Willy Munzenberg

Relief for Russia

Soviet Russia’s Relief for Its Starving

(13 January 1922)


From International Press Correspondence, Vol. II No. 4, 13 January 1922, pp. 33–34.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.
Public Domain: Marxists Internet Archive (2019). You may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet Archive” as your source.


In the hunger campaign Soviet Russia, bleeding from the wounds of six years’ war, with its industry and agriculture ruined by these wars, by an iron blockade and by innumerable acts of counter-revolutionary sabotage, has accomplished more than all the foreign relief committees and organizations together.

The Soviet government has provided 10,040,500 poods (approximately 150,000 tons) of seed grain for the winter sowing in addition to large quantities of grain to feed the starving workers and peasants and their children. Only 1,861,000 poods were obtained in foreign countries – mostly purchased by the Soviet government.

These figures are sufficient proof of the successful activity of our Russian comrades in the campaign against the famine. After the arrival of the seed all efforts were turned to the sowing. In many places they worked day and night – when daylight failed by the light of lanterns. The following table gives an indication of the degree to which they were able to attain the objective set beforehand.

Government

 

Seed arrived
poods

 

Area planned
for sowing
dessiatines

 

Area actually
sowed
dessiatines

 

Percentage
Accom-
plishment

 

Area sowed
1920
dessiatines

 

Percentage
as against
1920

Samara

1,909,743

8,000,000

426,831

  53.0

529,600

  80.5

Simbirsk

1,125,375

  500,000

235,831

  47.1

445,200

  62.9

Saratov

2,008,820

1,000,000

900,080

  90.0

167,600

117.2

Mari District

   320,000

   139,956

  74,177

  53.0

136,000

  54.5

Tchuwash

   557,598

   174,859

  14,587

  88.4

138,400

104.0

Tartar Republic

2,210,141

   962,000

359,161

  37.3

846,100

  42.3

Ufa

   805,903

   240,220

219,034

  91.3

521,200

  79.7

Votsk

     49,956

   286,780

146,352

  51.0

229,400

  63.8

Viatka

     55,671

   727,237

545,500

  75.0

684,900

253.9

Astrakhan

     76,500

     47,830

  48,500

101.4

  19,100

253.9

Tsaritsyn

   406,348

   399,210

321,917

  80.6

287,700

111.9

German Colony

   510,000

   230,000

138,000

  60.0

130,100

160.0

Bashkir Republic

   185,642

   125,000

  34,720

  19.4

151,400

  16.8

Ural

   293,481

     46,000

  40,000

  87.0

  24,000

166.6

Thus, thanks to the intensive labor of our Russian comrades the winter sowing was accomplished. The prospects for the spring sowing are, however, not very favorable since the governments which were still able to contribute rather large quantities of seed for the autumn sowing have today only little grain left. According to the figures of the Central Relief Commission the following quantities of grain are urgently needed for the spring sowing:

 

 

Poods

 

Area to be
sowed
dessiatines

Oats

13,410,500

   577,700

Barley

  1,985,600

   340,200

Wheat

12,470,700

2,299,000

Buckwheat

  1,512,300

   205,500

Millet

  1,749,700

1,167,400

Lentils

     428,700

     47,800

Peas

     401,200

     42,300

Flax

     415,300

     86,000

Hemp

     479,000

     47,700

Mustard

         7,800

       6,800

Sunflower

     416,400

   228,000

Spelt

     440,000

     44,000

Corn

     364,800

     90,000

Total

33,012,000

6,244,000

Russia itself can provide only a small portion of the necessary quantity, at most 15,000,000 poods. All the rest must be imported.

Workers and Comrades! Our relief campaign will be only patchwork if we only send food for the immediately necessary need, for the temporary alleviation of the famine. The furnishing of sufficient grain and of machines for an improved cultivation of the soil, which will enable a better crop in the future, is just as important, in fact even more important for the future and for the economic restoration of Soviet Russia. These are the present problems of the relief campaign which are of the greatest importance and which must be neither overlooked nor underestimated. We must do all in our power in order to help here as well and to ship the grain necessary for the spring sowing to Russia as soon as possible.


Last updated on 4 May 2019