

# Pravda's Editorial on Hungary

Following is the text of an article from Pravda on the events in Hungary:

The events in Hungary where the counter revolution succeeded in going into action to attack socialist achievements and the Peoples Democratic order, have evoked a deep response in the minds and hearts of all people who hold the interests of socialism dear.

In all the countries of the Socialist camp the intrigues of reaction have been unanimously condemned. The speeches of the leaders of the Communist parties of France, Italy and other countries have shown the unanimity of views in the ranks of the world Communist movement on the question of the events in Hungary. The Communist parties of capitalist countries are manfully fighting against the debauch of reaction.

Events in Hungary show that reaction for its anti-popular purposes tried to exploit the accumulated grievances of the working masses who were justly demanding an improvement in the leadership of the country and in the standard of life of the population.

There is no doubt that in the Hungarian events the former state and party leadership of Hungary, headed by Rakosi and Gero are to blame, for in solving problems of socialist construction they committed gross mistakes both in general political questions and in the field of economic policy and cultural development.

The leadership of the party headed by Rakosi and Gero became estranged from the party masses and the people and did not know the mood of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia.

The gross violation of legality was committed (the case of Rajk and a number of other cases in which many honest party and state workers innocently suffered).

In the economic field serious miscalculations were made:

A considerable part of the means was earmarked for the building of new large enterprises that were beyond the powers of a small country like Hungary.

A fast rate of industrialization which is correct under conditions in the Soviet Union was mechanically adopted in Hungary. Large enterprises were built without provision being made for raw materials.

The former party and state leadership of Hungary mechanically copied the experience of the Soviet Union in the field of industrialization despite the fact that the leaders of the Hungarian Workers party were repeatedly given comradely advice not to do this.

The planning of economic development should have proceeded from the concrete conditions of Hungary and account should have been taken of the fact that it is not up to every country to create all branches of industry as it has the possibility of relying on all the Socialist countries.

More means should have been expended on the development of agriculture and on increasing the production of consumer goods, which would have made it possible to improve steadily the living standards of the population.

The road taken by the Soviet Union's creating its own powerful industry within a short space of time was conditioned by the Soviet Union then being the only country of socialism in a capitalist encirclement.

Our people had to endure great self-denial and the mobilization of means in order to develop heavy industry as the most important guarantee of the country's independence and as a basis for the development of its economy.

If this had not been done the Soviet country would not have been able to resist Hitler Germany in the war and to destroy fascism.

In Hungary mistakes were also made in building up the party. The Hungarian Workers Party had over 900,000 members in a country with a population of 9,000,000. The doors were open for all who wished to join and for this reason people of all sorts entered it. The workers joined it but into the ranks of the Workers party there also came a flood of small bourgeois nationalist elements and careerists who wished to exploit the party for their own ends.

The party leadership did not pay due attention to selecting for the party the truly best people and did not do enough work in educating the cadres and all members of the party in the Marxist-Leninist spirit and in the spirit of international solidarity.

For this reason, when difficulties arose the country was unable to cope with the complicated situation in the country and could not rally the leading forces of the people for the fight against reaction. More than that, the party itself proved to be disorganized.

The leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party did not sufficiently respect the national peculiarities of the country.

The possibility was undoubtedly there during the ten years of developing the peoples' democratic order of educating and promoting to the leadership of the party and government to a greater extent than was done of people from the basic national cadres of the Hungarian Republic.

Practices were tolerated which hurt the national self-respect of the Hungarian people.

Thus a start was made in the introduction of a military uniform resembling the uniform accepted in the Soviet Union.

But each nation has national traditions and customs which must be respected. There is no need for everybody to have his hair cut to the same pattern. For does the same haircut adopted in armies and the same system of markings in schools prove the unity and international cohesion of socialist countries?

These of course are repugnant measures of no good to anybody which to a lesser or greater extent offended Hungary national feelings.

After the 20th Congress Rakosi proved unable and unwilling to head the movement for reform, and, on the contrary, in opposition to the views expressed by the majority of party members, stated that the policy pursued by the leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party was on the whole correct and needed no changes.

This caused serious dissatisfaction in the party. The party leadership, without a clear political line, did nothing to settle definitely and in a short time past mistakes.

It should be added that for several months there was open propaganda in Hungary against the party and the government in the press among a section of the intelligentsia, students and so on.

Along with justified criticism of the leadership there appeared with increasing frequency in the anti-leadership propaganda nationalistic, chauvinistic and other slogans, including appeals for a return to bourgeois democracy and anti-socialist expressions which frequently opposed the Yugoslav road to socialism to the experiences of the whole socialist camp, including the Soviet Union. The Rakosi-Gero leadership gave no rebuff to that negative mood and proved unable to find support in the Workers Party organization in which at that time healthy and internationalist ideas still prevailed.

The party leadership and organ of state power proved their lack of vigilance and failed to recognize both the justified dissatisfaction among the masses as well as the ever-spreading undermining and plotting work of counter-revolutionary elements.

Under such circumstances, dissatisfaction grew and became in-

creasingly bitter until finally it led to street demonstrations in Budapest on Oct. 23.

A section of the workers joined in the demonstrations with the good intention of expressing their justified dissatisfaction caused by the mistakes of the former leadership. But this elemental dissatisfaction was exploited by counter-revolutionary forces.

It has now been proven in all detail that the counter-revolutionary elements were organized beforehand, that they had their military command center, that they had their forces ready and in position for carrying out a putsch, that they had selected men charged with the mission of capturing arms stores and attacking selected objectives and that they had organized means of transport for delivering and distributing arms in previously selected places.

That is why the bloody events in Budapest caused by the provocative actions of the Horthyist bands took place.

Western bourgeois newspapers quite openly write that the Hungarian events have been carefully prepared for a long time, both internally and externally. The head of the United States intelligence, Allen Dulles, quite openly stated: "We knew of the Hungarian events beforehand."

The Hungarian Government, unable to deal with these anti-national elements and in order to restore order as quickly as possible in Budapest, addressed itself to the Soviet Government with the request for help by Soviet troops stationed in Hungary in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty.

As soon as the Soviet Government ordered its troops, at the request of Imre Nagy's Government, to leave Budapest, the counter-revolutionary forces began a cruel massacre of Communist, social and political workers and supporters of the people's democratic system.

Many facts show that Imre Nagy pursued a double-faced policy. On the one hand he announced that the entry of the Soviet troops into Budapest was necessary in order to suppress the counter-revolutionary forces and on the other hand he encouraged the active resistance of the counter-revolutionaries and remaining in touch with them.

Not encountering determined resistance from Imre Nagy's government, the counter-revolutionaries got hold of arms, created armed gangs which then received aid from the imperialist states, and dictated their conditions to Imre Nagy's government.

Imre Nagy's government practically had no power in the country. It sat in the Parliament building and conferred with the people through the microphone.

And during that time the Fascist-Horthyist gangs murdered whom ever they chose, seized progressive leaders in the streets, hanged them or cut their heads off.

During the seven or eight days of its existence Imre Nagy's government was reshuffled on several occasions and each time its composition leaned more to the right.

Imre Nagy's government became a cover for the activities of the counter-revolutionary forces. The plotters' military center was able to exert increasing pressure on its activities.

Under those circumstances the best men of the country, men like Janos Kadar, Ferenc Muennich and Imre Marosan, members of Imre Nagy's government, broke away from that government. The new government—Janos Kadar's revolutionary government of workers and peasants—decided to put an end to the bloodbath, stand up to the reactionary fascist forces and to ask the Soviet Union for help.

Under such conditions the Soviet Union's decision to come to the aid of Hungary's revolutionary forces was the only correct decision to take.

A socialist state could not remain a passive spectator in face

of the bloody orgy of fascist reaction in the People's Democratic Hungary.

When everything in Hungary has become calm, when life has returned to normal, the Hungarian working class, peasantry and intelligentsia will undoubtedly better understand and correctly evaluate our actions.

We regard our aid to the Hungarian working class in its struggle against the attempts of counter-revolutionaries as a fulfillment of our international duty. Our party considers it its duty to support the Hungarian Socialist Workers party in its work of implementing the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism.

When order has been restored in Hungary and its government considers that the presence of Soviet troops is not necessary, the Soviet Union for its part will under no circumstances insist on its forces remaining there.

Among foreign reactions to events in Hungary, Comrade Tito's recent speech at Pula attracts one's attention.

In his speech he devoted much space to the events in Hungary and pointed out correctly that counter-revolutionary elements had played a provocative part in them.

Tito said that reactionary forces after two or three days showed their real face. Under conditions of natural indignation against all that was done in the past, the then Hungarian leadership showed no willingness to remove the elements causing indignation among the Hungarian people and no desire to take a specific Hungarian road to socialism.

Tito characterized Imre Nagy's government as a government which had done nothing to prevent such a state of affairs.

According to Tito, the government constantly kept shedding tears over the radio and calling for aid instead of combatting it and showing its determination to prevent the murder of Communists and progressive people.

According to Tito, if Nagy's government had been more energetic if it had not been so hesitant, if it had energetically acted against anarchy and the murder of Communists by reactionary elements, if it had put up a determined resistance to reaction and so on, it is possible that the events would have followed a correct road and perhaps it might not have come to the intervention of Soviet troops.

But what did Imre Nagy's government actually do, Tito asked.

It called the people to arms against the Soviet Union and addressed itself to the Western countries asking them to intervene.

The events in Hungary, as Tito noted, assumed such dimensions that it became clear that a terrible civil war was taking place there, as a result of which socialism might be fully ended and matters might end in a third world war. Although we are also against interference, Tito stated, Soviet interference was necessary. This evidently, is a correct evaluation of the Hungarian events.

But in the same speech Tito calls the aid of Soviet troops to the Hungarian government "an error" and says: "We never advised them to resort to help by the army." It is impossible to term such a position logical and corresponding to reality. Now it is completely clear to all that, without this aid, the counter-revolution could have won in Hungary and that there would have been established a fascist Horthyist regime. Consequently, the aid of the Soviet troops was a necessary and inevitable step.

It is known that the help shown by the Soviet Union to the working people of Hungary in their struggle against counter-revolution called forth the approval of brotherly Communist parties and of the workers of the socialist countries.

Reflecting the point of view of the Communist party of China, the newspaper Jen Min Pao wrote: "The position of the Soviet Union

in relation to the Hungarian events is a completely correct position of proletarian internationalism. The Soviet government and the Soviet people have no justification to look on with folded hands when the government of Hungary, representing the will and national interests of the people, appeals to the Soviet Union for aid and when the Hungarian people would have become slaves of fascism if the Soviet Union had not, in answer, stretched out its brotherly hand."

In the past weeks there has been decided the question of the fate of socialism in Hungary. If in the center of Europe there had appeared a fascist Hungary, then the political situation of a number of countries situated in Eastern and Central Europe would have changed significantly and the international situation as a whole on the European continent would undoubtedly have worsened.

THE events in Hungary are the first great sortie of fascism during the entire postwar period, a sortie that showed that the threat of fascism still has not disappeared. In these conditions ideological unity, sharp vigilance and deep devotion to principle in the statement of questions relating to Hungarian events were required of all adherents of socialism.

All the more surprise is called forth by some propositions in Tito's speech which in no way make possible either the consolidation of all adherents of Socialism, or a correct understanding of a number of important problems of the international situation and of the real tasks of the world Communist movement.

To begin with, in Tito's speech, together with correct evaluations of Hungarian events, we meet some evaluations that cannot help but arouse justified surprise.

"Here, look," Tito appealed to his audience, "how a people with naked hands, badly armed, shows the strongest resistance if before it there is one goal—to free itself and to be independent. It is no longer interested in what kind of independence this will be, whether there will be a restoration of the bourgeois and reactionary system in the country, or whether it will be independent in national relations. This basically occupied its thoughts."

In the first place Comrade Tito greatly exaggerates when he speaks in this case of "the people"; secondly in such cases Marxism-Leninism teaches us to distinguish differently.

If part of the workers are indifferent to whether or not they are in the grip of exploitation, under the cover of false slogans "freedom and independence," if they are indifferent to whether their country is converted into a plaything in the hands of the great imperialist powers, if they are plunged into a new war, similarly to the way in which it was done by the fascist Hitlerite clique of Horthy in 1941-1944, this means that this part of the working class has fallen into trap set by reaction.

This would mean, consequently, that the masses go not toward freedom and independence but in a diametrically opposite direction, toward enslavement and loss of independence.

Marxism-Leninism requires that in approaching social phenomena one must always give an answer to the direct question: Which classes are integrated in one or another phenomenon, the interests of which classes correspond to one or another form of the social activity of the people?

It is true that in Hungary in the revolutionary events there appears the inclusion of a significant stratum of the working class. History knows many cases when the national feelings of the masses have been aroused, inflamed and utilized by reactionary forces against the vital interests of the people.

(To Be Concluded)