

The American **Socialist**

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35 CENTS

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Heyday of the Communist and Socialist Parties

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How silly can an editor get?

EAST OF PRAGUE

Lively book on the Soviet bloc



CRISIS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Pre-planned Program

On reading Braverman's able presentation in the debate [April 1958] with Lerner: I fully agree that in the long run Keynesian props won't preserve capitalism. The big boys would not tolerate the kind of redistribution of income required for a steady balance between capacity output and consumption. Nevertheless the socialist-minded community should, I feel, get behind a pre-planned, long range program along the lines suggested. Here are some of the reasons:

1) It (unlike socialism) can win acceptance, a victory also for the concept of social planning.

2) A huge reconstruction venture would make for a transfer of interest from harmful to wholesome activity, what psychologists call "sublimation" when they prescribe for juvenile delinquents.

3) American labor, intensively indoctrinated by capitalism, is too numb to think clearly about ideological theories in the abstract. They prefer escape through the drugs readily provided them: TV, sports, scandal, glamor, gambling, etc. We can arouse them only with a clear cut, understandable program of social action; a clear picture of an attractive social goal and a map showing how to reach it. Labels like "socialism," "democracy," "freedom," "prosperity," etc. leave them cold.

4) Socialists should heed G.D.H. Cole's admonition to strive for the best compromise available "under prevailing conditions." The bridge to socialism will require several spans. The Keynesian approach is one. It implies the acceptance of public planning and the subordination of private interests to the public welfare. In due course there will be a distinction between truly free enterprises and those which are or should be monopolistic and socially owned. As the area of human exploitation contracts, co-operatives will sprout and in perhaps forty years the transition to democratic socialism can be completed, i.e. if we can make sure that the competition between the two systems will be peaceful.

Irving Flamm Beverly Hills

Unemployment in New England appears much more substantial than anyone is admitting. These bosses don't even tell each other the truth. The GE plants have been especially hard hit, along with the machine tool plants and the cutting tools industry. In one textile printing plant (cloth print) the union has accepted the elimination of all paid vacations, elimination of 6 of 8 paid holidays, elimination of the company paid insurance plan, elimination of the night shift bonus, all this in order to keep the company working. That's the only case of its kind that I've heard about.

Ford's Somerville assembly plant is closed. GM's Framingham assembly plant is working on and off. Brown and Sharpe in Provi-

dence is down to 1,500 overall employees, a drop of 60 percent. Raytheon and Avco are getting some missile work. But most of it is engineering and development. If Dulles gets dragged to the summit, that may go too.

The labor movement is demanding that the politicians produce some "defense" work. The Governor is demanding \$50 million on a bond issue to give jobs. The Republicans are saying it's nothing but a move to buy votes, and they're holding it up.

D. T. Massachusetts

Devitalized Democracy

Last year I heard that in a Kansas college there was to be a meeting of a local group affiliated with one of the foremost national organizations concerned with human welfare. The campus bore no sign as to where the gathering would be, and it took some time for the college office to find out about the meeting. A few people were on hand, but soon came a telegram from the scheduled national figure that he was snowbound in Colorado and was not sure whether he could get to a train that was not tied up.

The college was Protestant, but soon a Catholic priest turned up with a group of seniors from his high school. A few other people came. A morning and an early afternoon session were held in a rather half-hearted fashion, but instead of going on through that day and the next, the conference adjourned in spite of being told that there was ample talent present, and that such a group did not need to be dependent at all on a personage from New York. Here was a group of unusually devoted people, fully aware of what they wanted, and yet unable to sustain a program in the absence of a distinguished guest.

If such is democracy at the grass roots,

what hope is there for the American Way of Life? How can a handful of committed people hope to sway the world, if they themselves have never grown up? The episode points a general moral for people willing to "let George do it." We'll never get anywhere as long as we aren't willing to be our own leaders.

For a generation, Wisconsin responded to the LaFollettes, in spite of the fact (or maybe because of the fact) that they had no clear forward look. Living on dairying and tourists, the people of Wisconsin had the generous impulses of nineteenth-century farmers and villagers and wanted to do the right thing—in nineteenth-century terms. Apparently, however, all that the La Follettes really taught them was "follow your leader!" Later McCarthy was available.

The old Socialist Party was so mistrustful of leadership that the local had no permanent chairman; each meeting elected one for the hour. Nevertheless its perennial candidates for the presidency were two, nominated repeatedly over almost a half-century. In spite of all the vigorous education and indoctrination, the party never learned how to lead itself. In this respect, the Socialists were first-rate Americans.

Our schools and colleges are not developing leadership, either that of individual aspirants or that of self-determined citizens. On the contrary, they are full of bored people devoid of enthusiasm or momentum. The welfare state is upon us with the equivalent of "Milk from Contented Cows!" When our Hitler comes along, we'll be ready.

Recently a top business executive said to a college faculty group: "Maybe some of your best students had better not go into business; they won't be able to stand the pressure for conformity." But in what line is that not true? I feel homesick for my farmer grandfather, who argued with an opponent till the latter concluded the debate with these words: "Well, James, one thing I know. If you ever fall into the river and drown, we won't look for you down stream."

Arthur W. Calhoun Illinois

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Crisis of the French Republic

AS this preliminary survey is written, French society hangs over an abyss. The poisoned well of colonialism from which France has so long drunk has finally infected the entire organism. Once again it has been proved, in the most direct and graphic way, that no nation can long remain free which oppresses others. The machinery of oppression recoils against the nation which has set it in motion; the hired thugs enlarge their demands for power and tribute until they are satisfied with nothing less than the abdication of those who hired them. Thus, finally, the French militarists have plunged the entire French parliamentary democracy into mortal convulsions by grabbing Algeria and proclaiming it a hostage returnable only to an authoritarian dictatorship under General Charles de Gaulle.

On May 13, the army commanders in Algeria seized control after riots of the French *colons* in which French and United States official buildings were sacked. General Jacques Massu, head of the paratroopers, appealed to de Gaulle "to take the leadership of a government of public safety" in Paris. General Raoul Salan, the commander in chief in Algeria, announced: "I have provisionally taken into my hands the destinies of French Algeria."

The ostensible immediate cause of the coup was the installation of Pierre Pflimlin as Premier. In view of Pflimlin's conservative record on Algeria, it is hard to see this as anything but a pretext. More likely, as most observers have noted, the Algerian army move was part of a widespread plot which involved rightist elements in Paris as well as in North Africa. There is evidence that the Algiers demonstrations that touched off the events were planned well in advance. At the center of the plot is Jacques Soustelle,

formerly de Gaulle's close associate, whose imminent arrival in Algeria was announced immediately after the army coup. Placed under house surveillance by the Paris police, Soustelle had no difficulty in taking off for Algiers, an "escape" which was little hindered by the fact that the main adviser of the prefect of police is a Soustelle supporter. Attempts were made to initiate armed actions and "committees of public safety" throughout France simultaneously with the Algerian putsch, but they foundered on the weakness of the rightists and the failure to evoke any echo of support in the broad population. But the military figures in France have made clear their part in the plot by coming to the support of the Algerian commanders: General Paul Ely resigned as Chief of Staff, Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin, the influential retired army head declared his "lack of confidence" in the regime, and numerous other generals and admirals made similar views known. The resulting situation was that, while the rightists in the political arena demonstrated nothing but weakness, the military high command showed a solid front in favor of the authoritarian coup. This in itself has been enough to create the crisis which grips the nation.

THE glib excuses that pour from the pens and mouths of rightist extremists in France are treated all too seriously in the American press. Thus one reads daily that the crisis came about because the "tough, dedicated" soldiers in Algeria, fighting "loyally for France," have been "betrayed and stabbed in the back" by a succession of fumbling, ineffectual regimes in Paris. Certainly the medley of governments of the Fourth Republic were bankrupt. But of all the people of

France, those with least cause for complaint are the army militarists and French *colons*.

There is little that they have desired that a French government could give them, which they have not had. Despite cabinet crises and the fall of governments, whether Independents, Radicals, Popular Republicans, Socialists, or any combination of these were in power, the war in Algeria has come first. Negotiations with representatives of the Algerian people were uniformly rejected. More than half the French armed forces of 950,000 men were shifted to Algeria to carry on the savage war. Impoverished France drained her treasury at the incredible rate of \$5 million a day to support the repression. No atrocities were spared, and all the measures of torture and infamy devised on the spot received the unflinching support of government after government. French newspapers and books that dared criticize were suppressed. Officials governing in Algeria who did not suit the tastes of the *colons* and the army were invariably withdrawn. Increasingly, the military took into its own hands the dictation of policy for the war, even where grave international risks were involved, as in the recent bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in Tunisia—an action which the civilian regime endorsed abjectly. The free hand in Algeria which the generals claim they want, they have long had. The real target of the putsch, as soon became clear, is Paris and the Fourth Republic. The extreme right, after having failed in the post-war period to set up a dictatorship, has now found its base in the military cabal.

By his assumption of leadership of the Free French forces during the war, de Gaulle was thrown together with the French Resistance, organized and led chiefly by Communists, Socialists, and independent radicals. The rightist element in its majority sought a comfortable collaboration with the Nazis through the Vichy regime. When the Germans were driven out of France, a most unusual patchwork of government was sewn together, based upon social elements that had little in common. De Gaulle, conservative and authoritarian to the marrow, became chief of state in an incongruous collaboration with elements strikingly dif-


ferent in social views and political persuasion.

INEXORABLY, the wheel of history turned to redistribute the political forces. De Gaulle moved ever closer to the old Vichyite forces, the rightists, the fanatical nationalists. But, with the cloud of collaborationism hanging over them, these elements proved too weak to win control. On the other side, the powerful contingent of the Left, the Communists, were rapidly isolated by a process compounded of the cold war and their own policies; so that, while they remain to this day the strongest single party in France, they are severely encapsulated in a political ghetto out of which they have not been able to break. Given the weakness of the Right and the division of the Left, no decisive solution has been possible in France, and the governments have been a succession of unstable coalitions embracing all the parties of the spectrum with the exception of the principals.

In the middle of 1947, de Gaulle launched his major bid for power, by organizing the RPF, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Française*. One of his chief aides, the novelist André Malraux, later said that "De Gaulle marched us full speed to the Rubicon, and then told us to get out our fishing rods." But the collapse of the movement was less de Gaulle's fault than this rueful complaint would seem to indicate. The fact is that, despite the early electoral sweep in local elections throughout France, the semi-fascist demagoguery of the movement never took hold. Apart from the pre-war fascist bands incorporated into the RPF, support was half-hearted. The movement deflated as quickly as it had blown up, but not before de Gaulle had marked himself irrevocably as an opponent of the democratic republic.

The RPF's frustrated program of 1948 is a pretty good guide to the desires of the Gaullists today. The central demand was for the liquidation of the parties; "make the French people unite under the aegis of a just and powerful State." The prohibition of unions was indicated in the plank proposing to "associate labor and capital in industry." For the rest, the program was replete with an incoherent and mystical nationalism, promising a re-

newal of French power and glory which, in the concrete world power situation, had long become an impossible nationalist dream.



Gaullism soon dispersed itself back into the traditional Right, and the megalomaniac General, albeit with his arrogance and vanity little disturbed, went into political retirement. There he remained, and would have remained for good, had not the militarist coup brought him back into the political arena.

THE Bonapartist gauntlet which the army has thrown down to the Republic is by no means unanswerable. The concentration of armed strength in Algeria is extremely vulnerable, due to its dependence upon French supplies of food and equipment, and due also to its involvement in a war which it has not been able to win. Generals do not by themselves make an army, and the French forces are composed in their big majority of unwilling draftees, among whom riots and protests against being shipped to Algeria were not unknown. If the government declared the insurrectionists to be outlaws, cut off all supplies, and called on the ranks to obey the instructions

of the government, the high-and-mighty generals would find themselves suspended in mid-air.

But the crisis is compounded of far more than a simple test of strength with the army. For the big capitalists and the traditional Right, a Gaullist solution has great attractiveness. What is even more important, the consequences of a fight against Gaullism, in which the government would have to rely chiefly on Communist and Left elements within the working class, are more frightening to it than Gaullist authoritarianism. Hence the cowardice of the so-called Center politicians and the indecent farce being played by the Plimflin government. As C. L. Sulzberger wrote from Paris in the *New York Times* of May 21: "The French drama has assumed the aspects of a ritual play in which all principal actors seem obligated by some code to deceive both themselves and the audience. . . . No official from the Premier down has dared brand the patently rebellious leaders as rebels." "An apparently growing number of conservatives," reports the *New York Times* "starting with former premier Antoine Pinay, seemed willing to give [power to de Gaulle] in a legal and orderly manner. . . ." Pinay, formerly a Vichyite, is the member of the classical Right to whom de Gaulle's supporters started deserting in 1952, and his present move portends the start of a new rallying of the Rightist politicians around de Gaulle. On May 21, Drew Middleton cabled from London: "The upper echelons of British politics, industry, and finance contemplated the possibility today of General Charles de Gaulle's return to power in France. At the moment there is a tendency in these quarters to see General de Gaulle as the only element capable of reconciling the central government in Paris with the dissidents in Algiers and thus avoiding either a prolonged period of disorder or perhaps even civil war. . . . The apprehension that centers on de Gaulle's name seemed to be concerned not primarily with his exercise of power but with the possibility that the ultimate reaction to it might be the creation of a popular front on the Left." It is this "apprehension," in France and abroad, which paralyzes government response to de

Gaulle and is giving him a chance at power.

DOES the threat of Gaullism foreshadow a new round of Hitlerism on the European continent, this time with France as its base? If history is to repeat that first great tragedy, this time the imitation will be a farce. Hitler could mobilize the great unused resources of the second mightiest industrial power of the world in the service of a manic nationalism. De Gaulle, or any other French dictator of the Right, would not be able to do any more than make feeble imitative gestures. Despite the bellowings of the *colons* and militarists, no such government could do anything more to win the Algerian war; far more likely, it could only involve Tunisia and Morocco. While it might at the outset tumble the existing regimes in those two countries, it could only finish by arousing all North Africa in a mighty blaze that would drive the French out of the area even sooner than now appears probable. De Gaulle could not find a way to restore France to great power status; more likely he would only preside over its further decline.

Inside France itself, de Gaulle could

not hope to solve any of the country's pressing problems, but only to put a lid on them. In the face of the powerful Communist movement, and the combativeness and radical tradition of French labor, that would probably mean civil war, even if de Gaulle were to ride into power "legally," with the Center playing the role of Hindenburg. But the French Left would be in a far weaker position were de Gaulle officially to command the resources of the state. It is to be hoped that the working class, which has been drained for these last years by repeated Socialist betrayals and demoralized by the Stalinism of the French Communist Party heads, will in this hour of supreme danger find its bearings and pull down the would-be Caesar before he has installed himself in the seat of power. An all-embracing general strike ended the Kapp Putsch in Germany in 1920, and it can do the same in France today. Otherwise, French labor will face heavy days, and, possibly, tragic experiences.

The crisis is of epic proportions, and, regardless of its immediate outcome, marks a turning point in the annals of European capitalism. What it means, broadly speaking, is that the pattern

of capitalist stability worked out after the second World War has been disrupted. In the future reckoning, the French crisis will figure with the launching of Sputnik I, and the break in the American economic boom, as the harbinger of the end of an era.

What the crisis in France means, in the last analysis, is that history cannot be cheated indefinitely by evasions, combinations, cheap tricks, such as have been characteristic of the Fourth Republic. The economic problems are too serious and unavoidable, the colonial revolt too irrepressible, the class tensions too great to be papered over by stockjobbers or lost in a do-nothing drift. Just as Germany in 1933, France is showing today: Capitalist democracy cannot be maintained in the face of the decomposition of capitalism and the desertion of the parliamentary system by the capitalists and their political spokesmen. France has sounded a new alarm for Europe and the world that there is no evading the business at hand, which is to move forward to socialist democracy and to the freeing of all nations enslaved by imperialism—or to fall prey once again to a recrudescence of dictatorship, neo-fascism, or nationalist-crazed militarism.

Why I was Not Impressed on Law Day

by Charles C. Lockwood

MAY 1st was Law Day and we heard and read a lot of brave and fine-sounding utterances by Bar Associations and lawyers, but frankly I was not as impressed as many were.

I remember all too well the exceedingly timid, if not cowardly, position taken by so many prominent lawyers and Bar Associations on cases and issues involving our most sacred constitutional rights and freedoms.

I remember all too well the great number of courts, governmental agencies, investigating committees and law enforcement officials who knuckled under to Joe McCarthy and McCarthyism and the ruthless persecution and shameful denial of justice that resulted.

During the past several years I have represented many defendants in "security risk" hearings conducted by lawyer Wilbur Brucker's Department and other agencies which were so anti-democratic, anti-law, and anti-everything decent and civilized as to make me wonder in what country we were and in what period of history.

In fact the situation has been so deplorable and fear-ridden that many, many organizations and individuals had the greatest difficulty in obtaining an attorney to represent them.

Not long ago the Socialist Workers Party wished to test the constitutionality of the infamous Trucks Act. It went to 40 Detroit lawyers before it found one who would take the case, and when that particular lawyer died a year or so later, both the FBI and the Detroit Loyalty Commission had their agents at the funeral taking down the license number

of every automobile present.

Although an iron curtain is rigidly imposed shrouding the subject in the utmost secrecy, this country is saturated with investigating agencies and investigators. Large sums have been paid to a most questionable group of informers who spy on anybody and everybody. Literally millions of files are kept on American citizens in every walk of life and in these files go the most weird rumor and the basest unverified accusation. And remember, this is all taking place in that great free democratic country of America.

Actually almost the only group of lawyers in the entire country who have dared to take part in vital cases involving basic civil rights and constitutional freedoms has been that group making up the National Lawyers Guild. And the Lawyers Guild without any hearing or legal cause shown was branded as subversive and placed on Atty. Gen. Brownell's subversive list. What a travesty this makes of justice!

During the past several years certain courageous and devoted members of the U.S. Supreme Court have waged a very real struggle to make certain that this is a government by law and that all citizens are given equal protection. Even now, however, Congress is moving swiftly to enact legislation to restrict the powers of the Court and tie the hands of these offending justices.

And so May 1 was Law Day and we heard and read a lot of brave and impressive statements by prominent citizens, but I, as one humble lawyer, was not impressed or thrilled. Too much of what we were told was simply not true.

Is the Atomic Energy Commission hiding the facts on detecting bomb explosions, in order to prevent disarmament?



The Shabby Tale Of an Official Confidence Game

by Daniel M. Berman

ESPECIALLY since the 1956 Presidential campaign, there has been considerable agitation throughout the world for a cessation of nuclear testing. The argument has been that a test ban would have two beneficial results: It would mean the end of the radioactive contamination of the air we breathe and the food we eat; and it would help clear the equally contaminated international political atmosphere so that further progress could be made in coping with the problems which divide the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Atomic Energy Commission has always taken a dim view of this approach. Its chairman, Admiral Lewis Strauss, has charged that both our military position and our development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would be injured by termination of nuclear experiments. Its ally, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, has tied a test ban to a series of conditions he presumably knew were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. And its father figure, Dr. Edward Teller—who proudly admits paternity of the hydrogen bomb—has declared that disarmament should be given up as a lost cause.

World reaction to the statements and actions of Strauss, Dulles, and Teller has ranged from incredulity to horror. As a consequence, the triumvirate has more and more come to rely on a single, supposedly impossible-to-answer argument to justify continuation of the arms race: A test ban is unworkable because the Soviets would cheat and we could not detect their clandestine experiments. It is against this background that one must examine what the AEC called “Rainier”—the explosion of an atomic bomb in an underground cave in Nevada.

AT 10 o'clock on the morning of September 19th, 1957, the AEC exploded a baby atom bomb at the end of a tunnel under a volcanic rock mesa on its test site in Nevada. The explosive force of the underground shot was only 1.7 kilotons of dynamite (the obsolete Hiroshima bomb was twelve times as powerful). It was obvious that the subterranean locale and the pint-size bomb were intended to simulate the conditions of a bootleg test carefully contrived to evade detection. Presumably, the results would indicate whether successful cheating was possible. The AEC scientists were jubilantly confident that the test would show the impossibility of a workable monitoring system.

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According to the *New York Times*, they predicted at once that “the explosion would not be detectable more than a few hundred miles away.”

A few months of supposedly meticulous checking confirmed the AEC’s “optimism.” On March 6th, 1958, the Commission was ready with a triumphant press release: “The earth waves were recorded at seismological stations at Los Angeles, about 250 miles, air line, from the shot mesa. This was the maximum distance at which the shock was recorded.” The AEC seemed surprised that the blast had been detected at even that distance: “Off-site the earth movement was so slight that it could be recorded only on extremely sensitive seismological instruments,” it declared. The significance of all this was clear: Any agreement to stop tests could not be effectively policed since the Soviets would merely take their experiments underground.

The only trouble with the AEC release was that it was false. We now know the facts—thanks primarily to Harold Stassen, President Eisenhower’s erstwhile assistant on disarmament.

Six days before the AEC issued its release, Stassen had given testimony to Sen. Hubert Humphrey’s Disarmament Subcommittee. He said he was thoroughly convinced that “a very effective inspection system” was readily obtainable. And he used the underground explosion in Nevada to bolster his position. “It is a matter of public information,” he stated, “and I can say to you, that that very small nuclear shot that was put out underground in last year’s test was recorded in every seismic instrument within a thousand miles.”

An enterprising reporter, I. F. Stone, who publishes a weekly Washington newsletter, spotted the discrepancy and started to check. He learned, among other things, that nineteen seismic stations maintained by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey more than 250 miles from the test area had detected the Nevada blast. Senator Humphrey prepared to investigate. To forestall real trouble, the AEC decided on March 10th to eat some radioactive crow. It shamefacedly asked editors to delete the section of the March 6th release naming Los Angeles as the farthest point at which the Nevada shot was recorded and substitute this sentence: “Seismological stations of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey as far away as College (near Fairbanks), Alaska, about 2,320 miles from the shot mesa, recorded the earth waves.”

The AEC claimed it had simply made an error. At least

two members of the Senate appeared unconvinced. Senator Humphrey noted on the Senate floor that the whole matter "gives the impression that scientific facts are being used by someone to prove a political point." And Senator Estes Kefauver was even blunter. "The question arises," he said, "as to whether it was a coincidence that the misinformation given out by the AEC in this case strongly bolstered the opinions of Admiral Strauss and Dr. Teller. If we are in fact dealing with a mistake made through inadvertence, it is a very peculiar kind of inadvertence, indeed."

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy scheduled an immediate hearing on the Case of the Peculiar Inadvertence. The hearing, however, was attended by only four of the Committee's eighteen members. Among the absentees were Rep. Chet Holifield (D., Calif.), Rep. Melvin Price (D., Ill.), and Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D., N.M.).

These three, who are among the AEC's severest critics, were in New Mexico for the funeral of a colleague, Rep. John J. Dempsey (D., N.M.). While they were burying their fellow Congressman, the Joint Committee was burying the investigation. The rites lasted less than an hour.

IF Representative Holifield had been present, he might have questioned Dr. W. F. Libby, acting chairman of the AEC, about an embarrassing subject. On January 21st, 1958, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held an executive session at which Dr. Herbert York, head of the Livermore Laboratory of the University of California, declared that the Nevada blast was detected in Alaska. The statement was delivered in the presence of Gen. A. D. Starbird, director of the AEC's Division of Military Application, which is in charge of testing weapons and studying methods for detecting nuclear explosions. General Starbird, by his own admission, did not bring this information to the attention of his AEC colleagues. He has explained: "We were interested in focusing on damage that might occur from the shock . . . I did not take this to be of any great significance to what I was trying to achieve." Thus Starbird's explanation for his silence was that the AEC had no concern with seismic effects. The report of the Livermore Laboratory, however, tells a different tale. It reveals that the Nevada test was meant, among other things, "to measure and evaluate seismic signals and effects at distances extending from the point of detonation out to all distances where the signals could be detected." No one on the Joint Committee pressed Starbird and Libby on this point.

Nor did anyone question the veracity of a new explanation about the false March 6th release—that a member of the AEC staff in Albuquerque who received official notification from San Francisco that the 250-mile figure was incorrect took ill before he could notify his superiors of the "error." No one on the Joint Committee even had enough of a sense of humor to inquire about whether perhaps the illness was psychosomatic. And no one asked the AEC representatives point-blank if they were asking Congress to believe that they were administering the Commission so poorly that one man's illness could have grave effects on the nation.

There are many other touchy subjects on which Dr. Libby could have been questioned. He could have been asked, for example, why the AEC has consistently minimized the hazards of radioactive fallout. Is it interested in convincing the public that, since the dangers are minimal, the case for continuing tests is strong? If not, why did it fail to mention until 1955 that cancer-producing Strontium 90 is being consumed by all of us with milk and vegetables, has a tendency to accumulate in human bones, and has a special affinity for the bones of children? Did it admit these facts only when it knew that an independent investigating committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Science was preparing to disclose them?

THE National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has proposed several additional questions to which the AEC's answers might be illuminating:

1) Until April 1957, the AEC measured the amount of nuclear fallout to which the public was being exposed against a deceptive yardstick—the maximum concentration considered permissible for workers voluntarily exposed to radiation under medically supervised conditions. Another yardstick was available—the "maximum permissible concentration, population"—which takes into account the fact that the general public includes people in various states of health and is deprived of the medical supervision which protect specialized workers. This "population" ceiling is ten times lower than the "occupation" ceiling. Did the AEC decide to operate with the latter figure in order to deceive the public about the dangers of radioactivity?

2) Why did the AEC suppress news of the Bikini hydrogen-bomb test in 1954? Was it afraid that public knowledge of the severe fallout would generate irresistible pressure for halting tests? Was it only the deductions of Japanese scientists and Dr. Ralph Lapp which resulted in the AEC's induced candor about the H-bomb—11½ months later?

What it all boils down to is the question which should be shouted in every newspaper, in every journal, and from every housetop: *Is the AEC trying to sabotage a nuclear test ban and all other disarmament attempts?*

Not long after the Nevada episode, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral suspension of nuclear testing. Perhaps emboldened by its Nevada victory, the AEC immediately embarked on a campaign to convince the American people that the Russians would be able to cheat—although Nevada had indicated the opposite; that the Russians were taking advantage of the fact that they had just completed a series of tests—although the United States has actually tested twice as many bombs as the Soviets have; and that an end to testing would mean a freeze in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes—although it would be simple to obtain United Nations authorization and supervision for such innocent and fallout-free experiments.

Lincoln doubted that it was possible to fool all the people all the time. If he had been able to anticipate some of the recent history of the AEC, he might not be so sure.

A view of psychoanalysis: Its adherents and practitioners ought to follow some of their own basic precepts a little more closely than they do.

Using Our Knowledge of the Mind

by Henry Ware



THE ideas, whether normal or abnormal, of an individual are understood in Freudian doctrine as being determined by the material conditions of his existence, including the conditions of his body as well as those of his social environment. Qualitative changes in a person's ideas, for the better or for the worse, depend on significant changes either in the organ-derived impulses impinging on his consciousness from within himself, or in the social relations impinging on his consciousness from without. An idea is incapable of taking hold of the mind and becoming an effective force in behavior except when it is felt in consciousness, as the expression of a need.

The custom of human beings of explaining "their actions from their thoughts instead of their needs—which . . . are reflected and come to consciousness in the mind" is discredited by Freud, as it was by Engels who in those words¹ characterized it as leading to the "idealistic outlook on the world." The contrary outlook that while ideas are decisive, it is upsurging needs and not ideas which are *basic* to behavior, distinguishes the Freudian as it does the Marxist doctrine from the common outlook of variegated critics of psychoanalysis, early and late, non-Marxist and would-be Marxist, like Horney, Bartlett, Moxon, Furst, and many others. These critics demand, in the words of Bartlett² a "rejection of the theory that emotional drives are more basic than ideas." They consider that "ideas are basic" to behavior, and alterable by some quite autonomous and disembodied force such as pure will-power, independently of material changes in the body or the objective facts of external relations.

The psychoanalytic approach to mental treatment is thus necessarily distinguished from the approach of such critics by its qualified scientific optimism. The idealists tend to pessimism, as for example Moxon,³ who in disparaging "cure" as an "impossible aim" only blurts out

about anti-Freudianism what has always been, from long before Freud, the approach of those who rely chiefly on suggestion and appeals to the will-power and harassed reason of the neurotic.

THE psychoanalysts are legion who display little interest or even belief in the consistent application of the objective principles of treatment which the best efforts of their science have evolved into a fine instrument. Analysts of the greatest prominence like Alexander, Loretta Bender, Bergler, Marie Bonaparte, Ferenczi, French, Anna Freud, Fromm, Edward Glover, Jones, Melanie Klein, Laforgue, Karl Menninger, Theodore Reik, Joan Riviere, Rickman, Sterba, and many others have put forward variations of frankly mystical, religious, intuitive, suggestive, or pessimistic approaches to treatment. Among them, although not in all of these analysts, are variations adapted to the fraud that it is not greed and conflict in the social environment, but a death instinct or an innate masochistic self-punishment tendency that is the ultimate barrier to the normal satisfaction of the needs of the individual. This authorized obscurantism, diffusing through the literature and the analytic Training Institutes, has perverted the thinking and therapeutic integrity of many-times larger numbers of less prominent and younger analysts.

The purely formal aspects of the slovenliness of the profession (in particular since its having put on weight) in matters of validations and standardizations, were earnestly marshalled by Edward Glover, in 1952.⁴ There is evidence that Freud himself in his later years was far from a consistent practitioner of the technique which he had so effectively developed. The abusive and wildly interpreted caricature of a psychoanalyst in Wortis's *Fragments of an Analysis with Freud*—but apparently a fair

picture for the particular fragments—bears no resemblance whatsoever to the discoverer and master of resistance-analysis of the "Papers on Technique," 1910-1919. Unfortunately, Wortis, who suffered his supposedly "didactic analysis"—as it used to be called—in four months of 1934-35, and published from his daily notes of it twenty years later, was entirely unfamiliar with the literature and principles of Freud on technique. He did not see the glaring discrepancy, and still takes for the genuine article, the mishmash of exasperated personal insults, reparative reassurances, and undisciplined divagations of the master in his decline.

THE problem of payment is the point of departure for another of the artificial contradictions between theory and practice in the profession. Payment for treatment was seen by Freud as an almost irremissible measure to fight the resistances on the part of the patient trying to protect the gains of illness. (These include the so-called paranosic gain, or circumstantial satisfactions, e.g., the solicitude or attention or exemptions from responsibility which accrue from a conclusive succumbing to strains, and the so-called epinosic gain, or unwholesome satisfactions of needs which are built into the illness as symptoms, in substitution of normal satisfactions which are blocked.) Payment is supposed to incite a need for a clearly advantageous return for the sacrifice, which adds an incentive and tends to reinforce the harried conscious strivings for health. Of course, the result may be a devaluation or a cynical corruption of the importance to the patient of his payment. In that case, it is theory and not infrequently practice, especially with more well-to-do patients, for the fee to be coolly raised. But the corollary and its practice are adroitly overlooked (although it has long been found feasible to provide analytic treatment at nominal or no charge, as through appropriate clinics, to persons of scant means) that when the importance to a private patient of his payment becomes revaluated upward, as upon a fall in his income or an increase in his family obligations, a lowering of the fee is as readily to be directed. It should not be merely acceded to by the analyst, nor worse, should the patient be dropped or handed down to a less expensive colleague.

Moreover it is overlooked that to the wealthy patient, a raising of the fee can serve as a reinforcement not of strivings for mental health, but by apparent example and identification with the analyst, of the predatory standards and impulses of the patient. That result could be avoided if the added levy were for some unselfish cause. But classical psychoanalysis, immersed in a predatory world, has difficulty in even perceiving as meaningful the conceptions of such standards and impulses, and of their antagonism to civilized impulses and standards as neurosogenic.

Classical analysis casuistically plays down the necessity, which it recognizes in principle, of engaging liberated energies in struggle against the frustrating and deforming agencies of the social environment. Freud points out,⁵ "When we succeed in dissolving a symptom into its elements, in freeing an instinct from one concatenation, it does not remain in isolation, but immediately enters into

combination with something else. . . . There is no truth in the idea that when the patient's mind is dissolved into its elements it then quietly waits until somebody puts it together again." Yet to the last,⁶ he could not see actively helping the individual to a realistic social ideology, and supposed that any such assistance was a new "crushing of the independence" of the individual, a "disrespect for his individuality," and a "disloyalty" of the analyst to his task.

IN particular, the classical analyst pusillanimously declines to help the individual even to an awareness of the selfish or greedy external environment which obstructs his cure, and seeks rather to keep his attention diverted from them. The neurotic misuses the reality of the predatory aggressiveness of the capitalist class to evade the reality of the aggressiveness which he has been mistaught to turn inward in hidden ways against himself. In the same way, the classical analyst misuses the reality of the self-directed aggressiveness of the neurotic to evade the reality of the predatory aggressiveness to which capitalist society, indirectly and directly, continually subjects the individual. The classical analyst resists the fact that under an economic system in which the production of the necessities for living is for profit as a merciless precondition of their use, virtually the whole natural and industrial resources of the nation become concentrated in the effective ownership of a tiny minority whose interests are basically predatory with respect to society. The classical psychoanalyst thus, as can hardly be rubbed in too often, wards off the conclusion that this predatory minority forms a powerful ruling class, which gives society an element of irrationality. Without some resistance to these irrationalities, there can be no complete psychological normality.

Actually, by means of its own discoveries, given an evasive application of them, psychoanalysis is well equipped to investigate the mental processes, and their social causes, which retard the perception of these facts by individuals, both neurotic and without neurosis, and including psychoanalysts. These are mental processes and social pressures which influence some individuals to resist the recognition of such facts even when their attention is called to them, and called to them logically and empirically—and which delay their acting on these facts individually and collectively, to their own and to all society's best long-range interests.

It is in his laying down of this equipment, and not in his making use of it, that the analyst is disloyal to his task.

Unquestionably many of the failures of classical analytic treatment, and relapses from its cures, are attributable to these deviations from, and unjustifiable limitations, of its own principles.

1 In "Dialectics of Nature," 1872-1882.

2 *Science & Society*, 1945.

3 *Science & Society*, 1948.

4 "Research methods in psychoanalysis," *Int. J. Psa.*, 33: 403-409, 1952.

5 In "Turnings in the ways of psychoanalytic therapy," 1919.

6 E.g., in his "Outline of Psychoanalysis," 1938.

Notebook of an Old-Timer

by George H. Shoaf



According to Hoiles

AMERICAN newspapers, commonly called the commercial press, for the most part, in their day to day issuance, and particularly in times of crisis, invariably take the side of what liberals are pleased to call "reaction" in formulating and expressing editorial policy. Between human rights and property rights, when rights clash as in labor strikes, or when pensions for the aged or disemployed workers are discussed, with very few exceptions, the commercial press always champions the so-called rights of property. Most newspapers publicize their editorial attitudes respecting these matters with subtle discrimination so as to avoid offending too many people. They want to maintain the fiction that this is a free country, that speech and press are free, and that they have the highest regard for the democracy of the Founding Fathers. All this, of course, is no news to intelligent newspaper readers.

In recent years, however, there has been projected into the Fourth Estate a chain of newspapers called The Freedom Chain whose policy and mission constitute a switch in conventional procedure. Excepting the *Los Angeles Times* under the editorial administration of its founder, Harrison Grey Otis, for sheer reaction, as that word is understood, and for blatant and open opposition to every principle and measure advanced for the common good, nothing like this chain of papers has appeared in the American scene. The chain includes The Santa Ana, Calif., *Register*; Marysville, Calif., *Appeal-Democrat*; Colorado Springs, Colo., *Gazette-Telegraph*; Clovis, New Mex., *News-Journal*; Brownsville, Tex., *Valley Morning Star*; Harlington, Tex.,

Herald; McAllen, Tex., *Valley Evening Monitor*; Odessa, Tex., *American*; Pampa, Tex., *Daily News*; Lima, Ohio, *News*; and the Bucyrus, Ohio, *Telegraph-Forum*.

As outstanding champions of free enterprise and individual initiative, with as little government interference as possible, The Freedom Chain excels every other medium of publicity in the United States. Quoting from a leaflet in which the policy and attitude of The Chain are set forth, here are the things for which it stands:

We must oppose all brands of socialism, whether it chooses to call itself communism, fascism, fabian socialism or new dealism.

We oppose socialism in factories, schools, churches and in the market places.

We do not believe there is any such animal as 'good political socialism,' either on a local, national or international scale. We do not believe in initiating force for any reason, even though the cause is a 'good' one.

We believe it is violating the rights of the individual to force him to support a school, church, industry, business or profession if he does not choose to do so.

THE entire editorial concept and functioning attitude of The Freedom Chain are so contrary to the facts of life, so much at odds with organized business and industry, so foreign to the social process, that were Americans alive, alert and informed, Freedom Chain would give them the biggest belly laugh of the century. Not strange

to say, however, this newspaper chain is not only a going concern, earning big money for its owners, but it influences powerfully the thinking of its readers in the several places of its publication. And therein lies the tragedy.

Consistently and continuously The Freedom Chain advocates:

Liquidation of organized labor. An end to all pensions, be they state, corporation, or union administered. Transfer of the Post Office Department from public to private ownership and control. Believe it or not, the construction of highways across the nation by private corporations with tolls charged for their use. Abolition of the public school system. Immediate change in the personnel of the U.S. Supreme Court, or its utter liquidation. These editorial demands are made in the name of the Declaration of Independence, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Golden Rule. Candidly, if this chain of newspapers did not actually exist, with the big circulation they have gained, and with business men in the communities where they are printed using them as advertising mediums, what is here written would read more like fiction than fact.

R. C. HOILES, Ohio born and reared, is the genius founder of the Chain. He says he began life as a printer's devil at \$3 a week. Taking advantage of free enterprise, he accumulated enough money—he does not say how—to go to Santa Ana, Calif., where for \$250,000 cash he bought from J. Frank Burke, present owner of a radio broadcasting station in Los Angeles, the *Santa Ana Register*. Within 15 years he enlarged his scope until today he has under his jurisdiction and control eleven newspapers. It has been rumored in Southern California that when Hoiles arrived in Santa Ana, he brought with him not only the price he paid for the *Register*, but \$10,000,000 in addition, all of which he leaves us to presume he accumulated while working as printer's devil.

About the time Hoiles arrived in Santa Ana, I came to Costa Mesa, ten miles toward the ocean, to make my home. I had lived in Los Angeles since the fiasco of the McNamara case in 1911. I subscribed for the *Register* and enjoyed Burke's liberal editorials. When

Hoiles took over and in the name of God and liberty began his editorial crusade against every principle and social procedure that had been my life obsession, I was outraged. One day I wrote a criticism of his strictures against organized labor and mailed it to him. For a wonder, he printed my piece on the editorial page, and subjoined a reply. I replied to his reply which he printed with another reply on his part. For a week we debated the issue, with other issues. One day he drove down to Costa Mesa and paid me a visit. He came, he said, to see what kind of looking man it was that had challenged him to debate. I invited him into my small study in the rear of the lot. He arrived at 3 in the afternoon saying he could remain only a few minutes. It was 6:30 when he left. During that time we discussed economics, the state of the nation and other matters. He revealed himself to be an anarchistic freebooter. I argued from the viewpoint of socialism. At times the discussion became heated. When I would prove a point from some book I took from the shelves, or demonstrate how impossible it was for society in this age of science, invention and organization to adopt his dream, he would grow red in the face and declaim loudly in hectic fashion. I do not believe the man was play-acting. He appeared to be seriously sincere in his position and attitude.

Finally, when he left, I accompanied him to the front, and when he got into his car he said: "Well, I can see our respective positions are so diametrically opposed we can never get together. While we can remain friends, I want to stress that you never need to submit another letter or article to the *Register*, for I won't print them. You may think you are right while I know I am right. So there is nothing between us further to discuss. Good bye."

A YEAR or so later he hired David Baxter to feature the editorial page as columnist. I had met Baxter on several occasions, but I never suspected he was going to lend his services to the Santa Ana *Register* to expose me as an undesirable Red and a subversive. My surprise can be imagined when on July 20, 1950, Baxter began his first column with these words: "George H.

Shoaf of Costa Mesa, Calif., is one of the great granddaddies of all collectivism. He is a symbol. He is forthright, a quality to be respected in any man. He has spent a lifetime in collectivist activities, mostly as a newspaper man, and he has thought the thing he stands for CLEAR THROUGH. He knows what the final end and objective of collectivism is, unlike labor unionists, public school advocates, New Dealers, Welfare Staters, and other half-way collectivists and internationalists who are taking a straight course to Communism but shy away when you show them where the road they are taking winds up. Dr. Shoaf knows from long experience that in the final analysis there are but two sides, the Right and the Left. . . . Dr. Shoaf and I have one thing in common—we are both realists. . . . Dr. Shoaf's trail concludes at Soviet Communism, mine at Individual Liberty." Then, following lengthy quotations from my printed writings, from the *Appeal to Reason* and other publications for which I have written over the years, he concluded his first column: "Tomorrow I will quote further from Dr. Shoaf—a man who knows exactly where all collectivism leads—and has long since TAKEN HIS STAND. Then, God willing, I shall take my stand—the EXACT OPPOSITE—and attempt to show the fallacy of the outspoken Doctor's position."

For the next ten days Columnist Baxter "exposed" me as an undesirable citizen, not only in the *Register*, but in several other papers of The Freedom Chain which printed his column. Naturally, I wrote replies to his misleading, exaggerated, and wild statements and sent them to the *Register* editor, but I was ignored and treated with contumely as well as with contempt. During the "exposé" I was the recipient of letters from "patriots" who said I should be run out of the country. In one letter I was notified that action against me would be physically taken either by the American Legion or by the Catholic Action Group. But nothing happened, and I am still a citizen of Costa Mesa.

BUT isn't it the irony of ironies that the newspapers comprising The

Freedom Chain should advance propaganda that might conceivably have been apropos in this country a century and a half ago, but is utterly outdated in this age of industrial organization where regimented labor operates automatic machinery in producing and distributing the necessities and luxuries of life? And isn't it the limit of irony to have to realize that this propaganda apparently is being swallowed and endorsed by Americans who pride themselves as being superior, intellectually, to the natives of every other country on earth? There is but one conclusion to which I can subscribe, and it is this: Owner-editor Hoiles, with P. T. Barnum, Jay Gould, and professional confidence men, takes it for granted that Americans are born suckers, that they love to be humbugged, and he is working his side of the street for all it is worth, and getting by with it!

Over the years Hoiles and his editorial writers have publicized their opposition to public schools so frequently and so savagely that space forbids full quotation. On April 18, this year, under the heading, "MORE STATE SCHOOL MONEY?" the Santa Ana *Register* editorially said: "We believe schools are not the business of any government agency, but are the business of the individual. So, the first step in waking people up to the outrageous costs of what is called education, should be to return all schools to local support and control. If the people awoken to that cost, they may soon realize that only those who want and need schooling should pay for the kind of schools they desire."

What gripes The Freedom Chain most and provokes the editors to beat their heads with their fists as they contemplate the situation, is the presence of organized labor and the influence organized labor exerts in behalf of democracy. The unqualified and complete destruction of organized labor overshadows every other demand promulgated by The Freedom Chain. Just a few quotations: "In fact, wages throughout the nation would be a lot higher if there were no labor unions," wrote Editor Hoiles in the Santa Ana *Register*, issue of April 18, this year. On March 25, this year, this editorial outburst: "Union men claim individual employees must have the union and



that without the union they have no voice respecting their own employment. Prior to unionism, every individual made his own bargain with his own employer, and thus had full voice as to what he will do and how he will be paid." Respecting organized labor's demand for higher wages, Hoiles editorially on March 28: "Can any one tell the difference between that form of tyranny, and communism, the worst form of tyranny? As the late Henry Ward Beecher said, 'organized labor that strikes is the worst form of despotism ever devised by the human mind.'" In a lengthy editorial discussion of the present recession and its causes, the April 16th *Register* concludes: "The conclusion to be drawn is that the present recession as it relates to unemployment has been caused largely by labor boss wage demands." And on January 7th, Editor Hoiles wrote: "I cannot tell the difference, other than in name, between unionism and communism."

RESPECTING government involvement in the personal affairs of private citizens, the following quotation from an editorial in the *Register*, of April 17, 1958, reads: "Is it reasonable to think a government can be kept partially socialistic? If complete socialism is not desirable, is partial socialism of any value? We do not believe we can have a little bit of socialism in free enterprise any more than we

can have a little bit of pregnancy. Other than providing for national defense and protecting each individual in his freedom, what business is it of government what each individual does? Are not public schools socialism? Is not social security or any government old-age pension or support socialism? We believe dependence on the government for schools, social security and other desirable things will lead to complete socialism."

To put the editorial policy of The Freedom Chain succinctly, the following letter was printed without comment several years ago in the *Register*. Had it differed from policy, it probably would not have been printed. Under the heading, "CONSISTENT POLICY," it reads:

I am now ready to confess. As a red-blooded, two fisted, upstanding American he-man who upholds the American way of life, I am opposed to communism, socialism, the welfare state, racial equality, old age pensions, high wages, short hours, abolition of slum districts, and any disposition by anybody to better the conditions of the working class.

I believe in putting Negroes and white laborers in their place, and keeping them there. As a proponent of the free enterprise system, I believe in living dangerously. Social security is utterly un-American and should be abolished. Imagine such Americans as George Washington, Jefferson Davis, J. P. Morgan, Cecil B. DeMille, Fulton Lewis, Jr., or Westbrook Pegler wanting or accepting social security!

As an individualist—and all true Americans are individualists—I am for the right of every man to exercise himself as seemeth unto him best, provided he is mentally brainy and physically strong and willing to acquire wealth at the expense of the community. This is carrying out the philosophy involved in the slogan of every tub standing on its own bottom. Obviously, I would replace the public schools with private schools, let the Post Office department be owned and operated for the private profit of a private corporation, and give the highways to private individuals with power to charge tolls for their use. I believe

that the government which governs least, governs best, and with a certain Wall Street magnate I proclaim—the public be damned!

On the international field I am for the military invasion and liquidation of Soviet Russia, and every other nation that refuses to bow down before the power and might of the United States. Man is a fighting animal, and it runs contrary to human nature to withhold from Americans their God-given right to fight whom they please to fight, and at any time or place. Therefore, I am for war, not peace, and I glory in the spunk of the Truman administration, backed by Wall Street, in its determination to force Soviet Russia to fight despite Moscow's agitation for world-wide peace.

I am not only a 100 percent American, but I am a 1,000 percent American, and damned be the Red who challenges my Americanism!

Tom Bell
Garden Grove, Calif.

As it happens, I was the author of this letter. Interestingly enough, no one but myself sent in a letter challenging the substance of this letter, but what I wrote in reply was never printed.

There is no intention here to charge the owners and editors of The Freedom Chain with crookedness in publishing their newspapers. Obviously, they are intelligent men, but their thinking, respecting economics and the historic trend toward collectivism, is fossilized. That this chain of newspapers appears to be succeeding in the communities where they function and circulate, getting the business advertisement and good will of the people whom they serve, constitutes a commentary on the ignorance and apathy of Americans who are living today in a fool's paradise. The American people cannot be blamed for political ignorance when this is the kind of stuff that is being inculcated into them. If the powerful unions were to back the setting up of progressive newspapers that could trade blow for blow with this yellow press, then the American people would have a chance at getting the truth and waking up from this huckstering nightmare.

Two peaks of socialist radicalism in the United States: the Debs period, and the Communist heyday of 1935-45. What are the lessons for today and tomorrow?

Two Radical Decades In American History

by Bert Cochran

THERE has been a catastrophic decline of radicalism in this country to the point where the organized movement consists of no more than a handful of splintered sects and about a half-dozen publications. This has convinced the more thoughtful that the crisis of the Left is too profound to be solved by devising a few snappy slogans or by optimistic calls to the dwindling ranks of the faithful. The Left has to think through all over again its basic evaluations. Achievement along these lines will not conjure up immediately thereafter an army with banners. But without it, there will be no solution at all. With it, the Left, or at least its most viable parts, can get itself set for the re-establishment of a new movement along realistic lines.

The search for a workable socialist course germane to this second half of the twentieth century is taking place under the most trying circumstances. The misfortunes have produced a babel of voices each espousing its own pet theory or nostrum, none carrying any special authority—and it is impossible for the moment to test any of the conceptions or tactics in the laboratory of experience. Moreover, the blows of adversity have undermined agreement on even so-called ABC fundamentals among radicals.

We are living in the midst of an era of supreme disillusionment where the status quo of the H-bomb, the intercontinental rocket, and the Garrison State, is abhorrent to the idealistic and rational; but where the pre-war ideals of Russian Communism and Western Socialism have become tarnished; and where nothing new with gravitational pull has come along. If we are thinking in terms of recreating an American Left as a compelling social force, and are not concerned primarily with preserving this or that family circle, coterie, or sect, we have

to do what the British socialists and the Russian socialists, each in their own way, accomplished at the turn of the century—to build up a body of intellectual thought that will become a polarizing force of attraction to the thinking youth and which will in due course penetrate the nation.

IT is toward this end, and to get some sort of perspective of the dynamics of radicalism in this country, that I am reviewing the two periods when socialism built up a considerable mass following—that of the Socialist Party from its formation in 1901 to its high point in the Presidential campaign of 1912; and the Communist Party from roughly 1935 to 1945.

The first thing that is striking about these two periods is that in both instances the socialist renaissance occurred in the midst of a vast populist upheaval dominated by middle-class leaders and thinking. In the first case, it was the Progressive and muckraking movements that swept America from the turn of the century, climaxed in 1912 by Theodore Roosevelt splitting the Republicans and Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee, easing into the White House under the banner of the "New Freedom." The halcyon decade for the Communists came during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, when the bitterness of the 1929-33 crisis broke in popular revulsion against big business rule and a revitalized Democratic Party put through, under the whip of widespread unrest, a program of ameliorative reforms. The socialist movement in its two best periods never went beyond a subsidiary minority status, growing in the shadow of the towering liberal reform movements.

The reasons why socialism never attained a European status in this country have been discussed at length by many historians and labor authors—the wealth of the country, the relatively high living standards, the mobility into the middle class, the waves of immigration up to 1920—and despite the recent pseudo-psychological lucubrations of Daniel Bell and others, these, in my opinion, adequately cover the case. This was the stuff which made middle-class thinking so pervasive and persuasive, and the root cause why both periods of upheaval were dominated by middle-class figures.

But it would be a big mistake to view both the Socialists and Communists as insignificant appendages, whose noisy proclamations constitute but a few stray footnotes to the history of the periods. They were small minorities, it is true, but because they represented a selection of the most virile, militant, and energetic, they acted as a catalyst in the social mixture without which the history of the time would not have been written as it was, and without whose efforts, its major triumphs would not have occurred. Just as our classical historians have minimized, where they have not slandered, the work of the Abolitionists or Radical Republicans during the Civil War period, so later historians have largely glossed over the role of the Socialists and Communists in the two most decisive decades of our modern history. All the more necessity for a new school of radical writers who will restore the true picture and help educate a new generation in the social dynamics of our country.

Everything is comparative: The Socialists of 1912 and the Communists of 1939 were small minorities in relation to Wilson and Roosevelt, but they certainly look big and imposing compared to anything on the scene today. That is why it is relevant to examine what specific insights of theirs are of use today in helping to set a course.

THE pre-World War I Socialist Party was really a federation of at least three parties around which revolved a galaxy of grouplets and private publications. At its formation, strongly reacting against Daniel De Leon's dictatorial over-centralization which characterized the previous socialist movement, and what with the existing suspicion between the two main groups which went to make up the fused organization, the Socialist Party granted full autonomy to its state organizations. As the conflict between different factions sharpened in succeeding years, the party clung to the loose semi-federation structure as the only way of maintaining its unity. Some historians have observed that the Socialist Party in this case instinctively adopted the structure of the major American political organizations, a structure particularly suitable to this country with its vast distances, its sectional disparities and its local assertiveness. Possibly correct, but the analogy is incomplete. Despite their breakup into state entities, the capitalist parties are dictated to on major questions by powerful monied cliques behind the scenes. They can therefore afford a certain amount of disorder, rivalry and stalemate on sectional matters. By contrast, the Socialist Party resembled at times a headless horseman and on more than one occasion was incapable of realizing a national policy. Nevertheless, taking the rough with the smooth, it carried the socialist message to the country in the decade before the first World War with greater effectiveness and built a stronger movement than had ever been done before or since.

Which section of the party was responsible for these successes? The Debs followers who advocated militant class struggle and industrial unionism? The Victor Berger Wisconsin school that stood for municipal reform and good government? The Morris Hillquit wing, which in time resembled the Wisconsin socialists but clothed its positions in the more Marxistic terminology and manners of the European socialists? Or, the semi-syndicalist Bill Haywood socialists, who believed in direct action and supported the IWW? In my opinion, the success came not from any one wing, but the combination. The Socialist Party throughout this time rested on the Progressive current more than it realized, and the Progressive movement was amorphous in the extreme. While lack of socialist single-mindedness repelled some, its different wings were able to attract disparate elements of the population to make up a more substantial movement than would have been possible for any one of the tendencies singly. The evidence is conclusive that socialism was still in its propagandistic stage and most radical-minded people were not ready to accept hard-and-fast civil war lines of division based on doctrinal and tactical differences.

The Berger and Hillquit wings, which made up the national leadership during most of the years, succumbed

to the pressures of middle-class America, and sought to adapt the Socialist Party to the prevailing mood. Their politics were often indistinguishable from that of municipal reformers. On the industrial field, they sought a friendly alliance with the craft-ridden, anti-socialist and none-too-honest Gompers bureaucracy of the AFL. Their milk-and-water socialism alienated the more aggressive, but it enhanced the party's acceptability among many others, as witness the influx of intellectuals, professionals, preachers, small business men, skilled workers, second-line AFL officials, into the party, and the electoral victories in Milwaukee, Schenectady and other right-wing strongholds.

ON the other hand, the *International Socialist Review*, run by the Haywood left wingers, was the accepted bible in other sections, and when the left wing stepped up its activity in 1910-1912, it pushed the party to its high point in membership and influence. When Haywood was drummed out of the party after the 1912 convention and thousands of left wingers dropped out in protest, the party declined in strength and never again attained this pinnacle.

It would be impossible to visualize the Socialist Party without the Debs Presidential campaigns which lifted the membership to heights of sacrifice, pushed to the background the stockjobbery and careerism of many of its locals, re-fed the springs of idealism that vitalized the movement, brought countless new converts to the cause, and left an indelible imprint on the political conscience of the country. The strong suit of the right wingers was electioneering, but when Allen Benson of the reform wing made the presidential run in 1916, he polled a third less than Debs had in 1912, and his percentage of the total vote dropped by a half.

That no single group carried the victory on its banners was demonstrated a little later when Right and Left formed separate organizations after 1919, and instead of bringing on the millenium, both sides found themselves wrecked in the twenties.

The Socialist Party experience would seem to indicate that for a whole historic period, the best organization concept for the socialist movement is that of a broad, tolerant, inclusive movement which permits the existence of various tendencies. I believe the concept has a lot of applicability for the next socialist attempt, provided it is understood that one cannot devise a cook book of recipes for radical politics, good for all times and places and under any conditions. The unity of a party that contains antipathetic groups will only last so long as the conflicts don't get too basic and embittered. When they reach this point, most groups place a higher valuation on their own positions than the unity of the organization. The unity of the SP lasted up to 1912, but after the McNamara affair, the right-wing leaders found the presence of the syndicalists intolerable and engineered a preventive split. Again, after the Russian revolution and the founding of the Communist International, the estrangement between the Right and Left factions became extreme and the split a foregone result. That's the law of organization, and it does no good to moralize over it. What is important is to work with the concept that, for a long while to come, we are

going to be in the preparatory educational stages of socialism in this country. It therefore behooves us not to get too impatient to read other positions out of the Left, not to draw out all differences of opinion to their breaking point, not to bring the atmosphere of a civil war inside the socialist movement. A united movement is not an absolute. At times it is impossible to achieve. But it is a highly desirable proposition, nevertheless.

ALTHOUGH the Hillquit-Berger leadership bent considerably to accommodate the socialist movement to the pressures and prejudices of official public opinion, all Socialists from extreme right to extreme left cherished the organizational independence of the party as a prime principle. They discouraged any attempts in the localities to establish labor parties or run coalition slates. Only once, after the 1908 election, and then only for a brief moment, did some of the right-wing leaders play with notions of setting up a labor party, but the hostile reception quickly shut off further speculation along these lines. Anyhow, the question was academic, as the Gompers AFL leadership was not interested. In other words, throughout its period of achievement, the Socialist Party operated as a head-on competitor of the two old-line parties as well as the many reform and fusion movements which were set up locally to head off its advance. Indeed, in Debs' greatest electoral success in 1912, he was battling not only against the Republicans and Democrats, but Theodore Roosevelt's Progressives, as well.



In recent years, this policy has been severely criticized, chiefly by Communist circles, as an illustration of rank sectarianism. If the criticism has validity, we are in the anomalous position that the sectarian policy gained more support than subsequent allegedly non-sectarian policies. But there is no merit to the criticism. Where the mass labor unions set up an independent party (even if it is not socialist) socialists will have to participate and very likely forego most or all separate electoral activity of their own. But that was not the situation throughout the Debs decade; and whether that will be the situation in the next progressive era, no one knows. To make a fetish of the organizational non-independence of socialist electoral activity is even more ludicrous than to make a fetish of its independence. At any rate, no one dreamt of suggesting in 1912, not the most inveterate municipal reform right winger, that the Socialists ought to support Theodore Roosevelt.

It takes a mind disoriented by years of Stalinist twists and turns to imagine that were such a tortured maneuver attempted, the socialist cause could have been the gainer.

Even in cases where by participation in local coalition reform tickets, the party might have won a number of offices that it lost by its independent stand, it is a question whether the resultant confusion and mixing of signals would not have lost more than the momentary gains accruing from electoral victory. After all, one of the big cards of attraction of the Socialists was that they offered a clear-cut alternative to the shysterism, debauchery, and corruption of capitalist machine politics, even in places where their program was all but identical with that of the middle-class reformers. Socialists may have to practice many ultra-flexible tactics in the coming days because of the weakness of the organized socialist movement, but that does not justify making a virtue, much less a new historical absolute, out of the necessities of the moment.

WITH regard to policy matters, one can write a fat book of the Socialist Party's mistakes, lacks, derelictions, and general muddle. The right wingers grew too tame and began practicing what the *Nation* of that time approvingly called "parlor socialism." The left wingers were a chaotic lot who went in for syndicalist excesses and primitive village radicalism. The party as a whole ignored the Negro struggle, it made no appeal to the foreign-born worker, its position on immigration was outrageous. Debs in his campaigns waved away such bothersome intricacies as imperialism, taxation, and what he called "other moth-eaten issues" to concentrate on the clear call for the overthrow of the capitalist system and the emancipation of the working class from wage slavery. All this is true; but the Socialist Party had something besides poorly thought-out answers to a number of questions and an unaggressive national leadership.

There was the heroic work of Socialists in practically all the major strikes of the period—and strikes in those days were not as easy and generally as peaceful as in recent times. There were the crusading municipal campaigns that gripped the cities. There was the tireless agitation of countless soap-boxers and lecturers who carried the message into the furthest hamlets and farms. There was the large socialist press which blanketed the country and broke through the official conspiracy of silence. Finally, there were the unforgettable election campaigns of Debs that put socialism on the political map. Add it all up, and you had the most colorful, the most stirring, the most effective movement of socialist protest to appear in this country. Even when the party passed from the scene, for all major purposes, after the war, it was remembered with respect and often with affection. It had struck the chord of American idealism and affected profoundly the American conscience. Let all those who have gotten enamored today of fancy-Dan footwork as the sure means to revive socialism ponder the fact that integrity, honor, moral courage, and straight talk were not the least important weapons in the old Socialist arsenal, and that Gene Debs, the radical agitator, had incalculably more impact on the country than Morris Hillquit, the smooth lawyer.

Proceeding to the next progressive swing, we find a certain continuity between the New Deal and the Wilsonian and Progressive movements. But the New Deal

achievements overshadow those of its predecessor like a towering peak dominating the hillocks below. If we can abstract ourselves from our knowledge of the post-New Deal reaction, the current destruction of organized radicalism, and the slow rhythm and see-sawing character of progress, the comparison between the two periods makes vivid the great advances of the working people in elementary protective organization, in living standards and social reform.

FIERCELY fought strikes dotted the whole of the Progressive era, but many more were lost than won. Labor remained unorganized in the fast-growing mass production industries. The AFL was made up in the main of the thin stratum of the skilled aristocracy and for all practical purposes there was a gentlemen's agreement in effect with the industrialists not to tackle the armies of unskilled. AFL membership stood at 548,000 in 1900 when the population was 76 million and had risen to 1,562,000 in 1910 when the population was 92 million.

There was probably more economic opportunity in those days than in the thirties for the wily and energetic to climb out of the working class and into the small storekeeper-merchant class—but the living standards of the mass of the people remained almost stationary. The average real earnings in manufacturing stayed relatively constant throughout the Progressive era. In certain other lines, wage earners did a trifle better, but no more than that.

Much of the Progressive and Populist legislative program, from popular election of Senators to banking reform, eventually found its way onto the statute books, but proved of ephemeral significance. The powers-that-be were in sufficient control to absorb the reforms and redirect them for their own purposes. Even laws specifically designed to help protect labor or the general public from abuse like the Clayton Act or the Lever Act became clubs against labor in the hands of corporation-oriented judges. The Adamson Act and the LaFollette Seamen's Act were worth-while but modest compared to the social legislation of the New Deal.

Probably the most important part of the New Deal, which marks it off qualitatively from its predecessor, and the one which did most to change the country, was the establishment of massive industrial unions equipped to do battle with the entrenched plutocracy. Instead of sanguinary strikes being fought and lost, the labor hosts brought the autocrats of industry to terms. The transformation of a largely atomized and supine class into an organized one breathing self-confidence and assertiveness revolutionized American politics far more than had the earlier Socialist challenges resting on a scarcely organized working class. The New Deal-CIO movement was miles behind the pre-war Socialists in its program, but its impact was more profound, and its immediate achievements were greater because of its crowning strength in the industrial heartland.

By 1940, individual real annual earnings in manufacturing were about a half higher than in 1914, and they continued rising more rapidly during the war. It wouldn't be correct to ascribe this improved living stand-

ard solely to the New Deal, or CIO, or both. Wages rose in the twenties as well; they were about a third higher in 1929 than in 1914, and the unprecedented second World War boom created labor shortages which inevitably pushed them further up. Nevertheless, the modern union movement created during the New Deal was unquestionably one of the instrumentalities enlarging the wage structure of the American worker and carrying him a rung higher on the ladder of social influence.

WITH the people on the move, it is little wonder that radicalism had a big field to work. The Communists were pretty much destined to be the main beneficiaries of the radical harvest, as they had in the course of the twenties outdistanced their rivals in their command of effective human forces and emerged as the powerhouse



of the Left. At the onset of the depression, the Communists were working out their Wild Woolly West line: the AFL was fascist; later, the NRA was fascist; socialists were social fascists; everybody but the Communists was betraying the embattled masses; you had to build Red unions and make united fronts from below; the revolution was around the corner. Their fanaticism, unscrupulousness and bizarre appearance repelled many potential converts and retarded their progress. But their strong characteristics were also in operation and brought them considerable results.

In many ways the Communist Party had a more responsive organization than the pre-war Socialists. It had what amounted to a barracks discipline, its leadership was extraordinarily purposeful, its membership was phenomenally hard-working, and of fighting quality. But unfortunately, unlike the pre-war Socialists, the Communist Party was not an independent organization. Its leadership and membership had taken training in the school of subservience to Moscow and the party was run on Prussian lines so that it could never get straightened out by its own efforts. When people got fed up, they just left. It always had an incredible membership turnover. For a few years, the party's sterling activities hid its fatal defects, and it looked like the Communists were going to beat the rap, but history finally closed in on them.

They first threw themselves behind the cause of the unemployed. For a while they were practically the only battlers for these forgotten millions, giving leadership to a swirling desperate movement fighting for relief, unemployment insurance, and jobs. The huge unemployed demonstrations of March 1930, the two national hunger marches and the 1932 Bonus March were tributes to the Communists' courage and organizing skill. They suf-

ficiently frightened the politicians to toss out some crumbs of relief. The Communist Party took on a new importance in the country, recorded in its growth. From less than 10,000 members at the time of its 1929 convention, it rose to 14,000 in 1932, and it laid the foundations for its considerable influence among intellectuals when a most impressive list of artists, writers, intellectuals, signed the call for Foster and Ford in that year's Presidential election.

IN the next two years—still operating under the insane approach of the Comintern—the Communists shifted their main attention to the industrial field. They did yeoman work in some of the initial NRA strikes and again made a record as some of the hardest fighters on the scene, notably in the first steel and auto drives and in the West Coast longshore strike. And again the party continued growing and enlarging its role. At its April 1934 convention the membership stood at 24,500, a 75 percent increase in two years, with its youth affiliate rising in the same time from 3,000 to 5,000.

Moscow began to shift gears after Hitler's triumph, reflected in this country in the Communists' dumping their Red trade unions in the spring of 1935 and their members joining the AFL organizations of their trade. But it was only at the seventh congress of the Communist International held in Moscow in the summer of 1935 that the new Peoples Front line was fully unwound. Browder rushed back to this country with the revelation and overnight the Communist Party executed one of its bewildering zig-zags with an ease and an absence of discussion that has baffled many a student of psychology as well as political science. For the next decade, with the exception of the Stalin-Hitler Pact interval, the Communists were the most vociferous shouters for Roosevelt. The same bigotry and totalitarian spirit—but also the same headlong drive with which they had previously fought for "the revolutionary way out of the crisis"—they now displayed in beating the drums for Roosevelt and the New Deal. Probably never before had any radical group gone so far in obliterating the demarcating lines between socialists and liberals.

Under the banner of Rooseveltianism, they proceeded to utilize their disciplined ranks and their growing acceptability to push out and entrench themselves in various reaches of American society. They were very important in many of the organizing drives and early struggles of the CIO. They consolidated their influence into positions of leadership in a number of national unions, a great many local organizations, and CIO central bodies of some of the most important centers. They were the motor force of the American Labor Party in New York, the Washington Commonwealth Federation, and eventually powerful in the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party. They were the moving spirit in setting up the National Negro Congress in 1936 with A. Philip Randolph, Du Bois and others, which for a few years was instrumental in mobilizing Negroes behind unions and in breaking the traditional Republican hold. The American Student Union and American Youth Congress were effective in gathering up

numbers of young people and represented powerful factions in the schools and colleges. In other circles, the Communists won support with their fight for Loyalist Spain and the setting up of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. With the formation of the American Writers Congress in 1935, the Communists became a force in the intellectual world and wielded both a moral and organizational power which fructified their efforts in other fields. The Communists had broken through as an authentic factor in the national arena.

IT was in this short period from 1935 to the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939 that its growth was most spectacular and its claim to being a national party seemed in the process of realization. Its 1938 convention registered 75,000 members for the party and 20,000 for the Young Communist League. After that there was no more actual growth. Its intellectual front all but collapsed with the Stalin-Hitler Pact. Some of its union positions began to erode. In 1944 it showed its theoretically highest figure of 80,000, but this was only 5,000 more than in 1938 and included a theoretical 15,000 in the armed forces. With Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 the Communist Party tried to erase the damning switch and get back with a vengeance into the "coalition": on patriotic grounds, it advocated speedup and incentive plans in the unions, it denounced Lewis's war-time coal strikes, it opposed A. Philip Randolph's March-On-Washington movement which was responsible for FEPC, it even advocated extension of the no-strike pledge into the post-war years. The Communists crowned their decade of adaptation by liquidating the Communist Party into an educational political association. But with the general decline of the New Deal, and the eruption of an unprecedented boom, the Communists also lost their momentum. Besides, as later events were to underline, the brief Stalin-Hitler Pact zig-zag cost them far more dearly than either they or others appreciated at the time.

Taken all in all, the Browder Peoples Front decade was the second major attempt of American radicalism to transform itself from a sect to a movement. That is the way, I believe, it will be written up in the future history books. Despite its deficiencies, socialism proved again that it was germane to the American scene. Given sufficient energy and application in a period of social receptivity, it would become the national expression of labor insurgence as it had time and again become on the European scene.

A NUMBER of ex-Communists have concluded from the experience that had the Communist Party cut loose from Stalin's coat-tails and pursued the Browder course sincerely and to the end, it would have avoided the hungry days and humiliations that came after. This is an oversimplified extrapolation; it leaves out an important figure of the equation. It was the Communists' attachment to Russia that permitted them to efface themselves within Rooseveltianism and still prosper as a special current. Any other radical movement, lacking this "ace in the hole," would have gotten dissolved in the larger swim—which is exactly what happened to the Socialist

Party. The SP was in a weakened state to begin with in the thirties, but it didn't go out of business in a literal sense. What happened was that pretty near everybody of any consequence (outside of Norman Thomas)—the needle trades leaders in New York, the Reuther people in Michigan, the Wisconsin group, the EPIC socialists in California, and so on down the line—simply hooked up with the New Deal and saw no further profit in hanging around a small radical outfit. If the SP had joined the Communists in voting for the Democratic administration, it would have simply formalized the process of dissolution that otherwise occurred without constitutional sanction. Even capitalist politicians handing out patronage cannot do very well with a "me too" program. For radicals who have to recruit on an entirely different plane, such a course is disastrous. The Communist Party was able to get away with it because it had Russian cement to make its militants stick.

It is all but impossible to evaluate the correctness or effectiveness of various Communist positions by taking them in isolation. To arrive at a basic judgment, you have to look at the whole complex of what made up the Communist movement: its arbitrarily handpicked leadership, its stifling internal regime, its brutal tactics towards other left wingers, its bewildering zig-zags powered from abroad—as well as its militancy, its spirit of self-sacrifice, its organizational dexterity, its fighting program on many questions of the day. You then have to consider how this given radical movement acted upon the social scene that obtained in the thirties. After isolating these two as in a laboratory, and examining them as finished anatomical specimens, we are drawn to the conclusion that the Communists' uncritical attachment to the New Deal helped them extend their influence beyond what would have been the case had their participation been more critical and independent. This is so because the Communists were able to attract numbers of adherents with whom they could not have succeeded with a more independent policy, while their losses of countless others who were conscious of their Stalinism or antagonized by their Machiavellianism were unavoidable—taking the Communist Party's character as given. A good case can be made out, however, that if you could have transplanted the pre-World War I Socialist Party into the thirties, it would have grown far more strongly than did the Communists with their ultra-Rooseveltianism, and would have made a more profound and lasting impact on the era.

THE Communists should have carved out in their lucky decade a more substantial domain than the pre-war Socialists, in view of the depth of the crisis and the sweep of the CIO. But they fell short of the mark. Though the country's population was about a third greater in 1930 and almost 45 percent greater in 1940, than in 1910, the best membership figure of the CP was about 100,000 compared to the SP's 135,000 before its 1912 convention, or 118,000, if we take the average for that year. The Communist press never came within hailing distance of the old Socialist press. Their organizational control in the new CIO unions was probably greater than what the

Socialists could boast of in the pre-war AFL. But even here it is questionable that the comparison was to their advantage. The Socialists gained their positions as known Socialists and were sent by their memberships to the AFL conventions with the clear knowledge that they would challenge Gompers on nationalization and industrial unionism. The Communists were operating on the risky terrain of denying themselves and winning influence through individual attainments or machine manipulations.

Their later catastrophes prove that a lot of their influence was of an insubstantial character based on deception of others as well as themselves. That is why when reaction struck they were so helpless to resist. When Debs was in jail in 1920, and the Socialist Party was a shambles as a result of the split, a million people paid a personal tribute to the old warrior by voting for him for the Presidency. The amnesty campaign to free Debs and the other political prisoners was supported well beyond liberal and labor circles. When the Communists got caught in the Smith Act dragnet, it was a far different story. No group of radicals had heretofore found themselves so isolated and abandoned. They couldn't even get a nickel's worth of credit for the good work they had done in the thirties.

If at this point we try to draw some general conclusions by comparing Hillquit-Debs socialism with Browder Communism, it becomes clear that it is difficult to reduce the two movements to any common denominator. The Socialist Party was a federation of several factions with a lot of internal free play. The Communist Party was a totalitarian structure run by an appointed fuehrer. The Socialist Party jealously guarded its organizational independence and counterposed itself to the old-line and reform rivals. The Communist Party dived headlong into the New Deal and supported Roosevelt—most of the time, pretty uncritically. And yet, there is a certain similarity between Browderism and Hillquit-Berger Socialism of an earlier period, even though the Socialist adaptation arose endemically, so to speak, while the Communist was triggered by the Comintern. Both movements, once they got beyond the confines of sects, were caught up in the overwhelming middle-class spirit of the country and tried to come to terms with it by blending in with the liberal current and falling in line with the trade union leadership. The Communist heads did it less graciously and less honestly than the Hillquit-Berger people, but disregarding the differences of time and circumstance, one can discern a common thread of purpose and technique, a tropistic reaction to the American environment.

LET no one imagine that this is a problem that is now behind us or can be laughed off by radical talk. Let no one deceive himself that middle-class pressures arose within socialism because bad leaders lacking courage or farsightedness unaccountably took over the helm. Involved here is a conundrum that has confounded socialists in the West for three-quarters of a century: What does a party do, whose aim is to change the warp and woof of society, when the working class is reformist-minded and satisfied with slow and small improvements? Should it proclaim regardless the true faith and remain a sect? Or should it hook up in some form with the

existing liberal current and become in practice, regardless of Sunday proclamations, what we call today a welfare-statist party? Socialism in its classic period tried to solve the conundrum by adopting an immediate program of every-day reforms which constituted the governing platform and sphere of practical action of the party, and an ultimate program, which described the long-term objectives of the movement. But the connection between the two often got pretty ephemeral, although the great figures of Western socialism always tried to maintain a balance whereby socialism would retain a mass character while not transgressing certain established doctrine designed to safeguard its integrity and future.



Another important feature in the careers of both the Socialist and Communist Parties is that neither party could dramatize its program and step forward as leader in the nation until it began to lead struggles. When Debs went into one of his marathon Presidential tours, when he raised the standard for Haywood, the McNamaras and Fred Warren, when socialists took the lead in strikes, that did more to dramatize socialism than a hundred routine activities or manifestoes. It is probably equally correct to say that the Communists owed more of their strength to militant campaigns for the unemployed, striking workers, Negro rights, or civil liberties (in America) than their many alliances with government and union personalities. The next radical movement will similarly fuse with a section of the people to the extent that it represents a fighting cause as well as a writing and talking cause.

It is not my intention to try to derive from the past experiences detailed tactical prescriptions for a movement that isn't here yet. That would be little more than pleasant indoor sport. All that can be done now is to lay out some of the general considerations that should animate radicals in preparing for the next American Left.

I believe that the next progressive upsurge will take as its starting point the high ground attained by the New Deal and will continue the social advance, even as did Roosevelt's New Deal in comparison with Wilson's New Freedom. Four outstanding social facts, which I will just set down here as if established, buttress this thesis: 1) The existence of an immense trade union movement with enormous potential social power and large social ambitions and aspirations; 2) A rising Negro movement intent upon wiping out all roadblocks to equal status with the whites; 3) A widespread philosophy that economic security is a realizable objective and that it is the duty of government to assure it. (If that is "creeping socialism," it has to that extent crept up on this country.) 4) The competition of a rival social system which is growing from two to three or more times faster than our

own and will no longer permit capitalism to proceed from boom to bust and the maintenance of surplus labor armies with the same impunity as of old.

FOR all practical purposes we can assume the populist character of the next progressive movement in view of the nebulousness of middle-class political thinking, the social conservatism of the labor and Negro leaders, the assured dominance of liberal-type politicians, the current collapse of organized radicalism. But it will not be a simple replica of the Roosevelt coalition. When John L. Lewis demanded cabinet status, he was deserted by the other labor leaders. But the labor leaders will be more self-confident and insistent, and the ranks more demanding, next time. Neither will the facile compromises with the Southern Bourbons pass muster again. The Negro movement has moved a long way ahead from that point. Both the labor and Negro movements are bound to play a far more decisive and conscious part in the next progressive advance, whether a major third party is formed, or not. Roosevelt deftly combined liberalism with imperialism, but the synthetic hyphenation has long ago run into the blind alley of the cold war. Progressivism will have to take up all over again its long-abandoned anti-imperialist and anti-war banner, this time, for civilization's survival as well as national progress.

That a new progressive wave of some such character will emerge is certain. Consequently, the opportunities for socialists ought to go beyond the thirties. But if the sum total of wisdom that radicals have scraped together out of the dolorous experiences of the recent past is encompassed by the gospel that we will have to get in and become part of this movement, then we would have to conclude that Henry Ford was right when he said that history is bunk. Of course, we will have to be part of this progressivist advance, and of course, we will want to support it. But that hardly defines the problem of American socialism, much less resolving or exhausting it. How socialists will support a new progressive movement, how socialists can be effective in their advocacy of basic solutions, how they can advance socialist thinking and influence, the relations between socialists and progressives—these are all matters of first rate importance, if we believe there is a place and need for a specifically socialist movement and are serious about reconstituting it.

I WOULD put down as the first plank of a platform of orientation that socialists will have to set themselves up as a political party at the first possible opportunity. That is the only way that a movement can function effectively under modern conditions and can hope to weave ideas into the fabric of social influence. Given the primitive state of the country's political thought, and the wide divergences in socialist opinion, the party will have to be conceived in terms of a loose structure with considerable autonomy for its subordinate divisions, and including a wide variety of tendencies and opinions—limited only by the acceptance of a socialist platform of action and the proviso that all are sincerely devoted to building the party and honoring majority decisions. Far better to have a movement in the field that carries weight, though it


fumbles and makes a lot of mistakes, than the present sterility and decay. For the spell ahead, we are called upon to get socialism back on the political map, the accomplishment of which takes precedence over other considerations.

The party will of course project itself on the political scene by its own aggressive and independent electoral and general political activities. (It will consider foregoing independent electoral activities, and might give up its separate existence, only if a large-scale labor party type of organization arose and afforded it the opportunity to participate as a tendency within this bigger movement.) It goes without saying that this proposition has nothing in common with tiny radical grouplets that parade around today as parties, and run election campaigns, which, with the best intentions, cannot help but be caricatures of the real thing. You cannot have a party until there are sizable contingents around able and willing to set one up. Before you have that kind of backing, educational work to spread the good word necessarily takes top priority. The ruthless men of action of the present miniscule Left, who can't be bothered with academic pursuits, and who insist on building the house before they have either planks or nails, will be all out of breath—those who are still around—by the time the actual construction work gets under way.

Some have voiced fears that the name "socialism" is a terrible hindrance, that because of its association with Russia, the name is discredited in the eyes of the American public. I am inclined to doubt that this is so. In any case, any attempt to juggle with names right now in isolation is tomfoolery. But mature socialists will not make a fetish of nomenclature. When a going movement can be formed, and if a lot of people feel strongly that a new designation is either necessary or highly desirable, then the next socialist movement will rechristen itself accordingly. It is not a problem—at least, not one that can't very easily be solved.

LESS simple will be the resolution of relations between socialists and non-socialist progressives and labor leaders. Of course, this is no matter for those who no longer see the possibility for a socialist movement in this country, and simply want to dissolve themselves in the present pulpy mix of conformism. But for those of us whose vision of a socialist future remains undimmed—and who are resolved to shun sectarianism and parochialism—the perfection of amicable working relations on an open and above-board fashion between the two is a matter of the first water. Whatever the precise organizational connection, socialists will have to be part of the main progressivist current, but must retain their political integrity and freedom of action to influence the public along the lines of socialist solutions. Without working relationships, socialists may be unnecessarily restricted. With working relationships based on abdication to a middle-class program, socialists may prosper as individuals while the socialist movement disappears. What will be necessary is to make sure that socialists are the legitimate Left in word and deed of the progressive movement and not simply a physical part of it.

No one will succeed today in devising the precise formulas to construct this delicately balanced mechanism. Of course, working relationships presuppose mutual trust and necessary compromise. But the ability to create an alliance will depend far more on how much of a force the socialists represent than on any subtle negotiations or tactics of self-effacement. The matter will become *actuel* only to the degree that socialism becomes a battle-cry again and that socialists are an organizational power that have to be taken into account in all calculations. And they will begin growing again, in the first instance, under their own steam, and the attractive power of their ideas and struggles. That is why the prescription is still good to perfect a program that answers the needs of the country and get busy winning adherents for it.



East of Prague

A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM? World Communism Since Stalin, by Konni Zilliacus. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1958, \$5.

DURING the entire two decades between the world wars, Mr. Zilliacus was in the Information section of the League of Nations, where one of his jobs was to follow Soviet affairs. From 1945 to 1950, and again since the last election, he was a Labor member of the British Parliament. During his earlier stay in the House of Commons, he was expelled from the Labor Party, on charges formulated as follows: "Over the last three years Mr. Zilliacus's speeches and

writings have, for the most part, taken the form of violent attacks on the Labor Government's foreign policy. He is recognized in Cominform literature as the leading British exponent of 'left-wing Social Democracy,' i.e. those Socialists whose substantial agreement with Cominform policies must ultimately lead them into complete agreement with the Communists."

Unfortunately for the authors of this charge, Mr. Zilliacus was at the same time subjected to a withering fire of abuse by the Soviet-bloc radio and press, because he backed Tito against Stalin starting in 1948. In the great treason trial at Prague in 1952, Zilliacus figured as the chief villain, the "Anglo-American-Titoist-Fascist" spy who was behind the conspiracy of the "Slansky center" to restore capitalism in Czechoslovakia. Thus, when Stalin died in 1953, Mr. Zilliacus's enviable heritage was that of an outcast and pariah in the official public opinion of both blocs. I call it an "enviable heritage" advisedly, as whatever his position in no man's land may have cost him, the critical and independent viewpoint which he gained is far more valuable.

When Mr. Zilliacus visited Russia and Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1956, he had the immense advantage of long-time acquaintance of the area, as well as the notoriety accruing from his prominence in the Prague accusations. He picked up the threads he had been forced to drop in 1948, "not as a Communist or fellow traveler, but as an inconveniently awkward and outspoken, but on the whole consistent Labor friend, whose views had been broadly confirmed by events." He was offered many apologies, quite a few confidences that wouldn't have been volunteered to another, and made new acquaintanceships among those who had been sent to prison for conspiring with him a few years earlier. Not the least of his advantages is a fluency in all the languages of the region.

At the huge Moscow State University, he was received by the President, who had with him a young assistant, an economist. "The President told me he had followed my speeches and writings for years. 'So have I,' said the assistant. 'I particularly like the way you stood up for Tito from the beginning.' The assistant spoke of the

changes in Soviet academic life: "My job is to study the economics of capitalist countries. I found trade between them had increased substantially since the war and wrote a paper on the subject. I was advised not to publish it and to keep my mouth shut, because Stalin had just produced a vast dissertation proving to his own satisfaction that trade between the capitalist countries was bound to decrease. . . . Now no one would dream of interfering with my reports. I am a research worker, and it is my job to learn as much as I can and say what I think about these things. If anyone disagrees with me, he will put a contrary view and we will have an argument about it in speech or writing. But there is no longer such a thing as political interference with my researches."

PROBING the feelings of leading Communists and theorists on the issues involved in democratizing Soviet life, Zilliacus found a lot of flexibility, interest in making livelier bodies out of committees and unions, but little real appreciation of the meaning of democracy. "They are honestly incapable of grasping the idea that democracy means the people deciding issues through their elected representatives. . . . No major policy initiative from outside the Party, nor indeed from below within the Party, would be in order. . . . On the other hand, no one who reads *Kommunist* . . . can doubt that a real serious effort is being made, as part of the great cleanup after Stalin, to democratize the internal life of the C.P.S.U. and to open it as widely as possible to the influence of the 'masses' through the trade unions, soviets, etc."

Zilliacus spoke to an audience of 600 young Communists, post graduate students of top Soviet quality, on the British Labor Party: "I have seldom addressed a keener or friendlier audience than this one. They could not possibly have agreed with a great deal of what I said, but undoubtedly accepted me as someone who was speaking to them in good faith. . . . Also I knew from what I was told afterwards that a great deal of what I had to tell them in the way of facts and inferences was new to them." He interviewed Khrushchev, who made it clear that the type of public disputes that took place in Lenin's day is not to be expected, as "the revolution was then in its formative stage and there were some issues on which the Central Committee could not reach agreement, so that the matter was referred to the whole Party membership. Today we are no longer in that situation." But Khrushchev stressed how much had been done to cut down the powers of the secret police, and to release political prisoners: "We have let an awful lot out and not put anyone in." "Khrushchev," writes the author, "was as frank as he was cordial—but he was adroit. There were obviously clear limits in his mind to the processes of inner-Party and Soviet democracy. . . ."

Featured in the account of his visit to Yugoslavia is a discussion of the Djilas case then developing. He presents the Djilas view of a two-party system, and then

offsets it with an explanation offered by "a Yugoslav friend" who saw the arraignment of Djilas as a coup of "the Party bosses" pulled off while Tito was away in India, and who concluded: "We badly need Tito's attention at home." In view of the later sentences imposed on Djilas, the account doesn't wash, but Zilliacus offers no other comment, and the chapter cannot escape an air of apologetics for his old friend Tito, whom Zilliacus visited on the island of Brioni. He reports Tito's "dilemma" as follows:

One evening, towards the end of a long talk about democracy, and Socialism, Tito broke out with passion: "If I didn't believe that Socialism also means humanism and freedom, I shouldn't think it worth working for Socialism." "But," he added, "revolution is a cruel thing (surova stvar). Those who have made a revolution cannot allow the beaten counter-revolution to try again under the guise of exercising democratic rights."

Everywhere he went, Zilliacus discussed Hungary, which was then gripped in a paroxysm of revolution and counter-revolution. Most aroused were the Poles, who looked on with the clear eyes of people who had just confronted the same brink. Few were disposed to wave aside the dangers inherent in the Hungarian events, dangers to the whole bloc and to Russia's military position: "The Poles saw all this and admitted that the situation was exceedingly difficult for the Russians. Nevertheless, everyone with whom I discussed it agreed that however great the risks of any alternative, what had actually happened was the worst possible solution."

A CERTAIN amount of the book is built on important documents: Khrushchev's reports, the debates in the Polish Communist Party, the renewed controversy between the Yugoslavs and the Russians after Hungary, etc. Mr. Zilliacus is a skilled narrator, and reproduces the flow of some of the events in an interesting form. But far more fresh and lively is the record of his trip, first-hand experiences, conversations with many Communist figures, on-the-spot assessments. Occasionally he falls back on the old habit of retailing government handouts about living conditions, etc., or he deserts analysis for the parliamentary debater's trick of trying to prove some case or other by out-of-their-own-mouths quotations from Western opponents, at which point he starts skimming the surface of events rather than digging out their meaning. But on the whole, the book offers much food for thought.

Mr. Zilliacus's viewpoint is the now-familiar one of a Soviet bloc in transition, with still a long way to go towards democratic socialism. In any event he has got a perfectly clear grip on the important idea, which he repeats several times, that Communism as it developed in the Soviet bloc is not a prototype that can be imitated in the West, where conditions are entirely dif-

ferent, and socialism will develop in an entirely different way. Traces of discarded idylls are to be found in his accounts of conditions in Russia, Czechoslovakia, etc., but any fellow-traveling air is largely dispelled by a firm and realistic overall view. Altogether, this is one of the most interesting books on Russia to appear in the last few years, and one of those most worth reading.

H. B.

Shall Make No Law . . .

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE by William O. Douglas. Doubleday & Company, 1958. \$4.00.

THE Supreme Court Judge who has come to be recognized as our most eminent civil libertarian has written a lucid account of his views on that subject and the reasons therefor. His method is to state what the law on a particular point is, criticize it, and then state what he feels the law ought to be. The book is divided into three parts: 1) freedom of expression; 2) the right to be let alone; and 3) the civilian authority.

The first section deals with the First Amendment to the Constitution. Douglas argues that the prohibition that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech" is an absolute one, as the language implies. The First Amendment, thus, occupies a position prior to all other values in Douglas' scheme of things. He differs from those of his colleagues who would subject speech to "reasonable regulation" by the legislature in the interests of protecting public health, safety, and morals. The danger of the latter position is that a legislature need only "reasonably" find that some type of speech *might* be injurious to public health, safety or morals in order to restrict it.

The point is illustrated by *Beauharnais v. Illinois* 343 U.S.250. "That was a prosecution for group libel under an Illinois statute. Those said to be libeled were Negroes. The defendant was a member of a group that sponsored a species of white supremacy." The defendant made certain inflammatory remarks, in a lithograph, about Negroes. The lithographs were distributed on a Chicago street corner. The Supreme Court sustained a judgment of conviction, not requiring "any showing that this leaflet in the context of its distribution created any immediate danger of conflict and violence." Douglas thoughtfully adds, "This is dangerous doctrine. It means that the rule which puts the white man in jail for criticizing the invasion by Negroes into white communities in the North can put the Negro in jail for criticizing lynching or segregation in the South."

If the content of speech is restricted, what constitutes free speech would be the arbitrary decision of those in power at any particular time. In a word, who's to draw the line? Therefore, he would not restrict speech unless the words are inextricably bound up with action the government is authorized to control, such as the often quoted "shouting 'fire' in a theatre" ex-

ample. (This does not mean Douglas would abolish the *civil* action of libel.)

He notes that without free speech, "the nation might drift to a pattern of conformity that loses all relation to the world and its large affairs." Yet Douglas fails to note that there are elements in this country who desire that very conformity, and indeed, have resolved to restrict free speech in order to obtain conformity and a fear to question the status quo. Douglas seems to feel that the drift to conformity is simply the result of an accident.

In a sense, the author betrays a certain legalism on the question of free speech. After all, the efficacy of the right of free speech is very limited in this society, when a small number of people have almost complete control over the media of public communication.

IN the second part of the book Douglas finds a constitutional right of privacy in: 1) the First Amendment's prohibition of laws abridging freedom of speech or religion—the privacy of one's mind; 2) the Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering soldiers in any house without the consent of the owner; and, most importantly 3) the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and the proscription that no search warrant shall issue "but upon probable cause." It is noted that this right of privacy protects only human rights and not the so-called "natural rights" which were invoked "by the *laissez-faire* theorists of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to protect the nation's economy against governmental control."

After examining the ever increasing number of violations of the right of privacy during the last decade, Douglas says that "the problem is one of education, whether we speak of coerced confessions, wire tapping, or other invasions of privacy. Courts can make their pronouncements and control individual cases. But the use of totalitarian methods will persist unless there is a lively educational program that teaches the dignity of man."

The third part of the book is about the incursions of military jurisdiction into civilian life. Douglas begins with the fact that the prime purpose of military law is to maintain discipline, while the function of civil law (theoretically, at least) is to secure justice. It is not surprising, therefore, that military trials fall far short of constitutional standards. For example, indictments by grand jury and trial by jury are not applicable to military trials. Further, "the extent to which other procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights such as the right to confront witnesses, the right to a speedy trial, protection against double jeopardy, self-incrimination and coerced confessions (which are currently, to some degree, part of the Code of Military Justice) are *constitutionally* required in military trials has not been authoritatively determined. . . . The standards provided in the code can be changed by another Congress to the extent that they rest not on the Constitution, but on the generosity of the legislature." Military

courts, he states, which are frequently conducted by men "who have no foundation in law or in the democratic tradition of law administration" have often passed sentences notorious for their harshness.

The moral is that military jurisdiction ought to be construed to its narrowest limits. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case. For example, Article 106 of the Code of Military Justice is so broad as to subject to military jurisdiction "almost any espionage done by a citizen" in time of war. However, in fairness it must be said that recent court decisions have restricted military jurisdiction. Douglas concludes by saying: "Today we are in a dangerous drift. Since World War II the military has been more and more in the ascendancy. . . . The great proportion of the federal budget spent on military matters . . . has helped catapult the military into a strategic position. . . . They are now closely aligned with big business and occupy a commanding position over our internal affairs." A constitutional framework for an American dictatorship could be constructed through the Court reversing its current trend and granting greater jurisdiction to the military over civilians.

The greatest value of the work is its comprehensive survey of what the law is today in the field of civil liberties. This is done in simple, clear language with little resort to legal jargon. If for no other reason than this, "The Right of the People" should be widely used. A. L.

Out of Breath

AMERICAN PARADOX: THE CONFLICT OF THOUGHT AND ACTION,
by Merle Curti. Rutgers University Press,
New Brunswick, 1956, \$2.75.

SINCE sputnik there has been a convulsive discussion of the place, worth, desirability of the intellectual, the scholar, the scientist, the man of thought. American society has been brought up short to its shortcomings in rude fashion. The land of practical men, the home of the main chance, the great stamping ground of immediate profitability and the quick turnover now learns that there is a long run. And the practical men are out of breath.

Merle Curti looks, in this pre-sputnik study, with uneasiness on the contempt for learning, scholarship, theory, science, so prevalent on the American scene. He wants to do something about it. He emphasizes two paradoxes in American life: First, the last few decades have seen considerable activity in studying the status, role, and values of intellectuals at the same time that these years have been characterized by a distrust of intellectuals. And, related to that: "When intellectual endeavor has obviously promoted material well-being, it has generally been recognized and rewarded. But when it has seemed to threaten established ways, and especially the power and influence of entrenched groups, it has often been resented and disparaged."

The first part of the book is an historical

survey. In colonial times the necessities of American life forced a close connection between manual and mental labor. The earlier fluidity of classes in a new land with many opportunities to get ahead prevented the hardening into rigid strata of worker and intellectual, characteristic of much of European society. Francis Bacon's urgings to apply science to everyday life found a wide audience in early America. The clergy as a stratum of intellectuals found it necessary to mix in practical affairs as teachers, physicians, lawyers, farmers, etc. Planters had to investigate nature both out of curiosity and to solve practical problems. Benjamin Franklin was typical of the artisans who busied themselves with intellectual explorations connected immediately or remotely with their day-to-day work. The early political leaders of the Republic were men of scholarship and action. The growth of commerce and industry and settlement of the West narrowed the gap in some respects between theory and practice in the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century with knowledge applied practically: exploring expeditions with scientific personnel included, geological surveys, canal and railroad building, and—exemplifying invention and technology—the axe, rifle, barbed wire, windmills, municipal utilities.

The growth of literacy was the American way of spreading knowledge and breaking down barriers between ideas and action, schoolroom and business. Although many scholars fiercely resisted social change, others ranged themselves on the side of reform. Support against slavery, against capital punishment, for farmers' rights, for labor's demands, for municipal reform, for public health found many scholars and intellectuals responsive. The list can be extended today to housing, recreation, industrial accidents, conservation, race relations. But many more



resisted. Wendell Phillips, in fact, charged in 1881 that scholars had dodged the major opportunities to align themselves with the forces of progress on the issues of slavery, penal reform, temperance, women's rights, labor.

IN spite of these conflicting currents among intellectuals we can perhaps give qualified acceptance to Curti's conclusion that "The first two-and-a-half centuries of American experience, geographic and social mobility, economic growth, the rise of political democracy, and the popularization of knowledge, all, as we have seen, conspired to narrow the gap between the scholar and the rest of the people."

But if the rapid growth of literacy and the extension of public schools fostering this growth were encouraging signs, American society harbored other tendencies inimical to reason, to intellectual freedom, to the growth of science. For one, anti-intellectualism was fostered by religious movements. Evangelists attacked colleges and formal knowledge as endangering faith. The twenties brought religious fundamentalists to the attack on the teaching of evolution. Even Reinhold Niebuhr, the modern sophisticated theologian has declared that intellectualism leads to unhappiness and that faith is the desideratum.

The frontier paradox was that there was faith in education but indifference or hostility to scholarship and intellectualism. Poverty, rootlessness practical necessities of life encouraged the attitude that academic training was useless, colleges were aristocratic. The farmers' early attitudes to agricultural colleges and experiment stations was typical: that you can't learn from books.

Businessmen have been utilitarian in their outlook. They were antagonistic to broad higher education till the late nineteenth century. The self-made man was and still is the ideal if not always the reality (the typical post-Civil War business leader has an education far above the average). Curti complains with justice that the business community as a whole has not understood or appreciated the intellectual. The main interest was in immediate and practical applications. The scholar was not considered a genuine producer. Literature became a marketable commodity depending on tastes molded by commercial advertising. Colleges ran the danger of becoming adjuncts to professional athletics and glorified centers for purely vocational training.

However, Curti attempts to absolve business society of sole responsibility for anti-intellectualism. He points to the democratic movement beginning with followers of Jefferson and given impetus by Jackson. Emphasizing practicality and action, they looked on scholars as aristocratic and anti-democratic. The "people" should be trusted, not the intellectuals. DeTocqueville complained around 1840 that intellectuals were fettered by the general will: The masses distrust complex ideas and rely on their own reason. The Lynds in the 1930's found the opinion in Middletown to be that the people know best without the advice of bookworms.

IT has become the fashion recently to blame, as Curti does, the democratic, levelling, equalitarian, populist tendency for anti-intellectualism in America. Richard Hofstadter in his "Age of Reform" lends credence to this retrogressive thesis. It would be hard to deny that there is a popular feeling of anti-intellectualism. Shall we then say as Curti does: "In view of the fact that businessmen are no longer so indifferent or hostile to intellectual values as they once were, I do not believe that anti-intellectualism can be too intimately or completely associated with the impact of business on American life?"

After all, America is a business civilization *par excellence*. Almost everyone has been raised from birth in an atmosphere where practicality, the self-made man, profitability, immediate money values, and "success," judged by cash standards only, are inculcated by every means of propaganda. The main decisions in school, business, press, public life, have been and are now in the hands of businessmen or their close associates. Their ideas prevail, and the "people" reflect these ideas. If there is any quarrel, then it has to be with a society which allows this system of ideas to prevail. To blame the "people" is to avoid putting the responsibility where it belongs: a business society led by businessmen.

The main content of the equalitarian, democratic, populist movements has been an attack on the monopoly of society by business leaders, more particularly big business. This attack has been for reforms allowing for greater participation by farmers and workers in economic and political life. Only incidentally has it borrowed as part of its propaganda an anti-intellectualism, and a very minor part at that. To see Huey Long or Gene Talmadge as leaders of a democratic, equalitarian movement is to defame progressive popular movements and confuse them with tendencies fascistic in character.

THE attitude of business toward scientific research exemplifies its general attitude toward intellectuals. Here we can best quote from Philip Siekevitz in an article on "A New Ethics for Science" in the *Nation*, March 15, 1958: "There was a time when scientific research was almost always connected with schools and as long as the professor taught well, he was allowed to putter for his own edification. As long as the results of scientific endeavor were thought useless in terms of making money and of consolidating the power of the ruling classes, the scientists were left alone. But I emphasize that they were left alone not because they were thought to be cranks, but because their work did not fit into the social fabric of the time. It was during this time that the ethos of scientific research was laid: freedom of research, open discussion and open controversy, non-interference by non-scientists. Scientists, in short, were a self-enclosed community within the nation." This was the period of the rise of industrial capitalism in the United States.

As economic organizations became larger, monopolies arose, and the role of science changed. Again to quote Siekevitz: "But in the last few decades, even the most knob-headed of bureaucrats have come to notice the social influences which the results of disinterested curiosity have produced. During this time the role of the scientist has changed. From an individual whose work impinged upon no one and nothing, he has become not only an active participant in society, but one who has in his power the means to change society. Unchanged are his ways in research, his goals, his ethos; but his lines of research have certainly changed. In all countries his financial support frequently comes from those who are actively interested in manipulating, for whatever purpose, the results which he can produce. . . . As the power of scientific research to change the world increases, so concomitantly will the influence of scientists over their research decrease."

Intellectuals are now hired by businesses by the thousands to do public relations, motivational research, in short, as super-salesmen. Aside from a depression which will leave them without a selling job, intellectuals have only to be reminded of the fate of a Robert Oppenheimer or an Edward Condon to know that there are strict limitations on what an independent mind can do.

CURTI's summary reasons for the attacks on intellectuals clinch the indictment against capitalism: a) the stratification and specialization of functions tend to fragment and professionalize each man's relations with others; b) businesses employ advertising men who use anti-intellectual slogans and gimmicks; c) the premium on conformity; d) the influence of the growing military establishment; e) the intellectual has become a bureaucrat in government, business, and academic life; f) the power structure and climate of opinion must not be challenged—to do so subjects an intellectual to suspicion and persecution. What is Curti's solution? He proposes the continuation and extension of adult educational activities in forums, PTA's, cultural programs such as under the New Deal; vocational education should not become the major emphasis in school programs; teach children how to think critically; reduce tensions by promoting multiple leadership in communities and on up; promote participation of everyone in making public decisions; make everyone feel he is someone, that he belongs, is wanted and has a contribution to make.

These are laudable preachments as far as they go. But they do not deal directly with the evils he has listed. A far better program appeared in the *American Socialist* for March 1958, in the article "What's Wrong With Our Schools?" It will be necessary to deal with and change the power structure of a business society if any deep-going changes in the current of anti-intellectualism are to take place.

PHILIP SAMEN

Can You Afford to Miss It?

WE know that with the recession pinching incomes and making for more cautious spending, some of our readers must be asking themselves whether they can afford to renew their subscriptions to the **AMERICAN SOCIALIST**. Actually, the question is whether they can afford not to renew.

Take a look at the world around us. The disturbing developments in our economy, whichever way they go by the end of the year, have already raised the serious question in many minds as to whether all the boasts of a "brand-new, depression-proof" system are warranted. The staggering blows to United States foreign policy in Latin America, the Middle East, and France, are bound to stimulate the feelings of millions of Americans, already growing since Sputnik I, that we need saner relations with the rest of the world. The French explosion will surely renew the search for new solutions in Western Europe, and re-draw political lines there.

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and March 1958 issues, we gave you a detailed appraisal of the economy of Brazil, typical of other Latin American countries, which concluded: "But the sands of colonialism are running out in Latin America as they are in Asia." Two months later came the anti-Nixon explosion. Then, in the March 1958 issue, our analysis of the Algerian war contained the following: "Algeria is a terrible canker on the French body politic, intensifying old strains and setting up new ones. Concentrating as it does the most extreme right-wing elements around a single, highly nationalistic, issue, it adds to the long-standing French danger that the postwar crisis and deadlock of political forces will be broken by a fascist-type coup, and the coming to power of a dictatorial regime." We don't have to emphasize the accuracy of that prediction.

THIS is not meant as a box score. Many things happen that we do not foresee, and that we or our contributors do not predict in their actual form of occurrence. But what it does underline is that the **AMERICAN SOCIALIST** very often succeeds in bringing you the news behind the news, the forces that are making history, the underlying pressures of our fast-moving epoch.

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