

A
Lectures on His. of Phil. Vol. I

Introduction

PART ONE Greek Philosophy

Introduction

The 7 Sages

Div. of the Subj.

Section One--Ch. I--1st Per., 1st Div.

A. The Ionic Phil.--Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes

B. Pythagoras --System of Nos.

C. The Eleatic School--Xenophanes, Parmenides,
Melissus, Zeno

D. Heraclitus--Logical Principle, Natural Phil.

Rel. of Principle to Consciousness

E. Empedocles, Leucippus, & Democritus

F. Phil. of ~~the~~ Anaxagoras, Universal Principle

The Homocentric

The Rel. of the Two

Ch. II--1st per--2nd Div. A. The Sophists--Protagoras, Gorgias

B. Socrates

C. The Phil. of Socrates--The Megarics, Euclides,
Euclides, Eubulides, Stilpo. 2. The Cyrenaic School: Aristippus, Theodorus, Hegesias, Anniceris

3. The Cynic School--Antisthenes,
Diogenes, Later Cynics

p. 383 (Sophists) Now the sophistry of common opinion, which is without the culture of thought & without scientific knowledge, is found in the fact that, to it, its determinations are, as such held to be existent in & for themselves, & a number of rules of life, maxims, principles, &c. are considered as absolutely fixed truths."

VOL. II--Greek Phil. Sec. I, Cont.

Ch. III 1st per.--3rd Div.--Plato, Aristotle

SECTION 2, 2nd Per.--Dogmatism & Scepticism
Stoics, Epicurus

Section III--3rd Per.--Neo-Platonists

A. Philo

B. The Cabala & Gnosticism

C. The Alexandrian Phil.

from Vol. III, p. 220: 3 stages of Metaphysics (of Understanding)

(1) spontaneous & uncritical assertion of unity of being
& thought--Descartes, Spinoza

(2) Opp. nos. Idea of experience--origin of thoughts &
justification, not whether they are absolutely
true--Locke

(3) Leibnitz & monad--world viewed as totality

The 3rd stage is the union itself, which is to be brought about which is the only subj. of interest, comes to consciousness & becomes obj.

p.167--In the Middle Ages it was chiefly the clergy, dts. of theology who occupied themselves with phi. In the transition per. the philosophers showed themselves to be in an inward warfare with themselves & in an external warfare with their surrounds & their lives were spent in a wild unsettled fashion...

p.168****Thus in earlier times bravery was individual; while mod. bravery consists in each not acting after his own fashion, but relying on his connection with others.

Section One--Mod. Phil. in its 1st Statement--Bacon, Jacob Boehme

Section Two--Per. of the Thinking Understanding

Ch. I. The Metaphysics of Understanding.

- A.--1st Div.--Descartes Spinoza Malebranche
- B--2nd Div.--Locke Hugo Grotius Thomas Hobbes Gdworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Puffendorf, Newton
- C--3rd Div. Leibnitz Wolff, German Popular Phil.

Ch. II--Transition Period

- A. Idealism & Scientific--Berkeley, Hume
- B. Critical Phil. Relative Aspect, 2. Positive Aspect.
 - a) Opp. bet. Sensation & Thought b) Montesquieu
 - c) Helvetius d) Rousseau
- D. The German Illumination

DM DM DM

p.172 (re Francis Bacon who represents the English) "For they appear to constitute that people in Europe which, limited to the understanding of actuality, is destined, like the class of shopkeepers & women in the State, to live always immersed in matter, & to have actuality but not reason as obj."

p.177: "Bacon thus divides human learning according to the faculties of memory, imagination & reason... (1) Under memory he considers his... (2) under imagination, poetry & art; (3) under reason, phi."

p.178 in "the manner of his time, a main characteristic of which is that anything can be made plausible through ens, e.g. from the Bible."

p.191 re Jacob Boehme which is "genuinely German... the Protestant principle... of placing the intellectual world within one's own mind & heart & of experiencing & knowing & feeling in one's own consciousness all that formerly was conceived as a Beyond."

HEGEL'S LECTURES ON
THE HIS. OF PHIL. VOL. III

Part 2. Phil of the Middle Ages

Introd.--The Idea of Christianity, The Fathers & Heterodoxy
Church & State

Section 1--Arabian Phil.--A. The Phil. of the Medabberim
B. Commentators of Aristotle
C. Jewish Philosophers: Moses
Maimonides

Section 2--The Scholastic Phil/

A. Rel. of Scholastic Phil. to Christianity

B. General His. Points of View:

1. The Bldg. up of dogmas on Metaphysical Grounds
Anselm Abelard

2. Methodical Representation of the Doctrinal System of
the Church--Peter Lombard Thomas Aquinas
John Duns Scotus

3. Acquaintanceship with Arist. writings--Alexander of Hales, Albertus
Magnus

4. Opp. bet. Realism & Nominalism--Roscelinus Walter of Montagna
Wm. Occam, Buridan

5. Formal Dialectic, Julian, Archbishop of Toledo
Paschasius Radbertus

6. Mystics - John Charlier Raymundus of Sabunde Roger Bacon
Raymundus Lullus

C. General Standpoint of the Scholastics

Sec. 3--Revival of the Sciences

A. Study of the Ancients--Pomponatius, Bessarion, Ficinus, Pic
Cassendi, Lipsius, Reuchlin, Helmont, Ciceronian Pop. Phil.

B.--Certain Attempts in Phil.

Cardanus Campanella Bruno Vanini Petrus Ramu.

C. The Reformation

* PART III * MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

p. 158: With the discovery of gunpowder the individual
passion of battle was lost. The romantic impulse
p. 159 towards a casual kind of bravery passed into
other adventures, not of hate or revenge, or the
so-called deliverance from what men considered the
wrongs of innocence, but more harmless adventures,
the exploration of the earth, or the discovery of the passage
to the East Indies. America was discovered, its treasures & people
-man, man himself, navigation was the higher romance of commerce.
The present world was again present to man as worthy of the
interests of mind; thinking mind was again capable of action.
Now the Reformation or Luther had inevitably to come....

***** p. 160 Here thought is more independent, and thus we
***** now abandon its unity with theology; it separates
itself therefrom, just as with the Gks it separated itself from
mythology, & did not until the time of the Alexandrians seek out
these forms again & fill the mythological conceptions with the
form of thought....

p. 166 with Descartes phil. of modern times
as abstract thought properly speaking
begins.

In 2nd place we have to consider negation,
destruction of this metaphysics--the attempt
to consider knowledge as its own act. &
determinations which proceed from it

The 3rd stage is the union itself, which is to be brought about & which is the only subj. of interest, comes to consciousness & becomes obj.

p.167--In the Middle Ages it was chiefly the clergy, etc. of theology who occupied themselves with phi. In the transition per. the philosophers showed themselves to be in an inward warfare with themselves & in an external warfare with their surrounds & their lives were spent in a wild unsettled fashion...

p.168****Thus in earlier times bravery was individual; while mod. bravery consists in each not acting after his own fashion, but relying on his connection with others.

Section One--Mod. Phil. in its 1st Statement--Bacon, Jacob Boehme

Section Two--Per. of the Thinking Understanding

Ch. I. The Metaphysics of Understanding.

A.--1st Div.--Descartes Spinoza Malebranche

B--2nd Div.--Locke Hugo Grotius Thomas Hobbes Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Puffendorf, Newton

C--3rd Div. Leibnitz Wolff German Popular Phil.

Ch. II--Transition Period

A--Idealism & Scepticism--Berkeley Hume

B--Scottish Phil.--

C/French Phil. 1) Negative Aspect, 2. Positive Aspect.

3. Idea of a Concrete Universal Unity

a) Opp. bet. Sensation & Thought b) Montesquieu

c) Helvetius d) Rousseau

D. The German Illumination

DM DM DM

p.172 (re Francis Bacon who represents the English) "For they appear to constitute that people in Europe which, limited to the understanding of actuality, is destined, like the class of shopkeepers & workmen in the State, to live always immersed in matter, & to have actuality but not reason as obj."

p.177: "Bacon thus divides human learning according to the faculties of memory, imagination & reason... (1) Under memory he considers his; (2) under imagination, poetry & art; (3) under reason, phil."

p.178 in "the manner of his time, a main characteristic of which is that anything can be made plausible through exs., e.g. from the Bible."

p.191 re Jacob Boehme which is "genuinely German... the Protestant principle... of placing the intellectual world within one's own mind & heart & of experiencing & knowing & feeling in one's own consciousness all that formerly was conceived as a Beyond."

p.409 "the sequence of these (Kant, Fichte, Schelling) philosophies shows the course which thought has taken."

Section 3--RECENT GER. PHIL. 409ff
A. Jacobi, B. Kant C. Fichte (pp.479-512)
D. Schelling, E. Final Result

p.409: "In this great epoch of the world's his., whose inmost essence is laid hold of in the phil. of his. nations only have played a part the Ger. & the Fr., & this in spite of their absolute opp., or rather because they are so opposite... In Ger. this principle has burst forth as thought, spirit, Notion; in Fr., in the form of actuality."

Jacobi

p.421 (Jacobi): "The form into which Phil. has in Jacobi's case finally fallen which is that immediacy is grasped as absolute, manifests a lack of all critical faculty, or all logic."

John
John

p.425: (Kant) "According to this the truth underlying the Kantian phil. is the recognition of freedom. Even Rousseau represented the absolute to be found in freedom. Kant has the same principle, but taken rather from the theoretic side."

ENLIGHTENMENT

p.426: "Theoretically the Kantian Phil. is the 'Illumination' or Aufklärung reduced to the method; it states that nothing true can be known, but only the phenomenal; it leads to knowledge into consciousness & self-consciousness but from this standpoint maintains it to be a subj. & finite knowledge."

"Not indiv. but Notion of indiv; not actuality but the Notion of actuality"

p.479 (Fichte) "his phil. is the Kantian phil. in its completion/
p.481: "Fichte's phil. is thus the dev. of form in itself."

Ego as both ego and as God.

p.499: "The deficiency in the Fichtian phil. is thus lastly that the ego retains the significance of the indiv., actual self-consciousness, as opposed to that which is universal or absolute, or ..."

Subjective
part

SCHELLING:

"THE TIMES CALLED FOR LIFE, FOR SPIRIT"

p.525: "What is lacking in Schelling is thus the fact that the point of indifference of subj. & obj. ity or the Notion of reason is absolutely pre-supposed without any attempt being made at showing that this is the truth...."

INTELL. INTUITION

p.526: "In phil. when we desire to establish a position, we demand proof. But if we begin with intell. intuition, that constitutes an oracle to which we have given way, since the existence of intell. intuition was made our postulate."

Presupposed
which
is presupposed

p.543: "UNSPIRITUAL BARRAGE OF WORDS" = Schelling's phil./

Final result, pp. 545-564 (see separate page)

Presupposed
Schelling

p.519: "On the one Schelling's system is related to the phil. of Fichte on the other hand, he, like Jacobi, makes his principle immediate knowledge--the intelligent intuitive perception"

p.544: "Locke's phil. is combined with foolish self-conceit into the bargain."

To this point the World-spirit has come, and each stage has its own form in the true system of Philosophy; ~~nothing is lost, all principles are preserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms.~~ This concrete idea is the result of the strivings of spirit during almost twenty-five centuries of earnest work to become objective to itself, to know itself:

Tantae molis erat, se ipsam cognoscere mentem.

All this time was required to produce the philosophy of our day; so tardily and slowly did the World-spirit work to reach this goal. What we pass in rapid review when we recall it, stretched itself out in reality to this great length of invested with its entire concrete development, its external subsistence, its wealth, is striving to bring spirit to perfection, to make progress itself and to develop from spirit. It goes ever on and on; because spirit is progress alone. Spirit often seems to have forgotten and lost itself, but inwardly opposed to itself, it is inwardly working ever forward (as when Hamlet says of the ghost of his father, "Well said, old mole! canst work i' the ground so fast?") until grown strong in itself it bursts asunder the crust of earth which divided it from the sun, its Notion, so that the earth crumbles away. At such a time, when the encircling crust, like a soulless decaying tenement, crumbles away, and spirit displays itself arrayed in new youth, the seven league boots are at length adopted. This work of the spirit to know itself, this activity to find itself, is the life of the spirit and the spirit itself. Its result is the Notion which it takes up of itself; the history of Philosophy is a revelation of what has been the aim of spirit throughout its history; it is therefore the world's history in its innermost signification. This work of the human spirit in the recesses of thought is paralleled with all the stages of reality; and therefore no philosophy oversteps its own time. The importance which the determinations of thought possessed is another matter, which does not belong to the history of Philosophy. These Notions are the simplest revelation of the World spirit; in their more concrete form they are history.

We must, therefore, in the first place not esteem lightly what spirit has won, namely its gains up to the present day. Ancient Philosophy is to be revered as necessary, and as a link in this sacred chain, but all the same nothing more than a link. The present is the highest stage reached. In the second place, all the various philosophies are no mere fashionable theories of the time, or anything of a similar nature; they are neither chance products nor the blaze of a fire

1. Hamelt, Act L. Scene V.

Not just the logic is his
to think BU
of history & philosophy

Thought
as subject &
with act
Stage 12-14

Concrete
History
Not just
History

of straw, nor casual eruptions here and there, but a spiritual, reasonable, forward advance they are of necessity one Philosophy in its development, the revelation of God, as He knows Himself to be. Where several philosophies appear at the same time, they are different sides which make up one totality forming their basis; and on account of their one-sidedness we see the refutation of the one by the other. In the third place we do not find here feeble little efforts to establish or to criticize this or that particular point; instead of that, each philosophy sets up a new principle of its own, and this must be recognized.

If we glance at the main epochs in the whole history of Philosophy, and grasp the necessary succession of stages in the leading moments, each of which expresses a determinate Idea, we find that after the Oriental whirl of subjectivity, which attains to no intelligibility and therefore to no subsistence, the light of thought dawned among the Greeks.

1. The philosophy of the ancients had the absolute Idea as its thought; and the realization or reality of the same consisted in comprehending the existing present world, and regarding it as it is in its absolute nature. This philosophy did not make its starting-point the Idea itself, but proceeded from the objective as from something given, and transformed the same into the Idea; the Being of Parmenides.

2. Abstract thought, nous, become known to itself as universal essence or existence, not as subjective thought; the Universal of Plato.

3. In Aristotle the Notion emerges free and unconstrained, as comprehending thought, permeating and spiritualizing all the forms which the universe contains.

4. The Notion as subject, its independence, its inwardness, abstract separation, is represented by the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics; here we have not the free, concrete form, but universality (abstract) and in itself formal.

5. The thought of totality, the intelligible world, is the concrete Idea as we have seen it with the Neo-Platonists. This principle is ideality generally speaking, which is present in all reality, but not the Idea which knows itself; this is not reached until the principle of subjectivity, individuality, found a place in it, and God as spirit became actual to Himself in self-consciousness.

Orans
the subject
subgr...
Being of Parmenides
to be in
of the

Glees
From
objects
is in
a way
of
leg
in the
being
of

In Neo-Platonists
was reached
Subjectivity

6. But it has been the work of modern times to grasp this Idea as spirit, as the Idea that knows itself. In order to proceed from the conscious Idea to the self-conscious, we must have the infinite opposition, namely the fact that the Idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutely undetermined in itself. As spirit had the thought of objective existence, Philosophy thus perfected the intellectuality of the world, and produced this spiritual world as an object existing beyond present reality, like Nature, --the first creation of spirit. The work of the spirit now consisted in bringing this beyond back to reality, and guiding it into self-consciousness. This is accomplished by self-consciousness thinking itself, and recognizing absolute existence to be the self-consciousness that thinks itself. With Descartes pure thought directed itself on that separation which we spoke of above. Self-consciousness, in the first place, thinks of itself as consciousness; therein is contained all objective reality, and the positive, intuitively reference of its reality to the other side. With Spinoza Thought and Being are opposed and yet identical; he has the intuitive perception of substance, but the knowledge of substance in his case is external. We have here the principle of reconciliation taking its rise from thought as such, in order to abrogate the subjectivity of thought; this is the case in Leibnitz's monad, which possesses the power of representation.

7. In the second place, self-consciousness thinks of itself as being self-consciousness; in being self-conscious it is independent, but still in this independence it has a negative relation to what is outside self-consciousness. This is infinite subjectivity, which appears at one time as the critique of thought in the case of Kant and at another time, in the case of Fichte, as the tendency or impulse towards the concrete. Absolute, pure, infinite form is expressed as self-consciousness, the Ego.

8. This is a light that breaks forth on spiritual substance, and shows absolute content and absolute form to be identical; --substance is in itself identical with knowledge. Self-consciousness thus, in the third place, recognizes its positive relation as its negative, and its negative as its positive, --or, in other words, recognizes these opposite activities as the same, i.e. it recognizes pure Thought or Being as self-identity, and this again as separation. This is intellectual perception; but it is requisite in order that it should be in truth intellectual that it should not be that merely immediate perception of the eternal and the divine which we hear of, but should be absolute knowledge. This intuitive perception which does not recognize itself is taken as starting-point as if it were absolutely presupposed; it has in itself

Ref

X

Use from thoughts in order to abrogate sub-ty of thought
Leibnitz monad

14689

1854
Subj
begins my
in nature
divinity

Subj
begins my
in nature
divinity

Subj
begins my
in nature
divinity

How to create
Fichte

III
① as critique
② as impulse
③ as Absolute Ego

intuitive perception only as immediate knowledge, and not as self-knowledge; or it knows nothing, and what it perceives it does not really know,--for, taken at its best it consists of beautiful thoughts but not knowledge.

But intellectual-intuition is knowledge, since, in the first place, in spite of the separation of each of the opposed sides from the other, all external reality is known as internal. If it is known according to its essence, as it is, it shows itself as not existing of itself, but as essentially consisting in the movement of transition. This Heraclitean or dialectical principle, that nothing is at rest, must be demonstrated of each individual thing; and thus in this consciousness--that the essence of each thing lies in determination, in what is the opposite of itself--there appears the apprehended unity with its opposite. Similarly this unity is, in the second place, to be recognized even in its essence; its essence as this identity is, in the same way, to pass over into its opposite, or to realize itself, to become for itself something different; and thus the opposition in it is brought about by itself. Again, it may be said of the opposition, in the third place, that it is not in the Absolute; this Absolute is existence, the eternal, &c. This is, however, itself an abstraction in which the Absolute is apprehended in a one-sided manner only, and the opposition is apprehended only as ideal (supra, p. 536); but in fact it is form, as the essential moment of the movement of the Absolute. This Absolute is not at rest, and that opposition is not the unresting motion; for the Idea, unresting though it is, is yet at rest and satisfied in itself. Pure thought has advanced to the opposition of the subjective and objective; the true reconciliation of the opposition is the perception that this opposition, when pushed to its absolute extreme, resolves itself; as Schelling says, the opposites are in themselves identical--and not only in themselves, but eternal life consists in the very process of continually producing the opposition and continually reconciling it. To know opposition in unity, and unity in opposition--this is absolute knowledge; and science is the knowledge of this unity in its whole development by means of itself.

This is then the demand of all time and of Philosophy. A new epoch has arisen in the world. It would appear as if the World-spirit had at last succeeded in stripping off from itself all alien objective existence, and apprehending itself at last as absolute Spirit, in developing from itself what for it is objective, and keeping it within its own power, yet remaining at rest all the while.

AK 9
but merely abstract thought

537

Absolute
Relative

AK 9

AK 9

AK 9
New Epoch

The strife of the finite self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness, which last seemed to the other to lie outside of itself, now comes to an end. Finite self-consciousness has ceased to be finite; and in this way absolute self-consciousness has on the other hand, attained to the reality which it looked before. This is the whole history of the world in general up to the present time, and the history of Philosophy in particular, the sole work of which is to depict this strife. Now, indeed, it seems to have reached its goal, when this absolute self-consciousness, which it had when the work of representing, has ceased to be alien, and when spirit accordingly is realized as spirit. For it becomes such only as the result of its knowing itself to be absolute spirit, and this it knows in real scientific knowledge. Spirit produces itself as Nature, as the State; nature is its unconscious work, in the course of which it appears to itself something different, and not spirit; but in the State, in the deeds and life of History, as also of Art, it brings itself to pass with consciousness; it knows ~~its~~ various modes of its reality, yet they are only modes. In scientific knowledge, or spirit, is its only true existence. This then is the standpoint of the present day, and the series of spiritual forms is with it for the present concluded.

After
this
is
certainly
true

2552

Why not
substance
is

Wah!

The latest philosophy contains therefore those which went before; it embraces in itself all the different stages thereof; it is the product and result of those that preceded it. We can now, for example, be Platonists no longer. Moreover we must raise ourselves once for all above the hostilities of individual opinions, thoughts, objections, and difficulties; and also above our own vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any particular value. For to apprehend the inward substantial spirit is the standpoint of the individual; as parts of the whole, individuals are like blind men, who are driven forward by the indwelling spirit of the whole. Our standpoint now is accordingly the knowledge of this Idea as spirit, as absolute Spirit, which in this way opposes to itself another spirit, the finite, the principle of which is to know absolute spirit, in order that absolute spirit may become existent for it. I have tried to develop and bring before your thoughts this series of successive spiritual forms pertaining to Philosophy in its progress, and to indicate the connection between them. This series is the true kingdom of spirits, the only kingdom of spirits that there is - it is a series which is not a multiplicity, nor does it even remain a series, if we understand thereby that one of its members merely follows on another; but in the very process of coming to the knowledge of itself it is transformed into

2553

nothing and multiplicity
me

spiritual
me

As which lives in us all

the moments of the one Spirit, or the one self-prose-
Spirit. This long procession of spirits is forced by the
individual pulses which beat in its life; they are the
organism of our substance, an absolutely necessary
progression, which expresses nothing less than the
nature of spirit itself, and which lives in us all. We
have to give ear to its urgency--when the note that it
gives its way on--and we have to make it a
real one. It is my desire that this history of Philosophy
should contain for you a summons to grasp the spirit
of the time, which is present in us by nature, and each
in his own place--consciously to bring it from its
natural condition, i.e. from its lifeless seclusion,
into the light of day.

By

Completely necessary

*We have a
give ear
to its
urgency
to
make
reality*

guy
*five lecture papers
5 times 1817 & 1820*

Lead
place in history
*from its natural
condition*
*its lifeless
seclusion*
*into the light
of day*