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Editorial

REASONS AND OUTLOOK FOR THE NEW "EASEMENT"

For the first time since the October Revolution, a Soviet premier is going to the United States, the citadel of imperialism, officially invited for a "friendly" visit. This is unquestionably a significant success for Soviet diplomacy and for Khrushchev personally.

This fact stands out all the more if it is taken into account that it is occurring after the failure of the Geneva Conference on Germany, and that on several occasions the American leaders were still recently excluding such a possibility, conceiving of a "summit" meeting only on the basis of tangible and substantial progress previously attained at Geneva. It was Khrushchev, on the contrary, who obstinately sought a dialogue with Eisenhower, much preferring it to a four-cornered "summit" conference.

From the diplomatic point of view, Khrushchev's trip to the United States, to discuss privately with Eisenhower, establishes, in the eyes of the masses of the world, the status of the U S S R as one of the two "super-great" powers of the present world, for it led its principal adversary to give striking recognition to this status.

What are the reasons that explain this important event in U S S R - U S A relations? The main reason lies in an evolution of the correlation of forces (including military forces) unfavorable to the United States, as a result of the present superiority won by the U S S R in the fields of intercontinental missiles, submarines, and anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense. The historic moon-landing of Lunik II is, in this connection, significant of the degree of power and precision attained by Soviet interplanetary artillery.

If that military superiority had already been overwhelming and with no counter-blow possible, it would have brought about, not a discussion between the two with a view to a compromise, but

just plain capitulation by Washington, in such an affair, for example, as Berlin. But this superiority is in fact only relative, and, given the nature of nuclear weapons, subject to an always possible counter-blow by the United States, with incalculable devastating effects.

That is why the Kremlin's initial ultimatum about Berlin quickly shifted to much more flexible forms of negotiations and possible compromises about the status of the city, once imperialism's will to resist was proved to be as firm as at the time of the Formosa crisis in 1958. Sure of its relative superiority (including military superiority) in the correlation of forces at the present stage, the Kremlin decided to try to legitimize the present division of Germany and to alter the Berlin status quo in favor of East Germany.

On their side, the imperialist powers, while finding themselves obliged to enter on the path toward a certain recognition of East Germany, have obstinately resisted the temptation to consider the present status of West Berlin to be in any way merely temporary. For such a recognition on their part would mean that they were conceding a revision of the status quo in Europe in favor of the Kremlin — and on the crucial question of a city like Berlin — at the risk of causing incalculable repercussions for the future of all Germany. *Hence at Geneva, during a major trial of strength between the Kremlin and imperialism — a trial of strength, what is more, that is nowise finished — the correlation of forces in the Kremlin's favor obtained certain results, but without imperialism's agreeing as yet to the alteration of the existing status quo in Europe.*

The flexible forms used in the talks are explained by the fact that, beyond these forms, the "abyss" of atomic war was clearly gaping for

both. Imperialism did not yield to the Kremlin's attempt to change the status quo in Germany, but neither did the Kremlin abandon its pressure to obtain such a result, even if only in the form of the recognition of *the temporary nature of the status of Berlin*.

Meanwhile the Kremlin obtained the invitation for Khrushchev to go to the United States. What compromise might then be able to be sketched out between the two "super-greats"?

In the best of cases for the Kremlin, Khrushchev might be able to obtain an engagement by the United States in one form or another to recognize the "two" Germanies and the "temporary" status of Berlin; a concession to renew trade with the USSR on the basis of credits granted it; and an agreement about nuclear tests and possibly on arms reduction.

In exchange, the Kremlin would in practice offer relatively little apart from its agreement about nuclear tests and disarmament. To guarantee Washington "social peace" in the capitalist and dependent countries by the mediation of an ultra-opportunist policy by the Communist Parties would be no "novelty," no "new concession," *for in practice this has been done for a very long time already*. On the contrary, an agreement between Washington and Moscow about measures aiming to preserve the monopoly of atomic weapons and prevent other powers from possessing and developing them in the near future has obvious advantages for both the "super-greats" — all the more so in that the stock of nuclear weapons and the experiments needed to perfect them, in the case of both the USSR and the United States, are amply sufficient to ravage the planet.

A lowering of the ceiling on weapons might also be able to offer grounds for possible compromise between the two "super-great" powers, so that the financial resources that would thus become available might be devoted to the budget of civilian expenditures and aid to "underdeveloped countries." The frantic race in modern arms that become more and more fantastically costly has become, financially speaking, ruinous, even for the capacity of a country like the United States. By speeding up, it renders incompatible the parallel pursuit of a social policy and a policy aimed at influencing the so-called "non-committed" countries.

Now the fundamental trend in all developed countries is toward increase in public expenditures needed for the social and material functioning of modern society: school attendance, scientific research, public health, social security, transportation, public works, city improvements, etc. Requirements on these levels are becoming urgent everywhere, including in the United States and the USSR, and would not be able to be

ignored in the long run by any political power. In the United States the increase in the public debt, the state's difficulties in obtaining cheap credit, inflation, and the more and more visible weakening of the currency, are really in the last analysis manifestations of the unproductive waste of a growing part of the national income. In the USSR military expenditures also act as a considerable brake on the upsurge in consumption of all sorts of products which the Soviet masses are now demanding in a more and more pressing way.

The problems of the "underdeveloped" countries, furthermore, are becoming alarming. The gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is widening both because the former are growing richer more rapidly than the latter and because in the latter increase in population is more rapid than corresponding increase in production, particularly agricultural production. The revolutionary explosion of this vast zone of countries is, under these conditions, inevitable and relatively near. Imperialism is currently becoming conscious of this danger and seems decided to make an effort to enable the national bourgeoisies to survive, otherwise they may be driven to ally themselves with the Kremlin. But if aid to these countries is to be effective, it must be very considerable. Washington and the Kremlin, in case they should engage in "peaceful competition" in aid to underdeveloped countries, would need enormous resources which inevitably would have to be provided by saving on arms.

Hence on the plane of nuclear tests and a certain reduction in arms there is now quite logically a basis for a possible compromise between Washington and the Kremlin. Even admitting that such intentions may exist or arise between the two "super-greats," however, one would still be forced to wonder to what an extent they could be put into practice. Is the Kremlin in a position to prevent China from soon possessing the atomic weapon, or Washington to deprive of it the new power already in formation, the Europe of the Common Market? And what, furthermore, would happen to the American economy in case of a serious reduction in the military budget?

In reality, a directorship over the present world on any plane at all — military, economic, or social — assumed by the two "super-greats," would be inoperative, both because of the existence of China and the colonial revolution, and because of newly revived inter-imperialist contradictions.

Among the most important problems that the present period poses to imperialism is the "damming" of the Chinese revolution. The Soviet bureaucracy itself would not be able to make major

decisions without wondering about Peking's possible reactions, without consequently consulting it and associating it in the decisions. It is seen even at this precise moment, where simple eddies on the borders of India and in Laos are making the West fear the outbreak of a new storm over Asia. Any international "easement," however relative it may be, cannot be conceived at present without the recognition of the People's Republic of China and its participation in negotiations on a basis of complete equality.

The colonial revolution — that is, the irreversible drive of the so-called underdeveloped countries toward their freedom from imperialism, the agrarian revolution, and industrialization — is another dynamic component of the period which in fact escapes from the control of a possible directorship of the two "super-greats." The example of the Algerian and Cuban revolutions, fighting practically alone and so far with striking success against far superior imperialist forces, is characteristic in this connection. And now the Bantu women in South Africa in their turn are entering the emancipating struggle, raising it right away to the most militant level ever reached in Negro Africa.

It might also be wondered whether the United States would agree to loosen up, if not indeed to bury, the Atlantic alliance in exchange for a few trifling advantages. Eisenhower's European trip seems to have had the purpose of reassuring the principal Atlantic allies about the real intentions of the United States. There are now cracks in the front of these alliances. To the extent that West Germany has brought off a spectacular economic revival, having become the second among world powers in the export of manufactured products, it is stirring up again the antagonism that formerly brought it into opposition to the other imperialist powers.

It suffices to cast a glance at the figures for the trend in world trade to understand with what concern a country like Great Britain, for example, observes the rise of German power. Britain is now resolutely hostile to the reunification of Germany, as is France also, to a certain degree. But France, on the other hand, has associated itself with Germany in the framework of the Common Market, which is emerging as a new economic (and soon political) power, taking a position in the ranks of the capitalist powers immediately after the United States. Britain, once more inevitably drawn up against Germany, stands up a fortiori against the Common Market which is already rivaling it as the "close second" in the capitalist world. The United States itself now has to take into account the economic (and soon political) entity that the Common Market is becoming.

The capitalist world has been changed since

the liquidation of the Second World War, and the reciprocal relations among the United States, Britain, Western Europe, and to a lesser extent Japan as well, have been modified. The then unquestionable supremacy of the United States over the rest of the capitalist countries has evolved toward a multilateralism of powers, continental Europe's share in industrial production and world trade, followed by Japan's, having much increased. The international policy of the United States has to take into account these changes which Washington no longer controls as strictly as in the past.

It may also be wondered whether the United States, in the best of cases for itself, with every other obstacle overcome, would be able to settle passively into "peaceful economic competition" with the U S S R, since the latter is currently developing at *twice the rate* of the United States.

It thus suffices to raise all these questions to counter the illusions of those who are already interpreting the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting as the prelude to the "reconciliation" of the two systems within a perspective of prolonged and quite idyllic "peaceful coexistence."

In reality the meeting is the result of a certain new correlation of forces, and heralds either a just plain retreat by imperialism concerning Germany, or, in case that negotiations are again broken off, a more acute phase than ever of the "cold war." In the best of cases, the meeting will lead to a whole period of discussions at the "summit," either two-handed or four-handed, in order to camouflage the impasse and postpone the "agonizing" decisions that must some day be resorted to.

Meanwhile Khrushchev's trip to the United States and the illusion thereby created that a lasting relaxation of tension is beginning, a "thaw," if not an "end of the cold war," is of admirable utility for the false apostles of "peace" in the style of Macmillan in Britain and Nixon in the United States. The Republican administration's probable candidate for the presidential elections next year is counting on being able to reverse the trend in favor of the Democrats through which the country is now passing, by polarizing around his own name the deep desire for peace felt by the American masses — one more reason why the discussions and "easement" may be prolonged until that date.

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Revolutionary Marxists have the duty, at this moment of euphoria orchestrated by the spokesmen of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy, to put the masses on their guard against hopes that are illusions which will inevitably soon vanish again. At the risk of flaunting what ap-

pears to political charlatans and incurable centrists to be their "sectarianism," the revolutionary Marxists will make clear to the masses the real reasons that are motivating current developments and the lessons to be deduced therefrom.

In reality the military correlation of forces is not of itself sufficient to inflict a decisive defeat on imperialism. On the basis of the present status quo preached by the ultra-opportunist policy of the Kremlin and the Communist Parties, capitalism is still capable of accumulating serious economic and military forces, and preparing for war.

Only victorious socialist revolutions can reduce

this power of imperialism and aid its defeat.

Any policy of abandonment of the class struggle and of revolutionary and socialist prospects in reality contributes to strengthening imperialism.

It is more than ever necessary to distinguish between the "peace" diplomacy of the Soviet state and the autonomous policy of the workers' organizations that are carrying on the fight for the revolution and for socialism, the sole guarantees of peace.

20 September 1959

Editorial Notes

CHINA AT THE HOUR OF "RECTIFICATION"

The technique of statistics affords, in its data and interpretation, a considerable margin of ambiguity. In one sense good statistics are the result and the reflection of an organization that is planned and endowed with a high cultural, scientific, and technical level.

Authoritarian regimes have often indulged in deceptive statistics, the fabrication of which was a well-kept secret. But there will rarely be found in the annals of this technique so extraordinary an adventure as that announced in the communiqués and other documents produced by the 8th plenary session of the VIIIth Meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which met at Lushan between 2 and 16 August.

The effort at self-criticism made by the Chinese leadership may admittedly be admired. But it is more difficult to accept the fact that a serious leadership can be wrong on so colossal a scale.

Let us examine the admitted facts:

The entire world was seized by admiration for the exploits that the Chinese economy, especially agriculture, achieved in 1958. Their scope equaled the Soviet prestige attained by sputniks.

And now here are the terms in which the C C of the Chinese C P "corrects" the official figures, reaffirmed on several occasions up until still very recently, concerning last year's production:

Repeated check-ups made in the first half of this year show that the figures previously published on the 1958 agricultural output are a *bit high* [our emphasis]. Verification shows that the actual amount of grain gathered in 1958 was 250 millions tons [as against 375 million previously announced]; the actual amount of cotton gathered in 1958 was 2,000,000 tons [as against 3,350,000 previously announced].

As for the production of steel, which in 1958 reached 11,080,000 tons, only 8 million "produced by modern equipment met the requirements of industry."

As a result of these "rectifications," of what must be

admitted to be a colossal scope, it was natural that the C C "found that the original targets set for 1959 were *somewhat* too high and need to be appropriately adjusted." (Our emphasis.)

There will therefore be this year only 12 million tons of steel (as against 18 million forecast), 335 million tons of coal (as against 380 million), 275 million tons of grain (as against 525 million), and 2,300,000 tons of cotton (as against 5,200,000).

Compared to the corrected 1958 production figures, the goals for 1959 represent an increase in the value of industrial production of about 25 %, and of agricultural production of about 10 %. It can be seen to what relatively modest dimensions the "great leap forward," so vaunted in 1958, has been reduced.

The embarrassment of the Chinese leadership in face of this retreat is evident in spite of the flood of attacks against the imperialist slanderers and against "the emergence of right opportunist ideas among some cadres" — all the more so in that this retreat became public on the eve of the first anniversary of the people's communes, the tenth anniversary of the Chinese revolution, and the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting.

For the Chinese leadership under these conditions to feel obliged to reduce the "Chinese miracle" to its real proportions, lacking any exceptional character, it must have had particularly imperious reasons. With a correction of the 1958 figures, it became impossible to face the realities of current production. These realities are, furthermore, clearly felt by the population, which is experiencing a severe "strain on the supply of certain commodities."

Chou En-Lai, in a report on the 1959 Economic Plan, delivered at the plenary meeting of the Standing Committee of the Second National People's Congress, explicitly admits this:

In the case of about a dozen commodities did supplies drop in the first half of this year: these included pork, beef, mutton, egg products, aquatic products, sugar, cotton wadding for

domestic use, leather shoes, etc.

Chou En-Lai then devotes himself to refuting the arguments of those — including some among C P cadres — who are criticizing the present economic situation and the policy of the party:

Some people have alleged that the market was strained all around. [...] A handful of people even said that before liberation one could get anything in the market but now nothing was available. [...] Some people suspect that the strain on the supply of certain commodities was due to excessive exports.

But the criticisms extend from the food situation to the party's economic policy:

Some people hold that during last year's mass campaign to make iron and steel much manpower was used, much money was spent, and part of the total products was iron and steel made by indigenous methods; as a result, it was "more loss than gain" or at most "loss and gain was a 50-50 affair."

Even the rise of the people's communes is naturally brought into question:

Those who assert that the People's Communes are in "an awful mess" are none other than imperialists who are violently hostile to our country's socialist cause, as well as some rightists and other reactionaries who are against the people, and against socialism.

Apart from these, there are some people who pay lip-service to socialism but find fault with this and that in the People's Commune movement, and maintain that the People's Communes have been set up prematurely and have gone wrong.

Chou En-Lai himself gives certain indications concerning this last criticism:

In the initial period of the establishment [of the communes], owing to lack of experience in management and to the influence of the bumper harvest and the mass campaigns for making iron and steel and for developing industry, some dining rooms failed to manage their grain and non-staple foods well, so that a little too much was consumed.

What conclusions are to be drawn from all this?

Certainly not that the drive of the Chinese economy is a myth, nor that the communes do not represent a form of economic and social organization which gives promise of a great future.

But the Stalinist style in which the Chinese leadership always operates — of bureaucratic commands, pride, and braggadocio — distorts the optimum possible rhythms of the country's economic development, and accumulates social tensions that are not absolutely necessary. By glorifying the "general line," always "correct" despite the obvious disproof of the facts, and by preventing a discussion and a democratic path for the party and the country, the Chinese leadership and its chief run the risk of imperceptibly getting bogged down in the way of the errors and then inevitably the crimes of a Stalin.

For this reason, the active aid of the world proletariat to the Chinese revolution is still necessary. By extending the world revolution, by broadening the economic foundation for the construction of socialism, the difficulties and tensions built up in China will be prevented from barring the road to the democratic and revolutionary renewal of the communist movement and delaying the hour of the final fall of Stalinism.

THE LESSONS OF KERALA

"The peaceful road to socialism," the reformist illusions spread about this subject at the XXth Congress of the C P S U and especially at the last congress of the C P of India, have received at Kerala the answer that might have been foreseen. Profiting by an agitation of the Church against a moderate project for a reform in teaching, Mr Nehru's central government eliminated the "communist" government of Kerala State and established presidential power there while awaiting new elections. Thus ends one of the most lamentable chapters in the history of Indian Stalinism, which has nevertheless been rich in opportunist ups-and-downs.

In the last parliamentary elections, the C P had become — in number of seats — the No 1 opposition party in India. It had at the same time won the absolute majority in one of the economically poorest and culturally most advanced states: Kerala. The Stalinists celebrated this event as a great victory. There was offered then and there the opportunity of comparing the administration of the Congress Party with that of the C P, they stated. At the same time they swore to remain strictly within the limits of the Constitution. And, like old Social-Democratic reformists, they hoped that after Kerala other states in India would, one after another, elect a "communist" government.

That is not the way things turned out. The dialectic of the class struggle proved to be stronger than reformist

logic. The poor masses had elected a Communist government because they wanted a radical change in their utter poverty. But when that government, out of "respect for the Constitution" and parliamentary cretinism, touched neither the plantations nor private enterprises, had its police fire on strikers "to reestablish order," and disorganized the trade-union movement, there was widespread popular disaffection towards it. That was the moment the bourgeoisie and the Nehru government had been lying in wait for in order to finish it off. The occasion was quickly found. It is significant that, faced with "street violence," the C P scarcely dreamed of organizing powerful popular counter-demonstrations; it was satisfied with police interventions and the arrest of demonstrators. Mr Nehru then took it on himself to reestablish order in his own way.

Even from a purely electoral point of view, this reformist policy has proved not to pay off. If, by daring reforms, the C P had succeeded in ensuring a broad popular base for itself, Nehru would have had to hesitate before intervening: he would not have wanted to suppress the "communist" government only to see it triumphantly reelected a year later. But the C P's administration of Kerala was so disastrous that this risk scarcely existed. Nobody believes that the C P will win back the absolute majority at the next elections.

Granted, it is not only the reformist policy of the

Indian Stalinists that has gone bankrupt. The legend of the "mild" and "just" Mr Nehru, guardian of abstract democracy, has also received a smashing denial. At the moment of the crisis, Mr Nehru revealed himself as what he has always been: a clever and cynical servitor of the bourgeois class. But instead of drawing at least this conclusion from the Kerala affair, the Indian Stalinists accuse him of — undermining confidence in the Constitution! They are really incorrigible.

From the viewpoint of the working class, the replacement of the "communist" government by a presidential regime in Kerala can nowise be considered a "lesser evil." Workers' parties cannot associate themselves with a bourgeois campaign for the overthrow of the govern-

ment of another workers' party, however culpable its policy may have been. But at the same time they must use the example of Kerala to carry revolutionary, Leninist, criticism into the ranks of the C P, which will unquestionably experience a grave internal crisis after the collapse of the Kerala government. The overall reformist premisses of the policy of the Indian C P must be subjected to revolutionary criticism. If they undertake this work in a class spirit, which never wipes out the fundamental difference between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois criticism and revolutionary Marxist criticism, the Indian Trotskyists will be able to make great advances in the coming months.

WHERE IS THE CUBAN REVOLUTION GOING ?

The Cuban revolution, which already eight months ago brought down the sanguinary dictatorship of Batista, has since undergone an uninterrupted development. Having won power through an armed struggle essentially supported by the peasant masses of the island, it steadily and tumultuously advances from stage to stage: the destruction of Batista's police and military apparatus; the agrarian reform; revolutionary warfare against the surrounding dictatorships and the reactionary plots organized on U S soil itself.

In this process, purges and regroupings within the general staff of the revolution follow one after another, stressing the preëminently Bonapartist character of the political power incarnated by Fidel Castro and the handful of his close lieutenants. This staff, of rather petty-bourgeois and even intellectual social origins, which is not supported by any party, any organized political movement, is a unique combination of the special traits of the revolutionaries of 1848 and the Mexican Zapatas of 1911, in the context of the social and international realities of 1959.

The undeniably romantic décor of the Cuban revolution can be understood only by taking into account the petty-bourgeois social origins of the present leadership of the revolution, the main social forces — peasantry, petty bourgeoisie of the cities — that dominate it at the present stage, and the revolutionary flamboyance characteristic of the traditions of Latin America, and of Cuba in particular.

But the picturesque aspects of the Cuban revolution must not hide the fact that it is taking place in a given national and international context that is far distant from the possibility of a pure and simple repetition of 1848 or of 1911. The Cuban "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, however drenched it may be in local color, does not cease to obey the laws of the permanent revolution in our period.

Its dynamic development so far has fully demonstrated this. In November 1958 Fidel Castro, accompanied by some 80 followers, landed on the eastern shores of the island and immediately took to the brush. His immense merit consists in his having known how to win the sympathy of the poor peasant masses of this part of the island and — thanks to the promise of a difficult agrarian reform (and already some practical applications along these lines) — to mobilize them actively on his side.

He was thus able to raise a real army of partisans, constantly harassing the forces of repression of the Batista dictatorship until they were broken up and completely beaten in the decisive final assault.

At this stage, the Castro experience is already highly instructive, showing the possibility of raising a whole peasant army which, in close liaison with the population, can maintain itself, grow, and fight effectively against the superior military forces of a dictatorship.

During this stage Castro combined the leverage of a political programme, of a difficult agrarian reform, with the organization and conduct of a guerilla which was able to use to the full all the resources of the soil and popular support in its favor. At the same time, he was working on the urban centres politically and militarily, by propaganda in workers' circles, incitation to strikes and terrorist activity, as he gradually benefited by the help and protection of the population.

The fact of thus having brought down, in a relatively short time, the sanguinary dictatorship of Batista, strongly organized and enjoying the full support of Washington and London, was already a striking proof of the strength of the revolution and foretold its dynamic development on a broad scale.

Immediately after the victory over Batista, the Cuban revolution buckled down to the task of violently destroying the state apparatus of the dictatorship and of reconstructing a new apparatus. The purge of the police, the army, and the administration was of wide scope and ended up in mass firings and in the execution of hundreds of persons. Nevertheless, the forms of the state apparatus remained the same, i e, bourgeois, despite the purge of personnel.

The new stage in the revolution was entered by the promulgation of the law of agrarian reform last May. Of all the social measures of the revolution, this was the most important and the most impatiently awaited. The island has great expanses of land, which are, however, either non-productive or the property of foreign or native latifundists.

These latifundists control about 46% of the arable land, while 70% of the peasant population have only 12%. Among the latifundists, sugar monopolies in U S hands control 75% of the most fertile land in the island, and two thirds of the sugar plantations!

The agrarian law promulgated by Castro is quite radical in its written dispositions. It specifies that no

person or corporate entity can hold more than 30 caballerías¹ of land, except sugar planters and cattle raisers, who will have the right to keep — and even then only in certain cases — 100 caballerías. Corporations must transform their anonymous shares into securities whose holders' names are registered, and foreigners cannot possess land without prior authorization from the Institute of Agrarian Reform.

Leases are henceforth forbidden, and all existing contracts will be automatically abrogated by the property's adjudication to the peasants who are actually tilling the soil at the moment when the agrarian reform goes into effect: five caballerías maximum to medium-sized families; two caballerías in certain cases of irrigated land. And lastly, the law strongly encourages coöperatives, which will benefit by important facilities in fiscal and credit matters.

It was the attempt to put this law into operation which caused — beginning with July of this year, and as might have been expected — the successive waves of domestic and foreign counter-revolution in Cuba. Foreign and domestic latifundists, as well as native capitalist landowners who were cultivating land on lease, formed a coalition to block by every means the putting into effect of the law of agrarian reform. Obstructionism and reactionary plots appeared within the government's own ranks and in Castro's close entourage.

There was also the desertion to the United States of Major Díaz Lanz who was in command of Cuban military aviation, and there was above all the direct conflict with President Urrutia, later dismissed in a revolutionary way by the people mobilized in the streets and public places of the capital on the dramatic night of July 17-18 of the present year.

The deepening of the revolution brought about an inevitable political differentiation in the ranks of its general staff, composed of petty-bourgeois ideologists — a good part of them being of Catholic origins — and bourgeois careerists. A more plebeian wing, subjected to the pressure of the revolutionary masses, thus broke away from the rest of the bourgeois and pro-imperialist elements, and sought, by basing themselves inevitably on these masses, to stand up to the reflex actions of the native reactionaries and of imperialism.

The revolutionary mobilization of hundreds of thousands of peasants armed with machetes, who fraternized on July 26th with the Havana workers celebrating the national day of the revolution, was aimed at showing the strength of the revolution in face of its enemies, scheming up new plots.

The heart of these plots in unquestionably incarnated by American imperialism, which has about \$ 1,000 million invested in Cuba, and controls more than half the island's sugar companies, half its railways, a third of its banks, the majority of its mining, power, and other firms, as well as the postal services, telecommunications, etc. Fabulous profits have been extracted from these investments: \$ 750 million between 1952 and 1957!²

American imperialism is afraid, furthermore, lest Cuba's contagious example spread throughout the Carib-

bean archipelago, Central America, and South America as well.

A radical agrarian reform that would dare expropriate — even with indemnization — the foreign and domestic latifundia, threatens to produce analogous revolutionary movements over the whole extent of Latin America, dominated since the time of the conquistadores by this regime in land.

Indeed, save for modest reforms undertaken in Mexico and Bolivia, and a few other exceptions, everywhere else in Latin America large-scale landed property predominates. In Venezuela, 3% of the landowners control 90% of the arable land; in Brazil, where scarcely 5% of available land is cultivated, the regime is similar. If it is taken into account that 70% of the population of Latin America live by agriculture and stock-raising, the primordial importance and highly explosive nature of the agrarian question can be estimated.

The Castro experiment, if ever it succeeds, threatens to touch off this powder magazine.

American imperialism and the native compradore strata whose interests are tied up with it, visualize this eventuality with anxiety — hence the desperate efforts made so far, from inside and outside the island, to sabotage the agrarian reform, if not indeed just plain overthrow the revolutionary regime, and even assassinate its leader.

The most immediate danger of contagion threatens the neighboring dictatorships of Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and of Somoza (Nicaragua). Through them would be affected the American monopolies in agricultural, mining, and other exploitations in the whole of the Caribbean archipelago and Central America, as well as the vital strategic positions of American imperialism in that region.

And yet the attempts at a military overthrow of the revolutionary regime, including through the Organization of American States, have so far failed, as has just been demonstrated at the recent Santiago Conference. On the contrary, the economic threats hanging over the revolution are more serious.

The deficit in the balance of payments, which at the time of the revolution was in the neighborhood of \$ 100 million, threatens to become further aggravated this year, for investments and income from tourists have dropped sharply. With the treasury emptied by the bandit ex-dictator, and the production of sugar and its price both fallen, the revolutionary government will have major difficulties in financing its programme of public works to combat unemployment at least partially (\$ 100 million), in compensating the expropriated landowners,³ and in simultaneously avoiding inflation.

To stand up to its economic, social, and international problems, the Cuban revolution needs to settle its social character right away by getting rid of the cloud of ambiguities that have accompanied it from the cradle. Begun, inevitably, as a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, from the viewpoint of both its leadership and its immediate tasks — independence from imperialism, agrarian revolution — it soon found itself involved in the contradictions inherent in any genuine revolution in our period: if these "bourgeois-democratic" tasks are to find a radical solution, it is necessary to fight resolutely against imperialism and native reactionary forces, in-

³ The price of the land was fixed on its tax valuation, rather lower than its market value.

¹ A caballería is about 33 1/3 acres.

² In contrast, the average monthly family salary for the approximately million and a half agricultural workers is scarcely 45 pesos, while 700,000 others, i.e., a third of the total manpower of the island, are unemployed.

cluding the native bourgeoisie, by relying squarely on the revolutionary mobilization and organization of the peasant and proletarian masses.

To do so causes the revolution to go in reality beyond bourgeois limits and to develop itself, organically as it were, as a proletarian and socialist revolution. To stop half way would inevitably mean retreat, the annulation of the conquests already won, and the victory in the long run of the reaction in the form of a new dictatorship. That is the iron law of any revolution in our times.

In order for the Cuban revolution to maintain itself and to attain its "bourgeois-democratic" goals — the real liquidation of all the aftermaths of imperialism, the land to the peasants who till it — it needs to base itself on the adequate organization of the revolutionary masses, gathered together in parties, committees, trade unions, and militia. Furthermore, in order to avoid

famine or economic asphyxiation, to diversify the economy, and to industrialize the country, it needs to nationalize the principal means of production, plan the economy, and receive financial, commercial, and technical aid, wherever it may come from, including the USSR and the other workers' states.

In this process, the organization and public appearance of the revolutionary Marxist mass party will prove to be the essential factor for accomplishment and the guarantee of victory.

The conditions in the island, in Latin America, and in the world, are favorable to there being no regression for a certain time in the Cuban revolution. It is urgent that this interval be utilized to endow it with the basic framework that is essential to its final victory: *a revolutionary Marxist party, an organization of the masses into committees and militia.*

DE GAULLE AND ALGERIA

When de Gaulle reached power, an idea that was widespread — even outside Gaullist circles — in France and elsewhere in the world was that he had a solution for bringing about peace in Algeria. That explains in part the fact that in the referendum he obtained so many votes from Communist voters. Even in the FLN there were tendencies to credit de Gaulle with liberal intentions.

More than a year has passed. He has perhaps made some rather resounding verbal demonstrations (the "peace of brave men"), but nothing else.¹ And the idea is developing that he has not been able to do any better than Mollet or Gaillard.

In any case, the question of Algeria, which, after de Gaulle's arrival at power, was no longer in the foreground of the political scene in France, is returning thereto — and very seriously.

Unfortunately, this is nowise the result of a mass movement against the continuation of the war. The apathy and political indifference in France are appalling.

The Algerian question comes back into the foreground first of all as a result of the heroic fight of the Algerian revolutionaries, whom nothing — tortures, sufferings, scanty equipment — has been able to force to give way, and who will continue inexorably to fight until victory.

The Algerian question comes back into the foreground also because of developments in Negro Africa, which have taken on a speeded-up rhythm during this last year, under the influence of various factors (among which not the least are the Algerian revolution itself on the one hand, and, on the other, the policy of Gaullist "grandeur" that wants to explode an atomic bomb in the heart of Africa).

Algeria is back on the agenda also because American imperialism would like to avoid having the desperate resistance of the old-time imperialisms drive the underdeveloped countries toward the workers' states, to which the masses of those countries have a natural tendency to turn.

And lastly, the policy of "grandeur" has to be paid

for, and Pinay, watchman over French finances, representing sectors of capitalists who know how to count, has pointed out to de Gaulle that it is impossible to do everything that he is proclaiming as long as the Algerian war lasts.

Here then are many factors to spur de Gaulle to do something to stop the war in Algeria. But, if he is in power, it is because the French army in Algeria and its general staff (General Ely et al) refused to obey the civil power which seemed to have inclinations toward making concessions in Algeria. It is possible that the colonels and captains — in Algeria — want no more of the Algeria of the settlers, but in any case they want Algeria, one way or another, to remain French. And de Gaulle's authority over them is more than limited. On May 13th 1958 the French army tasted a dish that is dangerous for any army, the coup d'état. On that day the army was still kept in hand by its highest commanders, some of whom went along with the movement so as not to be swept away by it. De Gaulle fears that a new operation might not be so simple and so easy to make use of, that it might be made not in his favor but against him.

And so he has to give an appearance of doing something without doing anything whatsoever. The Paris weekly, *L'Express*, recently reproduced the remarks made by de Gaulle at a press conference on 17 November 1947, on the subject of the Vietnamese war, which had then been going on for two years and which was to continue until Dien Bien-Phu in 1954. Let us quote these words of de Gaulle:

The genuine rule to be observed at present in Indochina is not to rush anything. It is necessary to know how to have time. It is necessary to last out. Why should we be the more hurried ones? One day or another the French solution will be imposed, the solution which, as early as March 1945, I had myself proposed: to deal, whenever we might be able, with whatever there might be in Indo-China that is truly representative, provided that it is not a question of enemies of France.

He has the same programme for Algeria, but he is

¹ This editorial note was written before de Gaulle's 16 September propositions or the reaction of the FLN thereto. For updating comment thereon, see p 82.

now in power. So, to the army, he gives the substance: continue pacification, i.e., the war, until victory. And, to get around the rocky headland of the United Nations meeting, he has found a verbal expedient: neither independence nor integration, but self-determination. This last term has obviously no real meaning at all in face of the continuation of hostilities.

We have no reason to make prognoses about what will happen at the U.N.O., whether a resolution in favor of Algeria will get the two-thirds vote, or whether deals and promises of all sorts will head off such a vote. That is far from decisive. What counts and will count more and more is the will to independence of the Algerian people, supported more every day by the peoples of the Arab and African countries and by the peoples of all underdeveloped countries. French imperialism, even with the support of American imperialism, is waging a strug-

gle that affords it no way out. The shortcomings and betrayals of the leadership of the French workers, and the resultant paralysis of the toilers of France, run the risk of leaving the field open in France itself, for yet a while, to still more reactionary and savage forces; that will be grave and costly, but not very viable, and finally cannot turn back the march of history.

We have no reason to despair of the French working class, which showed itself ready in 1955 and 1956 to struggle for peace in Algeria; but at the present moment it is hard for it by itself to regain the initiative in the matter of the struggle against the Algerian war. That renders all the more imperative an international aid to the Algerian revolution, an aid that will also serve as a stimulus for a renewal on the part of the toilers of France.

THE FALSIFIERS ARE BACK AT WORK

At the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A. A. Pankratova had demanded that Soviet textbooks return to historical truth. Solemn promises were made about this. But there's many a slip...

In the *Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, no 6, one Pavel Reiman wrote a long article on "The Origins of the Communist International." Though suffering from certain faults of oversimplification, this article tried on the whole to be objective — till it reached the First Congress of the C.I. From there on, Pavel Reiman wields with virtuosity one of the most pernicious forms of the lie: the lie by omission.

It is under these conditions that on March 2nd 1919 there opened the First Congress of the Communist International, in which there participated representatives of the Communist Party of Russia led by Lenin (the delegation included, notably [!], J. Stalin, G. Chicherin, and V. Vorovski).

We open the volume containing the minutes of the First Congress of the C.I., and we find the following list of the delegates of the Russian Communist Party: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Bukharin, Chicherin. There were two alternates with voice but without vote: Obolenski and Vorovski.

It will be said to us: it is not possible to speak of falsification, since the author states that the Russian delegation included *notably* the persons whom he names. Of course Pavel Reiman can hide his nudity behind this

magnificent fig-leaf of the little word "notably." But it is easy to retort to him that by omitting from his list the three Russian delegates who, together with Lenin, were entrusted with *the reports to the Congress* (Bukharin on the directives of the C.I.; Zinoviev on the attitude toward the Second International; and Trotsky on the Manifesto of the Congress), he just plain lies by omission. For how can one describe "the origins of the Communist International" while passing over in silence *three of the four authors of the C.I.'s founding documents?* How to give a valid description of its history while passing in silence over *the name of the President of the C.I.*, who was elected in 1919 and remained in office until 1926, George Zinoviev?

The falsifiers who are getting back at work are not only pernicious; they are above all stupid. The minutes of the 1917 and 1918 meetings of the Central Committee of the Russian C.P. have just been published. The names of Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin are spread out over every page. The conspiracy of silence is broken. To want to keep it going, each little valet in his own reserved corner, is a labor that is vain and condemned in advance to failure. We shall make a prediction for Pavel Reiman's benefit: before a year has passed, the whole of Soviet youth will know that Zinoviev was the president of the C.I. and that Trotsky drafted the Manifestos of its First Congress as well as those of the three following congresses.

GREAT BRITAIN ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS

The Conservatives have now decided to rush into general elections on October 8th. In so doing, they assume that the result will be in their favor. They are counting on the climate of international "relaxation of tension" and on the improvement in the economic conjuncture in Great Britain. They will claim before the British public that their diplomacy of personal contacts at "the summit" has proved to pay off, for Macmillan's trip to Moscow in a sense gave Khrushchev access to the United States. They will also

claim to have succeeded in reinvigorating the country's stagnant economy in a context of price stability.

But in reality, their strongest card in the elections continues to be the timorous and confused policy of the leadership of the Labour Party and the trade unions.

Since the official reformist leadership abandoned in practice the programme of nationalizations, the indispensable precondition to a genuine planned economy, the domestic policies of the two parties offer scarce any tang-

ible differences to the ordinary voter. And on the plane of private economy, it is natural that preference should go to the authentic representatives of "free" enterprise who have been able to show their dynamism as businessmen.

The issue of atomic weapons ought normally to polarize around the Labour Party the deep current that is running through the British masses opposed to the use of these weapons, including by unilateral disarmament by Britain. But the official Labour leadership has found a way to take refuge in an obviously invalid and hypocritical position on this question by putting forward the idea of the "non-nuclear club."

It will certainly not be the recent Manifesto of the Labour Party, concerned with culture, morals, the beautification of life, and joy in living, which will obtain for the party additional mass votes from worker and young-worker circles. For in these circles it would be hard for the argumentation of the Manifesto, picturing 1959 Britain in the colors of a society largely freed from material need, to find a persuasive and attracting echo.

Capitalist realities, in such matters as threats of war, job security, length and tension of labor, housing conditions, etc., are always vivid enough so that the worker does not take seriously the accountancy of the capitalist regime as a framework for leisure. On the other hand, the cultural manifesto of the Labour Party may have some effect on certain privileged petty-bourgeois strata who are anxious better to enjoy their material ease.

Despite the auguries that seem favorable for a new Tory victory, it would be prudent still to reserve a prognosis. In reality the margin between the two parties remains very narrow, and it would be enough for a mass of floating voters of less than a million to shift at the last moment over to Labour for the LP to carry off the victory.

Despite the recent Gallup polls (favorable to the Conservatives), influenced by powerful propaganda kept up by the Tories' extraordinary financial resources, and the control of the state in their hands, by-elections have indicated the slow and steady rise of the Labour Party.

However important the reflection of the workers' movement in the parliamentary mirror may be in a country like Great Britain, it is necessary to be careful not to judge it only through this image. The Labour movement has in recent times shown many signs of growing mature, which, at the present stage, places it right away in the vanguard of the workers' movement of all the countries of Western Europe. The spontaneous combativity of the British proletariat was been shown in a series of remarkable struggles, which this year set both British and European records.

In these struggles, important demands were put forward that show a class consciousness, and even a political consciousness, far superior to what we now observe on the rest of the European front. Despite the shortcomings or even the opposition of the official leaderships, strikes of solidarity with workers or union representatives sacked by the bosses have been frequent and dynamic. In all these cases we have seen the mass of the workers and the lower supervisory personnel mobilize spontaneously and make up for the weaknesses of the apparatuses.

The threat of unemployment bequeathed by the recession, and fed by constant technical advances, has rendered timely at this stage a central demand repeated pretty generally by all union men: *the 40-hour week*, or, in a more general form, *reduction in working hours, without reduction in pay*. That is a fully justified demand by which the proletariat throws back on to capitalism the consequences of its regime.

It may be expected that British capitalism, at grips with revived international competition, will give way more easily on new wage increases than on reduction in working hours — one more reason for organizing the battle on this field in a united front of all the trade unions, a need already felt by an important mass of the workers.

More political issues have already emerged this time in

the trade-union sector of the Labour movement. We refer especially to the strong minorities that appeared on the question of atomic disarmament in the national conferences of a whole series of unions this summer, before the TUC itself meets in convention at Blackpool in September. The fact that the official reformist leadership, by making a scandalous use of the weight of the bureaucratic machine, finally succeeded in obtaining a formal majority for its "non-nuclear club" policy, does not diminish the fact that the real majority in the trade unions — and not only in the wards as in the past — is at present far to the left of this leadership.

And this is so not only on the issue of *atomic disarmament* but also of *nationalizations*, quite correctly considered as inseparable from a really socialist policy.

The overwhelming majority by which these two issues were voted at the national conference of the great Transport and General Workers' Union, led by Frank Cousins, is indicative of the present degree of maturity of the British proletariat.

For the first time in the history of the British Labour movement, the leadership of the left wing has passed to the trade unions and is at the same time set at a higher level than at any moment in the past. This new left, on an essentially union labor basis, is currently being formed around three basic demands: *disarmament in the general direction of unilateralism; nationalizations; reduction in working hours.*

To organize this left among the rank and file, on these three issues, and on that basis to beat the right wing of the party and the trade unions: such is the central transitional task of the revolutionary Marxist wing of the Labour movement.

In case the Labour Party wins the elections, this platform of the left is going to take on a decisive importance, speeding up under the best possible conditions the political differentiation that has begun inside the Labour movement. In case of an election defeat, the same platform is going to become the basis of a more general struggle of the left against the new power of the Tories.

Such a defeat, furthermore, would not fail in any case to turn over the leadership of the Labour Party to its left.

At the present stage, general conditions in Britain remain more favorable than elsewhere in Europe to the militancy of the workers' movement. The improvement in the economic conjuncture does not seem to have the staying-power of a genuine prolonged boom. Like the rest of Western Europe, Great Britain is also emerging from the 1957-58 recession, but with a rather moderate rate of new expansion. So far the revival has been felt only in the field of consumers' goods, whose sale was stimulated internally by credit. There are indications that this stimulus is already weakening.

That leaves exports; these, however, though they have shown a certain progress, do not seem to be about to put an end to the irresistible drive shown for some time now by German and even Japanese exports.

Without Britain's being faced by the prospect of a new catastrophic crisis, it is making its way through a relative revival toward a situation of new difficulties, for its capitalist competitors, mostly more modernized than itself, have the advantage of better productivity and consequently of lower production costs. Hence there is a prospect of continuing if not aggravated tension on the social plane in Britain, but with a correlation of forces that encourages the proletariat to resist and fight.

The conclusion for the revolutionary Marxist wing within the Labour movement must be that its chances of becoming the militant structural frame of the new left are real ones, provided that it thoroughly digests all the lessons of the sectarian experiences of the past, and patiently and intelligently links itself with the class forces who are making their transitional experience in the organized Labour movement.

HEAVY WEATHER AHEAD FOR U S LABOR

With the passage of crippling new anti-union legislation by the Congress that they had themselves elected, and with the continuance of the already record-breaking steel strike with no sign of a settlement, there is penetrating into the lulling euphoria in which the majority of U S workers have been living in these recent years of prosperity, the sobering realization that they are facing a long-planned and generalized offensive, on both the legislative and industrial fronts, by the masters of American capitalism.

The gravity of the situation seems not to have been sensed at first by the steelworkers' particularly class-colaborationist bureaucratic tops, who, with their business-as-usual business unionism, approached contract negotiations with the idea of ending up with a 10 cent an hour raise, while the steel companies hiked prices \$4 a ton. This would have been the continuance of a pattern begun in 1946, when the steel barons used the pretext of an 18 1/2 cent an hour raise to boost steel about \$5 a ton. Since then there have been ten wage-raises for the steelworkers and 22 price-raises by the steel companies — many of the latter even in the face of a drop in the rest of the price index.

This pattern has always served as a pretext for the bourgeois press to howl that the wage-raises begat a wage-price spiral that was responsible for America's inflation. But this time it was harder to thump this mouldy tub because the pretext had been thoroughly disproved by evidence presented to the Kefauver Committee of the U S Senate, which demonstrated that the steel companies could easily grant wage increases without any rise in steel prices. The last financial reports of the big steel companies made this dazzlingly evident. Net profits for the first half of 1959 were \$254,900,000, 88% higher than 1958. Because of the recession? But U S Steel's earnings spurted from \$9.14 per ton in the second quarter of 1954 to \$19.31 in the exactly comparable last quarter of 1958. U S and Bethlehem Steel, at current market values, represent a 1,000% capital gain in ten years — while at the same time some \$10,000 million of new plant was built purely out of profits. Even the conservative *New York Herald Tribune* revealed on 3 July 1957 that in the 1946-56 period steel prices had risen 115% while labor costs rose only 30%. The steelworkers' own statistics showed that the ratio was \$3 of higher prices for every \$1 of wage increases. And a responsible private statistician worked out, from a confrontation of workers' time and company profits, that U S Steel is making a profit of \$2.28 per man hour — while moaning that it cannot afford to give a 15 cent an hour wage increase without an inflationary boost in steel prices.

The evidence was so conclusive that even a sector of the bourgeois press called for an anti-inflationary cut in steel prices — offset, of course, by a freezing of the steelworkers' wages, already gnawed into by the inflation since the last contract. So it is understandable that the top steel union leader David McDonald went into negotiations with a feeling of confidence that the usual deal could be extracted from the companies without too long a strike.

What he ran into, on the contrary, was a complete counter-attack on the very foundations of steel unionism.

The companies' intransigence on wages was largely pro forma; but before they would even talk about wages, they demanded fundamental changes in contract provisions about schedules and working standards. The 1947 contract had standardized the complex structure of steel labor into 32 job classifications; the lowest got the minimum contract pay rate; each higher classification a differential (originally 3 1/2 cents an hour, now more). For anything not classifiable, the now famous Clause 2B provided that "past prac-

tices" would be determinant. The classifications protected workers against abusive "down-grading," whereas Clause 2B soon turned out to be steel labor's greatest defensive weapon against the companies' indefatigable efforts to impose harder conditions on already hard enough toil. McDonald himself has estimated that, if 2B were eliminated, the companies could eventually throw out 100,000 workers by a "rationalizing" speed-up and overload.

And it is precisely on wiping out these protective measures that the companies are determined, and determined with a fierceness that jarred labor's negotiators. What is happening?

What is happening is that the steady increase in modernization of processes, and especially automation, is so increasing productivity per man that the workers are, under the capitalist system, working themselves out of jobs.

This situation was not unforeseen. Several years ago, when the implications of automation were sensed, there was a spate of articles on its effects on employment in publications of every level in every sector; but in the U S, notorious for tiring quickly of nine-day wonders, the subject dropped from sight as suddenly as it had appeared — without (what is graver) labor's reacting to the inescapable deductions by preparing concrete and militant plans, and driving to put them into immediate and forceful application.

Advance portents were not wanting. The most serious was the way in which industry climbed back out of the recession in terms of production *while leaving unreabsorbed a high proportion of those the recession had made unemployed*. This should have been a shrieking alarm signal to labor; it was certainly taken as a green light by capital.

The plans of monopoly capital, furthermore, had been laid well in advance. The authoritative *Business Week* in early July published a widely-quoted admission that, way back in 1957,

there was a series of round-robin talks among the labor relations officials of the electric manufacturing, steel, and auto industries. These set the stage for the "tough" bargaining that has come to a climax this year.

Talks among these industries are continuing. Within the past week, spokesmen in the electrical manufacturing and auto industries have acknowledged that their companies are keeping in close touch with the steel talks in New York. One put his hand to his chin, commenting: "We're involved up to here."

The practical preparations for the implementation of this policy were quite openly made. As we noted at the time in these columns, the tremendous spurt in steel production was far beyond the rhythm of recovery from recession. Its purpose was plainly *stockpiling* in preparation for a showdown. Steel inventories already held by customers are now revealed to have reached 21 million tons, while more than three and a half million were stocked by the steel producers themselves. And though a survey in the 21 September *Times* of London shows numerous smaller steel users forced to reduce production, it seems probable that the major users, especially auto with its seasonal shutdown for model changeover, will be able to hold out till near the end of the year.

Furthermore, if union militancy holds out, as it should, the bosses still have in reserve the weapon of the Taft-Hartley Act's provision whereby the government can force the workers back to work for an 80-day period, during which, by operating at near-capacity, the steel industry can again build up stockpiles. And Washington's attitude in the titanic struggle is perfectly obvious from the recent

passage by Congress of one of the worst anti-union bills in all its dishonorable history.

Belatedly, very belatedly, the leaders of US labor are beginning to recognize that this is not just one more strike, but probably the most critical strike since the stormy '30s, and that the steel barons' demands for the elimination of the protective provisions about schedules and working standards are the opening broadside of a merciless long-term attack aimed at the complete taming of US labor. The labor leaders' first reactions were in the form of practical solidarity: a gift to the beleaguered steelworkers of one million dollars (with another million promised) from the United Auto Workers, and the decision of the AFL-CIO Conference at San Francisco to contribute one hour's pay a month from each of its 12,500,000 members — an aid that might total a million dollars a day. But measures of solidarity, though sound enough, are quite inadequate in the present extremely grave situation. What is needed is an end to business unionism and class collaborationism and their replacement by a fighting *class* policy on both the industrial and legislative fronts.

On the industrial field, the answer to the bosses' attempt to use the technological unemployment resulting from automation and other advances in productivity to fire workers and smash unions, is to impose the sliding scale of hours — specifically, in the concrete circumstances of the USA, "30 hours' work for 40 hours' pay."

On the legislative field, the answer to the "betrayal" of the "friends" whom labor itself voted into office at the last elections, and the probable coming use of the vicious

strike-breaking provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, is not weeping and hand-wringing, but an abandonment of the false policy, proven again and again to be hopeless, of supporting "lesser-evil" capitalist candidates, in favor of immediate practical steps to create a Labor Party based on the unions.

These proposals, which have repeatedly arisen from the more militant sectors of the rank and file, have been dismissed as "impractical," "too advanced," "utopian," etc, by the top union bureaucrats. Now that the results of the bureaucrats' vaunted "practicality" are becoming grimly evident, the ranks of labor are going to do some hard rethinking, and the revolutionary Marxists in the USA must make clear to them that "30 for 40" and a Labor Party are the answers — not just as long-range propaganda goals, but as urgent agitational slogans — if US labor is not to be demoralized by a severe defeat.

To those of other nations to whom it may appear that the sleeping giant of US labor cannot be aroused in time, it should be recalled that one of its national characteristics has always been the abruptness and violence of its awakenings. For example, millions of men who in 1934 had scarcely heard of unions, by 1936 had not only poured into them, forming the then tremendously militant CIO, but had, in immense nation-wide strikes, sprung at one bound to what was in those days a new and revolutionary step, the full occupation of the struck factories. It is, as we hope the steel barons will soon find to their own discomfiture, too early to cross off the American workers.

A NOTE: ON DATING BY SEASONS

The present issue, number 7, Autumn, follows immediately after number 6, Spring. We have not, however, skipped an issue, and there will be, as usual, four issues in 1959. The matter is one only of seasonal nomenclature, and the explanation is as follows. The current series of *Fourth International* began on a schedule of: a Winter issue appearing near the end of February; Spring, end of May; Summer, end of August; and Autumn, end of November. When transport and distribution time was added, the result was that the seasonal dating appeared in some countries to be rather a misnomer. This situation is being corrected by a new publication schedule in which the current number, appearing at the end of September, will, as the Autumn issue, replace the late-August Summer issue; Winter issues hereafter will appear at the end of December; Spring issues at the end of March; and Summer issues at the end of June.

Trotsky 80th Anniversary Memorial Section

EIGHTY YEARS AGO

By PIERRE FRANK

Next November 7th will complete eighty years since Leon Trotsky was born. By his theoretical contribution and his militant life, he takes his place in the class of the most eminent proletarian revolutionaries, that of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg. But if these others are accepted as such in the workers' movement (which does not mean that their teachings are not trodden underfoot), the place of Trotsky, even at the present beginnings of "destalinization," has not yet been recognized. True, the crudest Stalinist lies are no longer repeated, for they would no longer find any listeners; but a number of lies and false ideas continue to drag on, including among those who think that they have been delivered from Stalinism. How many try to get out of it by saying: The struggle between Trotsky and Stalin is ancient history, outlived, a personal rivalry about more or less abstract theories, and Trotskyism — apart from a few faithful followers — no longer exists. This was not at all the opinion of Stalin who, after claiming that Trotskyism was dead, went on setting up — in vain — the most monstrous judicial machinations to kill it. Nor is it the opinion of Stalin's present successors, either. If they have not rehabilitated Trotsky and the Left Opposition, it is because they realize that it is not outlived ancient history, but one of the burning problems of the present day.

The figure and the teachings of Trotsky will inevitably find the place they deserve in the course of the anti-bureaucratic movement of the masses, and not in the bureaucracy's measures of self-defense to protect its political power and privileges.

Among some who perhaps do not lack sympathy but do lack a sense of history, what contributes to their failure to appreciate Leon Trotsky is the contrast between the last part of his life (from 1928 on) and his period of glory and power in the first years of the Russian Revolution. Max Eastman wrote in a recent article that Trotsky was a man of indecision who did not know how to fight against Stalin — all this based on a "psychoanalysis" for the American petty bourgeois. Without expressing themselves so stupidly, there are not lacking people who think that if

after all Trotsky was defeated by Stalin, it was because he pierced himself with his own sword at a given moment by his vision of the glorious period of the Russian Revolution, without understanding the new situation that was then opening up. It is, however, easy to verify the fact that it was Trotsky who really understood the new situation, whereas Stalin did not have the faintest idea of where he would be led by the struggle he started after Lenin's death. Power not only contributes to corrupt those who wield it; it also sets them on a pedestal which deforms their real stature. If someone like Trotsky lost the power, that must be his fault, and he was not so great a man as all that — such is the reasoning of petty-bourgeois thinkers. We are convinced that the future will say that the whole greatness of Trotsky was shown most clearly in that last and so dramatic period of his existence — such a period as none of the other great revolutionaries had to go through. Marx and Engels at the end of their days saw the workers' movement accept the doctrines that they — for a long time almost alone — had developed and advocated. Rosa was assassinated in a revolutionary period. Lenin died respected, just at the turning in the Russian Revolution, before he could join battle against the rising bureaucracy. It was to Trotsky, who, together with Lenin, had had the glory of leading the proletariat to power, that it fell to carry on that struggle. In it, the state that emerged from the first victorious proletarian revolution became the instrument of a narrow-minded and reactionary social layer of the new society, who systematically resorted to methods of violence within the workers' movement against the revolutionaries, to a degree that even the reformists had not reached. In the Soviet Union alone, the number of members of the Bolshevik Party liquidated by Stalin — according to the statement of Khrushchev at the session of the Central Committee in which he defeated Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich — reached 1,600,000. This figure alone indicates what was then the power of the bureaucratic reaction. Its hatred was aimed with its full force against Trotsky.

Trotsky's third exile never had an equal —

not so much because of the agents of Stalin who never ceased to exist around Trotsky and Leon Sedov; but this exile was in practice doubled by a cloistering imposed by various capitalist governments and by the interventions of the Soviet government. True, Trotsky could leave his home, engage in physical exercise (walking, fishing, hunting, etc), but it was in fact forbidden to him to take a direct part himself in the workers' movement. It is necessary to recall the rage poured out by the Soviet press when it was learned that Trotsky had left Istanbul to give a lecture in Copenhagen. The lion had escaped from his cage; few interventions were necessary to make the Social-Democratic Danish government understand what attitude it must take. Trotsky, a man of the masses to the highest degree, a militant the essential part of whose life had been passed in workers' organizations, in fact during this last exile found himself in a sort of prison with invisible bars, for he could communicate with the world and especially with the workers' movement only through visitors under the more or less discreet control of the police of the country he was in.

What is more, he had no exchange of thoughts, no relations, with the workers' leaders of his generation: the Social-Democracy and Stalinism had divided up between them the old leaders of the workers' movement. The more recent strata — those of the First World War and its postwar period — provided the elements for the bureaucratic apparatuses. Those who gathered around him were quite young militants, without a past, without training. It is easy to understand that this great difference in age and experience added to his isolation from the big labor formations kept up by apparatuses.

On the occasion of the publication this year of his *Diary* for the years 1934-35, some persons have discovered a "human" side to Trotsky. That is because they never knew how to read Trotsky. It is not at all hard to see in all his works how much he understands — because he shares — the feelings of the masses risen up against all oppression. And with him, as with Marxism's other great ones, these feelings take on all the more force in that they find their source in the understanding of causes and in the conviction that mankind now possesses the means to put an end to those inhuman conditions in which the great majority of them live. Nobody was more sorely tried than he and Natalia by the most hideous manifestations of Stalinism; those who were at their side saw how they suffered each time that their children were struck down by Stalinism. But they also saw the firmness with which they faced it, and how Trotsky in his grief redoubled his strength to carry on the struggle to which he had devoted his existence.

It is not simple to summarize Trotsky's theoretical contribution to Marxism, so considerable is it.

Above all, there is the theory of the permanent revolution, formulated when he was 26, in connection with Czarist Russia, but which, because of the trend taken by the world revolution — from the U S S R toward the East, in colonial and semi-colonial countries — contains its strategic basis for nearly two thirds of humanity in our times. While the Stalinist conceptions about "socialism in a single country" and "revolution by stages" have been swept away by such gigantic facts as the Chinese Revolution, the theory of the permanent revolution is still officially ignored by some, reviled by others, who remain in tow to native bourgeoisies without strength and without future.

The fundamental strategy for the struggle for power in the advanced capitalist countries (united front and transitional programme) had been formulated by the Communist International at its IIIrd and IVth Congresses, in fact by Lenin and Trotsky. It was defended and systematically elaborated by Trotsky against Stalinist revisions (sometimes sectarian, sometimes opportunist, conceptions of the united front — renunciation of the struggle for power and a transitional programme, and a policy of alliances with wings of the bourgeoisie, such as the Popular Front etc). Trotsky further proceeded to study in a practically exhaustive way declining capitalism's forms of defense (fascism, Bonapartism).

The creation of a first workers' state in an economically backward country and its isolation in the world raised the most complex problems on every plane. The victory of the bureaucracy and its absolute power under the tyrannical leadership of Stalin helped to aggravate all these problems. It is to Trotsky that we are indebted for the greatest clarity about these questions. On the problems of industrialization, planning, the proportions of the various branches of the economy, relations with the peasantry, relations of economic questions with soviet democracy, on political problems in the workers' state (separation of state and party, plurality of parties, etc), on cultural problems, on all problems posed today with a force rendered doubly explosive, both because of the level attained by the Soviet Union and because of the Stalinist methods of repressing independent initiative in any field whatever — on all these problems Trotsky provided the correct method of approach, and often indeed solutions that are still valid today. That the bureaucracy, forced to take action along lines indicated by him so many years ago, should continue to manifest hostility toward Trotsky, without however resorting to the worst calumnies of the Stalin era, is easy to understand: at the basis of all Trotsky's answers there is to

be found as the essential element the intervention of the masses by the reestablishment of soviet democracy.

We are leaving aside very many manifestations of Trotsky's thought in the most varied fields, in which most often he no more than sketched out the way of treating them, but which will unquestionably constitute for future Marxists — as is the case for very many passages in the work of Marx — a guide for tackling new problems.

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There is in Trotsky's work one point on which many an admirer of today is skeptical: that is his creation of the Fourth International and his conviction that it was, as early as before the Second World War, indispensable for ensuring the future of revolutionary Marxism and of the workers' movement. We shall not take up this whole question again here, where the militants of the Fourth International have so often had occasion to deal with it. We wish only to insist on the continuity of the international and internationalist activity of Trotsky. He had been one of the representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party to the Second International, and had seen its weaknesses; he had been at the foundation of the Third International, had there, together with Lenin, played the leading role, and had tried to make it into a genuine international leadership of the revolutionary workers' movement; and had seen that one of the essential factors in its disintegration had consisted of abandoning an internationalist conception in favor of "socialism in a single country." To that it must be added that Trotsky had taken not at all lightly the error he had committed, compared to Lenin, on the question of the *party*. It was necessary to keep revolu-

tionary Marxist principles intact, including that of the party — and, after 1914, there could be no question of anything except an international party. It is there that is to be found the explanation of the immense efforts expended by Trotsky in his last years on the turbulent problems of an organization so numerically weak as the Fourth International, efforts which remain incomprehensible to those who do not understand that in so doing Trotsky was showing that he had adopted the Leninist conception of the party. On this question too, we are sure that the future will show that Trotsky was right. No one can yet foresee the forms of organization by which we shall pass from today's Fourth International of cadres to tomorrow's Fourth International of mass parties, but for us there is no doubt that the mass revolutionary Marxist movement of tomorrow will connect up with the Third International of the time of Lenin and Trotsky through the Fourth International founded in 1938 under Trotsky's leadership.

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The error that Trotsky most often committed in more than one circumstance was to be ahead, and even very much ahead, of events. In that also, it may be said in passing, Trotsky found himself in the company of Marx and Engels. Although the brakes of reformism and the Soviet bureaucracy continue to have a strong effect on the mass movement throughout the world, they have lost much of their power. There is very little left of the Stalin cult five years after his death. And so we can, on this eightieth anniversary of Trotsky's birth, affirm with the greatest confidence that on his ninetieth anniversary his memory and his work will be honored by the great masses of the entire world.

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THE PARIS MILITANT

By ALFRED ROSMER

Trotsky stayed in France at various periods, but it was only during the two years he spent in Paris during the First World War that he could operate as a militant free to move about as well as to speak and write. That freedom was only relative, because it was that of the state of siege and censorship, but in that he was in the same boat as the French themselves, and what may here seem paradoxical is easily explained by reference to what the situation then was. In Vienna, where he had been living at that period, Russia's entry into war had made him an enemy alien, whereas in France the "alliance" protected him,

while at the same time Paris would be for him the best combat post in the hard struggle for the defense of socialism. Experience showed that this reasoning was correct: for nearly two years he was able to battle just as much among the French workers as in the émigré circles. If it all ended badly — by expulsion — there also Trotsky shared the fate of his French comrades at a time when the growth of opposition to war worried the government and led it to take open measures of repression. In his case, Petrograd was giving orders to Paris, for the expulsion, several times requested already, was finally demanded — in

which Stalin was later to repeat Czarist policy, and on two occasions.

On his way toward France, Trotsky's first stop-over was Zurich. He lingered there, staying three months, so warm and encouraging was the welcome he received from the section of the Socialist Party. In those first days of August, the Swiss socialists were, like those of all countries, overwhelmed by the collapse of the International; but, not being involved in mobilization, they were all there, especially the youth, discussing, trying to understand the meaning of the war amid the confusion created and maintained by rival propaganda. Trotsky brought them the stimulant they needed to keep clear heads. Like them he had gone through the German school of socialism: its Social-Democracy was not *a* party of the International but *the* party par excellence — one more reason for fighting mercilessly against the betrayal of its chiefs. Their collapse was a tragedy and, at first glance, the outlook was very sombre; that might lead to erroneous conclusions. But what was this war? A clash of imperialisms, of two great formations of antagonists. Of course, but there was a deeper and general meaning: the war marked the revolt of the forces of production against the outdated political form of the nation and the state; and, as the Socialist Parties were in fact national parties, they collapsed with it. Conclusion: all efforts to save the Second International would be useless; it was not socialism, however, that had collapsed, but its temporary external historic form.

An eyewitness, a member of the section and a participant in these discussions, Fritz Brupbacher, wrote later that, with Trotsky's arrival at Zurich, life was renewed in the workers' movement, and that his influence had such a power of attraction that they wanted to give him the mandate to represent the section at the next congress of the party. Though Switzerland would have afforded him a less exposed place of refuge, it was in the heart of a France at war that Trotsky wanted to settle; he wrote in haste a pamphlet in which, under the title "Der Krieg und die Internationale," he assembled and developed the ideas that he had just been setting forth to the Zurich socialists, a pamphlet that was so substantial and still so timely that in 1918 an enterprising American publisher made a whole book out of its translation into English.

In Paris there was another paradox: it was through the *Vie Ouvrière*, a revolutionary syndicalist organ, that Trotsky's liaison, neither ephemeral nor accidental, with the workers' movement, functioned. Yet there was a Socialist Party there that persisted in calling itself the "French Section of the Workers' International"; but when Trotsky, for a specific purpose, went

to the offices of the party's daily newspaper, he there found its leaders, Cachin among others, going along with the current as usual, therefore ultra-chauvinist; after a few useless attempts at discussion, they made it clear to him that he was an undesirable: they expelled him from *l'Humanité* before rejoicing to see him later expelled from France by Briand.

As soon as he had found a possible boarding-house — in the Parc Montsouris neighborhood, one of the émigré quarters of Paris — he sent for his family, Natalia and the two sons Leon and Sergei, to join him; from then on he could organize his activity in such a way as to be able to carry out successfully what was going to be his triple task. The articles that he was sending to the *Kievskaja Mysl* obliged him to follow closely both French politics and military operations: he was a skilled newspaper-reader, and quickly understood what each represented and what must be expected of it. As for parliamentary life, it was then so limited, so non-existent, that the government had to be sought out rather at Chantilly (General Headquarters) than at Paris. But his articles also gave him the opportunity of making research field trips throughout France, of meeting socialist and trade-union militants, of sounding out the state of mind of the average Frenchman: conversations with a Liège anarchist had enabled him to learn about and give an exact description of the resistance movement that had set a notable part of the population — and even the anarchists — against the German troops.

The main work of the day was, naturally, *Naché Slovo*, the newspaper, and the group that gravitated round it. The editors met every morning at the printshop in the rue des Feuillantines to discuss that day's issue and prepare tomorrow's, on the basis of information that came in, and of discussions about the conceptions defended by the various tendencies of Russian socialism, of polemics with the "defensists" and also with Lenin, who, from Geneva, was defending his own position with vigor and even brutality. Martov, right from the beginning, had been, before Trotsky's arrival, a sort of editor-in-chief; his anti-war attitude had helped to bring him close to the other sectors of the opposition. It did not correspond, however, to that of the majority of the Mensheviks whose representative to the International Socialist Bureau he was; he was embarrassed thereby, to the extent of being unable to accept having certain questions even raised and discussed — such as that of a new International. The clashes with Trotsky grew gradually more frequent and sharp, and as it was evident that Trotsky better expressed the conceptions of the paper's editorship, Martov resigned and left for Switzerland.

It was through him that the first contact had

been made between the Russian socialists in Paris and the centre of opposition, then numerically tiny, represented by the *Vie Ouvrière*; a letter he had written to Gustave Hervé, which the latter had published, had been the occasion for their meeting. And it was he also who announced to us the forthcoming arrival of Trotsky and who brought him around as soon as he did arrive. We used to meet in the evening, once a week, and when our little group was reinforced by these new allies, our horizon, until then sombre, lightened up. With Trotsky and Martov there came Dridzo-Losovsky, long settled in Paris, and a Polish socialist, Lapinsky. When, one evening, the Swiss socialist, Grimm, accompanied them, there could be conceived a rebirth of proletarian internationalism, and we already began arrangements which ensured us serious international liaisons, since, through the Swiss, it would be possible for us to remain in contact with the German opposition.

Of these meetings Raymond Lefebvre has painted a faithful picture in the preface to *L'Eponge de vinaigre*. They were kept up all winter, but were abruptly ended when the government profited by a revision of draft exemptions to call up all known oppositionals who had escaped conscription and send them to the armies. At that moment the idea of an international conference had already taken sufficiently specific form so that practical preparations for holding it were being thought out. It was known that inside the French Socialist Party discontent was growing against the nationalist and pro-government policy which the leadership was integrally imposing on the party; a manifestation of this discontent and its importance was the position taken by one of the best provincial federations, that of the Haute-Vienne, and rendered public by a report signed by all the federations' elected office-holders. The socialists of *Naché Slovo* hastened to make contact with some of them who happened to be in Paris. Meetings were held at Dridzo's place; they were not very encouraging, for the Limousins, though very firm in their criticism of the betrayal of socialism, shied away when we talked about the action that must be taken, obsessed by fear of a split, which they absolutely refused to face. The arrival in Paris of the Italian socialist Morgari, in search of participants in the future international conference, brought about the last meeting. Trotsky has amusingly described in *My Life* how, when Morgari suddenly spoke of underground activity, the worthy Limousins hastened to disappear. It was impossible to think of adding to the French delegation: Merrheim and Bourderon remained alone to represent the opposition, though, for that period, they represented it very well, even if they refused, despite

Trotsky's friendly insistence, to go further than their resolution at the confederal conference, which had, however, become insufficient, for it no longer corresponded to a situation that events were changing every day.

At Zimmerwald, the already known tendencies became specific. Lenin wanted acts: refusal of war credits by the Socialist parliamentarians; preparation of the new International; appeals to the workers for anti-war demonstrations. As against this clearly defined programme, the Italians set up a waiting policy: they refused to consider that the Second International was dead already; they wished for a rapprochement with the German centre (Kautsky-Bernstein); that was also the position of the Mensheviks. Trotsky was in agreement with Lenin (except on the question of defeatism), but he was in a position to understand better than Lenin what it was possible to ask of the conference at that stage: his Paris activity had permitted him to measure the strength of the opposition; in the same way, through his contacts with Grimm and Morgari, he knew exactly the current conceptions of the Swiss and Italian leaderships, of whom it could not be said that they did not represent the feelings of the rank and file. His speeches seemed so convincing that, at the end of the discussions, he was entrusted with the task of drafting the manifesto, which all the delegates approved. Lenin was not entirely satisfied, but that did not prevent him from considering that it was "a step forward," and that one could be satisfied with that much for the moment.

This fortunate outcome of the conference was going to permit Trotsky to find in France a base for his activity. The manifesto restored confidence, and the opposition, till then skeletal and dispersed, penetrated into the workers' movement. A committee had been created for the revival of international relations; its plenary meetings brought together a growing number of militants; one of its most active members was Trotsky, who soon dominated it. Its secretary was Merrheim; with the Metal-Workers' Federation behind him, he had, right from the beginning, courageously carried on the fight against the confederation's leadership; now he became too prudent, already disturbed at seeing the committee drive further than he had decided to go. And so he opposed all proposals made by Trotsky to carry the activity of the committee out into public, taking up again at every session his suggestion for creating a Bulletin, indispensable for the committee's own life, for circulating information verbally communicated during the meetings which it was important to take down and make known to all those who, in the trade unions and in the Socialist sections, were beginning to break away from the lies and illusions by which they had

been lulled in order to drag them into the war. Merrheim resisted, grew impatient when he saw the ascendancy that Trotsky was winning over the assembly, but he could do nothing against his clear comments on events, fed by an exceptional experience, against a well-reasoned revolutionary optimism that carried conviction. At the end of the meetings, militants of all tendencies, socialists, anarchists, syndicalists, approached Trotsky, questioning him about points which were not yet clear to them; dates were arranged to permit continuing such fruitful conversations. One of them, F Lorient, a member of the Socialist Party, definitively won over to the opposition, whose leadership he was to take within the party, wrote a pamphlet whose contents he had studied out with Trotsky, "Les socialistes de Zimmerwald et la guerre," which took its place among the clandestine publications of the committee.

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The Czarist government could not understand how an ally could allow a newspaper like *Naché Slovo* to be published on its territory. On several occasions it had asked that the paper be suppressed and its editors imprisoned. The operation was difficult, being contrary to the policy of the French government at that period, when the Socialist ministers were explaining that persecution of the opposition could only aid it by making it better known — much better to stifle it by censorship. A grave incident that took place among the Russian detachments brought to France at the request of the French government was to be the occasion of an intervention that was this time decisive. The soldiers of this detachment were subjected, in France, to a regime that the surroundings rendered unbearable; the officers treated them like brute beasts. A soldier, slapped in

the face by a colonel, retorted with such ardor that death ensued. *Naché Slovo*, declared responsible, was immediately prohibited, and an order of expulsion announced to Trotsky. Different interventions enabled him to gain a little time and to try to choose the place to which he was to be deported. All was in vain. The family was then living in the Gobelins quarter, quite close to the hall of the Reine-Blanche, where there had taken place the deeply moving August 1914 meeting at which the various Russian parties tore one another apart, the "defensists" signing enlistment papers in the French army. It was here that two policemen came to take him and conduct him to the Spanish border. But even from Cádiz, where he was stopping temporarily, Trotsky found the means of participating once more in the committee for the revival of international relations, and precisely on the occasion of the pamphlet that he had prepared with Lorient. The growing influence of Zimmerwald had led the minorityites in the Socialist Party to organize themselves on an extremely moderate basis, their position not being essentially differentiable from that of the chauvinists of the leadership, of which they denounced only the "excesses." This semi-opposition represented a danger; there was a risk that it would get some Zimmerwaldists to make a bloc with it against the leadership — which the pamphlet had foreseen. And so complaints arose from the minorityite members, accusing the Zimmerwaldists of "dividing" the opposition. One of these criticisms was communicated to Trotsky, who replied immediately: "Political forces are not 'divided' by clarity any more than they are added together by confusion. Three viewpoints, three motions: clarity is political honesty." And so ended, in an exceptional prolongation, his career as a Paris militant.

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THE TROTSKY LEGEND IN THE SOVIET UNION

By P RICHARDS

It was during the agitated days following the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in a remote village deep in the Siberian taiga. The radio (its installation in the farthest-off regions had almost been completed) had already given various current news items about the shifts among the tops of the party and the Soviets, and a few kolkhoz activists were sitting around, as was usual on Sundays, having a few rounds of vodka together, exchanging remarks about the news. Everything was going along very tamely, and, as people had got in the habit of

doing for decades now, they were being careful not to go beyond the formulations used in the official news. "Yes, Malenkov was not competent," the kolkhoz secretary said in a melancholy tone. "Bulganin, though, is capable enough," the president hastened to say, to show his loyalty for the "new man." And the organizational secretary of the party tossed off another glass, and added wisely: "Sure! Above all we have Khrushchev as the First Secretary of the Party — he'll really do something."

And thus the political part of the usual agenda

would have been completed if Frol Ivanovich, who was sitting in the place of honor, had not cleared his throat — which was a sign that he had something to say. Frol no longer held any post in either the local soviet or in the kolkhoz. But the solid old man who, at 82, still went fishing through the ice on the Ienissei, and, in the hot harvest season, could still rival in labor many of the young men, had a unique place in the party group of the kolkhoz: his party card bore 1918 as the date of his joining, and he was the only survivor for far around who not only could remember the fights of the partisans against Kolchak, but had himself taken part in them and had been decorated with the Order of the Red Flag.

And so Frol always found a hearing, though he did not much like to talk and seldom mixed into the discussions. But now Frol Ivanovich said in a solemn tone: "I'd like to say something else: now that Stalin is dead and we know that he *wasn't* right, we ought to come back to . . . Lev Davidovich . . ." Only a small number among the drinkers knew who was meant. They looked at one another, puzzled, and then hurried on to take up another subject.

But in the transitional months of 1955 and 1956, both before and after, this was not the only case where in party circles, among the workers as well as among the Soviet intelligentsia, the name of Trotsky, which for decades had been unmentioned or copiously insulted and reviled, rose up again. For the logic of the propaganda poured out for a quarter of a century by every means at the disposal of a gigantic apparatus led directly to the conclusion of the old kolkhoz-peasant and party-member Frol: the antipodes of Stalin was Trotsky. Stalin could be accepted or rejected only en bloc. The belief in Stalin was an erroneous belief (the "personality cult"). And so . . .

"TROTSKYISM" AND TROTSKYISM

For decades Stalin and his henchmen neglected nothing that might create in the population of the Soviet Union a legendary notion that was the incarnation of all that was negative, reprehensible, and contemptible.

If already in the years of the fraction struggles the Stalinist clique had put forward innumerable falsifications and calumnies instead of objective arguments, during the thirties any indication about what Trotsky had really said and done and what the platform of his supporters at different periods had been, was simply wiped out. Ideological struggle was forbidden in any form. The pretext was: "Since Trotskyism has ceased to be an ideological current, and has been transformed into a vanguard of international capitalism, into a gang of bandits, etc, the struggle against it is a matter for the organs of repression, and the

means of struggle are reprisals, arrests, deportations, etc."

Thus there appeared in the Soviet Union in the thirties what was called "Trotskyism" — a purely metaphysical scarecrow, which had absolutely nothing in common with the living Trotsky or with his supporters inside and outside the Soviet Union. This imaginary "Trotskyism" provided the pretext which the security organs — following the personal directives of Stalin, who, first through Yezhov and then through Beria, had ensured himself of direct control over the apparatus of terror — used in order to send hundreds of thousands of innocent workers, peasants, and Soviet intellectuals — among them innumerable persons who were entirely uninterested in politics, who could not even be counted among the malcontents — to jail cells, to camps in Siberia, in the Far East, in Kazakstan, and in the Arctic regions, and also to death by shooting.

The campaign of slanders that accompanied this vast action of purging on the widest scale, rose to fantastic heights: profound experts abroad (among them also some who were not directly in the pay of Stalin's agents) believed that they could justify the mass terror by saying that "here and there" insurrections against the Soviet Union had taken place, that "there's no smoke without fire," that "where a plane is being used, shavings fall." The truth is that *all* prosecutions under pretext of "Trotskyite" conspiracies, including the show trials of 1936 and 1937, were based on lies and provocation. The first ray of light of an objective investigation of these revelations based on the fiction of "Trotskyism," of the perjuries and extorted testimonies, permits of recognizing the real contours of this manoeuvre in deception, which was camouflaged by a refined mass-hypnosis: *nothing* can be maintained of the accusations of the thirties, and the victims of "the great madness" (such is now the term used in the Soviet Union itself for the blood-orgies of the thirties) are being — although for the most part posthumously — rehabilitated.

THE LOYAL ONES FELL STANDING, LIKE TREES

In the great sea of mass terror of those thirties, a single wave could scarcely find an echo; and so even now, after more than twenty years, nothing (or still very little) has reached the outside world about the fate of that little group of unshakably loyal ones, who never renounced the banner of the "Bolshevik-Leninists" and their leader Trotsky, who never for an instant capitulated, and whom neither threats, tortures, and refined torments, nor seductions and promises, could bring to flinch or to weaken.

In the Autumn of 1937, when the uncontrolled

tyrannical rage reached its peak, no more than a few hundreds of steel-hard Trotskyists, described in the administrative language of the NKVD by the professional term "orthodox," still remained alive in the whole Soviet Union.

They were assembled, with their families — wives and children — in special barracks separated off by barbed wire, which were in the neighborhood of far-away camps surrounded by deserts of ice (Vorkuta, Norilsk, Kolima), and, without any judicial procedures, on the basis of lists prepared by the NKVD, summarily executed by special commandos under the orders of selected officers.

The description of the last days and the last road of this "iron guard" of the Soviet working class will provide, as soon as it is known to public opinion in the East and the West, the sharpest contrast with that grotesque danse macabre under the staff direction of Vischinsky before the public of the Hall of Columns in Moscow, and bring to light real unfaked heroism and martyrdom such as are rare in our century, rich though it is in drama and tragedies.

The staging of the "Trotskyite" trials was, besides its other purposes, above all counted on to cover up the truth about the assassination of the last loyal Bolshevik-Leninists. For these fell standing, like trees.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEGEND

A lying and infamous historical writing (*A Short Course in the History of the CPSU*) was to serve to wipe out the traces of the crime; but the youth itself in the Soviet Union, to whom this disfiguring, hatefully slick, distorted chronicle was presented as the truth, to be believed in as something sacred, had its doubts. Even in the forties, in which Stalin had to be honored as a god and the *Short Course* was as untouchable as the word of god, the party "propagandists" who had to deal with instruction in the *Short Course* were constantly complaining about the refractory and skeptical questions of pupils and audiences to whom the chapters about the "Espionage and Acts of Diversion" of the "Trotskyites" were not at all self-evident.

There were even heretics who went so far as to ask what Trotsky had really wanted, how he had reached his position in the Communist Party,

and so on; and ever more and more — there were every year tens of thousands of cases — the security apparatus had to intervene, to put under lock and key such bold questioners, or their professors too, who had allowed such questions to be asked.

And the clearer it became that the state set up by Stalin did not at all resemble the soviet state predicted in Lenin's works, the more Soviet youth, especially the part that was more worthwhile and more interested in social progress, became eager to know the real content which must be covered up by the legend of "Trotskyism." There could be no question of getting one's hands on any work of Trotsky in textual form. But there were still documents in the public libraries, kept, it is true, only in secret cabinets, but that were given out against a sufficient guarantee by the reader. And among these were the minutes of Communist Party congresses, which had been printed in the twenties and early thirties (before the publication of the *Short Course*).

In Moscow, during the Summer of 1956, one of the books most read by the students and young party activists was the minutes of the XVth Congress of the CPSU. To the question why precisely this congress aroused such intense interest, a young engineer who had just moved up from the Komsomol into the party itself answered: "Why? Because it's there you find the big speeches of Trotsky and the other oppositional leaders. And that's so timely!"

In these last years the leadership of the CPSU has become uneasy over this growing interest in Trotsky. It cannot fail to realize that the Trotsky legend — and above all, its other side, now that the Stalin legend has been reduced to ashes — is directed against its own bureaucratic and dogmatic course. Hasty attempts are made to plug up the holes in the pot of the party history; the *Short Course* has been liquidated without more ado, but only, of course, to be replaced by other threadbare yarns, which, it is true, are no longer so bloody.

L D Trotsky, if the hand of the murderer had not prevented him from reaching his eightieth year, would not be too displeased with developments in the Soviet Union: behind the Trotsky legend the shadow of the genuine Trotsky is beginning to appear.

Reminiscences, Tributes and Evaluations

PREFATORY NOTE

On the 80th anniversary of Leon Trotsky's birth, it seems both appropriate and useful, in addition to the three preceding articles written especially for *Fourth International* on this occasion, to republish here — especially for the interest of the youth, to whom much of the material may be otherwise unavailable — various reminiscences, tributes, and evaluations of the great revolutionary. These brief items, excerpted from newspapers, magazines, and books, are mostly by persons who knew Trotsky, either in the intense earlier days when he was, with Lenin, preparing and carrying through the October insurrection, creating and leading the Red army on fourteen fronts, helping found the Communist International to lead the world revolution, fighting for a correct policy to keep the civil-war-shattered Soviet Union from sinking into bureau-

cratic dictatorship, or in those no less intense later days when, aided by only a handful of loyal followers, he continued fighting in exile, first to save communism and the Communist International from Stalinist degeneration, and then, when that degeneration reached a depth too great to permit its being undone, to build the Fourth International to keep high the stainless banner of Bolshevik-Leninism. As will quickly be seen, the writers are not all Trotskyists: they include enemies as well as friends, adversaries as well as allies. But all are in agreement about the tremendous calibre of this outstanding revolutionary leader. It is thus hoped that, from these excerpts, Leon Trotsky, whose theoretical ideas are familiar to our readers, will also emerge more three-dimensionally as the unique historical figure he is.



THE ORGANIZER OF VICTORY

By KARL RADEK

One of Leon Trotsky's outstanding characteristics was his ability to bring his powerful intelligence to bear upon subjects in which he had no previous specialized training, with such creative effectiveness that in a remarkably short time he not only became expert in them but was even able to make important new contributions to their theory and practice. This remarkable quality is exemplified concerning the art of war in the following article, which describes how Trotsky created from practically nothing the heroic Red army that saved the young Soviet Union from civil war and imperialist intervention. Its author, Karl Radek, born in 1885, was a brilliant German revolutionary leader of Polish origin, an organizer of the Zimmerwald Left, who, on the Russian Revolution, moved to Russia and joined the Bolsheviks, and became from 1919 to 1923

one of the principal leaders of the Communist International and its specialist in German matters. He was a member of the Left Opposition from 1923 to 1928; but, expelled from the party at the XVth Congress and deported to Siberia, soon capitulated to Stalin. Condemned to ten years of forced labor at the 1937 Moscow Trial, he presumably died or was executed about 1942. In spite of his later moral collapse and wretched end, he was for many years a respected Bolshevik leader, and the evaluation in the following article, published in 1923 in *Pravda* and the Comintern's press bulletin, *Inprecorr*, is not merely a personal tribute, but represents the official opinion of the Communist movement of Lenin's day on Trotsky as "the organizer of victory."

History has prepared our party for various tasks. However defective our state machinery or our economic activity may be, still the whole past of the party has psychologically prepared it for the work of creating a new order of economy and a new state apparatus. History has even prepared us for diplomacy. It is scarcely necessary to mention that world politics have always occupied the minds of Marxists. But it was endless negotiations with the Mensheviks that perfected our diplomatic technique; and it was during these old struggles that Comrade Chicherin learned to draw up diplomatic notes. We are just beginning to learn the miracle of economics. Our state machinery creaks and groans. In one thing, however, we have been eminently successful — in our Red Army. Its creator, its central will, is Comrade L D Trotsky.

Old General Moltke, the creator of the German army, often spoke of the danger that the pen of the diplomats might spoil the work of the soldier's sabre. Warriors the world over, though there were classical authors among them, have always opposed the pen to the sword. The history of the proletarian revolution shows how the pen may be re-forged into a sword. Trotsky is one of the best writers of world socialism, but these literary advan-

ages did not prevent him from becoming the leader, the leading organizer, of the first proletarian army. The pen of the best publicist of the revolution was re-forged into a sword.

The literature of scientific socialism helped Comrade Trotsky but little in solving the problems which confronted the party when it was threatened by world imperialism. If we look through the whole of pre-war socialist literature, we find — with the exception of a few little-known works by Engels, some chapters in his *Anti-Dühring* devoted to the development of strategy, and some chapters in Mehring's excellent book on Lessing, devoted to the war activity of Frederick the Great — only four works on military subjects: August Bebel's pamphlet on militia, Gaston Moch's book on militia, the two volumes of war history by Schulz, and the book by Jaurès, devoted to the propaganda of the idea of the militia in France. With the exception of the books of Schulz and Jaurès, which possess high value, everything which socialist literature has published on military subjects since Engels's death has been bad dilettantism. But even these works by Schulz and Jaurès afforded no reply to the questions with which the Russian Revolution was confronted. Schulz's book surveyed the de-

velopment of the forms of strategy and military organizations for many centuries back. It was an attempt at the application of the Marxian methods of historical research, and closed with the Napoleonic period. Jaurès's book — full of brilliance and sparkle — shows his complete familiarity with the problems of military organization, but suffers from the fundamental fault that this gifted representative of reformism was anxious to make of the capitalist army an instrument of national defense, and to release it from the function of defending the class interests of the bourgeoisie. He therefore failed to grasp the tendency of development of militarism, and carried the idea of democracy ad absurdum in the question of war, into the question of the army.

I do not know to what extent Comrade Trotsky occupied himself before the war with questions of military knowledge. I believe that he did not gain his gifted insight into these questions from books, but received his impetus in this direction at the time when he was acting as correspondent in the Balkan war, that final rehearsal of the Great War. It is probable that he deepened his knowledge of war technique and of the mechanism of the army during his sojourn in France, from where he sent his brilliant war sketches to the *Kiev Mysti*. It may be seen from this work how magnificently he grasped the spirit of the army. The Marxist Trotsky saw not only the external discipline of the army, the cannon, the technique. He saw the living human beings who serve the instruments of war, he saw the sprawling charge on the field of battle.

Trotsky is the author of the first pamphlet giving a detailed analysis of the causes of the decay of the International. Even in face of this great decay Trotsky did not lose his faith in the future of socialism; on the contrary, he was profoundly convinced that all those qualities which the bourgeoisie endeavors to cultivate in the uniformed proletariat, for the purpose of securing its own victory, would soon turn against the bourgeoisie, and serve as the foundation not only of the revolution, but also of revolutionary armies. One of the most remarkable documents of his comprehension of the class structure of the army, and of the spirit of the army, is the speech which he made — I believe at the First Soviet Congress and in the Petrograd Workers' and Soldiers' Council — on Kerensky's July offensive. In this speech Trotsky predicted the collapse of the offensive, not only on technical military grounds, but on the basis of the political analysis of the condition of the army.

"You" — and here he addressed himself to the Mensheviks and the SRs — "demand from the government a revision of the aims of the war. In doing so you tell the army that the old aims, in whose name Czarism and the bourgeoisie demanded unheard-of sacrifices, did not correspond to the interests of the Russian peasantry and Russian proletariat. You have not attained a revision of the aims of the war. You have created nothing to replace the Czar and the fatherland, and yet you demand of the army that it shed its blood for this *nothing*. We cannot fight for *nothing*, and your adventure will end in collapse."

The secret of Trotsky's greatness as organizer of the Red Army lies in this attitude of his towards the question.

All great military writers emphasize the tremendously decisive significance of the moral factor in war. One half of Clausewitz's great book is devoted to this question,

and the whole of our victory in the civil war is due to the circumstance that Trotsky knew how to apply this knowledge of the significance of the moral factor in war to our reality. When the old Czarist army went to pieces, the minister of war of the Kerensky government, Verkhovsky, proposed that the older military classes be discharged, the military authorities behind the front partly reduced, and the army reorganized by the introduction of fresh young elements. When we seized power, and the trenches emptied, many of us made the same proposition. But this idea was the purest Utopia. It was impossible to replace the fleeing Czarist army with fresh forces. These two waves would have crossed and divided each other. The old army had to be completely dissolved; the new army could only be built up on the alarm sent out by Soviet Russia to the workers and peasants, to defend the conquests of the revolution.

When, in April 1918, the best Czarist officers who remained in the army after our victory met together for the purpose of working out, in conjunction with our comrades and some military representatives of the Allies, the plan of organization for the army, Trotsky listened to their plans for several days — I have a clear recollection of this scene — in silence. These were the plans of people who did not comprehend the upheaval going on before their eyes. Every one of them replied to the question of how an army was to be organized on the old pattern. They did not grasp the metamorphosis wrought in the human material upon which the army is based. How the war experts laughed at the first voluntary troops organized by Comrade Trotsky in his capacity as Commissar of War! Old Borisov, one of the best Russian military writers, assured those Communists with whom he was obliged to come in contact, time and again, that nothing would come of this undertaking, that the army could be built up only on the basis of general conscription, and maintained by iron discipline. He did not grasp that the volunteer troops were the secure foundation pillars on which the structure was to be erected, and that the masses of peasants and workers could not possibly be rallied around the flag of war again unless the broad masses were confronted by deadly danger. Without believing for a single moment that the volunteer army could save Russia, Trotsky organized it as an apparatus which he required for the creation of a new army.

But Trotsky's organizing genius and his boldness of thought are even more clearly expressed in his courageous determination to utilize the war specialists for creating the army. Every good Marxist is fully aware that in building up a good economic apparatus we still require the aid of the old capitalist organization. Lenin defended this proposition with the utmost decision in his April speech on the tasks of the Soviet power. In the mature circles of the party the idea is not contested. But the idea that we could create an instrument for the defense of the republic, an army, with the aid of Czarist officers — encountered obstinate resistance. Who would think of re-arming the White officers who had just been disarmed? Thus many comrades questioned. I remember a discussion on this question among the editors of the *Communist*, the organ of the so-called left communists, in which the question of the employment of staff officers nearly led to a split. And the editors of this paper were among the best schooled theoreticians and practitioners of the party. It suffices to mention the names of Bukharin, Ossonski, Lomov, W Yakovlev. There was even greater

distrust among the broad circles of our military comrades, recruited for our military organizations during the war. The mistrust of our military functionaries could be allayed, their agreement to the utilization of the knowledge possessed by the old officers could be won, only by the burning faith of Trotsky in our social force, the belief that we could obtain from the war experts the benefit of their science, without permitting them to force their politics upon us; the belief that the revolutionary watchfulness of the progressive workers would enable them to overcome any counter-revolutionary attempts made by the staff officers.

In order to emerge victorious, it was necessary for the army to be headed by a man of iron will, and for this man to possess not only the full confidence of the party, but the ability of subjugating with his iron will the enemy who is forced to serve us. But Comrade Trotsky has not only succeeded in subordinating to his energy even the highest staff officers. He attained more: he succeeded in winning the confidence of the best elements among the war experts, and in converting them from enemies of Soviet Russia to its most profoundly convinced followers. I witnessed one such victory of Trotsky's at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. The officers who had accompanied us to Brest-Litovsk maintained a more than reserved attitude towards us. They fulfilled their role as experts with the utmost condescension, in the opinion that they were attending a comedy which merely served to cover a business transaction long since arranged between the Bolsheviks and the German government. But the manner in which Trotsky conducted the struggle against German imperialism, in the name of the principles of the Russian revolution, forced every human being present in the assembly room to feel the moral and spiritual victory of this eminent representative of the Russian proletariat. The mistrust of the war experts towards us vanished in proportion to the development of the great Brest-Litovsk drama.

How clearly I recollect the night when Admiral Altwater — who has since died — one of the leading officers of the old regime, who began to help Soviet Russia from motives not of fear but of conscience, entered my room and said: "I came here because you forced me to do so. I did not believe you; but now I shall help you, and do my work as never before, in the profound conviction that I am serving the fatherland." It is one of Trotsky's greatest victories that he has been able to impart the conviction that the Soviet government really fights for the welfare of the Russian people, even to such people who have come over to us from hostile camps on compulsion only. It goes without saying that this great victory on the inner front, this moral victory over the enemy, has been not only the result of Trotsky's iron energy which won for him universal respect; not only the result of the deep moral force, the high degree of authority even in military spheres, which this socialist writer and people's tribune, who was placed by the will of the revolution at the head of the army, has been able to win for himself; this victory has also required the self-denial of tens of thousands of our comrades in the army, an iron discipline in our own ranks, a consistent striving towards our aims; it has also required the miracle that those masses of human beings who only yesterday fled from the battle-field, take up arms again today, under much more difficult conditions, for the defense of the country.

That these politico-psychological mass factors played an important role is an undeniable fact, but the strongest, most concentrated, and striking expression of this influence is to be found in the personality of Trotsky. Here the Russian revolution has acted through the brain, the nervous system, and the heart of its greatest representative. When our first armed trial began, with Czecho-Slovakia, the party, and with it its leader Trotsky, showed how the principle of the political campaign — as already taught by Lassalle — could be applied to war, to the fight with "steel arguments." We concentrated all material and moral forces on the war. The whole party had grasped the necessity of this. But this necessity also finds its highest expression in the steel figure of Trotsky. After our victory over Denikin in March 1920, Trotsky said, at the party conference: "We have ravaged the whole of Russia in order to conquer the Whites." In these words we again find the unparalleled concentration of will required to ensure the victory. We needed a man who was the embodiment of the war-cry, a man who became the tocsin sounding the alarm, the will demanding from one and all an unqualified subordination to the great bloody necessity.

It was only a man who works like Trotsky, a man who spares himself as little as Trotsky, who can speak to the soldiers as only Trotsky can — it was only such a man who could be the standard-bearer of the armed working people. He has been everything in one person. He has thought out the strategic advice given by the experts and has combined it with a correct estimate of the proportions of social forces; he knew how to unite in one movement the impulses of fourteen fronts, of the ten thousand communists who informed headquarters as to what the real army is and how it is possible to operate with it; he understood how to combine all this in one strategic plan and one scheme of organization. And in all this splendid work he understood better than anyone else how to apply the knowledge of the significance of the moral factor in war.

This combination of strategist and military organizer with the politician is best characterized by the fact that during the whole of this hard work, Trotsky appreciated the importance of Demian Bedny [a communist writer] or of the artist Moor [who drew most of the political caricatures for the communist papers, posters, etc.] for the war. Our army was an army of peasants, and the dictatorship of the proletariat with regard to the army, that is, the leading of this peasants' army by workers and by representatives of the working class, was realized in the person of Trotsky and in the comrades coöperating with him. Trotsky was able, with the aid of the whole apparatus of our party, to impart to the peasants' army, exhausted by the war, the profoundest conviction that it was fighting in its own interests.

Trotsky worked with the whole party in the work of forming the Red Army. He would not have fulfilled this task without the party. But without him the creation of the Red Army and its victories would have demanded infinitely greater sacrifices. Our party will go down in history as the first proletarian party which succeeded in creating a great army, and this bright page in the history of the Russian revolution will always be bound up with the name of Leon Davidovitch Trotsky, with the name of a man whose works and deeds will claim not only the love, but also the scientific study, of the younger generation of workers preparing to conquer the whole world.

ON LENIN AND TROTSKY

By ROSA LUXEMBURG

Rosa Luxemburg, born in 1871, indisputably ranks among the dozen greatest revolutionary Marxist leaders of history. One of the founders in 1893 of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, redoubtable opponent of Bernsteinian revisionism, heroic anti-war prisoner, co-founder of the German Spartakists, one of the founders of the German Communist Party and editor of its organ, the *Rote Fahne*, tragic martyr to Social-Democrat-inspired assassination in 1919, and always a principled and original theoretician — Rosa may be termed an independent ally of the Russian Bolsheviks. She supported them against the Mensheviks

at the 1907 congress in London; and joined Lenin in introducing the anti-war resolution at the Stuttgart Congress. But she differed from them in her conception of the nature of the party and the importance of mass spontaneity. Her tribute quoted below is thus all the more impressive. It will be noted that to her, as to practically all the genuine revolutionaries of that period, "Lenin and Trotsky" formed almost a hyphenated word, and, with the addition of "with their friends," summarized the Bolshevik Party and its revolution.

The fact that the Bolsheviks staked their whole policy on the world revolution of the proletariat is precisely the most striking testimony to the range of their far-sightedness, to their fidelity to principles, and to the daring impetus of their policy. [...]

Whatever a party can, at a historic hour, provide in the way of courage, drive in action, revolutionary far-sightedness, and logic, Lenin, Trotsky, and their comrades gave in full measure. All the revolutionary honor and the capacity for action that were lacking in the Social-Democracy in the West, were to be found among the Bolsheviks. Their October insurrection not only in fact saved the Russian Revolution, but also saved the honor of international socialism. [...]

In this last period, where we are on the eve of decisive battles in the entire world, the most important question for socialism has been and still is just the burning question of the day: not this or that detail of tactics,

but the proletariat's capacity for action, the masses' drawing power, the will to take power in socialism generally. In this regard, Lenin and Trotsky, with their friends, were the *first* who went on ahead of the proletariat with their example, they are so far the *only* ones who can cry out, with Ulrich von Hutten: "I dared that!"

It is that which is the essential thing and it is what remains of the policy of the Bolsheviks. In this sense they retain the imperishable merit in history of having taken the head of the international proletariat in winning political power and in raising in practice the problem of the attainment of socialism, as well as having mightily advanced the struggle between Capital and Labor in the world. In Russia the problem could only be raised; it could not be settled in Russia. And it is in that sense that the future belongs to "Bolshevism."



FROM "SVYAZHSK"

By LARISSA REISSNER

Of Larissa Reissner, author of the following, Leon Trotsky himself wrote in *My Life*:

[...] This fine young woman flashed across the revolutionary sky like a burning meteor, blinding many. With her appearance of an Olympian goddess, she combined a subtle and ironical mind and the courage of a warrior. After the capture of Kazan by the Whites, she went into the enemy camp to reconnoitre, disguised as a peasant woman. But her appearance was too extraordinary, and she was arrested. While she was being cross-examined by a Japanese intelligence officer, she took advantage of an interval to slip through the carelessly guarded door and disappear. After that, she engaged in intelligence work. Later, she sailed on warships and took part in battles. Her sketches about the civil war are literature. [...] In a few brief years, she

became a writer of the first rank. But after coming unscathed through fire and water, this Pallas of the revolution burned up with typhus in the peaceful surroundings of Moscow, before she was even thirty.

Born 1 May 1895 of a German landowner father and a Polish mother in Vilna, Poland, Larissa Reissner was educated in Germany and France; rallying at once to the Russian revolution, she became its "burning meteor" before she was 22.

From her sketch of the defense of Svazhsk, we have excerpted here only her evaluation of Trotsky's qualities of leadership; but its descriptive parts are of a fascinating brilliance, and we heartily recommend them and the rest of her work, insufficiently known abroad, to German-reading comrades, who will find them in her *Oktober: Ausgewählte Schriften*.

[...] In conditions of constant danger and with the greatest moral exertions, [the Red Army] worked out its laws, its discipline, its new heroic statutes. For the first time, panic in the face of the enemy's more modern techniques became dissolved. Here one learned to make headway against any artillery; and involuntarily, from

the elementary instinct of self-preservation, new methods of warfare were born, those specific battle methods which are already being studied in the highest military academies as the methods of the Civil War. Of extreme importance is the fact that in those days at Svazhsk there was precisely such a man as Trotsky.

No matter what his calling or his name, it is clear that the creator of the Red Army, the future chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, would have had to be in Svyazhsk; had to live through the entire practical experience of those weeks of battle; had to call upon all the resources of his will and organizational genius for the defense of Svyazhsk, for the defense of the army organism smashed under the fire of the Whites. [...]

In the party and in the masses there lived only a foreboding; a creative premonition of [a new] military revolutionary organization which was never seen before and to which each day's battle whispered some new real characteristic.

Trotsky's great merit lies in this, that he caught up in flight the least gesture of the masses which already bore upon it the stamp of this sought-for and unique organizational formula.

He sifted out and then set going all the little practices whereby besieged Svyazhsk simplified, hastened, or organized its work of battle. And this, not simply in the narrow technical sense. No. Every new successful combination of "specialist and commissar," of him who commands and the one executing the command and bearing the responsibility for it — every successful combination, after it had met the test of experience and had been lucidly formulated, was immediately transformed into an order, a circular, a regulation. In this way the living revolutionary experience was not lost, nor forgotten, nor deformed.

The norm obligatory for all was not mediocrity, but on the contrary, the best, the things of genius conceived by the masses themselves in the most fiery, most creative moments of the struggle. In little things as well as big — whether in such complex matters as the division of labor among the members of the Revolutionary Military Council or the quick, snappy, friendly gesture ex-

changed in greeting between a Red Commander and a soldier each busy and hurrying somewhere — it all had to be drawn from life, assimilated and returned as a norm to the masses for universal use. And wherever things weren't moving, or there was creaking, or bungling, one had to sense what was wrong, one had to help, one had to pull, as the midwife pulls out the newborn babe during a difficult birth.

One can be the most adept at articulating, one can give to a new army a rationally impeccable plastic form, and nonetheless render its spirit frigid, permit it to evaporate and remain incapable of keeping this spirit alive within the chickenwire of juridical formulas. To prevent this, one must be a great revolutionist; one must possess the intuition of a creator and an internal radio transmitter of vast power without which there is no approaching the masses.

In the last analysis it is precisely this revolutionary instinct which is the court of highest sanction; which exactly purges its new creative justice of all deeply hidden counter-revolutionary backslidings. It places its hand of violence upon the deceitful formal justice in the name of the highest, proletarian justice which does not permit its elastic laws to ossify, to become divorced from life and burden the shoulders of Red Army soldiers with petty, aggravating, superfluous loads.

Trotsky possessed this intuitive sense.

In him the revolutionist was never elbowed aside by the soldier, the military leader, the commander. And when with his inhuman, terrible voice he confronted a deserter, we stood in fear of him as one of us, a great rebel who could crush and slay anyone for base cowardice, for treason not to the military but the world-proletarian revolutionary cause.

It was impossible for Trotsky to have been a coward, for otherwise the contempt of this extraordinary army would have crushed him. [...]



A REAFFIRMATION

By VICTOR SERGE

Victor Serge (Victor Lvovich Kibalchich), born in Brussels in 1890 of Russian revolutionary émigré parents, led an active and courageous life as an anarchist militant in Belgium, France, and Spain, until 1917, when, interned in France, he managed to get himself exchanged for an officer of the French Military Mission in Petrograd. He joined the Bolshevik Party, fought in the civil war, participated in the First Congress of the Communist International, and became an editor of its organ of the same name. He joined the Left Opposition in 1923. He was

It was to the cause of the workers that Leon Davidovich devoted his long life of toil, combat, thought, and inflexible resistance to inhumanity. All those who approached him know that he was disinterested and conceived of his whole existence only as part of a great historic task, which was not his alone, but that of the movement of the socialist masses conscious of the perils and possibilities of our period. "These are bitter times," he wrote, "but we have no other country." His character was integral in the full sense of the word: seeing no gap

expelled from the party and imprisoned in 1928, banished from the USSR in 1936. He remained active till some years after World War II, then gradually drifted away from Bolshevism and into relative inactivity. He died in exile in Mexico some years ago.

He is the author of numerous books, including three novels. The following excerpt, from his *Vie et Mort de Trotsky*, written in conjunction with Trotsky's companion Natalia Sedova, was published in Paris by Amiot-Dumont in 1947.

between behavior and conviction, idea and action; not admitting that higher interests, which give meaning to life, can be sacrificed to what is passing and personal to banal petty egotism. His moral uprightness was to an intelligence that was simultaneously objective, passionate, and always tended toward depth creative effort, the fight for the right . . . A simple man. He happened to note in the book whose author alluded to his "wi" was another man who] wanted power

I have *never* felt this sentiment . . . I sought power over intelligences and wills . . ." He felt himself to be not so much an authoritarian — though without failing to recognize the practical utility of authority — as one who spurred men on, drew them after him, not by flattering their base instincts but by summoning them to idealism, to clear reason, to the greatness of being fully men of a new type called on to transform society.

Those who hunted him down and killed him, as they killed the Russian Revolution and martyred the peoples of the U S S R, will meet their punishment. Already they have called down on a Soviet Union

weakened by the massacres called the "Stalinist purges" the most disastrous invasion. They continue on their road to the abyss . . . A few days after his death, I wrote — and I wish to change nothing in these lines: "Throughout his whole heroic life, Leon Davidovitch believed in the future, in the liberation of men. Far from weakening during the last sombre years, his faith matured still further and was rendered firmer by ordeal. Humanity of the future, freed from all oppression, will eliminate from its life all violence. As he did to many others, he taught me this faith."



FROM "NOTES ON THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION"

By JACQUES SADOUL

Jacques Sadoul's *Notes on the Bolshevik Revolution* are full of eulogistic remarks about Leon Trotsky. Sometimes, they are so eulogistic that one hesitates to quote them — from fear of falling into the "personality cult." What makes them outstanding, however, is the fact that at a later date, Jacques Sadoul became a faithful servitor of Stalinism, and did not hesitate even to place his prestige

It will be said that my reasoning would be justified only if Lenin and Trotsky were sincere. For a fortnight, I spent a good deal of my time with both men. I knew all their anxieties, their hopes, their plans. There are some feelings which cannot be questioned, and I can testify more assuredly than ever to the depth of conviction of the Bolshevik leaders. More than ever, they seem to me to be visionaries, if this description can fit thinkers like these men, who march inexorably on a path which they have previously mapped out; sustained and surrounded by the enthusiasm of their followers. They are men remarkable for intelligence and determination. [. . .]

Knowing Lenin and Trotsky as I do today, I am ashamed to have to defend, against such ignoble attacks, men whose intellectual honesty and moral stature is admitted even by their opponents: I speak of those who fought with them in the past and divided from them during the war. Anyone who knows a little of what they have done — the struggles for the ideal of Socialism in which they have been engaged for over 20 years, the harsh sacrifices which they have endured, the absolute contempt in which they hold material well being, the extremely frugal life which they have always led and which they are content to go on leading in power as in exile — must reject these slanders. [. . .]

Trotsky is at Brest-[Litovsk], Lenin has gone to Finland to rest a few days. Russia does not appear to have suffered thus far from their absences. These two are really the whole soul of the Revolution. They are remarkable men of action, mass leaders of a type I have never seen before. They have been able to acquire and maintain, despite all the slanders and under the most difficult conditions, an astonishing prestige. They have in supreme measure the qualities and the failings of the great political leaders: iron will, incredible tenacity, absolute conviction, the faith which moves mountains through every obstacle.

in the service of defending the infamous Moscow Trials — where Trotsky and Lenin's Central Committee were accused of having been "imperialist agents" as early as 1917!

That is why we quote some passages from the work of Jacques Sadoul, to give readers an idea of the manner in which *all communists* spoke of Trotsky before 1924 . . .

Of an exceptionally lively and supple intelligence, Trotsky is or knows how to be inflexible when it is necessary, when he feels that discussion cannot be allowed because discussion means doubt, and doubt in the leader causes demoralization in the ranks. I imagine that the disciples of Luther, the followers of Robespierre, the veterans of Napoleon, could not have had a more blind confidence in their leader or shown more veneration to him than the Red guards, the sailors, and the workers — who form the essential and basic nucleus of the Bolshevik forces — do to Lenin and Trotsky.

Trotsky often repeats to me how greatly he is impressed by the disinterestedness and utter devotion which these modest supporters lavish on their leader, and how he feels strengthened by their affection; when he speaks about his troops, ardent and devoted to the death, his voice, usually caustic and bitter, softens. He is moved by tenderness which his highly-strung, austere, and bitter nature rarely displays. Sometimes his satanic smile has sent chills through me, for the mind of Trotsky overflows with bitterness, contempt, and — well I know it — hatred, for the ruling class. I am truly convinced that these two exceptional and indeed great men (success alone will permit that bourgeois courtesan called history to classify them as such) are moved in their present action by the highest motives. [. . .]

The government of the soviets wanted to devote all its available resources and manpower to the problem of production which had fallen to a low level. Peace had been signed at Brest-[Litovsk]. Demobilization, that colossal enterprise which all the experts had declared impossible, had been accomplished in some six weeks. What need was there for an army?

The counter-revolutionaries of the entire world judged otherwise. Their manoeuvres obliged Russia to create, from nothing and in haste, a new military organization — a Herculean task after three years of war, after a

revolution made precisely against war. My letters have given day by day, the story of the difficulties of this army's formation, beset by difficulties. This story is that of the will of one man. As Carnot was the organizer of the armies of the French Revolution, Trotsky is the founder of the Red army. Starting out from the system of voluntary recruitment, he rapidly won acceptance for the great principle of compulsory service for all workers. Officers were lacking: Trotsky forced officers of the

Czarist army to hire out their services to the army of the Social Revolution. There were many betrayals. Trotsky had foreseen that. But at first, he could not do without making use of the collaboration of these ci-devants. He was neither surprised nor discouraged by betrayals. Gradually, he was able to get rid of the traitors and secure loyal officers. At the same time, he opened military schools throughout Russia where the proletariat could train officers from its own ranks.



THE PROPHET ARMED AND UNARMED

By ISAAC DEUTSCHER

Isaac Deutscher, a former Oppositional in the Communist Party of Poland, has been of late years settled in Britain as a historian, and is currently working on a three-volume biography of Leon Trotsky. Of the two quotations we are printing, the first, from the first volume, *The Pro-*

phet Armed, appears below; the second, from the second, *The Prophet Unarmed*, appears on page 80, at the end of Comrade Frank's review of the book. Both volumes are published by the Oxford University Press.

But no matter how the course of events has swayed and diverged from the route he had mapped out in 1904-06, by the middle of the present century he seemed once again to have grasped the "main chance of things" correctly. Whether one reads his message with horror or hope, whether one views him as the inspired herald of a new age surpassing all history in achievement and grandeur, or as the oracle of ruin and woe, one cannot but be impressed by the sweep and boldness of his vision. He reconnoitred the future as one who surveys from a towering mountain top a new and immense horizon and points to vast, uncharted landmarks in the distance. True enough, from his coign of vantage,

he could not take in the whole landscape below: patches of dense fog enveloped parts of it; and the play of distance and perspective looked different from what is seen in the valley. He misjudged the exact direction of a major road; he saw two or more separate landmarks merged into one; and he grievously overlooked one of the rocky ravines into which one day he himself would slip to his doom. But his compensation was the unique magnitude of his horizon. Compared with this vision, which Trotsky drew in his cell in the fortress, the political predictions made by his most illustrious and wisest contemporaries, including Lenin and Plekhanov, were timid or muddle-headed.



LEV DAVIDOVICH

By JAN van HEIJENOORT

Jan van Heijenoort, as a devoted and fervent Trotskyist, left his native France in 1932, when still very young, to join Leon Trotsky on the island of Prinkipo. He became Trotsky's principal secretary, and was with him until a

few months before the assassination. Van Heijenoort later left the movement and became a professor of mathematics and philosophy.

When Engels, revered patriarch of international Social-Democracy, passed away peacefully in London, burdened with years, the end of the century was approaching which separated the revolutions of the bourgeoisie from those of the proletariat, Jacobinism from Bolshevism. The transformation of the world, announced by Marx, was to become the immediate task, and revolutionists were to know unparalleled vicissitudes. And in fact the heads of the three greatest revolutionary leaders since Engels sustained the blows of reaction. The historian of the future will not fail to see in this one of the characteristic marks of our epoch. Nor should he fail to notice the source of these blows. Lenin's head was pierced by a bullet from the "Socialist Revolutionary" Fanny Kaplan. Rosa Luxemburg's head was shattered by the butt-ends of the "Social Democrat" Noske's

soldiery. Trotsky's head was laid open by the pick-axe of one of the "Communist" Stalin's mercenaries.

Our epoch of crisis, with its abrupt jumps and feverish tempo, devours men and parties more and more rapidly. Those who only yesterday represented the revolution become the instruments of the darkest reaction. This struggle between the head of the historic process and its leaden, dragging rump assumed its most dramatic form in the duel between Trotsky and Stalin, precisely because this struggle unfolded against the background of a workers' state already established. Trotsky, borne to the summits of power by the revolutionary explosion of the masses, persecuted and harassed when the defeats of the proletariat succeeded each other, became the very incarnation of the revolution.

He was aided by an astonishing physique. What

struck you first was his forehead — phenomenally lofty, vertical, and not heightened by baldness. After that his eyes, blue and deep, with a gaze powerful and sure of its power. During his stay in France Lev Davidovich very often had to travel incognito in order to simplify the problem of guarding him. Then he would shave off his goatee and brush his hair to one side, dividing it by a part. But when it came to his leaving the house and mingling with the public, I was always worried: “No, it’s really impossible . . . the first one to pass by will recognize him, he can’t change that gaze of his . . .” Then when Lev Davidovich began to speak, what attracted attention was his mouth. Whether he spoke in Russian or a foreign language his lips constrained themselves to shape words distinctly. He was irritated at hearing confused and precipitate speech from others, and always compelled himself to enunciate with complete distinctness. It was only in addressing Natalia Ivanovna in Russian that on occasion his enunciation became more hurried and less articulate, descending sometimes into a whisper. In conversations with visitors in his study his hands, resting on the edge of his worktable at first, would soon begin moving with large firm gestures, as though aiding his lips in molding the expression of his thought. His face with its halo of hair, the set of his head, and the whole carriage of his body were always proud and stately. His stature was above medium, with a powerful chest and a broad stalwart back, and in comparison his legs appeared somewhat slender. It is undoubtedly easier for someone who paid him one visit to say what he saw in Trotsky’s face than for one who was at his side for many years in the most variegated circumstances.

The one thing I never saw was the faintest expression of vulgarity. Nor was there any greater likelihood of finding what is called *bonhomie*. But a certain sweetness was not lacking, which no doubt originated in the formidable intelligence of whose readiness to understand everything you were always aware. What you usually saw was a youthful enthusiasm which joyously undertook everything, and at the same time was strong enough to induce others to cooperate in the undertaking. When it was a question of cudgeling an opponent, this sort of gaiety swiftly changed into irony, biting and malicious, alternating with an expression of contempt, and, when the enemy was particularly swinish, you would, for a moment, almost find a hint of malevolence. But his vivacity returned quickly. “We’ll fix ‘em!” he would say then with animation. In the isolation of exile the most dramatic circumstances where I could see Lev Davidovich were his conflicts with the police, or incidents with adversaries of bad faith. At these times his face would harden, and his eyes would flash, as though in them had suddenly been concentrated that vast will-power which ordinarily could be measured only by the labors of his entire life. Then it was obvious that nothing in the world could make him budge an inch.

In daily life this will-power expended itself in strictly organized labor. Any unmotivated disturbance irritated him extremely: he hated pointless conversations, unannounced visits, disappointments or delays in keeping engagements. To be sure, there was nothing pedantic in any of this. If an important question turned up, he would not hesitate a moment in upsetting all his plans, but it had to be worth it. If it had the slightest interest for the movement he would heedlessly give his time and

energy, but he showed himself all the more miserly of them when the carelessness, lightmindedness, or bad organization of others threatened to waste them. He hoarded the smallest particles of time, the most precious material of which life is made. His whole personal life was rigidly organized by the quality called singleness of purpose. He set up a hierarchy of duties, and brought to a conclusion whatever he undertook.

As a rule he did not work less than twelve hours a day, and sometimes, when it was necessary, much more. He remained at table as briefly as possible, and after sharing his meals for many years I could not say that I ever noticed on his face any mark of enjoyment for what he ate or drank. “Eating, dressing, all these miserable little things that have to be repeated every day . . .” he once said to me.

He could find his only diversion in great physical activity. Merely walking was scarcely a relaxation. He walked actively and in silence, and you could see that his mind was always at work. Now and then he would ask a question: “When did you answer that letter?” “Can you find me that quotation?” Only violent exercise gave him repose. In Turkey this consisted of hunting, and especially fishing, deep-sea fishing, complicated and agitated, where the body had to spend itself recklessly. When the fishing had been good, that is, very fatiguing, he began work on his return with redoubled enthusiasm. In Mexico, where fishing was impossible, he invented the gathering of cacti, of enormous weight, under a blazing sun.

Of course the necessity for security created certain obligations. During the eleven and a half years of his third emigration, it was only for a few months, at certain times during his stay in France and in Norway, that Lev Davidovich could walk about freely, that is, unguarded, in the countryside around his house. As a rule each one of his excursions constituted a minor military operation. It was necessary to make all arrangements in advance, and fix his route carefully. “You treat me as though I were an object,” he sometimes said, jokingly dissimulating whatever impatience there might have been in this remark.

He demanded the same methodical spirit he observed in his own work from the comrades who assisted him. The closer they were to him, the more did he demand of them and the less did he trouble himself with formalities. He desired precision in everything: an undated letter, an unsigned document always irritated him, as did in general anything easygoing, slipshod, or happy-go-lucky. Do whatever you’re doing well, and do it till you finish. And in this rule he made no distinction between petty day-to-day chores and intellectual work: conduct your thoughts to their conclusion, is an expression that often sprang from his pen. He always displayed great solicitude for the health of those around him. Health is revolutionary capital that must not be wasted. He grew angry at seeing someone read in a bad light. It’s necessary to risk your life for the revolution without hesitating, but why ruin your eyes when you can read comfortably and intelligently?

In conversations with Lev Davidovich what visitors were struck by chiefly was his capacity to find his bearings in a novel situation. He was able to integrate it in his general perspective, and at the same time always give immediate and concrete advice. During his third emigration he often had the opportunity of con-

versing with visitors from countries he was not acquainted with directly, perhaps from the Balkans or Latin America. He did not always know the language, did not follow their press, and had never had any particular interest in their specific problems. First of all he would allow his interrogator to speak, occasionally jotting down a few brief notes on a slip of paper in front of him, sometimes asking for a few details: "How many members has this party?" "Isn't this politician a lawyer?"

Then he would speak, and the mass of information that had been given him would be organized. Soon one could distinguish the movements of different classes and of different layers within these classes, and then, bound up with these movements, there would be revealed the play of parties, groups, and organizations, and then the place and activities of various political figures, down to their profession and personal traits, would be logically fitted into the picture. The French naturalist Cuvier used to boast of his ability to reconstruct an entire animal from a single bone. With his vast knowledge of social and political realities Trotsky could devote himself to a similar work. His interrogator was always astounded at seeing how deeply he had been able to penetrate the reality of the particular problem, and would leave Trotsky's study knowing his own country a little better.

At every moment you felt in Trotsky a huge fund of experience, not merely engraved in his memory but organized and reflected on lengthily and profoundly. You could also see that the organization of this experience had taken place around indestructible principles. Though Lev Davidovich hated routine, though he was always anxious to discover new trends, the least attempt at innovation in the realm of principles made him prick up his ears. "Trimming Marx's beard," was his expression for all these attempts to put Marxism in line with the current fashion, and he did not dissimulate his contempt for them.

Trotsky's style is universally admired. It is undoubtedly to be best compared with that of Marx. However, Trotsky's sentences are less spacious than those of Marx, in whom one is aware of a wealth of scholarly resources, especially in the youthful works. Trotsky's style achieves its effects by extremely simple means. His vocabulary, especially in his more properly political writings, is always rather limited. The sentences are short, with few subordinate clauses. Their power arises from a sturdy articulation, most often with strongly marked but always well balanced oppositions. This temperance of means gives his style a great freshness and, one might say, youthfulness. In his writing Trotsky is considerably more youthful than Marx.

Trotsky knew how to take advantage of that Russian syntax whose inflections permit the word-order within a sentence to be upset, giving the expression of the thought a force and emphasis difficult to attain with the limited means of modern western languages. And also difficult to translate. Lev Davidovich demanded a mathematical fidelity from his translators, and at the same time kicked against the rules of grammar in the foreign language which forbade a similarly concise and

direct rendition of his thought. Compared to that of Lenin, Trotsky's style is superior, by a large margin, in its lucidity and elegance, without any loss of power. Lenin's sentences occasionally become cumbrous, too heavy, disorganized. It seems as though the thought sometimes cripples its expression. Trotsky once said that in Lenin you could discover a Russian moujik, but one raised to the level of genius. Even though Lenin's father was a provincial functionary and Trotsky's a farmer, it is Trotsky who is the city-dweller, as opposed to Lenin, doubtless because of his race. This may be seen at once in the difference of style, without any attempt being made here to uncover this opposition in other aspects of these two giant personalities.

When Trotsky was deported to Turkey, the passport the Soviet authorities gave him put down his profession as writer. And in truth he was a great, an exceedingly great writer. If the bureaucrats' inscription causes a smile, it is because Trotsky was so much more than a writer. He wrote with ease, being able to dictate several hours at a sitting. But then he would go over the manuscript and correct it carefully. For some of these great writings, such as the *History of the Russian Revolution*, there were two successive drafts behind the definitive text, but in the majority of cases there is only one. His enormous literary production, in which are to be found books, pamphlets, innumerable articles, letters, hurried statements to the press, and notes of all sorts, is, needless to say, uneven. Some parts are more worked over than others, but not a sentence in any of them has been neglected. You can take any five lines in this ponderous accumulation of writing and you will always recognize the inimitable Trotsky.

Their volume is also impressive, and would alone bear testimony to a very rare will and capacity for labor. Thirty volumes of Lenin's complete works have been collected, in addition to thirty-five volumes of correspondence and odd notes. Trotsky lived seven years longer than Lenin, but his writings, from his long books to his brief personal notes, would undoubtedly come to triple that amount. In the eleven and a half years of his third emigration he amassed a labor which would honorably fill an entire lifetime. It may be said that the pen never abandoned his hand, and what a hand it was!

Trotsky has put all of himself into his books. Personal contact with the man himself did not modify the portrait that emerged from a reading of his works, but deepened it and made it more precise: passion and reason, intelligence and will, all carried to an extreme degree, but at the same time blending into one another. In everything Lev Davidovich did one had the feeling that he had given his whole being. He often repeated Hegel's words: Nothing great is done in this world without passion; and he had nothing but contempt for the philistines who object to the "fanaticism" of the revolutionaries. But intelligence was always present, in miraculous harmony with the fire. Nor could one dream of discovering a conflict: the will was indomitable because the mind saw very far. Hegel would have to be quoted once again: *Der Wille ist eine besondere Weise des Denkens*. Will is a specific function of thought.

THE TESTAMENTS OF TROTSKY

TESTAMENT

My high (and still rising) blood pressure is deceiving those near me about my actual condition. I am active and able to work but the outcome is evidently near. These lines will be made public after my death.

I have no need to refute here once again the stupid and vile slander of Stalin and his agents: there is not a single spot on my revolutionary honor. I have never entered, either directly or indirectly, into any behind-the-scenes agreements or even negotiations with the enemies of the working class. Thousands of Stalin's opponents have fallen victims of similar false accusations. The new revolutionary generations will rehabilitate their political honor and deal with the Kremlin executioners according to their deserts.

I thank warmly the friends who remained loyal to me through the most difficult hours of my life. I do not name anyone in particular because I cannot name them all.

However, I consider myself justified in making an exception in the case of my companion, Natalia Ivanovna Sedova. In addition to the happiness of being a fighter for the cause of socialism, fate gave me the happiness of being her husband. During the almost forty years of our life together she remained an inexhaustible source of

love, magnanimity, and tenderness. She underwent great sufferings, especially in the last period of our lives. But I find some comfort in the fact that she also knew days of happiness.

For forty-three years of my conscious life I have remained a revolutionist; for forty-two of them I have fought under the banner of Marxism. If I had to begin all over again I would of course try to avoid this or that mistake, but the main course of my life would remain unchanged. I shall die a proletarian revolutionist, a Marxist, a dialectical materialist, and consequently, an irreconcilable atheist. My faith in the communist future of mankind is not less ardent, indeed it is firmer today, than it was in the days of my youth.

Natasha has just come up to the window from the courtyard and opened it wider so that the air may enter more freely into my room. I can see the bright green strip of grass beneath the wall, and the clear blue sky above the wall, and sunlight everywhere. Life is beautiful. Let the future generations cleanse it of all evil, oppression, and violence, and enjoy it to the full.

L. Trotsky

February 27, 1940
Coyoacán

TESTAMENT

All the possessions remaining after my death, all my literary rights (income from my books, articles, etc) are to be placed at the disposal of my wife, Natalia Ivanovna Sedova. February 27, 1940. L. Trotsky.

In case we both die [The rest of the page is blank.]

March 3, 1940

The nature of my illness (high and rising blood pressure) is such — as I understand it — that the end must come suddenly, most likely — again, this is my personal hypothesis — through a brain hemorrhage. This is the best possible end I can wish for. It is possible, however, that I am mistaken (I have no desire to read special books on this subject and the physicians naturally will not tell the truth). If the sclerosis should assume a protracted character and I should be threatened with a

long-drawn-out invalidism (at present I feel, on the contrary, rather a surge of spiritual energy because of the high blood pressure, but this will not last long), then I reserve the right to determine for myself the time of my death. The "suicide" (if such a term is appropriate in this connection) will not in any respect be an expression of an outburst of despair or hopelessness. Natasha and I said more than once that one may arrive at such physical condition that it would be better to cut short one's own life or, more correctly, the too slow process of dying . . . But whatever may be the circumstances of my death, I shall die with unshaken faith in the communist future. This faith in man and in his future gives me even now such power of resistance as cannot be given by any religion.

L. Tr.

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE

*(The Latin American Stalinists
in the Footsteps of the Mensheviks)*

By ERNEST GERMAIN

A NEW PHASE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The Latin American revolution is currently passing through a new phase of marked upsurge. Not that it had experienced an ebb during these last years; indeed, it has been spreading and becoming generalized for a whole period. But for several months now both the breadth of the struggle and the consciousness of the toiling masses have made a spring forward that justifies the use of the term "new phase."

Let us leave aside the movement of partisans that is paralyzing several provinces in Colombia, the extraordinarily numerous and tenacious strikes in Argentina, the remarkable aftermath of the Venezuelan revolution, the victorious fight for the nationalization of a railway line in Brazil, and even Bolivia, where after six years of revolution the mass movement still keeps up an astonishing strength. For it is the upsurge of the Cuban revolution — which, jumping over stages, is hitting imperialism and the Cuban bourgeoisie with a series of blows each harder than the other and succeeding in mobilizing the masses on a scale hitherto unknown in this part of the Western hemisphere — that most adequately symbolizes this new phase.

At the moment that we are writing this article, the radio informs us that more than half a million poor peasants, come from every corner of the island, have assembled in Havana to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the 26th of July movement, and at the same time to demand that the government hold firm to its programme of agrarian reform. The revolutionary energy of the Cuban masses has sent sparks flying in every direction over the Caribbean. And some of these sparks, we have no doubt, will set fires in countries on the shores of the continent.

In this new rising phase of the Latin American revolution — which coincides with a rising movement of the revolution in Negro Africa, with the exacerbation of the revolutionary war of the Algerian people against French imperialism, with the ripening of the conditions for the conquest of power in Ceylon, which would open a new phase in the revolutionary process in Southeast Asia — revolutionaries have more than ever the

duty to examine in a cold and objective way the weaknesses and contradictions of the various political formations that are trying to win the confidence and support of the laboring masses. For despite the powerful blast of the movement of the masses, final victory will not be won so long as that power is not guided by a revolutionary party that is consistently seeking the conquest of power, the overthrow of capitalist domination ("national" as well as imperialist), and the creation of a new type of state, the dictatorship of the proletariat allied to the mass of poor peasants.

A DISASTROUS BALANCE-SHEET

Now the Communist Parties, which set out in the colonial revolution wearing the halos of their connection not only with Moscow but also with the victorious Chinese revolution, have for years been trying, with an energy and stubbornness worthy of a better cause, to confine the revolutionary movement of the masses of the colonial and semi-colonial countries within the limits of "national" capitalism and of "bourgeois democracy." The elemental power of the drive of the masses has not prevented this fatal orientation of the Communist Parties from piling up the terrible errors called Iran, Guatemala, Egypt, Iraq — the tragic experiences called support to Frondizi, support to Bandernayaka, support to Sukarno, without forgetting the scarce camouflaged support granted to Nehru, the most intelligent and the most dangerous leader of the colonial bourgeoisie.

It is true that this policy expresses a basic orientation of the Soviet bureaucracy: to form a world bloc with the colonial bourgeoisie, so as to "neutralize" imperialism in this way. The Soviet bureaucracy, as well as the colonial bourgeoisie, prefers a limited mobilization of the masses — just enough to threaten Washington, but not enough to bring the established order into danger — rather than the deepening of the revolutionary process. But the leaders of the various Communist Parties cannot just refer to the interests of the Kremlin to justify their policy that is contrary to the interests of the masses in their own countries. They must refer to the alleged "tactical necessities" of the revolution in these countries. And

as they are often facing young generations or those only freshly awakened to politics, they impudently indulge in invoking the name of Lenin or the experience of the Chinese revolution to put across their merchandise — whereas these references contain nothing but definitive condemnations for them.

Thus it is that in numbers 9 and 10 of the *Nouvelle Revue Internationale* (the international organ of the CPs), Rodney Arismendi devotes a pretentious study to "The Role of the National Bourgeoisie in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle." Under a farrago of phrases — all nuances and contradictions, where the form is faithfully wedded to the centrist content, where juxtapositions are of the "on the one hand, on the other hand" sort, and where finally there is an utter lack of any clear line, any revolutionary perspective, and any programme of *action* — Arismendi tries to reply to the critics who accuse the Communist Parties of systematically following an opportunist line toward the colonial revolution.

One prior remark is necessary. Arismendi naturally recognizes that "some errors of overestimation [?] of the national bourgeoisie" have been committed by various CPs. This sort of unprecise "self-criticism" always represents the best means of disarming genuine revolutionary criticism. But Arismendi refrains from referring to *one single concrete example* of the errors constantly committed in this connection by the CPs of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

He does not mention the unconditional support given to Nasser, of the systematic self-effacement of the Communists before Nasser . . . up till the day when Nasser interned the Communists in prisons and concentration camps.¹

He does not mention the unconditional support given to Bandarnayaka by the Ceylonese CP, which went to the extreme of organizing groups of scabs to help the government and the "national bourgeoisie" to break the strike of the Colombo port workers.

He does not mention the support given to Frondizi, who a few months later turned with all his forces against the workers' movement and decreed emergency laws against the Communist Party.

He does not mention the unconditional support given to Sukarno in his effort to form a Bonapartist regime in Indonesia, a regime that will set its iron heel on the workers' movement at the first opportunity.

All these living experiences, paid for by the blood of hundreds of proletarians throughout the

world, provide Arismendi with no research material. To settle the question of the "national bourgeoisie," he has to launch himself on perilous exercises in abstract tightrope-walking, but carefully refrains from appealing to historical experience — beginning with the so rich and typical experience of the Chinese CP's practice in 1925-1927, and its practice in 1946-1949 that rendered possible the victory of the third Chinese revolution.

We shall follow Arismendi into the field of "theory." But we cannot refrain from first refreshing his memory. Too many communists died in vain, and will die in vain, if the Arismendis can continue with impunity to cover up with "theoretical" formulae a shameful capitulation to the bourgeoisie.

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Half a century of experiences permits of summarizing in a few simple and precise points the duties of a revolutionary party in the colonial revolution:

- 1) To try first of all to form an independent political force of the proletariat and to fight against bourgeois ideological influence (of both imperialism and the national bourgeoisie) within the workers' movement.
- 2) To support critically any action, any step forward, any real movement, that is aimed against imperialist domination, independently of the temporary leadership of that movement, including when it is undertaken by the national bourgeoisie (nationalization of Mexican oil, of Bolivian tin, of Iranian oil, of United Fruit lands, of Cuban sugar lands, of the Suez canal, etc).
- 3) To represent within this movement the most energetic and radical force, the one that fights with the most devotion and self-sacrifice for the anti-imperialist victory.
- 4) To warn the toiling masses — in the cities as in the country — that the final victory over imperialism, the genuine rebirth of the nation, will not be able to be obtained so long as the movement is led by bourgeois or petty-bourgeois forces, vacillating and incapable of efficiently mobilizing the masses as a whole for the revolution.
- 5) To fight along this line for proletarian hegemony in the revolution, which means the winning, by the workers' revolutionary party, of the *leadership of the workers and poor peasants*, at whose head it overthrows the bourgeois order and creates the new socialist and soviet order.

These rules are not only those of Trotsky, of Trotskyism, and of the Fourth International.

¹ This opportunist policy toward Nasser, what is more, was preceded by a sectarian policy of refusing critical support, when the Stalinists were calling him fascist (in the same way that they called Perón and the 1945 P P A [Algerian nationalist party] fascist).

They are also those of Lenin and of the Bolshevik Party *from before the 1905 revolution*. The divergences between Trotsky and Lenin did not concern these elementary truths; they concerned the existence of an *intermediate phase* between the victory of the bourgeois-democratic anti-imperialist revolution and the victory of the socialist revolution. History has settled this difference: it has demonstrated in Russia, in Jugoslavia, in China, in the Vietnam, that the revolution's bourgeois-democratic tasks can be accomplished only by the conquest of power by revolutionary Marxist parties, only by the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the divergences between Lenin and Trotsky never concerned the role of the *national bourgeoisie* in the backward countries in our period.

The national character of the colonial revolution is determined either by the lack of national independence (in the strict sense of the word) or by forms of imperialist economic domination which appear to the overwhelming majority of the nation as the principal obstacles to its rise as a nation (in semi-colonial countries such as those of Latin America). In the latter case it is not possible to win an internal market sufficient for an industrial upsurge as long as the economy retains its semi-colonial structure. There thus results a real contradiction between imperialism and the national bourgeoisies of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. This contradiction involves manifold conflicts — political, economic, financial, cultural, and even military (Suez!). Nobody has ever denied this. It even means that the national bourgeoisie may be obliged to carry out partial mobilizations of the masses against imperialism — as was most strikingly demonstrated by the case of Perón in Argentina, whom Arismendi with an incredible light-mindedness describes as “fascist” (*Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, no 10, p 62). But it does not mean, any more in Latin America than in Czarist Russia, that the national bourgeoisie — faced by a proletariat strong in numbers, organized in trade unions for several decades, and making its bid for power — can *become a revolutionary force*.

That is the exact point at which the difference occurs between Leninism — even the “old style” Leninism of before 1917 — and the practice of the CPs today.

The yoke of imperialism, especially of Yankee imperialism, and the need to solve the revolution's democratic tasks, in the first place the agrarian question, change the national bourgeoisie into one of the factors of the revolution and render possible its participation in the democratic front of national liberation. It seems [!]

that this fundamental thesis cannot be brought into doubt.

In this connection the Chinese revolution constitutes a classic [!] model, just as Lenin's tactic before 1905 appears as the basis of the Marxist doctrine of the participation [!] and the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Thereby we possess a sure compass. [*Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, no 9, pp 76-7.]

The impudence of this author knows no limits. The “sure compass” of Lenin; the formula on “the hegemony of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist revolution,” the discreet allusion to the Chinese revolution (which? that of 1925-27 or that of 1946-49?) — all this artillery must cover up the thesis according to which “the national bourgeoisie is one of the factors of the revolution.” Now Lenin denied the validity of this thesis, which was defended before and during 1905 only by the *right-wing Mensheviks*.

Let us consult the key work of Lenin on this problem, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. Among other passages we find the following:

But we Marxists all know from theory and, from daily and hourly observation of our liberals, Zemstvo-ists, and Osvobozhdenitsi that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly in its support of the revolution [in the same way that Frondizi took his stand as an anti-imperialist — E G]. *The bourgeoisie, in the mass, will inevitably turn toward counter-revolution, toward the autocracy, against the revolution, and against the people* [emphasis added — E G], immediately its narrow, selfish interests are met, immediately it “recoils” from consistent democracy (*and it is already recoiling from it!*). [Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol I, p 404, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947.]

But, once so well started, Arismendi does not stop. A few lines farther on, he does not hesitate to state that, by “underestimating” the role of the national bourgeoisie, one

in practice blurs the national factor in the revolution: the national bourgeoisie is considered as a simple tool [?] of imperialist domination, the isolation [!] of the proletariat appearing as the nec plus ultra. This erroneous conclusion finds its origin in the fact that very frequently [!] the national bourgeoisie betrays and persecutes the proletariat. It is forgotten in this connection that the antagonism between it [the national bourgeoisie] and imperialism is a

constant factor, despite the spirit of conciliation characteristic of the national bourgeoisie as a class. [*Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, no 9, p 77.]

That's the kind of merchandise that they try to cover up with the name of Lenin!

In stating that in our period the national bourgeoisie cannot become a revolutionary factor, we are nowise "denying" the antagonisms between that bourgeoisie and imperialism; we no more reduce that bourgeoisie to the function of "tool of imperialism" than Lenin transformed the Russian bourgeoisie into a tool of Czarism when he emphasized that it will in the mass line up on the side of reaction in case of a really broad and popular revolution.

What our Latin American Menshevik understands no more than the Russian Mensheviks did, is that the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat becomes preponderant *during a revolution*, when thousands and thousands of the poor, the wretched, the unashamed victims of exploitation, abruptly become conscious of their strength and believe themselves capable of overturning everything. The bourgeoisie, national and imperialist, colonial and semi-colonial, is and remains the party of order. Private property takes precedence over any other consideration. When this private property is threatened, the bourgeoisie goes over to the counter-revolutionary camp; and in our period *any* revolution implicitly threatens private property — whatever miserable "communists" like Arismendi may do to assure the national bourgeoisie that not a hair of their heads shall be touched.

It is precisely for this reason that the antagonism between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism is expressed by speeches, books, conferences, mass demonstrations (remember Perón!), meetings among heads of parties and states, and voyages, even to Moscow . . . but not by a *revolutionary* mobilization of the masses. And anyone who impudently affirms the contrary must really have forgotten the A B C of Leninism.

By stating that the revolution loses its "national" character if unfortunately the "national" bourgeoisie does not take part in it, Arismendi utters another enormity fit to wake the dead. Thus the 1917 Revolution was not a national revolution because the bourgeoisie was in the camp of the counter-revolution! The Chinese revolution in 1946-47 was not a national revolution either, because you could have hunted with a magnifying glass for a "national bourgeoisie" in the camp of Mao Tse-Tung! The Vietnam and Algerian revolutions would not be "national revolutions" because in them the bourgeoisie is conspicuous by its absence. And it is a "communist" who is teaching this today to the workers of Latin America . . .

The whole twelfth chapter of Lenin's *Two Tactics* is devoted to this question. It is sub-titled: "Will the Sweep of the Democratic Revolution Be Diminished If the Bourgeoisie Recoils from It?" With his acrid dialectic, Lenin makes fun of the "Caucasian Mensheviks" who defend this "vile conception." What would he have said if he had been able to read the prose of the "Latin American Mensheviks"?

For, as a matter of fact, the Russian revolution will begin to assume its real sweep, will really assume the widest revolutionary sweep possible in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolution, only *when the bourgeoisie recoils from it* and when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side by side with the proletariat. In order that it may be consistently carried to its conclusion, our democratic revolution must rely on such forces as are capable of paralyzing the *inevitable inconsistency of the bourgeoisie* (i.e., capable precisely of "causing it to recoil from the revolution," which the Caucasian adherents of *Iskra* fear so much because of their lack of judgment). [Idem, p 406. Emphasis added.]

Here we have two diametrically opposed positions. Arismendi wails: "very frequently the national bourgeoisie betrays and persecutes the proletariat." If by mischance "revolutionary excesses" drive it into the camp of the counter-revolution, "the revolution loses its national character." Let us therefore bow down before the Frondizis, the Lotts, the Bandarnayakas, the Nehrus, the Nassers, the Sukarnos, even if they throw us in jail or burn us alive in locomotive fireboxes (as was done by Chiang Kai-Shek, the No 1 prototype of the "national bourgeoisie"). Lenin replies: Since it is *inevitable* that the national bourgeoisie will go over to the camp of reaction, let us not paralyze ourselves by efforts to keep it in the camp of the revolution. Let us strike out boldly at the head of the peasant masses, let us mobilize them, together with the workers, so as to complete our revolution against imperialism and against the bourgeoisie.

A real gulf separates these two conceptions. It is the gulf between Menshevism and Bolshevism. It is the gulf between the Stalinist policy today in Latin America and in many another colonial and semi-colonial country, and the Leninist, communist, policy advocated by the Fourth International.

THE ART OF "ISOLATING" THE PROLETARIAT

We are leaving aside Lenin's formula concerning the bourgeois-democratic revolution — to which we shall return a little further on — and

pausing at the most typical and revelatory passage of the quotation from Arismendi: By "underestimating the role of the national bourgeoisie," [...] the isolation of the proletariat appears as the *nec plus ultra*." Thus, if it refuses to ally itself to the national bourgeoisie, the proletariat "isolates itself."

Arismendi ought to present us with a chart of the social structure of any Latin American or other semi-colonial — not to mention colonial — country whatsoever, in which the national bourgeoisie is a social force of such numerical importance that by refusing to join in with it the proletariat appears as "isolated." Naturally such a problem is impossible to solve. Precisely what characterizes backward countries, colonial and semi-colonial, is that the bourgeoisie therein is — numerically, economically, and socially — relatively much weaker than the proletariat, which works not only for "national" bosses but also (and often, especially) for foreign capital.

And nevertheless, Arismendi returns to the charge with the accusation of "isolation":

Some insignificant little groups of Trotskyists have also come to clamor for the isolation of the proletariat . . .

he writes on page 79, thus taking over the essence of the formula of the Chilean Stalinist leader Luis Corvalán, who wrote on page 101 of No 8 of the same review:

The Trotskyists were supporting leftist tendencies in the hope [!] of isolating the working class and causing it to suffer a defeat.²

But the mystery can be cleared up: what Arismendi is in reality afraid of is the isolation of the proletariat from the *peasantry*:

The intensification of class combats and the driving upsurge of the strike movements — a very important characteristic of the current situation in Latin America — allow those who limit themselves to a superficial analysis of events to set up as a

² Since the XXth Congress of the CPSU, the Trotskyists are no longer either spies or "agents of imperialism," but only "ideological adversaries who have been definitively crushed." Why do they desire the isolation and defeat of the proletariat? By masochism? Or does the right hand of our neo-Stalinists still not know what the left hand wrote?

As for the "insignificance" of the "little groups" of Trotskyists, let us recall only that in the Province of Buenos Aires they obtained in the last elections 25% as many votes as the Communist Party, though they had candidates in only three circumscriptions whereas the Stalinists had candidates in every circumscription in the province; that at the time of Nixon's visit to Lima, it was they who led the big demonstration of students against that representative of imperialism; and that in Bolivia, the governmental press has been for months carrying on an unceasing struggle against them, describing them as a serious threat to the bourgeois regime.

theory their own desire to jump over the necessary stages in developments. Marx's indication that, *without the chorus of peasants, the solo of the proletarian revolution runs the risk of being transformed into a swan-song* is perfectly applicable — and all the more easily — to the wider field of the movement of national liberation. [*Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, No 9, p 79.]

So now we understand: by "underestimating the role of the national bourgeoisie — that is, by refusing to conclude united front alliances with it — *the proletariat is isolating itself from the peasantry!*"

Now Lenin wrote, on the contrary:

Anyone who genuinely understands the role of the peasantry in the victorious Russian Revolution will never say that the scope of the revolution will lessen when the bourgeoisie turns away from it.

Still better: he wrote that the outcome of the revolution will depend on the question; who will lead the peasants, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie? For the allusion — devoid of sense in his phrase — to the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, which Arismendi has mixed in with his ultra-opportunist and Menshevik notions — this allusion means precisely: *to wrench the political leadership of the peasantry away from the bourgeoisie, from the bourgeois parties, from the well-to-do lawyers, doctors, and businessmen, and from the industrialists, who paralyze it and prevent it from demonstrating in full its anti-imperialist anger, its desire for a radical change!*

It is you, Señor Arismendi, who are isolating the proletariat by obliging it to conclude alliances with the parties of the national bourgeoisie, parties that paralyze the peasantry and thus prevent it from joining with the proletariat. By opposing a Menshevik policy of a bloc with the national bourgeoisie, Leninism, Trotskyism, far from isolating the proletariat, create the conditions for the revolutionary alliance between the *proletariat* and the *peasantry*, an alliance which has as its precondition the emancipation of the peasantry from its bourgeois "leadership."

It is here, furthermore, that is to be found the weakness — the only one — in the formulae used by Lenin in 1905. In him there was not a trace of Menshevism, of illusions in or conciliationism toward the bourgeoisie, of opportunist fear of "frightening off the national bourgeoisie." But what did remain in him was the illusion that the peasantry might play an *independent* role in the revolution. That is why he spoke of the "bourgeois-democratic" phase of the revolution as *distinct* from the proletarian phase. The former would be characterized by the alliance between

a workers' party and a peasant party ("the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry"); the latter would be characterized by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But Lenin sets himself off from the Arismendis of today, among other things, by the fact that he is capable of a genuine self-criticism, not of a simulacrum of one which has as its purpose to cover up one's own mistakes. The experience of 1917 taught Lenin that an independent peasant party will never exist. The peasantry, as Trotsky had demonstrated as early as 1905, is capable of manifold heroic actions; but it is not capable of constituting a conscious political force independent of the proletariat and of the bourgeoisie. Hence the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry cannot take the form of an alliance between the revolutionary party and a peasant party (which *calls itself* a peasant party and is either a *bourgeois* party or an opportunist *workers'* party). Hence the victory of the democratic revolution demands the conquest of power by the proletarian party, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, with which it coincides.

Few comrades are aware that Lenin clearly formulated this self-criticism about the peasantry's incapacity for *independent political action*. That is why it is useful to draw their attention to a passage where the creator of the soviet state is quite explicit on this subject:

The second force is that which stands between developed capital and the proletariat. It is the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, it is what in Russia constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population — the peasantry. They are mainly small proprietors and small farmers. Nineteenth of them are like that, and they cannot be anything else. They do not take part in the acute daily struggle between capital and labor. *They have not been to that school*; their economic and political conditions of life do not bring them together, but disunite them, repel one from the other, transform them into millions of individual, separate small proprietors. Such are the facts, of which you are perfectly well aware. [...] We know from our own experience — and we see confirmation of it in the development of all revolutions, if we take the modern epoch, a hundred and fifty years, say, all over the world — that the result has been the same everywhere: every attempt on the part of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and of the peasants in particular, to realize their strength, to direct economics and politics in their own way, has failed. *Either under the leadership of the proletariat, or under the leader-*

ship of the capitalists — there is no middle course. All those who hanker after this middle course are empty dreamers, fanatics. [...]

[...] Insofar as the proletariat was unable to lead the revolution, this force always came under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. ["Speech Delivered at the All-Russian Congress of Transport Workers," in *Selected Works*, vol II, pages 690-2, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947. Emphasis added.]³

There is what remains of the theory of "stages": an absolute fiasco. The struggle for hegemony in the "democratic" revolution is precisely a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It is precisely in order to revolutionize the peasantry, in order not to be isolated from it, that the proletariat must distrust any alliance with the national bourgeoisie, that it must fight for its own revolutionary solutions. The example of Cuba has shown that an agrarian reform — even one that is relatively moderate but carried out at the moment of the revolution by revolutionary means, with an increasing mobilization of the peasantry — drives the "national bourgeoisie" of the Urutias & Co into the camp of the counter-revolution. Any revolutionary party that wants not to be isolated from the peasantry must drive with all its strength in this direction. Any workers' party which, for the purpose of not "jumping over the necessary stages in developments," would in practice refrain from the revolutionary mobilization of the worker and peasant masses, in order not to frighten the Kassems, Nassers, Sukarnos, Frondizis, Lotts, Bandarnayakas, & Co, *would fatally isolate itself from the peasant masses*, and would thus prepare its own repression by the national bourgeoisie, which would "betray" it still one more time.

The problem of the presence of this or that individual, little group, or small petty-bourgeois, middle-bourgeois, or even bourgeois party in the revolutionary camp is naturally not the decisive factor. It is significant of the confusion in Stalinist ideas about the colonial revolution that Arismendi speaks indiscriminately of the "presence" of "elements" of the national bourgeoisie in the "national liberation movement"; of "the exploitation of the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism"; of the "national liberation front" with the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie; and finally of "the alliance with the national bourgeoisie."

These notions, used indiscriminately, cover ab-

³ This passage takes up almost *word for word* the analogous analysis of Trotsky in his book on the 1905 revolution, and in the different texts in which Trotsky worked out the theory of the permanent revolution.

solutely different realities. Nobody would drive a national bourgeois out of an anti-imperialist united front *led by the workers' parties* just because he was bourgeois (although he would have to be regarded with great distrust — as Lenin said, it is *inevitable* that the bourgeoisie, *in the mass*, will go over to the counter-revolutionary camp, and how to be sure in advance that we have here an exception?). But neither would any Leninist agree to consider *the political subordination of the proletariat to the national bourgeoisie* — the vote for Frondizi; the refusal to defend the independence of the trade unions against Nasser as long as he had not broken with the U S S R; the refusal to support a strike against the Bandarnayaka government, etc — any more than the limitation of the mobilization of the masses under the pretext of not frightening off the national bourgeoisie. But it is of this opportunism that the Stalinist parties are currently guilty in most of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Arismendi invokes the example of China. We suppose that he prefers not to mention the 1925-27 policy of the Chinese C P, which, under the pretext of not “jumping over stages,” of maintaining with the “national bourgeoisie” a “bloc of the four classes,” precipitated the sanguinary defeat of the second Chinese revolution. But it is true that after 1946, when the third Chinese revolution began, the leadership of the Chinese C P continued to preach the theory of the “two stages,” and was, according to its own words, first carrying out a “democratic revolution,” and then passing on to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is necessary here to recall an old proverb, but reversing it: Do what I do, and not what I say. In vain Mao Tse-Tung talked about the “democratic revolution,” for there is not the shadow of a doubt that the People's Republic of China, proclaimed in 1949 at the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Peking, was a workers' state, a proletarian dictatorship, right from the beginning. To realize this, it suffices to recall that this state was born out of a ferocious civil war, in which the whole of the bourgeoisie was to be found in the camp of Chiang Kai-Shek — except a few deserters, renegades to their class, who served to amuse the gallery. It suffices to recall the extremely violent nature of the *class hatred* that the world bourgeoisie, and especially the American bourgeoisie, vowed against the People's Republic of China, not beginning with the nationalization of the last textile company — which, incidentally, has not yet occurred — but beginning with the foundation of the people's republic, and especially beginning with the outbreak of the Korean war.

And it might also be said to Arismendi: If instead of imitating only the opportunist theories of the Chinese, you would also imitate their ac-

tions; if, while prattling away about the progressive role of the national bourgeoisie, you would in practice treat the Frondizis, the Lotts, the Nassers, and the like in the same way that Mao treated their Chinese equivalents; if, instead of preaching the dangers of the isolation of the proletariat, you would in practice organize peasant uprisings, the peasant war on the model of Mao or even on the petty-bourgeoisie model of Fidel Castro — then history will show some indulgence toward your theoretical mistakes. If on the contrary your actions continue to be in conformity with your words, you will continue not only to lull the proletariat but also to betray it. And that, history will never pardon you!

We nowise mean to underestimate the pernicious role of erroneous theories, even if one departs from them in practice. The Chinese example, furthermore, is there to demonstrate this: the false conceptions with which the Chinese C P covered its practice, finally revolutionary beginning with 1946, today prevent the C Ps of the colonial countries from following Mao's path. Or still more paradoxically: what today is ridiculously called “Mao's path” in the C Ps of the colonial and semi-colonial countries is not the forming of an army of revolutionary partisans; it is not the mobilization of the peasant masses against the state and the landed proprietors, noble or bourgeois, foreign or national; it is not the definitive and violent rupture, by armed struggle, with the ruling party of the national bourgeoisie — a party capable, let us not forget, of carrying on in its own hesitating way a *war* against Japanese imperialism; it is not the refusal to break up its army and its own territory, even in the course of this war and despite all opportunist formulae about the “national bloc.” No, what is ridiculously called “Mao's path” is *the path to the defeat of 1927*, the refusal to mobilize the peasant masses thoroughly (“in order not to drive the national bourgeoisie away from the anti-imperialist front”); it is the subordination to the political leadership of this bourgeoisie; it is the abandon of any attempt to fight for power under one's own flag; it is the affirmation that this struggle for power cannot be put on the agenda “at the present stage.” It is, in short, the Menshevik path of 1905 and 1917, which Stalin borrowed with such tragic results in China and in Spain.

THE PECULIARITIES OF LATIN AMERICA

When Lenin characterized the role of the liberal bourgeoisie in Czarist Russia, he was speaking of a country where wage-earners formed less than 20% of the active population; he was treating of a world solidly dominated by the bourgeoisie, without workers' states, without the experience of proletarian revolutions (with the

exception of the experience, already far in the past, of the Paris Commune), and without colonial revolutions. It is understandable that these circumstances taken together favored a more revolutionary behavior of the liberal bourgeoisie, that it feared less than the bourgeoisie of today to be outflanked by the proletariat, and that the possibility of setting up in a backward country a "dictatorship of the proletariat" seemed to it just a bad joke.

If, despite all these favorable conditions, the Russian bourgeoisie had sufficient class consciousness *not* to urge on the revolution; if, despite them, it went over bag-and-baggage to the camp of reaction as soon as the first claps of thunder were heard — then how much more unlikely would be an abrupt participation of the "national bourgeoisie" in a genuine Latin American revolution today, when the U S S R exists, when capitalism has been destroyed over a third of the globe, when the bourgeoisie of Eastern Europe, of China, of the Vietnam, have seen the collapse of their power and wealth, when capitalism on a world scale is trembling for the future of its regime. To believe that under these conditions the national bourgeoisie in Latin America can become revolutionary — and not only the bourgeoisies of extremely backward countries, but even those of countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, that count a proletariat proportionately far more powerful than the Russian proletariat of 1905 — is to snap one's fingers at any consideration of class struggle.

Arismendi waxes indignant that Figueres, ex-President of Costa Rica and a quite typical Latin American liberal, should have crudely stated at Washington: "In our relations among Americans, the most important thing is the economic question, that is, the price of merchandise." This strange "Marxist" finds no other answer than the melodramatic remark: "Let prices be raised, and there is a country and a continent ready to sell itself!" That's it: the conflict between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, just like the conflict between Czarism and the national bourgeoisie, lies precisely in that: *to get a better share of the surplus-value*, to take for oneself the lion's share while leaving the smallest possible part for the "foreigner" or the "Czar." If by good fortune this demand is partially satisfied, even temporarily, the national bourgeoisie immediately goes over to the opposite camp, for at that moment it is a question of *defending surplus-value as such*, to prevent these tatterdemalion workers and poor peasants from taking the whole cake away from them. To replace the analysis of the class struggle by oaths in "defense of national industry" is a task that the communists in another age gladly abandoned to other political formations.

Arismendi talks a lot about "the broadening of the united front," of the alliance with the peasantry, etc. But he rarely raises the question: Who owns the tenant-farmers' land? Is it only big landed proprietors? Which are the countries in which a good part of the "national" bourgeoisie also owns land? Is this not especially the case in Cuba, which explains why this bourgeoisie goes over to the camp of the counter-revolution as soon as landed property is touched? The peculiarities of the Latin American revolution deserve precise analyses of this sort, and not the promise of finding oneself tomorrow in the same camp as Figueres provided he will kindly reestablish diplomatic relations with the U S S R.

The tradition of the communist movement in Latin America, while richer than it is presented by the Arismendis & Co, is admittedly more limited than the tradition of the communist movement in other sectors. Before 1929, the Communist Parties that had succeeded in becoming mass revolutionary parties were not very numerous in Latin America. But if Arismendi carefully avoids referring to this tradition, it is hardly for that reason. It is simply because on every page it indicts as false his opportunist and Menshevik conceptions.

Few documents were devoted to Latin America by the Communist International in the period when Lenin was still alive and participated in the activity of the C I. But one of these documents, doubtless the most important, deserves to be recalled to the attention of the communists of Latin America. It dates from September 1920 and was drafted by the C I's Executive Committee, of which Lenin was a member. It is a question of an appeal to all the workers of North and South America, titled, "The American Revolution." Despite the inevitably abstract and general nature of certain passages, which reflect the lack of experience of the revolutionary movement in this part of the world, its analysis and its conclusions remain today more valid than ever, especially because it calls for a joint struggle by the workers of North and South America, *for the overthrow of American imperialism and capitalism* in the western hemisphere. There can be found in it not a trace of prattling about the bloc with the national bourgeoisie. Here is the passage of this appeal concerning the tasks of communists in Latin America — at a period when the proletariat was infinitely weaker than it is now:

The task consists above all in the organization in each Latin American country of a communist party that is clearly distinct, determined, and conscious. It is not indispensable that this party be powerful right at its formation; it is necessary, however, that it possess a clear programme, that it

engage in resolute agitation for revolutionary principles and tactics, that it fight resolutely against the tempters and misleaders of the masses. Such a party must be composed of the best and most honest representatives of the masses; it must develop the programme of a genuine mass movement, it must integrate itself completely in the revolutionary struggle of the masses and lead it with patience and determination along broader and broader paths, toward more and more important goals.

Only a communist party can give clarity and honesty to the movement in Latin America; it is only in this way that it can be unified with the revolutionary movement in the United States and with the CI; it is only along this path that it can occupy the place belonging to it in the world revolution.

The agrarian problem is of the greatest importance. Agriculture still predominates in Latin America (even in Argentina, the country that is the most developed in Latin America from the capitalist viewpoint, there are less than 400,000 industrial workers in a population of more than eight million). The peasants are exploited in the cruelest manner; they live in extreme oppression and poverty; they form the cannon-fodder for military adventures. The Mexican experience offers a typical and tragic example. The enslaved peasants revolt and make a revolution. The fruits of their victory are carried off by capitalist exploiters, political adventurers, and "social-

ist" bawlers. The oppressed and betrayed peasants must be awakened to revolutionary action and organization. They must be taught that they cannot free themselves, alone, as peasants, but must *unite with the revolutionary proletariat in the common struggle against capitalism.*

The Communist Party must draw close to the peasants. It must do so, not with abstract formulae and theories, but with a practical programme suitable to awakening the peasants to *the struggle against the landed proprietor and the capitalist.* Union between the poor peasants and the proletariat is absolutely indispensable: *only the proletarian revolution can free the peasants by overthrowing the power of capital; only the agrarian revolution can prevent the proletarian revolution from being crushed by the counter-revolution.*

There is the language of the Communist International in the time of Lenin. Granted, it is highly general and abstract. But there is in these few paragraphs more revolutionary wisdom than in the thirty pages of Arismendi's contradictory prose. The line of the Leninist CI was clear — even when the proletarians were counted only by hundreds of thousands — and has now been enriched and developed thanks to an experience of 40 years of revolutionary struggles, which the Latin American organizations of the Fourth International — now when millions of proletarians exist, organize themselves, and struggle — apply to-day in Latin America.

THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN PRESENT-DAY JAPAN

(Excerpts from Draft Theses)

By T K

II¹

34. After the zigzag of right opportunism (1945-1950) and left adventurism (1951-1954), the C P is at present in a right opportunist stage for the second time. The C P leadership, unable to bring the internal dynamics of the Japanese revolutionary movement into agreement with the dynamics of the world revolution, is exploiting the working-class movement under its leadership in the interests of the privileged bureaucracy of the U S S R, concretely, the bureaucratic aims of the Kremlin. These betrayals are their fundamental aims.

Because of the duality of the Soviet bureaucracy that defends its privileges against both imperialism and the Russian working class, the duality of Stalinism, of Kremlin diplomatic policies, parallel to its domestic policies, has alternately adopted right opportunism and conciliation with imperialism in the period of the relative stability of its domination, and adopted left adventurism in the period of its crisis and perturbation and the rise of the mass movement. And in these processes it has dealt an enormous blow to the revolutionary struggle of the masses and produced one of the main causes of its defeat. Its zigzags between ultra-right and ultra-left are characteristic of the history of the Japanese C P since the war and its fundamental attitude in the present situation. Therefore, while the C P is not an accessory of bourgeois democracy as reformism is, and moreover is not the political expression of the labor aristocracy, it is defined as the centrist workers' party representing the interests of the privileged bureaucracy — a labor aristocracy parasitic on the workers' state in our working-class movement.

35. The defense of the workers' states by the C Ps cannot organize and lead the masses to the struggle for the overthrow of imperialism, liberate all the potential energy of the Japanese revolutionary movement, and combine itself with the advances of the communist revolution. Their defense is to bring pressure on imperialism and oblige it to conciliate with the U S S R by the "peace struggle" or by stirring up adventurist riots. In both cases, the working class and its aims

are forgotten. In the first, the basis is the maintenance of the status quo of the privileged Kremlin bureaucracy against the enemy in front and in back of it. In the second, the basis is an ultimatism by the bureaucracy that disregards the experiences of the working class and the rhythm of its spontaneity, and uses imperativism to the masses in the class struggle.

Many workers and intellectuals join the C P with the idea of inheriting the October Revolution and fighting under the banner of communism. But their revolutionary efforts are lost in the periodic zigzags of the C P leadership, and they are kept from maturing as revolutionary militants inside the mass movement, they grow corroded and lose their energies. But the C P, unlike the S P, is not parasitical on the bourgeois-democratic regime. Therefore it is not yet a permanent accessory of imperialism. And it must not be ignored that it is able to express under certain circumstances the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle for socialism by the masses. Good examples of this are in China, Korea, Vietnam, Jugoslavia, etc. In order to represent the interests of the privileged bureaucracy of the workers' states in our working-class movement, it is necessary for the Japanese C P, as an intermediary, to win over a definite number of worker militants withdrawn from the influence of bourgeois democracy and the Social-Democracy. This is the basis of the dual character of the Japanese C P. And this duality is different from that in the workers' states. This fact appears concretely in the C P's relations with the S P and the political forces of the petty bourgeoisie. These relations find expression on the one hand in the Popular Front, and on the other in the theory of Social-Fascism. In the former, the C P makes an effort to sell the workers under its influence to the Social-Democracy. In the latter, the C P launches to millions of workers under the influence of the Social-Democracy the ultimatum that they must fight under C P leadership, without united actions.

In order to put into practice such zigzag manoeuvres corresponding to Kremlin diplomacy, the C P needs an organization of worker militants separated from the Social-Democracy. Therein lies the particular dual character of the C P in our country. During a rise in the revolutionary mass

¹ For the first part, see our Spring issue.

movement, this duality drove the C P's of China and Yugoslavia to the conquest of power, against Kremlin diplomacy. This duality also defines the essence of the VIth National Conference of the Japanese C P. Before the VIth National Conference, the practice of left adventurism, the interdiction of democracy, and the completeness of bureaucratization in the party had reduced the membership of the C P so that it could not have an influence in the mass movement. Though it is hardly necessary to mention that it was a change in the Kremlin's diplomatic policy that caused the C P's shift from left adventurism to right opportunism, its restoration of strength to a certain extent shows us that even passively the C P is dependent not only on the Kremlin's policy but also on the revolutionary workers' movement. Without its influence in the revolutionary workers' movement, the C P does not have the means to bring the Kremlin policy to the masses. Therefore the C P leadership makes efforts to give some partial democracy in party life to the rank-and-file members in order to liberate the energy of the revolutionary militants capable of spreading through the mass movement.

36. But the democratization of party life is going beyond the limits aimed at by the C P leadership at the VIth National Conference. It is stimulated by the real commencement of the political revolution in the workers' states, the might of the world revolution — for example, the rapid development of the Arab colonial revolution, particularly in Algeria — and the start of the revolutionary transformation of our working-class movement since 1957. The main body of militant members began to criticize the complete incapacity of C P leadership in the mass movement. These militants, rooted in the mass movement, are unconsciously contrasting the C P tops' dependence on the Kremlin with the interests of the revolutionary class — this reflects the rise of the lower working masses in the C P. Their ideology is pulling away from Stalinism. In this field too the international decline of Stalinism is spreading. Concretely the decline of Stalinism is expressed, not in the weakness of the C P as a whole, but as a decline in the authority of the C P tops and the relative intensity of the main body of the militant cadres. These facts show that the relationship of contradictory forces inside the C P is changing a little in favor of the confused revolutionary-worker members. Thus efforts to examine the traditional theory of revolution have been begun by these members for their own reorientation, and are spreading rapidly.

37. The tradition of the October Revolution and the strategies and tactics of Bolshevik-Leninism were never digested by the C P before the

war. Though the revolutionary upsurge after the war organized several tens of thousands of revolutionary workers in the C P and infused fresh energy into it, the Stalinist leadership established complete domination over the new forces and barred the way through which the members could reach Bolshevism.

The discussion about the strategies and tactics of Bolshevism — the tactics for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship — begun by the Comintern and continued by the International Left Opposition and the Fourth International, has been sincerely opened up inside the C P against the background of the struggle of the C P opposition against left adventurism (1950-1954), the real decline of Stalinism, and the world revolution since 1953. Its key point is to oppose to the Popular Front the winning over of the masses to the revolutionary orientation through the Leninist united front, and to oppose to left adventurism the preparation of the serious insurrection for the conquest of power; and to understand and be certain about the above problems in the victorious revolutions and the defeated revolutions since the October Revolution.

38. It is the present duty of the Japanese section of the Fourth International to give conscious leadership to the spontaneous revolutionary tendencies in the left wing of the S P and its periphery, among the worker militants of the C P, and among the revolutionary students, in order to infuse them systematically with Bolshevism, to render them more intense and conscious. For these purposes the Japanese section, strictly maintaining its own independent organization, makes efforts to play an active part, fundamentally in the S P and partially in the C P, on a relatively long-term basis. The aims of the activities of the section inside these parties are to intensify the spontaneous opposition of the rank and file toward the top leaderships, and to accelerate the leftward trend of the masses. The period before the Second World War was characterized by the recession and decline of the world revolution; but the present period, when the Third World War is being prepared, is characterized by an upsurge of the world revolution. On the basis of the general character of the present period, the masses under the influence of the workers' parties show a tendency to come into collision with their leaderships, and to sweep over them in waves at times of periodic revolutionary upsurge. Such a perspective is the basis for the entrust activities of our section inside the C P and S P. Objective conditions, ripe for the socialist revolution, give powerful impetus to the development of the revolutionary leadership that possesses the idea and programme of the Fourth International — the new revolutionary party of restored Bolshevism. For at each

step in the development of the revolutionary mass struggle, to which the leaderships of the traditional workers' parties are opposed, it is revealed that they are opposed to the interests of the working class, and inevitably mistrust for their leaderships and hope for a new leadership will be cultivated among the militants.

From 1946 to 1949, the worker militants put their confidence in the CP and looked to the CP's leadership. But they were cruelly betrayed. During the Korean War (1951-1954), the active workers turned with high expectations to the left SP. But there also they were betrayed. Today many active workers have no confidence in the traditional leaderships. This feeling is expressed in the spreading of non-party vanguard groups, a typical one being the Revolutionary Group (Kakudo) of the National Railway Trade Union (the Kokutetsu). Though they gradually approach the CP and part of them identify themselves with the CP, they maintain a critical attitude toward the CP leadership. In regard to CP and SP workers, the situation is the same. To broaden such opposition between them and their leaderships and to exploit it in favor of the establishment of a genuine revolutionary leadership: such are the aims of the entrisms of the Japanese section.

39. Concerning this operation inside the CP, it should be noted that the difference between the CP and Bolshevism has three aspects:

The first is the CP's lack of internationalism, a failure to understand our revolution as being a link in the chain of world revolution. This produces a national-socialist supposition that the world revolution is the arithmetical total of national revolutions.

The second is the CP's renunciation in substance of the independence of the proletariat and the socialist revolution. This produces a submission to bourgeois radicalism.

The third is the CP's submission to parliamentarianism. This produces a failure to understand that the proletariat sets up, as opposed to the present state apparatus, the soviet, the highest form of the workers' united front.

These tendencies are expressed in all the documents of the Japanese CP, including the Draft Programme. During the internal struggle of 1950-1951 and the internal struggle caused by the discussion of the Draft Programme, the bureaucracy always insisted on these three tendencies, that cannot be separated one from another in the system of Stalinism. But the opposition, which strives hard to escape from the vise of Stalinism but is fundamentally chained to Stalinism, could raise only partial objections to the bureaucrats. Though a part of the opposition emphasizes the world revolutionary viewpoint, even its members cannot

see through the essence of the Kremlin's "peaceful coexistence." Some emphasize "class contradictions" and criticize the tops from the point of view that it is necessary to concentrate the main body of the party's strength on the development of the working-class struggles. Others are opposed to parliamentarianism but forget the idea of the soviets. Both in the 1950-1951 period and at present, the bureaucrats are united in their opinions, while the oppositions are disconnected one from another. Only Bolshevism against Stalinism, only the standpoint of the Fourth International against that of the degenerated Comintern, will be able to unite the oppositions on the revolutionary course.

The activities of the section inside the CP are, not only to criticize erroneous courses generally and theoretically, but also to struggle against the expression of erroneous tendencies in the concrete problems of the class struggle, to make contact with broad strata of the oppositions in process of differentiating themselves from Stalinism, to influence them by opposing to Stalinism the correct revolutionary orientation, and thus to accelerate their progress to Bolshevism. Accordingly, in the CP we do not limit ourselves to simple objections and simple persuasion, but must participate in the real mass movement — including the peace movements — with the CP rank and file, and in their midst make efforts to get the militants to advance to the revolutionary course. In this process, on the one hand we get into close contact with a large part of the critical active elements, and on the other we strengthen the Japanese section with the best elements from among them. Only this process will permit us to form the bases for the new revolutionary leadership out of CP members.

40. Concerning the operation inside the SP. Since the unification of 1955, it is evident that the leaders of the SP left wing are healing their break with the right wing. Thus the left wing is also decisively included in the non-governmental party in the bourgeois democratic regime. But on the other hand it is also undeniable that the lower strata of workers under the influence of the SP left wing are turning leftward in accordance with the development of the class struggle. This contradiction is expressed in the gap between SOHYO and the SP. The members of the SP left wing who occupy the majority in the SOHYO leadership are on the one hand confronted by the attacks of the ruling class that wants to crush and mutilate SOHYO by the agency of ZENRO, and on the other hand obliged to make leftist gestures to avoid pressure from the lower militant cadres who want to resist the oppressions of the ruling class by means of the united front of the working class. They are reluctantly obliged to criticize to

some extent the parliamentarianism of the S P, as they are the unwilling conveyors of the revolutionary energy of the lower masses.

The origin of the oscillation of the party lies in the fact that the workers under its influence, particularly its left wing, wish to stand up against the capitalists, to climb over the limitations of the party system. In the S P too there is a growing distrust of the leadership — including its left — among the lower militants. They begin to be conscious of the truth that a leadership suited to present conditions must be different from the present leadership. Hence unification of the new left, whose basis is more proletarian and more vigorous, is now on the agenda.

The task of the section inside the S P is to launch itself into party life as the perfect extreme left, to maintain its independent organization in spite of mingling closely with broad elements of the varying centrist lefts and keeping the worker militants who want a revolutionary policy and leadership from settling down into centrism. Our task in the S P is not to yield to the pressure of its reformist leadership, but on the contrary to join the leftward-turning worker militants, put ourselves at their head, and thereby struggle effectively against the reformist leadership.

Because there is not a genuine revolutionary mass party in the working-class movement, part of the worker militants who are in the process of escaping from reformism are now under the ideological influence of the C P. Concerning this tendency, at present inevitable, it is the task of the Japanese section to explain concretely and earnestly how harmful it is to pass from reformism — a form of petty-bourgeois tendency — to Stalinism — another form of petty-bourgeois tendency — and to indicate the revolutionary road of escape from reformism under the concrete conditions of the class struggle.

41. Our activity for the construction of the Japanese section as a revolutionary mass party is at present to integrate with the militants of the C P and S P, to organize among them an unshakable tendency based on the Fourth International and identified with its organization, and to further the leftward trend of broad strata of critical militants. Only by means of the organization of the independent revolutionary elements inside the traditional workers' parties, will it be possible to exploit exhaustively the first phase of the collision between the enormous upsurge of millions of workers and the present leadership, in favor of advancing on the road to the establishment of a new revolutionary leadership inheriting the traditions of Bolshevism.

In our activities inside the S P and C P, our practice shall be such that the questions not only of how to win and organize the first new cadres

of the Japanese section, but also of how to attract a large number of worker militants in the traditional parties to the revolutionary programme will be resolved. From the latter point of view, it is very important to establish the independent organization of our section inside the S P. Because the overwhelming majority of leading posts in the trade unions are occupied by S P members, and nine tenths of the working class are under the S P's political influence. Hence it happens that, when the trade-union activists turn left, the organization armed with the revolutionary programme can play a decisive role if at the head of the masses. This possibility will become more probable when the influence of the revolutionary tendency within the C P will be stronger. For then it will be less probable that masses who get clear of reformism will be attracted by Stalinism.

43. There is an undeniable possibility that another party, different from both the C P and the S P, a centrist party, will be born in the process of realignment in building the revolutionary leadership. If the waves of revolutionary upsurge are not rapid and the influence of the Bolshevik-Leninists in them is not powerful, it is possible that the left turn of the masses may not be directly crystalized into the establishment of a new revolutionary mass party, but may produce a split in the S P and the reappearance of the Left Social-Democratic Party. In the light of the history of the Left S P from 1951 to 1955, the decisive task under these conditions would be to give an active orientation to this fluid and formless centrist party — including to part of the worker militants through independent propaganda, taking the initiative of pushing it to the left so that it does not settle down into centrism.

43. By its activities inside the traditional or future *un*revolutionary workers' parties and its activities in attracting worker militants to the revolutionary programme, the building of a revolutionary party conscious of the true interests of the working class and capable of achieving them is prepared. The more rapidly and exhaustively these preparations in both entrism and independent activities are carried out, the more rapidly the revolutionary movement of the masses develops and the time for building the party at the level of the standard of class consciousness approaches.

44. The attacks of the ruling class against the working class incessantly oblige the masses to broaden and unify their front. In the trade unions — that were organized as a primitive form of united front for economic partial demands — there will begin to be pressure from below for their breaking out of their own framework. For in the imperialist epoch, though it happens on the one hand that the trade unions become accessory

to the bourgeois state apparatus, they have on the other hand a tendency to develop into a higher workers' front in opposition to the bourgeoisie. It is one of the main tasks of the Japanese section to accelerate this tendency with all its strength, so as to enroll the traditional leadership in this united front. Only in this anti-capitalist united front whose highest form is the soviet and whose appearance signifies the beginning of the revolutionary situation, will the revolutionary leadership, whether long prepared or newly born, be given the chance to unite the working class as a whole on its programme in order to make the revolution victorious.

V. PROGRAMME OF TRANSITIONAL DEMANDS — TACTICS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT

44. The strategic task of the Japanese section is the overthrow of capitalism. The objective conditions for the revolution are completely ripe, but the building of the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat is not yet accomplished. It is a central task of the future to resolve this contradiction, to raise the proletariat to the level necessary for its historic mission.

Therefore it is necessary to start out with the everyday form of the class struggle — the direct demands of the masses — and lead on to the strategy of the socialist revolution. Just to follow the present demands of the masses, their present level of class consciousness, while merely talking about the programme of socialism, is not the correct attitude.

It is necessary to help the masses to find the bridge between the revolutionary programme for socialism and the actual requirements of the masses in everyday struggles. This bridge must contain the programme of the transitional demands that come into existence from the present conditions and present consciousness of broad strata of the working class and lead to the conquest of power — the final single conclusion.²

The task of revolutionary tactics is to start out from present demands, to develop the anti-capitalist struggle of the workers in every field, to mobilize all strata to the revolutionary movement, and to build the unity of the working class. The general conditions for the transitional demands are the death agony of capitalism, the constant instability of the living standards of the whole working class and the toiling people, and the impossibility for capitalism to grant fundamental reforms to the working class as a whole. On the

basis of these objective conditions, the struggle of the masses demanding some concessions from the bourgeoisie meets with an extraordinary resistance from the capitalists and inevitably contains the tendency to develop into political class struggle. This fact means bankruptcy for reformism, which builds a Chinese Wall between economic and revolutionary political struggles. Economic struggles whose aims are those of large strata of the workers will inevitably come into collision with the capitalist united front backed by state power. Experience with such struggles makes the workers conscious of the need of class struggle.

These situations are analogous to those affecting scores of millions of laboring people. The aspiration for peace felt by many petty bourgeois, when it rises high, is obliged to come into collision with the imperialists' determination to make war preparations, and therefore is obliged to unite with the working class, the only class capable of overthrowing imperialism. Only the bourgeoisie makes profits out of the counter-revolutionary aggressive war against the workers' states. The working class and petty bourgeoisie — including its upper strata — do not make profits out of this war. These objective conditions force the petty bourgeoisie, in its struggle for peace, to oppose the bourgeoisie and overthrow it under the leadership of the working class.

45. In order to develop the struggle of the working class, the Japanese section puts forward the following demands:

1) Without reduction of wages, a 40-hour week in the big enterprises with maintenance of full employment, a 44-hour week in the middle and small enterprises, and a 30-hour week for definitely dangerous work, mining, and heavy physical labor. The national and local trade-union organizations must have the right to supervise the real application of the foregoing working hours. Without permission of the national and local trade-union organizations, the capitalists must not make workers work overtime; and the trade-union organizations should not permit the capitalists to make workers do overtime if there are any unemployed.

2) A minimum living wage for the legal hours worked by all strata of the working class. Eight thousand yen per month [\$22.25; £8] should be the minimum base wage for legal working hours for 18-year-old, unskilled, unmarried workers of either sex. State subsidy should be provided for small enterprises to the degree permitted by a committee in which the workers' organizations should be represented.

3) By means of agreements between the national and local organizations of the trade unions and the capitalist organizations, there should be pro-

²*The Death Agony of Capitalism and The Tasks of The Fourth International* (The "Transitional Programme," drafted by Leon Trotsky.)

hibited all discrimination between regular and occasional workers in wages, working conditions, and all other conditions affecting the lives of the workers.

4) The national unification (at above the highest standard of the present system) of all social insurance (health insurance, annuities, accident insurance, maternity grants, child annuities, etc), the National Treasury assuming defrayal of all increase in costs. The administrative machinery of social insurance should be put under the control of the trade unions, the peasants, and other sectors of the people.

5) When the capitalist class adopts a policy of inflation, wages should move on a sliding scale with prices according to collective agreement. But this sliding scale agreement for the object of protecting the already achieved standard of wages should not contain any limitation of workers' struggles to raise the basic wage.

6) The struggle of a united front of the entire class — including the highest form of struggle — against all attempts to restrict the legal and substantive rights of the trade unions. Against the fierce offensive of the capitalist class, making use of state power, the trade unions should conduct a basic struggle to develop the energy of the majority of the middle and lower strata of workers in an incessant fight against a class-collaborationist course, and should carry out a complete democratization and industrial unification on a national scale of their own organizations, which root themselves in local committees of cooperative struggle, whose highest form is the soviet. Such a unification of the trade unions enables them to utilize such powerful weapons as industry-wide and general strikes.

7) As the capitalist class wants always to beat back even modest demands by the workers unless they use force, the forms of struggle of the workers tend to develop from the traditional strike to the sit-down strike, that means occupation of the plant for a time. In such a step it is absolutely necessary to organize a factory committee elected by all the employees. With the hegemony of the middle and lower strata, who are the overwhelming majority of the employees, the factory committee challenges and resists the capitalist management and produces an embryo of dual power.

8) Prohibition of business secrecy; and workers' control of production. The contradiction between the social character of production and private ownership of the means of production loads on the working class and the other toiling masses an intolerable burden. It is therefore necessary to set up a workers' control committee based on the factory committee, to bring to light all the sources of income of the bourgeois owners, and to deter-

mine the quantity of products wasted as a result of anarchy in production and pursuit of profit. On the basis of such actions, the working class can struggle for a workers' planned economy against unemployment. And in the process of this struggle the demand will be raised that the state should confiscate any factories closed by the capitalists during depressions and let the workers manage them.

9) The confiscation by the state of the great monopolies that concentrate enormous wealth at the expense of the workers, peasants, and other toilers who are thereby impoverished. Confiscation by the state of mining, electricity, steel, private railway, fertilizer, and other industries. This is the only road to the raising of productivity, together with an improvement in living standards and an increase in employment, in these industries, where the contradiction between private monopoly and the working class and laboring people generally is becoming aggravated. This contradiction can be resolved in a progressive way only by the establishment of workers' control and the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government that secures it.

10) The workers' struggle for the defense and extension of the right to work against unemployment and high prices is impossible and defeated in advance until there is a direct struggle against finance capital, the real ruler of our country. It is necessary to confiscate the private banks, to concentrate them into a single national bank, and to establish a strict control by the workers over this all-powerful force.

11) The organization of workers' militias as the only serious insurance of freedom of assembly and press for the workers' organizations. Without the development of workers' self-defense corps, it is impossible for the workers to fight against monopoly capitalism's fascist gangs of thugs. All strikes and demonstrations should be defended by the workers' own forces against the fascist offensive.

46. In order to develop the anti-capitalist struggle by the peasants and the laboring people of the villages, the Japanese section proposes the following programme of transitional demands:

1) National autonomous organizations of the peasants against the exploitation of the bourgeoisie and the state, and mutual aid between the peasants and workers.

2) Concretely, the price of crops (such as tobacco and sweet potatoes) and livestock must be set at a level capable of making up for the cost of production, by negotiations between the peasants' autonomous organizations and the capitalists.

3) The price of rice and wheat must be determined by collective agreements between the

peasants' representatives and the government, above the level capable of making up for the cost of production. The price of rice should be on a sliding scale in connection with the wages of the workers or compensated by the government until such a scale is established.

4) Low-interest low-term loans made by the government (or by the banks, reinsured by the government) should be abundantly increased, and distributed autonomously by the peasants' organizations in which the poor peasants — the overwhelming majority among the peasants — should actively engage.

5) The committee that the workers set up on the basis of workers' management of the workers' planned economy against unemployment and poverty, should invite representatives of the peasants, in order to show millions of peasants the socialist road in an immense investment plan for agricultural development, as part of a general plan on a national scale and the real solution of the problem of excess agricultural population and peasant poverty, through exhaustive and amical discussions. The working class should persuade the peasants by the working class's struggles and the peasants' own experiences that the workers' state can develop the independent petty farms into great modern farms through coöperation without the terrible decomposition of the overwhelming majority of the poor peasants.

47. In order to develop the struggle against the preparation of the counter-revolutionary imperialist war that is continuing in spite of the untiring resistance of the masses all over the world, the Japanese section proposes the following demands:

1) Withdrawal of the US army from the territory of Japan and Okinawa. Withdrawal of the VIIth fleet to its own country. Immediate abolition of all military agreements. It is necessary to organize fraternization between the Japanese working class and the US army.

2) The Japanese bourgeoisie is pushing on with its military plans as part of the counter-revolutionary military alliance of international imperialism. The Japanese toiling masses will not give one man or one yen to the rearmament of the bourgeoisie that is producing the means of destruction against the interests of the workers and peasants. The working class should be at the head of the army boycott movement. As against military plans the working class proposes public works.

3) All important diplomatic negotiations that closely involve the people's future should be open to the public. All military agreements and negotiations with the USA to be made public. Complete abolition of secret diplomacy.

4) In order to free the working class and other toiling people from the influence of petty-bour-

geois pacifism and to struggle effectively against the preparation of the imperialist war, the Japanese section proposes the demand: replace the regular army by the people's militia. The struggle against the imperialist war will be crowned with success only when weapons are in the hands of all the people. The organizations of the workers and other toiling people should take all weapons in their own hands and practise the training of the armed people. The workers' organizations should organize military schools for training the cadres of the people's militia. The capitalists and the government must bear the expenses of the foregoing military demands. Only when the weapons are in the hands of the people can they decisively crush the aggressive plans of the international imperialists.

5) To bring the anti-war struggle to the army is an indispensable form of struggle in order to crush imperialism. The facts that the aims and policies of the war of the Japanese bourgeoisie and US imperialism are opposed to all the people and that the people's enemy is monopoly finance capitalism in our country and Wall Street should be incessantly propagandized among all the soldiers of the army. Fraternization is needed between the soldiers and the working class. The army should be disorganized and the military force of imperialism should be paralyzed and broken up from within through soldiers' committees by the soldier masses.

48. It is necessary to remove the policies and economy of our country and the destiny of its people from the grip of imperialism, which means war, panic, and destruction, and to combine them with the workers' states in China and the USSR. The working class should prepare a great economic plan combined with China's Second Five-Year Plan. Such a planned economy common to both China and Japan can be developed into a wonderful goal of struggle capable of attracting many laboring people to the working class to carry out the socialist revolution, when the above plan is combined with the slogan of workers' management and workers' power that will enable it to be concretized. The Japanese bourgeoisie defends with all its might a fusion with the international imperialist camp, a source of atomic war and poverty. The working class should unite all the people for combination with the workers' states, that signifies economic development, improvement in living, and permanent peace.

49. The establishment of a workers' and peasants' anti-capitalist government. In a situation characterized by the need for the working class and other laboring people to struggle against ruin and decline, by the maturity of the objective conditions for the revolution, and by the aggressive plans of imperialism, the necessity of the workers'

united front to defend the workers against the exploitation of the bourgeoisie is becoming urgent. In order to achieve the masses' transitional demands, even the partial attainment of which collides with the bourgeoisie, it is necessary for the united front of the workers of all organizations to overthrow the capitalist class and its parties and to build a workers' and peasants' anti-capitalist government.

Now the leaderships of the C P, S P, and other organizations, though they have the workers and peasants in their ranks and speak as their agents, in the last analysis play the role of transmitting the ideological and political influence of the bourgeoisie to the working class. As a result of this fact, the revolutionary pressure of the masses cannot attain the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government unless they go beyond their traditional leaderships and are drawn to the genuine revolutionary proletarian party. Nevertheless, the enormous pressure of the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle of the masses will drive the leaderships of the traditional workers' organizations into a dangerous corner and make them lose their *raison d'être*, i e, the support of the masses, if they continue to ally themselves to capitalism. The revolutionary proletariat, which continues to make efforts to win over the majority of the masses on the basis of its own programme, meanwhile appeals to the masses, without waiting to win over the majority of them, to build their own government, separated from the capitalist class, in order to carry out the transitional demands and demands that the workers' parties take the power completely independently of the capitalists.

To the extent that such a power — the workers' and peasants' government — is anti-capitalist and carries out our transitional demands, the Japanese section will support it in order to give impetus to the struggle against capitalist reaction. But when the petty-bourgeoisie character of the leadership makes the S P and C P leave the proletariat for a while in some extraordinary circumstances (fascist attack, danger of war, etc), such a government will be replaced by either the victory of the capitalist reaction or the independence of the proletariat.

The purpose of the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government is to make the bridge between the revolutionary rise of the masses and the historical delay in forming the leadership of the revolution. In contemporary circumstances it is necessary to win out over the influence of the petty-bourgeois leaderships through the experience of the masses and to win the majority

of the workers on the basis of the revolutionary programme. On the one hand, the Japanese section has complete confidence in the possibility that the objective process of contemporary political developments will cause the masses' struggles to rise higher and higher in spite of the brake of the treacherous leaderships; on the other hand, it appeals to the masses to impose their own government in order to attain their demands against the capitalist class, without assuming that the Japanese section has gained the majority of the masses. As a result, the situation will be speeded up toward the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

50. Forward to the formation of soviets, highest form of the proletarian united front!

When the mass struggle mounts higher than the "regular" level controlled by reformism and Stalinism, and mobilizes the overwhelming majority of the workers and other laboring people who suffer severely in contemporary society and are little protected by the trade unions and peasant organizations, the energy that has been kept dormant by poverty and repression will burst out of all the traditional organizations and will be the open announcement of the revolutionary situation. In the factories the factory committees, more than the trade unions, will develop the struggle of all the workers. Now more and more the workers will be drawn into the vortex of the struggle against the imperialist war. The broader and severer the struggles of the workers and the other toiling people are, the more distinctly the need of the united front will be visible to the masses. Out of the struggle of all the people for the transitional demands should grow the formation of the soviet — the highest form of the united front — and the united command, at the highest step of the struggle.

The soviets that unite the overwhelming majority of the masses against the capitalist class represent the power of the working class in its fight against the state power of the capitalists. The formation and national extension of soviets announce the beginning of the phase of dual power in the revolutionary situation, i e, civil war. The very logic of the political situation will defeat the influence of the half-hearted petty-bourgeois leadership in the soviets, and will enable the revolutionary party to grow rapidly and gain the leadership of the soviets. Because the problem is then openly posed to enormous masses that have become politically awakened: Either the dictatorship of the proletariat and the victorious socialist revolution, or the capitalism of depressions and war!

20 YEARS OF THE IVth INTERNATIONAL

By MICHEL PABLO

IV

From the End of the Second World War to the Second World Congress (April 1948)

When one examines a posteriori the history of the Fourth International since the Second World War, one soon realizes the need to distinguish a first period running from the end of the war until the Second World Congress (April 1948), marked by the following general thought: *The new international situation is dominated by the power which the conjuncture of the war conferred on the United States and the U S S R and by their reciprocal relations. In the trial of strength between these two powers, which threatens to culminate in the Third World War, American imperialism, more powerful than ever, sets out as the favorite. Only the intervention of the proletarian revolution under the leadership of a new revolutionary Marxist vanguard would be able to prevent the U S S R from succumbing in this test.*

The estimate of the global correlation of forces in favor of imperialism — particularly American imperialism — was based at that time on a series of real facts as they emerged from the world conflict: the world-wide expansion of American imperialism, enormously developed and enriched during the war; the economic weakening of the U S S R; the ultra-opportunist policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and the Communist Parties, thoroughly spoiling and even bringing into mortal danger the revolutionary positions and possibilities in the countries occupied by the Soviet army, the capitalist countries of Europe, and the colonies.

But the specific weight of each of these data, as well as the dynamism of the evolution of each of them, and especially their interaction, had not yet been properly evaluated. What handicapped a correct estimate of the dynamics of the situation at the outcome of the Second World War was especially the disappointments generated by the foreshadowed failure of the European revolution and by the behavior of the Soviet bureaucracy in the countries occupied by the Red army.

To the degree that it was becoming evident that the chances of the European revolution, real in a whole series of countries such as Italy, France, and Greece, ran the risk of being wasted by the ultra-opportunist conduct of the Communist Parties, and to the extent also that dual power continued in the occupied countries, our movement had a tendency to underestimate the Soviet

Union's ability to recuperate and victoriously to resist the pressure of American imperialism, then in full economic upsurge and at that time the sole possessor of the atomic bomb.

We were basing our revolutionary outlook especially on the aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism, on the advances of the colonial revolution, and on the role of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard in replacing the opportunist traditional leaderships.

In April 1946 was held the first postwar International Conference of the Fourth International, gathering together the representatives of the British, French, German, Belgian, Dutch, Swiss, Irish, Spanish, Canadian, and Palestinian sections, and those of certain other countries of the Western hemisphere and of the colonies.

The political orientation of our international movement at that period is quite clearly reflected in the principal political documents worked out by this conference: the Resolution on "The New Imperialist Peace and the Building of the Parties of the Fourth International," and the Manifesto entitled "Only Victorious Socialist Revolutions Can Prevent the Third World War."

The conference documents stressed the economic and social difficulties of capitalism on an international scale. They noted the development and concentration of the productive apparatus of a series of countries, first of all the United States and Canada, and the industrialization of new countries, a process accompanied on the other hand by the exhaustion, decomposition, and destruction of the economy of other countries. They emphasized the "enormous diminution of the specific weight of Europe in the world economy, accentuating in the extreme its economic dependence on the other continents, and particularly on America."

On the specifically economic plane, the April 1946 conference fixed the evolution and outlook as follows:

Thus, the war facilitated the development and the concentration of the productive apparatus of certain countries, and above all the United States, raising the productive capacity of world economy as a whole to levels above those of 1939, but simultaneously it created the universal impoverishment illustrated by the colossal national debts in all countries including the United States, by inflation, by the crisis of agricultural production, and the resulting drop in the absorptive capacity of the world market.

The war has not only failed to resolve the crisis of the markets, but on the contrary, has enormously aggravated it.

On the basis of this evaluation the April conference sketched out the following general economic prospect:

The revival of economic activity in capitalist countries weakened by the war, and in particular continental European countries, will be characterized by an especially slow tempo which will keep their economy at levels bordering on stagnation and decay.

American economy will soon experience a relative boom, since it is the only country capable of satisfying the immediate needs of the world market. This fact will facilitate the full functioning of its productive apparatus.

This increased production, however, will in a short while run up against the limited capacities of the domestic and world markets.

The United States will then head for a new economic crisis which will be more deep-going and widespread, whose repercussions will shake the whole of the world economy.

Setting out from a general analysis of the economic, social, and international situation, the documents of the April conference set up the prospect of "*a lengthy period of grave economic difficulties, convulsions, and partial and general crises.*" From this point of view, the documents insisted:

Thus it is impossible to draw conclusions about the real dynamics of the revolutionary upsurge when limiting ourselves to the European scale, and simply noting the absence, for a certain time, of the German revolution, however important this absence may be.

What confronts us now is a world-wide crisis transcending anything known in the past, and a world-wide revolutionary upsurge, developing, to be sure, at unequal tempos in different parts of the world, but unceasingly exercising reciprocal influences from one centre to another, and thus determining a long revolutionary perspective.

It is naturally easy to criticize a posteriori the underevaluation of the revival of the European economy, or the speculation about an American crisis of the classic type. It is necessary, however, to make an effort of imagination and place oneself in the concrete conditions of that time, with the European economy really collapsed, its productive apparatus broken up in the majority of

countries, its workers in revolt, and American aid limited to foodstuffs aimed at confronting the genuine want that reigned more or less everywhere on the continent, beginning with Germany.

The real revival of the European economy took place after 1948 or even 1950, and its genuine boom began only in 1953 — i.e., several years after the systematic aid of the United States had powerfully contributed to the revival of the economy, and *after the capitalist economy had been reconstructed by the European proletariat, urged on and misled by the reformist and Stalinist leaderships.*

At the end of the war, with the European capitalist economy dilapidated and the proletariat in revolutionary ebullition, the Fourth International was absolutely right to stake on the masses' refusal to pay the bill for the imperialist war and to agree, to the detriment of their own living standards, to patch up the collapsing capitalist regime.

The prospect of a boom in the European economy could result only from a certain defeat of the revolutionary possibilities and prospects of the European proletariat.

The Fourth International, during those years, was not ready to accept this defeat in advance as inevitable. It was staking on the struggles of the European proletariat, and casting its own weight, limited though it was, into these struggles, for a revolutionary solution to the undeniable crisis of European capitalism. It was that, furthermore, which marked the political differentiation that took place at that period in the ranks of our European and world movement.

A basically right-wing tendency, disappointed by the fact that the European revolution had not immediately taken place following on the end of the war, and impressed by the mass influence of the Communist Parties, began to wager on capitalist stabilization in Europe, on a basis of economic prosperity and bourgeois democracy. It blurred over the jerky and convulsive character of the evolution of the international situation, punctuated by crises and abrupt turns, in favor of a much more controlled, "peaceful," "democratic," and parliamentary evolution.

Tainted by an undeniable pro-Stalinist opportunism during the apogee of the parliamentary strength of the Communist Parties in the years 1945 to 1947, this tendency later, with the hardening of the "cold war," swung over to sectarian anti-Stalinist positions tainted by pro-Western opportunism.

Other tendencies, on the contrary, during this first postwar period — disappointed by the ultra-opportunist policy of the Communist Parties and the behavior of the Soviet bureaucracy in occupied countries, pillaged, dismembered, and op-

pressed — revived the discussions on the nature of the USSR and of Stalinism, defending on these questions the revisionist positions of “state capitalism” or “bureaucratic collectivism.”

But the bulk of the forces of the International held fast between these two tendencies, demonstrating a growing capacity for better adaptation of its revolutionary reorientation amid the extraordinary developments marked by the new situation created by the liquidation of the Second World War.

Granted, one might still pause now over one central prospect held by our movement at that period which seems not to have been verified: *a crisis of a classic type in the United States.*

Since the war the American economy has experienced *recessions* but not *classic crises*, and this question naturally requires an answer.

Our movement began to raise it only relatively late, toward 1955, following on the extraordinary boom that the capitalist economy went through from 1953 to 1957, and the undeniable effects of this boom on the evolution of the international and social conjuncture. We shall return to this question later. For the moment it suffices to say that the prospect of an American economic crisis, counted on in the near future and in a classic form, naturally had as a consequence the over-estimation of the possibilities of revolutionary crisis in the advanced capitalist countries, and especially the United States.

This estimate, combined with the importance assigned at that period to American imperialism, caused a premature advancing of the hour of the American revolution. In such a prospect, the meanwhile very real progress of the colonial revolution seemed dim and lacking in the specific weight which it must now be recognized it had in the concrete development of the proletarian revolution in our period.

The important document, “Theses on the American Revolution,” adopted by the XIIth National Convention of the SWP in the United States, is characteristic of this state of mind. The document is centred around the perspective of “the coming economic crisis” of the classic type in the United States: “In the wake of the boom must come another crisis and depression which will make the 1929-32 conditions look prosperous by comparison.”

The document, furthermore, is dominated by the idea of the “decisive” role of the USA in the world. It draws therefrom the following conclusions:

Should the European and colonial revolutions, now on the order of the day, precede in point of time the culmination of the struggle in the US, they would immediately be confronted with the neces-

sity of defending their conquests against the economic and military assaults of the American imperialist monster. The ability of the victorious insurgent peoples everywhere to maintain themselves would depend to a high degree on the strength and fighting capacity of the revolutionary labor movement in America. [...]

The issue of socialism or capitalism will not be finally decided until it is decided in the US. [...] The decisive battles for the communist future of mankind will be fought in the US.

★

The year 1947 was marked by important developments on the international and social planes: Truman’s 12 March speech which as it were inaugurated the “cold war” and the active intervention of American imperialism in Greece and Turkey; the launching of the Marshall Plan for the consolidation of European capitalism; the formation of the Cominform in September; the liberation of India; the progress of the Vietnamese revolution; the second civil war in Greece; the war in Indonesia; the great workers’ struggles in France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Japan, etc.

The Fourth International, reorganized at the time of the April 1946 conference, took a stand on all these events and participated actively in the class combats. The April 1946 conference took the decision of dissolving the International Executive Committee and the International Secretariat, which had during the war had their seat outside Europe, and to elect a new IEC and a new IS, predominantly European, based on the nuclei of the European Executive Committee and the European Secretariat.¹

Beginning with this date, the leading organisms of the International began to meet and function regularly. The First Plenum of the new IEC met from 15 to 18 June 1946. It adopted a series of important resolutions on the subjects of: the withdrawal of occupation troops from all the territories of Europe and the colonies; the situation in Spain; the unification between the SWP and WP in the United States; the opportunist deviation committed by the majority of the Central Committee of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste (the French section) on the question of the 5 May 1945 referendum in France; the tactic of the Revolutionary Communist Party (the British section) toward the Labour Party. For the first time since the war, the IEC took a stand in favor of a decisive orientation of the British Trotsky-

¹ There were unanimously elected, as members of the new IEC, 2 British, 2 French, 1 German, 1 Italian, 1 Spaniard, 1 Belgian, 4 North Americans, 1 South American, 1 Vietnamese, and the secretary. Among the alternates were 1 Hindu and 1 Chinese.

ists toward essential work in the ranks of the Labour Party.

In October 1946 there was held the IInd Plenum of the I E C, which declared international discussion open in preparation for the convocation of the Second World Congress of the International. This discussion was to bear especially upon: the question of the U S S R and the policy of the Communist Parties; the meaning of the Transitional Programme and the way of applying it; the tactic to be followed for building mass revolutionary Marxist parties. The agenda planned for discussion broadly reflected the main questions which concerned the International at that period, and on which divergences had appeared.

The IIIrd Plenum of the I E C, meeting at the end of March 1947, adopted a series of important documents: an open letter to the workers of Japan; an appeal for solidarity with the Indochinese masses fighting against imperialism; an appeal to the workers of Europe and the United States to oppose the projects of the imperialists and the Soviet bureaucracy concerning Germany, especially the exploitation of the Ruhr.

The Manifesto against the war in Indochina ended by calling on

all the workers' organizations to demonstrate their solidarity with the struggle of the Indochinese and colonial masses against imperialist oppression, and to boycott the production and transport of matériel to the imperialist armies.

The Manifesto concerning Germany took a stand against

the plans of brigandage of the Big Four, [against] annexations, reparations, and attempts to dismember Germany, [and for a] German republic of workers and peasants, united and free.

The IVth Plenum of the I E C, the last before the Second World Congress, was held in September 1947.

The reorganization of the forces of the International and its development are clearly reflected in the activity, both ideological and practical, of its different sections and of the new organizations that were being formed. The central press of the International at that period, essentially represented by the theoretical review, *Quatrième Internationale*, is a faithful mirror of this activity.

The holding of the Second World Congress afforded the opportunity to observe how strikingly the International's organization had progressed and its ideology and policy had matured since the war.

The labors of the Second World Congress of the Fourth International, beginning in early April 1948, lasted three weeks. About 50 delegates, representing 22 organizations of the Fourth Inter-

national and 19 different countries, were present at the congress, held in Paris.

Among the delegates were representatives from most of the European countries, including some still under American or Soviet occupation, from North and South America, from Africa, and from the Middle and Far East. The number of representatives from the colonial and semi-colonial countries was already particularly high. The main documents adopted by or worked out at the congress were:

The general political resolution on "The World Situation and the Tasks of the Fourth International"; the theses on "The U S S R and Stalinism"; the resolution on the struggle of the colonial peoples and the world revolution; and the programmatic Manifesto, "Against Wall Street and the Kremlin! For the Programme of the *Communist Manifesto!* For the World Socialist Revolution!" addressed to the exploited masses of the entire world; the new Statutes of the Fourth International; and lastly the organizational report of the International Secretariat bearing on the "ten years of combat" of the Fourth International. Various minor resolutions concerned settlements of political and organizational questions of the different organizations of the International.

The delegates to the Second World Congress did not fail to hail the fact that they were meeting on the hundredth anniversary of the *Communist Manifesto*, the first programmatic declaration of revolutionary Marxism and of the worldwide workers' movement that it inspired. [Editorial on the Second World Congress in *Quatrième Internationale*, March-April 1948.]

The moment of the congress seemed crucial:

Scarce three years after the end of the second imperialist war that ravaged the planet and pushed to the pitch of paroxysm all the contradictions of the capitalist regime, mankind finds itself once more before a concatenation of calamities inherent in the nature of this regime as long as it continues to last: the prospect of a new world economic crisis, threats of dictatorship and fascism, the atomic Third World War. [Ibid.]

Indeed, we were already fully in the "cold war," which had considerably changed the aspect of the international and social situation since 1946. Since that date, the congress resolution on the world situation said,

there have occurred developments on both the economic and political fields, allowing a more precise definition of the character of the present period, as well as the prospect and tasks in the near future.

Basically, the period opened by the war remained that of

an *unstable equilibrium*, i.e., a period of economic and political difficulties, of convulsions and crises, which inevitably generate great struggles of the proletarian and colonial masses. By spreading and growing exacerbated, these struggles endanger the capitalist regime itself.

[Nevertheless,] in the absence of a revolutionary outcome, the stepped-up crisis of capitalism threatens to lead once more to fascism and war, which this time would imperil the existence and future of all mankind.

On the level of economic prospects, the Second World Congress, while recording the advance in reconstruction of the European economy and the effects of the Marshall Plan, insisted on the irregular and precarious character of the revival. It noted, furthermore, "the signs heralding an oncoming depression" in the United States, without overemphasizing this time an imminent crisis of the classic type.

The Second World Congress continued to evaluate the global correlation of forces as being in favor of imperialism. American imperialism, according to the Second World Congress, had succeeded in tightening its stranglehold round the U S S R and the countries controlled by it, and has continued its offensive against the U S S R on every plane: diplomatic, economic, political, military, and propagandist.

Nevertheless, "despite its superiority in atomic arms" and its various successes, it was not getting ready to start the war.

The reason for this was the following:

American imperialism, before plunging into war, must feel itself in a real economic impasse and must have stabilized both in Europe and Asia solid support that will permit it to believe that it will be able rapidly and effectively to master the world chaos that would inevitably result [from such a war.] [Political Resolution.]²

Confronted by the aggressivity of American policy, the Soviet bureaucracy, which had meanwhile recorded notable progress in the reconstruction of its economy, reacted

by consolidating its control over the countries of its zone and by stiffening the oppositional attitude of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries that are entering the American orbit.

The Second World Congress, while having

² "The launching of a war under present conditions would mean its rapid transformation into an international civil war with uncertain results." [Ibidem.]

taken steps in the direction of the thesis of "the structural assimilation" of the countries occupied by the U S S R, continued to characterize them as still essentially bourgeois states. But there was no longer unanimity on this question among the international leadership, and internal discussions were beginning that brought into question the validity of this position.

It is true that, under the pressure of the "cold war," the Soviet bureaucracy itself was forced to speed up the liquidation of the vestiges of "dual power" on both the economic and political planes. The "coup de Prague" was already there, and not in Czechoslovakia alone.

The theses on "The U S S R and Stalinism" contained a section relating to the historical discussion on the Russian question, which happily made short work of the revisionist arguments put forth by the various "pro-Stalinist" or "anti-Stalinist" tendencies that had shown themselves in our own ranks.

With the discussion that took place both during the preparation for and at the Second World Congress, the "Russian question" has since then ceased to be a matter of controversy as to the social character, "worker" or not — although degenerated — of the U S S R.

Another merit of the Second World Congress was that it began an orientation toward real mass work for the organizations of the International, despite the fact that it still placed the main emphasis on the essentially independent work, and only exceptionally entrust work.

The Second World Congress furthermore reaffirmed the democratic-centralist character of the World Party, the International, by unanimously adopting new and more complete statutes, based both on those of the Third International and on the statutes voted at the Founding Conference of the Fourth International in 1938.

The document on "The Struggle of the Colonial Peoples" laid the emphasis on the new forms of indirect colonialism.

Seen a posteriori, the Second World Congress appears in an overall way as having closed the first period in the International's life and postwar development, during which our national forces were regrouping, sifting themselves, and reorienting themselves in the complex new situation bequeathed by the Second World War.

During that period, the forces of the Fourth International, grown more homogeneous politically, were gradually getting rid of sectarian habits and, here and there, of opportunist weaknesses, were becoming conscious of new international and social realities, and were making their way confidently toward their well-thought-out and effective integration in the real mass movement of each country.

Resolution of the International Secretariat

ON THE EVENTS IN TIBET

The events in Tibet, which this year brought about a conflict between the military and civil authorities of the central government of the People's Republic of China and the Tibetan armed forces, have given rise to diverse interpretations, including in our own ranks. Imperialist propaganda has seized on these events for the obvious purpose of impairing the drawing-power of the Chinese revolution, especially among the Asian masses, and also of compromising the Peking government in Asian "neutralist" opinion, especially in the eyes of the Asian and world colonial bourgeoisie, whose good graces and alliance Peking — following the Kremlin's example — is seeking.

The precedent of Hungary provided this propaganda with facile analogies, that were, however, obviously superficial.

In order to clarify the questions raised by the recent events, a reminder of certain facts of a historic and social nature is necessary.

Especially since the XIIIth century and up until the XIXth century, Tibet was administratively a part of the Chinese national empires and never appeared during this period as an independent state. In the XIXth century it became a protectorate of British imperialism, which — at the time of the liberation of India — transferred its rights to that country, but continued to keep its own agents on the spot, working against the Chinese revolution.

In 1951 the armies of the Chinese revolution entered Tibet, and Peking reached an agreement with the local authorities "on the measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet." In 1945 the Nehru government yielded its rights over Tibet to China, and Nehru himself then (15 May 1954) declared: "I am not aware that at any time during the last few hundred years, Chinese sovereignty, or if you like, suzerainty [over Tibet] was challenged by any outside country."

Within the limits of the Chinese empires, especially since the XIIIth century, the Tibetan people, ethnically distinct from the Han people, the Chinese people properly so called, lived side-by-side with other national minorities, the Mongols, the Uighurs, the Chuags, the Miaos, the Koreans, etc (to the number of about 50) who constituted the multinational country, historically formed as such, known by the name of China.

These historical facts — as well as the fact that Tibet, detached from China since the XIXth century by imperialism, had become in an unquestionable way an imperialist platform against the security and unity of China — justified the effort undertaken by the victorious armies of the Chinese revolution to recuperate Tibet from imperialism, according to a statute of *autonomous territory* (and not of *province*) within the limits of the Chinese People's Republic.

What is more, there has not been, especially in these last years, any proof of the existence of a Tibetan movement of national independence from China.

The national policy of the Peking government can be essentially criticized only from the viewpoint of its attitude toward the toiling masses of Tibet.

This country is marked by the existence of an extremely anachronistic and barbarous feudo-theocratic social and political regime. Some two to three hundred families of nobles hold — directly themselves and by their preponderant role in the government — about two-thirds of the land, the other third belonging to the monasteries ruled by the higher clergy. More than a million serfs, that is, the overwhelming majority of the country's population, labor on these lands, in the service of the secular and ecclesiastical nobility, as peasants, shepherds, and servants, in conditions of extreme material and cultural destitution.

In order to spare the country a revolution by its laboring masses, and not to compromise its relations with the Asian ruling classes, especially those of India, and the opinion of Asiatic Buddhism, Peking carefully avoided overturning the existing social order by basing itself on revolutionary mobilization and organization. In fact what it based itself on was just what it is now denouncing, namely the higher social strata crowned by the government and the Dalai Lama; it was from the "re-education" and "understanding" of these strata that Peking was awaiting the gradual introduction of reforms.

This opportunist policy completely failed. The strata of the ecclesiastic and secular nobility, fearing after all the inevitable process of structural assimilation with the rest of China, were concerned only with indefinitely postponing the reforms, to gain time and to pair up with imperialism to defend their "independence."

It is naturally possible that these efforts found a certain echo among the most backward elements in the country, disappointed by the de facto support accorded by Peking to the feudalists instead of stirring up civil war and backing the masses of the serfs against them.

It was in these conditions that the Chinese armed forces stationed in Tibet were harassed by white bands long before the more massive attack to which they were subjected in Lhasa itself last March.

At that time, the Chinese army had not "invaded" an "independent" country, but had been for several years on the spot, and according to all available proofs (including those of imperialism and the letters written by the Dalai Lama and later recognized as genuine by Nehru himself), it was subjected to the assault of forces trained and prepared by the feudalists.

Thus the analogy with the case of Hungary, where a *workers' state*, formally *independent*, was invaded by the Soviet army in order to crush a *workers' uprising*

aimed against the political, bureaucratic, and police regime whose allegiance was to the Kremlin, is superficial and therefore null and void.

Quite apart from any criticism about the previous attitude of the Peking government toward Tibet, at the moment of the conflict itself revolutionary Marxists define their position by taking into account the social forces facing each other: who is fighting whom. From this point of view, they are unreservedly for the victory of the armies of the Chinese revolution against the armed forces of feudal reaction.

The mass character of the latter, although problematical in the concrete case of Tibet because not based on tangible proofs, enters the question only as an element to determine the future solution once the feudal reaction has been beaten and the victory of the revolutionary army assured.

Taught by experience, forced by events, Peking is at present being led to proceed, finally, to the social revolution in Tibet, by relying on the serfs and by destroying the positions of property and power of the ecclesiastical and secular nobility.

Revolutionary Marxists support this action, while asking that it be entrusted essentially to the democratic

organizations of the country — committees, trade unions, militias, parties — and that it be carried out in the framework of a real regional autonomy for Tibet, including the right of complete separation from the rest of the Chinese Republic.

The Tibetan people being obviously a separate nationality, revolutionary Marxists recognize this people's right of self-determination; including the right to separate from China. In order that this right be exercised, it is necessary that the majority of the entire Tibetan people clearly express its opinion, for the proclamation of Tibetan independence by the feudal leaders does not represent a proof of this desire. Between the recognition of the right to independence and the active struggle of revolutionary Marxists for this right, there is, however, a difference.

In Tibet itself, any revolutionary Marxist forces would, however, have to support the position that the country remain fraternally united, on a basis of equality, with the other nationalities and autonomous territories of the People's Republic of China.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

July 1959



Appeal of the International Secretariat

IN AID OF THE ALGERIAN PRISONERS IN FRANCE

To the Working Class and Its Organizations:

While the workers of France are going away on their holidays, to the seaside, to the mountains, basking in the sun and enjoying life, thousands of Algerians, mostly workers, fighters of the great Algerian revolution, are rotting in the prisons of France.

For more than a week now, a second hunger strike has been taking place in Fresnes prison, which contains hundreds of Algerian prisoners. The purpose of this hunger strike is to obtain some improvement in the terrible conditions under which they languish, to obtain the rights of political prisoners, and to obtain such elementary things as the right to receive newspapers and parcels; for an end to all reprisals; for the direct examination of petitions by the Chancellery, etc.

The first hunger strike was called off by the strike committee on the 30th of June, on the promise that the status of detainees would be modified in accordance with these demands. But these promises have not been carried out; on the contrary, the brutality of the C.R.S. guards has increased and this conduct has spread even to the prison enclosures.

In the second hunger strike of the prisoners of Fresnes, Ben Bella and the other Algerian leaders, imprisoned on the island of Aix, have joined.

In the other prisons of France, by the hundreds and

soon by the thousands, the Algerians prisoners are supporting the movement.

During the first hunger strike the French authorities did not hesitate, in order to break the strike, to resort to the scandalous measure of cutting off the water supply to the prisoners — a measure that not even the Nazis carried out.

Working-class brothers of the Algerian working class in France, in Europe, in the entire world:

Come swiftly to the aid of the hunger strikers of Algeria, martyred in the jails of the Gaullist dictatorship.

Each day that passes puts in danger the life of hundreds and before long thousands of courageous fighters of the Algerian Revolution.

Call upon trade-union and political organizations to intervene urgently, call upon the labor press to give publicity to this strike, call upon them to send telegrams of protest to the President of the French Republic in Paris. Demand political rights and status for the Algerian prisoners in France. Demand the right of self-determination and of independence for the suffering people of Algeria.

Act forcefully and urgently!

Yours fraternally,

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

A RECALL TO ORDER

(An Open Letter from the International Secretariat of the Fourth International to the Members and Leadership of the Socialist Labour League)

The July-August 1959 issue of *Labour Review* contains an editorial entitled "In Defence of Trotskyism." The objective result, as well as the subjective scope, of this article is in glaring contradiction with its title. Ever since the beginning of 1957, which saw unity negotiations once more initiated by the Fourth International with the organizations which form the "International Committee," exchange of argument and polemics has remained internal — on both sides. Today the S L L abandons this attitude and publicly attacks the Fourth International, thereby seriously jeopardizing any chance of early unity of the world Trotskyist movement. This is therefore no contribution to the defense of Trotskyism; it is rather a contribution to weakening it. It contributes to the confusion which exists in broad progressive layers of the working-class movement about the nature of the Trotskyist organizations. It is another act that tends to discredit Trotskyism in Great Britain.

Under the circumstances, the Fourth International, created by Leon Trotsky, to which he adhered till the day of his death, and which continues to defend his ideas, his programme and his tradition, has no other choice but to answer these public attacks blow by blow. It regrets that, through no fault of its own, this public polemic, difficult for the great majority of advanced workers to understand, must start again. At the same time, however, there is also a progressive side to this irresponsible initiative of the S L L leadership. This discussion will allow many young comrades who have but recently joined the Trotskyist movement in Great Britain to understand better the significance and the purpose of the Trotskyist policies of the Fourth International, so slanderously misrepresented by the *Labour Review* editorial.

WAR AND REVOLUTION

After some historical introduction for the benefit of readers who do not know exactly what the Fourth International is and when and why it was founded, the authors of the *Labour Review* editorial, speaking about the cold war, arrive at the true scope of their article, the denunciation of "Pabloism," a creed which, they say, is adhered to by the present Fourth International leadership. This is how they define this creed.

It was in this period [of the cold war], under the pressures of Stalinism and imperialism, that certain prominent individuals in the Fourth International, headed by Michel Pablo, secretary of the international executive committee, began to *revise and reject the fundamental principles of the Marxist movement*. It was these revisions which caused a split in the Fourth International in 1953.

[*Labour Review*, July-August 1959, p 35.]

Here we have a statement of immaculate logic. Of course, if the leaders of a Marxist organization "revise and reject the fundamental principles of the Marxist movement," this can only cause a crisis and a split. No true Marxists, and certainly no such principled Marxists as Comrades Burns and Sinclair, the authors of the editorial in question, could stay for a long time together in a single organization with outspoken revisionists. And we are ready for the big blow, for the very next words tell us that "Pabloism had as its central thesis . . ."

If the reader is concerned by matters of programmatic principle, he will pause in his reading to ask himself: which of the tenets of Marxism will our orthodox principled comrades of *Labour Review* consider so fundamental that "revision and rejection" could only mean crisis and split? The thesis of the class struggle? Of the dictatorship of the proletariat? The Leninist theory of the state? The Trotskyist definition of the Soviet Union? The necessity of building a new revolutionary leadership throughout the world, for which the FI was founded? The defense of the Soviet Union? The Leninist conception of the revolutionary party? The principles of workers' democracy? The theory of the permanent revolution? The necessity of unconditional support of the revolutions of colonial peoples against their imperialist oppressors? The necessity of opposing class collaboration in peace and war inside a capitalist country? The necessity of a political revolution in the U S S R in order to restore Soviet democracy?

Dear reader, you are quite wrong. All these fundamentals of Marxism have nothing to do with the "crisis and split" in the Fourth International. The authors of the *Labour Review* editorial do not even pretend that the present FI leadership has "revised and rejected" them in any sense whatsoever. No, the "fundamental principles of Marxism" which we are said to have "revised and rejected" are beautifully described by Burns and Sinclair as follows:

Pabloism had as its central [!] thesis a deeply pessimistic prophecy of inevitable and immediate war. The forecast not only presumed the organic incapacity of the American and European working class to prevent such a war — thereby dismissing their revolutionary potentialities — but also attributed to the imperialist rulers a power, homogeneity and stability which they did not possess. [. . .] Since the 'inevitable', 'immediate' war would be a war against the Soviet Union, Pablo declared that by its very nature it would be an international civil war, a 'war-revolution'. The world was already being polarized between the forces of revolution and the forces of imperialism. Working-class bureaucracies, both Stalinist and right-wing, were in a vice. On the

one side was the irreversible march of imperialism to war — a war against the whole working class. On the other hand was the irreversible revolutionary wave. [Ibidem, p 35.]

We shall return to the subject itself in a minute. But some preliminary remarks are necessary. The authors pompously committed themselves to denounce a “revision and rejection of the fundamental principles of Marxism.” And the “central thesis” of this revisionism is pessimistic prophecy about the inevitability and the nearness of the imperialist war. Now we beg Comrades Burns and Sinclair: Please, show us the textbook, of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and even minor figures, where optimism or pessimism according to the inevitability and/or short-term or long-term perspectives about war is considered a “fundamental principle of Marxism.” In the twenties, Trotsky had predicted as probable an Anglo-American imperialist war. It so happened that this war never broke out. Did he thereby become a “revisionist”? When Hitler took power, Trotsky called upon the Soviet government to mobilize the Red Army immediately, for war was inevitable within two or three years. In fact war broke out only six and a half years later. Marx and Engels made many statements of the same nature. But perhaps, in the eyes of these distinguished Marxologues Burns and Sinclair, Marx was a little bit revisionist himself.

The old Romans had a neat saying for this kind of thing; it comes from the poet Horace: “The mountains are in labor, but they bear only a ridiculous mouse.” If indeed the “rejection and revision of the fundamental principles of Marxism” amounts to nothing more than a wrong and pessimistic analysis of the world situation, some comrades of the S L L might well ask their leaders, did this justify provoking an international crisis about it, not to speak of a split? Could this not have been settled by discussion and by experience?

The case of Burns and Sinclair is even worse than it looks *prima facie*. For this terrible “central thesis” of “Pabloite revisionism” was adopted *as early as Autumn 1950* by the *unanimous world movement*, with the exception of some French comrades. Burns and Sinclair were its staunch supporters for three long years. They had it unanimously adopted and confirmed at the conference of the British section of the F I which they headed. Till the very day of the split, they never said, murmured, or wrote a single word or line — not to say a discussion document — against this “central thesis.” A strange way of “giving battle.” A strange kind of “revisionism” which remained invisible to these orthodox critics for three long years. And so distinguished an “orthodox Trotskyist” as Comrade James P Cannon commented as follows on this “central thesis” adopted by the Third World Congress and the Xth Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, as late as 29 May 1952:

I think the Third World Congress made a correct analysis of the new post-war reality in the world and the unforeseen turns this reality has taken. Proceeding from this analysis, the Congress drew correct conclusions for the orientation of the national Trotskyist parties toward the living mass movement as it evolved since the war. Further, the Tenth Plenum, in its basic document on the tactical application of the Third World Congress

line, has faithfully interpreted, amplified and concretized the line of the World Congress.

Note well, this is the same Tenth Plenum document where Comrades Burns and Sinclair discovered the “central thesis” of “Pabloite revisionism.” And Comrade Cannon continues, on the nature of the Third World Congress and Xth Plenum documents:

We do not see any revisionism there. All we see is an elucidation of the post-war evolution of Stalinism and an outline of new tactics to fight it more effectively. We consider these documents to be completely Trotskyist. They are different from previous documents of our movement, not in principle or method, but only in the confrontation and analysis of the new reality and the tactical adjustment to it.

This definition by Comrade Cannon we wholeheartedly approve. It is the correct answer to the nonsense of the *Labour Review* editorial. There was of course only one sort of “revision” in these documents — not a revision of Marxist principles, but a revision in the analysis of the world situation, for the very simple reason that that world situation had changed in some fundamental aspects compared to 1938.

Let us briefly summarize the contents of these documents relative to the problem of war. World War I and World War II had been inter-imperialist wars. But it is obvious that the capitalists can slit one another’s throats only if they are not under the immediate threat of being overthrown by their respective workers (as they were after November 1918, when Foch let the Reichswehr have additional machine-guns to fight the German revolution). So it was absolutely correct to say, in the past, that an imperialist war could break out only if the workers’ movement was paralyzed (as in 1914), or crushed (as in the years from 1933 to 1939). The defeat of the Spanish revolution directly opened the road to the war.

But World War III will be an entirely different kind of war. It will not be an inter-imperialist war. It will be a war by an imperialist alliance, headed by American imperialism, against the Soviet bloc, the colonial revolution, and all active and class-conscious forces of the international labor movement. We hope that, at least on this point, there is no difference of opinion between the comrades of the S L L and the Fourth International.

Now one can visualize two sorts of wars by an imperialist alliance against workers’ states. One is the kind of war in which an imperialist alliance tries to crush an incipient danger for itself. This was the nature of the 1918-1920 wars of intervention in Russia. This was also, in a certain sense, the nature of the Korean war against revolutionary China. And under such conditions, it is still correct to say that the ability of the metropolitan workers’ movement to paralyze the criminal arm of imperialism could successfully stop the war. As a matter of fact, this is what happened in 1918-1920. Incidentally, it did happen also in a very limited sense in 1950-51, when the British Labour Party was the timid and unprincipled spokesman of the British and European workers’ opposition to MacArthur’s plan of using the atom bomb against revolutionary China.

But there is also another kind of imperialist war against workers’ states and colonial revolutions which can be visualized. Not a war under conditions of crushing military superiority for imperialism (these were still

the conditions of 1950, when the U S A retained the monopoly of the A-bomb), but a war of despair and self-defense by a dying class, which is not ready to leave the scene of history without a last-ditch fight for its existence. This is the kind of war the Third World Congress documents spoke about — with the full approval of the authors of this strange *Labour Review* editorial. And this is in all probability what World War III will be like.

The relationship of forces has turned with breathtaking speed against American imperialism. In 1945 it looked like the master of the world. Then came the colonial revolution. China was lost to it. North Vietnam was lost. The atomic monopoly, nay even military superiority, was lost. Within 15 or 20 years, economic superiority will be lost as well. The colonial revolution will “irresistibly” — we shall come back to this “revisionist” formula — spread from country to country. Sitting on top of the greatest stockpile of wealth and power which was ever accumulated on this planet, the leaders of U S imperialism see a world evolution in which they will lose country after country, continent after continent, till they will be isolated in their own hemisphere, nay their own country, economically strangled, socially threatened with imminent overthrow.

There is only one hypothesis which, under these conditions, makes war improbable. It is the hypothesis that U S imperialism has already been so decisively weakened that it is no longer capable of a last desperate attempt at self-defense. This is the illusion the Stalinist leaders seem, for the time being, to be laboring under. It is not the task of the Trotskyist movement to voice reformist illusions of this kind. No class has left history without defending itself by all means at its disposal. American imperialism still possesses tremendous means. It is mobilizing them, preparing for war. By far the most probable variant is that, sooner or later, it will throw them into the arena.

But can the international revolution not stop American imperialism? To a great extent it cannot. For each spread of the revolution is precisely followed by military intervention. There was military intervention against the Chinese, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Malayan, Kenyan, Tunisian, Moroccan, Guatemalan, Egyptian and Iraqi revolutions. There is military intervention against the Algerian revolution right now. There is no guarantee that any new revolutionary outburst will not be threatened by the same intervention. There is nothing “pessimistic” in this analysis, for if the list of countries we have enumerated is carefully reread it will be found that the majority of them successfully defeated this foreign counter-revolutionary intervention.

It may be objected: but what you have just proved is only a *general tendency*, not a precise timetable. This is true. The general tendency contained in the Third World Congress documents was correct. More precise predictions turned out to be incorrect. At the Fifth World Congress we made a long self-criticism on the subject. But it must not be forgotten that since August 1950, there have been four occasions on which we stood at the very brink of war: when the Chinese Army crossed the Yalu; when the U S atomic armada was already sailing into the Bay of Tonkin to relieve the siege of Dien Bien-Phu; when the Suez affair broke out; and when the American marines landed in the Lebanon to counteract the Iraqi revolution. Each time some specific

reason at the last moment saved the situation: inter-imperialist rivalry; the hope to come to an understanding with the colonial bourgeoisie; the high profits reaped in periods of boom; the conciliatory policies of the Kremlin, etc. But to understand why on all these occasions there has been no world war, is also to understand why the tendency towards World War III will remain and become more and more dangerous.

The only basis for a long-term “deal” between the Kremlin and Wall Street would be the ability of the Kremlin to guarantee the world status quo. It cannot do this, for two reasons: firstly because ever since 1946 the colonial revolution has become an autonomous force, which does not obey the Kremlin’s orders; secondly because the technical, economic, and social progress of the Soviet Union itself constantly changes the status quo. Under these circumstances, in the long run, the alternative for imperialism will be: to die fighting, or to die without fighting. We should have no doubt about the choice it will make. The only power which could prevent that would be the American working class, by taking power away from the monopolists. This would mean civil war in the U S A — and it will be admitted that that has not been quite so much on the calendar of world events since 1950, as the possibility of the sudden outbreak of World War III.

THE BUREAUCRACY AND “MASS PRESSURE”

The *Labour Review* editorial, we have just seen, indicated that the “central thesis” of “Pablo’s revision and rejection of the fundamental principles of Marxism” consisted in “a pessimistic prophecy of inevitable and immediate war.” We have already seen that this sentence contains at least three pieces of nonsense. There is nothing “pessimistic” about it — in the present world context. There is nothing “fundamental” or “principled” about it — it is a matter of analysis, not of principles. And it has nothing whatsoever to do with “revisionism.” If the worse comes to the worst, it is nothing but a wrong analysis of world evolution, which stands to be corrected by fraternal discussion and practical experience, on some occasion — and not by a split.

But perhaps we have been unjust to Burns and Sinclair. Perhaps what they wrongly called the “central thesis” of “Pabloite revisionism” was only some starting point. Perhaps we finally get at the devil’s tail when we read in the Editorial, on p 35:

But these irreversible developments did not mean that the working class and the oppressed peoples in struggle would come into ever sharper conflict with their bureaucratic leaders; or that the latter would seek, as in the past, to head off and destroy revolutionary development. On the contrary: according to Pablo, the conflict between the interests of the bureaucracy and those of the working class would be overcome. The bureaucrats would be swept along by the revolutionary wave, which would end imperialism.

One expects to find some substantiation for this serious accusation. No quotation follows. One reads on. No proof whatsoever is brought forward. The only quotation which follows — and which, incidentally, is taken out of the same Xth Plenum document in which Comrade Cannon found nothing revisionist and which he called “completely Trotskyist”! — says that the reformist

mass parties will make some leftward turns during a revolution:

These organizations cannot be smashed and replaced by others in the relatively short time between now and the decisive conflict. All the more so since these organizations will be obliged, whether they wish it or not, to give a leftward turn to the policy of the whole or at least a part of the leadership.

Now if that statement is looked at from all sides, from left to right, upside and down, nothing can be found wrong — not to say “revisionist” — about it. In a revolutionary period, leftward turns are made by the whole or part of Social-Democratic bureaucracies; isn't that so? Didn't that happen in 1918-1921, when “whole or parts” of the reformist bureaucracy of most European countries went as far as adopting — in words — the slogans of dictatorship of the proletariat and of soviets (the Austrian S P, the Norwegian Labor Party, the reformists inside the Independent S P of Germany, the French S P, the Italian S P, and many others)? Didn't it happen again in the period 1934-36, when such typical reformist bureaucrats as Léon Blum and Largo Caballero wrote that Hitler had won in Germany because the Social Democracy had been unable to build a dictatorship of the proletariat? Why shouldn't the same thing happen at the next revolutionary wave? Even that scoundrel Guy Mollet got himself elected general-secretary of the S F I O in 1948 on a leftist platform, during the revolutionary postwar upsurge!

Of course, the authors of the *Labour Review* editorial — the authors, not Comrade Pablo! — draw from this quotation (the only one they find to substantiate their strong accusation!) the following conclusion:

The bureaucrats were trapped by the revolutionary wave and forced to act counter to their nature — ‘whether they wish it or not’. To use words properly [mind you: the words “to act counter to their nature” are Burns's, not Pablo's!] they were forced to *change their nature*; for if a counter-revolutionary no longer acts as a counter-revolutionary, he ceases to be one.

Burns and Sinclair take a quotation which says that in times of revolutionary upsurge Social-Democratic bureaucrats, in whole or in part, in order to keep their treacherous control over mass parties, will make leftward turns — a hypothesis confirmed dozens of times in the history of the labor movement. They draw from that quotation the conclusion that — because of a left turn? — these bureaucracies can no longer act in a counter-revolutionary way (something which no document of the Fourth International, no document of Comrade Pablo, ever said), and then they accuse the F I of having “revised” Marxism by stating that — the bureaucracy has changed its nature! What kind of “dialectics” or “polemics” are these?

But more of the same is to come, for we now catch our unprincipled critics in the very act of deforming quotations. In order to “prove” that Pablo defends the revisionist thesis of bureaucratic self-reform, our clumsy falsifiers have *simply suppressed from their quotation two sentences where Pablo says the exact opposite!* For in the original Xth Plenum Report (printed in *Quatrième Internationale*, February-April 1952 issue), we find between the first (“countries where the reformist movements embrace the political majority of the working

class . . .”) and the second sentence (“These organizations cannot be smashed . . .”), quoted by Burns-Sinclair, the following passage:

In all these countries it is extremely probable, except for some new and at present unforeseeable developments, *that the radicalization of the masses and the first stages of the revolution*, of the objective revolutionary situation, will manifest themselves within these organizations. The main forces of the revolutionary party of these countries will spring up by *differentiation or disintegration of these organizations*.

Now any child reading these sentences *purposely deleted* by Burns and Sinclair from their “quotation” can understand that what Comrade Pablo said — and what everybody, including Comrades Cannon, Burns and Sinclair considered quite “orthodox Trotskyist” — was only that a revolutionary mass upsurge in a country with an established working-class mass party would begin by causing a differentiation *within* that party; that it would lead on the one hand to a leftward move of the bureaucracy (or parts of it) and on the other to the emergence of a genuine revolutionary tendency; that through the *struggle between* these tendencies the reformist party would disintegrate and a new revolutionary mass party would emerge, exactly as happened in most European countries between 1918 and 1923.

Comrades of the Socialist Labour League!

Ask your leaders why they have to lower themselves to the Stalinist methods of misquotation and slander, in order to fight their factional struggle against the Fourth International. You know where such methods lead; don't tolerate them in your organization! No honest discussion is possible when people, driven by factionalist passion, cynically distort not only speeches but even writings, and insinuate that comrades say the contrary of what is actually written down. The accusation of Burns and Sinclair, that the Fourth International defends the revisionist thesis that the contradiction between the working class and the bureaucracy is being overcome, was already disproved in the very passage which they “quote”! The only thing this passage says is that the *inevitable struggle between the bureaucracy and the workers* will, during a revolutionary period, *start within* the working-class mass parties, and not by the workers leaving these parties by the thousands!

THE STALINIST BUREAUCRACY AND MASS PRESSURE

But falsifiers Burns and Sinclair have still another ax to grind. The Fourth International is alleged to have made its peace not only with the reformist bureaucracy, but also with the Stalinist bureaucracy. Two “quotations” (we have just seen what they are worth!) are brought forward to “confirm” this sweeping accusation. The first reads as follows:

In countries where the C P s are a majority of the working class they can, under exceptional conditions (advanced disintegration of the propertied classes) and under the pressure of very powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses, be led to project a revolutionary orientation counter to the Kremlin's directives, without abandoning the political and theoretical baggage inherited from Stalinism.

Again we may ask: what is wrong with that statement? It comes, it is true, from the document "Rise and Decline of Stalinism," which, for the S L L, is considered heretical literature. But it was also made at great length (and in a much less limited way) by the Third World Congress documents — documents which were enthusiastically hailed by Comrades Cannon, Burns, and Sinclair.

The quotation speaks about "exceptional circumstances." If words mean anything, this means that this hypothesis is the *exception, not the rule*. Why then mention it at all? Because "exceptional circumstances" do occur from time to time. And it so happens that this "revisionist" perspective "rejecting the fundamental principles of Marxism," is nothing but an explanation of events *which have already happened* and which could — not as a rule, but in some exceptional case — happen again.

Please answer us, Comrades Burns and Sinclair: has capitalism been destroyed in Jugoslavia? Has it been destroyed in China? Has it been destroyed in North Vietnam? By whom has it been destroyed in these three cases? By genuine revolutionary parties, Trotskyist parties? Of course not. By the Communist Parties of Jugoslavia, China, and Vietnam. Did these parties, at the time of their conquest of power, still keep "the political and theoretical baggage inherited from Stalinism"? Of course they did. The Jugoslavs started to break with that heritage only three years later, and have not yet completed the process. As for the Chinese, they have hardly begun, not to speak of the Vietnamese. But did they not take power contrary to the directives of Stalin? Of course they did. Is that a general rule for the future? No, only in extremely exceptional cases will such a thing repeat itself.

So if we carefully read this "revisionist thesis," without letting ourselves be carried away by passionate invectives, we find that it corresponds literally to objective reality, objective truth. To read into this statement any idea that the contradictions between the Soviet bureaucracy and the working masses have been overcome, needs an extreme degree of bad faith.

The second quotation which proves our kowtowing before the Stalinist bureaucracy is another striking example. It concerns the concessions which the Soviet bureaucracy had been forced to make in increasing number to the pressure of the Soviet masses. Comrade Pablo wrote:

The dynamic of their concessions is in reality liquidatory of the entire Stalinist heritage in the U S S R itself, as well as in its relations with the satellite countries, with China and the Communist Parties. It will no longer be easy to turn back. [...] Once the concessions are broadened, the march towards a real liquidation of the Stalinist regime threatens to become irresistible.

Now again, from this quotation Burns and Sinclair draw the conclusion that "according to Pablo," the contradiction between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Soviet masses "has been overcome," that the Soviet bureaucracy will liberalize itself or that Pablo puts a question mark above the necessity of a political revolution in the U S S R. Once more these are of course absolutely slanderous deductions — not proved by a single word which is actually quoted. The only thing this quotation says is that under pressure of the masses, the Soviet bureaucracy was obliged to make concessions

to the people which have proved irreversible and which open the road to the overthrow of the Stalinist regime. There is nothing wrong with this statement; it is a correct analysis of what happened in Russia in 1953.

In reality, the Fourth International was the first working-class organization which understood that the relationship of forces between the Soviet workers and the bureaucracy had fundamentally changed in the workers' favor. This change is precisely the factor that determines the *pre-revolutionary character* of the present situation in the U S S R. This is a fundamental change compared with the prewar situation. Burns and Sinclair seem not to realize this even today. But the National Committee of the S W P understood it very well, for it stated in a resolution of April 1956:

A new stage has opened in the continuing development of the Russian revolution. The masses of the Soviet Union, who were politically expropriated by the bureaucracy under Stalin, and who suffered its brutal rule for nearly three decades, are evidently once again in motion; they have already forced far-reaching concessions from the bureaucracy and more can be expected to follow. [...]

[...] The [XXth] Congress [of the C P S U] thus marks the beginning of a new, profoundly revolutionary stage in the Soviet Union. *The immediate reason for the concessions, as we have indicated, was the palpable pressure of the masses which has grown so great* that the bureaucracy calculates it cannot be suppressed simply by sweeping purges as in the days of Stalin — it is more expedient to bend with the pressure in hope of avoiding being broken by it.

A revolution, in history, is very often preceded by evolution, concessions from the enemy, shadow fights which prepare the real thing. There is nothing "revisionist" in stating this; it is, on the contrary, the ABC of Marxism. Revisionism is the denial of the thesis that this process of pressure and concessions needs to transform itself into a revolution, a direct mass action, a qualitative "leap," in order to achieve final victory. Deutscher and other people who thought that the bureaucracy could reform and suppress itself, were revisionists; if they still think so today, they are still revisionists. But Pablo nowhere said or wrote that. On the contrary, *in the same article* from which Burns quotes, nay, in the same paragraph, he explicitly states that Stalin's heirs make the said concessions to mass pressure "in order to survive as the Bonapartist leadership of the privileged bureaucracy." A few sentences earlier he explicitly states that it would be fundamentally wrong and dangerous to conclude that the new leaders have been reforming themselves and that they can successfully "democratize from above the Stalinist bureaucratic and police regime."¹

¹ The *Labour Review* editorial distorts a third quotation from an article by Comrade Pablo. On p 37, the authors quote part of his article, "Democracy, Socialism, and Transitional Programme" (which originally appeared in *Fourth International* no 6, Spring 1959, p 34): They attempt to create the impression that Pablo proposes "precisely the present policy of the British Communist Party." But in order to arrive at that result, they quote two paragraphs which in the original text do not follow one after the other, but are separated by the following: "In both cases, the parliamentary origin of the workers' government would in

And again we must ask you, comrades of the Socialist Labour League: Why is it that Comrades Burns and Sinclair, who have often known how to fight capitalists, reformist bureaucrats, and Stalinists with correct arguments, have to resort to crude slander, distortion, and falsification in their irresponsible fight against the Fourth International? Perhaps for the same reason why the Stalinists, who more than once have correctly polemized against capitalists and even against the Social-Democratic stooges of capitalism, cannot honestly refute Trotskyism but must resort to slander, vilification, and forgeries? Is it because they are basically wrong in this fight?

HOW TO BUILD REVOLUTIONARY MASS PARTIES

The *Labour Review* editorial insists strongly upon the necessity of building "an alternative leadership." It sees in the building of that leadership the main goal of the Fourth International. We completely agree with that statement. That is what the Fourth International was created for: to give a new, genuinely Marxist, genuinely revolutionary leadership to the workers of the world. The question is not whether one agrees or not with that mission; no one can be Trotskyist and put a question mark above it. The question is *how* we are going to attain these goals *in practice*.

Experience has taught that it is not enough for a group of people to *say* or *claim* that they are "the alternative leadership," in order to be recognized as such by the masses. They must conquer the *political* confidence of the advanced workers, and, in the end, of the majority of the working class of their country. This is not an easy task. The Stalinists, in many countries, have been trying to do this for more than 40 years, with little or no result. We Trotskyists have been trying to do it for 25 years. At least there exists a huge body of experience in this matter. It might have been thought that Comrades Burns and Sinclair, who attach so much importance to this question, would at least summarize some of the lessons of these rich experiences. They do not even attempt to. Instead, they content themselves with hollow and pious incantations: "Slow, painful, uphill work"; "building an alternative leadership"; "smashing the bureaucrats' hold over the working class"; "practical struggle to win leadership." All well and good, but please tell us *how* this will be done.

We can at least give one example how it cannot be done. *Labour Review* devotes quite some space to denouncing the class-collaborationist policy of the CP of Great Britain. There is no doubt that the British Stalinists have been guilty of that crime at many periods of

fact be the result of the revolutionary united-front mobilization of the masses. *This mobilization, as well as the adequate organization of the masses*, would then be the guarantee that a workers' government might apply its transitional programme against the inevitably fierce resistance of the bourgeoisie." (Emphasis added.) Now this is exactly what the Transitional Programme says on the subject. Are Burns and Sinclair against the united front? Are they against the united front government? Are they against the united front government supported by mass committees? Of course this proposition applies only to countries where the working class is politically divided between two mass workers' parties, not to Britain. In Britain the formula is of course the Labour Party govern-

ment, to a greater extent perhaps than any other European CP (we recall their fight for a coalition government in the 1945 general elections). But it is also undeniable that, at other periods, the British Stalinists have shown quite courageous examples of militancy among the organized workers and the unemployed. The "third period" (1928-1933) was typical of that. It was a period of great economic crisis, which brought unheard of misery to many layers of the British working class. It was a period which witnessed the extraordinary betrayal of the MacDonald group. It was a period of numerous militant class actions led by the Communists. Yet when that period was over, and a trial balance was drawn of the relationship of forces between the reformist Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Communist Party, the conclusion had to be reached that the former had grown stronger compared to the latter, and not the other way round.

As a great number of similar experiences in other European countries confirm the same rule, we may formulate it in the following way. In countries with an old-established political mass movement, to which the overwhelming majority of the workers give political allegiance, no alternative leadership will be built up essentially through leading militant strike actions on the economic front. If they act in an intelligent way, individual revolutionaries (like individual Stalinists) can win very strong positions in this way as shop-stewards or even as union leaders on a regional or national scale. But this nowise means that the workers who follow them in a strike or a militant action against union bureaucrats are ready to follow them politically into a new party, group or league. And those who follow them there will not stay for long, if they remain outside the organized mass party of labor.

We can draw a second conclusion from this experience. In all countries with organized mass parties of the working class, to which the majority of the class gives allegiance, no *mass* revolutionary party will be built mainly by *individual recruitment* (i.e. winning over, through propaganda or the example of militant actions, individual members of the mass party, or groups of 4, 5, 10, 12 members at a time). There is no example of such a process of building an alternative leadership of the working class, either in the history of the Third International, or in the history of the Fourth International. Revolutionary mass parties will be built through *splits inside the reformist (or Stalinist) mass parties*, splits not of a couple of hundred or even a couple of thousand members, but splits which draw away the majority (or a very strong minority) of all the politically conscious members of these parties. That is the way the Communist mass parties of Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, France, and Italy were built in the early twenties. And in countries like Britain, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, where the Communists failed to do that job efficiently — notwithstanding Lenin's correct and far-sighted advice — the CPs have remained politically isolated sects right up to this day.

Of course these lessons from forty years' experience apply only to countries where a politically organized and conscious working class exists. They do not apply to countries where there exists a strong trade-union movement, but no mass political party of the working class. They certainly do not apply to countries where there exists no mass labor movement at all. It was in these

latter conditions that our Ceylonese comrades, whom Burns approvingly sets up as an example, have been able to build an independent Trotskyist mass party which has won over the majority of the workers of their country. But inasmuch as the conditions under which our Ceylon comrades — in a certain sense also our Bolivian comrades — work are exceptional and not the rule, for in most countries of the world there exists today a working-class mass movement, either purely trade-union, or trade-union as well as political, the lessons of their splendid achievement cannot be applied to countries where these conditions do not exist, without miseducating the movement, leading it into a dead end and causing repeated demoralization and disintegration.

The terrible example of the French allies of Burns — whom he has himself characterized in a recent document of the International Committee — as a “small opportunist sect,” should give much matter for thought to the members of the S L L. A few years ago, this Lambert group, which counted some excellent militant workers in its ranks, boasted also that it was building an “alternative leadership for the French workers” because it had played a leading role in some unofficial strikes and had brought together some militant unionists — outside of the mass movement. Today it has practically collapsed when these inflated dreams proved absolutely unrealistic.

We have spoken of countries where a politically conscious and organized working class exists, and about countries — like Ceylon — where at the time of the foundation of the L S S P there existed neither mass unions nor mass parties of the working class. But there exists a third category of countries, countries with a strong trade-union movement, but no politically organized masses of workers. In these countries, according to the thoroughly rotten, defeatist, pessimistic, and revisionist outlook attributed to the present Fourth International leadership, there is slight probability that the mass of the workers will at one bound jump from a total lack of political consciousness to political consciousness at its highest level: revolutionary Marxism, Trotskyism. That is why that allegedly treacherous leadership proposes for such countries the “rigmarole” of “transitional parties,” i e, mass labor parties based on the unions. The *Labour Review* editorial scornfully denounces such a proposition as revisionist through and through. Unfortunately for the authors of that editorial, the real patent-right of that proposal does not belong to the I S of the Fourth International but to — Comrade Trotsky, who made it in 1938-9 to the S W P. It was adopted enthusiastically by the S W P and has been kept ever since as a main plank in the S W P program!

The only “innovation” we have made is to extend the same idea to some countries with the same conditions (mass unions but no independent working-class political party) such as Argentina, Morocco, and Tunisia. We still wait for any argument to tell us why this is correct in the U S A but wrong in Argentina — where, incidentally, our comrades have conquered quite some influence in the unions owing to this slogan, and where they got 15,000 votes in the province of Buenos Aires, 25 % of the Stalinist vote.²

² As an indication of the principled character and political homogeneity of the policy of the International Committee, it may be noted that while Burns is now opposed to entrism in Social-Democratic and Stalinist Parties, his Argentine

Comrades Burns and Sinclair wind up this passage of their indictment of the Fourth International with the following sweeping assertions:

What is the essence of Pablo's theories? They are a complete negation of the Marxist conception of the *conscious intervention* of the F I. If one accepts the Pabloite dogma of irresistible processes, then the entire struggle for correct working class leadership, and therefore for the building of it, becomes completely redundant. If ‘objective conditions’, the ‘new reality’ as Pablo called it, can make bureaucracy act as a revolutionary force, then what earthly purpose does the Marxist movement serve? Why should Marxists put forward their own policies against those of the present leaders of the working class? Why should the Marxist movement fight to build itself as a realistic alternative before the working class, if “mass pressure” can cut revolutionary channels along which the present leaders or at least sections of them, will have no option but to travel?

But it is not simply a question of running away [!] from the difficulties of building a revolutionary movement, and covering one's retreat by an artificial and mechanical scheme of ‘irreversible processes’ which will bring the victory of socialism. [*Labour Review*, p 37] ³

Now this is indeed a childish rigmarole, to use a word which Burns and Sinclair seem to like. *Labour Review* has produced no shadow of a proof that the present F I leadership abandons to either bureaucrats or “irresistible processes” and “objective conditions” the tasks of building a new revolutionary leadership or of achieving the victory of world revolution. What the F I consistently pointed out in this connection since 1950 was the fact that, *contrary* to the 1923-1943 pre-war period, the relationship of forces on a global scale had irreversibly swung against capitalism, and that therefore objective conditions were globally *favorable* to the building of revolutionary mass parties, and not unfavorable as before the war. *Labour Review* has not quoted a single sentence proving that the F I thinks that the bureaucracy can reform itself or become revolutionary. What the F I *did* say in this connection was that the bureaucracy would split under the pressure of the revolution,

political ally Moreno has entered — the *bourgeois nationalist* Perón party!

³Burns and Sinclair make quite a play about “irreversible” processes. If one believes in “irreversible processes,” why fight for the revolution? How little they understand about the concrete ways to bring about victorious revolutions! Marxists never thought that the objective conditions alone “could do the job”; but they always thought — and still think — that certain objective conditions, certain “irreversible processes,” are *necessary prerequisites* for a successful revolution. The National Committee of the S W P showed a better understanding by voting in its April 13-15 session a resolution on the XXth Congress of the C P of the Soviet Union, which has this to say about “irreversible processes”: “The slogan ‘back to Lenin’ is thus a proletarian slogan which the masses will inevitably fill with their own revolutionary socialist content. Naturally, this will not occur in a day. The workers are yet unorganized. The bureaucracy will fight desperately as it nears its doom. The entire process will have its ups and downs and even reversals. *The important thing is that the process has begun and in the final analysis it will prove to be irreversible. [!]*”

and that some parts of it would go along for *part of the way* towards the revolution, a unanimously recognized fact in Hungary (Nagy!), Poland (Gomulka!), Jugoslavia (Tito!), Germany 1918-23 (part of the U S P D - leadership), etc.⁴ The idea of a revolutionary mass movement being led only by those who have been "pure from birth" is of course a childish sectarian illusion. But in all this there is not the slightest proof of the assertion that the F I is "running away from the difficulties of building a revolutionary movement." Far from "running away" from those difficulties, it is tackling them, not without success, in more than thirty countries throughout the world.

For the first time in its history, the Fourth International had tried to work out a rounded theory of the concrete way to build revolutionary mass parties in various parts of the world. To this, Burns has nothing to oppose but slanderous invective and empty phrases. It is not in this way that a Marxist movement gets educated; and it is certainly not along such a road that it becomes a mass movement.

AN IRRESPONSIBLE TURN IN GREAT BRITAIN

But the heart of the matter is the new tactical decision of the Burns group concerning "independent work." In order to understand the thoroughly unprincipled, monstrously irresponsible nature of this turn, the young comrades who have recently joined the S L L should consider the following facts.

For more than 13 years, the Burns group — before the split, during the split, and after the split — has been violently and totally opposed to the public activity of a Trotskyist organization in Britain. As we have argued above, it has argued that the mass revolutionary party of the British workers will be born as a result of differentiation within the Labour Party — not only the unions affiliated to the Labour Party but the Labour Party as a political organization, with its annual conferences, its local branches, etc. It has argued at great length that any independent Trotskyist activity, which draws forces away from that work inside the Labour Party and jeopardizes the security of that work, should be condemned and stopped as a disruption of the building of a revolutionary mass party in Great Britain.

As late as 6 July 1957, Comrade Burns wrote a letter to the I S, in the course of the then unity negotiations. We wish to quote the following passage from that letter:

We must disagree with you when you maintain that our attitude toward Comrade G's group is ultimatic. Our movement in Britain discussed for many years the tactics and strategy for the construction of the Revolutionary Party. By an overwhelming majority, the International movement as a whole decided with us that the entrust tactic was the best way to do this. As far as we are aware, no decision has ever been taken by your bodies to reverse this, and certainly the International Committee is fully in support of this policy. *More than ever* we are convinced that this is the correct road for our movement.

⁴Burns himself wrote in May 1957 on the Polish events: "A section of this native [Polish] bureaucracy began to lean on the masses to counteract the demands of the Kremlin." ("The Fight against Pabloite Revisionism," p xiii in the I S *Internal Bulletin*, edition of July 1957.)

The G group are in favour of the ex-R C P policy of "open work" and we for our part have no desire to resume the old discussions of the forties. What happened to the R C P and the majority of its leaders should be instructive enough in this respect. [. . .]

[. . .] When we say that they must disband the R S L, we are simply repeating that our movement rejects the tactic of "open work" and there is nothing ultimatic about this. It is simply a statement of fact. [. . .] We for our part will not tolerate any resumption of the old factionalism and for this reason *we are absolutely opposed to any forms of activity which will repeat the wasteful practices of the past, re-opening old issues which have long been settled by history.*

We do not agree with Comrade Burns' description of the activities of the R S L at that time. But for the rest, we were and are in full agreement with everything said in that letter concerning the entrust tactic in Britain, as the best way to build the revolutionary party. We were and we are opposed to an orientation towards independent activities which are "the wasteful practices of the past." Like Comrade Burns, we considered this question an issue "which had long been settled by history."

Barely two years after writing that letter, Burns now has completely reversed his position on this fundamental issue. Now he is in favor of independent activity. Now he wants to build the S L L not only as an independent working-class organization, but even — there can be no other meaning given to the *Labour Review* editorial — as a Trotskyist one.

Now first of all we may ask: Did the Burns group prepare this fundamental turn by a thorough-going discussion, by a deep-going analysis explaining why this break with 14 years of political struggle and experience suddenly became necessary? There was no discussion. There was no conference. The decision was made at the top, with breath-taking celerity. It was approved after a short discussion which *followed* instead of preceding this fundamental turn.

One should expect Burns and Sinclair to give at least a short explanation of the reasons for this fundamental turn, of their "analysis and assessment of the present situation in Britain" — as they accuse us of clinging to the entrust tactic without such an analysis. But the only explanation for the building of the S L L as an independent organization is to be found in one paragraph:

The Socialist Labour League has not come into being by accident, but out of the struggles of the past year, which showed that such an organization was needed by the British working class. It has come into being to intervene in the experience of the working class, to organize, educate and prepare the vanguard which is drawing fundamental lessons from the employers' offensive, from rank-and-file resistance and from Right-wing betrayals. It has come into being at a time *when the growing militancy in industry is not yet being carried into the Labour Party*. It has come into being to fight for class struggle policies inside [?] the Labour Party and the trade unions, so continuing and carrying forward in present-day conditions the best traditions of Trotskyist work within the mass or-

ganizations of the working class. [Ibidem, p 38 — emphasis added.]

What a curiously self-contradictory statement! The S L L, we are told, has been born out of the struggles of the past year. True, for, a year before, Burns still considered the dissolution of an independent group an absolute precondition for unity! But that means that the S L L is a child of the conjuncture, of recent events. Nowhere in this document is it proved that the mass of the British workers have abandoned their political allegiance to the Labour Party. Nowhere is it argued that the radicalization of the British workers as a class will not find its first mass expression *inside* the Labour Party, through the building of a new left wing. The only thing Comrade Burns argues about is that *this has not yet happened*. That is the only objective justification he gives for his turn.

It so happens that the very same position had been defended by Jock Haston and his group in the old R C P *against* Comrade Burns! The sectarians argued that it was no use entering the Labour Party, as long as there was no immediate prospect of a mass left wing inside it. In the meantime we have to conduct militant struggles and attract vanguard elements to the party, they said. Comrade Burns, with the support of the International, answered that argument by saying that it would be too late to wait until such a left wing actually had come into existence in order to enter the L P; that we should be there before, in order to play our role in building this left wing right from the start. In other words: the entrust tactic was *independent of the passing conjuncture*, “boom” or “slump,” temporary growth or stagnation of the left wing in the L P. It was a general line, correct for a whole historical period, as long as these three factors continued to exist:

- 1) Strength and self-confidence of the British working class.
- 2) Political allegiance of the big majority of that class to the Labour Party.
- 3) Certainty that each wave of radicalization of the working class would find its mass expression inside the L P, by the building of a new left wing.

Nothing has happened since 1957 to change these basic conditions. Nothing justifies therefore the fundamental turn which was implicit in the setting up of the S L L. It was an *impressionistic manoeuvre*, born from temporary conditions and impatience, opposed to the thoroughgoing analysis of the conditions for building a revolutionary class party in Britain, which British Trotskyists had achieved after fifteen years of discussion and experience!

Why was the S L L formed? Between Bevan's break with the left on the question of nuclear disarmament and the present moment, the left inside the Labour Party was undoubtedly disorganized and dispirited. At the same time, militant workers responded hotly to the employers' offensives in the shops. Thereby they came into headlong conflict with the right-wing union bureaucracy. There seemed to be a contradiction between this radicalization in the shops and the “lull” inside the Labour Party, including the Labour Left. Those were the reasons for the hasty building of the S L L.

Now the very moment the printers' ink had dried on the *Labour Review's* editorial, we witnessed the appearance of a *new mass left wing inside the Labour*

Party: the left wing concentrating around the problem of unilateral nuclear disarmament and some other no less important issues: nationalization, the 40-hour week, etc; and for some time it even looked likely that this left wing would get a majority at the next L P Conference! This left wing is broader than the Bevan wing of the early fifties. It has especially a much larger union basis. It has linked some very important economic demands to its foreign-policy platform. And its political demands are more advanced than those of the late Bevanites.

Of course Frank Cousins, as a person, might be not an ounce better than Bevan as an individual. But that is not the point. We have never judged left-wing tendencies through illusions in their bureaucratic leaders; we appraise them for their importance in raising the average political consciousness of hundreds of thousands of workers. The formation of the Bevan tendency had that effect; the present Cousins current will have the same.

This event, of very great importance for the future of the labor movement and the class struggle in Britain, did not take us by surprise. British and international Trotskyists had been trained for 15 years to expect just that — after the wave of trade-union militancy of the past months.⁵ It was *inevitable* that that wave should find political expression inside the Labour Party. That is what the International — and Comrade Burns himself — had been predicting for years and years.

It is not surprising that the comrades who have joined the S L L from the C P, impatient with the lull and the generally sad state of affairs inside the L P in 1958 and the beginning of 1959, were eager to strike out on their own. They did not have the experience with the Labour Party we had. They had not been educated with the general lessons which the Trotskyist movement has drawn from 40 years of experience of the British left. But Burns, Sinclair, and the other old Trotskyists should have restrained them and warned them that a new and bigger left wing would come up inside the Labour Party. Instead, in their unprincipled manner, they yielded to that pressure, and started their independent organization *at the very moment* the new and broad left wing was being born!

Comrade Burns might reply, with fake indignation: “We have no intention of abandoning the entrust work. Didn't we write that the S L L would fight for class struggle policies *inside* the Labour Party?” Unfortunately, that statement is nothing but an empty and hypocritical formula. A French writer once said that hypocrisy is nothing but vice presenting its respects to virtue. We may say that Burns's hypocritical formula about

⁵ As late as May 1958 the Burns group adopted a political resolution that says: “Formalists, sectarians and Stalinists begin their assessment [of the L P] by considering the leaders. All the political demands of the workers must turn in the direction of the Labour Party. [...] The growing demands for socialist policies among the working class must be demands on the Labour Party, which at this stage appears as the only alternative to Toryism. [...] In the period of mass action opening up, new forces are going to move into action. *Will they by-pass the Labour Party? On the contrary, we reaffirm our opinion that the central political experiences of the working class will be geared to developments in the Labour Party. The fight for revolutionary leadership is impossible without roots in this mass party of the British working class.*”

“fighting inside the Labour Party” is nothing but his bad conscience paying respect to his own former principles, which he has now so irresponsibly thrown overboard.

The way the S L L was launched rendered its existence within the Labour Party practically impossible, for anybody who has no illusions about the nature of the right-wing bureaucracy. But let us admit that the naïve founders of the S L L were taken by surprise by the Transport House ban. This ban is, however, a fact. Now if the S L L had wanted to stay inside the Labour Party, it would, after this ban, have had to disband under protest. Nothing of the sort happened. It decided *openly to defy the bureaucracy*. Under the present circumstances, such a defiance inevitably leads to expulsion. Burns says that only ten members of the S L L have been expelled till now. We do not know if these statistics are not a bit gilded on the edges. In any case, more and more expulsions will follow. A big part of the old Trotskyist cadres, who had worked for more than 10, in many cases nearly 20 years, inside the Labour Party, will find themselves outside the Labour Party — at the very moment the struggle between the left and the right wing is flaring up again, stronger than ever before. A policy which has such a result, after all the past discussions and experiences of British Trotskyism, is an utterly irresponsible one. It destroys by one stroke of the pen the results of a long period of energetic and fruitful revolutionary work.

Some comrades might reply: “What do you propose instead? Capitulation before Transport House?” We should ask these comrades to read carefully some chapters of Lenin’s *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder*.

The British Labour Party is the strongest working-class organisation in Europe. It is governed by a treacherous right-wing bureaucracy, which acts as a stooge of the capitalist class. It manipulates the mass movement through a rotten bureaucratic apparatus. The struggle with this apparatus is a life-and-death struggle for the future of socialism in Britain. To say that you will “openly challenge” their rules, and refuse to retreat, *when you are not strong enough to win the support of the majority of the workers*, means only to withdraw from the field of struggle for the cause “of purity,” to leave these millions of workers politically at the mercy of the right wing and some confused centrist oppositionals. To retreat before the attack of the right wing is neither “unprincipled” nor “dishonorable.” It is absolutely indispensable in order to break in the long run the hold of the labor fakers on the mass movement.

There is nothing new or “revisionist” about this thesis. It has been applied in the recent past by Comrade Burns himself. Some years ago the bureaucracy banned the left-wing paper *Socialist Outlook*. Comrade Burns had some influence in that paper. He defended — correctly — the position that the editors of the *Outlook* should stop publishing their paper under protest. Was that “capitulation before Transport House”? Of course not. Was it perhaps “refusal to build an alternative leadership,” or “replacing revolutionary action by pressure of the masses”? Nonsense! It was an indispensable step for safeguarding the vanguard’s chances of linking up with hundreds of thousands of leftward-moving workers, i.e., for a successful fight against Transport House.

You may ask your leaders: Why don’t the same arguments apply to the present situation? Do they really think that the Labour Party has lost the political allegiance of the majority of British workers? Do they really think that under present conditions, in the given relationship of forces, they are stronger than the L P bureaucracy? It is one thing to defy Transport House when you have say two or three million votes behind you; it is something else to “defy” the bureaucracy and to be kicked out from the arena of struggle because of an utterly fantastic over-estimation of your own forces.

We should like to add a last word on this subject. Through the present issue of the *Labour Review* the S L L now presents itself openly as a *Trotskyist* organization; but Burns still upholds the legend that it wants to work “inside the Labour Party.” Can anyone imagine greater confusion? Has he never heard about the Transport House ban against the C P joining the L P? Does he not know that even at the time Attlee and Stalin were close allies this ban was not lifted? Does he not know that Transport House rightly considers Trotskyism a variant — and from its own point of view, a more dangerous variant — of communism? How can anybody in his right senses think a single moment that Transport House is going to accept the affiliation of an officially Trotskyist organization to the Labour Party? Isn’t it clear under the circumstances that the building of the S L L means the end of the entrism tactic, the sudden irresponsible liquidation of the fruits of ten years’ hard work?

The comrades who have recently joined the Trotskyist movement coming from the C P might not understand why we argue with so much passion on this point. To understand that passion, we ask them one thing: *Demand from your leaders the documents on entrism produced between 1945 and 1949!* Study the arguments brought up on both sides during the discussion. Study especially the very documents then written by Comrade Burns. Perhaps you will then understand that even if the S L L should gain many more members than it has at present, but *outside* the L P, it would be an incommensurably lesser threat to the bureaucracy than a hundred Trotskyists *inside* that Party. Perhaps you will also learn, then, that, to use comrade Burns’s own words, the “open work” of the S L L, whatever may be the courage, enthusiasm, and combativity of its militants or its momentary progress, will in the long run prove to be nothing but a waste of energy, a source of disappointment, discouragement, and demoralization. No one should reopen a debate on this issue “which has long been settled by history.”

BACK TO INTERNATIONALISM!

The *Labour Review* editorial ends with a confused page on internationalism; another expression of bad conscience on the part of Comrades Burns and Sinclair. They solemnly reaffirm their adherence to the idea of an International, which is more than “a simple sum of parties” (*ibidem*, p 39). But at the same time, they subtly revise the basic Trotskyist, i.e., Marxist, conception of an International based upon democratic centralism on a world scale, i.e., the *World Party of Socialist Revolution*, as Trotsky named it.

Now the comrades who have joined the S L L coming from the C P may regard with some distrust the idea of

any kind of "centralism" (even be it democratic) in an International. They know the sad experience of the Comintern and of the Cominform. They know how the Kremlin used to "lay down the line," and how the C Ps, all over the world, used to follow, in a servile and abject manner, all the twists and turns decided by the Soviet bureaucracy.

But our International has nothing in common with practices of this kind. How could it have? It has no state power; it has no apparatus of its own; it has no financial means other than those which the sections put at its disposal; it is not dominated by a single section; it cannot bring any kind of "pressure" on any section, except, of course, the pressure of ideas, documents, and discussion. That is the way the International has functioned in the past, when Comrade Burns also was a member of its leadership. That is the way it functions today.

The *Labour Review* editorial makes some dark insinuations about this subject. It says (*ibidem*, p 39):

The International will not be built by a group of impressionistic 'world strategists' handing down the tactical line to each country; nor by commentators charting the 'irreversible processes'. An international movement will be built by helping national movements to reach a thorough understanding of the realities of the struggle in their own countries, and of their tasks.

If by "handing down the line" Burns and Sinclair mean the kind of *diktats* the Stalinist Comintern used abruptly to apply, this is nothing but slander of the Trotskyist movement. We dare them to give a single example of any such thing having been done by the Fourth International, in any country. If, on the contrary, they mean that the International should not express its opinion on the main tactical problems confronting the sections, and should not submit these opinions to international and national discussion, then what does the second sentence mean? How can you a help a national section to reach "understanding of the realities of the struggle in their own countries," without discussing the main tactical problems, and, above all, the problem of the correct road to building a revolutionary mass party?

In fact, Burns never was against such discussions and even international decisions in the past. As long as he was a member of the International majority he pushed the International leadership, again and again, to intervene in the British section in order to "speed up" the solution of the crisis, to intervene in many other sections with the same goal, to "expel," "crush" and "eliminate" all kinds of tendencies with whom he had tactical differences. Happily, the International never followed this kind of advice, and always *discussed for many years* tactical problems of sections, before taking any definite decision. What Burns really means, therefore, is this: as long as I am with the majority, I want the right to apply strictly the rules of democratic centralism on an international scale. But if, unfortunately, I find myself in an international minority, than I want it put down that there shall be no international "meddling" in my "internal affairs." In that case, the International must be reduced to a letter-box and a discussion club. This is the reality that underlies the "principled" "orthodox" of comrade Burns. For really orthodox Trotskyism is above all attachment to the idea and the organi-

zation of the International, as Comrade Trotsky taught us so many times.⁶

We have quite a number of other outstanding witnesses on this subject. Comrade Cannon told an S W P convention in November 1946:

Internationalism, as the Trotskyists have conceived it, means first of all international collaboration. But in our view this international collaboration must signify not only the discussion of the problems and tasks of co-thinkers in other countries — this is where platonic internationalism begins and ends — *but also the solution of these problems, above all our own specific problems, in action.* [*Fourth International*, February 1947, p 43.]

That has always been the conception of Trotsky; that has always been the practice of the Fourth International And here you have another statement on the same subject:

The additional factor which aggravates the sectarian sickness of the British section is the past history and evolution of the present majority leadership. Their unprincipled split from the Fourth International in 1938, which they defend to this day, is a source of constant miseducation in the party. Their *inability to understand the role of international democratic centralism* and to abide by the decision of the 1938 Founding Conference of the F I on the British question, merges today with the organisational abuses of their sectarian policies. On the international field

⁶ Burns and Sinclair write that "the supreme task for Marxists today, as the International Committee sees it, is to establish the political independence of the working class through the construction of *powerful revolutionary parties in every country, parties which will provide the solid foundations for the Fourth International.*" (*Ibidem*, p 38.) Further on, they write: "The conference will be a step [!] toward the eventual [!] unification of the international revolutionary forces into a world party on a realistic [!] basis, with a centre whose functions can develop [!] as the growth of the movement permits the rise of representative executive bodies with an authority that has been earned by work." (*Ibidem*, p 39.)

Our authors espouse here the old centrist formula — "First build national parties, then a "really authoritative" International" — against which Trotsky fought all his life. Here is an excerpt from one of Trotsky's polemics against the I L P on this subject:

"It is necessary to understand first of all that really independent workers' parties — independent not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of both bankrupt internationals — cannot be built unless there is a close international bond between them, on the basis of self-same principles, and provided there is a living interchange of experience, and vigilant mutual control. *The notion that national parties (which ones? on what basis?) must be established first, and coalesced only later into a new International (how will a common principled basis then be guaranteed?) is a caricature echo of the history of the Second International: the First and the Third Internationals were both built differently. But today, under the conditions of the imperialist epoch, after the proletarian vanguard of all countries in the world has passed through many decades of a colossal and common experience, including the experience of the collapse of the two Internationals, it is absolutely unthinkable to build new Marxist, revolutionary parties, without direct contact with the self-same work in other countries. And this means the building of the Fourth International.*"

it is reflected in their permanent distrust of the patient educational efforts of the International Executive Committee, and their constant skirmishing on secondary issues.

[*Internal Bulletin* of the R C P, Special 1947 Conference Number — emphasis added.]

You know of course who wrote those sentences which call upon the International to “lay down the tactical line.” It is Comrade Burns himself.

If Trotskyists attach paramount importance to the International and internationalism, it is not only for reasons of principle. It is also because of the immense importance of an international organization for working out a correct political line. Marxism teaches us that knowledge is impossible without action. Politics are today world politics; national problems are inextricably linked with international ones. You cannot correctly formulate an international analysis behind an office desk or before a typewriter. Such an analysis must be tested by the practical experience and action of revolutionists all over the world. It must be the result of the confrontation of these experiences. Outside an international organization, such a real confrontation is impossible. Outside an international organization, revolutionists inevitably make grave errors of interpretation. To name only one example: the terrible mistake the “International Committee” and Comrades Burns and Sinclair made on the Algerian question — and note well, the Algerian revolution is today the most important revolutionary movement going on in the world — by “discovering” that the M N A, a moderate nationalist organization which today openly collaborates with butcher de Gaulle, was a “working class,” nay a “Bolshevik” party, which should be supported against the F L N even in its acts of individual terrorism within the anti-imperialist camp — this terrible mistake would never have happened if the Burns organization had remained within the Fourth International.

FOR A UNITED WORLD CONGRESS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL!

Having given lip-service to the idea of the International, Burns sets out to explain that the “time has come to reorganize the Fourth International and build it as a powerful international party linking the vanguard of the working class throughout the world.” A pompous and slightly ridiculous statement. *For Burns and his “International Committee” have now been trying to “reorganize” (i.e., to split) the Fourth International for six long years, and they have completely failed in this task.*

They split the International in 1953, without any previous political discussion. They set up a “rival” international, with a “rival” international leadership. In four countries of the world, Britain, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Canada, they got the majority of Trotskyists. In thirty countries, this majority stayed with the Fourth International. That was the situation in 1953; that is the situation today. For six years, the “International Committee” has tried to split the Trotskyist organizations in the other countries, or to set up new organizations. They only could assemble a few individuals here and there, whose only common principle was their opposition to the F I majority, without a common programme, not to speak of a common analysis of the world situation or a tactic worked out in common.

If, after these six years of failure — during which the

Burns group made undeniable numerical progress in Britain, but during which many sections of the Fourth International made very important advances, and many new sections were founded — if, we say, after these six years Burns says that *today* he will start “reorganizing” the movement, this is only dust in the eyes of his membership, a diversionist manoeuvre to turn it away from what it really wants: *reunification of the world Trotskyist movement!*

In our opinion, the split of 1953 was an irresponsible one, because the differences between the two tendencies were only tactical ones, not differences in principles. The comrades of the S L L may differ with us on this subject. But they could hardly deny what Comrade Cannon stated in a letter to the Ceylon section of the Fourth International (March 1957): that since the split the positions of both tendencies had come very close to each other. Since then, grave differences have appeared only on the question of the Algerian war, and these differences seem also lately to have disappeared. Therefore, there is today no practical nor principled political justification for the split in the world Trotskyist movement.

The Fourth International must hold its Sixth World Congress in 1960. Burns announces an international conference of the “International Committee” for the same year. If both conferences convene, one can tell in advance what will happen. There is nothing to be “assessed,” for the situation in the revolutionary world movement is very clear. There are some national sects (like the American De Leonites, the Italian Bordiguists, the German Brandlerites), which will attend neither of these conferences. There is the Yugoslav C P, which will not be present either. And there are the Trotskyist organizations, of which the overwhelming majority will be represented at our Sixth World Congress, and a minority at the conference of the “International Committee.”

This would only consolidate and perpetuate a split which nobody can justify any longer today. It would tend to confuse and discourage those willing but insufficiently informed sympathizers who are now thinking of joining the Trotskyist movement in some countries such as England. It would be nothing but a manifestation of childish factionalism, in view of the tremendous problems we have to solve, and the tremendous progress a unified movement could make.

We therefore call upon you *to organize together with the F I the united world congress of Trotskyism in 1960.* The conditions for doing this are simple, and your leaders had already agreed upon them in 1957. Let us set up a parity committee which will lay down the rules of international discussion and material organization prior to and during that congress. Let there be an understanding and agreement, already proposed by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International in 1957, that whatever tendency remained in the minority at that congress would not be the victim of any kind of “repression” or “organizational measures,” that that minority should get greater than merely numerically proportional representation on all leading bodies of the International, including the International Secretariat, and that the some of the powers transmitted by the statutes of the International to the I E C, in case of differences within sections, should be reserved only to World Congresses during a transitional period of healing the split. If any supplementary orga-

nizational guarantees are asked, we are ready to examine them most attentively. All these problems can be fraternally discussed and solved, *for the political differences allow such a solution.*

Comrades of the SLL!

It is time to recognize the facts of life. The Fourth International, World Party of the Socialist Revolution, cannot and will not be "reorganized" because it exists, functions, and grows, with the support of the overwhelming majority of Trotskyists. Your goal should be to unify with that International, not to set up a smaller rival one. This must and can be done in the coming

year, if your leadership abandons its sectarian factional attitude on the question of unity. Divided from the International, you will experience new and harsh disappointments. United with it, you will participate in a new and higher stage of building a revolutionary vanguard in the world.

Forward towards a united world congress of Trotskyism in 1960!

Forward towards a united Fourth International!

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

September 1959



Appeal of the International Secretariat Distributed at the Youth Congress in Vienna

Don't listen to imperialist propaganda, in which to its dishonor, the leadership of the Socialist Party and the Socialist Youth also participate. Listen to us, who speak as communists to communists. Listen to the voice of revolutionary Marxism!

BACK TO LENIN!

Appeal to the Progressive and Working-Class Youth of All Countries Assembled at the Vienna Festival

Dear friends and comrades,

In the name of revolutionary Marxists everywhere, who have unflinchingly upheld the banner of Leninism, we greet the progressive and working-class youth of all countries, assembled in Vienna for the Youth Festival.

We greet the young workers, peasants, and students of the Soviet Union, of New China, of the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe and Asia, who are building a new and better society. Whatever criticism we have of the political regime in these countries; whatever may be the distortions and deviations from the true path of Marxism-Leninism of which the bureaucratic leaders of these countries are guilty, we shall never underestimate the gigantic importance of the economic and social progress achieved thanks to the nationalization of the means of production, the suppression of capitalism, the building of a planned economy.

This progress we hail enthusiastically. We call upon the youth and the workers of all countries to defend it with all their strength against attacks and attempts at subversion on behalf of reactionary imperialism.

All Help to the Heroic Colonial Revolution!

We greet the young workers, peasants, and students of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, of Asia, the Arab world, Negro Africa, and Latin America. We greet the heroic fighters of the unconquerable struggle for freedom and independence of all oppressed peoples, who are writing a unique and glorious page in the history of human emancipation.

We call upon the youth and the workers of all countries to give their utmost help to the colonial revolution, and above all to the Algerian revolution, upon which the whole

The imperialists hide behind the mask of "freedom." But their reign is marked by countless crimes against the freedom and dignity of all peoples, by savage repression against the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Malaya, Kenya, South Africa, the Cameroons, Guatemala, and above all their inhuman war against the Algerian people in which more than half a million people have already been slaughtered in the last four years.

Have no confidence in the crusaders for "free enterprise" and their various self-titled "democratic" lackeys! Capitalism is a decaying reactionary system; it is able to ensure the workers of some privileged imperialist countries a relatively high standard of living only at the expense of terrible exploitation of hundreds of millions of colonial slaves, whose incomes are less than 10% of the average income of the Western countries.

Whatever wrongs must be righted in the USSR and in the people's democracies, must be righted by the toilers of these countries themselves, never by the stooges of American imperialism!

power of French imperialism and its NATO allies is brought to bear. Dockers, railroad-workers, pilots, refuse to load and transport arms for the French colonial army! Workers of the capitalist countries, express your protest against the cruelties and tortures of French imperialism in huge meetings, demonstrations, and solidarity strikes! Workers of the Soviet Union and the other workers' states, call upon your governments to give much greater help, money, and especially arms to the heroic Algerian people, and to recognize its government.

The organization of a world-wide movement of political support and practical help for the colonial revolution is today the utmost duty of the international labor movement. It is only through such a huge movement of class solidarity

that the oppressed toilers of the colonial and semi-colonial countries will learn not to have confidence in their own national bourgeois exploiters, to build their own revolutionary parties of workers and poor peasants.

Progressive and Communist Militants of Underdeveloped Countries!

The examples of Russia, Jugoslavia, China, and Vietnam completely confirm the lessons of Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution. The revolution in backward colonial or semi-colonial countries will triumph and open a definite road to national rebirth and growth only if it is led by a revolutionary working-class party and arrives at the conquest of power by the toiling masses.

All attempts to limit the revolution to a stage of "democratic revolution," of collaboration with the "national bourgeoisie," to which in fact the leadership of the revolution is delivered, can lead only to stagnation and defeat. The recent tragic examples of Guatemala, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, and Argentina, provide a lesson which must not be forgotten. In all these countries, Communist Parties called upon the people to support bourgeois democratic

"progressive" forces. Today, Frondizi, for whom the Argentine CP called the workers to vote, has unmasked himself as a stooge of imperialism. Nasser has organized a violent repression of the communist and working-class movement. Sukarno will do so tomorrow.

Communists and progressives should support each step forward of national bourgeois leaders against imperialism in underdeveloped countries. But at the same time they should constantly warn the toiling masses of their countries, that the final victory over imperialism is impossible without a general uprising of the masses, without their organization in democratic committees, the overthrow of the old state machine, and the leadership of the masses by a revolutionary, communist party.

Put the Overthrow of Capitalism on the Agenda in the West!

We greet the young workers, peasants, and students who have come to Vienna from the industrialized capitalist countries of the West. They come from countries where the labor movement, in contrast to the magnificent upsurge of the colonial revolution, is witnessing serious retreats. In France, the coming to power of de Gaulle is a great defeat for the working class; it creates for the first time since 1945 a threat of fascism in Western Europe.

In most of the other Western countries, the Communist Parties are weaker than ever since the Second World War, sometimes even weaker than during the '20s. Notwithstanding the tremendous crisis in the '30s and during and after the Second World War, capitalists everywhere in the West have succeeded in temporarily restabilizing their economy and their state.

This is not at all the "fatal" result of the "cold war," "American intervention," and the "anti-communist campaign." It is the result of fatally wrong policies of the Communist Parties. At the end of the war, these parties were everywhere in rapid growth. The masses, disgusted by capitalism and disappointed by Social-Democratic reformism, wanted new and radical changes. In France, Italy, and Greece, power was within reach of the labor movement.

At that time, however, the leaders of the Communist Parties, aided and abetted by Stalin and the leaders of the Soviet Union, completely failed to live up to their historic task of destroying capitalism (with the exception of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which, against Stalin's orders, established a workers' state in its country). They participated in bourgeois coalition governments. They sang the praise of the "new" capitalist democracy. They condemned strikes as "weapons of the trusts."

Communist and Progressive Workers of Western Europe!

It is necessary to come back to Lenin's programme of uncompromising struggle against capitalism, its state and its economy. The working class will score its victories over Western capitalism not as a result of what happens elsewhere in the world, but only as a result of its own anti-capitalist struggle. It is necessary to work out in each country a concrete programme of transitional demands

which, starting from the immediate concerns of the masses, mobilize them in an anti-capitalist struggle. It is necessary, in other words, to put the overthrow of capitalism on the agenda, instead of pushing it back to the distant future of a "great capitalist crisis" or of "the Soviet Union overtaking America's production and per capita consumption."

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This criminally doomed policy has powerfully assisted the French bourgeoisie in creating a chauvinist current inside the working class. It has paralyzed and sabotaged effective working-class action against the Algerian war, in the spirit of the campaign against the Morocco war organized by a much weaker French Communist Party in 1925. It has paved the way for the Gaullist dictatorship. It continues to disarm the French workers by creating the stupid parliamentary illusion that this dictatorship could be overthrown through "election victories."

For a Return to Soviet Democracy! Young Communists of the Workers' States!

The slogan "back to Lenin" applies first of all to your own countries. The present leadership of the CPSU pays lip-service to the same slogan. But its practice is very far from this promise.

Undoubtedly many things have changed for the better since Stalin's death. The worst excesses of police dictatorship, the concentration camps, the inhuman labor laws, have been suppressed. But the Soviet Union is still far

from the soviet democracy which it experienced under Lenin and Trotsky.

"Back to Lenin" — this means above all back to truth. You may deceive and lie to the class enemy in the class struggle, Lenin taught; you may never lie to your own party and your own class. But Khrushchev has not told you the truth about the terrible years of Stalinist dictatorship — he has given you only part of the picture. He has passed over the role which he himself, with all the present leaders of the CPSU, played as accomplices to Stalin's cruel crimes against the people, the working class, and the communists of the Soviet Union and all countries — these crimes which in Autumn 1941 brought the Soviet state within an inch of its downfall. He has not given you a serious Marxist evaluation and explanation of these crimes. "The personality cult" is a completely non-Marxist formula; it replaces the struggle of social forces by individual psychology as a fundamental explanation of a whole historical period.

In reality, Stalin's reign and crimes are not to be explained by his personality, but by the social conflict between the ruling bureaucracy and the masses of the workers. The purpose of these crimes was to defend against the toiling masses the growing inequality, the huge privileges of the bureaucracy, its usurpation of all political power, the "one-man-rule" in the factories.

Today, although Khrushchev has been forced to make many concessions to the workers, this rule of the bureaucracy remains basically unchanged. Khrushchev even defends it with guns and tanks, as he did against the Hungarian workers' revolution. There are no workers' soviets in the factories who have the right to decide on the plan, the right to dismiss the managers. There are no workers' soviets in the cities and the republics who, in free and democratic discussion, map out the general policy of the state. There is no freedom of tendencies and of discussion in the Communist Party as in the time of Lenin and Trotsky, no freedom to draft different resolutions and theses and fight for them within the party, before congresses.

"Back to Lenin" means, for the Soviet Union, back to soviet democracy, i.e., full democratic rights and freedom for the toiling people. Soviet democracy today, when the capitalist class has physically disappeared from the Soviet

Union, when the destruction of capitalism is definitively achieved, as Khrushchev himself admitted at the XXIst Party Congress, means not only the freedom for ideological tendencies inside the Communist Parties, but also the freedom for the organization of all Soviet parties based upon the defense of the nationalized property and opposed to world capitalism.

In order to discover for yourself the road back to Lenin, back to truth, back to soviet democracy, to self-government of the working people — you have to study the literature of the Old Bolsheviks murdered by Stalin, the faithful comrades-in-arms of Lenin who together with him engineered the victory of the October Revolution, and built the Soviet State and the Communist International.

Fight for free access to all libraries and archives! Study the works of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rakovsky, Piatakov, Preobashensky, Radek, and the closest collaborator of Lenin during and after the October Revolution, the leader of the October insurrection and creator of the Red Army, Lev Davidovitch Trotsky. Denounce the new falsifications which, contrary to the solemn promises made at the XXth Party Congress, abound in the newly edited *History of the CPSU*, and which you can discover easily by studying the historical documents of the years 1917-1927. Ask for a full rehabilitation of all the victims of the infamous Yechovtchina, the victims of the infamous Moscow Trials, where the leaders of Lenin's Central Committee were forced by torture to besmirch their own imperishable memory. Fight in your universities, factories, youth and party organizations, and trade unions, for an increase of equality and democracy! Organize yourselves!

Build study circles to compare the programs of the various opposition tendencies within the CPSU after 1923 with the reality of Stalin's crimes denounced by Khrushchev, with the reality of the Soviet Union today. Familiarize yourself with the writings and works of Trotsky and the world Trotskyist movement which for 30 years has kept the stainless banner of Leninism flying, despite inhuman persecution by fascism, capitalist reaction, and Stalinism. By such objective study, we are sure, you will end by finding the road toward the Leninism of today, which lives and struggles through the Fourth International!

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL



Conference of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Ceylonese Section of the Fourth International)

POLITICAL RESOLUTION

As the third year of the MEP government draws to its end, its servitorship to both foreign and local capital stands confirmed and irreversible. Its incapacity to carry Ceylon's economy forward is universally accepted. Its inability to reform either radically or at all the administrative system inherited from colonialism is generally recognized. Its initial impetus towards progressive reforms in political, social, and economic fields stands almost exhausted. Consequently its clashes with the forward-reaching masses have become more frequent, more extensive and more direct. In particular its clashes with the working class tend to be head-on in character and to pose political issues with increasing directness. The working class of Ceylon is today already faced with the task of a more and more

open and direct struggle against the MEP government to rally the masses of non-worker toilers around a programme of radical reconstruction of the nation's political, economic, and social structure. The struggle to overthrow the MEP government is therefore also the struggle to open the road to the necessary and urgent radical reconstruction of Ceylon's political, economic, and social systems.

THE SITUATION IN THE MASS MOVEMENT

There are two principal features of the current political situation which require to be carefully assessed for the purpose of determining the tactics of the struggle to overthrow the MEP government. On the one hand there is the continued faith of the broad masses, including the

working class, in the franchise. On the other hand there has been during the last year and a half a tendency amongst sections of the masses and especially of the working class to resort to direct or extra-parliamentary action.

Since November 1957 we have witnessed a series of working-class strikes, all economic struggles save the token one-day general strike on March 3rd last, which, however, is a special case. The communal upsurge of May 1958 and the rigors of the first months of the consequent Emergency served only to interrupt these strike struggles but did not prevent their resumption in recent months. There is certainly a readiness among workers to strike on felt economic issues.

Apart from strike action by the workers we have also witnessed in recent months such political phenomena as mass resistance to destruction of shanties, mass occupation of Crown land and mass satyagraha on railway lines. No doubt these manifestations of discontent did not spread in the manner that strike struggles spread among the working class. Nevertheless they are noteworthy phenomena in that they bore the character both of mass and of direct actions and were engaged in by other sections of the toilers than the workers. It is also to be noted that these actions too were directly rooted in day-to-day needs.

In short the masses still rely primarily on constitutional methods and processes; but they are ready in the case of felt issues to resort to direct action even outside the constitutional process to bring pressure to bear upon the government.

The one important strike struggle of the workers which was not rooted directly or at all in a felt economic issue was the token one-day general strike of March 3rd last demanding the withdrawal by the government of the Public Security (Amendment) Bill. It constituted the first major effort from any quarter since the MEP came into power to bring the working class as a whole or at least in the predominant majority of its unionized sections into political direct action. Marked as it was by the coming together of the major plantation-worker unions with other big union organizations of the industrial and white-collar workers, marked also as it was by the coming together of major trade-union organizations in both the government and the private sectors, and marked finally as it was by a massiveness of numbers and by the wide variety of economic and administrative activities affected, this action undoubtedly marks a turning point in the history of Ceylon's trade-union movement. It constitutes the first major effort of the trade-union movement to bring the working class into political direct action.

At the same time it is correct that the Conference of Trade-Union Organization succeeded in bringing into action on this occasion only sections of even the organized workers. For instance the Stalinist-led and MEP-led unions did not come in but were positively hostile. Again, the broad mass of unorganized workers and also of workers who though unionized are scattered in small groups did not get drawn into action although they were not hostile. Even sections of workers in some of the striking unions failed to participate. In other words this general strike did not bring into action either the working class as a whole or even the organized workers as a whole.

Nevertheless it must be repeated that the movement for and on March 3rd constituted a gigantic political direct action of the organized working class of Ceylon. It carried a whole stage forward the process of politicalization of the working class in all its sections.

It demonstrated the fact that the illusions in the MEP government have already been shattered among a considerable section of the workers. This is a striking achievement when one considers the extent of the illusions in the MEP government which prevailed among the workers barely three years ago.

The MEP government's reaction to the direct action phenomena mentioned above and to the communal upsurge

of last year (which was of course also a case of widespread mass political direct action, although aimed at reactionary political objectives and marked by grossly anti-social methods) has been to arm itself with more and more repressive powers which can be utilized in displacement of the parliamentary process. The Public Security Act has been kept on the statute book in spite of a general election undertaking to repeal it. The Emergency framework of laws promulgated under the Public Security Act was utterly needlessly prolonged; and the Act itself has been strengthened in its repressive provisions through the recent amendments. The truth is that by reason both of its communal policies and of its anti-strike policy the extraordinary powers of the Emergency have become to the MEP government an everyday necessity.

However, between the capacity of a government to obtain repressive powers and its capacity to use them there can of course be a great gulf. Weak governments may actually break in the effort of mass repression; and the MEP government is a weak government.

The main source of the MEP government's weakness is its lack of political coherence. It is a coalition without a programme. It is also far more an assemblage of variegated personalities than a coalition of parties. Its social base is also variegated, stretching as it does from bourgeois elements all the way across every stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie right along to not inconsiderable working-class elements. Over and above conflicting class pressures it is also subject to the continuous and varying pressures on whose support it has relied and must continue to rely. These groups, of which the main are racial and religious communal groups and organized groups of intermediaries to the rural masses (bhikkus, Ayurvedic physicians, Sinhala schoolmasters and the like), bear upon the MEP government with their own specific pressures which it cannot in its own interests resist. The result of it all is that the MEP government, far from guiding the nation through a definite policy, tends much more to be tossed by the contrary currents of mass, class, and group pressures.

Underlying this situation of the MEP government, however, is a steadily strengthening tendency to resist working-class pressure and to deny working-class demands. This resistance, although it is conducted in the name of the so-called general public against the working class as such, serves of course the interests of preserving and protecting the interests of capitalism in Ceylon. The extraordinary powers taken by the MEP government are therefore powers taken in the interests of the capitalist class.

Despite this strengthened tendency and growing readiness to resist the working class and its demands, the basic dilemma of the MEP government as a government of bourgeois reform continues with unmitigated force. This is the dilemma of satisfying mass aspirations without destroying the fundamental framework of capitalist social and economic relations. The economic situation renders the dilemma more acute than ever.

Two features are prominent in the economic situation. The government finances its rapidly increasing expenditure through a mounting deficit of income against expenditure. The result is inflation which is reflected in rising prices. At the same time, despite increased expenditure, the government's own investment programme taken together with private investment falls so far short of the necessary means to expand the economy commensurately with the needs of a population which is growing at about 2.6 per cent per year that the national economy is in relative decline. The consequence is steadily growing unemployment and intolerable pressure on the land resources of the country. Not all the accelerated efforts of the government in strip colonization have succeeded in assuaging this mounting pressure of the employment-hungry and the land-hungry. The total industrialization effort of the government and private capital continues to be substantially inadequate to the needs of the situation.

It is manifest that a major social and political crisis is maturing in the context of the deepening fundamental economic crisis. The questions posed thereby are not questions of mere concessions to the masses within the prevailing capitalist relations.

They are questions pertaining to the continuance of the capitalist system itself. Within the framework of a relatively declining economy the limits of concessions may well have been reached already. Certainly the real and credit reserves of the government are not great; the volume of private reserves available for further tapping appears to be strictly limited; and the prospects of foreign aid are not comparable to even minimum need. Further concessions must therefore pull down the rate of profit below that which is required locally for stimulating capitalist enterprise and thus endanger the very functioning of even the existing economy. In short, whatever be the desire of the government, no further important concessions to the masses are possible.

However, the masses have not been lifted out from their poverty levels by the concessions they have wrested from the MEP government. Much of what they have won has been neutralized by risen prices and spreading unemployment. At the same time the very promises of the MEP government have stimulated the mass desire for immediate improvements while the post-April 1956 environment has enabled massive organizations of whole sections of the population for action on their demands. In the result the mass pressure for further concessions continues in the context of the growing inability of the capitalist economic system to afford major concessions.

The political situation thus poses inexorably the choice between maintaining capitalist relations in Ceylon and replacing them with what is now generally accepted to be the alternative, namely socialist relations. There is no way forward without this fundamental change being brought about; and it is precisely the inability and basic unwillingness to bring about this change which has served to bring out into the open the fundamentally capitalist nature of the MEP government and to propel it into head-on collision with the working class.

However, there is a considerable gap between objective necessity and mass realization thereof. Although the capitalist nature of the government is clear to the politically advanced sections of the masses, it is not yet clear to whole sections of the masses. Similarly the need to overthrow the MEP government is not yet clear to wide sections of the masses. Therein lies the fundamental characteristic of the present political situation and therein also is posed the Party's fundamental political task today.

THE COMMUNAL SITUATION

The upward-thrusting economic issues and the mounting class struggle have tended to overshadow the communal issue and to push it into the background. However, it will be idle to regard this obstacle in the way of the class struggle as having been surmounted, and dangerous to disregard its reactionary potentialities. Although May 1958 may not be repeatable, communalism remains a powerful weapon in the hands of reaction.

In the first place the Sinhala Only issue continues to bedevil racial relations. Although the Ceylon Tamil masses are quiescent and open Tamil resistance has subsided, mass resentment among the Tamil continues intense and the determination not to give in remains well-nigh universal amongst them. Neither the MEP with its statutory provision for the reasonable use of Tamil nor the UNP with its promises of administrative provision for the use of Tamil can assuage the situation, still less solve the language problem. The only policies which can logically replace parity are on the one hand subjugation of the Tamils and on the other, division of the country. Of course national disaster lies along either way.

There is a second way in which racialism threatens to

bedevil national solidarity. While the UNP seek to beat the MEP with the stick of the unsolved "*Indian Issue*," the MEP itself is turning more and more to the anti-Indian cry as a means of diverting the masses in general and the working class in particular from onslaughts on the MEP government. Just as the Sinhala Only policy was presented as a means of solving the unemployment problem amongst Sinhalese seeking government jobs, so also anti-Indianism is presented as a means of solving the unemployment problem in the Sinhalese rural areas in general and in the Kandyan areas in particular.

It is necessary to grasp the explosive and reactionary possibilities of anti-Indianism. The desperate economic condition of the village population in the plantation areas where immigrant labor is concentrated gives to employment competition a directly racial aspect. Since moreover the immigrant estate-workers' mass is also without political rights and held outside the normal parliamentary processes by deprivation of the franchise, the turn to anti-Indianism also brings electoral advantage to capitalist politicians. If there is any moderating influence upon this tendency it is the concentration of the plantation workers in a vital sector of the country and their high organization and militancy. Any attempt at large-scale communal violence against them can create conditions of civil war.

There is a third aspect of communal relations which is of importance. This is the aspect of relations amongst religious groups. There certainly is a government-backed drive for the consolidation of Sinhalese Buddhist predominance in the political structure of Ceylon. Its anti-Christian character has perhaps been a little soft-pedaled recently, while its anti-Marxist character, that is to say its counter-position to the working-class ideology, has begun to be a little loud-pedaled. It is necessary to realize that Sinhalese Buddhist communalism continues as a means for the MEP to rally the Sinhalese petty-bourgeoisie against the party and programme of the working class.

THE CLASSES AND THEIR PARTIES

Despite the hollowness of the MEP government's claim to being socialist becoming more and more manifest, despite its loss of impetus even as a government of bourgeois reform and despite its now open and direct servitorship to local and foreign capital, the predominant section of the big bourgeoisie and whole sections of the bourgeoisie generally remain in opposition to the MEP government. This is because the MEP government has failed to create an atmosphere of security for their existing investments and still less with regard to further investments. There is also the profound bourgeois distrust of what they regard as the left wing of the government.

In this situation the effort to revive the UNP finds wide bourgeois support. However, the bourgeoisie have found the difficulty of providing the UNP with a leadership acceptable to them as a whole and also popular with the masses. Nevertheless, the UNP campaign has undoubtedly reinvigorated sections of the old UNP following and even attracted back some sections which went over to the MEP after the 1956 general elections. But the extent to which dissatisfaction with the MEP amongst the masses has brought masses again to the UNP is difficult to measure. The one certainty is that it has made no gains in the working class. In any event, especially since the communal explosion of May 1958, the UNP can no longer be treated as a negligible factor in national politics.

The SLFP, though predominantly petty-bourgeois in composition, is essentially a bourgeois party. Its specific role is to endeavor through the MEP government to contain the mass movement within the bounds of the bourgeois order. It differs in character from the UNP in several ways. It enjoys little support amongst the bourgeoisie; what little support it has comes from the economically less powerful sections, and that too only from the Sinhalese bourgeoisie. It contains within itself a group of Sinhalese

petty-bourgeois radicals who transmit the pressure of the Sinhalese radical petty-bourgeoisie. It is therefore more responsible to mass pressure than the UNP ever was.

The S L F P is the major organization and predominant power within the MEP coalition. The other organization in the coalition is the radical Sinhalese petty-bourgeois group of Philip Gunawardene. The coalition is held together by Sinhalese communalism and self-interest, that is, the common need to maintain themselves in office.

In regard to the upper petty-bourgeoisie, the landed proprietors among them have benefited from the generous subsidy schemes for manure, replanting, price-support and the like. However, sections of property-owners and businessmen among the Sinhalese upper petty bourgeoisie who formerly supported the MEP government have turned away in the direction of the UNP. They have been influenced by what they consider to be the weakness of the government as evinced principally in relation to strikes and the May 1958 communal explosion. The impact of the Paddy Lands Act on the paddy land owners and of the multipurpose coöperatives on the interests of the retail traders has also contributed to this result.

Sections of the Sinhalese middle and lower petty-bourgeoisie in town and country are dissatisfied with the MEP government and are politically frustrated. Assailed by both rising prices and spreading unemployment, lacking the means available to the working class of defense and organization against economic blows, failing to obtain economic relief through the barren policies of communalism, they see no clear way forward today. Although as a mass they are inert today, the ferment within them continues.

The resentment roused among the Sinhalese rural masses by the Emergency repression of June-July 1958 narrowed the MEP government's base amongst them. That resentment has been subsiding with the lifting of the repression and the lapse of time. More permanent factors play a principal part today in shaping and determining rural mass opinion. The economic condition of the rural masses is deteriorating, principally as a result of rising prices and growing unemployment. Their land hunger has not been assuaged by the stepped-up colonization policy of the MEP government. The Paddy Lands Act and the multipurpose coöperatives have not yet brought them any appreciable benefit. In these circumstances dissatisfaction is growing even amongst the very large sections which supported the MEP but this dissatisfaction has not yet found a means of political expression.

Among the petty bourgeoisie, the restlessness of that social layer in town and country which consists of those who may be termed the swabasha intellectuals is real but not the same in all sections. It is idle to deny that the MEP government has made some moves in the direction of meeting their demand for equality of treatment with the English-educated intelligentsia. Save in the case of the Tamils the very policy of Sinhala Only undoubtedly serves this. So also does the raising of the status of the pirivenas and the reorganization of the pirivena system of education. The effort to modernize the curriculum of the swabasha schools has the same consequence. The stress on the advancement of ayurveda is also a step in the direction of equalization of status as between the English and the swabasha wings of the intelligentsia. The support of indigenous culture and, despite the communalism which attends it, the support given to the advancement of Buddhism also have consequences of a similar character.

As the same time the stratum of swabasha intellectuals remains an unsatisfied and "under-privileged" stratum. The swabasha intellectuals have not yet achieved anything like a position of equality of status or even an approximation to equality of status with the English-educated intellectuals. More decisively they have not achieved anything like even approximation to the financial status of the English-educated intellectuals. The gap between the pay of English teachers and swabasha teachers is well

known. The gap between the salaries of ayurvedic practitioners and allopathic doctors is tremendous. There are no swabasha lawyers yet, though they will soon arise. Above all the unemployed swabasha SSC youth continues in a state of frustration. So that the swabasha road does not yet lead to the heights that can be reached along the road of English.

Thus, the basic causes of the upsurge of the swabasha intellectuals in recent years continue to exist. Sections of them, like the teachers, the ayurvedic physicians, and the SSC unemployed youth, have got on the move again on their demands and have come or are coming into direct conflict with the government on the basis of suspicion of the government's willingness to implement its promises. The movements of the teachers and the youth especially have already shown a readiness to link up with the organizations of the working class and a tendency to shed the reactionary communalist perspective which previously hindered struggle developments. The struggles of these sections will help to destroy their illusions in the MEP government and create the opportunity for the party to find new roads to the rural masses.

Although the organized sections of the working class have wrested certain wage concessions like the Rs17/50 increase, these concessions have not compensated even these sections adequately for the rise in the cost of living since 1956. Whole sections of the working class that are unorganized have not got even these gains. At the same time the prices of essential commodities have tended to stabilize themselves at the high levels reached last year. The general economic condition of the working class has thus deteriorated.

The victories won by the organized working class have increased the confidence of the working class as a whole in its capacity to fight for new gains. On the other hand, unemployment is undoubtedly growing and bringing back something of the atmosphere of job-insecurity which prevailed so pronouncedly in UNP days. Further, employer resistance to working-class demands has become more determined and even aggressive.

Government policy in relation to the working class is broadly to attempt to establish class peace through a variety of means. It has enacted certain ameliorative legislation which however has either touched only the fringe of working-class needs or, as in the case of the Employees' Provident Fund, has not yet been rendered effective. In the matter of we, the government has tried to avoid the basic issues by appointing commissions, while making piecemeal, limited, and belated concessions when compelled to do so. In dealing with industrial disputes in the government sector the government has systematically sought to divert the unions from struggle to protracted procedures of conciliation and arbitration even by compulsion and intimidation.

The government has removed some impediments in the way of trade unionism. However, while the trade unions grew, government resorted to various devices to bring them under its control. It has tried to establish joint councils, with hardly any success. It has continued the UNP's denial of the fundamental trade-union and political rights of government employees. It has set about the splitting of unions under open government patronage. When all other methods have failed it has not hesitated to use violence and other methods of intimidation against strikers. Moreover, through the Public Security (Amendment) Act it has armed itself with further powers of direct repression of workers' struggles and militant unions.

The Ceylon Indian workers continue to be under special political disabilities such as the denial of citizenship and the franchise. As in the case of other basic issues concerning the working class, the MEP government has evaded these issues too. At the same time MEP politicians have been engaging in more and more frequent communal attacks on the Ceylon Indian workers while the MEP

government itself is under attack by the UNP and other communalists for having failed to settle the Indian issue along Sinhalese communalist lines. In this situation the inadequacy of the traditional organizations of these workers is beginning to become manifest to these workers themselves. The need to participate in the politics of the country is increasingly understood by them and their desire to do so has grown. Along with this their pressure on their organizations to participate in the national political movement has also grown. The politics of the Ceylon Indian workers is bound to be anti-MEP government in view of the anti-Indianism of the MEP government.

With the establishment of the Soviet Embassy the Communist Party of Ceylon has come under the direct supervision of the Soviet bureaucracy. The interference of the Soviet bureaucracy in local politics has also increased. Fearful of a return of the UNP to power and anxious regarding the real possibility of an LSSP government emerging, the Soviet bureaucracy has a direct interest in maintaining the MEP government in power. Aside from granting financial aid and the like to the MEP government, it has, in line with this policy, converted the Communist Party of Ceylon into a more or less direct agency of the MEP government within the working class in particular and in the country generally. However, in the interest of preserving a following, the Communist Party engages in various pressure moves, including direct action, but always within the perspective of maintaining the MEP government in power. It also seeks systematically to infiltrate the government and to increase its influence within the government ranks by supporting the petty-bourgeois radicals in the MEP. In the result, the Communist Party has tended on the one hand to lose some of its following to the MEP and on the other hand to alienate the anti-MEP sections of the masses. Seeking to adapt itself to this situation it has adapted its policies more and more clearly to the Sinhalese Buddhist communalism of the MEP government.

The May 1958 events and the experience of the Emergency that followed have further embittered the Tamil masses against the MEP government. The Reasonable Use of Tamil Act has nowise changed their attitude, and continuing discrimination against the Tamil-speaking people keeps adding to their embitterment. However, there are no signs at present of a resumption of direct action by the Tamils. Despite the sympathy created for the Federal Party by the banning of this party and the detention of its leaders for some months during the Emergency, the political hold of the Federal Party amongst the Tamil masses has weakened. These masses are beginning to feel that the Federal Party line of politics does not provide a means to the solution of the problems raised by the MEP government's anti-Tamil policy. It is also beginning to be understood by the Tamil masses that the solution to their problems of winning their minority rights lies in the linking of their struggle with the anti-capitalist struggle of the masses of Ceylon as a whole. It is significant that the Federal Party had no role to play in the general strike of March 3rd which was the biggest mass action against the MEP government in its three-year history.

OUR TASKS

The fundamental political task of the party today is to carry forward the consciousness of the masses and first of all of the organized working class, to an active realization of the need to overthrow the MEP government. This is not a mere propaganda task. It will be achieved only by the party leading the masses through the necessary experience in struggle. And the coming period is one of struggle both by the working class and sections of the toiling masses on their respective demands.

In relation to the working class, the MEP government and the capitalist class have well-nigh reached the limit

of concessions consistent with the maintenance of the capitalist order. Although minor concessions are still possible, the basic demands of the workers, particularly in the matter of wages, cannot be met in view of the present mood of the working class; therefore, the perspective opens up of widespread and determined struggles of the workers on such demands. These struggles will both bring the workers more and more into conflict with the government, and raise political issues. The task of the party will be, while organizing and conducting such struggles, to lead the workers through their experience in such struggles to the realization of the need to overthrow the MEP government and the capitalist order which it maintains.

Further, in the conditions of today, directly political issues (such as the Public Security Amendment Bill, the question of political rights for government employees, etc), or matters which involve political issues (such as the failure to implement the National Employees Provident Fund Scheme, the absence of a National Minimum Wage, etc) are arising as matters whose importance is felt by large numbers of workers. It will be the task of the party to take up such issues in time, and to conduct agitational campaigns on them with the perspective of struggle. This will help to accelerate the politicalization of the working class.

Particularly in view of the efforts of the MEP and UNP to generate a hostility among the rural masses to the working class, it is the more necessary today to make the working class increasingly conscious of its role of leadership of the rural masses. With this aim in view the party must lead the workers in the task of forging links with the rural masses for action on suitable issues. Efforts to obtain the sympathy of the rural masses for the workers in their struggles, the championing by the workers of the demands of the rural masses, and joint action on felt common demands, would help forward the accomplishment of this task.

The weakened position of the Stalinists among the workers provides the party with an opportunity of making gains in the trade-union field at their expense. The MEP unions, built on the basis of Sinhalese communalism, governmental patronage, and minor concessions obtained through Industrial Tribunals, appeal principally to the more backward workers. The role of these unions is to divert the struggle of these workers into harmless channels and to lull them with small concessions. It is the task of the party to expose to these workers the treacherous role of these unions which are hostile to any serious struggle and to win them over by its militant leadership. At the same time, however, the party itself must utilize its own capacity and prestige in the union field to organize these more backward layers of the workers that are coming more and more into trade-union organization. In this effort it must not hesitate to utilize, wherever necessary, the procedure of the courts and tribunals set up under the Industrial Disputes Act.

It is essential for the party to grasp the contemporary importance of political work within the mass organizations of employees of the white-collar class, of both the English and swabasha strata.

In mobilizing the working class for common action, the party will avoid sectarianism and endeavor to rally together for struggle the organizations of the working class on the widest possible scale. The first real general strike in the history of the working-class movement in Ceylon brought into existence the Conference of Trade Unions. The preservation and development of this centre as a rallying point of militant and independent trade unionism will help both to wipe out the stooge leadership of the MEP and Stalinist unions, and to mobilize the working class on the widest possible scale for the great battles that lie ahead.

The party should recognize the weakness of its activities among the rural masses and should carry on in a more systematic and widespread manner its agitation and pro-

paganda among these masses. While seizing every opportunity to agitate on concrete local issues and seeking to impel the rural masses into action on such issues wherever possible, the party should give special importance to propaganda and agitation on the issues of rural unemployment, high cost of living, land hunger, and oppression by headmen, police, and other officials and the delays in the administrative system. The party should try to present such issues in a concrete form which will appeal to the rural masses. Effort should be made to enter the multi-purpose coöps and cultivation committees, to utilize these organizations to the maximum for serving the interests of the rural masses and the tenant cultivators and small-owner cultivators, and to demonstrate in practice the limitations and drawbacks of government policy in this field.

As for the swabasha intellectuals, the party must recognize that it has failed so far to find an effective way of linking up with them. Indeed the party must recognize that the suspicion genuinely exists within this stratum that the party does not really stand for and identify itself with the swabasha demands. A principal reason for this was the diversion of the swabasha movement in the Sinhalese areas into communalist channels. However, there are manifestations today that whole sections of this stratum are either going into action or preparing for action on their demands on non-communal lines. In these actions they necessarily come into conflict with the MEP government. The opportunity is thus created for the party to penetrate this stratum by active participation in the preparation and conduct of these struggles. The party must engage systematically in this work especially among the SSC unemployed youth, who can most easily be brought under the influence of the working-class movement. Through this work the party can gain a whole set of adherents spread throughout the country who will constitute a valuable link between the party and the rural masses.

Amidst the tasks set out above, the continuing task of opposing the MEP government's various policies of discrimination against the minorities must not be overlooked. The party has an enormous fund of good will among the minorities, and the task of strengthening and consolidating the party base among the minorities remains a principal task.

THE COMING PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTIONS

The party must prepare from now on consciously and thoroughly for the next parliamentary general elections, with a view to bidding for a majority.

Mass illusions in the franchise as a means of attaining political power and of achieving social change are extremely widespread and real. The reforms which are proceeding in respect of the electoral process are likely to strengthen these illusions. These illusions can be shed only through experience. On the other hand the elections provide the party an invaluable opportunity to advance mass consciousness and to reach whole sections of the masses with whom it ordinarily has no contact.

There is a widespread demand among the working class and the toiling masses generally that the party should bid for a majority at the next general elections. Despite the disfranchisement of the Ceylon-Indian workers and despite the weighting of the constituencies against the working class, such a bid can and will serve the party's political aims if conducted by the proper methods and in the correct perspective. Certainly, such a bid will help to impress upon the masses the seriousness of the party's bid for power. The party engaging in the elections will endeavor to convert the elections themselves into a mass struggle, that is, it will seek to give the elections a class-struggle character. Further, the party must understand clearly that the struggle for a parliamentary majority is primarily a struggle for gaining control of a state instrument which can

be utilized in the interests of the mass struggle, and that a parliamentary majority cannot be a substitute for the mobilization of the revolutionary masses.

CONCLUSION

The party will carry out the specific tasks outlined above in relation to various sections of the people in the setting of its general propaganda and agitation for the overthrow of the MEP government and the replacement of it by an LSSP government. The party will demonstrate that this is a necessary means to preserving and fostering national unity, ending corruption, carrying through the urgent reorganization of the country's political, administrative, economic, and social structure, and releasing and mobilizing the nation's energies for these tasks.

In the course of its propaganda and agitation the party will highlight the following questions:

Growing Unemployment and High and Rising Prices: The party will point out that these problems can be solved only by a series of anti-capitalist measures which will include the nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, the taking over of the import and export trade which will permit a proper control of prices and a comprehensive plan of socialist development. In relation to nationalizations the party will stress the importance of securing the enthusiastic coöperation of the workers through making them partners in the management of the nationalized concerns.

Housing and Social and Welfare Services: The party will draw attention to the government's complete failure on the housing question and the inadequacy of the social and welfare services, and point out that it is only a government with a socialist plan that can set out on the road to a real solution of these problems.

Corruption: The party will draw attention to the manifest unwillingness of the MEP government, like the UNP government, to take action against the increasing corruption in the state apparatus. It will point out that only a government that is itself above corruption can take the determined measures to stamp out corruption from public life.

Bureaucratic Administration: The party will draw attention to the dilatoriness and ineffectiveness of the present bureaucratic set-up of the administration which is isolated from the masses and acts in a harassing and oppressive way. It will point out that the complete reorganization of the administrative apparatus, which is essential if this apparatus is to become responsive to mass needs, can be effected, not by a government which bases itself on the police, the armed forces, and the bureaucracy, but only by a government which bases itself on the awakening masses.

In this way the party will demonstrate to the masses that not only the overthrow of the MEP government is necessary but also the overthrow of the capitalist system itself.

In thus exposing the source of our political, economic, administrative and social ills, the party will also demonstrate concretely in terms of specific measures the need for the socialist reorganization of Ceylon's economic and social structure. The creation of a widespread understanding of what the party in power would concretely do will itself help to carry the party to power.

The political task in relation to the question of what is the government necessary in order to carry the whole nation forward to a new era is therefore to win popular acceptance for the view that the correct alternative to the MEP government is an LSSP government because the necessary alternative to the present order is a socialist order. We must present consistently and all-sidedly to the nation the concept that an LSSP government is the necessary instrument for building a socialist society.

FORWARD TO AN LSSP GOVERNMENT!
DOWN WITH THE MEP GOVERNMENT!
FORWARD TO SOCIALISM!

ADDENDUM

The internal conflicts of the MEP government have shattered it from within. Not only the MEP government but also the MEP itself is no more. Mr S W R D Bandaranaike now heads a straight SLFP government while the SLFP becomes the sole governing party.

The Philip Gunawardena group, a Sinhalese communalist group of radicals, has been forced out of the government and has left the Government Party. They have been followed by a Sinhalese communalist grouping of petty-bourgeois radicals of the SLFP. With these developments the Bandaranaike government has undergone a change in class composition. From a government of a bourgeois party in alliance with a petty-bourgeois group, and responding within limits to the pressure of this group and other similar petty-bourgeois elements in the Government Party, it has been transformed into a government of a bourgeois party pure and simple. Apart from the fact that the main support of the SLFP comes, not from the big bourgeoisie but from the economically less powerful sections of the Sinhalese bourgeoisie, the present SLFP government is not very different from the UNP government of the past.

Two results flow from this situation. Firstly, the left coloration that the Bandaranaike government exhibited for the past three years has disappeared, and the capitalist character which it always possessed, now stands exposed for all to see.

Second, a further rightward shift in the government's policy can be expected. Even before the present crisis, the rightward shift of the government had already commenced. But the removal of the petty-bourgeois pressure within its ranks, represented by the Philip Gunawardena group and to a lesser extent by the petty-bourgeois elements in the ranks of the SLFP Parliamentary Party itself, will further accelerate this rightward shift in policy. The recent attack on Marxism by the SLFP government illustrates this. The SLFP government's service of capital will now be more direct, more open, and more complete.

The change in the Bandaranaike government also reflects an important change in the situation within the capitalist class. The political overturn at the April 1956 general elections left the capitalist class both disoriented and disorganized politically. Big capital, that is to say, the decisive section of capital, although it clung to its economic positions in the major sectors of the economy (the plantations, banking and insurance, the export and import trades), could not give to the capitalist class as a whole either a clear line of political action or a firm and united political lead. Big capital therefore marked time. But big capital began to get once again on its political feet as the MEP government advanced in the performance of the role which has historically been the role of every Popular Front-type government. This is the role of containing the leftward moving masses within the framework of capitalism while gaining time for the capitalist class to regroup itself politically in preparation for a class offensive. The MEP government differed from a Popular Front government in the following principal respects: 1) it gained a large section of its mass support through the rousing of Sinhalese communalism, and 2) there was no substantial representation of the working class in the Front. However, it is true that the MEP evoked, especially among the Sinhalese masses, hopes of a nature similar to those evoked by Popular Fronts of the classical type. As the MEP government stood firm within the capitalist framework even while compelling the capitalist class to important economic and political concessions, the capitalist class began to regain its class confidence. This was reflected first of all in the economic field as for instance in the intransigence of Big Capital in the export field with stepped-up resistance to every threatened invasion of the fields of exploitation of "private enterprise" (the Co-op. Bank Bill; the expansion of the CWE's field of operations). Big Capital has re-

covered its political confidence and is beginning to move in on the government with its demands. Not the defense of capitalism's essential positions only, but the defense of capitalism on all major fronts, is now the demand of Big Capital from the government; and the reconstitution of the cabinet represents a preparation for the performance of that task.

Although the MEP government was a Popular Front-type of government, its break-up has not resulted in a disorientation among the working class. On the contrary it has resulted in a growth of self-confidence among the working class. The principal reason for this is the fact that, unlike the classic Popular Front governments in Europe, the MEP government was faced from the outset with the opposition of a revolutionary working-class party with a mass following, the LSSP. The working class was thereby enabled a) to reap the advantages of a Popular Front-type government without becoming its adherents, and b) to escape disorientation when the MEP government failed and finally broke up.

The working class by and large has no illusions about the class character of the SLFP government and therefore stands in opposition to it. Any question of the SLFP maintaining or obtaining a significant base in the working class is ruled out. Secondly, the working class, conscious of greatly extended organization and big trade-union victories won against the government itself and also against the capitalists generally, stands capable in suitable circumstances of a major offensive on all fronts, including the political front. Thirdly, the possibility of mobilizing the working class for struggle under LSSP leadership has been considerably enhanced by the serious weakening of the position of the Philip group, the Stalinists, and the SLFP in the working class, and the further growth of confidence in LSSP leadership in class struggles.

The situation among the rural masses is in marked contrast to that existing among the working class. They largely stand confused by the break-up of the MEP government. The LSSP was unable to prevent this in any significant way because, firstly, as a working-class party its main base was among the workers, and secondly because even the limited base it possessed in the rural areas was seriously weakened by the growth of Sinhalese communalism under the MEP government. The danger exists in this situation of the rural masses turning right. However, the growth of rural dissatisfaction over unemployment and high prices, which raise class issues, and the competition between the two bourgeois parties, the SLFP and the UNP, for rural support, provide the working class with the opportunity to make a bid for the leadership of the rural masses.

In the changed political and mass situation, the SLFP stands greatly weakened and the SLFP government in the coming period is likely to discredit itself more and more with the masses. It is also not unlikely that this government will be defeated in Parliament and compelled to hold a general election before its term is completed.

The revival in recent times of the UNP, the tried political party of Big Capital in Ceylon, reflected not merely the failure of the MEP government, but also the revival of capitalist class confidence. Big Capital has been mobilizing behind the UNP, and with the break-up of the MEP government the UNP is making a determined bid for a return to power.

However, if the capitalist class becomes fearful of a strong working-class bid for power, the UNP and SLFP may coalesce in one way or another as a means of uniting the capitalist class around a single political banner in defense against the working class offensive.

The Philip Gunawardena group, that depended to a large extent on ministerial position for its influence, stands disoriented and even demoralized by the loss of these posi-

tions and the entire failure of its policy of joining with the SLFP to form the MEP. While there is a certain sympathy for Philip Gunawardena, particularly in the rural areas, the prospects for the Philip Gunawardena group, whether alone or in linkup with other splinters from the MEP, are bleak, so long as their essential aim is to continue the discredited politics of the shattered MEP.

The Communist Party is also involved in the failure of the MEP government because of its position of support of this government. Further, the Communist Party, despite every effort to maintain a contrary appearance, still essentially supports the Bandaranaike government in office. This is principally because the Bandaranaike government continues its policy of maintaining good relations with the Soviet bloc of countries. However, it is impossible for it to face the masses with straight support to the SLFP government. The CP is therefore compelled to complicated and as usual unprincipled manoeuvres under cover of a call for a united front of the progressive forces (including those still with the government) under the leadership of the working class. This is but the old anti-UNP line refurbished, and the old MEP politics in a new guise to meet the new situation. And it is first of all a line directed against the revolutionary line of the LSSP.

In the Northern and Eastern provinces the break-up of the MEP government and the precarious parliamentary position of the SLFP government has aroused new hopes in the possibility of the emergence of a government which will not be Sinhalese communalist. This will help the party in its efforts to wean the masses of these areas away from Federalist influence.

The task before the party is to mobilize the masses under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the SLFP government and to replace it with a LSSP government. This task gains urgency from the fact that the break-up of the MEP government has accelerated the process of polarization of Ceylonese society between the working class on the one hand and the capitalist class on the other. Struggles in which the question of power will be posed are a distinct possibility in the period ahead. There is also a possibility of the capitalist class launching an offensive against the working class with the backing of the SLFP government and with the rural masses indifferent or even hostile to the working class.

It is therefore of vital importance that the working class should make a determined effort to win over the as yet undecided rural masses.

The Sinhalese educated petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, who were among the chief supporters of the MEP, are today, like the rural masses, confused by the break-up of the MEP government. A special effort should be made to attract to the revolutionary working-class movement the dissatisfied strata among these sections.

In relation to the working class itself the task of the party is the political and organizational preparation of the class to take the lead for the overthrow of the SLFP government and the ending of capitalist rule. The wide recognition among the working class of the capitalist nature of the SLFP government, as well as the recognition of the weakness of this government, make this task easier.

In the period of struggle that is ahead, it is important that the working class, while engaging in such limited struggles as may arise, should seek to conserve its energies for major struggles on demands of a generalized character which will bring it face to face with the capitalist order and the SLFP government that defends it. Accordingly the party will strive to formulate, popularize and advance appropriate generalized demands in the situation as it develops.

With the development of the mass struggle, the party should also be alive to the need for advancing slogans for the creation of organizations of the workers, corresponding to the stage of the struggle. The time is ripe today to call for the building of volunteer corps under the aegis of the trade unions.

The party has also to be aware that the precarious position of the SLFP government in Parliament renders a defeat of this government in Parliament at any moment and a consequent general election a distinct possibility. Accordingly the party, while continuing its efforts in Parliament of attempting to secure the defeat of the government at the earliest possible moment, must seriously and without delay make all necessary preparations for contesting if not all, most of the seats at a general election, with a view to obtaining a parliamentary majority.

It is necessary for the party vigorously to combat the idea of a broad front of so-called progressives as proposed by the Stalinists or the petty-bourgeois groups that have split from the MEP. The experience of the MEP's failure and break-up provides proof of the futility and danger of unprincipled combinations of this kind, and demonstrates that it is only on a clear anti-capitalist programme which can unite all sections of the oppressed and exploited regardless of race or creed, that the masses can go forward to a united and socialist Ceylon.



*Manifesto of the IXth Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario
(Bolivian Section of the Fourth International)*

**LET US ORGANIZE THE WORKERS' LEADERSHIP
OF THE BOLIVIAN REVOLUTION**

To All Who Labor!

In the present situation of stagnation in the conquests of the revolution and of capitulation of the Lechinist leadership of the workers' movement, the MNR government and imperialism are keeping up their offensive against the positions and gains of the toilers, and are preparing new blows against the Bolivian revolution.

The rise in the price and demand for tin in the world market has meant a relative improvement in the economic

situation of the country, but this has not had the slightest repercussion on raising the living levels of the toiling population, but is used by the government as a basis for its offensive against the worker, peasant, and poor middle-class masses. Furthermore, none of the fundamental economic problems of the country has been solved, nor can be under the present regime, and the basic economic situation continues to be precarious and with no way out. Not only have the fantastic promises about oil, made by Siles

two years ago, not been fulfilled, but the imperialist trusts have not pumped up, and are not for the moment thinking of pumping up, a single drop of oil, while they are — with the collaboration of the government — gradually strangling the Y PFB in order to remain the absolute masters of the field.

THE GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVE

The government feels helpless to find any fundamental solution for saving capitalism other than the liquidation of the basic conquests of the revolution. But it also feels its own weakness in face of the resistance of the workers and peasants, and advances toward its goal by stages. It is profiting by the relative reanimation of the tin market for this advance by stages. Therefore, after having had its way in the first assault against the mine commissaries, it is now making a pause before setting out on the definitive unfreezing of prices. It is the same with the closing down of mines: after the closure of Pulacayo, it has for the moment desisted from closing down other enterprises. And similarly with the discharge of factory-workers, suppression of social security, etc.

But these pauses indicate only that the government feels too weak to impose imperialism's plans on the country at one fell blow, and nowise that it has given up such plans. It is thus keeping wages frozen, and is preparing new attacks against the commissaries, workers' control, trade-union radio stations, etc.

The Lechinist workers' leadership, however, instead of profiting by this weakness of the government in order to strengthen the position of the masses, is thinking only of negotiating a capitulation and of covering up the permanent retreat in which it has been leading the workers' movement since the IInd Congress of the COB.

PAZ ESTENSSORO AND THE MNR LEFT

It is on this dual basis that Paz Estenssoro is staking his attempt to win back positions for his party and for the capitalist government: on the one hand, on the improved prices for tin which diminish the pressures on the government and allow it to extend the time-limit for completely unfreezing commissary prices, closing mines, etc; on the other, on the capitulation of the Lechinist trade-union leadership, which has given up the struggle to fight for the improvement of the masses' situation.

Bolivia is indirectly receiving powerful support from the sustained rise of the masses throughout Latin America, from the successes of the Cuban revolution, and from the weakening of imperialism. But Paz Estenssoro is using this, not to advance the revolution, but to negotiate the sellout to imperialism on better terms.

One of the pillars of this manoeuvre of the MNR, aimed at momentarily winning back positions in order to use them as a base to launch a new assault against the conquests of the masses, is the MNR left itself. This left has renounced any independent perspective and has capitulated in fact and in programme to Silism. It is now playing the game that Siles requires, covering with its "left" phrases the attempt to reorganize the MNR in the working centres and in the mines, and trying to reorganize or strengthen the comandos, those eternal spearheads against the trade unions and the workers. This is so obvious, that the membership application blanks of the left sector were printed by the government (which authorizes and encourages the left), and in many places it is well-known Silists who are acting as organizers and recruiters for this "left."

THE PEASANT SITUATION

The government is also trying to ensure itself positions in the countryside and to hold back the growing discontent of the peasants and their possible regrouping with the workers' movement, particularly the miners. The Lechinist labor leadership has paralyzed any action toward the rural regions, has desisted from setting itself up as the workers'

centre that the peasants are seeking and waiting for, so as to fight to carry forward the agrarian reform and raise their living levels, guaranteeing the division and real possession of the land. Here also, in this betrayal, Paz Estenssoro is trying to present itself as a hope and a pole of attraction for the peasants. Paz Estenssoro is speculating on the peasants' intense longing to find a leadership that pays attention to their problems and solves them, and is trying to go on keeping the peasants in bounds by refreshing their confidence in the MNR, discredited by so many betrayals. This is the goal of the propaganda around the new distribution of deeds to land, tours through the rural regions, the activity of Rojas, etc. But this manoeuvre can reach a momentary and relatively high pitch only because of the betrayal of Lechinism. The appearance of a new workers' leadership which raises in the rural regions the programme of the revolution and of the worker-peasant alliance, will receive peasant support, which is now channeled, although amid much distrust, in Paz Estenssoroism.

THE CAPITULATION OF LECHINISM

What emerges with complete clarity from the present situation is that its basis lies, not in the government's strength (which is highly relative) or in that of imperialism (which received a terrible blow on April 19th and is losing ground in all Latin America). It lies in the capitulation and retreat of the Lechinist labor leadership, which is trying to keep the workers' and peasants' movement paralyzed, divided, and subjected to the MNR.

This capitulation reflects the bourgeois, capitalist, reformist conceptions and programme of this leadership, which lacks an independent workers' programme and way out, and sees no solution other than the maintenance of the MNR in power, although the MNR is today the enemy no 1 of the revolution and the workers. This leadership, in refusing to struggle and to organize the workers' struggle for their own solution, which is (as opposed to the capitalist government) the workers' and peasants' government, has no other remedy than to capitulate and surrender to Silism, selling out strikes and gains, as it does in every fundamental problem.

But this Lechinist leadership, owing to its constant sell-outs and betrayals, is in crisis, and has more and more rapidly lost its prestige and authority with the toilers. To maintain itself and keep its hold over them, it has had to resort to alliances with the repudiated "reestructadores" [trade-union "reorganizers"], as it did with the railwaymen and at Telamayú. But this only speeds up its crisis and decomposition.

Nevertheless, Lechinism keeps controlling the labor movement, especially because there has not emerged as yet another staff of workers' leaders on the national scale that offers an alternative choice to the workers for their regroupment.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORKERS' LEADERSHIP

The emergence of this new workers' leadership is thus the key to the situation and to any new advance of the revolution to overcome the present stagnation, seize the initiative from capitalism, and defeat the government's offensive.

Therefore Siles, Paz Estenssoro, Lechin, and the MNR, together with their manoeuvre to win back certain positions for the MNR, are concentrating all their fire against the possibility that such a new leadership be organized and emerge. Hence the attempts to expel the militants of the POR from the mines (which the workers defeated), the repressions and imprisonments of POR leaders and militants, etc. The government and imperialism see in the POR the centre that can lead and organize the new revolutionary workers' leadership, and see the growing echo of its activity among the workers.

The activity and programme of the POR nevertheless

obtain this echo, because they respond to a need that is making its way among the worker and peasant vanguard and among ever broader layers of the toiling masses: the need for a new revolutionary leadership. The workers' trend toward a new leadership is making its way in the most advanced workers' centres, where the experience of Lechinism's treason is most evident. In San José, in Siglo XX - Catavi, in the railway centres, the struggle has begun. In Huanuni, the workers repudiated Celestino Gutiérrez and his reestructadores, and, together with them, their Lechinist allies, and are demanding a new leadership. In the valley of Cochabamba, peasant discontent with the bureaucratic leadership of Rojas, entrenched in Ucucreña, is being shown by the growing prestige of other centres of leadership, such as that set up at Ana Rancho.

This struggle for a new leadership, headed by the mining centres, has begun amid a temporary ebb in the struggles for demands in those sectors: the toilers, at the time of the latest blows and defeats (e.g. the commissaries) due to the old leadership, do not want to hurl themselves into the fight while they still have those leaders in whom they feel no confidence. But at the same time there is building up a new wave of struggles in other sectors, such as the school-teachers, which has already found an echo among the telegraphers, building workers, railwaymen, and others.

ORGANIZE A NEW LEADERSHIP WITH A WORKERS' PROGRAMME

In this situation, the central task for the worker and peasant vanguard is to overcome the brake of the Lechinist leadership, and organize the new revolutionary leadership of the workers' and peasants' movement that the toilers need. The struggle for this new leadership is bound up with the struggle for the defense of the conquests of the revolution and for the demands of the toilers.

This new leadership, independent of the MNR (in any of its wings whatever) and of any bourgeois party and policy, must regroup itself around a programme of transitional demands to improve the situation of the masses, reorganize the workers' movement, defend its conquests, and carry forward the revolution.

The crisis of the Lechinist leadership, and the manoeuvres of the MNR and the government in the rural regions, tend to undermine and weaken the worker-peasant alliance, the main support of the revolution. The new workers' leadership must include the worker-peasant alliance as a fundamental point in its programme and in its struggle. The mining centres and the railway workers, who are today at the head of this struggle for new leadership, must from now on develop this alliance, supported by and supporting the peasants in their zones, and be strengthened by this support against the attacks of the government and the manoeuvres of the top union bureaucracy.

The emergence of a new workers' leadership is not a process that goes in a straight line and simultaneously everywhere. It is already begun, and will advance first in certain

centres and trade unions, to spread from there to the national federations and confederations. But it is a process that does not turn back, and that will speed up, with the crisis of Lechinism, the new struggles of the masses.

APPEAL OF THE PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO

In every factory, workers' neighborhood, mining district, railway centre, big estate, peasant centre, etc. in every worker or peasant union, the P O R calls on the vanguard workers to organize an independent revolutionary way out, to set up and raise to leadership a new staff of revolutionary leaders with a programme of defense of the conquests and advances of the revolution.

Comrade toilers of the mines, the cities, and the countryside:

The P O R calls on you to organize the new worker and peasant leadership, with this programme of struggle: for an immediate and general raise in wages; against unemployment and the shutting down of enterprises; against the unfreezing of prices in the mining commissaries; for the complete distribution of the land and the deeds thereto, and for the fulfillment of the agrarian reform; for trade-union democracy; for the defense of the trade unions' radio stations; for the defense of workers' control; for the development of workers' and peasants' militias; for the defense of the Y P F B and against the imperialist oil-trusts; for acceptance of credits and aid from the U S S R and the workers' states; for the expulsion of the imperialists and their agents from the country; for expropriation without indemnization of the railways, and their administration by the workers; for the reorganization of the Comibol under workers' administration; for a workers' plan of economic development; for a regroupment and reorganization of the labor movement in a Special Congress of the Central Obrera Boliviana, to impose workers' solutions to the problems of the country and the revolution.

The IXth Plenum of the Central Committee of the P O R calls on all the toilers to fight for these solutions and this programme, and to strengthen and develop the ranks and the organization of the P O R in all places of labor: mining, working, and peasant centres. The P O R is the guarantee of the defense of the revolutionary conquests, against the MNR, the rosca, the government, and imperialism; it is the centre for the organization of the new leadership of the workers' movement; and it is the vanguard party to carry forward the revolution to the total defeat of imperialism and capitalism and to the government of the toilers, the Workers' and Peasants' Government.

IXth PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE P O R

Oruro
9 August 1959

THE PROPHET UNARMED

The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky 1921-1929. By Isaac Deutscher. Pp 490. London (Oxford University Press), 1959. 38 s

We very warmly recommend to our readers this second volume of Isaac Deutscher's biography of Trotsky, which has just gone on sale. As in the first volume — which concerned the previous years — we find here the same wealth of facts, testifying to very meticulous research work into numerous sources. What we have the right to expect of a historian is that he understand and demonstrate the concatenation of events, their internal logic, and — when it is a matter of the biography of a man like Trotsky, situated at the centre of gigantic political struggles — cast light on the place, the role, and the purposes of the man under study. From this point of view, Deutscher, without in the least indulging in apologetics, has written a very solid book.

It is true that the five years that have passed between the first and second volumes of Trotsky's biography have been filled with events that have powerfully aided a better comprehension of years of the greatest and most fatal lacerations in the Bolshevik Party. Destalinization — however limited it still may be today — could not fail to cast a very vivid light on the years of the Stalinization of the Soviet Union. In his preface, Deutscher explains it thoroughly, and at the same time explains why Stalin's epigones, after having taken two steps forward, take one step backward, and why they also are trying to conjure away the ghost of Trotsky. He also shows the hopelessness of this latter effort in the following lines of his preface:

What the Soviet Union and communism take over from Stalinism is mainly its practical achievement; in other respects, as regards methods of government and political action, ideas, and 'moral climate', the legacy of the Stalin era is worse than empty; the sooner it is disposed of, the better. But precisely in these respects Trotsky has still much to offer; and the political development can hardly transcend him otherwise than by absorbing all that is vital in his thought and applying it to realities which are far more advanced, varied, and complex than those he knew.

These lines tie the past up with the present and the future. But Deutscher's book is no more a political work than it is a work of apologetics: it is the book of a historian, but a historian who is treating past questions that retain a burning timeliness. And one of the most valuable aspects of the book is that history is laid open and demonstrated therein with so much cohesion that it cannot fail to lead the reader to draw conclusions about present-day events.

The historical narrative will be a revelation for the majority of readers, for since 1930 there has been such an accumulation of lies about this past that — with the exception of a tiny minority that was able to become acquainted with the truth in pamphlets printed in very small editions — even those who were far from believing in the Stalinist lies could hardly have a correct view of what had happened. Even for those who knew the truth and who really lived these years, so to speak — I refer to the communist militants outside the U S S R, who, from this period on, were close to the Bolshevik-Leninists of the Soviet Union — this book will do more than just remind them of a story they already know. It will also permit them to

reëxamine it, on the one hand in a more complete way (for in that period only fragmentary information got through), and on the other from a distance that allows them to see better the concatenation of events.

The book's first chapter, titled "The Power and the Dream," gives a picture of the Soviet Union immediately after the end of the Civil War, of the dislocation of the economy and of the extraordinary depression of the proletariat. This chapter also gives a view of the problems which then faced the Soviet leaders, and how Lenin and Trotsky in particular reacted. Nobody today can doubt that Lenin and Trotsky were getting ready to lead a fight against the rising bureaucracy. Deutscher recalls this, with all proofs in hand, those furnished by Trotsky and those provided by Khrushchev & Co since the XXth Congress, which corroborate on all points the documents that Trotsky had published some 30 years before. But Deutscher carries his researches still further. He shows that Trotsky had been the first to become aware of the deterioration that was occurring among the top men in the party and the state, and that Lenin, for a period, busy with daily tasks and anxious to maintain the cohesion of the leadership, not yet having measured the current phenomenon at its correct value, resisted several proposals of Trotsky in the Political Bureau. Then he shows Lenin, become conscious of the gravity of the bureaucratic danger, carrying out a turn and decided to lead a resolute and implacable struggle:

[...] he used his last ounce of strength to strike a blow at the over-centralized machine of power. He invoked the purpose of the revolution for its own sake, from a deep, disinterested, and remorseful devotion to it. And when at last, a dying man, his mind ablaze, he moved to retrieve the revolution from its heavy encumbrance, it was to Trotsky that he turned as his ally.

Another chapter of the greatest interest is that titled "Not by Politics Alone..." — devoted to Trotsky's position on cultural questions. It can be measured therein how greatly the bureaucracy disfigured Marxism in these questions, and how many intellectuals had their minds so beclouded by the material power at the bureaucracy's disposal that they swallowed down a crude and indigestible mash of grain-husks which of itself could not hold its own on the plane of ideas. We should like to hope that these pages will aid numerous intellectuals who belatedly broke away from Stalinism to find their way back to the genuine path of Marxism.

We do not want to list in detail every chapter of a book which will instruct its readers and make them reflect. We should, however, like to say a few words about certain questions taken up in this book, on which, in our opinion, there still remains much to be said.

Deutscher on several occasions mentions Trotsky's hesitation to start the struggle or to continue it. He stresses Trotsky's silence at the XIIth Congress on the problems of democracy and the party regime, his silence at the XIVth Congress at the time of the break-up of the troika and the conflict between Stalin on the one hand and Zinoviev and Kamenev on the other. And he seeks an explanation therefor, all the more so in that, in volume one, he had highlighted Trotsky's audacity in 1917. One point he raises is

that of the relations between Trotsky and the Old Guard of the Bolshevik Party: Trotsky was, he said, "in it but not of it." This is partly true and there is no doubt that it was a factor, especially at the beginning; but in 1926-27, the majority of the Old Guard — as Deutscher himself notes — was in opposition to the Stalin-Bukharin leadership and had rallied behind Trotsky and Zinoviev, because the political questions were the determinant ones. If a large number of them later capitulated, that was either because of political divergences, or because of exhaustion.

Deutscher gives as the main reason for Trotsky's attitude the fact that he took his position within the framework of the correlation of forces that existed at that period:

He placed his own person and action within the framework of social forces which determined the course of events; he saw his own role as subordinate to those forces; and his aim, the revival of proletarian democracy, dictated to him the choice of his means.

That would deserve to be considerably developed. Of all the Soviet Bolsheviks who lived through those years, Trotsky was unquestionably the one who had the closest grasp of reality and who was the most far-sighted. Now for a long time it was not against the danger of a stifling bureaucratic power, but against that of a restoration of capitalism, that he led the struggle. A few months ago, in a conversation, a young cadre-element of a "people's democracy" brought up against us this "error" of Trotsky, for the danger of the restoration of capitalism proved to be non-existent. We do not think it was any error. First of all, Marxism makes no pretensions to astrology; what can be asked of it is, in the first place, a correct analysis of the social forces in presence; as for the correlation of forces between them, that is more difficult to measure. And especially, in the present case, nothing would be more incorrect than to deduce the correlation of forces in the USSR and in the world of nearly 40 years ago by— what the sputniks and luniks of today indicate. The bureaucratic phenomenon was occurring for the first time in a workers' state, and the possibility of a regime of the Stalinist type was a priori difficult to imagine; but, before anything else, in those years the possibilities of a capitalist restoration were not at all just a product of Trotsky's imagination. In case a civil war broke out, the pro-capitalist forces, still numerous in this period, would quickly and forcefully have come into the open. It is because Trotsky, more than anyone else, had made a keen appraisal of the dangers of this situation that, in the struggle against the bureaucracy, he had an attitude of extreme prudence that seems in contradiction with the audacity he demonstrated during the Revolution and the Civil War.

There was also, among the elements that weighed in his decisions, a highly complex question that was a stumbling-block for a large part of the Bolshevik cadres who participated in the Left Opposition of 1926-27; and on this point, in our opinion, Deutscher's thought, although it has advanced compared to that in the first volume, has not succeeded in reaching a satisfactory clarification. It is known that Deutscher insisted on "substitutism," an idea expressed by Trotsky in 1903 when he was fighting against Lenin, but which he never took up again after 1917. "Substitutism" would seem to be the party's substituting itself for the class, thinking and deciding for it, and even acting or forcing it to act, it might be said, in spite of itself. After the Civil War, the Soviet working class was exhausted to a degree never experienced before; then the party substituted itself for the class; and that would be Stalinism — Bolshevism nationally and internationally isolated from the working class. Let us grant that Deutscher's thought is more subtly shaded, and more subtly shaded in volume two than in the last pages of volume one and in other works he has written. But this idea is a quite widespread one in a form without any subtle shadings.

For many members of the Old Guard, the party remained the party, and that led them to capitulation for lack of prospects for a revival of the Soviet and international workers' movement. In the '20s it was difficult to determine to what a degree the party was still the Bolshevik Party and to what a degree it had been corrupted by the Soviet bureaucracy. A process, a struggle, were taking place: the party, from being the instrument of the proletariat, was tending to become the instrument of strata that had emerged from the proletariat and its revolution, strata whose specific interests were from the historical point of view distinct from and opposed to those of the proletariat. The Bolshevik Party did not "substitute" itself for the working class under Stalinism. A leading party, even a leading coterie, cannot take the place of a social stratum; they are always its expression, even if in certain cases this does not appear as clearly as was the case in the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik Party became the instrument of a social stratum other than the proletariat. The form of the Communist Party remained the same, but the content was profoundly changed — not only on the plane of ideology, but also on that of men: it was not only the Left Opposition that was physically crushed, not only the Right Opposition, but also (as Khrushchev mentioned at the XXth Congress) the majority of the "winners," i.e., of the second-rank members who had ensured the victory of Stalin's leadership. The objection will perhaps be raised that it was in the CP of the USSR that destalinization began. But under present conditions, since that party is the only political forum, it was inevitably there that the first signs of political renewal had to show themselves. But if the bureaucrats and Thermidoreans had every interest in using for their own ends the form of the Bolshevik Party, exploiting at that time its authority in order the better to put over an anti-Bolshevik policy, we are profoundly convinced that the new vanguard of Soviet society, at a given moment in its development, will — in a different way, even to the degree of organizational forms — oppose what has for long years now been only an instrument of oppression of the Soviet workers.

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Deutscher's book ends with Trotsky's exile from the Soviet Union. A new chapter in Trotsky's life was opening — the last chapter, also full of great events. Let us hope that we may be able to read with as much pleasure as this present volume the end of the biography announced by Deutscher. And let us conclude this hasty review of volume two by quoting the lines with which the author expresses his evaluation of Trotsky:

"Very few men in history have been in such triumphant harmony with their time as Trotsky was in 1917 and after; and so it was not because of any inherent estrangement from the realities of his generation that he then came into conflict with his time. The precursor's character and temperament led him into it. He had, in 1905, been the forerunner of 1917 and of the soviets, he had been second to none as the leader of the soviets in 1917; he had been the prompter of planned economy and industrialization since the early 1920s; and he was to remain the great though not unerring harbinger of some future reawakening of the revolutionary peoples (to that political reawakening the urge to transcend Stalinism which took hold of the Soviet Union in the years 1953-56 was an important pointer; still faint but sure). He fought "against history" in the name of history itself; and against its accomplished facts, which all too often were facts of oppression, he held out the better, the liberating accomplishments of which one day it would be capable."

PIERRE FRANK

September 1959

A LIBERAL AT A LOSS IN THE XXth CENTURY

The Economy, Liberty and the State. By Professor Calvin Hoover. Pp 445. New York (The XXth Century Fund), 1958 \$ 5.00

Professor Calvin Hoover has been for a long time a student and so-called "specialist" on the Soviet economy. He also has had some direct experience with the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany. Personal experience, contrary to what empiricists think, is not always favorable to scientific thinking, especially if the experience is limited and the subject very vast in scope. So Professor Hoover's recent ambitious attempt at summarizing the vital problems of our epoch shows all the signs of an honest liberal staring wide-eyed at his century and being quite at a loss about it.

Like so many liberals, Professor Hoover tries to solve the trick by giving to the category of "class" a loose subjective definition which enables him to deny that both the modern welfare state and the Nazi dictatorship were capitalist states in any sense whatsoever; the USSR, of course, is no workers' state either, and is mixed together with the fascist dictatorships in the same category of "totalitarianism," i.e., states ruled by one dictator or a small dictatorial clique. That the Soviet totalitarianism just happened to have destroyed private ownership of the means of production and the bourgeoisie as a ruling class (and physically as well), whereas the same bourgeoisie and the private ownership of the means of production flourished under Hitler as never before, does not make a decisive difference to him. He speaks about a "ruling bureaucracy" in

Nazi Germany, about the "enormous amount of government control over industry" — but does not specify that this control was exercised by agencies headed by the main industrialists themselves!

Of course the economic importance of the New Deal in the USA, of government control, of the "reduction in the inequality of income distribution," etc., is taken for granted. And the economy of Britain and of Western Europe is even called a "mixed economy." If one looks for a handbook of liberal illusions, prejudices, fears, and simplifications, one can get it right here, not without a scholarly touch (the discussion of Russian real wages, for example, is very interesting and illuminating: Hoover arrives at the conclusion that these wages were in 1957-58 50% higher than before the war and will rise continually through the coming years).

Professor Hoover's conclusion? It is necessary to "control" and "regularize" the economy (including a solution for the problem of cyclical fluctuation and endemic inflation) without giving the state too much power and having it become totalitarian. He does not know exactly how this can be done, but his ideal is somewhere in between a Labour government Britain and a Rooseveltian America. About the tremendous power the monopolists retain and exercise in these societies he doesn't worry very much.... E G

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"MOTIVATIONS"

Lenin and World Revolution. By Stanley W Page. New York (New York University Press), 1959.

There is at present in the United States a whole school of historians and sociologists who are resorting more and more to psychology, if not indeed to the conception they have formed of psychoanalysis and of Freudianism, to explain the "motivations" of the work and action of historic figures.

In the present book it is Lenin who is as it were "psycho-analyzed" in order to explain "his fundamental leitmotiv": "a compulsive need to dominate." Its author solemnly teaches us:

It is the ego, formed and made sensitive in special ways through early impressions, that selects from an indifferent and chaotic environment such challenges and stimuli as give it a crystalline structure of conscious or unconscious action.

It was "the demon-driven ego" of Lenin, "intent upon dominating the processes of destruction and rebuilding," that explains the "revolutionary fanaticism" of his work and his action.

The author, specialized for the American army in studies of Russian — and especially Soviet — history, has proposed "to remove Leninism from the realm of the scientific and indisputable and to open upon it the floodgates of free critical evaluation."

A reading of this book, however, gives evidence rather of the fatal weaknesses of its psychological method for explaining mass phenomena like the Russian Revolution and the Leninist communist current, than of the objective reasons, independently of any personal "motivation," for the striking success recorded by these phenomena.

The balance sheet of the "free critical evaluation" of the book and its method is, under these conditions, frankly disappointing. By orienting "psychological researches" toward the intellectuals in the service of the Pentagon, one might perhaps learn better what "inner demon" these intellectuals obey that they want to write their "scientific" books.

M P

★

BOOKS RECEIVED

Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy. By Walter Millis (with Harvey Mansfield and Harold Stein). Pp 436. New York (The Twentieth Century Fund), 1958. \$4.00

To be reviewed in our next issue.

News of the World Workers' Movement and of the International

Algeria

DE GAULLE MANOEUVRES; THE FLN CONTINUES THE FIGHT

De Gaulle's much-awaited statement on Algeria combines recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination, including by complete "secession" from France, with every sort of restrictions, ambiguities, and dodges. It reflects his concern with warding off the pressures brought to bear on the Bonapartist power now ruling France, by divergent forces: its army, its imperialist allies, and the Algerian revolution.

The positive aspect of the statement is that it definitely buries the thesis of "integration," the watchword at the inauguration of the May 13th regime.

The negative aspects of the statement are its refusal to recognize the FLN and to enter into negotiations with it to settle the exact conditions under which the Algerian population can freely express its choice; and also its am-

biguities about the "referendum" in the "twelve departments" of Algeria and the "regroupment" of French settlers and "collaborators" — ambiguities which include the possibility of a partition of Algeria into a zone that is "independent by secession," and another that is "French by integration."

As we go to press, the precise answer of the FLN is not known.

But the strength of the Algerian revolution, which has already forced the burial of the thesis of "integration," will know how to give an intelligent answer to the manoeuvres of this Bonaparte, and, by a struggle that is intensified and well coördinated on all levels, make his regime concede genuine independence to the Algerian people.

We shall return to this subject in our next issue.

THE DEATH OF AISSAT IDIR

The cryptofascist dregs of the French army in Algeria have contemptuously challenged the whole world workers' movement by the cowardly and provocative assassination of Aïssat Idir, general secretary of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens, precisely at the moment when world-wide labor protests designed to save him were rising higher.

Aïssat Idir was arrested on 23 May 1956, technically on the charge of "endangering the external security of the state," but in simple fact for trade-union militancy. He was transferred from camp to prison to camp to prison, and repeatedly tortured by the over-age juvenile delinquents of the French army who seem bent on outdoing in sadism their Nazi teachers. But he yet lived to be brought to trial, on 12 January 1959, before the Algiers Military Tribunal, where he was defended by, among others, the well-known Belgian senator, Henri Rolin. *For lack of any evidence whatsoever on the charge, he was, two and a half years after his arrest, acquitted.*

But not released; on the contrary, spirited away, he was kept incommunicado from his family and lawyers and once more vengefully tortured by disappointed parachutists. Protests of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions were made in vain to the French government, which also ignored the protests of the World Labor Organization. A high Swiss trade-union official who grew interested in the case was repeatedly refused entry to Algeria. French authorities, in pure fantasy, alleged that Aïssat was contemplating suicide.

After months of refusal, a lawyer was finally admitted to see Aïssat at a prison hospital, where he was confined with horrible burns on his legs. He found Aïssat under

close and hostile guard, and was not permitted to speak to him alone. But despite the presence of a spying officer, Aïssat denied any attempt at or desire for suicide. He had been excruciatingly tortured by parachutists with a blowtorch, hence the burns. An appeal to de Gaulle to order the release of this man, acquitted of charges and quite illegally held, went unanswered.

In mid-July a desperate appeal by the UGTA, transmitted and echoed by the World Federation of Free Trade Unions, roused workers' organizations all over the world to tardy protests. Just as they were reaching a first pitch, in early August, his death — "by suicide" — was cynically announced by the French authorities.

Outraged, Maître Rolin, himself a Socialist, denounced the responsibility of French Socialist Robert Lacoste for the arrest and the SFIO for its pussyfooting behavior. And the UGTA correctly demands that workers' organizations on a world scale, recognizing that the very principles of trade unionism are attacked, demonstrate by concrete actions their repudiation of these gangster methods of French colonialism. We whole-heartedly associate ourselves with this appeal, as we have with those preceding it, and we salute the memory of this one further union martyr. The attitude of the present French government, like that of its predecessors, in covering up, by an attitude in which hypocrisy and menace are uniquely blended, the murderous swine of parachutists and other sadist torturers who are running hog-wild in Algeria today, should cause revolutionary Marxists to rededicate themselves passionately to the task of sweeping off the face of this earth such creatures as dirty and dishonor it.

BULLETIN

As we go to press, we learn from the UGTA that the life of Ali Yahia Majid, another trade-union leader detained by the French occupation troops, is also in danger from their maltreatment. Many other Algerian unionists held in concentration camps are similarly threatened. The

UGTA appeals to labor organizations everywhere to rush protests to the International Labor Office, urging it to send a neutral international commission to Algeria, *while there is still time* to save the lives of these tortured union brothers.

Bolivia

P O R COMRADES FREE

In our last issue, we announced that we had heard that the arrested leaders of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian Section of the Fourth International, were to be exiled; later reports, however, brought the news that protests by workers and university students had caused the government at the last moment to cancel this measure and free the comrades. Their liberty was brief: since then they have been several times arrested and several times freed again. The pretexts have varied, for the Siles government juridically plays by ear, improvising laws as it goes along; but the purposes have been invariable, for the arrests have occurred whenever and wherever P O R influence was growing dangerously strong in any given situation — the most striking case being the arrest of Comrades Fernando Bravo and Víctor Villegas for precisely the period of the miners' congress at Telmayu, to help the Lechinists to face a barrage of criticism. The federation's organization,

the conduct of the recent strike, bureaucratization and malversion, passivity at the murder of Miranda, and Lechin's sudden trips abroad at the most critical times — all came in for attack. These criticisms were concretized in resolutions by delegates from Catavi, Siglo XX, Santa Fé, and San José calling for a complete change of leadership.

The P O R, which won the majority in the elections for congress delegates in Santa Fé and San José, and probably would have done in Catavi and Siglo XX had new election been held, fought hard at Telmayu, but did not quite succeed in forming the alliance needed. Thus, with great difficulty and a majority of abstentions, Lechin, closing ranks with the supporters of Siles, squeaked by.

For the moment, all our comrades are free again.

For an analysis of the new situation, see on pages 76-78 the resolution of the IXth Plenum of the Central Committee of the P O R.



Chile

ANTI-MALRAUX DEMONSTRATION SOLIDARITY WITH THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

André Malraux, author of the great revolutionary novel, *Man's Fate* — whose later degeneration through the stage of a Stalinist propagandist (*Man's Hope*) to his present disgraceful eminence as a governmental apologist for Gaullist Bonapartism has been one of the strangest and saddest cultural phenomena of these recent decades already rich in examples of demoralization and renegacy — has been recently engaged in a Latin American tour to try to swing public opinion behind French colonialism for the test of the imminent vote on the Algerian question at the U N O. In this task, his hypocritical double-talk about tortures has been so particularly odious that even part of the bourgeoisie press has expressed its nausea.

Other and more immediate expressions of protest met him at the University of Chile during a ceremony in which he was to receive an honorary degree. Suddenly members of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskista), Chilean Section of the Fourth International, shouted from the gallery the slogans "Long Live Free Algeria!" "Murderer Malraux!" and "Down with French Imperialism!" The slogans were applauded and taken up by a large number of the students present. At this point thousands of leaflets showered over the audience. Mauraux's speech was completely disrupted. Police arrested four students. Next day the press of Santiago was full of reports of this well-merited protest against the cynical agent of the French assassins of the Algerian people.

The text of the leaflet:

Manifesto of the P O R

ANDRÉ MALRAUX
AMBASSADOR OF ASSASSINS

And now comes André Malraux, involved in the death of 800,000 Algerians, massacred by the French bourgeoisie that he represents.

André Malraux, the man who forgot his book, *Man's Fate*, in order to show off in his job of advocate for the killers of people who are fighting for their freedom.

Throw the murdering bands of the French bourgeoisie out of Algeria!

Long live the Algerian National Liberation Front!

Long live the Algerian revolution!

PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO (T)

For its part, the C U T (the Chilean Trade-Union Federation), responding to the appeal of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International and to the campaign launched by the P O R (T), sent a cable to the French government denouncing the assassination of Aissat Idir and demanding complete independence for the Algerian people. Furthermore, the Chilean Committee for the Support of the Algerian Revolution, the C U T, and the P O R (T), sent a joint cable to the Algerian government-in-exile in which they pledged their solidarity with its struggle.

LEFT SPLIT-OFF FROM COMMUNIST PARTY JOINS THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The 1 August *Uanguardia Proletaria*, public organ of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskista), Chilean Section of the Fourth International, published a letter from the Movimiento 2 de Abril announcing its decision to join the ranks of the P O R as a result of its agreement with the principles, programme, and policy of the Fourth International.

This movement, numerically quite strong, owes its name to the events of 2 April 1957, when popular protest demonstrations ended in a massacre by police and the CP leadership opportunistically capitulated; a large number of young communists who protested the party's capitulation

were brutally expelled, and formed themselves into the Movimiento 2 de Abril. Subsequent contact with the P O R, through ideological exchanges and fraternal discussion, resulted in their accepting our positions and being incorporated into the ranks of the F I. We offer a heartfelt welcome to these young comrades.

In reporting these encouraging developments, only two of many in the turbulent evolution of the Chilean left, we regret that the general article on Chilean events, promised in our last issue, has not arrived in time for the current one. We hope that in our next we can fulfill our postponed promise.

Indonesia

IBNU PARNA FREED

With profound satisfaction we learn from the Partai Acoma that its secretary, Comrade Ibnu Parna, was released from prison one week before the National Day celebrations on August 17th. He had spent 11 months in the well-known Djakarta jail of "Ruman Pendjara Tjipinang."

In the classic revolutionary tradition, Comrade Ibnu Parna did not waste his time in jail, but engaged in translating — among other things, Comrade Michel Pablo's

pamphlet, *The Fourth International: What It Is; What It Aims At* — into Bahasa Indonesia. By this very useful work, "the Fourth International is popularly introduced to the Indonesian working class," the Comite Pusat of the Partai Acoma writes us, and concludes: "Herewith we thank the international proletariat for its solidarity, and herewith we are sending the greetings of Comrade Ibnu Parna and all members of the Partai Acoma."



Italy

BOOK BY COMRADE MAITAN ANALYZES STALINIST POLICY

Successful sales, especially to Communist Party intellectuals, have greeted the appearance of the latest book by Comrade Maitan of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International, *Teoria e politica comunista del dopo guerra (Postwar Communist Theory and Policy)*, published by Schwarz of Milan. It is a volume that will give all literate Stalinists cause for some serious thinking and re-thinking; and is of interest to all revolutionaries who wish to increase their understanding of the fatal role of Stalinism in the restabilization of European capitalism.

It is a systematic and richly documented study. Comrade Maitan demonstrates and minutely explains, with all the necessary references to the texts, the C P's activities, and the objective data: the successive Stalinist conceptions of "antifascist unity" and "progressive democracy" that were current during and immediately after the war; the "democratic path" and the revolutionary path to socialism, with all necessary references to the germane texts, both of the Italian C P and the C P S U, and to the classics of Marx-

ism, as well as in the light of the experiences lived through in Jugoslavia, China, Labour Britain, the workers' states, the colonial revolution, and in the context of the Italian social and economic reality; the problem of the middle classes and the policy of alliances; the conceptions prevalent in the Italian C P on the agrarian question and the Mezzogiorno; the nature and function of the Italian C P. Other chapters are devoted to more general problems such as automation, and the prospects of the labor movement in Western Europe.

Though the main examples in the volume are drawn from Italian experiences, the parallels are so many that the book has a great value for other countries as well. It is to be hoped, however, that other similar volumes for other countries will be worked up soon by the cadres of our international movement.

In our next issue, we shall publish a chapter from this valuable volume.



USSR

IRREPRESSIBLE INTEREST IN TROTSKY INCREASES

Interest in what Trotskyism really is continues to rise in the Soviet Union. Beside the cases reported by Comrade Richards on pages 18-20, several items of news this last quarter confirm this promising phenomenon.

In the August 16th London *Observer*, its correspondent George Sherman reports concerning the U S Exhibition in Moscow:

The Americans and Russians have also reached a compromise about the 100-odd books on Russia and political science which were removed from the open shelf at the instigation of the Ministry of Culture. Back from the American warehouse, they are enshrined in glass cases — forbidden fruit to be seen but not touched.

Stalin and Trotsky

But the encyclopaedias alongside them on the open shelves are touched — and often. Young people with notebooks openly copy facts about Stalin previously unknown to the Russian citizen. I saw a young man intently taking notes about a man whose name few Soviet citizens still dare to speak in public — Leon Trotsky.

In an article of his series "Khrushchev's Russia," H E Salisbury, who recently spent four months in the Soviet

Union, writes in the September 11th *New York Times*:

Russians used to blanch at mention of the name of Leon Trotsky. Even today you do not hear it often. But a young man in a provincial city brought Trotsky's name into a discussion of books on Russia. Another joked about his physical resemblance to Trotsky, and a third said, "We have begun to talk about Trotsky a little, but we still don't write about him."

We have also been informed that articles on the U S S R from our French equivalent, *Quatrième Internationale*, were translated with polemic commentaries and officially distributed at Moscow University in an edition of from 6,000 to 7,000 copies, in order to "prove" the "false" position of the Trotskyists. This break through the long conspiracy of silence about Trotskyism's real ideas is immensely encouraging, for the truth that we present need fear no Kremlinite commentaries. We shall be happy to provide the Soviet educational authorities with many more articles for them to contradict; indeed, if they would assure us of a 6,000 to 7,000 circulation among Soviet university youth, we should be delighted to issue *Fourth International* in a Russian edition.

Now Off Press

THE ARAB REVOLUTION

By MICHEL PABLO

Especially at the moment of de Gaulle's new proposals concerning Algeria and the critical vote on the question of the Algerian war and Algerian independence at the United Nations, this 72-page pamphlet is particularly timely. But its value transcends any particular component, however important or timely, for it constitutes a complete survey of the whole subject of the *entire* Arab revolution. One section provides the necessary historical background of liberation movements, another analyzes the economic structures of the whole vast region extending from the Atlantic to the Euphrates, and a third explains, as against the fatal errors of unprincipled Stalinist zigzags, what should be the policy of revolutionary Marxists on the steadily unfolding Arab revolution. To the main text, consisting of Comrade Pablo's Report to the XXIst Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, as reproduced in our issues 5 and 6, there has been added an extensive introduction that updates and increases the impact of the original report.

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