an educated Negro. The brazen conduct of women in forming this society was attacked by clergymen as an "act of flagrant sedition against God." While women were clothing and feeding the Negro on his way to Canada, "clergymen huddled in churches and wrung their hands, forecasting the doom of the American home and the good old traditions."

Five years after the Women's Anti-Slavery Society was organized, it held a convention in Pennsylvania Hall, a public building recently dedicated to "liberty and the rights of man." While the delegates conducted their business, a mob surrounded the hall. Stones were thrown at the windows, breaking pane after pane, and vitriol was hurled through the gaping holes, while a cry rose, "Burn the hall!" Two or three hours after the women vacated the hall, it went up in flames.

That night Philadelphia was in an uproar. The mayor wanted to stop abolitionist activities and police protection was non-existent. The mob headed for the home of James and Lucretia Mott. There was a period of tense waiting inside the house while the yells and turmoil in the street grew closer. But as the minutes passed, the noise seemed to recede and gradually fade into the distance. The next day they learned that a friend had joined the mob and when they were within a block of the house, he flourished a stick and cried: "On to the Motts!" then led them up a succession of wrong streets. This was one of many similar incidents for Lucretia Mott, and her calm composure in a riot became legendary.

Sarah and Angelina Grimke, aristocratic women from the South, were among the earliest speakers and organizers of the abolitionist movement. I came across an interesting quotation from a speech by Angelina Grimke delivered before a Massachusetts legislative committee in 1832:

"As a moral being I feel I owe it to the slave and the master, to my countrymen and to the world, to do all that I can to overturn a system of complicated crimes built upon the broken hearts and prostrate bodies of my countrymen in chains and cemented by the blood, sweat and tears of my sisters in bond."

Evidently Churchill knew a good phrase when he saw it.

Begin Organizing

Factional struggles inside the abolitionist movement led Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton to call a convention for woman's rights in 1848.

Eight years earlier, a fight had taken place over the election of a woman to a business committee of the American Anti-Slavery Society. The vote was favorable to the candidate, Abby Kelly; and the anti-woman group seceded from the organization and formed their own anti-slavery society. A world-wide anti-slavery convention had been called in London. Purged of its reactionary elements, the American Anti-Slavery Society elected Lucretia and two other women to their executive committee and chose her and Charles Remond, a Negro, as delegates to the London convention. Lucretia also headed the delegation from the Women's Anti-Slavery Society.

Another delegation — one hundred per cent male, of course — was sent by the newly formed organization. In London every effort was made to keep peace by persuading the women delegates to withhold their credentials, but Lucretia insisted that the responsibility for rejection must rest with the convention.

Wendell Phillips opened the fight on the convention floor by proposing that all persons with credentials be seated. He pointed out that the convention's invitation had been addressed to all friends of the slave and Massachusetts had interpreted this to mean men *and* women. Clergymen at the convention were particularly eloquent in their opposition to seating women. "Learned Doctors of Divinity raced about the convention hall Bible in hand, quoting words of scripture and waving their fists beneath the noses of disputing brethren who did not know woman's place."

The reactionaries won. Women were admitted as guests only and seated behind a curtain which screened them from public gaze. Garrison, the greatest figure in the abolitionist world, was scheduled to be the main speaker. On his arrival he climbed the stairs to the women's balcony, sat beside Lucretia behind the curtain, and remained there until the close of the convention.

It was on this trip to England that Lucretia met Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a young bride of one of the delegates. It was here that they decided to start a crusade for woman's rights on their return to America, although eight years passed before they were able to carry out their plans and call the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848.

This Equal Rights Convention, the first ever held in any country, was the official beginning of the suffrage struggle. The first day of the convention had been advertised as open to women only. When the women arrived at the Unitarian church they found they were locked out. A young professor climbed through a window and opened the door for them. On the spot, they decided to admit men, which turned out to be a fortunate decision for the suffrage cause.

James Mott was chairman of the meeting, as the women were still timid and did not know too much about parliamentary procedure. The Declaration of Sentiments adopted by the convention was signed by 68 women and 32 men. The resolutions called for complete equality in marriage, equal rights in property, wages and custody of children, the right to make contracts, to sue and be sued, to testify in court — and to vote.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton introduced the suffrage amendment. It was op-

posed by Lucretia Mott because she considered it too radical and thought it would arouse public antagonism and ridicule. Frederick Douglass seconded Mrs. Stanton's motion and made one of the most eloquent speeches in history for woman's equality and her right to vote. His speech inspired the women to overcome their hesitation and pass the suffrage resolution. Within a year a National Woman's Rights Association was organized and state and national conventions were held regularly.

Persecution and Abuse

The woman's movement was met with a storm of abuse, particularly from the clergy, although a great many men just considered it funny. Within a few years, as it gained momentum, it met more serious opposition. Opponents of suffrage were divided as to whether the population would decrease because women were unsexed or illegitimately increase because of the practice of free love.

A typical example of the anti-suffrage point of view appears in a book by Dr. L. P. Brockett, quoted at some length in Hare's biography of Lucretia Mott. It gives a picture of just what would happen if women were allowed to vote and declares it will be a gala day for the prostitutes, as "modest refined Christian women" would refuse to go to the polls in such company. Hare paraphrases the book:

"What a lesson of evil would be taught children on that day. Imagine the innocent offspring, clutching its mother as it stands in the presence of 'poor wretches, bedizened in gaudy finery, with bold, brazen faces, many of them half or wholly drunk and uttering with loud laughter, horrible oaths and ribald and obscene jests! What an impression the child would receive! And if the mother attempted to tell her daughter that these were bad women, the child might query: 'But mother, they are going to vote. If they were so very bad, would they have the same right to vote that you and other ladies have?' Unable to answer so precocious a question, the 'modest, refined Christian mother' would scurry home, leaving the polls to her male representatives and the women of the underworld."

"To drive home the lesson," says Hare, "the book is illustrated with a picture showing the refined woman at the polls completely surrounded by a vicious group of derelicts of both sexes. The picture vividly warns any woman who is on the verge of becoming a follower of Lucretia Mott, the type of men and women with whom she must associate if she votes. It also discloses the unintentional fact that the voting male is the uncouth immigrant, the bowery heeler,

LUCY STONE

"For her ability to remain unperturbed through hoots, jeers and murderous assault, she had few equals."

and the pimp; the same male hailed by opponents of female rights as woman's natural representative in affairs of government. One glance at the men in the picture convinces the reader that woman's benign influence in the home had gone awry, despite this best chosen argument of the anti-suffragettes."

Dr. Brockett also predicts that some disastrous changes will occur in the appearance of women:

"The blush of innocence, the timid, half-frightened expression which is, to all right-thinking men a higher charm than the most perfect self-conscious beauty, will disappear and in place of it we shall have hard, self-reliant bold faces, and in which all the loveliness will have faded, and naught remain save the look of power and talent."

The suffrage workers encountered additional ridicule at this time due to the introduction of the Bloomer costume. It was rather strange in appearance, consisting of trousers partly concealed by a full skirt that fell six inches below the knees. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone and Susan B. Anthony probably suffered greater martyrdom because of this costume than for any other phase of their crusade, and after a few years they discontinued wearing it, feeling that it did more harm than good. Nevertheless, the outfit did give much greater freedom of action and was adopted by many farm women of the period and recommended by doctors for use in sanitariums. It was the first step toward the freedom of the modern dress.

Mrs. Stanton became one of the most active suffrage leaders and it was in this period that her life-long collaboration with Susan B. Anthony began. She was the mother of five boys and two girls, and whenever her schedule of lectures, conventions and meetings became too heavy, she would threaten to interrupt it by having another baby. Lucy Stone, now best known as the woman who insisted on keeping her maiden name, also became prominent in the 1850's. Lucy's use of her own name grew out of her original opposition to marriage. When she did marry, the unusual ceremony attracted considerable comment, none of it favorable. She and Henry Blackwell opened the wedding with a statement:

"While we acknowledge our mutual affection by publicly assuming the relation of man and wife, yet in justice to ourselves and a great principle, we deem it a duty to declare that this act on our part implies no sanction of, nor promise of voluntary obedience to, such of the present laws of marriage as refuse to recognize the wife as an independent, rational being while they confer upon the husband an injurious and unnatural superiority, investing him with legal powers which no honorable man would exercise and no man should possess. We protest especially against the laws which give the husband:

"1. The custody of the wife's person.

"2. The exclusive control and guardianship of their children.

"3. The sole ownership of her personal property and use of her real estate, unless previously settled upon her, or placed in the hands of trustees as in the case of minors, lunatics and idiots.

"4. The absolute right to the product of her industry."

They continued with the regular marriage ceremony, omitting the word "obey," but there was a popular feeling, especially since Lucy kept her

own name, that they were not really married.

Many Negro women like Harriet Tubman, the extraordinary leader of the underground railway, and Sojourner Truth, also played an active role in the woman's rights movement. Tubman is reported to have been an amazingly eloquent speaker, but for reasons of personal safety the speeches were rarely recorded.

Not a Soft Occupation

Even a bare outline of the lives of these early women leaders arouses admiration. Lecturing for woman's rights was not exactly a soft occupation. Travelling was pretty rough then and the reception was likely to be rough, too. These women kept going at a remarkable pace in spite of large families and heavy domestic responsibilities.

Mrs. Stanton wrote most of her speeches after midnight while the children were sleeping — I don't know when she slept. Most of the women continued their work without let-up even when they were in their sixties and seventies. Lucretia Mott was 83 when she spoke at the 25th anniversary of the suffrage association. They were middle-class women but many of them faced economic hardships. Lucy Stone went to Oberlin College — the first to admit women — and worked her way through, sweeping and washing dishes at three cents an hour. Her life as an abolitionist and woman's rights speaker was not exactly a cinch either. She lived in a garret in Boston, sleeping three in a bed with the landlady's daughters for six and one-fourth cents a night. Constance Burnett in *Five for Freedom* describes a fairly typical meeting at which she spoke. (She was the outstanding orator of the woman's movement, a real spellbinder.)

"Lucy posted her own meetings, hammering her signs on trees with tacks carried in her reticule and stones from the road. The first poster usually drew an army of young hoodlums who followed her up and down streets, taunting, flinging small missiles and pulling down her notices as soon as her back was turned . . .

"For her ability to remain unperturbed through hoots, jeers and murderous assault, she had few equals. It was a common thing for her to face a rain of spitballs as soon as she stepped before an audience. Once a hymn book was flung at her head with such force it almost stunned her. On another night, in midwinter, icy water was trained on her from a hose thrust through a window. Lucy calmly reached for her shawl, wrapped it around her shoulders and went on talking.

"At an open air anti-slavery meeting on Cape Cod, the temper of the crowd seemed so dangerous that all the speakers, one after the other, vanished hastily from the platform. The only two left were Lucy and Abby Kelly's husband, Stephen Foster, a firebrand abolitionist of the same mettle from New Hampshire.

"Before either of them could get to speak, Lucy saw the mob begin its advance. 'They're coming, Stephen. You'd better run for it,' she warned him hurriedly.

"Stephen no more than Lucy ever ran from danger. 'What about you?' he protested, and with that the surging, yelling mass was upon them. Overpowered, Foster disappeared in the melee, and Lucy, suddenly deserted, looked up into the face of a towering ruffian with a club.

" 'This gentleman will take care of me,' she suggested sweetly, taking his arm, and too astonished for words, he complied. Reasoning calmly with him as he steered her out of the violence, she won his reluctant admiration and his consent to let her finish her speech. The platform was demolished by then, but he conducted her to a tree stump, rounded up the rest of the 'gentlemen' and preserved order with raised club until she was through talking. Lucy gave the whole gang a piece of her mind, not neglecting to collect twenty dollars from them to replace Stephen Foster's coat, which in their gentlemanly exuberance they had split in two."

The Alliance Ends

During the Civil War there was little activity in the woman's movement. All of the women were devoted to the abolitionist cause and enthusiastically entered into various types of war work. But the end of the war brought the end of the fifty-year alliance between the woman's cause and the Negro movement.

The split took place when Negro men got the vote. The Republican Party and the Negro leaders were both pressing for passage of the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution to enfranchise Negro men. The Republicans were not particularly interested in Negro rights but they wanted votes. The Democrats, who opposed the Negro vote, now gave lip service to woman suffrage in order to annoy the Republicans and hypocritically charge them with hypocrisy.

Negro leaders argued that this was the "Negro's hour" and it was a matter of practical politics to push through the vote for Negro men while it had a chance of ratification. Adding woman suffrage to the amendment would inevitably result in its defeat. Negro and abolitionist leaders insisted that they were devoted to the woman's cause and would continue to fight for universal suffrage after Negro men got the vote.

Many of the women were embittered by what they considered a sell-out. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in an argument with Wendell Phillips, said: "May I ask just one question, based on the apparent opposition in which you place the Negro and woman? Do you believe the African race is composed entirely of males?"

For fifty years these women had fought for the abolitionist cause and they felt that they had won the right to be included in the suffrage amendment. They would not agree to being left out on grounds of political expediency. They got little support and the 15th amendment was passed, giving the vote to Negro men only.

At the American Equal Rights Association convention in 1869, a formal split occurred; with the majority, the more conservative grouping, supporting the Boston abolitionist wing. Among the majority were Julia Ward Howe and Lucy Stone, who formed the American Woman Suffrage Association. The radical minority, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, organized the National Woman Rights Association. For twenty years these two groups remained separate.

As I have indicated, the principal cause of the split was the division of opinion over supporting Negro suffrage while the question of woman suffrage was postponed. I've read some eloquent statements on both sides of this argument. Negro leaders like Frederick Douglass, the first man to speak up for woman suffrage in this

country, felt that the Negro cause was jeopardized by the women who selfishly advanced their own demands instead of waiting until it was more "practical" to advocate suffrage for women, too. Women felt this attitude was a great injustice on the part of the abolitionists, showing ingratitude to the women who had fought so long and so courageously for the Negro cause.

In Lucretia Mott's biography there is a description of the Centennial Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence:

"The newly enfranchised citizens appreciated what had been done for them — by their sex. Women on the sidewalks watched them carry banner after banner emblazoned with the names of Garrison or Phillips or Douglass. They searched in vain for a tribute to Lucretia Mott, or the author of Uncle Tom's Cabin, or any other woman of the anti-slavery conflict."

Both the Negro and the woman's movement were greatly weakened by the split in their ranks and it was another fifty years before women got the vote. In several accounts of this split written by men in sympathy with the Negro side of the argument, the women were held responsible for the delay because extremists in their ranks insisted prematurely on suffrage.

Historically there is not much point in speculating about what would have happened if the Negroes and women had stuck together — how long this would have delayed Negro suffrage (if at all) — and whether or not woman suffrage would have been won at an earlier date. Most Negro men were enfranchised in name only, and even to this day millions have not been able to exercise their constitutional right to vote. Personally I can't help sympathizing with the women who felt they had been deserted and betrayed. It's unfortunate that the reform movement was split as a result but I'm not sure this was entirely the fault of a few women "radicals." There were heterogeneous elements in the Equal Rights Association, many of whom felt that their cause, Negro emancipation and enfranchisement, had been won, and it is probable that this conservative element would have broken away in any case.

The history of the woman's movement from this point on, divorced from the other reform struggles for which the women originally fought, becomes a bit dull. It is more bourgeois in character, exclusively concerned as it is with the vote.

The Struggle for the Vote

Immediately after the passage of the 15th amendment, Susan B. Anthony decided to test the new law, which was worded in such a way that it might possibly be construed to include women. In Rochester, N. Y., she and twelve other women armed with a copy of the Constitution demanded the right to vote. The election inspectors were so startled by this move that the women were allowed to cast ballots. They were promptly arrested for voting illegally. Susan was fined $100. She refused to pay the fine, hoping that she would be imprisoned and the case could be carried to the Supreme Court. But the judge was a shrewd politician and did not order her arrest. The fine has not yet been paid.

In the twenty-five years following the Equal Rights Convention of 1848, women achieved many of their original demands. More and more states passed laws giving married women the right to custody of their children, to disposal of their wages and their property.

Curiously enough, the first and most successful advocates of these laws were men whose interests were threatened. In upstate New York wealthy Dutch fathers-in-law became indignant when their daughters' property was squandered by spendthrift husbands. The Married Women's Property Bill was passed largely through their influence. In one of the Southern states a similar bill was introduced by a man who wanted to marry a wealthy widow. Heavily in debt himself, he knew her property could be attached to pay his debts if they got married. When the bill passed she could keep her property and they could both live comfortably on her income.

The Territory of Wyoming was the first to give women the vote in 1869; Utah followed the next year; Colorado and Idaho a little later. Pioneers in the West, accustomed to women who could load a gun, ride a horse and run a homestead as competently as a man, were more easily persuaded than Eastern men that women are not frail or feeble-minded. Twenty years later when Wyoming applied for statehood, the fact that women voted there became a political issue. Wyoming declared: "We will remain out of the union 100 years rather than come in without woman suffrage."

Susan B. Anthony continued to campaign for another thirty years. Her final speech to a Woman's Rights Convention was made in 1904 when she was 86 years old. An incident reported in *Five for Freedom* gives some idea of her remarkable energy:

"During this year Susan delivered 171 lectures, besides hundreds of impromptu talks. She traveled ceaselessly. The journey home through the Rockies in January became rugged when her train ran into mountainous drifts. Tracks had been recently laid, breakdowns were frequent and waits interminable. Passengers had nothing to eat but the cold food they had the foresight to bring. Many nights were spent sitting bolt upright.

"Susan did get back finally, in time for the annual convention of her National Woman Suffrage Association in the capital.

" 'You must be tired,' they greeted her in Washington.

" 'Why, what should make me tired?' asked Susan. 'I haven't been doing anything for two weeks.'

"The restfulness of transcontinental rail trips in the 1870's was not apparent to others."

By 1900 the suffrage movement had become more powerful, but so had the opposition. The liquor interests, afraid that women would vote for prohibition, poured millions of dollars into campaigns to defeat woman suffrage. In state after state women lost out when the suffrage question came to a popular vote. The following circular published in Portland, Ore., is an example of how the liquor crowd worked:

"It will take 50,000 votes to defeat woman suffrage. There are 2,000 retailers in Oregon. That means that every retailer must himself bring in twenty-five votes on election day.

"Every retailer can get twenty-five votes. Besides his employees, he has his grocer, his butcher, his landlord, his laundryman and every person he does business with. If every man in the business will do this, we will win.

"We enclose twenty-five ballot tickets showing how to vote.

"We also enclose a postal card addressed to this Association. If you will personally take twenty-five friendly voters to the polls on election day and give each one a ticket showing how to vote, please mail the postal card back to us at once. You need not sign the card. Every card has a number and we will know who sent it in.

"Let us all pull together and let us all work. Let us each get twenty-five votes."

This was signed by the Brewers and Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association. In this case the liquor interests were successful and woman suffrage was defeated. In spite of such defeats, the suffrage cause won more and more mass support. Jesse Lynch Williams gives a description of a suffrage parade which he watched from the window of a Fifth Avenue club:

"It was Saturday afternoon and the members had crowded behind the windows to witness the show. They were laughing and exchanging the kind of jokes you would expect. When the head of the procession came opposite them, they burst into laughing and as the procession swept past, laughed long and loud. But the women continued to pour by. The laughter began to weaken, became spasmodic. The parade went on and on. Finally there was only the occasional sound of the clink of ice in the glasses. Hours passed. Then someone broke the silence. 'Well boys,' he said, 'I guess they mean it!'"

In Albany, a representative from New York City said that not five women in his district endorsed woman suffrage. He was handed a petition signed by 189 women in his own block.

Turn to Militant Tactics

The split following the Civil War lasted twenty years. In 1890 the two suffrage organizations united as the National American Woman Suffrage Association. But in 1913 the movement split again, this time over the question of militant tactics imported from Great Britain.

The British suffragists started later than the American but once they got going, they really went to town. The militant suffragist movement in England, organized by Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters in 1905, battled cops and hounded public officials. They chained themselves to posts or iron grillwork of public buildings and went on talking while the police sawed them loose. They climbed on rafters above Parliament and lay there for hours so that they could speak out at any opportune moment. Hundreds were arrested. In jail they continued to battle prison officials, went on hunger strikes, were subjected to forcible feeding.

A book written by one of Mrs. Pankhurst's daughters gives a colorful glimpse of the lively character of their protest. A poster, reproduced in the book, reads: *"Votes for Women* — Men and women, help the Suffragettes to rush the House of Commons, on Tuesday evening, the 13th of October." (In the subsequent trial there was a good deal of debate as to just what the word "rush" meant.)

The title of Chapter 20, "June and July 1909," is followed by a brief summary: "Attempt to insist on the constitutional right of petition as secured by the Bill of Rights, arrest of Mrs. Pankhurst and the Hon. Mrs. Haverfield, Miss Wallace Dunlop and the hunger strike, 14 hunger strikers in punishment cells. Mr. Gladstone charges Miss Garnett with having bitten a wardress."

Chapter 21, "July to September 1909," gives this summary: "Mr. Lloyd George at Lime House, 12 women sent to prison, another strike, hunger strikers at Exeter Gaol, Mrs. Leigh on the roof at Liverpool, Liverpool hunger strikers," etc. Some of the pictures have captions like "Lady Constance Lytton before she threw the stone at New Castle." "Jessie Kenny as she tried to gain admittance to Mr. Asquith's meeting disguised as telegraph boy."

Two American women, Alice Paul and Lucy Burns, took part in the English demonstrations, were imprisoned and went on hunger strikes. They returned to this country determined to introduce some new methods into the now rather conventional woman's movement.

In 1913 Miss Paul organized a suffrage parade in Washington, D. C. Some 8,000 women marched down Pennsylvania Avenue. As the procession approached the White House, it was blocked by hostile crowds. "Women were spit upon, slapped in the face, tripped up, pelted with burning cigar stubs, insulted by jeers and obscene language." Troops had to be brought from Fort Meyer. Afterwards the suffragists forced a Congressional inquiry and the chief of police lost his job.

Alice Paul concentrated on passing a federal amendment which the older suffragists had more or less shelved while they fought local battles from state to state. Miss Paul followed the political tactics of the English movement. This was to hold the party in power responsible for the delay in granting woman suffrage and to campaign against *all* candidates of that party regardless of whether or not they supported suffrage as individuals. By that time women had the vote in a number of states and Miss Paul systematically campaigned against all candidates of the Democratic Party, in power at the time.

Conservative elements in the suffrage movement did not accept this tactic and Miss Paul and others were expelled in 1913. They formed a new organization which took the name National Woman's Party in 1916. This organization also followed the British policy of putting a lot of pressure on top officials. (It got so that the British Prime Minister and cabinet officials were afraid to speak in public and only appeared at bazaars and social affairs.) To get favorable action from Wilson, who saw numerous delegations but kept stalling, a picket line was thrown around the White House in January, 1917. It continued day after day. On Inauguration Day, in a heavy rain, 1,000 pickets circled the White House four times.

In April, war was declared but the picketing continued. In June patriotic mobs began to tear down their banners and maul the pickets. On June 22 police started arresting the women, who refused to pay their fines. Hundreds were sent to prison, including Lucy Burns and Alice Paul. A history of the National Woman's Party gives some details as to how they were treated:

"Instantly the room was in havoc. The guards from the male prison fell upon

us. I saw Miss Lincoln, a slight young girl, thrown to the floor. Mrs. Nolan, a delicate old lady of seventy-three, was mastered by two men . . . Whittaker (the Superintendent) in the center of the room directed the whole attack, inciting the guards to every brutality. Two men brought in Dorothy Day, twisting her arms above her head. Suddenly they lifted her and brought her body down twice over the back of an iron bench . . . The bed broke Mrs. Nolan's fall, but Mrs. Cosu hit the wall. They had been there a few minutes when Mrs. Lewis, all doubled over like a sack of flour, was thrown in. Her head struck the iron bed and she fell to the floor senseless." As for Lucy Burns, "They handcuffed her wrists and fastened the handcuffs over her head to the cell door."

Alice Paul's hunger strike lasted twenty-two days. The authorities insisted on an examination of her mental condition. The doctor reported: "This is a spirit like Joan of Arc and it's useless to try to change it. She will die but she will never give up."

In the meantime, speakers of the National Woman's Party were arousing the whole country against the treatment of the prisoners. Suddenly, on March 3, they were released. They were promised action on the suffrage amendment; but the following June, when Congress continued to stall, they started picketing again. Soon they were back in jail and on their hunger strikes.

The Senate finally voted on the amendment. It lost by two votes. The women transferred their pickets to the Senate.

Alice Paul started a "watch fire" in an urn in front of the White House. Every time President Wilson made a speech abroad that referred to freedom even in a passing phrase, a copy of the speech was burned in the "watch fire." Invariably, police arrested the women who burned the speech. Evidently reports reaching Europe of the "watch fire" embarrassed the President, for he cabled two Senators asking them to support the suffrage amendment.

In February, 1919, the Senate voted again and the amendment lost by one vote. In June it was finally passed. It still had to be ratified by the states and this meant a state-to-state struggle lasting another year. The women of the United States voted in the presidential elections of 1920.

I seem to have given most of the credit for final passage of this law to the National Woman's Party. The older suffrage organization continued its work during these seven years. It had a membership of almost two million as compared with a top membership of fifty thousand in the National Woman's Party. But it was this militant minority that gave the final push to the suffrage drive.

The Struggle Ahead

Since I have limited myself to the struggle of American women for legal equality, I have not attempted to describe their economic development in this hundred-year period, their entry into industries, office work, trades and professions, or their role in the trade-union movement. That story would require another article, but its close relationship to the growth of the woman's movement is obvious. As women achieved economic independence, their demand for the vote was taken more seriously. Laws change slowly and are generally a reflection of changes that have already occurred on the economic and social level.

Almost thirty-five years have passed since women got the vote. We are in position now to appraise what women achieved when they won the suffrage and what they did *not* achieve.

Many people are disappointed over the results of woman suffrage — for example, all those who believed that politics would be "purified" by the participation of women. Reactionaries insist that suffrage and the entry of women into industry have actually achieved nothing, that modern women are miserably unhappy, frustrated and hysterical and go insane at a faster rate than ever before. (All this because women are allegedly emotionally passive and have been forced against their true nature into competition with men.) The solution, if we are to believe them, seems to be to hurry back to what's left of the home, which is something like going all out for the horse as a means of modern transportation. *Modern Woman — the Lost Sex* by a woman psychiatrist, Marya Farnham, is a good example of this reactionary trend.

Even people who approve of modern woman are disappointed at the results of the woman's rights struggle. Purdy in his biography of Mary Wollstonecroft says:

"All that has been done for women in the last century and a half has not saved them from the tragedies that afflicted Mary Wollstonecroft, Eliza Bishop and Fanny Blood. Inherited poverty, brutal or indifferent parents, disease following overwork and neglect, reluctant or faithless lovers, incompatible husbands, the struggle to wring a living from an apathetic world — has not been ended by female suffrage or any other abstract benefits women have recently achieved."

I can't help wondering just how many problems they thought woman suffrage could solve. The vote was a simple question of democratic rights and not a magic formula that could dissolve all the bitterness and frustrations of women's daily lives. Men have been voting a hundred years longer than women and they've still got problems. That doesn't mean they should give up voting. If Negroes suddenly achieved complete equality with whites, they would still face unemployment, the threat of war, reaction and all the other difficulties that confront every worker, regardless of race or sex. That doesn't mean they should give up the fight for full equality.

I don't doubt that women are unhappy. The legal equality and other democratic rights for which they fought so heroically are meaningless as long as their position in economic and family life remains basically unaltered.

The economic status of women is undergoing change. This is bringing about the first fundamental difference in women's lives. Women now constitute one-third of the labor force and 25% of all married women are working. This is a revolutionary development that in the long run will mean a great deal more than the vote.

But the majority of women still face discrimination in wages and jobs. The average income of women workers is less than half that of men. They are also doubly exploited, as wage

earners and as wives. A survey by General Electric revealed that the average work week of employed wives is 79 hours — 40 on the job and 39 at home.

This explains why women are not too enthusiastic about their so-called "emancipation." Women workers are obviously *not* emancipated, any more than male workers, Negro workers, or any other section of the working class.

The structure of the family is also undergoing change, partly as a result of women's changing economic position. Women are not as restricted in their sex and family relationships as they were when Mary Wollstonecroft first rebelled against marriage.

I believe it is significant that the first women who fought for equality and woman's rights directed a large part of their protest against bourgeois family relationships. Only at a later date did they center their attention on issues like the vote. It may be that in our re-examination of women's problems we will return to their starting point. In the light of modern psychological and anthropological knowledge, we should study the relations of husbands and wives, parents and children, in a society that is founded upon the institution of private property and where marriage laws and customs reflect this basic concept of private ownership.

Both the economic and sex status of women is changing, but these changes are only the first steps toward a revolution in human relationships which will take place in the future. The fight for freedom is indivisible and no basic change can be achieved in a society where men, as well as women, are not free.

When women are really emancipated from the economic exploitation and emotional restrictions of our society, men too will be freed from the frustrations and unhappiness which the same system inflicts upon them. But this can only be achieved in the cooperative atmosphere of a socialist commonwealth where our personal relationships will not be an expression of the property forms of a competitive society.

Early Years Of the American Communist Movement

by James P. Cannon

Origin of the Policy on the Labor Party

May 18, 1954

Dear Sir:

This replies to your inquiry of May 15 on the origins of the labor party policy.

I think this whole question of the party's activity in farmer-labor party politics in the first half of the Twenties ought to be separated into two parts. First, the original policy and how it came to be adopted by the party; second, the perversions of this policy in the experiments, more correctly the fantastic adventures in this field, under the tutelage of Pepper. Here I will confine myself entirely to the first part of the subject—the origins of the labor party policy—reserving the second part for a separate report.

There is not much documentation on this question and I find that my memory is not so sharp as to details as it is on the fight over legalization. That is probably because the real fight was over legalization. The labor party policy, the development of the trade-union work, and the whole process of Americanizing the movement, were subsumed under that over-all issue of legalizing the party. Insofar as they took a position on the related questions, the factions divided along the same lines.

With considerable effort I have to reconstruct my memory of the evolution of the labor party question in the American movement. I may err on some details or miss some. My general recollection however is quite clear and is not far wrong. The approach to the question zig-zagged along a number of high points in about this order:

(1) To start with, the left wing of American socialism had been traditionally rigid and doctrinaire on all questions—revolution *versus* reform, direct action *versus* parliamentary action, new unions *versus* the old craft unions, etc. The publication of Lenin's pamphlet on left communism marked the beginning of their comprehension that realistic tactics could flexibly combine activities in these fields without departing from basic revolutionary principle. We needed the Russians to teach us that.

(2) The first approach of the left wing to the question of the labor party was inflexibly sectarian and hostile. I recall an editorial by Fraina in the Revolutionary Age or in the Communist in 1919 or early 1920 against "laborism," i.e., the policy and practice of the British Labor Party and the advocates of a similar party in this country, who were fairly numer-

ous and vocal at that time. In that period Fraina, who was the most authoritative and influential spokesman of the left wing, was an ultra-leftist. He seemed to be allied with this tendency in the Comintern, which was centered around the Dutch communists and some German leftists. This tendency, as you know, was vigorously combatted and defeated by Lenin and Trotsky at the Third Congress of the Comintern (1921).

(Incidentally, you will find Trotsky's two volumes on "The First Five Years of the Communist International," published by Pioneer Publishers, informative reading on this period. It impinges on America at least to this extent: that Trotsky polemicized against Pepper (Pogany), who had been in Germany with a Comintern delegation, and at that time was himself an ultra-leftist.)

This article or editorial by Fraina expressed the general attitude of the party, which was ultra-leftist all along the line in those days. Perhaps I recall this particular article or editorial because I was a quite pronounced "right winger" in the early Communist Party, and I thought that people who were advocating a labor party were a hell of a long way out in front of the labor movement as I knew it in the Midwest. However, I must say that it never occurred to me at that time that we could be a part of the larger movement for a labor party and remain communists. Engels' perspicacious letters on this very theme were unknown to us in those days.

(3) The theoretical justification for such a complicated tactic—conditional support of a *reformist* labor party by *revolutionists*—came originally from Lenin. I think it is indisputable that Lenin's proposal to the British communists that they should "urge the electors to vote for the labor candidate against the bourgeois candidate," in his pamphlet on "Left-Wing Communism," and his later recommendation that the British Communist Party should seek affiliation to the British Labor Party, gave the first encouragement to the sponsors of a similar policy in this country, and marks the real origin of the policy.

I don't think this contradicts the statement you quote, from the Foster-Cannon document of November 26, 1924—which was probably written by me and which I had long since forgotten—that the Comintern's approval of a labor party policy in 1922 was obtained "mainly on the strength of the information supplied by our delegates, that there was in existence a

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strong mass movement towards a farmer-labor party."

Lenin's intervention in England provided the original *justification* for revolutionists to support a labor party based on the unions. Our contention in Moscow in 1922 was simply that a realistic basis existed for the adaptation of this policy to America. There was considerable sentiment in the country for a farmer-labor party at that time. The Chicago Federation of Labor was for it. The Farmer-Labor Party had had a presidential candidate in 1920, who polled about half a million votes.

It seemed to us—*after* we had assimilated Lenin's advice to the British—that this issue would make an excellent basis for a bloc with the more progressive wing of the trade-union movement, and open up new possibilities for the legitimization of the communists as a part of the American labor movement, the expansion of its contacts, etc. But I don't think we would have argued the point if we had not been previously encouraged by Lenin's explanation that revolutionists could critically support a reformist labor party, and even belong to it, without becoming reformists.

(4) I do not recall that the question of a labor party was concretely posed in the factional struggle between the liquidators and the undergrounders-in-principle. The real issue which divided the party into right and left wings, was the legalization of the movement. On all subsidiary questions—labor party, realistic trade-union program, predominance of native leadership, Americanization in general—the right wing naturally tended to be for and the left wing against.

As far as I can recall, all the liquidators readily accepted the labor party policy. After the leftists had been completely defeated on the central question of party legalization, any resistance they might have had to the labor party policy collapsed. I do not recall any specific factional struggle over the issue of the labor party by itself.

(5) Furthermore, it was the Comintern that picked up our information and our advocacy of a labor party policy at the time of the Fourth Congress, and formulated it most clearly and decisively. I am quite certain in my recollection that the Comintern letter to the Communist Party of the U.S., announcing its decision in favor of the legalization of the movement, referred also to the labor party policy. The letter stated that the formation of a labor party in the U.S., based on the trade unions, would be "an event of world historical importance."

If you will check this letter, which it seems to me was printed either in the Worker or the Communist early in 1923, I think you will find the definitive answer to the question of the origin of the labor party policy.

(6) Pepper certainly had no part in initiating the policy in Moscow "before and during the Fourth Congress." He was in America at that time. In answer to your question: "Or did he pick up that ball and run with it after he came to the U.S.?" — I would simply say, Yes, but fast; in fact he ran away with it.

(7) Valetski, the Comintern representative to the American party in 1922, was one of the leaders of the Polish Communist Party. I met him when he returned to Moscow after the Bridgeman Convention, and heard him speak in the American Commission several times. He did not fully support the liquidators and I had a

number of clashes with him. His position after he returned to Moscow would indicate quite clearly that he had not been sent to America with a predetermined decision of the Comintern to support legalization. Rather the contrary.

The change of position and the eventual decision was made in Moscow as a result of our fight there and not on the recommendation of Valetski. He began to shift his position in the course of the debates, but he didn't go all the way. He tried to get us to agree to a compromise to blunt the edge of the decision, but we refused. I recall Zinoviev saying privately to us, when we complained to him about Valetski's position: "He is changing, but he is not fully on our line yet."

Valetski was obviously a learned and quite able man. I think he had originally been a professor, but he apparently had a long record in the Polish movement. They had had all kinds of faction fights in the Polish party. His experience would have qualified him to be sent as representative of the Comintern to a young and comparatively inexperienced party torn to pieces by factional struggle.

Factionalism and faction fights are frequently derided by side-line critics as aberrations of one kind or another, a disease peculiar to the radical movement. But I never knew a political leader of any consequence who had not gone through the school of factional struggles. To be sure, I have also known factional fighters—quite a few of them—who were no good for anything else; who became so consumed by factionalism that they forgot what they started out to fight for. But that's part of the overhead, I guess.

Yours truly,
James P. Cannon

P.S.—I had never heard that Lenin raised the labor party question with Fraina in Moscow already in 1920. That is very interesting. I think it also supplies corroboration to my own conception, set forth above, that Lenin was the real originator of this policy. He must have turned over in his mausoleum, however, when he saw what was later done with his idea. —JPC.

Fraina — the Founder

June 15, 1954

Dear Sir:

Fraina: (Re. your letter of May 10.)

It is certainly correct to list Fraina as one of the most important personalities in the formative period of American communism. In my *History of American Trotskyism,* I stated my opinion that he should be recognized as the founder of the movement.

I believe that John Reed and the Liberator did most to popularize the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks in the broad public of the American left wing. Fraina's influence was somewhat narrower; his Revolutionary Age was essentially an internal party paper. In that field he did more than anyone to shape the ideology of the young movement of American Communism. At the same time he put the stamp of his own romanticism and sectarian rigidity upon it.

The official propaganda of later years, assigning the role of "founder" to Ruthenberg, always offended my sense of historical justice. Ruthenberg was a big man — in his way — and a strong man among the pioneers, but he was by no means the originator, the "founder."

* * *

I did not know Fraina personally. I first met him only casually at the National Left Wing Conference in New York in June, 1919. I met him a second time when he returned to this country as a member of the "Pan American Agency" of the Comintern with the mission to unify the two parties. This must have been late in 1920 or early in 1921. The other two members of this "Pan American Agency" were Charley Johnson ("Scott") and Katayama, the old Japanese socialist then living in New York, who later went to Moscow and remained there. I think this was a joint meeting of the negotiating committees of the two parties.

The only memory I have of the meeting is that Fraina spoke there impartially, on behalf of the Comintern, for unity and conciliation. As in all the joint meetings to negotiate "unity" in these days, the discussion must have been somewhat heated. I remember Charley Scott telling me afterward that Fraina had referred to my conduct at the joint meeting as "factional." This was probably not inaccurate, as I was decidedly hostile to the manifest ambition of the "Federationists" to "control" a united party. Scott's remark about Fraina's impression of me remained in my memory and enables me to peg the meeting.

Fraina left soon afterward on a mission for the Comintern in Latin America. Later we heard about his defection and the report that he had failed to account for some Comintern funds.

I recall a statement by Charley Scott in New York (it must have been late in 1921) to the effect that Fraina had misappropriated Comintern funds and that the matter was therefore out of the party's hands. Scott said: "For that he will have to account to the GPU," or words to that effect. Somehow or other I remember that definitely. After that Fraina seemed to drop entirely out of the consciousness of the party leadership.

* * *

I cannot recall anything coming up about Fraina in Moscow in 1922. I have no recollection of any kind of official consideration of his case during my long stay there.

But here I can report an incident which may be of interest in piecing the Fraina story together. During one of my trips to New York (it must have been in 1924 or possibly in 1925) I was handed a letter from Fraina. I cannot remember who handed me the letter, but I am pretty sure it was addressed to me personally. In this letter Fraina stated that he was working and saving all he could from his wages; that he wanted to make arrangements to pay his debt in installments and to work his way back into the party, and asked me to help him. My recollection of this letter is sharp and clear.

On my return to Chicago I took the letter before the Political Committee and it was discussed there. The decision was made that since his affair concerned Comintern funds, it was outside the jurisdiction of the American party; and that Fraina would have to address himself to the Comintern and straighten out his relations there before the party could do anything about it. I conveyed this decision to Fraina through the comrade who had acted as intermediary—again for the life of me I can't recollect who it was — and that's the last report I had of Fraina until, years later, he began to write again under the name of Corey.

* * *

I never met him personally in those later days. But strangely enough, we came close to meeting. He appeared to be breaking with the political line of the official Communist Party, while remaining a communist, and there were some indications that he was becoming sympathetic to the Trotskyist position. It was soon after the Hitler victory, when a new party of anti-Stalinist communists was in the air. In a discussion I had with V. F. Calverton, Sidney Hook and a few others associated with Calverton's magazine at that time, we discussed the question of a new party. They asked what our attitude would be toward such people as Fraina, with whom they evidently had some contact and association.

I told them that I really didn't know what to say, because the old financial scandal would put a cloud over Fraina until it was cleared up in one way or another. Nevertheless, I was very much interested in Fraina, and hoped a way could be found to collaborate with him. When I visited Trotsky in France in the fall of 1934, I took up the question of Fraina and asked his opinion.

Trotsky also was interested and sympathetic and thought that we should by no means reject an overture from Fraina. He finally suggested the following policy: That the new party would be too weak to take upon itself the responsibility of an outstanding personality who had a financial scandal hanging over him. Our defense of him would not be effective enough to do any good, while involvement in the scandal would hurt the party. Fraina should go back to the Communist Party and straighten out his financial entanglements and get an official clearance from them. After that the new party we were forming could accept him as a member without any reservation.

That seemed to me to be the soundest position to take and I agreed to proceed along that line. Upon my return we became deeply involved in the final stage of negotiations with the Muste group, building up to our joint Convention in December. I think I relayed Trotsky's advice to Fraina through the Calverton group, but I am not absolutely sure of it. At any rate, we never had any direct contact with Fraina; and soon after that he began to move away from the communist movement altogether.

* * *

Fraina was truly a tragic figure. The deportation proceedings brought against him in the last year of his life, after he had fully renounced his youthful communism, added a final stroke of savage irony to a life which was offered to two opposing causes and was rejected by both.

In spite of all, the best part of Fraina — the young part — belongs to us. When one considers how primitive the American left-wing movement had been in matters of theory, and its desolating poverty of literary-political forces, the pioneer work of Fraina in this field stands out by contrast as truly remarkable.

I think it no more than just to say that Fraina was the first *writer* of pioneer American communism. He did more than anybody else to explain and popularize the basic program of the Russian Bolsheviks. American communism, which stems directly from the primitive American left-wing movement, owes its first serious interest in theoretical questions primarily to Fraina.

It is quite useless, however, to demand more from people than they can give. Fraina was too weak to be a leader. He could not stand up against the brutal bulldozing of the Russian Federation leaders who had the power of organizations and finances and wielded their power as a club. Fraina's capitulation to the Hourwich group, after the National Left Wing Conference in 1919 had decided to continue the legal fight within the SP, certainly did a lot of damage.

The premature split of the SP, and the monstrous absurdity of the split of the communist movement into two parties at the moment of its formal constitution; and then the hasty, ill-considered, and in my opinion, unneccessary plunge into total illegality — were calamitous mistakes, if not crimes, of leadership in which Fraina was more the intimidated accomplice than the author.

Nobody knows how many thousands of American radical socialists — potential communists — were lost and scattered as a result of these insane procedures, imposed upon the movement by the Russian Federation madmen. I have always believed that two people made it possible for this wrecking crew to work such havoc. They could not have done it alone. They needed both Fraina and Ruthenberg, and got them both for different reasons.

In my own mind I have always blamed Ruthenberg more than Fraina. Fraina was weak, and there is not much that can be done about that. Ruthenberg was far stronger, but he was swayed by an overreaching personal ambition. I ascribe more blame to him precisely because of that. The history of American communism would quite possibly have taken a different course, with far greater advantages in the long run, if Fraina in 1919 had been propped up and supported by people who knew what the movement needed and were strong enough to enforce their policy.

Instead of that, Fraina was brutally clubbed down by the strong bosses of the Russian Federation and left without support by Ruthenberg, who then, as always, thought too much of himself, his own position and his own role. Ruthenberg would probably have been greatly surprised if someone had told him, in those critical days, that the most important service he could render to the cause of American com-

munism was to re-inforce the position of Fraina; to create conditions for him to do his work as a political writer with a certain amount of latitude.

The sprawling left-wing movement, just emerging from the theoretical wasteland of its pre-history, needed time to study, to learn and to assimilate the great new ideas which had exploded in the Russian revolution. The self-centered Ruthenberg could not possibly have understood that Fraina's work of exposition, at that time, was more important than his own, and that he should lend his strength to support it.

Yours truly,
James P. Cannon

Four Ways of Viewing the Communist Party

July 20, 1954

Dear Sir:

I enclose a manuscript* which attempts to explain the transformation of the Communist Party in the last half of the Twenties and gives my view of the basic causes. You will note that I have left out all reference to the various incidents and turns of events which you inquired about in your letters dealing with this time. I will answer these questions separately, as well as I can from memory. But the more I thought about this period, the more it became clear to me that the factual story can be meaningful only if it is placed within a framework of interpretation.

As I see it, there are at least four ways to approach a history of the Communist Party in this period, leaving out the official CP version, which isn't worth mentioning:

(1) It can be described as a dark conspiracy of spies and "infiltraters." (This theme has already been pretty well exploited.)

(2) It can be told as a story of the doings and misdoings of more or less interesting people who fought like hell about nothing and finally knocked themselves out.

(3) It can be written as an item of curiosa about an odd lot of screwballs who operated in a world of their own, outside the main stream of American life and exerted no influence upon it; something like the books about the various utopian colonies, which from time to time occupy the attention of various professors, Ph. D. thesis writers and others who are interested in things remote from the work-a-day world.

(4) Or, one can treat the evolution of the CP in its decade as a vital part of American history, which was destined to have a strong influence on the course of events in the next two decades.

This last is my point of view. The historian who wants to write a serious work, regardless of his own opinion of communism, will probably have to consider this approach to the subject. Otherwise, why bother with it?

The historical importance of the first ten years of American communism, particularly the latter half of this decade, really comes out when one gets into the New Deal era and attempts to explain the various factors which contributed to Roosevelt's astounding success in steering American capitalism through the crisis and the Second World War *without any opposition on his left.*

My own opinion is that Roosevelt was the best political leader crisis-racked American capitalism could possibly have found at the time; and that his best helper — I would go farther and say his *indispensable* helper — was the Communist Party. The CP did not consist, as the current popular version has it, of the Ware-Chambers groups of spies who infiltrated some Washington offices and filched out a few secret documents. That was a mere detail in a side-show tent.

The CP itself operated during the Roosevelt regime as a first-class force in support of Roosevelt in the broad arena of politics and the labor movement. It played a major role first in promoting the expansion of a new labor movement and then in helping Roosevelt to domesticate it, to blunt its radical-revolutionary edge, and to convert it into his most solid base of support in both domestic and foreign policy.

Furthermore, the Communist Party had to be prepared for this role by the gradual and subtle, but all the more effective and irreversible transformation it went through precisely in the five years preceding the outbreak of the crisis.

Things might very well have happened differently. Let us assume that the CP had developed in the last half of the Twenties as a party of the Leninist type; that it had retained the strongest leaders of that time and they had remained communists and, in the meantime, had learned to work together as a team; that the party had used its monopolistic leadership of the new mass upsurge of labor militancy to impose upon the new union movement a genuine class-struggle policy.

Assume that the CP had contested with Lewis-Hillman-Murray in the struggle for leadership of the new union movement instead of abdicating to them for reasons of foreign policy; that the new union movement under communist influence had launched a radical labor party instead of submerging in the Rooseveltian People's Front in the Democratic Party; that the CP and the big segment of the labor movement which it influenced had opposed the war instead of becoming its most ardent and most reliable supporters.

All that is just about what a genuine Communist Party would have done. What would American history in the Roosevelt era have looked like in that case? It certainly would have been different. And it is not in the least visionary to imagine that such a different course was possible. The key to the whole situation was the evolution of the CP in the last half of the Twenties.

That, in my opinion, removes the study of early communism from an exercise in speculation about a bizarre cult and places it right where it belongs — in the main stream of *American* history.

Yours truly,
James P. Cannon.

*See **Fourth International, Fall 1954.**

Automation -- Menace or Promise?

by Harold Robins

A REVOLUTION in the method of production is taking place in American industry through introduction of *automation*. The tendency itself is not new. Karl Marx was familiar with it, calling the factory "in its most perfect form" the "automatic factory."* What is new is the extent to which automatic systems have been introduced on production lines, especially in the United States since the end of World War II.

In the production of atomic materials it is generally known that the lines are completely automated. No human being can handle radioactive products in any quantity or even come near them without fatal injury. This industry, consequently, began in 1942 on the basis of automation. The atomic industry, however, only holds the mirror of the future to other industries. A survey of some of the principal ones will show how about 13,000,000 workers are already being more and more directly affected by the deep inroads automation has made.

Auto

A report of the United Automobile Workers, CIO,** has the following to say:

"Although the Ford Motor Co. has received a good deal of publicity about its automated plants, it is not alone in its modernizing efforts. GM, Chrysler, and the independent producers are installing similar machinery . . . it is clear that industry has embarked on a full scale program of automation. Each company is contesting with the next to see how fast it can automate its plant and thereby reduce its unit labor costs. The changes in effect, and those yet to come, require that the union give careful attention to manpower displacement problems."

The UAW's conclusion is generally correct. The key is in the following statement: ". . . one man will do at least the work now done by five men." This may sound like the panicky statement of an alarmist. If anything, however, it is a conservative estimate. It was supported by such illustrations as an automatic machining unit at Nash Motors that reduced man hours by 80% and by the statement of a Ford spokesman that direct labor has been reduced by 25-30%.

Actually in given units, the change — a change pointing to the future for the whole industry — is much greater. *Mill and Factory* for December 1953 reported that Buick had introduced two automatic engine-head production lines and two engine cylinder-block lines on which every bit of machining was completely automatic, *eliminating every single production worker.*

A Ford spokesman, commenting on the installations at Cleveland and River Rouge, said that the entire cost of the Cleveland modernization would be returned in the first year in labor "savings."

A Buick representative boasted that one machine costing about $350,000 had replaced 17 machines on the production line. The labor "savings" from the production workers displaced along with the 17 machines would no doubt easily repay the cost of the new equipment within a year.

Iron Age reported August 12, 1954, that Buick had a fully automated *foundry* for producing cylinder blocks, cylinder heads, valve guides, etc. The November 1, 1954, *Automotive Industry* described Packard's new engine plant at Utica, Mich., as having fully automatic engine-head and engine-block lines. A single operator is required at the control panel. *No production workers are needed at all.* The installation is said to have cost more than $20,000,000. Its capacity is rated at 50 engine heads and blocks an hour.

De Soto, Pontiac and other companies have installed similar production lines. In making Chevrolet V-8 engines, one worker stands by each of some 18 machines for tool changes. Other machining operations too, from GM roller-bearing production to radiator caps and bumpers, have completely eliminated production workers.

General Motors reports that it spent $750,000,000 for modernization last year and plans to spend at least another $500,000,000 in its U.S. plants this year. In Britain GM plans to spend $100,000,000 in the next five years for automation. In Germany GM has already spent $100,000,000 and is slated to spend another $71,000,000 for modernization. Realization of GM's plans will make possible a 15% increase in over-all production *within a year and a half* (spring of 1954 to fall of 1955). Figures on how many workers will be displaced at the same time are not given.

Chrysler borrowed $250,000,000 from Prudential Life Insurance Co. to finance a change-over. Ford is reported to have spent $600,000,000 for its huge re-equipment costs. And in England Ford has a five-year plan calling for the expenditure of $181,000,000.

The same logic that operated in Marx's time indicates that the competition in production line changes in auto must spread to other branches

*See his illuminating analysis of the evolution of automatic machinery and factory and its effect on the working class in "Machinery and Modern Industry," Capital, pp. 405-556. Kerr edition.

**"Report on Automation," delivered at the Economic and Collective Bargaining Conference, Nov. 12-14, 1954.

of industry, must challenge every large producer to do likewise or die.

Will the auto workers perhaps find jobs through the expansion of total production, or in maintenance of equipment as the new technology spreads throughout the industry? It is true that some of the companies are calling up displaced workers for other, non-automated jobs. Yet at the same time they are crowding a year's production into roughly half a year. That fact alone spells out how permanent the new jobs will be.

As for the creation of new jobs, the new machinery generally requires less servicing than older equipment. But we need not depend on impressions as to how many workers can find such jobs. A typical plant will show what is involved. Ford's Cleveland plant has a "guestimated" capacity of half a million engines a year. According to *Mill and Factory* (October 1953) a labor force of 500 men is required. About 100 of them are cleaners and sweepers. About 50 are carpenters and millwrights. The balance is made up of lubrication and hydraulic specialists, machinists and toolmakers, pipefitters, electricians and electronic technicians. The only labor shortage Ford ran into was electronic technicians. Ford hired electricians and schooled and trained them on the job and after work.

Iron and Steel

The continuous rolling mill has been an automated set-up for more than 20 years. That process shapes cast ingots into rolled sheets, strips and bars. Despite this highly developed technique, the industry employed almost 800,000 production workers in blast furnaces, steel works, iron and steel foundries as well as rolling mills.

Iron Age, in its March 4, 1953, issue tells about a new mill built by the Great Lakes Steel Corp. near Detroit. An automatic process was introduced in the slabbing mill, scarfing unit and soaking pit. All production workers were replaced by automatic mechanisms. A chief operator and assistant sit in an air-conditioned pulpit controlling the entire works.

In 1954 U.S. Steel opened a new mill at Morristown, Pa., reportedly the most modern in the industry. As yet no details have appeared as to its production methods or the number of workers that will be displaced in other, less modern mills. The previous example, however, gives us an indication of the enormous productivity of a handful of workers using automated equipment.

The September 24, 1953, *Iron Age* informs us that Atlas Steel of Canada opened a new continuous casting mill that ". . . threatens change in steelmaking methods . . . eliminates the need for all ingot casting and stripping equipment except the ladle crane. . . . Conventional steelmaking generates about 25-30% scrap." The new mill reduced scrap to 3-10%, according to the same source November 4, 1954.

"Over-all cash savings . . . are figured at 3 cents per pound for stainless, 8 cents per pound for valve steel, 20 cents per pound for high speed steel." "There is less equipment to maintain . . ." The report indicates that continuous casting eliminated the "need for all ingot casting and stripping equipment, soaking pits and blooming mills which are the largest and most expensive units in conventional steel mills."

A new automated molding plant is reported in operation at Cleveland. Owned by the Eberhardt Mfg. Co., the new unit is said to take only one-fourth the floor space required by other processes for the same production. According to the November 4, 1954, *Iron Age,* it performs 12 operations, among them, molding, closing, clamping, cooling, stripping and shakeout. It is a package unit laid out in multiples of flask length. Controls are electrical and pneumatic and operate in conjunction with cycle time. The number of production workers eliminated by any of these changes is not given.

The manufacture of steel pipe and tubing has become automatic. *Iron Age,* July 16, 1953, reports that Pittsburgh Steel opened a new plant to make casings for oil pipe lines automatically. This put the company in position to compete with Colorado Fuel and Iron, Republic Steel and the Lone Star Steel Co.

In this way the steel industry is attempting to better its position in the world steel market. They are well aware that in the fight for a narrowing market whoever doesn't automate will be automated out of business.

Machine Tools

On January 3 of this year, the New York *Herald Tribune* reported that the machine tool industry faces the pleasant prospect of big sales because "New machine tools offer greater opportunities than ever for speedier production and more fully automatic operations."

Iron Age, however, reported in November of last year that at the Leipzig Fair in East Germany the machine tool industry there made significant dents in the markets of "Central American countries, the Near East, Indonesia, and Japan." The East German factories, it seems, buy the latest automatic machines from Western Europe. With these set up on automated lines they manufacture "old look" (about 1948 model) lathes and other machine tools of fine construction, low price and easy credit terms that cannot be matched anywhere. (The same report states that the balance of trade between East Germany and West Germany has now been brought into balance — by the export from East Germany of cheap hardware — probably produced on automatic production lines.)

Tremendous orders were placed with the U.S. machine tool industry in 1953-54 ($1,100,000,000 in 1953 and $900,000,000 in 1954), but the end of 1954 saw a slackening off. However, an upswing now seems to have occurred in the section turning out automatic machinery, which is good news for them but bad news for those turning out standard equipment. They must now compete with a flood of second-hand equipment displaced by automated set-ups.

Oil and Pipelines

The UAW-CIO "Report on Automation" states that in the petroleum industry, according to an unnamed spokesman of the industry, "The average refinery which would employ 800 people without instrumentation would

employ 12 people were instrumentation utilized to the fullest extent possible."

R. T. Neuschel, writing in the January 1953 *Mill and Factory,* says:

"More and more industries are becoming increasingly mechanized. Process industries (chemicals and oils) were among the first to show this trend. As an example today, almost half the employees in some petroleum refineries are engaged in keeping the vast network of mechanical equipment in good working order."

Neuschel says tersely of the scope of automatic machine processes in other fields:

"Fabricating industries are following the same trend. Mechanization of manufacturing processes is on the upswing in metals, plastic moulding, textiles, to name a few. Even in the distribution field there is a growing trend toward mechanization."

According to *Instruments and Automation,* "Pipeline instrumentation is expanding — including automatic pumping stations operated by microwave and telephone line telemetering. Radioactive isotopes are being used for locating batches in stream . . ."

The relatively new pipeline industry is rated as sixth largest in terms of capital investment. It maintains 167 storage fields (generally exhausted petroleum fields) for storage of natural gas. At distribution pionts workers control the flow of products to trucks, railroad cars and tanks by pushbutton methods. Fleets of light airplanes inspect the vast lines that reach every section of the country except the Columbia River Valley. (Gas is due there next year from Canada and the San Juan Basin in Arizona.)

In the closely related petrochemical industry, 80% of which is located in the South, the investment per worker now runs from $20,000 to $30,000 according to the Southern Association of Science and Industry. Most of the big oil companies have entered into competition with independent chemical plants. The large rubber, steel, paper and other corporations are also in the field. Petrochemicals make up about 25% of the chemical industries' $20,000,000,000 in sales.

The January 3 New York *Times* reported that the average investment per worker in the chemical industry "now exceeds $25,000 and may run four times that much in certain new, highly mechanized plants." How high productivity is in the chemical industry can be gauged from the fact that behind the $20,000,000,000 in products stands only 527,000 production workers, according to the *Times.* ("The industry provides direct employment to about 780,000 persons," says the same source.)

Electronics

The effect of automation in the electronics industry is particularly dramatic since up until very recently manufacturing was done by hand methods of assembly construction. Expansion under such relatively primitive methods could occur only by employing more workers and using more space.

The federal government financed the research that finally made possible electronic-stage manufacture where the product is assembled like a Tinkertoy set, the kind used by youngsters to build derricks, bridges, houses, etc. After three years of research, *Mill and Factory* reports, November 1953, that a process of printing electronic circuits on a ceramic wafer was developed. Other components, too, are printed and automatically assembled by machine soldering instead of the older hand methods. Resistors, capacitors and coils are printed by the new process. Inspection of every circuit is automatic. The result is better units that stand more strain and cost considerably less. The press turns out about 2,800 wafers an hour. (It too is automatic of course.) With this new process, "circuits may be developed to amplify signals, generate and shape wave forms, scale count, and perform customary electronic functions."

The UAW "Report on Automation" states that ". . . a radio assembly line geared to produce 1,000 radios a day requires only two workers. Hand assembly lines it replaced required 200 workers."

At the CIO Convention last December Reuther mentioned a machine that turns out 90,000 electric light bulbs a day.

T. J. Watson, Jr., president of International Business Machines Corp., was quoted by the New York *Herald Tribune,* January 16, as declaring: "Machines are being made that have thousands of times the speed of machines only ten years ago, and there appears to be almost no limit to the possibilities of electronics as applied to the American business office."

Coal

A brief review of changes in the coal industry, printed in *Reader's Digest* last December, indicates that the coal miners of the 1950's, displaced by mechanization like those of the 1920's, will continue to migrate in search of jobs. But unlike the 300,000 miners of the previous generation, the present generation will not find many jobs. Today all the basic mass production industries, as well as agriculture, are increasing productivity and at the same time cutting the size of the labor force.

To strip the ground away from coal seams in Pennsylvania, the Hanna Coal Co. has built a 1,700 ton derrick and ordered another one of 2,800 tons. This machine will have a capacity bite of some 10 tons.

Remote-control mining equipment in West Virginia produces six times the national average production per man. (This average includes high-production strip mines.) The result is coal delivered at $5 a ton in Charleston, W. Va.

A coal pipeline is under construction from western Pennsylvania to Cleveland. It will deliver coal at a cost saving of $1.25 a ton. *Iron Age* (April 29, 1954) reports other lines are now being planned.

Railroads

The January 3 New York *Herald Tribune* reports that "pushbutton freight yards, centralized traffic control, and even electronic brains in the accounting office" are new features being introduced in the railroad industry. Electronic "brains" rent for $13,000 to $40,000 a month (IBM rates) and are tremendous payroll savers. As a matter of fact, these more

than human "intelligence" machines are operated by ordinary humans who, it seems, unlike the machines, expect wages.

This sampling of various industries should be sufficient to indicate the impact of automation. The use of automatic machinery may not be as all-inclusive in many industries as in atomic production but it is affecting virtually all to one degree or another and the logic of its development is clear enough. A few additional facts will indicate how widespread it is becoming:

Western Union has introduced a nationwide automatic switching system. Saw mills and paper mills are going in for automation. Bottles coming from automatic bottling machines are automatically placed in cartons. The Roman Cleanser Co. formerly employed nine men to stack filled cartons coming off a conveyor line. This is now done by a machine — and with less breakage.

The painter in factories is being replaced by machines. Studebaker reports introduction of automatic spraying of the prime coat. This eliminates all sprayers and water sanders who formerly rubbed down the prime coat. According to the January 15 *Automotive Industries*, all painting on new Chryslers is completely automatic.

Ward's Automotive Report, cited by the UAW-CIO "Report on Automation," reveals that a "passenger car plant which formerly employed 36 men to feed fenders into a conveyor for spray painting, now has modernized equipment which automatically feeds six sets of fenders to a fast merry-go-round where various colored finishes are applied simultaneously."

Richer Living?

Capitalist propagandists hail the promise of automation but give little consideration to the tragic consequences for working people thrown out of jobs. An example is the article by Wm. F. Freeman in the January 3 New York *Times*. The headline declares, "Automation Aims at New Freedom" and the subhead adds, "Devices that Run Factories Promise to Release Men for Richer Living."

That would be good news if it were true. However, although the *Times* boasts that it gives "All the News That's Fit to Print," it did not see fit to print any proof of this optimistic forecast for automation. It did not even admit that it is the drive for profits that impels the use of more and more automatic machinery. Instead it is introduced "to the end of freeing workers from drudgery, monotony and fatigue of repetitive work, of reducing worker hazards, of opening the avenue to more important and better paying jobs and of improving the quality and uniformity of product."

An industry spokesman quoted by Fortune magazine (cited in the UAW-CIO "Report on Automation") was more honest when he confessed: "I don't think we are consciously trying to ease the burden of our workers, nor consciously trying to improve their standard of living. These changes take care of themselves."

A Union Problem

The union bureaucracy has shown some signs of alarm at the development of automation. The UAW-CIO "Report on Automation," with its displacement figure of four out of five workers is a case in point. But the program proposed up to now to meet the problems arising from the revolution in technique now sweeping industry at truly American speed leaves much to be desired.

The report speaks of re-training displaced men at company expense for other jobs in auto. The re-training proposal is excellent — if it is actually fought for; but just what "other" jobs will be available remains a mystery. They could be created by establishing a much shorter work week and thus spreading the available employment. But that is not Reuther's program.*

*The attitude of the auto barons on this question may shed some light on Reuther's position. For instance, Harlow H. Curtice, President of General Motors, "explained that he is a definite opponent of the 35-hour week." (See "In Europe, too, He Found the Future BRIGHT." Issued by General Motors Department of Public Relations.)

The report also demands that the government help re-train the displaced men for other jobs. Another excellent proposal — if fought for. How much of a fight is required can be gathered from the fact that the government is unwilling to provide adequate schooling even for children. According to the National Citizens Commission for Public Schools, America is falling behind its growing population by some 67,000 classrooms a year. (New York *Herald Tribune*, December 27, 1954.)

The "Report on Automation" takes as its major demand the so-called "Guaranteed Annual Wage." If the full demand were won, and if it were applied retroactively so as to cover displaced workers, it would provide the cushion of one year's severance pay. Reuther's record, however, leads one to doubt that any promise of militant struggle under his guidance is worth a great deal.

A test of his willingness and capacity to fight is provided by the threat automation presents to the entire bracket of older workers with high seniority who are approaching the retirement age of sixty-five when company-financed pensions will be due. If these workers can be dumped before then by introducing automatic processes, the companies stand to make a sizable saving, a consideration of which they are quite conscious. The "Report on Automation" admits that in the new automated plants preference in hiring is given to younger workers. The youth, too, must have jobs; but if Reuther were seriously concerned about placing the older workers shouldn't he be concerned about their senior right to work where automation is going into effect today?

Another point in Reuther's "solution" is the "Annual Improvement Factor." "The immense productivity gains of automation should be assessed and then shared equally by all workers in coming negotiations," says the "Report on Automation."

Good. The workers should share in the benefits of automation. But two considerations are sufficient to judge the worth of Reuther's "solution." (1) The strength of a union is based

on the members it has in the plants. This is steadily being cut down by automation. (2) Under the Reuther program, the four out of five displaced from their jobs have a dim chance to share "equally" in anything but a search for jobs.

To these displaced workers Reuther really has nothing to offer, unless an invitation to support the Democratic Party can be considered an "offer." And what does the Democratic Party promise beyond meager unemployment insurance and relief handouts? What happens to the standard of living of the displaced workers as automation cuts deeper and deeper? And with the fierce competition for jobs sure to follow, even those on the automatic production lines will find their standard of living dangerously threatened.

It should be evident that the problem of automation, as it affects the working class, demands a far-reaching solution, one that can be carried out in the final analysis only on the political level, for it involves much more than the worker-capitalist relation in this or that corporation or even industry. It concerns the working class as a whole in its relation to the entire productive system and the capitalist class in America. To effectively struggle for their interests on such a scale, the workers must turn to independent political action. That means formation of a fighting Labor Party, one of whose first tasks must be to draw up a program that approaches automation as a national problem requiring the whole power of government to be brought to bear in protecting the worker as he becomes displaced by the machine he created.

Beyond that, of course, looms the still bigger problem — how to convert automation into a positive benefit for the working class so that the leisure and freedom from drudgery it promises is converted into a reality and not allowed to fade like a mirage. That can be accomplished only under socialism, under a scientifically planned economy. Automation gives fresh urgency to consideration of the socialist solution in America.

From the Arsenal of Marxism

Belinsky And Rational Reality

by G. V. Plekhanov

Lucifer: Was not thy quest for knowledge?
Cain: Yes, as being the road to happiness.
— Byron, "Cain, a Mystery."

Chapter I

"THE ROOT question of Hegel's influence upon Belinski's world outlook has been posed by most Russian critics, but it has been analyzed by none with the necessary thoroughness through a comparison of Belinski's well-known views with their original sources," says Mr. Volynski. "No one has analyzed attentively enough Belinski's esthetic ideas in their original content, nor subjected them to impartial judgment on the basis of a definite theoretical criterion." (A. Volynski, *Russian Critics*, p. 38.)

All of this is by no means surprising because prior to Mr. Volynski's appearance among us, there existed no "real" philosophy, nor was there any "real criticism." If some of us did happen to know something, we knew it merely in a confused, disorderly way. By way of compensation, as of now, thanks to Mr. Volynski, we shall all rapidly set ourselves in order and enrich our meager stock of learning. As a guide Mr. Volynski is quite reliable. Observe, for instance, how neatly he solves "the root question of Hegel's influence upon Belinski's world outlook."

"Maturing and developing in part under the influence of Stankevich's circle, in part independently by digesting his impressions of Nadezhdin's articles, Belinski's thought swiftly attained its peak, and its highest pitch of enthusiasm. For Belinski, the Schelling period had already concluded by 1837; and Hegel's philosophy, as it reached him through talks with friends, through magazine articles and translations, occupied a central place in his literary and intellectual pursuits. And so it is precisely here, and most strikingly, that there emerges Belinski's inability to draw independent logical conclusions concerning political and civil questions in which philosophic theorems are involved; systematic thought was beyond Belinski's powers. He was astounded by Hegel's doctrine, but he lacked the strength to think this doctrine through, in all its several parts and several conclusions.

"Hegel charmed his imagination, but provided no impetus to Belinski's mental creativeness. For the complete analysis of the basic propositions of idealism, one had to arm oneself with patience. It was necessary to call a halt for a while to flights of fancy and of emotion, so as to give them new wings later on. But Belinski was incapable of calmly poking and prying into the truth — and his whole Hegelianism, together with his infatuation with Schelling, as expounded by Nadezhdin, was bound in the end to degenerate into thought that was inharmonious, shot through with logical mistakes, admixed with queer dreams of a conciliationist-conservative bent." (Same source, p. 90.)

Mr. Volynski was thus greatly shocked by Belinski's temporary conciliation with reality; and he is able to explain it in one way only, namely, Belinski grasped Hegel poorly. To tell the truth, this explanation is not exactly new. It may be found in the

memoirs (*"My Past and Thoughts"*) of A. I. Herzen, as well as in the recollections of I. S. Turgenev and even in a letter by N. V. Stankevich to Neverov, written almost immediately after the publication of Belinski's famous articles on the Battle of Borodino and on *Menzel, Critic of Goethe.* What is Mr. Volynski's own is composed of snide comments concerning the ignorance of Belinski coupled with subtle hints anent the unquestionable and incomparable superiority of *his own* (Mr. Volynski's) *Prometheus of Our Times.*

At first glance the above explanation reproduced by Mr. Volynski — and it circulates in several versions — appears quite plausible. Hegel proclaimed: *Was wirklich ist, das ist vernuenftig* (what is real is rational); and on this basis Belinski rushed to proclaim as rational, and by this token, sacred and untouchable, the whole rather unpretty Russian reality of his times; and he started passionately to attack everybody who was not satisfied with it. The articles in which Belinski expressed these conciliationist views were "nasty" articles, as the liberal Granovski said moderately and accurately at the time. But Hegel bears no responsibility for them; he put a special meaning into his doctrine of rational reality and this special meaning escaped Belinski who neither knew the German language nor had the capacity for "pure thought."

Later on, and especially under the influence of his moving to Petersburg, he saw how cruelly wrong he had been; he perceived the true attributes of our reality and cursed his fatal straying into error. What can be more simple than all of this? Sad to say, however, this explanation simply explains nothing.

Without entering into an examination of all the different variants of the foregoing explanation, let us take note here that our present-day "advanced" *patriae patres* (honor-laden sociologists included) look upon Belinski's articles on Borodino and on Menzel through the same eyes as the biblical patriarch must have regarded the "youthful errors" of his prodigal son. Magnanimously forgiving the critic-genius his "metaphysical" strayings, these "advanced" persons are loath to refer to them, in accordance with the folk-saying, "Whosoever recalls the past, stands to lose an eye." But this does not deter them from hinting, relevantly or irrelevantly, that they, the "advanced" persons, who while still virtually in diapers grasped all the philosophic and sociological truths; they hint, I say, that they understand perfectly the whole profundity of those strayings into error and the whole horror of that "fall" into which Belinski was led by his misplaced and imprudent — but happily, only temporary — passion for "metaphysics."

Betimes young writers are also reminded of this "fall," particularly those who tend to be disrespectful toward the Crowned Ones of literature, those who dare doubt the correctness of our "advanced" catechism, and who turn to sources abroad in order better to clarify for themselves the problems which are agitating modern civilized humanity. These young writers are told: "Watch out! Here's an example for you . . ."

And in some instances, young writers do take fright at this example, and from being disrespectful turn into being respectful; and they mockingly pay their respects to "foreign philosopher caps" and prudently "make progress" in accordance with our home-developed "recipes of progress." In this way, Belinski's example serves to shore up the authority of our "honor-laden sociologists."

According to one such sociologist, namely Mr. Mikhailovski, Belinski was nothing all his life but a martyr to the truth. As an art critic he was remarkably gifted. "Many years shall pass, many critics shall be replaced, and even methods of criticism, but certain esthetic verdicts of Belinski shall remain in full force. But in return only in the field of esthetics was Belinski able to find for himself a virtually uninterrupted sequence of delights. No sooner did an esthetic phenomenon become complicated by philosophic and politico-moral principles than his flair for truth betrayed him to a greater or lesser extent, while his thirst (for truth) remained unslaked as before, and it is just this which made of him a martyr to the truth, the martyr that emerges in his correspondence." (See the article "Proudhon and Belinski," with which Mr. Pavlenkov saw fit to adorn his edition of Belinski's works.)

Since the flair for truth generally betrayed Belinski each time an esthetic phenomenon became complicated by philosophic and politico-moral principles, it goes without saying that the period of Belinski's infatuation with Hegel's philosophy falls under this same general law. This entire period in Belinski's life obviously rouses nothing in Mr. Mikhailovski's breast except a feeling of compassionate sympathy toward the "martyr to the truth," coupled, perhaps, with a feeling of indignation toward "metaphysics." Compassionate sympathy walks here arm in arm with great respect. But this respect pertains *exclusively* to Belinski's truthfulness with regard to the philosophic and "politico-moral" ideas expressed by him at the time; Mr. Mikhailovski sees nothing in them except "rubbish."

Substantially this view on Belinski's period of temporary conciliation is identical with the view of Mr. Volynski cited previously. The difference is this, that in Mr. Mikhailovski's opinion the conciliation "came from under the spell of Hegel," whereas in Mr. Volynski's opinion, borrowed by him from Stankevich, Herzen, Granovski, Turgenev and others, Hegel had nothing whatever to do with it. But both Mr. Volynski and Mr. Mikhailovski are firmly convinced that Belinski's conciliationist views are erroneous from top to bottom.

However authoritative are the opinions of these two stout fellows — of whom the one is as potent in sociology as the other is in philosophy — I take the liberty of not agreeing with them. I think that precisely during this conciliationist period of his development, Belinski expressed many ideas which are not only fully worthy of a thinking being (as Byron once somewhere said), but which merit to this day the utmost attention of all who seek a correct standpoint in order to evaluate the reality around us. To prove this theoretical approach, I must begin from somewhat afar.

Chapter II

In 1764, in a letter to Marquis de Chauvelin, Voltaire predicted the impending downfall of the old social order in France. "It will be a beautiful tapage [a French word meaning both a show and an uproar]," he added. "The youth are lucky; good things are in store for them." Voltaire's prediction was fulfilled in the sense that the "tapage" really turned out a thing of beauty. But it may be said with assurance that it did not turn out to the liking of those who lived to see it and who belonged to the same tendency as did the sage of Ferney. This sage never spared the "mob"; yet, toward the end of the Eighteenth Century, it was primarily the "mob" that staged the "tapage" and carried it through.

True enough, for a while the conduct of the mob corresponded fully to the views of "respectable people," i.e., the enlightened, liberal bourgeoisie. But little by little the mob flew into such a temper, became so disrespectful, impertinent and full of vigor that "respectable people" fell into despair. And perceiving themselves conquered by the wretched, unenlightened mob, they sincerely started to doubt the powers of *reason* in whose name Voltaire and the Encyclopedists had worked; that same *reason* which, it seemed, ought to have placed at the head of events none but its own torch-bearers and representatives, i.e., the self-same enlightened bourgeoisie.

Beginning with 1793 faith in the powers of reason declined noticeably among all those who felt themselves driven from their positions and overwhelmed by the unexpected and fearsome triumph of the "mob." The ensuing events brought a train of interminable wars and overturns, wherein naked military force triumphed more than once over what all enlightened people had held the most indisputable of rights. This could only feed the disillusionment that had set in. It was as if the events were mocking the demands of reason.

And so we observe, toward the close of the Eighteenth Century, that faith in reason falls away completely; and although in the days of the Consulate and the Directory, the so-called ideologists continue, out of habit, to extol reason and truth (*la raison* and *la verite)*, they no longer do so with the same verve as before; the former enthusiasm is gone, and so is their influence. The public refuses to listen to them. The public, like Pontius Pilate, smiling skeptically, now wants to know, "And what is truth?"

Madame de Stael, who knew intimately the French intelligentsia of that era, states that the majority (*la plupart des hommes*), taking fright at the terrible march of events, lost all inclination toward self-perfection and "overwhelmed by the might of the accidental, ceased to believe altogether in the power of human capabilities." (De la Litterature considere dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales, 1800, Intro. p. xviii.)

(On page iv of the same introduction she expresses herself even more categorically: "The contemporaries of a revolution," she says, "frequently lose all interest in the search for truth. So many events are decided by force, so many crimes are absolved by success, so many virtues stigmatized with obloquy, so many unfortunates abused by those in power, so many generous sentiments subjected to mockery, so

Editor's Note

The Russian intellectuals, the only revolutionary intelligentsia in modern Western history, have left us a great heritage of theory. Their literary and artistic productions are relatively well known abroad (Pushkin, Gogol, Mussorgsky, etc.), but the Russian pioneers in the field of thought are virtually unknown, especially in our country. This is true in particular of V. G. Belinski (1811-1848) and N. G. Chernishevski (1828-1889).

These two great Russian scholars, critics and thinkers were, like Francois Fourier in France (1772-1837), true disciples of Hegel (1770-1831): They headed the galaxy of intellectuals who payed the way for Marxist thought in Russia.

G. V. Plekhanov, founder of Russian Marxism, a profound student of philosophy and best trained Marxist of his day, dealt systematically with Chernishevski, writing a book as well as essays about his life and work. Plekhanov held Belinski in equally great esteem, considering him "the most remarkable philosophic organism ever to appear in Russian literature."

Belinski's chief merit in Plekhanov's opinion was that he was the first "by the genius flight of thought to pose before us those problems of theory whose correct solution led directly to scientific socialism." Plekhanov intended to present Belinski to the Marxist movement in a systematic way, but never got around to writing his projected book, leaving only articles which nevertheless constitute a sizable volume.

The finest of these essays, "Belinski and Rational Reality," he wrote in 1897 at the pinnacle of his brilliant Marxist career, years before he deserted the cause to which he owes his fame. Even for Plekhanov's leisurely epoch and his leisurely way of writing, this was a lengthy article. It had to be published in two installments in the revolutionary periodical **Novoye Slovo** (New Word. 1897, Nos. 7 & 8). Plekhanov begins his treatment of Belinski with the fourth chapter of the eight he wrote.

He thought this lengthy beginning necessary, because he decided first to expound the real meaning of Hegel, more accurately, the meaning of Hegel's general statement of the dialectic: **All that is real is rational; all that is rational is real.** It was little understood in Russia at the time. The study of Belinski that follows further develops the basic ideas of Hegel's school of thought.

This essay on Belinski and Hegel thus supplements Plekhanov's earlier article in 1891, "The Meaning of Hegel," written on the sixtieth anniversary of Hegel's death and published in our magazine, April and May 1949.

V. I. Lenin said "it is impossible to become a real communist without studying, really studying, everything that Plekhanov has written on philosophy, as this is the best of the whole world literature of Marxism."

In 1922 Leon Trotsky wrote: "The great Plekhanov, the true one, belongs wholly and exclusively to us. It is our duty to restore to the young generations his spiritual figure in all its stature."

The translation below was made from the original Russian text by John G. Wright. Chapters I and II appear in this issue. The rest of the essay will be published in further installments.

many swinish acts of selfishness philosophically glossed over, that all of this drains away the hopes and confidence of people who remained most loyal to the cult of reason.")

This disillusion with the powers of reason, far from confining itself within France's borders, found its expression elsewhere as well. In Byron, for instance. Byron's *Manfred* thus declares philosophy:

To be of all our vanities the motliest,
The merest word that ever fool'd the ear
From out the schoolman's jargon. . .

Byron regards contemporary socio-political events as the senseless and cruel whims of "Nemesis," a goddess inimical to humans. "Nemesis" is just another name for accident. But at the same time Byron's pride is roused against the sway of this blind force. The pathos of Manfred, as Belinski would have phrased it, consists precisely of the mutiny of a proud human spirit against blind "fate," of his urge to bring under his control the blind forces of nature and history. Manfred solves this task in part by means of magic. Obviously such a solution is attainable only in the realm of poetic fancy.

The Third Estate's reason, or more accurately the bourgeoisie's level of understanding — a bourgeoisie that was striving to free itself from the yoke of the old order — failed to pass the harsh historical test that fell to its lot. It proved bankrupt. The bourgeoisie itself became disillusioned in reason.

But while individuals, even though in considerable numbers, could rest content with such disillusionment and even flaunt it, such a state of mind was absolutely ruled out for the class as a whole, for the entire *ci-devant* Third Estate, in the historical situation at the time.

By their swiftness, by the large-scale and capricious changes they wrought, the political events impelled the social activists at the close of the Eighteenth and the start of the Nineteenth centuries to doubt the powers of reason. These same events, in their subsequent movement, were bound to give a new impulse to the growth of social thought, bound to evoke new attempts by thinking people to discover the hidden fountain-heads of social phenomena.

In France, during the period of the Restoration, the age-long tug of war between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy (lay and clerical) was resumed with new vigor and under new socio-political conditions. In this struggle each side found itself in need of at least some ability to foresee events. And although the huge majority of the combatants pinned their trust, as is the custom, on their "good horse sense," and "the school of hard knocks," nevertheless, among the bourgeoisie, then still full of youthful vigor, there appeared, already at the beginning of the 1820's, not a few gifted individuals who sought by means of *scientific* foresight to triumph over the blind forces of accident.

These attempts evoked debates over the need to create social sciences. Likewise these attempts gave rise to many remarkable figures in the field of historical science. But a scientific investigation of phenomena is the province of nothing else but — reason. In this way, the very course of social evolution acted to resurrect the faith in reason, even if it did pose new tasks before reason, tasks unknown, or at any rate, little known to the "philosophers" of the Eighteenth Century. That century's reason was the reason of the "Enlighteners."

The historical tasks of the Enlighteners consisted in evaluating the given, then existing, historically inherited set of social relations, institutions, and concepts. This evaluation had to be made from the standpoint of those new ideas to which the new social needs and social relations had given birth. The urgent need at the time was to separate as quickly as possible the sheep from the goats, "truth" from "error." Therewith it was immaterial to learn whence a given "error" came, or how it originated and grew in history. The important thing was to prove it was an "error," and nothing more.

Under the heading of error everything was included that contradicted the new ideas, just as everything that corresponded to the new ideas was acknowledged to be the truth, eternal, immutable truth.

Civilized mankind has already traversed more than one epoch of enlightenment. Each epoch possesses, of course, its own specific peculiarities, but they all have one family trait in common, namely: An intensified struggle against old concepts in the name of new ideas, which are held to be eternal truths, independent of any "accidental" historical conditions whatsoever. The *reason* of the Enlighteners is nothing else but the *level of understanding of an innovator* who shuts his eyes to the historical course of mankind's evolution, and who proclaims his own nature to be human nature generally; and his own philosophy — the one and only true philosophy for all times and all peoples.

It was just this abstract *understanding* that suffered shipwreck thanks to the "tapage" at the close of the Eighteenth Century. This "tapage" disclosed that in its historical movement mankind obeys, without comprehending, the irresistible action of some sort of hidden forces which ruthlessly crush the powers of "reason" (i.e., the powers of abstract understanding) each time "reason" runs counter to these hidden forces.

The study of these hidden forces — which first appear in the guise of blind forces of "accident" — henceforth became a more or less conscious aim of every scholar and thinker who was occupied with the so-called moral and political sciences. Saint-Simon gave this the clearest expression. "The science of man, to the present day, has never been more than a conjectural science," he says. "The aim I have set myself in this memoir is to affix to this science the seal of the science of observation." (Memoire sur la science de l'homme).

The Eighteenth Century ignored

history. Henceforth everybody is seized with history. But to study a phenomenon *historically* means to study it in its *evolution. The standpoint of evolution* becomes gradually dominant in philosophy and in the social sciences of the Nineteenth Century.

As is well-known, the evolutionary viewpoint produced especially rich fruits in German philosophy, that is, in the philosophy of a country which was a contemporary of the advanced European states *only in point of theory* (in the person of its thinkers). Germany was therefore then able, free from the distractions of practical struggle, to assimilate in tranquility all of the acquisitions of scientific thought, and painstakingly to investigate the causes and consequences of social movements taking place in the West. (*In den Westlichen Laendern,* as Germans often used to say in those days.)

The events that occurred in France toward the end of the Eighteenth Century met with strong sympathy on the part of advanced Germans right up to the year 1793. That year scared out of their wits the overwhelming majority of these people and drove them into doubts about the powers of reason, just as was the case with the enlightened French bourgeoisie. But German philosophy, then flowering luxuriantly, was quick to see the ways in which it was possible to gain victory over the blind forces of accident.

"In freedom there must be necessity," wrote Schelling in his *System des Transcendetalen Idealismus.* Schelling's book was published exactly at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century (in the year 1800). Schelling's formula means that freedom can manifest itself only as the product of a certain, *necessary,* i. e., lawful, historical development; and it therefore follows that the study of the course of this lawful development must become the first duty of all true friends of freedom. The Nineteenth Century is rich in all sorts of discoveries. Among the greatest is this view on freedom as the product of necessity.

What Schelling started, Hegel finished, doing it in his system wherein German idealist philosophy found its most brilliant consummation. For Hegel world history was the progress of the consciousness of freedom, but a progress that *must be understood in all of its necessity.* To those who held this point of view "the history of mankind no longer appeared as a confused whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable before the judgment seat of the now matured philosophic reason, and best forgotten as quickly as possible, but as the process of development of humanity itself. It now became the task of thought to follow the gradual stages of this process through all its devious ways and to trace out the inner regularities running through all its apparent accidents." (Engels.)

To discover the laws governing mankind's historical development means to assure oneself the possibility of consciously intervening in this process of development; and from being a powerless plaything of "accident," becoming its master. In this way German idealism opened up for thinking people exceptionally broad, and in the highest degree pleasant, horizons. The power of accident was bound to be supplanted by the triumph of reason; necessity was bound to become the firmest foundation of freedom.

It is not hard to imagine how enthusiastically these pleasant horizons were greeted by all those laden down by sterile disillusion, and who down deep in their tormented hearts preserved an interest in both social life and in "the striving toward self-perfection." Hegel's philosophy revived them to new mental activity and in the transports of initial infatuation it seemed to them that this philosophy would swiftly supply answers to every single great question of knowledge and of life; would provide solutions to all contradictions, and inaugurate a new era of conscious life for humanity.

Carried away by this philosophy was everything youthful and fresh, all who were thinking in the Germany of that day; and, yes, as is generally known, not in Germany alone.

(To be continued.)

BOOKS



Peasant And Bureaucrat

by Joseph Hansen

Communism and the Russian Peasant; and Moscow in Crisis, by Herbert S. Dinerstein and Leon Goure. A Rand Corporation Research Project. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 254 pp. 1955. $4.50.

These two studies, printed as a single book, are of unequal value. **Moscow in Crisis** deals with a brief period in 1941 when the German imperialist armies came close to taking the capital city of the Soviet Union. It is a sketch of the incompetence of the bureaucracy, the cowardice of the ruling caste and their panic-stricken exodus from the threatened city.

As background, the two authors indicate how Stalin's military policies in the early part of the war played directly into the hands of the German generals and how during the war the bureaucracy lied to the Soviet people about the real situation.

The main point of the study — to discover, if possible, why the flight of the whole top officialdom, and the removal of police controls for some three days, did not touch off an uprising — offers nothing new. In the absence of a program, of a party, of leaders, what else could be expected? The authors reach this conclusion but do not indicate so well a perhaps even more important factor — the need felt by the people for solidarity, despite the hated bureaucracy, in face of the imperialist invaders.

Even had an organized working-class political opposition to the Stalinist regime been present, it is doubtful that it would have taken such an occasion to organize an uprising, although it would surely have made big political capital of the flight of the locusts. How well revolutionary criticism of the Stalinist bureaucracy would have fitted in with the mood of the Moscow workers is indicated by facts cited by the authors about the wide-spread "verbal hostility"

displayed toward the "parasites" and sporadic acts of rough justice carried out on the spot by workers and soldiers who stopped Stalinist officials fleeing in automobiles heaped high with food and baggage.

The other study, **Communism and the Russian Peasant**, by Dinerstein, is more useful, providing good background material for an appreciation of the long-standing crisis in agriculture, the crisis that recently registered itself in the downfall of Malenkov.

From a study of the Soviet press, particularly farm publications, interviews with refugees from the USSR and reports of students of Soviet affairs, the author attempts to draw conclusions about the relationship of peasants and the Stalinist officials immediately over them. These are fitted into the general theory Dinerstein holds about Bolshevism and planned economy. How valid his theory is, I will consider later. The facts he presents, however, have an interest of their own and are well documented.

According to the official propaganda of the Stalinist bureaucracy and its sycophants, socialism has been "achieved" in the Soviet Union. The status of the peasant, however, resembles much more that of a serf than that of the free, all-sided man of the socialist future. By law, a peasant must work 233 days a year on kolkhoz property (the collective farm). The other days he is free to work on his own midget garden plot. He tends to be bound to the soil like a serf in that he cannot leave the kolkhoz without official permission. Theoretically he is supposed to be taken care of by the kolkhoz — he cannot be fired without official permission and he is also supposed to have his needs and those of his family taken care of by the production of the kolkhoz. In this too a serf-like relation is evident.

But the first call on kolkhoz production is the government, and this is a government over which the peasant, like the worker, has no control, this having been usurped by the Stalinist bureaucracy. The parasitic caste makes sure of its share, first by setting the quota without consulting either peasants or workers; second, by harvesting the crop through the Machine and Tractor Stations which hold and operate the farm machinery used on the kolkhozes. Besides the government, a good part of the crop goes to the local bureaucracy. In many cases the government not only gets the whole crop, but the kolkhoz is forced to buy additional on the market to make up its exorbitant quota.

In order to get by at all, the peasant is thus forced to work intensively on his own little plot. And since it is from his own bit of ground that he has the best chance of deriving a surplus, his interest centers there. Thus a bitter conflict is set up between the bureaucracy and the peasant.

The peasant is inclined to favor his own piece of land against the kolkhoz in choice of seed, care in use of fertilizer and stock, and intensity of cultivation. Seed, fertilizer, tools, stock tend to vanish from the kolkhoz. Even the kolkhoz boundary lines tend to shrink and the small plots to expand at their expense.

The bureaucracy attempts to counter by incessant propaganda about "building socialism" in Russia, about not "stealing from the state," by punitive legislation, brutal seizures of garden produce, pressure on extent of holdings, and by various tax measures. This is seasoned with appeals to the self-interest of the peasant, occasional relaxation of taxes, permission to own a few head of stock, more generous returns from labor on the kolkhoz, purges of minor officials, and so on. But the deep-going conflict in interests remains paramount.

The lower ranks of the bureaucracy are caught between the two pressures. Their first loyalty is generally toward the officialdom and their first task is to meet the arbitrary paper plans that are decided upon by the bureaucrats in Moscow. These are often so far out of line with the real possibilities that they cannot possibly be met. Yet not to meet them invites prosecution as a "saboteur" and "conspirator." In addition, many of the smaller bureaucrats sympathize with the peasants in their charge. Consequently they cut corners and doctor reports on fulfillment of plans. This, in fact, is a universal feature of planning in agriculture, as Dinerstein proves with abundant evidence.

The theoretical explanation offered for this state of affairs does the author no credit. First of all we are told about the alleged peculiarities of the Russian character, from this is derived the alleged peculiarity of Bolshevik aims, which finally show up in the form of the bureaucratic drive. Along with this, planning as such is held accountable for the many evils suffered by the peasant in the Soviet Union. Such an explanation tells us nothing, however, except how superficial the author is when he tries to reach general conclusions, for the facts he himself has so laboriously gathered from hundreds of sources speak against his theory on every page.

The deformation of planning in the Soviet Union — particularly the lack of either check or control by the peasants and workers — cannot be ascribed to the Russian national character. Is the deformation of planning in Yugoslavia due to the Yugoslav national character? Or in China to the Chinese national character? As for the Bolsheviks, they were liquidated long ago. Their party was smashed by the Stalinist bureaucracy which was a product of Russia's backwardness and prolonged isolation.

The root cause of the ills that beset the workers and peasants in the Soviet Union lies ultimately in the pressure exerted by world imperialism on the degenerated workers state. The immediate cause lies in the growth of the Stalinist caste, a parasitic formation comparable to a gangster-type, capitalist-minded, trade-union bureaucracy.

It would be difficult enough for an isolated workers state of a normal type to expand its heavy industry while at the same time assuring maximum production of consumers goods. The Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky understood this very well and consequently placed main emphasis on securing help from the rest of the world by revolutionary means. Their defeat at the hands of the bureaucracy placed a new terrible burden on the backs of the Soviet people — the caste whose main drive is privileges at the expense of the country. It is the greed of this caste that has caused the deformations in planning described by Dinerstein.

To secure and maintain its privileged position, the caste had to smash workers democracy in the USSR, institute police controls and police terror. These in turn required an enormous expansion of the bureaucracy to carry out these functions. They also meant a decline in living standards of the masses, curtailment of the rate of growth of the productive forces, constant goading of the workers and peasants, smoldering unrest continually threatening to take revolutionary political forms, and consequently further police controls and intensified terror. Development of this vicious cycle, the main feature of Stalinist rule, has led to a whole series of deepening contradictions between industry and agriculture, between heavy and light industry, city and country, etc., that cannot be gone into here.

As a study of the relationship between the peasant and the bureaucrat who rules his daily life, Dinerstein's research merits reading. Unfortunately the author spoiled the scientific value of his contribution by substituting the most superficial psychology for an explanation of class relations in the Soviet Union and by making out the revolutionary socialist politics of the Bolsheviks in the time of Lenin and Trotsky to be the same as the counter-revolutionary politics of the Stalinist caste.

A Case Of Schizophrenia

by Paul Abbott

In the foreword to this book, C. West Churchman, editor of the **Journal of the Philosophy of Science,** announces that it is the first of a series "by a group of scientists dedicated to the founding of an Institute of Experimental Method, whose major goal would be the development of methodology as a science in itself."

On the jacket of the book, the publishers list some of their other publications, including works by Albert Einstein, John Dewey, Jacques Maritain, George Santayana, Alfred North Whitehead, etc. The author holds the impressive titles of Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Bethany College and Lecturer at the Carnegie Institute of Technology.

All this would indicate a promising development — that an influential group of intellectuals has turned to serious consideration of one of the major problems facing science today, its methodology. The author's introduction sounds even more promising:

"The emergence of a new economic order or society is usually accompanied by what the philosopher, Kant, chose to call 'Copernican' shifts in attitude toward the world . . . Kant brought an end to naive empiricism and rationalism with his revolutionary Critique of Pure Reason. His successor, Hegel, confronted with the problem of interpreting progress in history as it related to an organism of ideas, developed a new logic which put the syllogism of the ancient world to work at new and dynamic tasks. In Germany and Austria the influence of these modern philosophies resulted in the development of two of the most influential systems of modern thought: 'Marxian Economics' and 'Freudian Psycho-Analysis.'"

Schanck affirms his agreement with Hegel's logic and with the materialist outlook of Marx and Freud. In his opinion the latter two "anticipated modern scientific thought in physical science by nearly a hundred years."

Schanck scores those who from a literary or philosophical background write book after book telling us what "Freud or Marx really meant" but who only demonstrate their complete failure to understand the meaning of modern scientific method. Moreover he holds that those, like Max Eastman, who attack Marx or Freud as being "mechanical" or unscientific don't know what they are talking about.

In his first chapter, Schanck starts out with the "law of combined development" through which the scientists in other fields should be able to take over the advanced method developed by Marx. However, they haven't. Instead, slowly and painfully, groping their way, they have proceeded empirically. In so doing, however, their very subject matter has forced them to become dialectical to one degree or another. Schanck proposes to show how this has occurred and what progress has been made.

He starts with Newton when the shift from Aristotelian speculation to modern experimentation occurred. Then he considers the mechanistic method and its limitations which led in physics to a logic of contradiction, of the interrelation of such categories as quality and quantity, and of the development of statistical laws. Then chemistry with its basic concept of dynamic equilibrium, "the mutual penetration of opposites." Next biology with its emphasis on the relationship between the internal and external environment of the organism, and finally the contributions of Freud and Marx, particularly their conscious use of dialectic logic and their emphasis on the continuous, revolutionary development of the individual and of societies.

The Permanent Revolution in Science, by Richard L. Schanck. Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. 112 pp. 1954. $3.

Despite its extreme sketchiness, this sounds so good that it may appear at first sight simply carping to call attention to a major error in his presentation of Marx. According to Schanck, Marx saw free enterprise and monopoly as "the two basic trends" in capitalist society out of whose conflict a third force tends to rise.

As students of Marx are well aware, the basic contradiction is in the conversion of labor power into a commodity — of the worker into a thing — and the conversion of the labor process into a process of creating surplus value, where the worker as a thing becomes the means to an inhuman end, the accumulation of capital for its own sake. From this stems the class struggle between those possessing nothing but the commodity, labor power, and those possessing the means of production.

Having evaded the class struggle and the problem of the political forms it takes, Schanck turns to ethics in his next to the last chapter. Here he follows Edgar A. Singer, founder of a wing of the school of pragmatism that includes such figures as William James and John Dewey. Singer's ethical norm, according to Schanck, is to work for the cooperation of mankind in the struggle against nature, a mankind, however, abstracted from all societies and all time.

Marxists, in contrast, take mankind as it has developed concretely in class formations. Their ethical norm is to favor or join in the struggle of that class whose rule makes possible the greatest possible development of the productive forces at a given time, the objective being achievement of a material base of such enormous productivity as to relieve mankind of the need for drudgery, thus permitting every individual to develop his full capacities as a human being. Today that means fighting for a planned economy. The principal difference between capitalist and socialist ethics lies in the fact that in the socialist society of the future the worker in control of the means of production becomes an end in himself. With that, class society is transcended.

In the final chapter, Schanck suffers a "Copernican" shift in attitude landing in the most vulgar pragmatism. The students of Singer, he reports, have organized an Institute of Experimental Method that aims at making "a science of scientific method." Already they have scored conspicuous successes. At the University of Pennsylvania in May 1946 they made a study of consumer "interest." The results of this won over Wroe Alderson, "a marketing expert," and Edward Deming, "a sampling expert." At Oberlin, the senior planner of the Cleveland Planning Commission was attracted by what the Institute might accomplish in his field, particularly architecture. (Determining the "purpose" of a given project, "efficiency" in achieving it, etc.) At Ohio State University, Mr. W. A. Shrewhart of Bell Telephone became interested. And then the Institute, getting into "welfare work," came to the aid of a New York City Settlement House in "discovering what contemporary humans wanted of them in their own neighborhood." Other universities similarly welcomed the work of the Institute. In fact in questions of "methodology" in many industrial and governmental problems, the Institute has been so impressive that it can be favorably compared to the wartime military operations research teams to which it is similar "in form." Its future among industrialists and government bureaucrats thus seems assured.

"And so this survey of science comes to a close," Schanck says and concludes with a quotation from Singer: "More humane than soup-kitchens, more practical than cannon, must be every advance toward a sound theory of evidence."

Comes to a close just two chapters late, we might add, otherwise we might have been left puzzled over the book, lacking the "evidence" to prove that what we are dealing with here is a clear case of schizophrenia.

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