

THE MARXIAN WAY

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO ENQUIRY AND LEARNING

JANUARY-MARCH, 1947

Editor : M. N. Roy

Vol. II. No. 3

CONTENTS

M. C. SAMADDAR	SOURCES OF THE NEW HISTORY
ANDRE' BRISSAUD	CHRISTIANITY AND COMMUNISM
M. N. ROY	PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
	NEW HUMANISM
EDITORIAL NOTES	
BOOKS REVIEWED	EXISTENTIALISM by Guido de Ruggiero ... THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES by K. R. Popper ... THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY by John H. Hallowell.

RENAISSANCE PUBLISHERS
15, BANKIM CHATTERJEE STREET
CALCUTTA 12.

Price Rs. 3/- per copy
Yearly subscription Rs. 10/-

SOURCES OF THE NEW HISTORY

By M. C. Samaddar

It is now generally realised that a dynastic history is insufficient to meet the demand for knowledge that modern conditions make. It is an era of science, and neither chronology nor tales of kings, wars and battles satisfy us today. It is also an era of growing humanism, and it is not possible for it to admire or hero-worship the homicidal glory of nations and kings. History today has to be a scientific story of mankind—either over the entire globe or in a country or smaller locality. A scientific story of mankind means telling *how* social conditions have come to be what they are today. Every historical phenomenon must have a cause, and the same can be discovered. It is in this spirit of enquiry that we have to approach the sources of history.

The new scientific history is not to be a history written with any particular bias. There have been quite many biassed histories. Some have tried to prove the inherent backwardness and emasculation of the Indian people to justify the foreign rule. Others have tried to idolise a purist past—purist, *i.e.* before contamination by foreigners—to give the intellectual sanction to a racial boycott. This latter group has tried to ascribe all our social evils to foreign rule, and in that process it has largely been guilty of travestying truth to the extent of confusing the cause of the disease with its symptoms.

Even the most fanatical believers in the necessity of a biassed history would accept that today the need for a biassed revision does not exist. The imperialist historians who would prove the inherent inferiority of the Indian race should be able to see that any exercise in ingenuity to distort or suppress evidences can have hardly any pragmatic value. Foreign rule has ended, and a biassed history cannot

reinforce the shackles. The nationalist historian should be able to see that the intellectual background to racial boycott is not necessary today. The foreign rulers are going, and an idolisation of a primitive past is not only unnecessary, but may have disastrous effects. The shackles today are not "imperial and foreign", but "national". The majority of the people are still shut out from the freedom that should be theirs by elements, by oppressive elements, which are racially the same as those who are oppressed. On the other hand a nationalist bias may lead to the strengthening of the shackles, by inculcating among the people a wrong sense of historical social requirements. Therefore, it might be argued that whatever reasons there might have been in the past for the production of biased histories, there are none today. The story of the people living in India has, therefore, to be re-told in a manner that truth about our past may be known and appreciated properly.

The truth about the past of the Indian people is not the same thing as the truth about the ruling families. At best any dynastic history tells us the story only about an infinitesimal fraction of the people. Social and economic conditions or ideological aspirations are not taken into account.

In an earlier writing I have had to coin the following definition of history : "It is the study of the sequence of cultural landscapes in their entirety (type, productivity and internal human relationships) with proper consideration of the evolutionary process, the influences at work and the time taken over the unfolding of the sequence." I am unable to make a better definition now, though I hope when this viewpoint attracts attention of those better equipped to deal with problems of historical research, a more complete and satisfying definition would be forthcoming. The nature of the enquiry under this definition would require a chronological classification of the various types of cultural landscape, their technological and productive aspects, their

ideological inclinations and how the two, together with the other forces at work, led to the evolution of later types.

Even a superficial view of the subject, as is given above, reveals that the sources of information for this type of study are slightly different from the sources of a strictly chronological or dynastic history. Some kind colleagues have been of the opinion that at least in India the information available on the social and human aspects is so fragmentary that any complete rewriting of India's history from the scientific viewpoint may be impossible. This essay is written primarily to indicate the sources but, owing to the restricted space at my command, not to wholly answer the scepticism about a proper scientific history of India.

Vincent Smith had made one of the earliest complete historical studies of the country. He had, in the spirit of a pioneer, gone into details about the sources of Indian history. He had classified these sources under six heads, namely : (1) inscriptions, or epigraphic evidence ; (2) coins or numismatic evidence ; (3) monuments, buildings, and works of art, or archæological evidence ; (4) tradition, as recorded in literature ; (5) ancient historical writings, sometimes contemporary with the events narrated ; and (6) foreign testimony, mostly supplied either by the works of travellers or by regular historians. No later historian has been able so far to add a seventh source. Records of the human activity of a people are not limited to the field covered by these five native and one foreign sources. The life of a people has diverse and manifold aspects and in each branch of life, if we search, we are bound to get records of the activities of ancient, mediaeval and recent communities. The difficulty lies in correlating isolated records into forming a complete picture. The expansion in the scope of our enquiry would enable us to use more material than has hitherto been possible. A chronological or dynastic history, which has often been wrongly called 'political history', is strictly speaking a limited study. It is like the morphological study of the

crowns of trees, ignoring the rest of the tree-physiology. Dynastic or strictly political changes represent only the apex point of the life of a community and, frequently, a pre-occupation with dynastic or political changes makes the historian oblivious of the various forces at work in the life of a community—the forces whose aggregate produces the results that the historians are so busy noticing. It is, therefore, that a very great broadening of the subject takes place when we take to study the entire cultural landscape—that is the complete picture of the life of a people. It is needless to say, that the effort required to broaden the study would be counterbalanced by a corresponding saving in the labour that is at present spent on individual reigns and the fortunes of a dynasty—microscopic events in comparison to the vast bulk of the people.

Vincent Smith himself admitted that he was handicapped by his narrow terms of enquiry. In his *Oxford History of India* he says of Alberuni's writings that they were "of high value as an account of Hindu manners, science and literature ; but contribute comparatively little information which can be utilised for the purposes of political history". Evidently Smith expected Alberuni to give him a chronicle of the various dynastic changes properly dated at the expense of the Arab traveller's observations on the way Indians of his time lived. Alberuni's *Tahkik-i-Hind* is a veritable study of the Indian cultural landscape at the time of Mahmud Ghazni and, supplemented with information from other sources, should make the picture of India in the eleventh century fairly complete.

In the same book Smith says of the monumental evidences : "Considered by itself and apart from the inscriptions on the walls of the buildings, while it offers little direct contribution to the materials for political history, it is of high illustrative value, and greatly helps the student in realising the power and magnificence of some of the ancient dynasties." Monumental evidences are of great

value for a proper appraisal of the cultural landscape. Not only do we get an idea of the technological advance made by a community till the date of the building of the monumental evidences we examine, but from an examination of the purpose for which the monument was originally intended and the magnitude on which it was built (and comparisons with the monuments of the same period intended for other purposes) we can get an idea of the relationship between the component human parts of the society of the period. If Smith found such a study only incidental to dynastic history, we can realise to what extent the sources of history have been wrongly utilised, and what results a fresh approach can bring from the old sources.

Today the position is that the historians who would set to rewrite India's history, and to write for the first time a people's history of India, would have to, on the one hand, secure some fresh sources and, on the other, to re-examine the sources that have been utilised to find other than dynastic information. Before any attempt is made to explore fresh sources of history, a re-examination of the old sources might be found immediately beneficial. An illustration of this point is available even from a cursory comparison of two books on ancient Indian history. Hemchandra Rai Chowdhury in his *Political History of India* has sifted at great pains the fragmentary evidence in the Vedas, Puranas and the Epics about the dynasties that ruled in India between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries before Christ. Abinas Chandra Das, on the other hand, in his *Rigvedic Culture* has examined the same material to show the evolution of the Vedic Aryans from a neolithic culture to one of field agriculture and iron tools. In the opinion of the present writer the picture drawn by A. C. Das is clearer than the one by H. C. Rai Chowdhury, the better scholarship of the latter notwithstanding.

It is not possible in this article to deal exhaustively with the general principles of utilisation of sources of history

nor to examine each type of source in any detail. The attempt has been made here to illustrate and indicate rather than to write anything authoritative and scholarly. The present writer is still at that stage where he is busy provoking consideration of certain facts, rather than making a direct contribution to history either by assessment of evidences or by drawing conclusions from them. He is not yet in a position to make a direct contribution to history itself; he is busy persuading others to do this. This is because of the fact that being not daily engaged in historical research he should leave this task to more competent hands. However, a brief consideration of existing sources of history is made here to illustrate more specifically what type of information can be extracted from them. So we revert to the classification of sources of history made by Vincent Smith.

Let us take inscriptions first. Smith considered them to be the most important and trustworthy source of knowledge for the earlier periods of Indian history. Unfortunately, they do not at present go further back than the third century B. C. At Mohenjodaro, however, has been found hieroglyphic epigraphy which is not yet deciphered. If it is deciphered, we shall have a "trustworthy" source taking us back to the third millennium before Christ. The deciphered inscriptions of the periods later than the Indus Valley civilisation contain either official documents set forth by kings or other authorities or records made by private persons for various purposes. Most of the inscriptions on stone either commemorate particular events or record the dedication of buildings or images. Generally they are dated in one of the multifarious Indian eras. Hitherto all inscriptions which did not give any dynastic information have just been recorded but not searched for the other evidence they might yield. Even the famous edicts of Asoka have been only noticed to illustrate the individual king Asoka, but not to illustrate social conditions of his time.

The Asokan edicts clearly indicate that the authority of the Mauryan empire was being resisted by local allegiances ; that the country had undergone a period of religious intolerance ; that frequently local potentates were resisting the authority of Magadha on grounds of religious differences, and that bitter religious differences and arguments often tended to undermine the temporal authority of the State. The Asokan edicts were calculated to win the hearts of the people on ethical and moral grounds ; to soothe religious acerbities by appeal to the spirit of toleration, and to gain popular sanctions for the Mauryan empire against the opposition of the Brahmins. A more detailed examination of the texts of the Asokan edicts is bound to yield more information.

If the social context is analysed we may find the reasons for inscribing fragments of plays on stone-tablets at Ajmere and Dhar, and also for similar inscriptions of musical scores in South India. It may be possible to glean information from these attempts to secure permanent record, which is not yet done, and is of no value to the dynastic historian. Only in a period of apathy towards art and culture would the inscriptions of the above-mentioned type be made. And periods of apathy would only occur if local potentates were too harassed by war, or at the low ebb of their fortune and unable to patronise architecture and art. Or else the ideas inscribed were in some measure directly opposed to the prevailing views of the time.

Inscriptions relating to the Government store-houses like the Sohgaura plate should be looked to reveal monopoly state trading, and the commodities in which this was done and why was it done ? The inscriptions which have been catalogued and published more or less aggregate many thousands and range from the simple signature of a pilgrim to long and elaborate Sanskrit poems and treatises. They represent a wealth of material which has to be re-examined from the non-dynastic point of view.

Numismatic evidences are extremely valuable for dynastic history, but for the purposes of a social and economic history they do not contribute any information beyond the skeleton of chronology that they supply us. It is true that without a skeleton of chronology it is not possible to have the sense of *time* which is essential to all historical studies and which distinguishes it from other social sciences. Some authorities on Indian history have seen metal shortage in Muhammad bin Tughlak's experiments in token currency. Apart from this solitary instance, numismatic evidences do give a certain amount of information about internal and foreign trade. Hoards of coins removed from their mint should indicate brisk trade, and in the geographical distribution of Indian and foreign coins of a period considerable indication of trading conditions might be obtained. It is also possible to infer that in a period of economic prosperity more coins would be minted than in one of depression. But it is not certain that we would find all the coins that were minted in a period. A good amount of the earlier mintings might have gone to supply the metal for the later issues. Even then a numerical-geography of numismatic finds on the principles of ornitho-geographical research may help us form some comparative pictures of the economic life of the country through the centuries. The number of coins of a particular period found in each locality may be plotted over a map of India. An idea of the total number of coins found and the territory over which the finds are distributed would be formed for each period. But as indicated earlier no absolute reliance on the numismatic evidences about the economic and social life of the people can be formed. Some essentially comparative views can be had. That is all, but even that, I think, is worthwhile the trouble taken over it.

As regards archæological evidence we all know how valuable it is to study the stratification of archæological remains for chronology. And earlier in this present essay it has been hinted as to how an idea of the technological

advancement and the relationship between component human parts may be had from comparative studies of archæological remains. One of the clearest gauges of the economic and social organisation of a people is the study of how their surplus value was spent, and who accumulated and disbursed it. In an age where the priesthood are the dominant class, temples will take the largest share of the surplus value and would be built in that magnitude. When the Kshatriyas became more important, the surplus was spent on palaces and forts. Later when the private accumulation of wealth started, private houses were also built magnificently. In India in the age of Akbar for the first time we see magnificent private houses. Smith noted the following about archæological remains : "The scientific description of buildings erected for religious or civil purposes, such as temples, stupas, palaces and private houses, throws welcome light on the conditions prevailing in ancient times. The study of works of art, including images, frescoes and other objects, enables to draw in outline the history of Indian art, and often affords a most illuminating commentary on statements in books. The history of Indian religions cannot be properly understood by students who confine their attention to literary evidence. The testimony of the monuments and works of art are equally important, and in fact, those remains tell much of what is not to be learned from books. Intelligent appreciation of the material works wrought by the ancients is necessary for the formation of a true picture of the past." But Smith only considered the formation of this true picture of the past secondary to the main purpose of sketching a dynastic history.

In mediaeval Europe, as also in India, a study of the embellishment of the Church in its material possessions was one of the greatest factors influencing lives of the people and political developments. In India, a study of the religious orders, temples and monasteries is essential to any understanding of the past, for throughout its history religious

authority has been more in evidence in this country than the state authority. And religion has touched the economic and social life of the people to a greater extent than the state. The struggle between religion and the state became acute several times. Buddhism and Jainism were patronised by the ruling households on this account. Asoka's edicts sought to apply the anodyne on the wounds that this severe conflict had inflicted on the people. The growth of the Buddhist monastic order, however, forfeited to Buddhism the support of the ruling houses and resurgent Brahminism beat it down. The next period in which this struggle became particularly acute was during the days of Akbar. Like Asoka, the Mughal Emperor tried to preach toleration so that religious attachments might be lessened and the feudal class may be able to consolidate itself and face the two rival churches—one Hindu and another Moslem. Aurangzeb levied the *jezya* to assert the authority of the state primarily, though it is possible to see that in his anxiety to fight the Hindu religious authority which detracted from the imperial sway, he made concessions to and an alliance with the Moslem religious authority. The straightforward fight between temporal and spiritual authority that occurred between Alauddin and the Moslem religious leaders is of a different type.

Some authors have made an extensive, and sometimes an extravagant, use of tradition to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the past. A good portion of our knowledge of the period between 650 B.C. and 326 B.C. is wholly derived from tradition. In my opinion tradition which continues to be a rich source of historical information long after 326 B.C. can give more facts of the nature that a people's history requires than what it has yielded in shape of information about dynasties.

When we come to chronicles and ancient historical writings, sometimes contemporary with the events narrated, the paucity of material for a people's history is frequently appalling. The chronicles are ostensibly dynastic in their

outlook and hence. it is difficult to get more material out of them than what has been already extracted. In this sense the other sources are comparatively richer for the people's history than the ancient or mediaeval historical records.

Foreign testimony is, of course, in a different category. Some of the travellers have left us brilliant records of India, and like Alberuni, the travellers are not obsessed by kings and dynasties.

This brief and superficial discussion of the sources of history, already recognised and utilised, serves only one purpose and that is to indicate how more information can be had about our past from the sources which are believed to have been exploited to the utmost. But the main contribution of the new history is its method. Not only is the scope of enquiry broadened, but the method of enquiry is also improved. If history is the study of the sequel of our cultural landscape, we have to adopt a more scientific attitude towards our subject and the evidences before us. It is not only testimony which is to be our guide (as it has been so far) but an assessment whether the testimony is reliable or not ; whether the laws of social dynamics and the various forces of determinism at work would indicate the probability of the testimony being taken at its face-value. Dr. G. G. Coulton in a recent issue of *The Rationalist Annual* has discussed the subject of "truth in history". He has taken for his illustrations the ecclesiastical records and chronicles and has quoted the confession of Patriarch Agnellus, author of the lives of his many precursors and a source of medieval history. Agnellus prefaced his writings with a study of his sources and said : "Where I have not discovered any history of any of these bishops, and have not been able by conversation with aged men, or by inspection of monuments, or from any other, authentic source, to obtain information concerning them, in such a case, in order that there might be no break in the series, I have composed the life myself, with the help of God and the prayers of the brethren."

It is not only Agnellus who used the method of writing history by revelation. According to Dr. Coulton, "the Middle Ages have left us priceless chronicles in the simple form of Annals ; but, beyond this, the typical chronicler is like Froissart, frequently painful in his factual inaccuracies. The temptations to historical falsehood are as innumerable and ubiquitous as the temptations to international rivalry and war. Human curiosity invents history where it cannot find it." Both ancient historical writings, even when contemporary, and traditions suffer from the temptation to be inaccurately definite where information is lacking. In fact, the religious and metaphysical mind is frequently speculative, and does not admit frontiers to its knowledge inspite of its apparent humility. On the other hand, the scientific mind is never speculative ; it admits of frontiers to its knowledge without any hesitation. The scientific historian does not seek to fill in gaps, though in contemporary Indian historical research (particularly those of my illustrious co-citizen, the late Mr. K. P. Jayaswal) extravagant use of philological and place-name similarities has been made to fill in dynastic gaps which were not necessary. The dynastic historian is frequently confronted with this problem : that of filling in gaps. The chief merit of a dynastic history being its wealth of unrelated but chronologically linked facts, its inclination to fill gaps at the cost of veracity is great. A people's history does not suffer from the same obsessive necessity to fill in gaps. Its sweeps are wider, and it is more concerned with developments and influences than age. Gaps in the sequence of the cultural landscape are few, but wherever they occur very patient and systematic research alone can fill in the picture.

When we take the scientific outlook of history, our methods undergo a certain amount of modification. We have necessarily to notice the laws behind the social dynamics and then verify any testimony. Material verification of all testimony also becomes necessary—and in the process of

material verification we come across newer sources of history. In number 2 of *Ancient India* (Bulletin of the Archaeological Survey of India) the following observation is made : "Archæology in India is blest with a wealth and variety of material unsurpassed elsewhere in the world. With a proper effort, it can rival that of any other country. But a primary need is an enlargement of outlook, a fuller comprehension of the natural sciences as ancillaries to humanistic researches ; a more sustained urge on the part of our students if archæology and history are to supplement the study of the great literature which they have inherited by exploring, at first hand, the Good Earth which is India and is a heritage no less relevant to their enquiry."

Endorsing the views expressed above, the present writer would say that the division between archæology and history, or to say in other words between pre-history and history should be abolished. The story of man in India since his earliest habitation of this land (since the Pliocene) is history. The distinction between dated and undated history (pre-history) was allright till the emphasis on history was on dates.

A fuller comprehension of the natural sciences as ancillaries to humanistic researches is particularly valuable in the earlier periods of human development. The Pleistocene geology of India must be thoroughly worked and watched for historical information. Ethnological research must be pushed further, particularly in regard to craniometry of the skeletons found in the pre-historic caves. Even a people's history makes demands on our sense of time and so astronomical sources of chronology must be tapped. Tilak and others had tried by back-calculation to find the age of the Rigveda from positions of the Orion and other constellations noted in that ancient book. The results were not satisfactory, because the geographical poles were supposed to be fixed. This source of error could be partially corrected and the absurd antiquity of 4500 B. C. would not be obtained

if the same calculations are made allowing for shifting of the geographical pole in the light of researches on continental drift by Wegener and Van du Toit. The age of Mahabharata can also be calculated back if the reference to a complete solar eclipse at Hastinapur during that war is used astronomically to yield information.

The characteristic source that develops out of the new method of enquiry is the *cultural*. On a world view cultural patterns follow a dynamics of their own roughly. If the system of enquiry followed by geology and archæology is applied to history, we can, as in geology, identify cultural landscapes by their fossils. The fossils of the cultural landscape are monumental, epigraphic, sculptural, artistic, literary and philosophical. With a proper historical enquiry it would be possible to classify the cultural landscape into greater detail than primitive communist, antique, feudal and capitalist. Whenever we come across the debris of a particular type associated with a particular cultural landscape, we can reason back and identify the cultural landscape. Then it would be possible to check upon chronicles and tradition in a manner that has not been possible so far.

It might be helpful to illustrate the value of artistic, literary and philosophical evidences. It is always helpful to view the skill and style of artistic work together with utilitarian background of the work. What social element had made the demand on the artistic genius of the age? This is a valuable indicator of internal human relations between the component human parts.

M. N. Roy in one of his several speeches delivered in connection with the Indian Renaissance Movement made a brilliant contribution to the science of historical research. He said that it should be possible to reason back from existent philosophical and ideological works to know what kind of society prevailed at the time when a philosophical and literary work was composed. There is an intimate causal relationship between the conditions of an age and its

thoughts. Not only philosophical but various religious, political and other writings can be utilised in this manner to yield historical secrets.

This new and characteristic method of historical research needs development. It is too early to say much about it for the testing in actual research has not been tried so far. But with this method as with all historical methods reverence for truth and objectivity cannot be over-emphasised. At the outset of this article I had cautioned against biased histories, whether of the imperialist or nationalist variety. The strength of the workers in the new and scientific method of historical enquiry would lie in its followers to remember Dr. Coulton's words : "Therefore, let us, in the one as in the other case, work untiringly on all sides at our one clear aim of unravelling. We want to change Man's spirit ; but for this we must also change his environment ; and then by reaction, the more civilised environment will breed the higher spirit. Let no falsehood, however small, be encouraged or tolerated ; let it be exposed to the light of sane criticism."

CHRISTIANITY AND COMMUNISM

(Translated from the French text)

By *André Brissaud*

Zero and the Infinite (the French title of Arthur Koestler's book *Darkness at Noon*) is a fascinating literary work which cannot very well be placed in the category of novel, although it has the charm of a novel and is intensely evocative and lively, and has modern aesthetic appeal. Thought provoking political doctrines and profound philosophical theories expounded therein lift the captivating book out of the limited category of the novel to the high level of a valuable historical document. It is a brilliant illustration of communist revolutionary theses and a comprehensive concretisation of the political philosophy of Stalinist Marxism.

Indeed, philosophy and politics merge in this book, as it were, to provide the leitmotif of a grim tragedy which unfolds itself in the strictly authentic historical setting of the great Moscow Trials of the year 1936. Stirring and staggering scenes move with merciless swiftness on a stage surcharged with riotous emotions—sorrow, fear, anxiety and horror. It is the story, narrated with a stern objectivity, of the progressive degradation of a Marxist who believes himself true to his creed, and yet is compelled to deviate from the logical line of revolutionary action, laid down for members of the Russian Communist Party under its mighty and all-powerful Number One—Joseph Stalin.

In a brief introduction to the book, Arthur Koestler writes :

“The persons in this book are imaginary. The historical circumstances determining their actions are authentic. The life of S. N. Roubachoff is a synthesis of the lives of several men who became victims of the so-called Moscow Trials. Several

amongst them were personally known to the author. This book is dedicated to their memory.”*

The hero of the book, Roubachoff, is a companion of Lenin, a veteran revolutionary, who has fought in epoch-making battles to defend the revolution, a deposed leader of the Communist International, and an ex-People's Commissar. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin are symbolised in one person. At the same time, he reminds one of Trotzky also. He represents an old generation which imbibed Communism, as it were, with mother's milk, and grew up to live for it. His opposition to the ideas of a new generation, even though purely intellectual in the beginning, leads him step by step to an active opposition to the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Branded as a counter-revolutionary, he is thrown in prison. There he is subjected to the mysterious operation of a formidable machinery devised to break his morale and destroy his individuality. Finally, in the public trial he is made to abjure and dishonour himself abjectly in order to justify his condemnation to death.

Koestler's book brings out in clear relief the relation between the principles of a universal morality and the Marxist conception that ethical values are always functions of revolutionary action, of the evolution and social setting of man in the process of the unfolding of history. The conflict between Communism and Christianity is here depicted in its proper perspective.

“There are only two conceptions of human morality, and they are poles apart. The one is Christian and humanitarian ; it holds the individual to be sacred, and maintains that the rules of arithmetic do not apply to human entities which, in our equation, represent either 'zero' or the 'infinite'. The other conception starts from the fundamental principle that a collective end justifies all means, and not only permits, but postulates that the individual should be in every way subordinated and sacrificed to the community.”

* All quotations from Arthur Koestler are retranslated from the French edition as the original English text is not available.

That is the central theme of the book. The essential difference between Communism and Christianity, as regards the aims and objects towards which action tends in these two doctrines, is clearly grasped when one examines not only their systems of attitude and conduct, but also the methods of action and the means adopted for achieving the end. The absolute incompatibility of these doctrines comes out strikingly in their respective fundamental philosophical conceptions. Since morality necessarily flows from philosophy, let us try to throw some light on the characteristic ideas of Communist philosophy and of Christian philosophy, in order to understand better their opposing conceptions of morality.

The Communist philosophy is based essentially on the Materialism of Karl Marx and F. Engels. Its fundamental principles can be summarised as follows: Matter is the primary and eternal reality, and out of it comes the spirit. Intelligence appears *in* matter and *out of* matter, once the latter is in a suitable state of organization. Lenin admits with Feuerbach that

"Our conscience and our thought are products of a material organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of the spirit; indeed, spirit is the most eminent product of matter."

F. Engels categorically declares that

"The unity of the world does not consist in its being....The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and tedious development of philosophy and natural science." (*Anti-Duhring*, Pt. I, p. 41).

In another place, Engels writes:

"The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being....Which is primary?...The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world, creation in some form or other...comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism." (*Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 24-26)

Karl Marx deduced these fundamental propositions from classical German philosophy, English political economy and French Socialism.

With Engels, Marx took over and elaborated dialectics—the antique method of discussion practised by Plato, which served as a means to arrive at the truth by opposing contradictory opinions. Marx and Engels conceived dialectics as a universal law of nature. They keenly felt the necessity of a dynamic conception of the world, of society, of humanity. Aristotle had held that identity signified truth—eternal, universal, unalterable, absolute truth. Following Hegel, Marx and Engels rejected the Aristotelian doctrine. They maintained that dialectic was the clash of contraries ; that nothing was absolute, nothing definite ; that all was action, movement, transformation, becoming. With the dialectic method, based on experience and scientific investigation—(embryology makes the study of man possible, palaeontology the study of animals, history the study of the present),—one can think of the world, man, society, as in a process of constant discovery and scientific progress ; in that process, the world, man, society, undergo perpetual adaptation, constantly renewing and revivifying themselves. Action is the means to attain the supreme end of dialectics, which is to make the dialectical movement of ideas coincide with that of reality.

“In practice man must prove the truth, i. e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness (*Diesseitigkeit*) of his thinking....The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways ; the point however is to change it.” (Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, 2 & 11).

All through the works of Stalin, Lenin and Hegel, we can discern the laws of dialectics, which can be reduced to four : the *law of movement*—everything transforms itself unceasingly ; the *law of contradiction*—when contrary forces oppose each other, their clash engenders movement ; the *law of reciprocal action*—everything influences everything else ; and the *law of progress in jumps*—evolution leads to revolutions. Thus, dialectics can be defined as follows :

“Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of the motion and development of Nature, human society and thought.” (*Anti-Duhring*, I, p. 135).

Dialectical Materialism rejects any philosophy which is dogmatic, which would be content with contemplating the results of science and synthesising the sciences. Dialectical Materialism also rejects any philosophy which claims to be the creation of a single human mind, attaching all importance to collective pursuits, team work, encyclopedic endeavour.

The Marxian philosophical doctrine is applicable to society as Historical Materialism, which is defined by Lenin as follows :

“If, generally speaking, Materialism explains consciousness in terms of being, it postulates that, applied to the social life of humanity, social consciousness should find its explanation in social existence.” (Lenin, *Karl Marx and His Doctrine*)

The material condition of social existence even in its widest sense (including religion, politics, law and morality) is further claimed to be determined by the economic structure and the technique of production. Thus, the material forces of production determine, for the Marxists, the patterns of social life, and economic development determines the evolution of the social patterns. This shows the supreme importance attached to economic evolution, which determines all human activity. In the preface to the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels insists on this main principle which dominates their whole theory :

“In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily following it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch ; consequently, the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes ; the history of these class struggles forms a

series of evolutions in which, now a days, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without, at the same time, and once for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.” (*Communist Manifesto*, Preface, p. 28)

Marxism is atheistic. The direct consequence of its materialist philosophy is denial of the existence of God. There is no spiritual power ; matter is the origin of everything. God does not exist except as an imaginary creation of man. That is Marxian philosophy—a conception without finality and without God, inherited from Epikuros and Lucretius, Descartes and Spinoza, Helvetius and Diderot. And yet, *Communism is a religion*. It is, indeed, an atheistic religion ; nevertheless, it is a religion, in which we find, under a new garb, all that it denies.

God is replaced by a new idol : the proletariat, or even better, the ideal socialist society. Every action, every thought of the militant Communist is dedicated to the sacred cause ; it is a total sacrifice, joyfully offered, of his entire being. Communism permeates the whole life of the militant party member, and serves as the moral standard for his actions. The doctrine soon adopted a dogmatic character :

“The party is never wrong”, said Roubachoff. “The party is the incarnation of the revolutionary idea in history....We are doing the job of prophets without being equipped with their gift. We have replaced vision by logical deduction.... One proof refutes the other, and in the end we have had to fall back on belief—an axiomatic belief in the correctness of our own reasoning.” (*Darkness at Noon*)

A veritable dogma is authoritatively imposed on the adherents of this new religion, which has its own—may be revolutionary—Credo and Sacred Scriptures : the works of Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin. It has also its Messiah—Lenin, who is truly deified :

"Lenin is dead, but he lives in the spirit of every single member of the party. Every party member is a part of Lenin. Our entire Communist family is the collective incarnation of Lenin." (*Appeal of the Supreme Soviet*, January 22, 1924)

This religion has its High-Priest• as well as its Sanhedrim to interpret and elaborate Leninism : Stalin and the Supreme Soviet. Roubachoff says :

"Revolutionary theory has congealed into a dogmatic cult with a simplified catechism easy to grasp, with No. 1 as the High-Priest celebrating the philosophical Mass. The very style of his speeches and articles bears the stamp of infallible catechism ; they are divided up into questions and answers with a logic truly marvellous in its crude simplification of problems and facts." (*Darkness at Noon*)

This religion, as we shall see, has also its ethics, which proclaims as its basic principle that whatever corresponds to the interest of the proletariat is moral. "Whatever serves the class struggle of the revolutionary proletariat is good" (Jaroslowski). Communist perfection is the aim of this ethics, a perfection which postulates total dedication to the ideal and unquestioning endorsement of any action of the party, which demands readiness to sacrifice everything—friendship, family, work, habits, sentiments, and which categorically calls for absolute recognition of a single authority : the Party.

This new religion, which has its dogma, its God, its Credo, its Messiah, its Sacred Scriptures, its morality and its High-Priest, naturally conflicts with other religions. It is violently opposed to the Catholic religion, because Christianity is the greatest obstacle to the establishment of the "City of Communism".

Christianity, first and foremost, is a *religion*, that is to say, an active realisation of the relation between man and God. It grips the whole individual, his spirit, his heart, his will and his entire activity, which must be directed towards God, the final end of man. It is truth and life. Before

anybody can be a Christian, it is necessary for him to see clearly the end of existence and the design implied therein. According to Christianity, that requires first of all belief in God and realisation of his relation with creation, and then realisation of Him in daily life, through active devotion as well as through the readiness to orientate one's whole life towards God. In this way, man experiences intimate union with God, and realises the ultimate aim of life. But let there be no mistake : the Christian religion, as we shall endeavour to show, is not merely an individualist, but decidedly a social religion.

Christianity is a revealed religion ; its doctrinal contents are but partially accessible to the mere light of reason. The doctrinal foundation of Christianity is based on truths which can be known only through revelation, and which have to be admitted on the testimony of God. The revelation has been experienced by the Patriarchs, the Prophets of the Old Testament and by Christ, the "Son of God become Man", whose life and divine mission are narrated in the New Testament.

To this revealed religion man responds by faith. Faith means realisation of Christ, spiritual, living contact with God, a contact alive with luminous fullness. It is the assent of intelligence, based on the authority of God, to the truth revealed by God, especially by Christ, and which cannot be realised except under the influence of Grace and with the free consent of man. The surrender to Christ, the total surrender of the individual, wins for him an inner enrichment which brings him nearer to God. Faith compensates what is lacking in the Christian dogma, the material expression of the revealed Truth, which, however, does not exhaust the whole content of truth.

The following is an attempt at a brief analysis of some aspects of Christian metaphysics on which the Catholic Dogma is based. Knowledge of the systematic connection between the different metaphysical expressions enables us,

through analogies and comparisons, to separate what is essential for our comprehension from dogmatic Christian theology.

The teachings of the Faith do not provide any explicit indication regarding the reality of the external world. Yet, the entirety of Christian dogmas and morality presupposes this reality. Matter, being pure force, cannot be capable of any action ; since action is our only means of knowledge, we cannot know matter. That is the syllogistic Christian reasoning.

“Matter, though purely indeterminate being, is not just nothingness ; it is power,” declares Thomas of Aquinas (*Commentaria in Libros Aristotelis*, lect. IX, no. 3, 4).

“Ceux qui croient que la matière peut exister seule se figurent implicitement que l'être lui-même est un genre ; que la matière en est une espèce, et que cela suffit à la déterminer comme être. Mais cette donnée est fautive...L'être n'est pas un genre, c'est une notion transcendente et multiple (*ens dicitur multipliciter*).”^{*}

The Church categorically rejects the Cartesian realism which identifies matter with extendedness and counterposes the primary qualities (resistance and extension) to the secondary qualities (colour, smell and sound) as regards their reality. The Church maintains that these are mere manifestations objectively caused by the differences of matter. The materialist atomist theory, according to which matter really exists and is the only reality in the world, is denounced. The Church disowns the spiritualist idealism of Berkeley as well as Leibniz's theory of monads, together with the Hegelian thesis of the non-existence of matter as well as of spirit, according to which the pictures and ideas which 'our' spirit forms of matter are the successive manifestations of an unknowable Absolute.

* “Those who believe that matter can exist by itself imagine implicitly that Being itself is a genus ; that matter is a species thereof, and that suffices to define it as Being. But that is a wrong notion...Being is not a genus, it is a transcendental and multiple concept (*ens dicitur multipliciter*).” (R. P. Sertillanges, *Philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin*, tome II, p. 12.)

Christian metaphysics outlines a solution of the problem of ultimate reality. It affirms the existence of a dual creation, spirit and body (Latran Council of 1215), and defines human nature as follows :

“Corps passible et âme intelligente ou raisonnable informant essentiellement le corps.” (*Council of Vienna, 1311*)

To return to the Aristotelian doctrine adapted by St. Thomas of Aquinas, substantial form and primary matter are the metaphysical elements of corporeal beings :

“Existence is primarily idea, being mainly form, action ; matter is only a limitation, and like non-being mixed with being.” (*Sertillanges, Philosophie de St. Thomas, II, p. 77*)

Christian metaphysics rejects the Greek dualism of Plato, Aristotle and Anaxagoras regarding the origin of the world, just as it rejects the Manichean dualism as well as all forms of monism, whether materialist or spiritualist. Christianity recognises only *Creationism*. The origin of the world in creation is a dogma of the Catholic religion : creation is production of being out of non-being—completely so, without requiring any pre-existing object. “The created being is produced *ex nihilo sui et subjecti*.” God has created the Universe. He has created quite freely. The world had a beginning, and has not been created from eternity. God has created everything for his glory, which is also the happiness of the intelligent creature. “*Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei*.” (Psalm XIX, 2).

Space and Time are constructions of the mind, not arbitrary constructions, but formed on the basis of **sensory** data. There is neither space nor time independent of the corporeal beings. The very possibility of space and time disappears where the continuity of matter and motion ends. The “beyond” is not only non-existent, but inconceivable. Space and time are non-existent for souls separated from their bodies, that is to say, after death. Souls are nowhere, either in space or in time.

The Christian religion insists on this concept of the

soul existing by itself, in its intellectual and volitional activity, entirely independent of matter. The soul lives united with the body, yet it has its own existence which it imparts to the body. After death, it subsists 'formally' in its intellectual and volitional aspect. It subsists in its individuality; its immortality is conscious; and it is in full possession of its two essential faculties. At the time of death, the soul is judged by God, in the sense that it is mentally illuminated by God, by means of an idea; in a flash, the entire past and the sentence called for by it are revealed. Thereupon, the soul acquires the knowledge of the things and beings which are believed to constitute the place assigned to it by Divine Justice. The notions of Paradise, Purgatory and Hell are to be conceived only in this sense.

We have tried to lay bare as objectively as possible the philosophical foundations respectively of Christianity and Communism. It is remarkable how violently the two philosophies are opposed to each other. The following quotations are indispensable to show the magnitude of the clash between Christianity and Communism.

An avowed hostility to religion is a characteristic feature of Marxism. Lenin declared :

"Fear created the gods. Fear of the blind force of capital,—blind because its action cannot be foreseen by the masses.... This is the tap root of modern religion, which, first of all and above all, the materialist must keep in mind, if he does not wish to remain stuck up for ever in the infant school of Materialism." (*On Religion*, p. 24)

Marx himself was equally outspoken :

"Religious criticism is the precondition of all criticism.... The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is needed for their real happiness; they need to shed the illusions about their real condition, which requires illusions." (*Contribution to the Critique of the Philosophy of Law*)

To quote Lenin again :

"The idea of God has always lulled and blunted 'social emotions' and substituted concern for the dead for interest in the living. It has always involved the idea of slavery—of the

worst and most hopeless slavery. The idea of God never united the individual with society, it has always bound the oppressed classes by faith in the divinity to submission to their oppressors." (*On Religion*, p. 76)

Finally, here is what Bukharin explains in his *ABC of Communism* :

"Communism is incompatible with religious faith : a Communist who rejects the religious commandments and who acts according to the directives of the party, ceases to be a believer. On the other hand, a believer who pretends to be a Communist, but infringes the directives of the party in the name of his religious commandments, ceases to be a Communist."

Nor is the Catholic Church any more tolerant or moderate in its opposition to Communism. Pope Leo XII qualified Communism as

"the mortal pest which seizes the marrow of human society and destroys it." (*Quod Apostolici Muneris*, December 28, 1878)

Pope Pius IX declared that

"This nefarious doctrine called Communism runs directly against the natural law itself ; such a doctrine, once admitted, would spell total destruction of all the rights of the institutions, and all the proprieties of human society." (*Dui Pluribus*, November 9, 1846)

Lastly, Pope Pius XI declared in a long Encyclical devoted to atheist Communism, *Divini Redemptoris*, of March 13th, 1937 :

"Bolshevist and atheist Communism aspires to subvert the social order and to root out Christian civilisation....In such a doctrine, obviously, there is no place for the idea of God ; there is no difference between spirit and matter, or between soul and body ; there is no survival of the soul after death."

The present Pope, Pius XII, is no less categorical than his predecessors in his hostility to Communism, when he declares :

"We cannot be too wary, particularly in these days, of the Bolshevik conspiracy, which aims at nothing less than the destruction of the Christian order. Priests and troops alike must be on the alert, because the roaring lion is stirring, *quaerens quem devoret*."

The Christian conception of morality is inseparable from the theological doctrines which define the origin and end of man. The Communist conception of morality, on the other hand, is inseparable from the materialist philosophy, which regards the notions of Final Cause and Ultimate End as metaphysical, non-scientific, mythological, and therefore without interest.

“Religious criticism leads to the doctrine that, for mankind, man is the highest being. The doctrine logically sets up the categorical imperative of subverting a social system which puts man in a degraded, helpless and contemptible position.”

That is the point of departure of Marxist Humanism : return to concrete reality. This Humanism is the negation of traditional morality, that is to say, of Christian morality. Lenin maintains that the communists deny ethics and morality

“in the sense in which they are preached by the bourgeoisie, a sense which deduces these morals from God’s commandments. Of course, we say that we do not believe in God. We know perfectly well that the clergy, the landlords and the bourgeoisie all claimed to speak in the name of God, in order to protect their own interests as exploiters.” (*On Religion*, pp. 78-79.)

It should not be forgotten that Marxist theoreticians make morality dependent on society. Only the collectivity has real and inalienable rights. Subordinating the individual to society, Marxism holds that the life of the mind is only an expression of the relations between the human brain and social environments. Society produces and shapes ideas and gives them to man ; action has no value unless it is useful for the establishment and development of the future collectivist society ; morality must therefore correspond to the interests of a single class : the proletariat. In *Darkness at Noon*, Roubachoff, the hero of the book, writes in his diary :

“All conventions and all morality thrown over board, our only guiding principle is that of logical consequence....We do not admit the existence of any private sector, not even in the

brain of the individual....The party denies the free will of the individual...the possibility to choose between two solutions... the faculty to distinguish between good and evil..."

Marxian liberty can be understood only as necessity—of discovering, expressing and utilising the dialectical laws. For the Marxist, liberty is identical with creation : creation of himself and creation of the world. Man must make his own history, he is the maker—and the only maker—of his progress. "In acting on nature outside us", said Marx in *Capital*, "and in changing it, man changes his own nature." Man can and must make his future society ; this all-powerfulness is not arbitrary and does not rest in the isolated individual, but in the human species acting as a whole. This doctrine implies the total dependence of the individual on the social environment in which he develops, the individualist view of existence surrendering to the collectivist conception.

Christianity refuses to admit such a utilitarian and relativist morality, which is a consequence of dialectical materialism. Christianity refuses to sacrifice man to the collectivity ; it attaches primary importance to the concept of the human personality, and for that reason does not recognise the supremacy of any privileged class. It holds that not the proletariat alone deserves consideration ; it is concerned with the human being in all his social and spiritual diversity and multiplicity. It condemns Marxist relativism and utilitarianism because they are essentially egoistic, and holds that such morality has no absolute value.

"Communism deprives man of his freedom, the spiritual principle of moral conduct ; it divests human personality of all that constitute its dignity, of everything that morally resists the onslaught of the blind instincts. As against society, it does not grant any natural rights to the human personality....It is a system full of errors and sophistries, antagonistic both to reason as well as to Divine Revelation ; a doctrine subversive of the social order because it destroys its very foundations, a system which disowns the true origin, nature and purpose of the State as well as the rights of the human personality, man's dignity and liberty." (Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris*, March 19, 1937)

It is hardly necessary to comment on this condemnation by the Head of the Catholic Church, which shows that no compromise is ever possible between the two clashing views of the Universe and of human existence. For the one, the individual is zero, subordinated and sacrificed to the community, and, as Koestler says, "it is the quotient of a million in a million" (*Darkness at Noon*). For the other, the individual has sacred rights.

Nothing entitles us to say that the two doctrines are reconcilable ; on the contrary, to say so would amount to a gross error or a monstrous falsification. "The jokers and the dilettantes", says Koestler, "have always tried to mix up the two conceptions ; in reality, that is impossible." The fight between the two philosophies, the two systems of morality, is becoming more virulent and embittered every day, notwithstanding certain temporary and localised accommodation in some countries. The world can now realise that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the tenets of dialectical and historical Materialism and the rules of Christian traditional morality.

Everyone wants peace : the Christian, because he believes in charity and fraternity ; the Democrat, because he desires that peaceful well-being should reign in the world ; the Marxist, because he wants an era of universal justice ; and the Socialists, because they are for ever fighting for the happiness of the working class and the middle-classes. All are animated with the best of sentiments. All want the happiness of man. And yet, because all claim for their particular doctrine absolute and exclusive lucidity, truth and merit, they are unhesitatingly prepared to throw the world into a new catastrophe which would this time be absolute and apocalyptic.

We are not going here to pronounce judgment on Marxism and Christianity as philosophical or political doctrines. But it is necessary to realise, without condemning either the one or the other, that the equilibrium of the world

is lost because the irreconcilable clash of these doctrines leaves no other alternative than violent war or revolution, if humanity is to be allowed to assert itself in its historical march forward.

Can the catastrophe be avoided? Can we escape going over the precipice? We wish that men were wise enough to comprehend the urgency of laying the foundation of a new Humanism; we wish that this synthesis of the opposing forces was achieved for the sake of intelligence, justice, goodwill and dignity.

Society can of necessity demand certain sacrifices from the individual, but in return it must guarantee him free development—unfolding of his potentialities—by making him conscious of his collective responsibilities. Authority and freedom, human personality and power, the dignity of the individual and that of the State, must be reconcilable in a harmony of justice and truth.

Only then shall we perhaps experience the rise, out of the present state of ruin and conflict, of a new type of man, frankly revolutionary, yet peace-loving and humane, capable of putting his mark on the new civilisation which is yet to be.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

By M. N. Roy

Hegel said that the history of philosophy was the history of the world. Having learned from Hegel the philosophy of history, Marx corrected the master and declared that the history of civilisation was the history of class struggle. Nearly a whole century has passed since these apparently contradictory doctrines of historiology were expounded. The contradiction is apparent, because both Hegel and Marx regarded history as an organic evolutionary process of becoming unfolded by its own dynamics. Because the contradiction is apparent, even now the controversy is not settled, dispassionate thinkers finding it difficult to choose one or the other view.

The greatest historian of the nineteenth century advanced yet another dynamic doctrine of historiology, which seemed to combine the apparently conflicting views of Hegel and Marx. In the introduction to his projected, but never finished, *Universal History*, Michelet wrote in 1830 : "With the world began a war which will end only with the world : the war of man against nature, of spirit against matter, of liberty against fatality. History is nothing other than the record of this interminable struggle."

Nearly a generation before Marx, and independent of Hegel, a young Parisian professor, the would-be historian of the French Revolution, felt dissatisfied with the conventional views of history. Searching for a new method of writing history as a science, Michelet hit upon the idea that philology, the study of the origin of languages, might yield a clue to the secrets of the past history of peoples. The philological approach to the problems of historiology led Michelet to the conclusion that history was mingled with philosophy.

One hundred years before Michelet's effort to make a new science out of history, an obscure teacher of Roman Law at Naples, Giovanni Battista Vico, had written a treatise on the "Principles of a New Science Dealing with the Nature of Nations, Through Which Are Shown Also New Principles of the Natural Law of Peoples". Michelet discovered a kindred spirit in Vico,—a pioneer who had blazed a new trail of historical research. The central theme of Vico's until then little known work is that humanity is its own creation. Insisting upon the method that the facts of known history must be referred back to their primitive origin, in order to be properly appreciated, Vico established what he called "this incontestable truth : the social world is certainly the work of man." The corollary to this incontestable truth was "that one can and should find its principles in the modifications of human intelligence itself."

Young Michelet, writing "on the burning pavements of Paris" in the midst of the July Revolution of 1830, was struck by Vico's anthropological, philological and sociological approach to the problems of historical research. He was, as he himself declared, "seized by a frenzy caught from Vico, an incredible intoxication with his great historical principles." Michelet did not live long enough to write his *Universal History*, to show how history and philosophy had been intertwined through the ages. But he had occasion to proclaim that "all science is one : language, literature and history ; physics, mathematics and philosophy ; subjects which seem to be the most remote from one another are in reality connected, or rather they all form a single system."

So, the organic view of history is not the result of Marx putting his master on the feet. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels had read Michelet, and Vico's ideas were also not unknown to them. On the other hand, the "new science", born at Naples, had reached the German seats of learning through Wolf, Leibniz, Herder, Lessing, Goethe and other scholars and philosophers. Not only Herder knew

of Vico's work before he wrote his *Ideas Towards the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*; Vico's influence can be detected also in Hegel's philosophy of history.

Vico, in his turn, had read Francis Bacon's works. Unkind critics of the time thought that the *Scienza Nuova* was a plagiarism of *Novum Organum*. That was, of course, malicious; but it is a fact that Vico's work was cast on the pattern of Bacon's researches. It was from Bacon that Vico admittedly got the idea of applying to the study of human history the inductive method which the former had recommended for the study of natural history. Grotius had made a philological study of the history of theology and philosophy in order to discover universal laws of nations. Having studied his works, Vico conceived of the possibility of applying similar methods for discovering general laws of history. The dynamics of ideas can be traced all the way back to the great thinkers of the remotest antiquity.

Tracing the chain of thought in modern times, one finds Savigny recognising a similarity between Vico's doctrines of historical jurisprudence with his own. The preface to Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history published in 1837, mentions Vico as one of the three, the other two being Herder and Schlegel, who had treated the subject previously. The first German translation of Vico's *Universal Law*, published in 1854, carried an introduction which pointed out the similarity of Hegel's ideas with the doctrines of the Italian historian, expounded more than a hundred years ago. Moreover, it is quite possible that Hegel felt Vico's influence through the intermediary of Rousseau, who was at Venice when the finalised version of *Scienza Nuova* was published there. Judging from his *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, one can assume that Rousseau had picked up from Vico the idea of philological approach as the clue to the problems of the origin of civil society.

"Marx and Engels seem to have taken from Vico, perhaps in the first place through Michelet, but later at first

hand, the formula that 'men make their own history', from which their Historical Materialism was developed...Historical Materialism, in this sense, went beyond anything directly asserted by Vico, but as it seemed to his Marxist interpreters, in a direction in which he himself had gone a long way." (*Introduction to the Autobiography of Giambattista Vico*, translated by Max Harold Fisch and Thomas Goddard Bergin, pp. 105 & 107, pub. Cornell University Press, 1944).

Labriola was the first to give a systematic shape to the Marxian materialist conception of history. In his essays on the subject, he recognises Vico as the forerunner of Marx. Later on, Paul Lafargue more explicitly showed that the Marxist view of history could be traced back to Vico through Morgan. Early in his intellectual career, Marx himself had read Vico. In 1861, he expressed surprise at Lassalle's not having read the *Scienza Nuova*, and admired "its philosophic conception of the spirit of the Roman Law". In a footnote to *Capital*, Vico is actually mentioned as having said that "the essence of the distinction between human history and natural history is that the former is made by man and the latter is not". An exhaustive study of the works of Vico led Sorel to the conclusion that "Vico's ideogenetic laws" anticipated the Marxist doctrine that ideas are functions of the mode of production. Finally, Croce has revealed the Vician ancestry of Marxism: "Marx and Sorel have brought to maturity Vico's idea of the struggle of classes and the rejuvenation of society by a return to a primitive state of mind and new barbarism". (Benedetto Croce, *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico*, p. 243).

There is an unbroken chain of the evolution of ideas, which refuses to conform either with the Hegelian doctrine of dialectical development or with the Marxian materialist conception of history, although it does corroborate Hegel's philosophy of history rather than the economic determinism of Marx. Nevertheless, Marxism also fits into the reality of

the dynamics of ideas thanks to its idealistic essence. Vico learned from Bacon and Hobbes, but expounded his new science (of history) as a critique of the philosophy of natural law. On the other hand, Vico can hardly be called an ideologist of the proletarian revolution. He was a Catholic. Humanity is its own creation ; but God alone is great—he could not get away from such self-contradictory notions. Yet, Vico did anticipate the Marxian materialist interpretation of history, which is explicitly anti-religious and atheistic. To associate Marxism with any particular class, or even with any particular epoch, is to minimise its historical importance. Materialism is the essence of Marxism. If philosophy was the super-structure of social relations of a given epoch, then Materialism could not be earlier than Marx. But it is. It is as old as human thought. The rationalism of primitive man subordinated him to the gods. Philosophy originated in the earliest revolt against that original fall of man. Ever since then, it has had a dynamics of its own.

History is a history indeed of struggle, not only of classes, but of man against nature. Social evolution is but a continuation of the biological evolution taking place on a higher level, where the struggle for existence, to be more effective, becomes collective. That is why history is an organic evolutionary process.

Hegel's absolute idealism was the grand culmination of speculative thought—of the divine philosophy founded by Plato. But Hegelianism was not the liquidation of classical philosophy, as Engels asserted in his book on Feuerbach. Marx and Engels took over from Hegel much more than logic. The affinity between Hegel and Marx is usually not fully realised. "The Holy Family" was never dissolved completely. Marx and Engels remained Hegelians, because Hegel's Philosophy of history was essentially materialistic. As a spiritual progeny of Spinoza, Hegel could not help that, because pantheism is inverted materialism. On the other hand, dialectic process can never be independent of the

dynamics of thought. Therefore, Marx and Engels necessarily took over from Hegel a considerable element of idealism with his dialectics, which was never really put on its feet. The feat of having reversed Hegelian dialectics so as to manufacture materialism out of idealism, was a figment of imagination. Marx proclaimed his independence of the master by a simple *tour de force*. As a matter of fact, there is little of essential difference between Hegel's idealistic conception of the historical process and the Marxist doctrine of historical determinism.

The idealistic view of history places the Hero at the centre of the stage ; he is a demi-god, not bound by any law. The whole history of mankind is a composite biography of great men. Hegel completely discarded this view. His philosophy of history makes no room for heroes, regarded as supermen or demi-gods. The role of heroes in history is only to serve as the vehicle of the spirit of the age ; through them, the unconscious social purpose becomes conscious, and is realised. In other words, great men do not make history ; they are products of history.

This significant idea was quite explicit in Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history. Analysing the historical role of Julius Caesar, for example, he said : "It was not merely his private gain, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe." Then Hegel went on to generalise. "Such are all great historical men, whose own particular aims involve those larger issues which are the will of the World Spirit.... Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs ; on the contrary, they were practical political men. But at the same time, they were thinking men who had insight into the requirements of the time—what was ripe for development. This was the very Truth for their age, for their world."

This non-teleological view of the dynamics of history was shrouded in mystic jargon and metaphysical imageries

which were aptly described by Engels as "fever fantasies". But abstracted from that context of verbal extravagance, it was not only in the tradition of Vico, but indeed of Renaissance Humanism. On the other hand, the passage quoted above could be passed on as a quotation from Marx, provided that "historical necessity" is written in the place of the "World Spirit". If the term used by Hegel lends itself to an anthropomorphic interpretation, "historical necessity" can also be called a metaphysical conception, having a teleological connotation. Only the acumen of modern scholasticism could maintain that there is a difference between historical necessity and providential will. Referred ultimately to the revolutionary function of the new means of production, historical necessity has the connotation of predestination. The necessity of earning livelihood with the greatest economy of energy may explain why and how new means of production are evolved. But that necessity is not a metaphysical force. It is felt by man; and it is man's effort which satisfies the necessity. The realisation of the necessity expresses itself in the will of man; will motivates action; and new means of production are created. Man proposes, and also disposes. The Hegelian doctrine that freedom is the realisation of necessity provides the human dynamics to the Marxist theory of social evolution. Alternatively, evolution of the means of production will have to be regarded as a predetermined automatic process, the final cause of which must be somewhere beyond the reach of human intelligence. In order to keep determinism within the reach of human history, it is necessary to recognise the creative genius of man. Otherwise, the dictum that man makes history will be only an euphemism. In other words, the dynamics of ideas, the unconscious purpose of society finding expression through thinking men, is the very essence of an organic view of history as expounded by Vico, Michelet and Marx.

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." This last sentence

of the famous *Theses on Feuerbach* is supposed to mark out Marxism as a philosophy of action, distinct from all the older systems of speculative thought. The source of inspiration for his philosophy of action, Marx, however, found in Hegel's "Idealism" which, like all consistent systems of metaphysical speculation, laid the foundation of the materialist philosophy.

Leaving aside Spinoza's concept of "soulful matter", one can easily see that a little contemplation reveals the materialist implication of the monadology of Leibniz, and of Kant's "transcendentalism". The concept of "thing-in-itself" is a testimony to the reality of the "external world". The dynamic concept of the Idea in dialectic relation to nature and history indicated escape from idle metaphysical speculation, and provided a basis for action with high ideals, for intellectual participation in the affairs of the secular world with the object of re-making it and with the conviction that the thinking man has the power to do so.

This essence of Hegelian idealism captivated the imagination of young Marx. The German interpretation of the eighteenth century materialism had failed to appreciate the importance of ideas in the evolutionary process. It had gone to the extent of denying the objective reality of ideas, regarding them as mere "secretions of the brain" (Bucchner). Marx categorically rejected that absurdity. Engels traced the origin of thought to "matter-in-motion". Logically, he admitted, the two were co-existent in the process of biological evolution, and as such bound to be mutually influenced and determined. Otherwise, man could not possibly be the maker of the social world. The *ad hoc* concept of matter-in-motion does improve upon the Newtonian natural philosophy which, notwithstanding its mechanistic view of the physical Universe, makes room for a *deus ex machina*. Nevertheless, as "motion" (later on conceived as energy or the vital force), Newton's *deus ex machina* re-enters the picture to interfere, in the last analysis, with the processes of evolution—physical,

biological and social. Man being thus deprived of all creative power, the Marxian philosophy of action would have no leg to stand on. Therefore, Marxist materialism, to be a self-contained system of philosophical thought, necessarily, though not always explicitly, recognises the sovereignty of ideas, and admits that they are as real as physical and social processes. Just as rational idealism, as distinct from theology and teleology, was logically bound to culminate into materialist monism, similarly, materialist philosophy must include recognition of the objective reality of ideas, with their own dynamics, if it is not to degenerate into vulgarity, or relapse into Newtonian natural philosophy which makes room even for an anthropomorphic God.

Marx and Engels were quite conscious of their Hegelian heritage, which they never really disowned. Marx was an unabashed idealist, even when he wrote his theses on Epicurus which outlined the fundamental principles of his materialist philosophy. Engels also was equally outspoken. "That everlasting struggle and movement of peoples and heroes, above which in the eternal world soars the Idea, only to swoop down into the thick of the fight and become the actual, self-conscious soul—there you have the source of every salvation and redemption, there the kingdom in which everyone of us ought to struggle and be active at his post."

During the twenties and thirties of the nineteenth century, Hegel dominated the intellectual life of Germany, and during that period, Germany made a considerable contribution to historical criticism which reinforced materialist philosophy. Competent historians of philosophy hold that the decline of German idealism began in 1830.

Thereafter, Hegelianism became the instrument of a struggle against the power of the Church, theology and the religious view of life. With the publication of Strauss's *Life of Jesus* in 1835, the leadership of a free criticism of religious tradition passed to Germany from England and France. Strauss was a Hegelian, and never disowned the master.

"We may say that idealism itself lent assistance to materialism in awakening the sense for the systematic working out of leading ideas, and in provoking, by its very opposition, the young and aspiring natural sciences. To this was added that in no country had such general freedom been attained from religious prejudices and ecclesiastical pretensions, and one's own ideas, as it were, so much claimed as a necessity for all educated persons. Here too, it was idealism that had prepared the way in which materialism might later move along, almost without any hindrance worth naming; and if this circumstance is often entirely overlooked by materialists, or even entirely misrepresented, that is only one of the many signs of the unhistorical sense that is so often found combined with materialism." (Albert Lange, *The History of Materialism*, Part II, p. 244.)

The parentage of modern materialism is ascribed to Feuerbach as well as to David Strauss. The former's materialist Humanism is the transition from Hegel's idealism to the materialism of Marx. Feuerbach built his materialist Humanism on the basis of the ancient doctrine of Protagoras: Man is the measure of things. And he learned it from Hegel, who was also a Humanist of the ancient sophist tradition, which inspired materialist philosophy in all ages. Hegel departed from metaphysical idealism in that he opposed the human mode of knowing to the universal mode of knowing. "His whole system moves within the circle of our thoughts and fancies as to things to which high-sounding names are given. The antithesis between essence and appearance is in Hegel nothing more than an antithesis of two human modes of conception." (*Ibid.*, p. 249) That aspect of Hegelianism was the starting point of Feuerbach's humanist philosophy, which went into the making of Marxist materialism.

Feuerbach wrote: "All our ideas spring from the senses. Idealism is, therefore, right in seeking in man the origin of ideas, but wrong in trying to derive them from

isolated man as a being existing for himself and fixed as a soul. Ideas arise only through communication, only out of the converse of man with man. Not alone, but only in virtue of a duality, we attain to ideas and to reason. Two human beings appertain to the production of man, as well of spiritual as of physical man ; the community of man with man is the first principle and criterion of the true and the universal." (Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft.*)

Feuerbach derived all that from Hegel, and Marx built upon the foundation laid by the humanist Feuerbach. It is true that Marx and Engels were very critical of Feuerbach's Humanism, which actually did lend itself to Max Stirner's philosophical anarchism. But in so far as Marxist materialism disowns Feuerbach's Humanism, it is defective. That defect divorces materialism from ethics, and consequently opens up the possibility of its degenerating into a carnal pragmatic view of life.

In his last book, *Der Alte und der Neue Glaube*, published in 1872, Strauss declares his adhesion to the materialist view, but even then he shows how materialism and idealism flow into each other. "The whole mind of a true Hegelian was schooled and exercised to pass over unsuspectingly the point where materialism and idealism separate. His (Strauss's) materialistic testament has all the appearance of a fruit ripened through many years." (Lange, *History of Materialism*, Part III, p. 325.)

It was Hegel who first propounded the doctrine of the identity of thought and being, which was taken over by Marx and Engels as one of the fundamental principles of their dialectic materialism. It is an essentially idealistic doctrine. Identity of two things implies the notion of their co-existence. Physical being transcends the beginning of biological evolution. If thought is identical with being, then, it must be admitted that consciousness, in which thought originates, is not conditional on life ; that there is such a thing as cosmic

consciousness co-existent with the physical Universe. That admission, logically compelled by the doctrine of the identity of thought and being, thoughtlessly incorporated in Marxist materialism, strikes at the root of materialist philosophy. On the other hand, if the doctrine is that thought is identical with being, from a certain level of biological evolution, then, it cancels the other Marxist doctrine that ideological systems are mere super-structures of economic relations. In the context of materialist philosophy, which associates consciousness with life, and traces the origin of life in organic matter (carbon compound), the doctrine of identity of thought and being only means that in the biological evolutionary process, including social evolution and history, thought is co-existent with physical (social) being. With this doctrine, shared by both, idealism flows into materialism. The latter can replace the former as the philosophy of the contemporary and future life only by taking over the positive outcome of the entire past history of thought.

As a neo-Kantian, Albert Lange was a severe critic of Hegel. Yet, he was forced to concede that Hegel greatly influenced the development of historiology, which came to be known as the materialist conception of history. The critical Lange further testifies that Hegel's contribution to the history of civilisation was considerable. Still another critic of Hegel corroborates Lange's concession: "If our historical writing no longer contents itself with the learned discovery and critical sifting of traditions, with the ordering and pragmatic exposition of facts, but, above all, seeks to understand the deep-lying connection of events, and to take a large view of the historical development and the intellectual forces that govern it, this process is not last to be referred to the influence which Hegel's philosophy of history has exercised even upon those who never belonged to his school." (Zeller, *Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie.*)

Hegel thus prepared the ground for Marx. Indeed, the

Marxist view of historical progress is essentially analogous to the dialectical movement of Hegelian philosophy. Hegel established a philosophical relation between classical idealism and the naturalism of the Renaissance. The physical world of phenomena is not dismissed as a deceptive appearance. It is real. The absolute idea manifests itself in the dialectic relation with nature. The dialectic relation between idea and physical existence, between thought and being, is classically depicted in the following passage :

“The absolute concept does not only exist—where unknown—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. Then it alienates itself by changing into nature, where, without consciousness of itself, distinguished as the necessity of nature, it goes through a new development, and finally comes again to self-consciousness in man—completely in the Hegelian philosophy.” (Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*)

Engels was sarcastic, but he could not prove that Marxian dialectics was essentially different from the Hegelian. The difference is only in the choice of phraseology, and as regards priority. The question of priority is an epistemological question. It is irrelevant in history. There, both the categories—idea and being—are given, and historical events presuppose the thinking mind ; thought precedes action.

Trying to combine rationalism, the view that history is a determined process, with the romantic view of life, which declares the freedom of will, Marxist historiology contradicts itself. Not that the two cannot be combined. They are combined in Hegel's dialectics. As a matter of fact, the notion of progress is a product of reason and romanticism. Nature is a rational system ; so is society, because it is a part of nature, social evolution being a prolongation of the biological evolution. If the mechanistic view is not to be tampered with, then neither a *deus ex machina* should be allowed to wind up the clock of the evolution of the physical Universe, nor any conscious effort

of man is to influence the unfolding of social forces. And the mechanistic view of the physical, biological and social evolutions is the very essence of materialism. The doctrine, whether of Vico or of Michelet or of Marx, that man is the maker of the social world, contradicts materialist philosophy, unless the mechanistic view of evolution is clearly differentiated from teleology ; unless romanticism is reconciled with reason ; and will (freedom) is fitted into the scheme of a determined evolutionary process. That can be done only by recognising the creative role of man, not as a mere cog in the wheel of a mechanistic process, determined by the development of the means of production, but as a sovereign force, a thinking being who creates the means of production. Otherwise, the rationalist concept of determinism cannot be distinguished from the teleological doctrine of predestination. The idea of freedom, the possibility of choice, distinguishes the one from the other. If the rationalist view of history precluded the romantic attitude to life, then, there would be no room for revolutions in history, the concept of freedom should be written off as an empty ideal. Yet, according to Marxism, revolutions take place of necessity ; they are historically necessary. The point of departure of the Marxist philosophy of action, the point where it is supposed to break off from the idealism of Hegelian dialectics, is that man makes history. That is also the fundamental principle of romanticism. Unless this idealistic core of Marxism is clearly grasped, the romantic idea of revolution, to be brought about by human endeavour, cannot be harmonised with the rationalist view of progress, which is the essence of materialist philosophy.

The recognition of the decisive role played by thinking men, that is to say, by ideas, in historical processes, runs counter neither to the rationalist notion of progress nor to the mechanistic view of evolution. The harmony between the rationalist conception of progress and the romantic idea of revolution also takes place in the materialist philosophy,

which is not a negation of idealism, but absorbs idealism and goes beyond by tracing the roots of ideas in the rational scheme of nature. The thinking man acts upon the process of social evolution not as a *deus ex machina*; he is an integral part of the process itself. The human brain, is also a means of production—of ideas, which motivate action to create history.

These philosophical implications of Marxism were not clearly thought out by its founders. Therefore, the Marxist view of history is vitiated by the contradiction between rationalism and the romantic notion of revolution. With his rationalism, which is the essence of his materialist philosophy, Marx was a humanist, and as such a romanticist. He combined, as Hyndman wrote, the "righteous fury of the great seers of his race with the cold analytical power of Spinoza." A different personality could not be the prophet of revolution; because any successful revolution is conditional on a combination of thought and action inspired by a harmony of rationalism and the romantic view of life. Revolutions are historically necessary; therefore men can bring them about. The apparently contradictory concepts of necessity and freedom are harmonised in Marxism. That is Hegelian dialectics taking its revenge upon Marx.

The harmony is in the thesis that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." This basic doctrine of the Marxist philosophy of revolution is a legacy of Renaissance Humanism, which saw the relation between history and philosophy. Inspired by the humanist tradition, Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning* emphasised on the necessity of shifting importance from precept to application, from theory to practice, from philosophy to history. Bacon, at the same time, was a rationalist, the exponent of inductive logic, which made Newtonian mechanistic natural philosophy possible. Inspired by Bacon's humanist approach to historiography, Vico's *Scienza Nuova* unfolded the romantic vista of

humanity creating itself. The relation between Marx and Bacon can be traced far backward through the history of philosophy.

Aristotle conceived history as a rational evolutionary process. The organic conception of history was taken over by the Stoics, who dominated European thought until it came under the influence of Christian theology expounded by the genius of St. Augustin. After a whole millennium of scholasticism, the rationalist view of human progress was revived by the Men of the Renaissance. That was a demonstration of rationalism and romanticism being two parallel currents of thought which intermingled themselves to make history. The romanticists of the Renaissance themselves argued "that it was absurd to regard the whole period from Constantin to Columbus as a mere empty chasm separating two kindred ages of enlightenment ; but that, on the contrary, it was necessary to perceive beneath the surface of things one continuous purpose slowly working itself out in this and every age." (Prof. F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *The Science of History in The Outline of Modern Knowledge*, p. 801.)

Historically speaking, there were two Aristotles : the author of *Metaphysics* and *Logic*, claimed as the philosophical authority of mediaeval Christian theology ; and the author of *Politics* and *Ethics*. The latter was completely forgotten until the Arabs resurrected him and introduced him to Europe, to be taken over by the Renaissance humanists. The evolutionary view of human progress was thereafter elaborated by a galaxy of luminaries in the firmament of the world of thought. Finally, Hegel shaped it as the key to world-history or the history of civilisation. "He saw the whole process of the political development of the human race as a gradual realisation of the idea of freedom." (Ibid.) That evidently is the common ground for Hegel's idealism and Marxian materialism. Any hiatus in the evolution of thought since the dawn of civilisation is only imagined by those who claim to have sucked out of their own thumb a

whole philosophy of the future, which has no past. The history of thought is the key to the history of civilisation, because it can be logically reconstructed.

To keep some sort of record of the past in the form of legend and mythology has been a common practice with all ancient peoples. But the writing of history did not begin until the Greeks, with their remarkable rational and secular approach to every problem of human existence, appeared on the scene of antiquity. The progressively triumphant age-long struggle for the spiritual emancipation of man began when in 585 B.C. an eclipse took place according to the prediction of Thales. That epoch-making experience suggested to the bold Ionian thinkers the idea that physical phenomena and social events were not brought about by the caprice of countless gods. With the awakening of an insatiable curiosity, they began to enquire into everything including the past of the human race. The Hegelian view that philosophy is the clue to history, that "history is philosophy teaching by example" (Bolingbroke), originated with Thucydides, and expounded almost in its modern form by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first century B. C. Philosophy having inspired the writing of history, its history, logically as well as empirically, provided the motive force of the history of civilisation, which is, as Michelet said, the story of man's struggle against nature, the war of liberty against fatality.

During the thousand years when the secular spirit of enquiry was overwhelmed by the Christian faith, history naturally became a handmaid of theology. But that also was a blessing in disguise. Patristic historiography was the creator of the science of history. The history of man, from his fall in the Garden of Eden to his redemption, could not be imagined except as an evolutionary process, a causal chain of events. Even the dogma of predestination is essentially a rational concept. After the miracle of creation, nothing comes out of nothing; every step in man's life, towards salvation or redemption, is caused—indeed, by the will of

God, but none the less caused. That is a rational view, which patristic history had to develop in order to fortify the position of the Catholic Church. The *Ecclesiastical History* of Eusebius, written early in the fourth century, was the first attempt to write a history of human society. St. Augustin's *Civitas Dei*, written a century later, was a landmark in world literature, not because of the effort to rationalise the Nicean creed, but because, in spite of itself, it was the first essay in the philosophy of history.

Matter is indestructible ; so are ideas. Thousand years of almost impenetrable darkness could not extinguish the fire of the spirit of enquiry kindled by the founders of science and philosophy. Disowned by Christian Europe, the inspiring tradition of man's early struggle against nature was treasured by the infidel Arabs, who eventually passed it on to the natural heirs, so to say. Learning from the Greek masters, particularly Aristotle, a succession of Arab scholars, from the tenth century onwards, occupied themselves with the science of history. The culmination was Ibn Khaldun's *Universal History*, written at the close of the fourteenth century. It was such a profound treatise on the philosophy of history that Professor Flint called the author "the founder of the science of history." (R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*). The Arabic culture, inspired by the secular and rational spirit of the ancient Greek philosophers, reached Europe through the universities of Spain and Italy. Its contribution to the European Renaissance was incalculable. With the humanist revival of secularised history, a cycle of the dynamics of ideas was complete. Embodying the precious heritage of the past stretching out to the remotest antiquity, Vico indicated the future development. The philosophy of history and the history of philosophy mingled in his work. Therefore, Vico was hailed by Michelet as his master, and Michelet harmonised the apparently contradictory Hegelian and Marxian views of history.

Vico spoke of "two histories—that of languages and

that of things". By things, he evidently meant human acts—social and political. If events were given a wider connotation, history would have to include at least geology. Vico suggested that philology should be considered as a part of history. That was a great idea, which revealed the intimate connection between history and philosophy. Because, philology is also a part of philosophy. The earlier stages of the history of philosophy merge into the history of languages. The method of the science of history is criticism, as observation and experiment are the methods of the physical sciences. The past is to be studied for a rational explanation of the present. The discovery of a rational connection between the past and the present of the human race shows up history as an evolutionary process; consequently, it becomes possible to deduce some general laws governing historical events. But the past is not there for the historian to study. There are only records. They are of two kinds—physical (implements, ruins of buildings, works of art and craft, etc.) and written documents. The latter can be called mental or spiritual records; and they are of the primary importance, because only with their help can the significance of the physical records be fully appreciated. Philology is the instrument for reconstructing a universal history of the past on the basis of a criticism of written records. History of languages thus is a part of the science of history. On the other hand, words originate in course of the process of biological evolution to serve as vehicles for the expression and communication of primitive ideas and emotions. Languages develop to serve the purpose of co-ordinating disjointed ideas and emotions. So, the history of languages is the history of the evolution of thought—the history of primitive philosophy. Since without the aid of philology no history could be written, to that extent, Hegel was right in saying that the history of philosophy was the history of civilisation. Most probably, he got the idea from Vico's doctrine of two histories. The fact, however, is that by critical study of the

records of the past, history discovers the hidden springs of human action. So, the past can be reconstructed more accurately as the history of thought. If Hegel's dictum is stated in Croce's words—"all true historians are willy-nilly philosophers"—then, it can be appreciated as containing the generally acceptable truth about history.

The materialist conception of history, to identify the history of civilisation with the history of class struggle, loses all sense if intelligence is accorded no place in the process of social evolution. In that case, Marxism as a philosophy of action will have no leg to stand on, and revolutions will be impossible. They are historically necessary, but they are also made by men moved by the idea of revolution. In any case, it is palpably absurd to regard history as a succession of events brought about by the automatic development of the means of production. The man cannot be eliminated from the evolutionary process of history. Social forces are not metaphysical categories; they are the collective expression of the creativeness of man, and the creative man is always a thinking man.

Philosophically also, the materialist conception of history must recognise the creative role of intelligence. Materialism does not deny the objective reality of ideas. They are not *sui generis*. They are biologically determined; priority belongs to the physical being, to matter, if the old-fashioned term may still be used. But once the biologically determined process of ideation is complete, ideas are formed, they continue to have an autonomous existence, an evolutionary process of their own, which runs parallel to the physical process of human evolution. The two parallel processes, ideal and physical, compose the process of social evolution. Both are determined by their respective logic, or dynamics, or dialectics. At the same time, they are mutually influenced, the one by the other. That is how history becomes an organic process. If the present can be convincingly explained by a more rational understanding of the past,

then it will be evident that only a synthesis of idealism and materialism, more correctly speaking, a dispassionate and comprehensive appreciation of the entire heritage of human thought, can be the philosophy of the future. Only such a non-partisan philosophy will throw a flood of light on the deep gloom which to-day hangs on the horizon, and blaze new trails for humanity to get out of the present impasse.

To put the proposition more precisely, what is needed is a restatement of materialism, so as to recognise explicitly the decisive importance of the dynamics of ideas in all the processes of human evolution—historical, social, political and cultural. Epistemologically, idealism stands rejected. The old problem of perception, which baffled philosophy for ages, has been solved by modern materialism with the aid of the latest discoveries of physiology. The gulf between physics and psychology is no longer unbridgeable. The bridge is thrown across by merging psychology into physiology. All components of the most highly developed organism can be reduced to carbon compounds which are physico-chemical substances. Vitalism cannot introduce a mysterious metaphysical factor (*elan vital* of Bergson or *entelechy* of Driesch) into the process of biological evolution without leaving the ground of experimental science. In so far as idealism takes philosophy beyond the radius of experience and invokes super-sensual categories, it is hardly distinguishable from religion. As such, it is of no use for man in quest of freedom. It is long since Plato's Universals have been relegated to the realm of poetry. Honest consistent idealist philosophy has had little to add to the ancient sage. Modern idealism since Descartes could never get out of the vicious circle of dualism, which stultifies philosophy, because it leads to religion. Notwithstanding his transcendentalism, Kant was more of a materialist than usually perceived. The Monist idealism of Spinoza and Hegel was inverted materialism. The other modern schools of adulterated, rationalised idealism are "shame-faced" materialism.

In so far as it claims nothing more than that *ideas have an independent history of their own*, that the history of philosophy (dialectical development of ideas) is the master-key to the problem of reconstructing the history of the race from the dawn of civilisation, idealism flows into materialism, the two together providing a rational, comprehensive explanation of the past and present, and a guide for mankind exploring the unknown depths of the future.

“Quick transitions to new types of civilisation are only possible when thought has run ahead of realisation. The vigour of the race then pushes forward into the adventure of imagination. The world dream of things to come, then, in due season, arouses itself to their realisation. Given the vigour of adventure, sooner or later, the leap of imagination reaches beyond the safe limits of the epoch, and beyond the safe limits of learned rules of taste. It then produces the dislocation and confusion marking the advent of new ideals for civilised efforts.” (A. N. Whitehead, *Adventure of Ideas*)

No sensible materialist would find any difficulty in sharing that view of a front rank idealist philosopher of our time. There is no other way to explain how great revolutions take place in history. History is made more by the brain of man than by his brawn. Without recognising idea as the driving force of history, the materialist conception of history becomes a very superficial doctrine, and historical determinism a fallacious proposition. The view that social evolution and even cultural history are determined entirely by the operation of economic forces, does not necessarily follow from materialism. Even in the narrow sense of a social philosophy, Marxism is not identical with economic determinism. Materialism is the only philosophy possible; economic determinism is *a* method of interpreting history. There are other methods. Social, political and cultural history is determined, because nature is a cosmos—a law-governed, rational system. But just as in nature, there are more than one determining factor in history also. Human

intelligence is one of them. The equations of the science of history must embrace all the determining factors. Cultural history, particularly, is ideally determined.

Moreover, determinism is a logical concept. It is inherent in the process of becoming. No extraneous agency intervenes to determine the process, because in that case it would admit of dualism, whereas monism is inherent in the logical concept of determinism. Since materialism alone makes monism possible, it is the only logically perfect philosophy. Economic determinism, being a dualist concept, cannot be necessarily related to materialism.

The materialist conception of history fails when it dismisses ideal systems (ideologies) as mere super-structures of economic relations, and tries to relate them directly with the material conditions of life. The logical development of ideas and the generation of new social forces take place simultaneously, together providing the motive force of history. But in any given period, they cannot be causally connected, except in the sense that action is motivated by ideas. A new idea must be referred back to an old idea. Philosophy has a history of its own, and it is not a kaleidoscope of phantoms. In as much as action is motivated by ideas, determinism in history is primarily ideal. Historical determinism comes to grief whenever its exponents take a superficial, one-sided view, ignoring the dynamics of ideas.

From time to time, the march of history is obstructed by the requirements of the established social order, which sets a limit to human creativeness, mental as well as physical. The urge for progress and freedom, born out of the biological struggle for existence, asserts itself with a renewed vigour to break down the obstacle. A new social order, conducive to a less hampered unfolding of human potentialities, is visualised by men embodying the liberating ideas and cultural values created in the past. A new philosophy is born out of the spiritual heritage of mankind to herald a reorganisation of society.

The passionate belief in the creativeness and freedom of man is the essence of the romantic view of life. The idea of revolution, therefore, is romantic ; at the same time, it is rational, because revolutions take place of necessity. Revolution thus appears to be a self-contradictory concept. Can reason and romanticism be fitted into the self-same evolutionary process ? That is a fundamental problem of the philosophy of history.

The rational order of nature and history is predetermined ; it must run its course ; it cannot be changed by any human endeavour. This rationalist view seems to exclude the possibility of revolution. But there is another way of looking at the thing without abandoning the rationalist view. Human will is a part of nature ; it also grows out of the rational order. Man's desire and endeavours in pursuance thereof are also determined ; therefore, revolutions take place of necessity ; they are historically determined. As mutations in history, they are inherent in the rational process of social evolution.

The difference between reason and romanticism is that one perceives what is necessary, and therefore possible ; whereas the other declares impetuously what is desirable, what should be done. Is the idea of revolution, then, irrational ? Is there no room for reason in the scheme of revolutionary practice ? There must be, if revolutions take place of necessity. Romanticism, tempered with reason, and rationalism enlivened by the romantic spirit of adventure, pave the road to successful revolutions.

The apparently baffling problem stated above arises from a syllogistic simplification of the complicated warp and woof of actual life, unfolding itself in the context of the rational system of nature. Rationalism is the intellectual and moral sanction for the classical view of life. Classicism is conservative. On the other hand, romanticism is a revolt against the classical conservative attitude to life ; therefore, it is irrational. This syllogistic

simplification confuses teleological rationalism with the secular concept of reason. The latter is identical with human intelligence, and therefore cannot be antithetical to will. In the last analysis, there is no contradiction between rationalism and the romantic view of life. The two are harmonised in the idea of revolution. If romanticism is the urge of the will of man to break out of the elaborate chains of tradition, orthodoxy and teleological reason, then, it is the most powerful incentive to revolution.

The romantic view of life is subjective. It logically leads to the liberating doctrine—man is the maker of the world—developed during a whole period of history, from Vico to Marx. Indeed, it originated earlier, in the Renaissance, which represented the revolt of man against the tyranny of teleological reason and theological moral order. On the other hand, secular rationalism, developed in the modern scientific view of life, is objective. It places man, grown out of the background of an evolutionary process in the context of a law-governed physical Universe, in the centre of the world, ultimately subject to the laws of nature, but having the possibility, if not actual power, of progressively acquiring mastery over it. Essentially, there is little difference between the two views of life. Modern psychology has eliminated the distinction between the subjective and the objective. By doing so, it has solved the old problem of perception, and freed philosophy from the vicious circle of epistemology.

Marxism is the attempted synthesis between the two apparently antithetical views of life—rational and romantic. Perhaps Marx himself was not aware of the far-reaching implication of his philosophy; therefore, it remained full of fallacies which could be explained away only by dogmatic interpretations and spurious interpolations. The attempt will have to be completed so as to

*combine the various currents of past thought into a comprehensive system of philosophy of life. But thereafter new contradictions will arise, and the dialectical process of history—of philosophy as well as social events—will go on and on, for ever. That philosophy is sublime which opens up before mankind the vista of infinity without deluding it into the wilderness of metaphysical abstractions.**

* Introductory chapter to *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution* which will be published in course of the year.

NEW HUMANISM

PRINCIPLES OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY

1

Man is the archetype of society. Co-operative social relationships contribute to develop individual potentialities. But the development of the individual is the measure of social progress. Collectivity presupposes the existence of individuals. Except as the sum total of freedom and well-being actually enjoyed by individuals, social liberation and progress are imaginary ideals, which are never attained. Well-being, if it is actual, is enjoyed by individuals. It is wrong to ascribe a collective ego to any form of human community (nation, class, etc.), as that means sacrifice of the individual. Collective well-being is a function of the well-being of individuals.

2

Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the basic urge of human progress. The quest for freedom is the continuation on a higher level—of intelligence and emotion—of the biological struggle for existence. The search for truth is a corollary thereof. Increasing knowledge of nature enables man to be progressively free from the tyranny of natural phenomena, and physical and social environments. Truth is the content of knowledge.

3

The purpose of all rational human endeavour, individual as well as collective, is attainment of freedom, in ever increasing measure. Freedom is progressive disappearance of all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities of individuals, as human beings, and not as cogs in the wheels of a mechanised social organism.

The position of the individual, therefore, is the measure of the progressive and liberating significance of any collective effort or social organisation. The success of any collective endeavour is to be measured by the actual benefit for its constituent units.

4

Rising out of the background of the law-governed physical nature, the human being is essentially rational. Reason being a biological property, it is not the anti-thesis of will. Intelligence and emotion can be reduced to a common biological denominator. Historical determinism, therefore, does not exclude freedom of the will. As a matter of fact, human will is the most powerful determining factor. Otherwise, there would be no room for revolutions in a rationally determined process of history. The rational and scientific concept of determinism is not to be confused with the teleological religious doctrine of predestination.

5

The economic interpretation of history is deduced from a wrong interpretation of Materialism. It implies dualism, whereas Materialism is monistic. History is a determined process ; but there are more than one causative factors. Human will is one of them, and it cannot always be referred directly to any economic incentive.

6

Ideation is a physiological process resulting from the awareness of environments. But once they are formed, ideas exist by themselves, governed by their own laws. The dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the process of social evolution, the two influencing each other mutually. But in no particular point of the process of the integral human evolution, can a direct causal relation be established between

historical events and the movements of ideas. ('Idea' is here used in the common philosophical sense of ideology or system of ideas.) Cultural patterns and ethical values are not mere ideological superstructures of established economic relations. They are also historically determined—by the logic of the history of Ideas.

7

For creating a new world of freedom, revolution must go beyond an economic reorganisation of society. Freedom does not necessarily follow from the capture of political power in the name of the oppressed and exploited classes and abolition of private property in the means of production.

8

Communism or Socialism may conceivably be the means for the attainment of the goal of freedom. How far it can serve that purpose must be judged by experience. A political system and an economic experiment, which subordinate the man of flesh and blood to an imaginary collective ego, be it the nation or a class, cannot possibly be the suitable means for the attainment of the goal of freedom. On the one hand, it is absurd to argue that negation of freedom will lead to freedom; and, on the other hand, it is not freedom to sacrifice the individual at the altar of the imaginary collective ego. Any social philosophy or scheme of social reconstruction which does not recognise the sovereignty of the individual, and dismisses the ideal of freedom as an empty abstraction, can have no more than a very limited progressive and revolutionary significance.

9

The State being the political organisation of society, its withering away under Communism is a utopia which

has been exploded by experience. Planned economy on the basis of socialised industries presupposes a powerful political machinery. Democratic control of that machinery alone can guarantee freedom under the new order. Planning of production for use is possible on the basis of political democracy and individual freedom.

10

State ownership and planned economy do not by themselves end exploitation of labour, nor do they lead to an equal distribution of wealth. Economic democracy is no more possible in the absence of political democracy than the latter is in the absence of the former.

11

Dictatorship tends to perpetuate itself. Planned economy under political dictatorship disregards individual freedom on the pleas of efficiency, collective effort and social progress. Consequently, a higher form of democracy in the socialist society, as it is conceived at present, becomes an impossibility. Dictatorship defeats its professed end.

12

The defects of formal parliamentary democracy have also been exposed in experience. They result from the delegation of power. To make democracy effective, power must always remain vested in the people, and there must be ways and means for the people to wield the sovereign power effectively, not periodically, from day to day. Atomised individual citizens are powerless for all practical purposes, and most of the time. They have no means to exercise their sovereignty and to wield a standing control of the State machinery.

13

Liberalism is falsified or parodied under formal parliamentary democracy. The doctrine of *laissez faire* only

provides the legal sanction to the exploitation of man by man. The concept of economic man negativates the liberating doctrine of individualism. The economic man is bound to be a slave or a slave-holder. That vulgar concept must be replaced by the reality of an instinctively rational being who is moral because he is rational. Morality is an appeal to conscience, and conscience is the instinctive awareness of, and reaction to, environments. It is a mechanistic biological function on the level of consciousness. Therefore, it is rational.

14

The alternative to parliamentary democracy is not dictatorship ; it is organised democracy in the place of the formal democracy of powerless atomised individual citizens. The parliament should be the apex of a pyramidal structure of the State reared on the base of an organised democracy composed of a country-wide network of People's Committees. The political organisation of society (the State) will be coincident with the entire society, and consequently the State will be under a standing democratic control.

15

The function of a revolutionary and liberating social philosophy is to lay emphasis on the basic fact of history that man is the maker of his world—man as a thinking being, and he can be so only as an individual. The brain is a means of production, and produces the most revolutionary commodity. Revolutions presuppose iconoclastic ideas. An increasingly large number of men, conscious of their creative power, motivated by the indomitable will to remake the world, moved by the adventure of ideas, and fired with the idea of a free society of free men, can create the conditions under which democracy will be possible.

16

The method and programme of social revolution must be based on a reassertion of the basic principle of social progress. A social renaissance can come only through determined and widespread endeavour to educate the people in the principles of freedom and rational co-operative living. The people will be organised into effective democratic bodies to build up the socio-political foundation of the post-revolutionary order. Social revolution requires, in a rapidly increasing number, men of the new renaissance, and a rapidly expanding system of People's Committees, and an organic co-ordination of both. The programme of revolution will similarly be based on the principles of freedom, reason and social harmony. It will mean elimination of every form of monopoly and vested interest in the regulation of social life.

17

Radical Democracy presupposes economic reorganisation of society so as to eliminate the possibility of exploitation of man by man. Progressive satisfaction of material necessities is the precondition for the individual members of society unfolding their intellectual and other finer human potentialities. An economic reorganisation such as will guarantee a progressively rising standard of living, is the foundation of the Radical Democratic State. Economic liberation of the masses is an essential condition for their advancing towards the goal of freedom.

18

The economy of the new social order will be based on production for use and distribution with reference to human needs. Its political organisation excludes delegation of power which, in practice, deprives the people of effective power ; it will be based on the direct participation of the entire adult population through

the People's Committees. Its culture will be based on universal dissemination of knowledge and on minimum control and maximum scope and incentive to scientific and creative activities. The new society, being founded on reason and science, will necessarily be planned. But it will be planning with the freedom of the individual as its main purpose. The new society will be democratic, politically, economically as well as culturally. Consequently, it will be a democracy which can defend itself.

19

The ideal of Radical Democracy will be attained through the collective efforts of spiritually free men united in a political party with the determination of creating a world of freedom. The members of the party will function as the guides, friends and philosophers of the people rather than as their would-be rulers. Consistently with the goal of freedom, the political practice of the party will be rational and therefore ethical. The party will grow with the growth of the people's will to freedom, and come to power with the support of enlightened public opinion, as well as intelligent action of the people. Realising that freedom is inconsistent with concentration of power, its aim will be the widest diffusion of power. Its success in attaining political power will be a stage in that process, and, by the logic of its own existence, the party will utilise political power for its further diffusion until the State becomes coterminous with the entire society.

20

In the last analysis, education of the citizen is the condition for such a reorganisation of society as will be conducive to common progress and prosperity without encroaching upon the freedom of the individual. The Radical Democratic State will be the school for the political and civic education of the citizen. Its structure

and function will enable detached individuals to come to the forefront of public affairs. Manned with such individuals, the State machinery will cease to be the instrument in the hands of any particular class to coerce others. Only spiritually free individuals in power can smash all chains of slavery and usher in freedom for all.

21

Radicalism integrates science into social organisation, reconciles individuality with collective life, gives to freedom both a moral-intellectual and social content, offers a comprehensive theory of social progress, in which both the dialectics of economic determinism and the dynamics of ideas find their due recognition, and deduces from the same a method and programme of social revolution in our time.

22

Radicalism starts from the dictum that "man is the measure of everything" (Protagoras) or "man is the root of mankind" (Marx); and advocates reconstruction of the world as a commonwealth and fraternity of free men, by the collective endeavour of spiritually emancipated moral men.

EDITORIAL NOTES

Blissfully disregarding the basic fact that the civilised world is experiencing a profound cultural crisis, statesmen and diplomats are endeavouring to restore peace in Europe. While they talk of peace, the war still goes on—now on the ideological front which stretches across the whole of the civilised world. They only deceived themselves who refused to recognise the ideological conflict which constituted the background of the armed struggle against international Fascism, and superciliously declared that ideological wars belonged to the Middle Ages, that civilised peoples did not fight for this or that religion. Of course, conflicts of ideas cannot be settled in a clash of arms. But they do precipitate social and cultural crises heralding long periods of moral chaos which may culminate in apocalyptic catastrophes spelling the collapse of a civilisation. Contemporary Europe is experiencing such a fateful crisis which may turn out to be fatal.

The article by André Brissaud, reprinted in translation from the Belgian journal, *Synthèses*, graphically describes the ideological core of the profound cultural crisis which has overtaken Europe, confronting it with the choice between Communism and Christianity. Maintaining by an analysis of the creed that Communism also is a religion, with its Church, High-Priest, casuists and catechism, Brissaud comes to the conclusion that it is a choice between two faiths: one, old and venerable, strongly entrenched in tradition; the other, new and vigorous, still full of apostolic fervour and proselytising zeal. Such a conflict cannot be composed; nor can the world remain perpetually in a state of civil war. Consequently, it is heading towards an apocalyptic catastrophe; sooner or later, the issues will be joined on battle-fields; a total war will be waged with fanatical

fury on both the sides. Civilisation is in the danger of going up in flames.

Brissaud, however, is not an alarmist. Having indicated the gravity of the crisis precipitated by a conflict of irreconcilably hostile ideologies, he points out the escape in a new Humanism, which will be a synthesis of the two opposing ideologies. It is a fascinating perspective described briefly in the closing paragraphs of the article.

A new Humanism, to be more correct, a humanist revival on the basis of modern civilisation and scientific knowledge, certainly does offer a hope for the tormented mankind. But will it be a synthesis of Communism and Christianity? If the term is used in the Hegelian sense, then Communism must be regarded as the antithesis of Christianity, and then again, there must be a negation of the negation to produce the synthesis. This process presupposes identity of the opposites. Brissaud evidently does not visualise the mystic process of Hegelian dialectics. He suggests and hopes for, a simple combination of what he believes to be good in both the clashing ideologies: a combination of Christian morality and secular justice demanded by Communism. Is that possible? In order to take an optimistic view, one must discover elements of Humanism both in the thesis and the antithesis—in Christianity and in Communism.

Marx, indeed, was a Humanist; but present day Communism has completely forgotten its humanist tradition. Otherwise, it could not become, for all practical purposes, a religion—dogmatic and intolerant. It calls for the sacrifice of the individual man at the altar of the imaginary collective ego of the working class. Collective ego being an abstract conception, can be easily raised to the pedestal of a godhead. That being the case, Communism and Humanism have become antithetical creeds. It is no easier for a Communist to be a humanist than for a camel to pass through the eye of the needle.

We make a distinction between Communism and Marxism. One is a comprehensive philosophy, while the other is a political practice supposed to be guided by that philosophy. In reality, the political practice of Communism has deviated far from the philosophy which it still professes. Otherwise, given the humanist pedigree of Marxism, its practice would have successfully dislodged Christian ideology, instead of galvanising it into a powerful revivalist movement as reaction to the spread of Communism. Because, Humanism was the real antithesis of Christianity. The man of the Renaissance was the proverbial anti-Christ. As a philosophy Marxism, therefore, could be the synthesis—New Humanism. Communist political practice, which necessitated falsification of the philosophy and corruption of ethical values, confused the situation, blurred the perspective of social and cultural development towards New Humanism. Nevertheless, that still remains the only hope; and civilised mankind must travel the Marxian way if it is to survive the present crisis.

We shall presently elucidate this point which is not a dogmatic assertion. But before proceeding, let us examine the relation between Humanism and Christianity. The relation was antithetical; Humanism placed at the centre of the Universe the man of flesh and blood, not the immortal soul temporarily residing in the body, deposing God from that proud position. That was the greatest revolution in the history of mankind, although it happened quietly, but irrevocably. The Renaissance was a mighty revolt against the Christian view of life which dominated the Middle-Ages.

The moral austerity of the early Christians was, indeed, of the Stoic tradition; but the classical concept of individuality was much too secular to be fully harmonised with the totalitarianism of the Universal Church, or even with the rationalist theology of mediaeval Christianity. Individualism, as conceived by the Renais-

sance, was known neither to the Christian nor the antique thought. The autonomous individual, possessed of an unlimited creative power, was an entirely un-Christian concept. As Burckhardt discovered, under the impact of rampant individualism, creative energy and moral chaos of the Renaissance, Christian traditions gave way to the ancient pagan modes of thought. Christianity rationalised the feudal tyranny of the Middle-Ages on the authority of St. Paul, who had compared society with the body composed of so many limbs which must serve the purpose of keeping the body alive. It was the will of God that society was divided into classes; it was the religious duty of every man to labour contentedly in the field God had allotted to him. In such a teleological social theory, there was no room for any individual autonomy, which is the essence of Humanism. Any creativeness for human energy cannot be claimed consistently with the faith in a Divine Providence; and that faith is the foundation of Christianity as also of all other religions. Humanism, therefore, cannot possibly be harmonised with any religion.

The suggestion presumably is to rescue the early Christian morality, which was smothered by the Catholic Church and its sophisticated theology. The attempt was once made on the large scale of a European movement. The Reformation denounced the corrupted Christianity of the Roman Church and called for a return to the Gospel and the Sermon of the Mount. Protestant morality was a reaction to the moral chaos of the Renaissance. Echoing Epicurus, the man of the Renaissance exclaimed: "I want to deny God so that I can be good, just and virtuous because I like to be so." The idea that man, *as man*, not as a marionette of some superhuman agency, could be moral, was denounced even by Protestant Christianity as "moral chaos". Morality is a by-product of religion; only the religious man can be moral.

Humanism was a revolt against this Christian view of morality. How can Christian morality, then, contribute to the rise of a new Humanism? Christian morality is spiritual terrorism. Consistent with the Christian or any other religious view of life, it is not possible to have an ethics without accepting the unscientific and irrational notion of a Creator or Final Cause or Ultimate End.

Since the Reformation ran into the sand of Lutheran bigotry and Calvinist intolerance, Renan's was the greatest attempt to give a humanist interpretation to Christianity as preached by Jesus.

"Jesus was not a founder of dogmas, or a maker of creeds; he infused into the world a new spirit. To follow Jesus in expectation of the Kingdom of God was all that was implied by being Christian. It will thus be understood how, by an exceptional destiny, pure Christianity still preserves the character of a universal and eternal religion. It is, in fact, because the religion of Jesus is in some respects the final religion. To renew itself, it has but to return to the Gospel. The Kingdom of God, as we conceive it, differs notably from the super-natural apparition which the first Christians hoped to see appear in the clouds. But the sentiment introduced by Jesus into the world is, indeed, ours. His perfect idealism is the highest rule of the unblemished and virtuous life. He has created the heaven of pure souls, where is found what we asked for in vain on earth, the perfect nobility of the children of God; absolute purity, the total removal of the stains of the world; *in fine*, liberty, which society excludes as an impossibility, and which exists in all its amplitude only in the domain of thought. The great Master of those who take refuge in this ideal Kingdom of God, is still Jesus. Whatever may be the transformations of dogmas, Jesus will ever be the creator of the pure spirit of religion; the Sermon on the Mount will never be sur-

passed. Whatever revolution takes place, will not prevent us attaching ourselves in religion to the grand intellectual and moral line, at the head of which shines the name of Jesus. In this sense, we are Christians, even when we separate ourselves on almost all points from the Christian tradition which has preceded us."

That is beautiful poetry written in prose. Rejecting dogmatic religion in favour of mysticism, one does not get out of the vicious circle of transcendental morality. Renan depicts Jesus as the Son of Man, but he also says that Jesus believed himself to be the Son of God. "They felt the Divine within themselves. We must place Jesus in the first rank of this great family of the true sons of God. Jesus had no visions; God did not speak to him as to one outside of himself; God was in him; he felt himself with God, and he drew from his heart all he said of his Father. He lived in the bosom of God by constant communication with him. He believed himself to be in direct communion with God; he believed himself to be the Son of God. The highest consciousness of God which has existed in the bosom of humanity was that of Jesus." (Renan, *Life of Jesus*)

Once that much is conceded, Renan's argument that Jesus did not claim any revelation becomes untenable. How did the Son of Man acquire the belief that he was the Son of God? Through revelation. The truth of the Gospel, the moral excellence of the Sermon on the Mount, thus was of transcendental origin.

That perhaps is the mystic's way of feeling in tune with the Infinite; and the consciousness of cosmic harmony is the source of ethical and aesthetic sense. But in so far as the mystic way does not clearly branch off from the notion of God, it cannot go in the direction of Humanism; because, it is not differentiated from the religious mode of thought, which necessarily subordinates man to some form of super-

human and super-natural authority. In that context, morality can never be spontaneous.

Is a spontaneous, secular ethics possible? That is the question of questions raised by the cultural crisis which has overtaken the contemporary world. Can man be moral by his nature, without any compulsion, be it of religion or law or social convention? A new Humanism will lead civilised mankind out of the present crisis, towards a brighter future, if it can solve this central problem of our time. We feel that it can; hence our endeavour to help the formulation of a more rational, more comprehensive, more satisfactory philosophy of life. But it is not to be sucked out of the air; it must be reared on the foundation laid by old currents of thought.

It goes without saying that a system of ethics, to be rational, must be an integral part of a comprehensive philosophy; in other words, it must be related with an appropriate cosmology, epistemology, psychology, all co-ordinated by a common logic. An unprejudiced mind in search for such a philosophy turns towards Materialism. Any other school of philosophy, in the last analysis, requires a transcendental, super-sensual reference. Man cannot be spontaneously moral unless he feels that his being and becoming are not subject to the operation of any force beyond the reach of his understanding. Only a spiritually free man can be spontaneously moral, and the materialist philosophy alone gives man the conviction that, growing out of the background of a self-sufficient physical Universe, he is also self-sufficient, master of his own destiny.

Religion, on the contrary, demands of man a total abandon, surrender, to God, no matter how the ultimate category of the religious mode of thought may be conceived. The religious man is a spiritual slave, embracing slavery voluntarily and wearing the chains with happiness. As such, he cannot be a sovereign individual,

who alone can be spontaneously moral ; be good, just and virtuous out of his own volition because it is in his nature to be so.

Barring Materialism, all other schools of philosophy postulate or assume a Final Cause, which cannot be fitted into the scheme of the physical Universe. It is not enough to reduce everything to Ideas or Platonic Forms ; the latter must be traced to some origin, if the explanation of the totality of being and becoming is to be fully coherent. To do so is the function of philosophy. Therefore, without being dogmatic, one can say that Materialism is the only philosophy possible ; the only philosophy which explains life without going beyond the physical world. Spontaneous morality follows from such an explanation of life. Conscious of being a part of the Universe, which is a cosmos, that is to say, a harmonious whole, man feels himself really in tune with the Infinite ; spontaneous morality results from that self-realisation.

It is, therefore, not a choice between traditional morality, with transcendental reference or sanction, and the relativist morality of Communism. Both must be rejected by New Humanism. In the last analysis, there is little to choose between the two ; both deprive man of his sovereignty ; under neither system man is a free agent ; in both the cases, his behaviour is dictated either by a super-ego or by a collective ego. If Communism has become a religion, with its God and the Church, its ethics must be on par with Christian morality. The Christian totally surrenders himself to his God ; the Communist dedicates his life to the service of his God—the proletariat, and voluntarily places himself under the discipline of his party, which is as authoritarian and infallible as the Catholic Church. For the defenders of traditional morality, be it of Christianity or any other religion, or of any non-materialist philo-

sophy, to disparage the ethics of Communism while comparing it with a dogmatic faith, is like the pot calling the kettle black. In neither case is morality spontaneous ; in both the cases, it is forced, dictated, obligatory, blind faith rationalising it as a voluntary act.

One cannot have it both ways : To criticise Communism as a religion, a dogmatic creed, and yet oppose it with the religious mode of thought, which starts from faith. If New Humanism cannot do any better, it will be a still-born child.

By vulgarising the materialist philosophy, and by debasing a hypothesis of social science (proletarian revolution) into a fanatical faith, Communism has degenerated into a religion. Its morality is no longer relativist, which presupposes a rationalist approach to ethical problems ; it is dogmatic just as traditional morality, which has no rational foundation, and whose final appeal, therefore, is not to the conscience of man, but to some transcendental authority.

Differentiated from the modern religion of Communism, materialist philosophy, as outlined by Marx, reinforced by modern scientific knowledge, as well as revised so as to be so benefitted, provides the foundation for a New Humanism. It is simply because philosophically Marxism was of the humanist tradition, being the culmination of that current of thought which, since the dawn of civilisation, sought to explain nature, including man, without going outside nature. Renaissance Humanism, with its passionate belief in the creativeness of man, inspired the rise of modern science which, in its turn, resurrected materialist philosophy. Therefore, it is in the logic of history that the turn has come for Materialism to lead the humanist revival, which is destined to take the civilised world out of the present cultural crisis.

Materialism to-day is not merely a naturalist cosmology, offering a mechanistic explanation of the universe of dead matter. A growing knowledge of the living

world has enabled it to become an all-embracing, self-contained, philosophy with its epistemology ; even psychology, the science of the soul, has come within the reach of Materialism. Conscience need no longer be referred to the imaginary divine spark in man ; it is but an expression of the essential rationality of man, who is essentially rational because he is an integral part of the law-governed Universe which is a cosmos. Physical Determinism is reason in nature ; on the higher level of organic evolution, it operates as rationality. Psychology attaches greater importance to instinct than to intelligence, because the former represents spontaneous operation of innate rationality. In instinct, physical Determinism is more evident than in intelligence, which is subject to the accumulated consciousness of environments before they were mastered by man.

Psychology has torn away Psyche's veil of mystery. The soul has a natural history. Its development can be traced all the way down the process of organic evolution, which merges in the background of the world of inanimate matter. Thus, Materialism to-day is in a position to explain all the aspects of nature ; it has become an all-embracing philosophy, which liberates man, a product of nature, from the tutelage of anything beyond his comprehension and beyond his power. Materialism thus sets man free to feel, think and act in tune with the Universe. The Prometheus unbound applies himself to the task of remaking the world so that it will be the home of a new type of man. That is New Humanism.

BOOK REVIEWS

A NEW HUMANISM ?

EXISTENTIALISM by Guido de Ruggiero ; Edited and Introduced by Rayner Heppenstall, Secker and Warburg, 6 s.

Notwithstanding his transcendental preoccupations, Kant felt a secret sympathy with the Aristotelian view of philosophy as refined common sense ; and so, while introspection showed him the subjective form of reality, he sought to root experience in the thing-in-itself. However, even he had to admit that, except through the categorical imperative, this datum made no contribution to knowledge ; and, though his successors, lacking the aid of psycho-analysis, could not maintain that the voice of conscience always lies, they possessed enough logic to realize that the noumenon exerted an irresistible attraction on Occam's razor. Thereafter came Hegel ; and, being a self-conceited rationalist, he not only exiled the surd from the universe of idealism but, in the process, denied also the legitimate claim of the particular. At any rate, that is what Heine concluded after a night of confounding monologue which ceased only when Hegel conceded that the absolute was too unique to be identified with anybody save himself ; and, perhaps because modesty made the professor haltingly coy, the poet came away with the conviction that there was no room for personality in the Hegelian system. Yet Heine's misunderstanding was by no means exceptional ; and William James, who spent a polemical life preaching that truth must be amenable to public verification, was, if less ironical, more explicitly derogatory.

"Since we are in the main not sceptics", he said, "we might go on and frankly confess to each other the motives of our several faiths. I frankly confess mine—I cannot but think that at bottom they are of an aesthetic and not of

a logical sort. The 'through-and-through' universe seems to suffocate me with its infallible impeccable all-pervasiveness. Its necessity, with no possibilities ; its relations, with no subjects, make me feel as if I had entered into a contract with no reserved rights, or rather as if I had to live in a large sea-side boarding house with no private bed-room in which I might take refuge from the society of the place. I am distinctly aware, moreover, that the old quarrel of sinner and pharisee has something to do with the matter. Certainly, to my personal knowledge, all Hegelians are not prigs, but I somehow feel as if all prigs ought to end, if developed, by becoming Hegelians. There is a story of two clergymen asked by mistake to conduct the same funeral. One came first and had got no further than 'I am the Resurrection and the Life' when the other entered. 'I am the Resurrection and the Life', cried the latter. The 'through-and-through' philosophy, as it actually exists, reminds many of us of that clergyman. It seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast slow-breathing unconscious Kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown ties."

Kierkegaard, who preceded James by several decades, was only too familiar with those abysses and ties. Sexual deficiency had implanted in him a pathological sense of guilt ; and the resultant ambiguity of his relationship with women, seeming like heartless trifling, so shocked the high-minded puritans he lived among that he found the Ivory Tower inescapably inviting. Yet he also needed love ; and, as the earth denied him this, he sought for it in God. Moreover, self-assertive by nature, he considered the self-effacement circumstance forced upon him galling ; and, in consequence, he could not rest content with drawing sustenance from objective reality, but wanted to reduce the Universe to a subjective drama built around his personal anguish. For Kierkegaard was no optimist. Though his romantic nature

made him unwilling to face facts, he did not abolish the distinction between ambition and achievement by wishful thinking. Instead, he recognized God's indifference ; and, in spite of the loathing he had for Hegel, he accepted conflict as the law of spiritual life. The times were, however, unresponsive to such a despairing view of things : advancing technology promised ultimate solution of every conceivable problem ; and a dialectical process without the saving grace of recurring synthesis could not be expected to appeal to a progressive age.

The nineteenth century was exceptional in as much as an expanding economy supplied it with the incentive to incessant hope. Earlier generations, even when sustained by faith, had not been strangers to the "dark night of the Soul"; and we, who are both materially and spiritually bankrupt, belong to the older tradition resuscitated by Kierkegaard, because, a believer though he always remained, the divine disappointed him at every stage. But the deception did not lead him to the same conclusion as ours : he did not suspect that his search had been fruitless for the simple reason that what he had sought had never existed ; and, since this apprehension of non-being or nothing is the core of the existential philosophy Heidegger and Jaspers have elaborated out of Husserl's Phenomenology, it is unfair to saddle Kierkegaard with the latest metaphysics. On the other hand, despite the mysticism implicit in the dialectical conception of the Universe, Hegel had very nearly exhausted the possibilities of rational thought ; and, if human mind were to avoid stagnation, it had to attempt a new departure by due recognition of the irrational. Here Kierkegaard, as well as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, were found to be pioneers ; and, driven by the desolation of our world, we have gone beyond their minimal view of life which, with the introduction of will, becomes, we have lately learnt, more frightful and not less meaningless.

Solovyov, a Russian mystic writing towards the close of the last century, maintained that metaphysics was prior to ethics, because one can act virtuously only when one knows what the real demands of one ; and, as the philosophy of existence denies the very possibility of knowledge, it fails to discover the principles of the good life, although humility is the kernel of this doctrine. That is why Prof. Ruggiero, a neo-Hegelian of the Crocean School, has poured scorn on all existentialists, whether of the heretical majority grouped about Heidegger and Jaspers or of the Christian minority headed by Gabriel Marcel ; and there is no doubt that the rationalist's victory over the obscurants carries immediate conviction. But reconsideration shows that the appeal of the irrational cannot be dismissed so summarily ; and, once we admit the totalitarian implications of a teleological approach, like the Communists', we are no longer in a position to condemn unreason for its amoral potentialities. In any case, even if right conduct cannot be based on existentialism, its merit as an artist's credo has been adequately indicated by Mr. Heppenstall in his autobiographical introduction to Prof. Ruggiero's evasively elliptical critique ; and, elsewhere, M. Jean-Paul Sartre, another French exponent of the latest gospel, has persuasively argued that existentialism is but a new name for humanism. "Since I am a man", said Terrence, "nothing human is alien to me" ; and both Baudelaire and Flaubert, who refused to accept the escapist ideal of literature current in their days, were unconscious existentialists. Perhaps the same is true of James Joyce and T. S. Eliot.

Sudhindranath Datta

PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY

THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES by K. R. Popper,
2 Vol., George Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, £2. 2s.

The beauty and appeal of moral idealism may not necessarily ensure it against a catastrophic sequel. The

social disasters precipitated by idealist zeal and tenacity are not much less imposing than social stagnation maintained by cupidity, inertia or opportunism. Consequently new visions of an ideal society are often confronted with trepidations and non-committal cynicism from those very people who are potentially the most sensitive to the appeal of such visions. The initiated believers may feel exasperated at such moral conservatism and trace it to vanity, dryness of heart, or, in the language of the youngest and most self-assured of all churches, to 'petit-bourgeois coupon-clipper' mentality. Yet the heretics refuse to be brow-beaten and accept their ignominy with a smile—usually a pathetic, and for the moment, inconsequent smile.

Idealist social visions are, however, suspect because such visions generally are not thorough enough. A thorough idealism must be a practical idealism. The vision must have a clearly formulated design and also must of necessity include within itself a methodological perspective through which the vision is to approximate its realisation. Social idealism is a rational-moral recoil from the ineptitude and immorality of the existent order. Such recoil can have a positive significance only when it works out the method and technique for a successful and economic elimination of those defects. It must therefore not only be ideal but also eminently empirical and practical. To be truly idealist, it must not only indicate the principles of a better society, but also a method for understanding the actual and some effective technology for the realisation of the potential.

One of the perennial ideal visions of mankind since the dawn of civilisation has been that of the Open Society. "The open society", says Prof. Popper, "is the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions" (vol. I, p. 152). In other words, it is functioning democracy run on humanist principles. The growth of the individual is the aim of the social institution and conduct is given an approximate harmoniousness through the unifying influence

of reason. Such an ideal ought apparently to attract every person. Yet human history is at least a chronicle no less of mass scale recoil from humanist trends than of painstaking movement towards it. The recent phenomenon of Fascism is a staggering evidence of this recoil. That experience has jolted many idealists out of their optimism about the logical inevitability of human progress. Neither the Christian nor the dialectical *deus ex machina* appeared in time to resolve the catastrophe. This experience has driven the more serious among the champions of open society to explore the grounds of their idealism and to trace the nature of its weakness so that they may be duly removed. The two volumes under review by a teacher of logic and scientific method in the University of London, though apparently written as a critique of four major systems of European social thought, form another sustained endeavour to raise and solve some fundamental problems of social understanding and construction which lie at the heart of the failure of democracy to assert itself against tribalism.

Prof. Popper is not content to point out the nature of the weakness of humanist thought so far; he has also constructed an alternative approach to humanist ideals which he claims to be free from these defects and which therefore may be expected to ensure a greater possibility of their realisation. His alternative is an *élaboration* of the liberal pragmatic reformism of Hayek, Dewey, Lippman and similar anti-collectivists of that tradition.

The main weakness of humanism, according to Popper, lies in its unfortunate traditional association with a methodology of understanding and a technology of social change which, while proposing to champion its ideals, in reality negate them in the process. The open society is falsely postulated on tribalist interpretations of social history; the methods for its realisation have an ill-concealed anti-rational orientation. Popper traces the nature of this suicidal traffic between contradictory ideals in the course of a critical survey

of the 'historicist utopian' tradition in European social thought. He selects four major exponents of this tradition representing different degrees of tribalist influence : Plato, divided within himself under the strain of the contemporary passage from tribal to civilised society, the greatest apologist of totalitarianism with an ambivalent attachment to the open society ideals of his master Socrates ; Aristotle, the uninspired compromiser ; Hegel, the most dull and diehard of all tribalists, with this derivation of the absolute state from the concepts of liberty and reason through dialectical magic ; and Marx, an honest rationalist and humanitarian, suffering from an overwhelmingly strong collectivist psychosis. Their systems, however, have a fundamental unity : they are all derived from a common historicist method of social understanding and a common utopian technique of social change. And Prof. Popper contends that the two greatest ideological enemies of the open society are this historicist method and the utopian engineering technique, which under humanist professions, serve as the camouflaged theoretical fifth column of the forces of irrational collectivism.

Popper's book consequently opens with a direct attack on historicism. The historicist, according to him, "sees the individual as a pawn, as a rather insignificant instrument in the general development of mankind. And the really important actors on the stage of history he may find perhaps in the great nations and their great leaders or perhaps in the great classes or in the great ideas" (Vol. I, pp. 5-6). Further, historicism implies a deterministic interpretation of human history and permits no scope for the role of individual human variables or of their distinctive choice. This attitude of collectivist and deterministic interpretation of human history results, according to Popper, from a confusion of natural law with normative law. This confusion may take two forms, naive naturalism or naive conventionalism. In either case, the sequence of happenings in both the physical universe and in human society are believed to follow the

same uniform causal logic. Such belief is, however, both empirically and theoretically unjustified. There is a basic dualism of facts and decisions and the latter cannot be derived from the sequence of the former. Norms or decisions are man-made and super-imposed on the physical sequence of events. Therefore, it is not possible to deduce any law of social progress from an analysis of social facts.

Thirdly, historicism implies prophecy-making. A certain law of social development is once assumed and then by applying it to an analysis of contemporary events, the next state of social development is dogmatically deduced. Whether historicism be materialist or idealist, pessimist or optimist, conservative or futurist, it implies a certain pre-determined course of unilinear development. The development may be determined by the abstract transcendental ideas of Plato or the immanent teleological forms of Aristotle or the dialectical logic of Hegel or the economic determinism of Marx. The difference in the characterisation of the determining forces is of small consequence. The movement may be either towards degeneration from the original form of Plato or of progressive approximation to some hypothetical *summum bonum* as in Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. In either case it implies a trans-human, super-individual, one-way series of pre-determined sequence.

And this brings us to the next and I suppose the most important point of attack on historicist theory. This may be called the moral relativism of historicist theory. The movement of history being predetermined by some inexorable law of sequence, there is no scope for changing that sequence through the exercise of individual reasoning and moral choice. Thus historicism implies positivist ethics. Whatever happens, happens according to some inherent law of sequence. All that the individual can do is to recognise this law and to accept it as the necessary guide to his conduct. The law may be conveniently twisted to support past institutions or existing systems or some future utopia. That, however,

makes no difference. The basic postulate of this morality can be summed up in two Hegelian formulations. What is real is rational and freedom is the recognition of necessity. This means fatalism and opportunism. In simpler language, it asserts that might is right. The confusion of decision with facts thus leads to the negation of all morality.

Thus historicism is the enemy of the open society on four counts. It is collectivist and eliminates the role of common individuals. It is deterministic and thus has no place for the creative role of individual reason and choice. It is monistic and thus invests man-made conventions with perfectionist unchangeability. Hence, while claiming to be scientific, it lends countenance to oracular dogma. And fourthly, it is amoral or reduces morality into submission to organised power.

From the above destructive criticism of historicist method Popper naturally passes on to an equally devastating attack on what he describes as "utopian social engineering". The utopian technique is derived from a less consistent form of historicism "which permits human interference." (Vol. I, p. 138). It is based on the tacit assumption of some hypothetical absolute principles of social sequence. A complete ideal blueprint of perfect society must precede organised progressive action. Stable improvements are possible only through a radical reconstruction of society, through a thorough scraping up of the existent order. The programme of action must be logically deduced from a correlation of the abstract perfectionist *idos* to the existent social pattern. All piecemeal and departmental improvements in social structure should be condemned as "reformist" attempts to maintain the status quo. (Vol I, Chap. 9, pp. 138-40).

The above approach to the problem of planned social progress, Popper maintains, is unscientific and involves most dangerous possibilities. It is unscientific because it is based on the presumption that the persons planning social improvement can visualise any abstract form of institutional perfection.

Such presumption is supported on historicist ontology which establishes the absoluteness of its *idos* or *teleos* by positing some deterministic laws of social sequence issuing from or moving towards that *teleos*. Such ontology has no experimental or rational foundation. It is dangerous because "the utopian attempt to realise an ideal state using a blueprint of society as a whole, is one which demands a strong centralised rule of a few and which, therefore, is likely to lead to a dictatorship" (Ib., p. 140). "Social life is so complicated that few men, or none at all, could judge a blueprint for social engineering on the grand scale ; whether it be practicable ; whether it would result in real improvements ; what kind of suffering it may involve ; and what may be the means for realising it" (Ibid). It implies not only a claim of perfection for the blueprint but also the same unique distinction for the utopians. The sociological knowledge necessary for large scale engineering being "simply non-existent" (Ib., p. 142) at present, there can be no definite and guaranteed method to realise the ideal. Consequently, the planners or their successors may realise after proceeding to a certain stage in their work of revolutionary transformation that the method was wrong and a revision at that stage may be impossible or at least would mean tremendous sacrifice and wastage. Further, its smooth working would require psychological conditioning of the people and ruthless elimination of all dissentient voices.

The mentality underlying the utopian method is described by Popper as radical or aesthetic or romantic. It is radical because it can think only in terms of total transformation of an entire system at a time. It is aesthetic because like the artist it must begin by a clean sweep of the social canvas before constructing anything new. "The artist-politician has first to make his canvas clean, to destroy existing institutions, to purify, to purge" (Ib., p. 146). It is romantic because it refuses to have any compromise with life, to learn gradually from experimentation, and because "it springs from an intoxication with the dreams of a beautiful world" (Ib., p.

147). Such an approach is not only irrational and futile but "leads only too easily to violent measures". It involves thus a negation in the process of the open society which as a utopia it may claim to cherish.

Historicism and utopian engineering being thus irrational and dangerous, what is Popper's alternative approach to the problem of social change and development? The two aspects of this 'open society' approach are indicated by the terms critical conventionalism and piecemeal engineering.

Critical conventionalism or critical dualism begins with "a conscious differentiation between man-enforced normative laws or conventions and the natural regularities which are beyond his power" (Ib., p. 51). It derives no sanction for human institutions, relations or codes of conduct from any transcendental or immanent determinism in the process of natural sequence. Instead, it "asserts that norms and normative laws can be made or changed by man...and that it is, therefore, man who is morally responsible for them" (p. 52). The standards by which man may judge the relative goodness or badness of different norms and with reference to which he may make his choice in favour of one convention or another "are not to be found in nature. Nature consists of facts or of regularities and is in itself neither moral nor immoral. It is we who impose our standards upon nature, and who introduce in this way morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part of this world" (p. 52). This does not mean that conventions are arbitrary or that there are no natural laws of social life. Conventions themselves are derived from application of human reason (never fully perfect): only, the world of moral conduct has a certain autonomy from the world of natural laws. Also there are certain important natural sociological laws connected with the functioning of social institutions. "In social life we meet both kinds of laws, natural and normative, which makes it so important to distinguish them clearly" (Ib., p. 56).

The above distinction implies a certain method of

correlating historical events which is basically different from the method of historicism. First, it means that social history is not a uniform homogeneous mass with a determined unilateral movement. In so far as its elements are man-made conventions, its movement can have no absolute direction. Hence history can have no uniform significance. A significance or meaning can be put into it by the historicist according to his interest or point of view. Neither can the method of natural sciences be applied to history, for, "in history the facts at our disposal are limited and cannot be repeated or implemented at our will" (Vol II, p. 252). Consequently, theories of history cannot have the validity of scientific law : they may be described as interpretations. Such interpretations can have no finality ; they may vary from generation to generation, place to place, group to group, from one point of view to another. Again, there can be nothing like universal history ; what we actually do is to identify the multifold complex of human relations and activities with one of its more imposing aspects, usually with that of political power. Properly, however, there may be various histories of various aspects of social change and even here these histories have no claim to objective absoluteness. "A concrete history of mankind, if there were any, would have to be the history of all men. It would have to be the history of all human hopes, struggles and sufferings. For there is no one man more important than any other. Clearly, this concrete history can not be written. We must make abstractions, we must neglect, select" (Vol. II, p. 257). Thus historical interpretation involves a scale of values. Values cannot be deduced from facts. It is based on individual reason and choice. Any so-called pretentious law of historical sequence can give no sanction to our moral decisions. It is the decision which invests the sequence with any direction or significance.

This pluralist pragmatic interpretationism logically points to the piecemeal method of social engineering. If

there be no inexorable deterministic law whose recognition must regulate our conduct, then there can be no sanction for the utopian method of social canvas-cleaning. If no man be more important than another (though he may be stronger or more influential), then there can be no moral or rational justification in claiming for one's interpretation and method any absolute validity. Instead one should admit in all reasonableness: "I may be wrong and you may be right and by our effort, we may get nearer to the truth" (Vol. II, p. 213). This is the essence of rationalism which orientates piecemeal technique. That technique is limited to the solution of immediate and commonly understood social problems. It chooses a limited field of reform at one time and always seeks to incorporate institutional guarantees against any dangerous concentration of power in the process of planning and improvement. "The piecemeal engineer will accordingly adopt the method of searching for and fighting against the greatest and most urgent evils of society rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good" (Vol. I, p. 139). The "blueprints for piecemeal engineering are comparatively simple...for single institutions...If they go wrong, the damage is not very great, for readjustment is not very difficult" (Vol. I, p. 140). Further, being simple and immediately experimentable, such a blueprint can be executed with lesser power-concentration and with greater toleration for criticism. It will be less dictatorial and more democratic.

While it would be absurd to try to formulate in a magazine review any detailed criticism of such a well worked-out thesis (completed in 620 pages), I may presume to indicate certain points of counter-argument that may come from persons who, with a due appreciation of Popper's pointers, may not find in pragmatism a superior methodological approach to open society.

It is true that temporal sequence has no meaning or purpose and that when it is interpreted as history, direction

or significance is invested in the process by the historian from his own point of view. The invested direction is, however, not necessarily unidimensional. The origin and execution of this invested direction may then be empirically and logically traced to the morally neutral process of physical sequence. The tracing of the origin of course does not mean any sanction for it. What an historian can do is (a) to abstract the laws of sequence (which, as in the physical sciences, are first hypothetical and always approximate, open to amendment or reformulation as new and recalcitrant data are confronted with); (b) to trace the link between the general cosmological laws of sequence and the changing laws of conduct or human conventions; and (c) to formulate laws (technological and not ethically binding) of institutional and interpersonal action-reaction and sequence which may be drawn upon to effect purposive social change.

The pointer about an indefinite series of variables is based on a justified hesitation about employing the logic of limited constants to the multi-dimensional universe. But just as in modern physical sciences, so too in historiology, the nineteenth century conception of causality shall have to be largely restated in accord with post-relativist methodology. Causality now is orientated by the idea of probability, a relative configuration of point-events in unstable equilibrium potentially involving a plurality of relative configurations. This would mean that in social history we can no more talk in terms of what Popper aptly calls 'essentialism'—some essential factor forming the determining condition of subsequent events (Vol. II, p. 8 et seq.). Instead, our approach should be that of deducting an approximate logic of relation between never-completely-listed *engrements* of elements and events in space-time. I will readily admit that unlike as in physics, we have not yet formulated adequate symbols or equations to conduct investigations in social history from this relativist point of view. The situation demands

planned systematic endeavour and not a negative attitude of pessimism and despair. Between our limited knowledge and the unexplored ranges of externality, there is the process of progressive approximation which is concretised in science. Approximation in knowledge is based on the postulate of law-governedness which is not shaken by methodological limitations. The alternatives to law-governedness are pure empiricism or transcendentalism which no rationalist humanist will choose. Historicism assumes nothing more than law-governedness in social world; the laws formulated being only approximate systematisations are always open to verification in the light of new experience and methodological improvements. Apropos the epistemological problem of personal orientation, scientific enquiry and social conduct require at our state of knowledge the making of a distinction between the public and the private aspects of experience. In as far as the elements and point-events (in human history, individuals and their experience) form unique microcosms containing the universe, they are undefined variables and no uniformity or relation may be established. In as far as they are, however, data in a common continuum, they enter into relations, become relative constants, are subsumed under categories, and uniform laws may be abstracted from their common character as elements in the multi-dimensional continuum. The first is the private and the second the public aspect of data. Rational enquiry and conduct apply so far only to the *publicist* universe—because reason can work only on the foundation of publicly accepted labels, descriptions, symbols and rules of predication (which are also the laws of relation). The rational publicist universe is approximate because it cannot, on admission, cover all the moments in the continuum, nor the infinite range of aspects of each moment, and also probably because the continuum itself is in flux. Approximation entails multiple externalities but not repudiation of externality. Historicist enquiry like the natural Sciences

and social conventions presumes no more than the validity of publicist approximation.

Seen in this light, historicism may not necessarily involve collectivism, fatalism or amoralism. Probablist logic can and necessarily does admit of individual variables, multiple sequence and scope for choice without getting bogged in transcendentalism or mysticism. Indicating, under the limitations of acquired data, the approximate range of definite subsequent probables, historicism claims no absolute comprehensiveness to that range. But the knowledge of the range of definite probables is an essential precondition to individual choice and freedom. As for ethics, the initial determining influence is that of the urge for survival which, with growing knowledge and control of circumstances and complication of inter-individual relationships, becomes orientated with ever increasing ranges of requirements and the laws formulated to satisfy this ever orientating urge form the principles of human morality. What in the primitive stage of ignorance and helplessness was limited to a mere urge for survival becomes gradually a desire for the unfolding of the indefinite potentialities of man and an endeavour to eliminate all restrictions on that process of unfolding. This is the transformation of animal survival into human freedom and in the process of transformation, environmentally determined conduct takes an individual and moral quality. Such transformation is possible only through growing understanding of the laws of externality and sequence. Hence while sequence may be in itself amoral, probablist approximation to the knowledge of the laws of sequence is the foundation of morality.

The charge of collectivism similarly is based on an unfair confusion of the incidental with the unavoidable. Rational investigation must be conducted in terms of public units and the nature and size of these units depend on the relative refinement of the tools of enquiry. The extreme paucity of historicist knowledge so far has led to employment

of crude tools and to enquiry in terms of such large lump-units as nation, class, institution etc. The aim of historicist enquiry is, however, to approximate more and more accurately the laws and the nature of the multidimensional relationships between individual variables and to deduce from those laws a practical science of social engineering and technology to provide increasing scope for the functioning of individual variables. The more is the knowledge accumulated, the greater will be the refinement of the instruments and categories of investigation and the brighter the prospect of historicism to work with the individual variables as the units of study. Thus the progress of historicist science involves a systematic displacement of hypothetical collectivist abstractions by concrete individual elements in the centre of its study.

Now about the utopian method. True that a comprehensive blueprint of radical transformation involves great dangers. The chief danger concerns the initial responsibility of the planners and organisers of change. But neither is piecemeal change, in so far as it is not haphazard but planned, immune to such danger and responsibility. Initially it may involve less risk ; but can it be at all consistently applied to any institution or activity of wide and complicated range without involving an implied perspective of total transformation and a scale of priorities ? A policy of reform even in such strictly particularised matters as trade, currency, employment, educational curriculum or electoral method shall require some definite *placing* in a comprehensive plan of institutional readjustment (may be in a process) ; otherwise such piecemealism will be arbitrary and may lead to inter-institutional maladjustment and wastage. Either piecemealism is constitutionally myopic or it is wasteful and without direction or it has some inarticulate total postulates which it is inhibited by some predispositions to make public.

In any purposive institutional change there are always

certain unavoidable issues affecting the lives of groups of people on which decision are to be made and for these decisions there is no escaping personal responsibility. These decisions involve relative priority and the fundamental question of a criterion of value. Whether wholesale or retail, the issues being unavoidable, is it not more rational and democratic to place all the cards on the table for as many people as possible to see? The real issue in fact is not between utopianism and piecemealism, but between conscious purposive change and *laissez faire* positivism. Planned social change to avoid obscurantism and wastage needs maximum comprehension of the perspective of subsequent problems issuing from its initial action in the entire context of the institutional network. Utopian method does not exclude piecemeal technique; in fact it can work out very largely through piecemeal change; it does not choose sudden subversion though in desperate circumstances it may be forced to it. On the other hand, piecemealism has no direction and self-consistency without a comprehensive orientation. The two are complementary and each loses its purposive significance if completely dissociated from the other.

At the same time Popper's pointers are extremely valuable in shaking all social planners from false and dangerous complacency. Effective guarantees must be provided for in the methodology of change against all possibilities of power concentration and collectivist gosestep. The romantic and radical nature of utopianism, however, is not itself objectionable. For, Romanticism is the expression of confidence in human ability to shape environment; and Radicalism is thoroughness in understanding and conduct. Its aesthetic nature is an acknowledgement of the need of comprehensive visualisation of the rationally desired so that the blueprint may not remain amorally probable but is also felt to be morally necessary. But the analogy of complete canvas-cleaning is unfair. The radical utopia may fully recognise

the laws of approximation and probability and, therefore, prefer education to force and revolution by consent to revolution by organisational coercion as means for the realisation of its utopia. I have elsewhere tried to outline this radical democratic method of social change. It is utopian but not collectivist ; historicist but not positivist ; aesthetic but not irrational or intolerant ; and revolutionary without dispensing with the benefit of piecemeal change (See S. Ray : *Radicalism*, Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta.)

Finally, Popper's judgment on the four philosophical systems which he has chosen to illustrate the nature of the enemies of open society is not consistently fair. The most thought provoking, systematic and controversial of the judgments is that on Plato : the major part of the first volume is devoted to a consideration of the Platonic system. The division of the Platonic system into Socratic and Platonic, though done on good authority, is obviously unfair to the disciple ; besides, equally imposing authorities can be cited against any particularised division of the dialogues or arguments. Popper bases his exceedingly harsh judgment on Plato on the dogmatic assumption of such over-simplifield division. Consequently, the conflict of loyalties that invests Platonism with a dramatic tone is only casually glanced over by this pragmatist critic. Also in his strong bias, he refuses to note the obviously democratic and rational implication of certain of Plato's major concepts and whenever they are thrust upon his argument, he passes them on to the exclusive credit of Socrates. Popper's praise of the Great generation—of Pericles, Protagoras, Democritus, Socrates, Antisthenes, Herodotus etc.—is however well deserved. On the other hand, he casually dismisses Aristotle in less than twenty pages. His greatest grudge is against Hegel and though I largely share in his antipathy, I must admit it to be quite unfair to treat him with mere invective and abuse. And to cite Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard as champions of open society and reason against Hegel's tribalist irrationalism is, I am afraid,

giving away half one's case. The treatment of Marx has neither the originality of the Chapters on Plato nor the bitter brilliance of the attack on Hegel ; it is, however, exceedingly fair and quite comprehensive (though Marxian economics is but barely touched). The arguments against what is described as "sociology of knowledge" is of considerable significance and though the pragmatic alternative is not established, the criticism rightly exposes the most irritatingly facile nature of much of so-called 'sociologist' interpretation of highly complicated social phenomena in naive essentialist terms. In short, the book will definitely provoke serious and systematic thinking among all who are concerned with building an open society for mankind and in these days of moral-intellectual inertia and reflex-conditioning, that is as great an achievement as a book of this type can aspire to achieve.

Sibnarayan Ray.

BEYOND LIBERALISM

THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY by John H. Hallowell, Kegan Paul, London, 12/6s.

The famous manifesto of the Goettingen Professors against the arbitrariness of the Hegelian State has been recorded in history as the intellectual expression of a popular protest against tyranny. But one hundred years later, in Germany, there was no Dahlmann to ask, as he did in 1837, "Must I teach henceforward that the supreme principle of the State is that whatever pleases those in power is law? As a man of honour, I would cease to teach rather than sell to my audience for truth that which is a lie and a deceit." On the contrary, Kelsen, while still calling himself a Liberal, declared that "every State was a Rechts-Staat."

"With the rise to power of the National-Socialists in Germany, liberal political institutions collapsed like a house of cards, tumbled over by a gust of wind. The rapidity and completeness with which liberal institutions were

destroyed, suggested that the spirit in which these institutions were originally conceived had reached a hitherto unsuspected stage of inner degeneracy."

That remarkable event is the point of departure of a study of the rise, decline and fall of Liberalism recorded in this book. The author holds that Liberalism has been defeated in many countries as much by its own degeneracy as by the agency of opposing creeds. The purpose of the study is to ascertain when and how Liberalism as an ideology became decadent in Germany. The author admittedly does not try to answer the more difficult question—Why Liberalism became decadent?—except by implication. Yet, he generalises from the German experience and holds that, by some inner necessity to be found in itself, the liberal ideology decayed and degenerated everywhere.

The author proceeds to argue that the notion of decadence means departure from, or perversion of, Liberalism as such, which he calls "integral Liberalism." Therefore, he proposes to begin his study with a "reconstruction of Liberalism as an integral system of ideas, the delineation of the idea of Liberalism in the Platonic sense." But in practice, he defers the task and describes "the process of formalization that characterizes the decline of the liberal ideology." The methodology is rather unsound. Repeated references to "integral Liberalism" punctuate the description of the process of its formalization; but the definition of the standard is deferred to a subsequent chapter. However, the author's thesis is that, born and bred in the intellectual atmosphere of the Renaissance and Reformation, Liberalism was subsequently corrupted by Romanticism and the positivist view of life. Although the thesis is quite convincingly expounded, the author's case is weakened by his reluctance to call a spade a spade. What he calls integral Liberalism was simply the natural philosophy of the scientists of the Newtonian era. The weakness of the one was also the weakness of the other. Eighteenth century

Materialism was the logical development of the Newtonian natural philosophy. Liberalism degenerated into neo-romanticism because it would not be true to its philosophical origin by accepting an out and out materialist view of the world. The sovereignty of man could not be established on the terrestrial world so long as God was postulated even as "the Great Mechanic of a mechanism that ran by itself". The doctrine of emanence was a philosophical subterfuge. Pantheism could not be reconciled with the notion of *deus ex machina*. On the other hand, consistent Pantheism, as developed by Spinoza, was inverted Materialism. Liberal ideology degenerated into formalist legal concepts when it rejected Materialism for metaphysics.

But the author holds that the metaphysical notion of a natural order "was in large parts the product of scientific Materialism", which was "congenial to the nineteenth century bourgeois way of life." On the contrary, for the preservation of the bourgeois social order, which was securely established by the nineteenth century, it was necessary to discover a transcendental moral sanction. Therefore, Liberalism degenerated into metaphysical rationalism. A teleological view was inherent in the liberal doctrine: *Laissez faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui-même*. The world was like a clock wound up by God. If integral Liberalism was to maintain that the less one interfered with the mechanical order, the better, as the author holds, then Liberalism indeed was a still-born child. Because, that doctrine would not only limit the function of the State, but deny freedom of the individual. Yet, sovereignty of the individual and freedom of will are the essence of Liberalism, and neither of them is consistent with the metaphysical notion of a natural order, which cannot be conceived without postulating either a Great Mechanic or the Final Cause. Except on the basis of materialist philosophy, Liberalism is bound to be self-contradictory, fallacious and even dishonest. Therefore,

all who, like the author, dream of a liberal revival, should realise the philosophical implication of true Liberalism. The author, however, fails in that. Believing in a metaphysical moral order of nature, his integral Liberalism was bound to degenerate. It is idle to talk of its resurrection.

The positive elements of classical Liberalism, however, can and most probably will survive the present social and cultural crisis of the civilised world as resurrected Humanism, to put contents of reality in the formalised concept of individualism, and to free will and reason from mystic and metaphysical connotations. Monistic scientific Materialism will be the philosophy of New Humanism. By tracing will and reason to their common biological denominator (the process of organic evolution) and merging biology through chemistry into physics, integrated scientific knowledge reveals man's true relation with nature. There is no transcendental natural law. All known as well as unknown laws of nature operate through man in so far as they affect human affairs, man being an integral part of the physical nature; he is also a subject involved in the process of feeling, knowing, creating. The doctrine of individualism becomes practicable only when man's dual relation with nature is realised—with the help of an integrated scientific knowledge and its philosophical consequence—monistic Materialism.

To be so revived, Liberalism must be traced, beyond Protestant Christianity to Pagan Humanism. But while analysing the historical background of the liberal ideology the author makes the common error of regarding Renaissance and Reformation as succeeding stages of one intellectual movement. In reality, the one was not the logical sequel to the other; the succession was purely chronological. The two movements were very differently inspired and motivated. One was secular, iconoclastic, atheistic—revolt of man against God and his agents on earth; the other, religious. There was little in common between Renais-

sance Humanism and the individualism of Protestant Christianity. Early Humanism could be conceivably reconciled with a non-doctrinal theism, because the latter, through Pantheism, logically tended towards Monism, which must be materialistic, if it was not to be dissolved into Hegelian Absolute Nothing. But deism and Humanism are mutually exclusive, and Protestant Christianity was deistic. Therefore, the fountain-head of the liberal ideology must be found either in the secular Humanism of the Renaissance or the non-conformist religiosity of the Reformation. In the latter case, formalisation of the notion of individualism was predetermined; and to degenerate into the faith in the counterfeit deities of impersonal law and a metaphysical moral order was its inescapable fate. The religious mode of thought must follow its own logic; and if the origin of the idea of individuality is to be traced in Protestant Christianity, it must be conceived in the context of the religious mode of thought. That exactly is done by the author. He writes: "The Christian ideas of the Middle-Ages were merged with Stoic conceptions of individuality to produce the individualism of modern times." Renaissance Humanism drew inspiration from the Stoic philosophy as well as from all other schools of ancient thought and learning. But it would be very difficult to establish any relation between Stoicism and Protestant Christianity. Lutheran dogmatism and Calvinist intolerance had little of early Christian morality, which was of the Stoic tradition.

On the question about the origin of the idea of individuality and the doctrine of individualism, a modern liberal theologian is more instructive. He writes: "If Protestantism represents the final heightening of the idea of individuality within terms of the Christian religion, the Renaissance is the real cradle of that very un-Christian concept and reality: the autonomous individual." (Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of man*.) He further

holds that the Renaissance produced "a new concept of individual autonomy, which is known in neither classicism nor Christianity."

In so far as Liberalism disowned or ignored its humanist origin, it was bound to be, on the one hand, a formalist and legalist doctrine in secular relations ; and, in philosophical and ethical matters, on the other hand, it was equally bound to adopt a metaphysical-rationalist and transcendental attitude. A philosophical reorientation, therefore, is the prerequisite for a liberal revival. But in that case, it will no longer be Liberalism ; it will be a triumph of Humanism enriched by the experience of several centuries and reinforced by modern scientific knowledge.

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**Edited by M. N. Roy, Printed by Debsaran Das Gupta from Sripati Press,
14, D. L. Roy Street, and Published by Debsaran Das Gupta
from 15, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta 12.**

THE MARXIAN WAY

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO ENQUIRY AND LEARNING

Editor : M. N. Roy

Vol. III, No. 1

1947 - 48

CONTENTS

TARKATEERTHA LAXMAN SHASTRI JOSHI	JYOTIRAO FULE :
	REBEL AND RATIONALIST
JULES MONNEROT	SOCIALISM AND FREEDOM
SIBNARAYAN RAY	MODERNITY AND FORM
M. N. ROY	HUMAN NATURE
EDITORIAL NOTES	
BOOKS REVIEWED	THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST
	DEVELOPMENT by Paul M. Sweezy
	THE AGE OF REASON, THE FLIES and IN CAMERA
	by Jean Paul Sartre
	PERMANENT REVOLUTION by Leon Trotsky
	BANGLA SAHITYER KATHA by Srikumar Banerjee
	CULTURAL LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION by S. I. Vavilov
	MY EXPERIENCE IN SOVIET RUSSIA by Meghnad Saha
	Periodicals : SYNTHESES
	ESPRIT . LA PENSEE . LA REVOLUTION PROLETARIENNE .
	THE WIND AND THE RAIN . LONGMAN'S MISCELLANY

RENAISSANCE PUBLISHERS
15, BANKIM CHATTERJEE STREET,
CALCUTTA 12.

Price : India — Rs. 3/- per copy
Foreign — 5s. or \$ 1.00 „ „

Yearly subscription : India — Rs. 10/-
Foreign — 20s. or \$ 4.00

JYOTIRAO FULE

REBEL AND RATIONALIST

Tarkateertha Laxman Shastri Joshi.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the impact of western civilisation provoked a strong reaction in the more intelligent sections of Indians. It was a twofold reaction ; one favourable and the other hostile. The favourable reaction gave rise to introspection, self-examination, an interest in historical research and studies, rationalism, scientific criticism, a desire for reform and a general aspiration for social and cultural reorganisation. A number of bold reformers came to the forefront, inspired by the desire to change the course of social development. The cultural ballast of two thousand years and more stood against them. A stagnant social order, resulting from a long-standing tradition of blind faith, was putting obstacles in their way. Long established social institutions, deep-rooted traditions and a people firmly believing in them, were insurmountable stumbling blocks. On the other hand, the inspiration of new ideas and the achievements of the West had roused in them an indomitable courage and unparalleled enthusiasm.

The hostile reaction implied jealousy for the achievements of the West as also a fear of the ultimate disintegration of a divine, religious, spiritual culture, respected and worshipped for centuries. The western ideas coming in the wake of the British conquest appeared to suggest that the cherished ancient tradition meant only a little of knowledge mixed up with a lot of illusions, dogmas and myths ; that the old and dilapidated social organisation had to be reorganised if India was to progress ; that the means with which certain castes endeavoured to remain in a predominant position were feeble and fleeting, and their greatness was mostly illusory. Critics of antiquated ideas

and decayed social institutions were condemned by the traditionalists, who argued that the reformers were dazzled by the outward glamour of the western civilisation. Fearing that western civilisation might take roots in the Indian soil, threatening destruction of the indigenous tradition and culture, the hostile reaction expressed itself in the form of discontent against the British rule. The tendency to idealise the past, rationalise religion, customs, the caste system and idolatry was born out of that reaction. It was in tune with the tradition of centuries, and therefore had enormous power of combatting all attempts at reform.

The struggle between these two reactions is the essence of the social history of India under the British rule. It is reflected in politics, religion, philosophy, science, art, literature. Two distinct outlooks on life emerged from this struggle. Rationalism and humanism were born of the first reaction, while the second led to the rise of nationalism. Both the reactions were not so distinct all over the country as they were in Bengal and Maharastra. The reformers, who generally welcomed the western civilisation, can broadly be divided into three groups. Firstly, the religious reformers : prominent among them in Maharastra were men like Modak, Ranade, Bhandarkar. The second group was composed of rationalist reformers, who were agnostics and materialists, followers of J. S. Mill and Spencer : the most prominent among them were Agarkar and Lokahitwadi. The third trend was of the Non-Brahmin reformers : it was a revolt against the Brahmanical culture. A feature common to all of them was the receptivity to western scientific knowledge. They all agreed that modern education was the foundation of the reforms they all advocated. They also agreed that the caste system should go and individual freedom should be established ; that it was essential that far-reaching social changes should take place in the country before a democratic political regime could be established.

Jyotirao Fule was the pioneer of the third tendency.

Voicing the bitterness of the Non-Brahmins, who had suffered most under the domination of orthodoxy, Fule struck at the very roots of Hindu religion and tradition. The Brahmins ruled in Maharashtra until the British took over the government of the country. Corruption, caste fanaticism, suppression of the Non-Brahmins, executive partiality against them and general chaotic conditions characterised that rule ; profound effects of that experience lay at the root of the Non-Brahmin revolt.

The rationalist religious views of Brahmin reformers did not reach beyond the middle class. They simply advocated the need for reform in the family and individual life and conduct of the middle class, so as to bring it in tune with their professions and the requirements of a changing economic order. The taboos regarding food and manner of eating, dress, worship, the various mortuary rights, etc., all were to be reformed so that they might suit the requirements of an urbanised middle class mostly in service of the Government. The institution of joint family thus became the main concern of their critical thinking. The members of the middle class were leaving their families for distant cities, districts or provinces for service : a movement necessitated by the inadequacy of the traditional village professions in affording the requisite means of livelihood. The joint family thus disintegrated ; its members also began to part from each other in search of professions as lawyers, doctors, teachers, officers, etc. The traditional custom of child marriage began to create difficulties in the new situation. The ordinary illiterate girl ceased to be attractive for the educated young man, leaving the shelter of the joint family. Education of women thus became a necessity. Similarly significant became the problem of widowhood. The moral inspiration to reform all customs indicative of the dependence and slavery of women arose out of the respect for human personality learnt from the West. The custom of Sati, compulsory life-long widowhood, child marriage, purdah,

absence of any rights of inheritance, absence of divorce—all these and other customs came in for slashing criticism.

The basis of the Hindu tradition, customs, laws, caste system, untouchability, etc. is the Brahmanical religion. It furnishes a moral sanction to all cultural and social aspects of Hindu life on the basis of transcendental values. The desired reforms, therefore, required a drastic criticism of the Hindu religion itself. The reformers proceeded to build the religious sanction of the reforms they advocated. The Brahmo Samaj in Bengal and its off-shoot in Maharashtra, viz. the Prarthana Samaj, arose out of the endeavour. The cultural development and fusion in the nineteenth century reached a stage at which it could be maintained that the various aspects of existence could not be confined within the narrow limits created by religious, national or regional differentiation; and this had its echo in the activities of these reformers, who postulated that the essential principles underlying all religions are the same. They did not, therefore, accept as unqualified authorities the dogmas, the apostles or the founders of any religion. Reason, on the other hand, was accepted as the guide, with the result that an atmosphere conducive to the reception of ideas from the West was created.

The founder of the Non-Brahmin reform movement, Jyotirao Fule, was born in that atmosphere of cultural disintegration and religious criticism. Belonging to the Non-Brahmin community, he had to face serious difficulties in prosecuting his education. But his deep and penetrating intellect and highly sensitive and developed mind could not fail to understand comprehensively the meaning of the changing conditions. Few could see so well as he did the significance of the far-reaching changes following in the wake of the establishment of the British rule. Jyotirao may, therefore, be described as the first in the vast down-trodden mass of the Hindu society who was deeply conscious of, and comprehensively understood, its social slavery.

Those who do not understand their slavery cannot be free from it. It was Jyotiba who gave the message of this understanding to them, and drove home to the mass of common people living in social and cultural degradation for centuries together, the meaning of their existence. He was a rebel against God, against religion, against dogmas and the so-called sacred traditions of the past.

Social evils such as the caste domination of the Brahmins, rigid conformity to the caste hierarchy, the fostering of faith and ignorance in the name of religion, the predominance of stupid customs sanctified by faith, became aggravated under the degenerate Brahmanical rule in the latter period of the Mahratta Kingdom. Law was never properly codified and its execution became all the more whimsical. The collection of land revenue, the methods of debt recovery and the conditions of service were full of confusion and involved endless suffering and hardships to the peasants and workers. Fule described these conditions in one of his essays known as "*Ishara*" (Warning): "Not long ago, until the end of the regime of the last of the *Arya* Peshwas, Rao Baji, if a peasant committed a slight default in payment of land revenue, he was made to stand half-bent in the blazing sun, a big stone put up on his back, or his wife was made to sit on it, and down in front of him was lighted fire with chillies thrown in it. The ruler treated his subjects like animals. Their only use was to produce for the ruler and the men and women of his caste food and clothing by toiling hard in the sun and the rains, and to keep them provided with their numerous luxuries.... Now that this (British) Raj has been established, the people are free from this moral, political and other oppression born of caste hatred."

The government always stood by the *Sowkar* (money-lender); the debtor was always harrassed and had to face the prospect of losing everything. Jyotiba describes the conditions: "In those days, it was not necessary for the creditor to

file civil suits ; for the government was in the household of the *Sowkar* himself. He could, therefore, any time beat the debtor, seize everything that belonged to him, sell away his cattle, torture him in various ways as also the members of his family, make them stand in the scorching heat of the sun, with heavy stones on their heads..... For a sum of seven or eight rupees, the poor peasant might lose his farm, his cattle, his wells, everything, and he himself eventually be driven to a nomadic existence or suicide."

The cast differences were highly intensified under the Peshwas. Jyotiba cites a number of instances to show that Brahmin arrogance and hypocrisy knew no bounds. For example, he writes : "If a Brahmin were to appear on the bank of a river where a Sudra (Non-Brahmin) was washing his clothes, the latter had to collect them all and go to a distance, so as to avoid all possibility of polluting the Brahmin. If even a drop of water from the Sudra's washings contaminated the Brahmin, the latter turned red with fury and hit him with the heavy brass pot in his hand. There was no sense in complaining, for it was a rule of the Brahmins. The complainant himself was likely to be punished."

The torture to which the untouchable was subjected was much worse, almost beyond imagination. He had to be careful that his shadow did not pollute the Brahmin and was, therefore, in serious danger while moving in the localities inhabited by the caste Hindus during the morning and the evening hours when the shadows are the longest. He had to hang an earthen pot round his neck (to be used as a spittoon) while walking in the streets frequented by the Brahmins and other caste Hindus ; he was allowed to go there only if he tied a small twig to his waist, so that the polluting prints of his feet might be swept by it. In short, in the reign of the Peshwas, the untouchables lived worse than animals, the Brahmins better than Gods. Jyotiba complains seriously that large amounts out of

public funds were spent in feasts to the Brahmins and as Dakshina (monetary presents to the priestly class). The heart-breaking contrast between the parasitic, corrupt and insatiable Brahmins and the miserable, degraded and impoverished mass of toilers, has been ably depicted by him. He also refers to the brutal punishments awarded under the law in those days. Any commission of crime used to be punished by chopping off limbs such as hands or feet. Such punishments in fact were a common feature of all regimes for centuries together and were not a specific feature of the Peshwa rule. It was not a fault of the Peshwas, but of a centuries-old tradition.

Chaos prevailed in the Brahmanic kingdom of the Peshwas. The people were at the mercy of robbers (Pendharis), vagabonds and bullies ; they were completely helpless. Property was insecure ; none was sure of enjoying what he produced ; all productive effort was paralysed. That was the reason why the people welcomed the British rule. It was against this background that reformers like Jyotirao interpreted the past. The persistence of the old order, even under the British rule, led them to examine the fundamentals critically. The meaning of Indian history and life, as it was really lived, consequently dawned on them. No wonder that, instead of condemning the British rule, they welcomed it for the liberating ideas that came in its wake. The West brought the message of human freedom. It roused in men like Jyotiba an intense and passionate desire to see Indian humanity, enslaved materially and spiritually for centuries, freed from that slavery.

The movement for social reform, however, did not take roots nor gather strength and momentum. Jyotiba directed his attention within to trace the causes of social degradation. His survey of the history and culture of the country revealed that the root cause of degradation was inherent in the Hindu society itself. He went further into the analysis and traced the responsibility for it to the Hindu

religion and the Brahmanical orthodoxy. His first important work was styled "Social Slavery in the Guise of Brahmanical Religion under the Civilised British Rule". The book was dedicated to "All those American citizens who strive for the liberation of the Negros".

In this book he writes : "Even in the British rule, the illiterate Non-Brahmin masses are subjected to numerous hardships, because the officials entrusted with the task of executing the laws are mostly Brahmins. The hierarchical caste rules of status are being observed with the same rigidity. Even in a city like Poona, the Non-Brahmins cannot take water from the same place as the Brahmins ; the Brahmins also dominate the educational institutions. The text books are prepared in a way as will conceal the weaknesses of Brahmanical religion and scriptures. The vast rural masses and especially the peasantry cannot afford the luxury of education. They are illiterate and have therefore to suffer and are often cheated by the so-called educated. They spend uselessly their hard-earned money owing to religious beliefs and superstitions. They are either ignorant of the injustice done to them or, if conscious, are incapable of getting it undone, due to ignorance and poverty. No one takes note of their grievances or tries to get them redressed". Referring to spiritual slavery, he observes that slaves are not necessarily possessed of the desire to end their slavery. Some slaves are known to side with their masters. American negro slaves did not often attach so much importance to ending their slavery as the free Whites and Americans did. British officials prepared a scheme for removing the grievances of the tenants of the Khot Zamindars in the Konkan districts. The Zamindars were known to beat the tenants and torture them ; but in spite of all this, when the tenants were called in as witnesses, all their evidence was favourable to their masters. The people, therefore, have to be educated and it must be modern education that will counteract their religious faith and seemingly innocent superstitions.

Jyotiba advocated also modernisation of agriculture and protested against usury. But he did not seem to realise that the traditional social structure could not be fundamentally changed by the British rule. He had high hopes about the liberalising western civilisation, and therefore overlooked the dark side of the British regime. He started his "Satyashodhak" (Seekers after Truth) movement after the Mutiny of 1857. In those days, anti-British sentiment prevailed in a section of the educated middle class. They regretted the failure of the Mutiny and tried to spread anti-British sentiments privately as well as through the press.

Jyotiba held apparently strange views about the Mutiny. He did not regret, but on the contrary was happy about, its failure. That was an unpopular view. But his arguments could not be disregarded by any scientific historian. History would have repeated itself, he argued, if the British rule had collapsed; the rule of the Brahmin Peshwas would have been restored; the traditional Hindu religion would have regained the upper hand, and the little hope of liberation of the millions of down-trodden would have been completely destroyed. He further maintained that social injustice in this country was thousands of years old and very deep-rooted; the British rule might be there to-day, and disappear to-morrow; the main issue however was the abolition of this social slavery; and its sanction was the Brahmanical religion.

In his work *Slavery*, Fule made an effort to find out how the prestige of the Brahmins, their thought and institutions, were established. In his opinion, ignorance and blind faith, primarily responsible for the social slavery of the Hindus, was a creation of the Brahmins. There is no direct authoritative historical evidence as regards when and how the Brahmanical domination was established. Fule, therefore, endeavoured to make inferences from the scriptural literature, such as the Shruties, Smrities and the Puranas, by interpreting them historically. He argued: The Aryans

came twice to India by the sea route from Persia and tried to conquer the country. That was the period of the "Matsya" and "Katsya" avatars ; both of them were aquatic animals. The invaders, however, failed to conquer India. Subsequently, they came overland. The mythological story about the subsequent three incarnations, viz. Varaha, Narasinha and Vamana, is the history of that second period of Aryan aggression. In the times of Vamana, their victory was almost complete ; thereafter, under Parashurama, they carried out a mass massacre of the warring Kshatriyas in order to consolidate their rule. Having established their rule, the Brahmins proceeded to perpetuate it by stupefying the people with fantastic tales about gods and demons, also by introducing enslaving social customs. The tales of the Puranas were based on cunning, deceit and bluff. The Brahmins also created the feelings regarding caste superiority as well as untouchability. These hierarchical conceptions were meant to keep the vast mass of people perpetually divided, for the conquered were numerically far more than the conquerors and could therefore be ruled only by being divided. Those who were ahead of all the rest in the struggle against the Brahmins were degraded to the level of untouchables.

Fule argues that the Brahmins came from outside the land, while the generally held view is that the Vedic Aryans were foreigners, and that they included the three Varnas of Brahmins, Kshatriyas and the Vaishyas. Fule's idea seems to have been determined by the present-day social structure of Maharashtra and South India. In these parts, according to the orthodox Brahmins, there are only two Varnas : the Brahmins and the Sudras. It is a conventional belief among the Brahmins in the South that those who are not Brahmins are all Sudras.

According to Fule, the ancient history of India was the history of the struggle between the Brahmins and the Non-Brahmins. The Sudras and the untouchables of to-day are, in his opinion, the Kshatriyas of the ancient times ; the

Aryans, who came from abroad, were the Brahmins. The native brave Kshatriyas have been styled as "Asuras" in the Brahmanical scriptures; the tales of Pralhad, Hiranya-Kashyap, Bali and Vamana depict the ancient struggle between the Brahmins and the Non-Brahmins. The gods worshipped by the Non-Brahmins, their festivals, rituals and customs have been styled by Fule as the religion of the original inhabitants. Fule's interpretation of the non-Vedic gods worshipped by the Non-Brahmins is of great sociological importance. The Brahmins seem to have accepted the important ones from amongst these gods. The religion of the original Non-Brahmins inextricably fused with that of the Vedic Brahmins, with the result that it became extremely difficult and delicate to say which of the gods were the original.

It is maintained by some that the Bhagwat Dharma, based on devotion, was really the religion of the people. Fule disputes the view and argues that the poet-saints who preached the religion of devotion simply strengthened the bonds of the Brahmanical religion. The result was reinforcement of the hold of the doctrine of Karma on the minds of the people. Both Bhagawat Geeta and Bhagwat religion preached the doctrines of caste, re-birth and Karma, which increased the helplessness of the people and their inaction and love of slavery. The essential teaching of Bhagwat Dharma was : "Live peacefully in the conditions God wishes you to live in." The people should meekly accept social slavery. That was the injunction of religion. These observations of Fule, though unpalatable, are true. Idol-worship, pilgrimage, temples, rituals, *Bhajan*, the service of the master (Guru)—all these are features of the Bhagwat Dharma. They involve waste of time, energy and wealth. As recompense, the Bhagwat Dharma also offers the delusive concepts of heaven, hell and re-birth.

Fule founded the Satya-Shodhak-Samaj (Society of the Seekers of Truth) to carry on agitation against Brahminism.

He was fully aware that only with principles higher and nobler than those of Hinduism—in fact, of any religion—could the Brahmins be effectively combatted. He pointed out that every established religion concealed some injustice and therefore had to suppress truth to a greater or lesser extent. Religious differences stand in the way of realisation of the brotherhood of men and free co-operation among human beings. Religions have divided humanity and have thus sown the seeds of perpetual conflicts. Religious fanaticism has often led to the shedding of human blood. The unity of mankind is a great truth, and religious bigotry tends to destroy it. Instead of purifying man and leading him forward, religion has often caused his degradation.

What is true of religion is also true of nationalism and patriotism. These have led one group of humanity to fight against another. The result is war and an enormous waste of human creativity. The nations have always to remain prepared for war ; vast sums of money are spent on armies ; the people, especially, the peasants, have to suffer from enormous burdens of taxation. Wars and aggressions must be stopped, and for that purpose the perverted sentiments of religious bigotry and patriotism must go.

Fule developed his constructive ideas in his work *Public Religion of Truth (Sarvajanic Satya Dharma)*, and thus gave a new outlook and philosophy to the Satya Shodhak Samaj. The first great truth he asserted against all religions and national differences is the unity of man ; and the aim of all human activity must be to build up a human family based on "liberty, equality and fraternity". There should be no difference in the rights of the sexes ; no man or group of men has the right to dominate over another man or group of men. God has conferred on all human beings religious and political freedom as their birth-right ; and any one encroaching upon that freedom must be regarded as the enemy of truth. To oppress any individual for his religion or political views is to be guilty of fighting

against truth. Everyone must have the fullest freedom to propagate and spread his religious and political ideas. Everyone also has an equal right to enjoy fully the things of this world. Tilling the land, handicraft or any other labour does not make a man low ; on the contrary, it only proves his greatness. Man's fundamental right as well as duty is to harness the forces of nature to the satisfaction of his own requirements, on the basis of an understanding of their laws. If man endeavours, he can transform this earth into heaven. To produce or obtain things essential for existence, is the first duty of man on this earth. To help each other for that purpose, is a higher form of that duty. This is the true worship of God. God does not expect *Bhajan, Japa*, etc. ; for he is the master of the whole Universe. He does not need any praise, worship or devotion of man. If man lived up to the advice given by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, human life will have served its purpose.

The truth, thus narrated by Fule, may be regarded as the essence of human knowledge and culture, achieved and built up since the dawn of civilisation. He has discussed the means of knowing truth as well as its criterion. Where is truth to be sought, if it cannot be found in the scriptures or in the preachings of apostles, saints or the founders of religions ? Fule says it can be sought for in man's reason. This reason, which makes both the knowledge about the Universe as well as moral truth accessible, is inherent in the very nature of man. God has conferred that gift on him. He has not given dogmas, scriptures ; He does not give "darshan" to the Rishis or saints, nor does He give them advice ; there are no incarnations of God. He does not inspire any particular fortunate individual. He has given the one and only gift to man, and that is reason.

Apart from his idea of God, Fule thus appears to be a clear-thinking rationalist. He does not accept any organised religion. On the other hand, he does not

distinguish between conscience and reason. That worship, prayer, *Bhajan*, etc. are all not expected by God, that it is not necessary for man to do all these things—nay, doing them is wasteful, is his view. He also does not accept any “world elsewhere”, re-birth, heaven, salvation, Karma. All this implies that he does not accept God in any sense which will lead to an organised religion. It is impossible to know or to see God ; He does not save or destroy anyone ; He does not love or hate anyone ; He created the Universe, laid down its laws, and created man capable of knowing those laws, endowed man with reason and gave him the power to use it. Man should not try to go to the heavens, or attain salvation or see God ; for all these things are impossible. Man should, on the other hand, endeavour to live the life on this earth in the best possible manner. From this it appears that Fule entertained the idea of God simply for his personal philosophical satisfaction. Being a *Mali*, he perhaps thought of nature as a rich garden. There are plenty of subterranean streams of water in it, if not many on the surface. If man will make the necessary efforts, it can be made to blossom and fructify. It can be a beautiful garden, a paradise. But for that purpose, reason and efforts must go together. Without these, nature is an agency of man’s destruction. Hunger, thirst, disease, etc. are its instruments ever prepared to destroy man. Man can be free from them only with the help of his reason and efforts.

It is clear that these ideas of Fule are based upon noble and eternal human values. The language used by him for conveying them is full of passion. There is an inspiration in his writings which delves deep into the past and can see far in the future. He was determined to avenge against Brahmins and Brahmanical religion, being enraged with the injustice and oppression it has perpetrated. But his equipment, when compared to the requirements of this stupendous task, was meagre. In those days, the social strata to which

he belonged were almost entirely untouched by education. His writings on occasions are marred by a vulgar abusive tone ; the language is rough and unsophisticated. That is why his writings were not appreciated by the intelligentsia. The late "Maharshi" Annasahib Shinde used to describe Jyotiba's writings as a wild fruit : it is perhaps not very juicy, but full of medicinal qualities. Following Fule's hints and clues regarding ancient Indian history, noted scholars like Annasahib Shinde, B. V. Jadhav and Dr. Ambedkar have written important treatises on historical research.

SOCIALISM AND FREEDOM

Jules Monnerot

It is the will of the masses : that is the unanswerable argument of the press, the parties and the heads of States. What is this power to which all must bow ?

It would appear strange that a word should be uttered with reverence, with an almost religious inflexion of the voice. Mass, in common usage, means weight and signifies gravitation downwards, fall-back—the contrary of *elan*. It is highly significant that such a word should be taken for something very good (indeed, none better). The dictionaries tell us that mass is “the aggregate of parts forming a whole”, or “the totality of a thing whose parts are of the same nature”; but it is also used to describe “an assemblage of men considered as forming a body”, and finally “the commonalty of men”. In the plural, the word is used in the same sense : “To appeal to the masses”, “to move the masses”.

When we say “masses”, and want to be precise in the use of words, what do we mean by it ? The assemblage of a crowd ; but then it is also a fact that, once people return home, once the assemblage dissolves and is no longer united in space, we still continue vaguely to imagine it as if it yet existed. It is an assemblage of men not taken as men, but as an assemblage of individuals stripped of what in everyone of them is singular and individual. If those who use the word masses would take the trouble of thinking out what they mean to say, they should think : Individuals together, with their individualities suppressed as if by interaction, mutually destroying each other. The word mass is neither masculine nor feminine. Neither singular nor plural ; it is a collective neuter. Who thinks in terms of mass, thinks of the individual solely and exclusively in terms of what it has in common with the others. If it is admitted that all human

existence is particular, the mass does not exist like a man exists; yet, in the face of this non-existent entity, the existing feels itself abjectly small. In abstraction, by decomposing the mass into its simple and primary elements, we obtain a being which, divested of all particular characteristics, is moved by only such motives as are shared by all his neighbours subject to the same conditions.

Whoever says to-day "It is the will of the masses", just as they once said "It is the will of God", does not therefore consider the individuals as a distinct, complex and personal entity, but as something which may be suppressed and superceded. Not so with the masses, by this definition: there is nothing but the mass. It is the sovereign reality, and the individuals composing it are considered as being mere abstractions and interchangeable. This being its nature, the mass demands that, to the extent that the individual is personal and unique, it cannot be taken into account. But if it be prepared to renounce all tokens of individualness, then it would be virtually the only reality in the world, raised to the n th power. The mass is the individual immensely magnified, but on condition of a total renunciation of whatever is individual in him. The needs of individuals, which are deprecated, despised and condemned as egoistic, are sanctified when they appear as needs of the mass. According to Durkheim, society, which is decidedly the supreme form of being, and in relation to which all other being seems to lack necessity, has remained an abstract conception for the use of some academicians. Now, with the denomination mass, that very conception has triumphed, to the extent of being practically irresistible. Who could resist the mass, before which we are already so small and deflated, and which could easily flatten us out still more, and completely crush us? The logical consequence of this view is that in the name of the mass "one" may massacre, torture, judge, execute, oppress, persecute—all in good conscience (of which Durkheim

was aware when he likened the social with the divine). Here is a new sanction of right, of power, of holiness. Confronted with the conception of the mass, the isolated individual feels guilty and, conscience-stricken, throws his weight into the greater weight; he is driven to that complete abandon when he feels, or believes, himself to be alone, and is compelled to think that who is alone is wrong; that one cannot be right as against the mass, from which emanates all true, effective, all-shattering rightness.

At first sight, crowds appear concentrated and masses scattered: the mass is only an abstraction of the crowd. But the intellectual process which abstracts the mass from the crowd has far-reaching implications. Once considered as real, the mass becomes something different, something more than the crowd. The masses give an irresistible strength to whomever knows how to speak in their name. He is truly possessed, as if the entire weight of the mass was on his side. The mass roars like a tidal wave when it recognises in him that strength which is its own.

Incessantly we invoke the masses and address to them exhortations, adjurations and supplications. Yet it is not wrong to say that the masses do not exist. Nor is it wrong to say that nothing can resist them. "We march amidst myths", sometimes more compelling than hunger.

Democracy was conceived by its prophets with a view to give all power to all people. The idolisers of the masses maintain that they only carry this idea to its logical consequence. They say: "Democrats, do you want more democracy? The people as a body is more people than all the single individuals composing it. The most perfect expression of the people is the masses." Thus, they say, rationalist democracy, representative rule based on the law of number and the sacrifice of minorities, is still far from the ideal which inspires it. Is it not much more democratic, is it not democracy *achieved*, if power is given to men united in a

crowd? If anybody has remained at home, is he not rather an "aristocrat" and "bad"?

It can hardly be ignored that there is some error in this reasoning and an abuse of confidence. Do thousand sleepers see more than one who is awake? None can to-day shut his eyes to the fact that men united in crowds produce peculiar phenomena, on which science has as yet thrown little light. "Something" takes shape in which everyone of the temporarily de-individualised individuals is, to some extent, merely an interchangeable factor. In the sense in which one speaks of a "mineral realm", there is also a "mass realm". It is a new state *sui generis* of human matter, governed by its own laws.

Communism and Fascism were mass movements. Both evoked and exploited crowd phenomena. "Professional revolutionaries", like their American contemporaries who created the psychotechnique and applied to the art of publicity, knew how to operate with certain simple, empirical, but efficacious notions of collective psychology. In this way, some specifically modern forms of power have gradually developed, based on an empirical but consistent and technical knowledge of crowds as a special realm, as a state *sui generis* of the human matter, a theory closely linked up with practice, as the Marxists say.

The Western peoples had at that time forgotten or lost their religions and their festivals. Most men, already impoverished and debased by the unfortunate conjunction of individualism and utility, were further reduced in the early twentieth century to a narrow, restrictive and hectic kind of existence. Every man was thus delivered virtually defenceless to the first crowd. Politics became a crusading pursuit; it acquired a religious fervour. This does not date since the last but one world war, as is usually maintained, but since much earlier—since the days when the Cross was replaced by national flags, which were to bring so many new crosses. Politics has thus sanctified itself most strikingly in

contemporary Russia, Germany and Italy, all sorely tried nations for whom a social reorganisation was a question of life and death. It helped men of frustrated aspirations to deceive their starved religiosity. It offered them ties of an obscure and violent devotion to which they could consecrate themselves irrevocably and without reservation. The German or Italian totalitarianism had not been a profitless venture, though. Privileges and authority accrued to those of the ruling set who knew how to manage the old oligarchies by playing down the menace that they constituted for the latter. At the same time, catholicism, that Western religion of the French, made as it were of their own substance, carnal and earthy, increasingly lost its power to attract the more "dynamic" crowds into the precincts of its sacred places.

In a crowd, says Freud, the relation between the leader and the led "reduces" itself to a kind of hypnosis—the hypnosis of a state of erotic dependence. In the insufficiently explained phenomenon of mass hypnosis, Freud shows the operation of the libido, just as in the case of individuals, according to his theory constructed on the basis of observations and hypotheses. But—and this is a new characteristic *sui generis* of the metamorphosed libido—the bond uniting the members of a group, however "libidinal" and therefore individual it may be in every-one of them, nevertheless allows to all of them the experience of passions and actions often inaccessible to the single individual. Representative democratic regimes produced phenomena which at first were taken for the expected result thereof and the normal working out of that political system. But ultimately they proved to be utterly alien to the essence of democracy and totally incompatible with it. As it were at the time of the Jews and their great Prophets, the power of the word over the masses and of the masses over the word became manifest. Freud describes the mechanism of the identification of every individual composing the crowd with

the "leader", who can ravish, transport and charm the crowd, who plays on this instrument while at the same time he is himself inspired and as if possessed by it. "The emotion which (the leader) provokes", says Durkheim, "comes back to him, stronger and amplified, reinforcing his own emotion all the more." Everything happens as if the leader was in a special state of communication with the crowd. He is transported. He repudiates all limitations of the individual nature. He partakes, as Durkheim would say (to the exasperation of the ethnologists) of the collective "*mana*"; he disposes of it. He acquires an infallible skill to say what is needed, at the moment when it is needed ; he cannot say but what pleases and what is expected : an actor who, as if in spite of himself, enacts a scene of seduction. *The crowd cannot worship itself except in incarnation.* The people, at that moment, is no longer what is counted and represented at the time of that rational ritual of going to the ballot box. Democracy irrationalises itself, disintegrates and ceases to be itself. Intoxicating himself with its very existence, the leader embodies the force ; the crowd recognises it in him and roars out that it exists ; it is something which is neither one individual nor another, not a thing nor a man, which is nothing in particular, and does yet exist, like a torrent rushing downhill from the mountain sides.

Government by masses being impracticable, the leader appears as the liberator of the masses. He promises fulfilment of their desires while they are yet only desire. In this way, he gains a power of which something remains with him even when the crowd dissolves.

The prophetism of the great Jewish Prophets is a typical instance. It was a social event which introduced something new in the known history of the world, and which created such a grandiose precedent that subsequent events of a similar nature appear like pale

imitations. All times have produced phenomena of prophetism.

The pronouncements of the great Jewish Prophets had an unparalleled power of contagion, which grew and radiated. They also represented and mobilised the common aspirations, which gave them their incomparably contagious quality. The Prophet revolts against appearances which would make of him a man like all others, instead of a man *for* the others. The force which he feels and experiences in himself is so powerful that it could not be anything but Jehova Himself.

What we know of the Prophets allows us to compare them with the modern leaders of masses, who also proclaim that their peoples are chosen peoples. They too have dedicated their lives to national redemption. And they want that, having grown out of an anarchic state and amorphous mass thanks to their effort, *this* nation, *this* people should become a totalitarian unit, one totality.

Scientific and industrial progress have enabled the founders of the new authoritarian régimes, which marked the twentieth century as the age of tyrannies, to perfect an unprecedented technique of oppression. Compared to them, Nebuchadnezzar would appear to be relatively liberal, because he was without the means to regiment entire populations, unit by unit, to condition them from birth, to keep them on short rations throughout their lives, to harrass them and to haunt them with radio, press and a meticulous control of the whole of human existence, in which rationalisation does not exclude unreason. It is true, he too knew already of deportations, he did have prisoners put to death at the stake or thrown down from high walls ; but he had not invented tortures like that of making his victims become accomplices of the hangman, of tormenting them by holding out false expectations, or of making them play the role of accusers in their own trials. Individuals then could escape the nets laid out by the predatory State. But to the modern

tyrants even territorial frontiers do not constitute boundaries of their realm : it extends all over the earth—a new kind of *diaspora* (dispersal of the Jews from Palestine) which, while participating in the life of other collectivities, as occasion demands, either maintains that it is oppressed, or un.masks itself as the conqueror.

One of the characteristic features of democratic and liberal regimes is the uninterrupted ascent in the social scale of men coming from the popular classes : all hopes are allowed, theoretically to be sure, to every individual. In the totalitarian autocracy, every one renounces all higher aspirations on his own account, but reposes them in a personality with which he identifies himself in the emotional effervescence produced by the crowd, and in which he recognises himself ; but which is not marred by the imperfections of his own existence, such as it is—an existence which would then appear only as a mere imitation, a pale reflection, of the existence of the “leader”. The former is emptied to fill the latter. It is not given to all to have a destiny ; the leader is a kind of general keeper of destiny. The modern autocrat is like that highest product of classical liberal economy, the perfect self-made man, who leaves all the others far behind—a “son of the people” become “father of the people”. Democracy is thus resorbed, and we are back to the origins of royalty. Again the people delegates its power to its leader, but no longer, as in representative democracy, in an abstract, arithmetical, utilitarian manner, but passionately, in mystic abandon, like a woman, like the faithful, like a crowd. The leader does more than represent the man as a part of the crowd ; he incarnates him plastically and exalts him. It may go so far that he is taken for the type of masculine beauty prevailing among his people. His similarity with the actor, the *star*, is too obvious to elaborate the point. One can identify himself with both when they happen to be of the same sex ; and one can give oneself away to them, if of the other sex, with a passion which,

compelled to find fulfilment only in substitute, tends by this very fact to idolatry and ritual.

The leader is not leader because he is by nature apart from the rest like the high from the low. He comes from the depth of the mass. He has sold picture postcards painted by himself at street corners ; he has begged ; he was a miner or a cook. *Sacred actor in a live miracle, having performed the passion-play of popular existence, he now intensely interprets the drama of national existence.* The mass of people, which has deposited on him the crushing burden of initiative, the night-mare of autonomous individual existence, retains only the right to applaud. The leader need be no more than an "ordinary" man, but he is so to the point of hysteria. His "success" means to the mind of the crowd that he was supernaturally chosen and inspired. Democratic mysticism loses itself here irrecoverably in what is still rather animal in the human make up.

Democracy presupposes adult participants. Its theoreticians categorically reject the idea that the majority cannot be yet of age. The triumph of democracy in the State implies the triumph of reason in the individual. When the voters elect a deputy, one has, theoretically, to do with grown-up persons. Every monarch, on the contrary, is the father of his people. The modern autocrat, the leader, is also a representative. He "represents" the forces of desire, the efficacy of dreams, the power of the myth, the dictatorship of the imagination. Men who know very well that during their life time they will never escape want and anxiety, project part of themselves in a personage not residing in heaven, but a god-become-man, who can transform the world because he is incarnate. Man, as a piece of the mass, throws off the mediocrities of adult existence, and thus releases potentialities in him which were suppressed by the (Freudian) "reality principle"; by abandoning himself, together with others around him, to an act of deification, he derives an accession of strength. Individuals, closely huddled together,

exorcise all individual inadequacies by projecting a Pharaoh on the screen which is their guide. In this picture, all that is perishable, corruptible and contingent in them is solemnly, and later ritually, denied, and aggressiveness, that source of power, is ceremoniously asserted. In this way were born, and are still being born, veritable *theatrocracies*. If man is a political animal, the mass is a religious beast.

The public meeting, with its sacramental words and gestures and its lithurgic chant, appears like another virtually religious ceremony of a new creed. Soon only the leader will speak, or whoever speaks, will speak in his name. The expression of the emotions of the masses tends to be subject to strict rules. The dialogue between the leader and the mass becomes stylised, hieratic and ritualist. Man in a meeting grows more and more rigid. By and by, the crowd will explode only in cadence, and according to a rhythm. It gives itself over to the profound intoxication of communion and obedience. Everyone has stepped outside himself. After that experience, the model subject of a colossal theatrocracy will endure to his utmost, to the extreme of incurring death, the consequences of a state of trance of that grand monster of which he had been a part.

A people de-individualises itself under the shocks of actually experienced or impending collective dramas or in consequence of a historic earthquake, or again of inherent contradictions of the regime which it has given to itself. That is how the masses are born. There be no sectional groupings in the State, said Jean-Jacques Rousseau: those who in 1789 translated the intentions of the "conquering bourgeoisie" into facts had the Provincial Councils, and the provinces themselves, the ancient municipal institutions, parliaments, guilds and free corporations, abolished by the Assembly. Once started on this path, the Legislature abolished also all congregations, fraternal, men's and women's

associations and foundations, whether ecclesiastic or secular. To complete this work, the Convention and Napoleon, under the pressure of historical necessity, had only to regiment academic institutions and introduce mass recruitment for the army. The law, no doubt, subsequently made much of the individual, more than ever before; yet, everything happened as if with the purpose of binding him all the better, hand and foot, in economic servitude. The disruption or disintegration of time-honoured social relations, and the suppression of the Orders, had created the precondition for the appearance of this transitory and dynamic phenomenon of social amorphousness: the masses. In 1848, they forced their entry to the forefront of the political scene; without their participation or their neutrality, the Second Empire would not have been possible in France (nor, beyond the Rhine, German unity). The Napoleonic legend as a factor of history—this active conjunction of mythos and the masses—heralded the tyrannies of our century. For the first time in modern history, the catalytic properties of a mixture of demagoguery, nationalism and tyranny are here being experimented.

The masses cannot remain the masses. They carry their own negation in themselves. The masses are agitated in public meetings, but mass effervescence soon becomes the ritualist demonstration of the ambitious enthusiasm of an organised group. By the logic of their very being, the masses tend towards dissolution of the amorphous stage, because the germs either of hierarchy or of monarchy are inherent in it. Every live mass instinctively looks upon the army as its model, and as a challenge to shape itself on that model. Modern totalitarianism is militarisation of the masses—an organisation of the people on the model of an army. The masses, as masses, being an anarchic state, everything happens as if that anarchy could ultimately not tolerate itself. Any collectivity must realise that the question: to be organised or not, is in fact the question:

to be or not to be. The mass state is not stable. What matters is not so much the intellectual content, nor even the human significance of the proposed ideologies ; a party which holds mass meetings to stir up wilful excitement, which can most effectively organise people on the model of the army, and yet maintain the tradition of being rooted in the people—such a party, operating in a society with unstable and precarious institutions, has the chance to succeed thanks to the power which it possesses, the fear which it invokes and the attraction it exercises. The “professional revolutionary” *applies* empirical notions of crowd psychology to manoeuvre men into the mass state, just as the engineer, applying science to industry, utilises mountain torrents to generate power.

In all typical epochs, there was some relation between art and political power. Louis XIV was no alien to the style of Racine. But the tyrants of our time would dictate from above how human creativeness should express itself. Notwithstanding their technical perfection, these most effective despotisms of history do not seem to be the most enlightened—not yet, at any rate. Under their rule, the “ideologists” are always called upon to “purify” ideas, as are the historians to distort the facts.

The contemporary masses form themselves (like the clouds) in a social atmosphere in which the traditional religious beliefs prove powerless to allay a suddenly arisen fear. After the first world war, in Russia as in Germany, conditions of life became inhuman. All possibility of coming out of those conditions destroyed in the germ, men flocked frantically together ; they were subjected to hard and shattering pressures, following each other in quick succession. The masses are a feature of a society which has lost its

form (measure) and which retains nothing but its content (weight). The rise of the masses is the symptom of a disorder historically interpolated between two orders. While the modern tyrants are still compelled to speak to the masses, to talk about the masses, the purpose of their existence and their mode of action are such as if the masses did not exist at all. A process of organising the people, treated as the masses, overrides everything else.

Finally, it should be noted that the phenomenon called the masses occurs in societies where the great collective festivals are no longer what they used to be. There are no more popular games or dramatic performances based on religion. Individualism and empty ostentation have replaced the festivals. A society which would outlive the stage when it is composed of masses, and reconstitute itself into an order (without necessarily having to pass through Fascism), might profitably adopt the practice of periodical ritualist congregations on festive occasions. Public festivals would give a meaning to the senseless term "organised leisure"; therefore they are wanted. Incidentally, the inevitable hierarchy and associations would thereby "sanctify" themselves from time to time. Theoreticians who would deny that the phenomena of social differentiation, of the formation of societies within society, is inevitable, would have to prove their case. We shall wait and see.

After a great historical upheaval, when in a collectivity no hierarchy, no distinction commands any longer the consent of all, when different social organs, by force of circumstances, acquire much too independent an existence, when every constituent unit confounds its own interest with the public welfare, arbitrariness, illegitimate privileges, minor usurpations, intrigues and slackness combine, and society ceases to be anything more than the sum total of all these. In such conditions, the masses blindly tend towards

some kind of monarchy : law remains on paper, truth itself is threatened.

And once truth ceases to be a value for civilisation, the danger is indeed great. Even the sacred frontiers which delimit the realm of the exactest sciences may not, in the long run, resist. One can only hope that the all too crude regimentation of thought would not prepare for humanity a collapse in which all past achievements will be lost.

Perhaps the time has come when those who wish that truth retained some power in this society of ours, must count their number.

Does that mean that we are not to take sides ? Not at all. Socialism *or* Freedom, or Socialism *and* Freedom—for us still a problem, this question has already become a dilemma for others.

Let us not close our eyes to what is becoming evident to all : Absolute State control of economic life creates the instrument of despotism—the perfect collective crime. The onrush of the masses manifested an effervescence. But the temperature cannot be kept up : the masses will freeze into a monolith, unless human genius, which obeys only in order to command, proves itself capable of directing them into different channels. Human genius can survive only through conquest ; it can transform the world only if it faces this supreme challenge which disputes its very existence. At this juncture, it will either have to succumb, or to preserve conditions in which it can operate.

To pay for Socialism with political freedom, is too high a price ; it means giving up a present good, certainly very modest, but achieved at great cost, for future good : and the antagonism between the two cannot be questioned. To deny the dilemma outright, one must have shed every vestige of honesty. (Possibly this non dialectical virtue stands on its last legs to-day). All the more is it necessary that the

best amongst us should ponder over the problem of the compatibility of Socialism and freedom, and insist that the exceptionally difficult task that history has set to us, to be solved here and now, is to make a synthesis of the two imperatives. There is no doubt that we are facing a tragic situation—and the great risk of being defeated. But what is at stake is worth the risk.*

* Translated from the French Monthly Review *La Nef.*, Paris, Vol. III, No. 25, with the author's permission by Ellen Roy.

MODERNITY AND FORM

Sibnarayan Ray

The modern sculptor without religion, without direction, tradition, and stability, is at a terrible disadvantage compared with the sculptors of previous periods. He has to invent even his subject matter, and he has at last been driven into the *cul de sac* of "pure form" where he is either making works which are totally meaningless or repeating aimlessly the same set of forms with slight variations.

Epstein.

In the processes of art we shall find...the processes commonly used to induce the state of hypnosis.

Bergson, *Time and Freewill*, P. 14.

Art such as Picasso's, M. Maritain once wrote in *Art and Scholasticism*, shows a fearful progress in self-consciousness on the part of painting. That description applies equally well to Schoenberg's music, Kafka's or Sartre's fiction, Henry Moore's sculpture or Auden's verse. Probably it also applies to Maritain's own theological metaphysics. And not only is that progress itself fearful ; it is also marked by a progressive intensification of the feeling of fright.

The immensity and 'deadliness' of this fearful progress becomes disconcertingly obvious from even a casual comparison of contemporary thought and imagination to that of its immediate predecessors. Galsworthy and Joyce, Anatole France and Jean-Paul Sartre, Yeats and Auden, Shaw and O'Neil, van Gogh and Braque, Loeffler and Strawinsky—I am thinking of this collection of odd pairs that comes almost off-hand to my mind, and the breach is unmistakable. And yet, chronologically speaking, many of them overlap in the periods of their composition. Nevertheless, I do not apprehend any serious objection if I were to describe the first set in these groupings as our immediate predecessors and the second as the tall men among our moderns. And while the startling difference in tone and temper may tempt interpretative temerity and excite possibly justifiable display of unreserve, its universal existence, I presume, may not be

disputed by either our sociological 'pontiffs' or our more punctilious 'journeymen.'

It is my intention in this essay to briefly describe the state of affairs in contemporary mind as evidenced primarily in its literature. An investigation of the other significant forms of human expression would have made the discussion unwieldy; although I am inclined to believe that the evidence, at least of modern painting, sculpture and music, will also corroborate my general description. With some allowance for the inadequacy of any generalisation, it may even not be impertinent to suggest that recent philosophical thought as exemplified in the writings of pragmatists, intuitionists and logical analysts, also shows remarkable similarity in tone, temper and preoccupation.

Before I proceed with an elaboration of my theme, it is necessary to indicate certain obvious limitations of this essay. No age can strictly speaking be ever homogeneous. To describe a period by any general label is, therefore, indiscreet. This is a pertinent, though somewhat platitudinous, criticism made against historicist method. Nevertheless, while each individual is possibly unique and therefore non-classifiable, it is also empirically true that their inter-relations, as well as their dependence on the entire system of inter-relations which is society, produce approximate uniformities (other than physio-biological) which provide a public homogeneous background to their individual heterogeneity. Of course, this socio-cultural homogeneity is never absolute; it changes under diverse influences. Still, it may not be altogether irrelevant to speak of the relative particularisation of a period; the specific pattern of relations that holds its various elements together and that finds an integral expression in what is commonly described as its tradition and culture cannot simply be dismissed as a historicist figment. To speak in terms of dates is apparently hazardous, and yet to discuss the dominant tone of a period may not be altogether pointless.

Besides, particularisation involves emphasis on differential features. That does not mean any disregard of generic continuity, nor does it involve any dogmatic denial of resemblances between particulars. Nevertheless, a period can be isolated only when its distinctive contours are drawn in deeper shades or sharper relief. This isolation also requires initial disregard of the nuances of the individuals composing together the reality of the period. The complex totality of circumstances that may explain the relative intensity of change in certain periods of history is beyond the purview of our present discussion ; the occurrence of such intensified periods, however, is indisputable, and the margins that demarcate somewhat vaguely one age from its preceding and succeeding ages are the symbols of such acute intensification in its social dynamism.

And it is also, I hope, in the logic of things to illustrate the character of a period by selecting specimen primarily of its expression at its highest tension and widest incidence. This selection is naturally limited by the knowledge of the surveyor and also partially by his psychological preferences. While one can try to be fair and catholic in one's selection, I am afraid, the non-admission of these limitations can only speak of pretentiousness and immaturity.

II

In this limited and specific sense, modern mind as reflected in its imaginative literature appears to be distinguished by a remarkable intensification of uncertainty about the symbolic and publicist value of its own world. [I use the term public and publicist all along in this essay in the specific meaning in which it is used in modern Semantics, logic and behaviouristic social psychology.] And it is acutely conscious of the menacing implications of this uncertainty—even from the aesthetic point of view. Modern mind (except when it is mass-mind) is morbidly solipsist ; morbidly, because it feels its privacy as an augue and yet

cultivates it with Jesuitical earnestness. And as solipsism, both logically and psychologically, points to the flux of inchoate sensations, the modern individual has not only lost his social moorings, but is even without a centre within himself. Modern art is desperately experimenting in form ; and form is not only essential for social shareability of experience, but also for the preservation and growth of individuality. In its social aspect, modern art is experiencing the crisis of symbol-dissolution ; internally, it is grappling with a collapse of integrating centres. The distinctive tone of modern art (where it is not crudely blatant as for example in the recent work of Aragon) is one of unmitigated anguish resulting from acute consciousness of this dissolution and collapse.

Sensitivity without direction, Ezra Pound wrote in one of his *Cantos*, and this generally describes the predicament of the modern artist. An unrelieved sequence of disasters, involving the collapse of the existing fabric of modern civilisation, has naturally increased the acuteness and intensity of the modern artist's response to his human milieu ; he has unfortunately, however, little scope for organisation of his experience or for concentration on design. If it were only an aesthetic dead-end, his efforts would have been exclusively directed to the working out of new and more expressive aesthetic designs. But the simultaneous occurrence of a general social collapse has taken away from him that advantageous moral certitude which makes an all-out concentration on aesthetic design possible. A Galsworthy or an Anatole France had not to confront any serious self-distrust of their modes of expression or their tacitly assumed values ; hence they could chisel out finished sculptures with masterly craftsmanship in external details. The inter-war generation could not produce anything comparable to old Jolyon or Monsieur Bergeret or Jacob ; its typical characters are Stephen Daedalus or Monsieur Mathieu. Our immediate predecessors gave us the sculpturesque in literature ; with

us, it is either an art of the surface or an art of the surreal, an art of amorphous movements frantically struggling to find form for forces about whose character it is precariously uncertain.

It is this peculiarity of modern art which, I believe, Virginia Wolfe wanted to emphasise when she described the work of her contemporaries as the art of fragments, the art of note-book. Modern artists are terribly conscious of the utter inadequacy of prevailing forms to provide any public medium for their acutely felt experience. The so-called literary Left may jeer at such admission as the futility of the highbrow ; from their inane height of new orthodoxy, they may benignly shed tears over the poor inmates of the Ivory Tower. Yet, orthodox art has produced nothing comparable in aesthetic value with the output of Joyce or Rilke or Kafka or Eliot. Even Mayakovsky (whom I know unfortunately only in Mr. Marshall's authorised translation), who has been recommended by Stalin himself as the greatest poet of proletarian revolution, is at his best only when he toils in anguish through the wreckage of human history ; his hymns to the new faith have rarely the sweep and sinuousness of Vaughan's or Herbert's devotional verse. Besides, at least in English poetry, the very people who claimed to have discovered new horizons in the socialist faith, and who were officially sponsored as the poets of the new era, are, alas, no more in the orthodox Church. Who but the aesthetically blind will dispute that Auden, with all his limitations, has produced his best work not when he was a Communist, but only as he moved tormentedly in the dark and obscure maze of the subconscious ? And even on the other side of the Channel, Eluard and Aragon, in spite of their adjuration of surrealism and vociferous proclamation of *l'homme communiste*—is not their best poetry even now essentially surrealist, expressionally contorted and obscure, in content esoteric and tortuous ? There can be little question of blaming these artists for their morbid solipsism. For who is there to-day

that cares for the fate of man and is intensely alive to contemporary happenings, who is not similarly tormented by this universal disintegration of cultural forms—is not anguished in his helplessness to stem the tide of universal disaster ?

III

It may be objected that the above description is rather overdrawn—that at most it applies only to the existentialist movement in modern art and philosophy. The return of Kierkegaard and the Marquis de Sade, however, is not limited to a couple of pontifical special pleaders or small groups of neurotic highbrows. If Existentialism and Surrealism were just exhibition pieces of a score of amusing faddists like Heidegger, Tristan Tzara, you and I might have smoked our quiet pipes in the lounge and chuckled benevolently over their antics. But existentialist anguish and surrealist disorder have to-day invaded all ranges of human life on a phenomenal scale. They are not limited to the avowed exponents of the two movements. There is not one major artist of the present generation who is immune to their influence. And in a sense, this morbidity had been creeping upon this age over a long period, in fact since the beginning of the present century. Between the *Portrait of an Artist* and *Finnegan's Wake*, between Monsieur Teste and Monsieur Mathieu, there is a continuity, a continuity which, for example, cannot be traced back to Zola or Ibsen or even Thomas Mann. It lies probably in the utter atrophy of social feelings, in the admitted uncertainty about interpersonal communication, in warped self-centredness and moral disintegration of modern literary mind—and in the field of literary tone and technique, in the splitting of grammatical syntax, in ambiguity of word-meaning, and in the bantering ambivalence in one's attitude to oneself which has come to pass as metaphysical wit.

The dissolution of form came in sundry ways. To-

wards the close of the century, Bradley had already touched with his dialectical wand the relational pattern of predication and analysis and logic, which had come to be considered as relatively the most stable of public forms, appeared as if shattered as fragile cobweb. We still do not seem to have recovered from his spell. William James helped to dissolve personal integrity into the stream of consciousness, while Freud claimed to have discovered an amorphous world of subconscious slime beneath the thin and deceiving crust of human reason and morality. The influence of James and the Freudians have been possibly the most profound on contemporary imagination. Even in the comparatively more solid region of physical reality, the discovery of Relativity and later on of Quantum Indetermination made the Universe appear embarrassingly personal, and human knowledge precariously contingent and conventional. Explorations in Semantics also contributed to this general feeling of uncertainty; while the types and nature of ambiguity and symbolic imprecision were elaborately analysed and catalogued, it became more and more obvious that personalism in symbols was nearly unavoidable, and unless they were reduced to mathematical pointers, communication of complex experience was fairly impossible. In fact, it was research in Semantics which persuaded Richards, probably the most influential of modern English literary theorists, to suggest an exclusively emotive use of language in poetry. Carnap may claim to have reduced all thought into syntax, but the bewilderment and frustration of less impersonal human beings was acutely conveyed when, in *Sweeney Agonistes*, the hero cried out in despair :

But, if you understand or if you don't,
That's nothing to me and nothing to you.

The cumulative result of these various explorations was the isolation of the sensitive individual from his interpersonal background and the consequent disintegration of his own individuality. The physical Universe, the human soul,

and all the symbols, traditions and values which underlay human relationships, had lost their self-subsistent and stable objectivity. Explorations in the fields of anthropology and social sciences had further exposed the absurdity of considering any human convention as "natural" or "immutable." Added to this cultural chaos was the decomposition of the various social institutions of the nineteenth century. These developments together introduced a phenomenal intensification of that feeling of isolation, decay and abject helplessness which in the nineteenth century was at most a problem of abnormal pathology. The institutional expression of this development was the rise of mass-faiths, monolithic parties and total States. In the field of art and literature, these feelings have expressed themselves in the frantic and repeatedly frustrated quest for new forms.

IV

In the field of imaginative literature, the dissolution has come in devious ways. It can be seen in the tone, technique and preoccupation of all forms of modern literature. There has thus, for example, developed an intense anxiety for symbolic precision combined with syntactical obscurity; a general psychology of heartlessness and asociality and absence of moral integrity; a highly sophisticated recoil from logical coherence and fall-back on sensory experience and emotions as communication-media; conscious avoidance of larger sweep and concentration on atomised units; an anguished sense of personal loneliness and decay; and a hard tone of cynicism and sadistic wit. With some very rare exceptions, if any at all, these features apply to the entire range of modern art and literature.

The movement for symbolic precision began quite early with the French Parnassians and Symbolists; they also introduced the technique of syntactical obscurity in expression. Their chief contention was that intense personal experience is not shareable, and the conventional symbols of

language, which are generally employed for communication and exchange of experience, can only make a travesty of the experience intended to be conveyed. Nevertheless, externalisation of experience makes employment of symbols unavoidable. Such symbols are, however, necessarily personal in character. The discipline of intellectual categories to achieve approximate integration of a complex of experiences can only distort those experiences. Therefore, the most that can be attempted is to communicate only very partially the suggestive aura of the smallest possible unit of experience with the help, as far as possible, of the phanopoeic and melopoeic qualities of language. Already in his *Divagation Relativement Au Verbe*, Mallarme had spoken of *rien que la suggestion* and demanded reduction of poetry into incantation. Valery, following Mallarme, renounced *pensee directe ordonnant les idees* (Verite) and defined art work as "individual formations of categories of minds" (Introduction to the *Method of Leonardo da Vinci*). He developed the symbolist thesis that "there is absolutely no question in poetry of one person's transmitting to another something *intelligible* that is going on in his mind. It is a question of creating in the latter a state of experience whose expression is precisely and uniquely that which communicates it to him...the image or emotion is valid or sufficient if it produced in him this reciprocal relation between the word-cause and word-effect" (*Variete*). This theory thus indicates a programme of cultivating unique personal experience, primitive phano-melopoeic modes of expression and concentration on inner form of experience in complete indifference to the limitations of conventional language.

While formally repudiating the mystical excesses of Symbolism, the two major movements in modern poetry during and after the first world war, Imagism and Surrealism, seem to have accepted its main principles. Both the movements are now more or less events of the past ; but they have exercised most profound influence on modern literature.

Imagism started as a movement against the vagueness of the late romantics. Its main aim was to bring back to poetry "definiteness of presentation". "An image", explained Pound, the chief exponent of the imagist theory, "is that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex...It is not an idea. It is a radiant cluster ; it is what I must perforce call a Vortex." In the *ABC of Reading*, Pound had deplored the replacement of the primitively sensuous mode of mental organisation by the abstract and intellectual ; he had invited modern artists to cultivate human antennae and to abjure cerebral systematisation which, according to him, amounted to atrophy of the senses. He had reminded us that in Greek the word aesthetic means sensuous and is opposed to gnosis, dianoëia and even eikasia. His models, therefore, are the Byzantine and Hellenistic poets of the Augustan era, the mediæval troubadours of Provence, the Japanese Noh plays—models which resemble each other in their insistence on sensuous appeal, deliberate exclusion of all moral or logical integration and in selection of small units of experience as the theme of art. T. E. Hulme, the other theoretician of the movement, demanded from the modern artist the ability to distinguish, "the particular faculty of mind to see things really as they are...the grip over oneself which is necessary in the actual expression of what one sees" (*Speculations*). Hulme also made clear the philosophical outlook behind this art movement. "Put shortly, these are the two views then. One, that man is intrinsically good, spoilt by circumstances, and the other, that he is intrinsically limited but disciplined by order and tradition to something fairly decent. To the one party, man's nature is like a well ; to the other, like a bucket. The view which regards man as a well, a reservoir full of possibilities, I call romantic ; the other, which regards him as a very finite and fixed creature, I call classical." This so-called classicist outlook, which actually was Jesuitical in character, formed the philosophical background to Imagism.

The influence of Imagism, which as an organised movement died out after Pound's quarrel with Amy Powell, was strictly limited to the Anglo-American world. Surrealism, on the other hand, has been essentially a continental phenomenon. Besides, where Imagism was ultra-classic, Surrealism was blatantly super-romantic. Its roots have been traced back to French symbolists and even to the Gothic revivalists of the late eighteenth century (Andre Breton, *What is Surrealism?*). Nevertheless, as a modern movement, its major extra-æsthetic sources are Freud, Jung and Bergson. One may dismiss the dadaist antics of Tzara as a superficial expression of war-time nervous disorder; but the experiments and contentions of serious artists and writers like Breton, Read, Max Ernst or Salvador Dali cannot be easily disregarded. Surrealists contend that there are other and more vital planes of existence than the one people live in their conscious everyday life (D. Gascoyne, *A Short Survey of Surrealism*). These planes are fluid and dynamic and their shifting matrix can only appear as chaotic, ambiguous and meaningless to the stereotyping approach of reason and convention. These planes exist in the human subconscious and are lived only in uninhibited impulsion. In their support, the surrealists bring in Bergson's metaphysic of *elan* and intuition and the Freudian psycho-analytic of Id and Pleasure Principle. Jung's deification of the collective mnemonic unconscious also greatly encouraged the movement (N. Calas, *Confound the Wise*). Breton even goes to the extent of claiming for it the sanction of Marxian social dialectic (Breton, *Ib.* p. 70). But it would seem, as Herbert Read points out in his symposium on *Surrealism*, that anarchism and not Marxism is probably the best political supplement to the surrealist movement. (Also see Read: *Anarchism and Poetry*).

In spite of their obviously contradictory character, Imagism and Surrealism resemble each other in certain fundamentals, and it is in these that they are both symptomatic of the cultural dissolution which we have been trying

to describe. Both recognise the collapse of old forms and are remarkable for acute sensitiveness to modern social disintegration. Both consider reason and morality as primarily inhibitive influences. Both are blatantly asocial. Both believe that the abstract symbols and values which hold civilisation as well as individual personality together, atrophy and warp human sensitiveness. Both suggest a fallback on primitive modes of response: Imagism, on visual and auditory sensations, and Surrealism on organic impulses. Both demand isolation of the individual from social life. In either movement, linguistic organisation is emphatically auditory rather than syntactical.

The inadequacy of this sophisticated primitivism in modern art is probably nowhere better illustrated than in the work of the very artists who are oriented by these ideals. Ezra Pound, the ablest exponent of Imagism, for example, sought for years most scrupulously to practise sensationist precision and unitism in his poems. He describes his poems as *Personae* or masks, cast-off once put to form, autonomous and impersonal. But already as early as 1913, he is found dissatisfied with the image, although he was seeking sanction and support from similar art movements in ancient Greece and mediæval Provence and China. In *Lustra*, he speaks of the social significance of art rituals. (*Lustrum* is an offering for the sins of the whole people made by the censors at the expiration of their five years of office). And in *Homage to Propertius*, Pound is already found painfully conscious of the limitations of his theory. He who had learned from Arnaut Daniel "an aesthetic of sound, of clear sounds and opaque sounds, of heavy beats and of running and light beats" (*Make It New*, p. 50), he who was poet of "white words as snow-flakes, moss words, lip words, words of slow streams", is disturbed by an alien impulse to commission his songs to "go to the nerve-wracked, the enslaved-by-convention" and "to bear to them my contempt for their oppressors". He is fretfully reminded that his genius is

no more than a girl, and that "soft fields must be worn by small wheels"; but unlike Propertius, he is not content to perfect miniature *epyllions* for a garden school coterie. He is forced to go beyond and, in *Hugh Selwyn Mauberly*, he describes the predicament of the modern artist, also indicating the forces which drove him to the great adventure of the *Cantos*.

Mauberly, said Eliot, is the document of an epoch. The hero of this poem was "out of key with his time" and tried to remain "unaffected", devoting himself to the "elegance of Circe's hair". But unless the human individual can become the God of Spinoza, every haven of purity "leaks through its thatch". Mauberly had tried to live on drinking Ambrosia, believing that "all passes, Anangke prevails". Yet, the relentless pressure of social life made aesthetic absorption impossible. And so he :

drifted...drifted precipitate
 asking time to be rid of...
 of his bewilderment, to designate
 his new found orchid
 to be certain...certain
 (amid aerial flowers)...time for arrangements
 drifted on to the final estrangement...

The modern imagist who has tried to live like Walter Pater's Marius or the hero of the Axel's Castle in a decorated little world of gem-like sensations, finds himself unable in the supervening social blankness "to sift *To Agathon* from the chaff" and discovers to his agonised bewilderment how his aesthetic sieve has turned ultimately into his social seismograph. It is with this experience that Pound passed his imagist adolescence and became in the *Cantos* the epic poet of Ulysses wandering in modern hell. It may be true, as Eliot says in *After Strange Gods*, that Pound's hell is other people's hell and therefore does not trouble us; and quite possibly this is due to the immaturity of Pound's understanding and moral sense. Yet, in his

pathetic turning away from the diletantism of Cavalcanti to Dante's "direction of the Will" (*Jefferson and/or Mussolini*), in the immature endeavour to find some principles of social reconstruction in the economics of Major Douglas (*ABC of Economics*), in his belated effort to write "a poem of some length" and disastrous confusion of Fascism with social stability—Pound stands out as a tragic example of the failure of modern imagination to find some integral extra-aesthetic pattern, as also of its convulsive recognition of the need for it. In this Pound, *il miglior fabbro*, the poet of the *Cantos*, the artist-henchman of Mussolini, shows the way to his other sensitive contemporaries—whether they are Communists, Catholics or Kierkegaardians, to Eliot as much as Eluard, to Hamsun and Jules Romain as much as to Aragon, Alexei Tolstoi and Jean-Paul Sartre. [For a more detailed study, see my essay on "Ezra Pound and the Cantos" in *The Calcutta Review*, May, 1943].

V

A more easily recognised, but nonetheless significant, facet of this dissolution of form is the pathological tone and temper that pervades the entire range of modern art. This can be seen in the types of characters that recur with sinister regularity in modern poems, plays and fiction—in the imagery and the cumulative emotional effect of any modern art work from Rilke to Dylan Thomas. It is also seen in the anarchic wit and sadistic preoccupation of the typical modern artist. (Probably a most extreme example will be the *Autobiography* and the recent work of Salvador Dali.)

Thus, for example, the most mature and influential poet in English language of the inter-war years, T. S. Eliot, has offered us as his lifetime's achievement a whole range of personae who all resemble in being hollow men and women frightened and deranged, pursued by furies and hallucinations, incapable of love or friendship or human warmth of feelings—to use his own words, "shape without

form, shade without colour, Paralysed force, gesture without motion". They are all acutely nostalgic and suffer from persecution complex, living a life of fake impeccability, are morally atrophied, demented by that anguish of isolation which Kierkegaard had so elaborately described about a century ago. Whether it is Mr. Prufrock who cannot propose to the lady he loves, or the hero in the "Portrait of a Lady" who, at the end of their liaison, cries out hysterically: "And I must borrow every changing shape...dance, dance like a dancing bear"; or it is old Geronimo and the group of impotent people round him trying to "protract the profit of their chilled delirium" ("I have lost my passion: why should I keep it Since what is kept must be adulterated?"); or it is Mr. Sweeney shifting from ham to ham and the group he collects later on around himself in *Sweeney Agonistes* waiting for the knock of death at the door,—Eliot's personae are always the hollow people, "headpiece filled with straw", who cannot face life even in their dreams. The world of the *Waste Land* is a world peopled by these men and women, tormented by memory and desire—"crowds of people walking round in a ring"—symbolised in the person of Tiresias, blind old man with wrinkled female dug, passively suffering the anguish of perennial decay. Cleopatra and Elizabeth, the Lady sitting in a chair and the Lady of the Rocks, Lil and Albert of Eastend slum, the young carbuncular clerk who assaults "unreproved if undesired" the beautiful typist—they are all empty people who never had "the awful daring of a moment's surrender", and whose salvation probably lies in complete voluntary negation of themselves before some hypothetical God of Catholicism. But no, Eliot also, like Pound, is uncertain about salvation; it would appear that neither Plotinus nor St. Thomas can save man from the Hell of Original Sin. The rains, of course, came to the Waste Land from distant Himavant, but it left our Ulysses-Tiresias-Galahad with the unresolved question: Shall I at least set my lands in order?

In his more recent writings, Eliot has become comparatively less whimpering and nostalgic ; yet, neither Becket in *Murder in the Cathedral* nor Harry Monchensey in *The Family Reunion* could break the chain of original sin or transcend the matrix of existential suffering and reach the *summum* of beatitude. In his war-time *Quartets*, Eliot is therefore found confessing to himself his failure to reach any stable haven of faith ; he is still uncertain about the question with which he started two decades ago in "the Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock": Would it have been worthwhile, after all, would it have been worthwhile ? [For an elaborate analysis and evaluation of Eliot's poetry, criticism and philosophical ideas, see the author's forthcoming publication, *Introducing T. S. Eliot* and a series of essays on Eliot by him in *Mysindia*, Bangalore, 1945-46]

VI

This feeling of lonesomeness, insidious and intransigent, has resulted in an attitude of cynical callousness about others and in terrified recoil from expansive fellow-feeling or faith in human goodness. This is what, I suppose, Victor Gollancz has lamented about in his book *Our Threatened Values*. You can see that in the personae of Eliot I have already mentioned ; you can also see it in Auden, Huxley, Sartre, Lorca, Werfel and even among less well known artists. The passive suffering and impotent wit of the hero of the *Dog Beneath the Skin*, or the warping of human feelings by the unscrupulous will to power in the *Ascent of F. 6* ; the hard brilliance and sadistic banter of *Point Counter-Point* or *Eyeless in Gaza* ; the emotional anaesthesia of the hero in the *Age of Reason* and the impotent anguish of the heroine in *Yerma* or *The Barren*—they all speak of a world in which human feeling, morality and reason are completely desiccated and the individual reduced into abstract samples of psychopathology—paranoiacs, epileptics, narcissists and sadists, having no

integrity within themselves nor any healthy harmonious relation with other human beings. It is a world of the diseased and dying, without love and beauty and hope and confidence,—a world which was vaguely described in perspective by Rilke in his *Elegies*, a world of anguished marionettes pulled by strings of fear,—a world whose typical epitome is the recently published *Autobiography* of Salvador Dali. Is it, then, very strange that a world like this can produce at its most intensely tragic moments nothing better than a character like Joseph K (in Kafka's *The Trial*)—a character who, in spite of his strong and persistent struggle against the machine of power, is slowly but irresistibly broken to fragments? As Auden put it in his dedication to Erika Mann in *Look Stranger* :

Since the external disorder and extravagant lies
the Baroque frontier, the surrealist police
what can truth treasure or heart bless
but a narrow strictness ?

I have tried in this essay only to indicate in broad outline the precarious state of things in which modern art is involved. It is obvious that the problems are larger and more comprehensive than can be indicated by the term aesthetic. Herbert Taube, the ablest interpreter of Kafka's writings, considers the issues to be primarily metaphysical. Maritain and Eliot, on the other hand, find the cue in theology ; the Freudians discover the roots in nervous disorder and inhibition ; while Marxists contend that the problem is one primarily of economic readjustment. Whatever the value of all these points of view may be, the extra-aesthetic nature of the contemporary predicament in art is being more and more recognised by the artists themselves. Modern artists are found either seeking desperately an escape in what Orwell has described as personal oases of harmony,

or throwing down their hands before the accumulated momentum of mass-faiths. Meanwhile, the need for integral reconstruction of life, both individual and social, based on a comprehensive humanist philosophy remains imperative, as much in the field of art as in all other spheres of modern life.

HUMAN NATURE

M. N. Roy

More than two-hundred and fifty thousand years have passed since the origin of the human species. It is rather an arbitrary estimate. Because anthropology has discarded the hypothesis of monogenesis. However, the point is that only a small fraction of the time during which the human race has inhabited the earth comes under the purview of recorded history. Another period is covered by legends, myths, mythologies and epics. The historical value of those superstitious, poetical, imaginary and hear-say accounts of pre-history is of late being increasingly appreciated. Eventually, the scope of history proper may be extended backwards. Even then, by far the larger part of the time since the origin of the human species will remain the realm of pre-history. Yet, whatever is constant in human nature was formed during those remote days. Anthropology will have to dig deep in that subsoil in order to discover the hidden springs of the mental evolution of the species.

The history of the infancy and adolescence of the human species coincides with the process of biological evolution. It is therefore that subsequent history, the history of civilisation, is to be regarded as an organic evolutionary process; and it could be rationally explained only when it was so conceived. The history of the infancy and adolescence of the human race has to be biologically reconstructed—as stages in the process of the biological evolution of the species. The biological approach to pre-history, the history of early savagery, throws a flood of light on the age-old problem of human nature.

The knowledge about the descent of man rules out the doctrine of creation. The appearance of man in earth having no other reason than the origin of a new biological species, the laws of the development of the human race

cannot be essentially different from the general laws of organic evolution. Human nature, therefore, is determined by those laws. Subject to an evolutionary process, it cannot be an immutable category. It is a hackneyed saying that human nature never changes. The truth, however, is just the contrary: To change is human nature. Otherwise, there is no sense in regarding the history of civilisation as an evolutionary process.* Yet, just as life is the red thread running through the whole process of biological evolution, similarly, there is a residue of humanness underlying the flux of the process even before it has gone beyond the borderland where the primitive man is still not fully differentiated from his animal ancestry. The origin of humanness, therefore, antedates the origin of the species. That is a logical corollary to the doctrine of descent. The origin of a new species is a mutation in the process of evolution. The qualitative change, however, is superficially functional; the biological form involved in the process undergoes no essential change, anatomically or physiologically. In structure and size, the brain of the primitive man differs very little from that of the anthropoid ape. The one inherits the mental and emotional equipments of the other as the basis of humanness which, therefore, is a direct outcome of the process of biological evolution ever since the origin of organic matter.

Notwithstanding any obstinate scepticism in that respect, science has abolished the *hiatus* between inanimate nature and the organic world. Life grows out of the background of non-living matter. There is a causal connection

* "The foundation of all understanding of sociological theory—that is to say, of all understanding of human life—is that no static maintenance of perfection is possible. This axiom is rooted in the nature of things. Advance or decadence are the only choices offered to mankind... The very essence of reality, that is, of completely real, is process. Thus, each actual thing is only to be understood in terms of its becoming and perishing. There is no halt in which actuality is just its static self, accidentally played upon by qualifications derived from shift of circumstances. The converse is the truth... The pure conservative is fighting against the essence of the Universe." (A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*).

between the two. It would be going beyond the purview of this essay to dispel all doubt on that score. The point of departure is the scientific view which rules out the doctrine of creation as an unnecessary hypothesis. The physical Universe is a cosmos ; living nature is a part of that law-governed system ; it logically follows that the processes of organic evolution are also determined. Empirical knowledge, which culminated in the discoveries of Darwin and Wallace, corroborated this logical hypothesis. It went into the formulation of the doctrine of evolution, which represented discovery of reason in living nature.*

Taking place in the context of the law-governed physical Universe, biological evolution is also a rational process. Life is neither an inexplicable category called intuition, nor is it a mysteriously purposive urge ; it is a determined physical process. In metaphysical terms, it is the unfolding of reason in nature. But reason itself is not a metaphysical category ; it was not conceived as such until the necessity for rationalising the irrationalism of the so-called revealed religions was felt. Then, the concept of reason was identified with the *ad hoc* doctrine of Providence in order to mitigate the absurdity of the notion of an anthropomorphic God, and to fit both the notion of God and the doctrine of Providence into philosophical thought (theology), which developed throughout the ages under the impact of reason inherited by the human species as a primitive instinct from its immediate animal ancestry. Reason is the simple, instinctive notion that every object of experience is connected with some other object or objects which may or may not have been already experienced, but because of the belief in the connection, which holds the world of experience together, their existence is assumed. There, belief is to be defined as a conviction regarding

* "Just as physiology has found no case of interference with the order of nature as revealed by physics and chemistry, the study of evolution has brought to light no principle which cannot be observed in the experience of ordinary life and successfully submitted to the analysis of reason." (J. B. S. Haldane, *Facts and Faith*).

matters of fact. This notion determined all the forms of early human thought, such as magic, fetishism, animism and natural religion.

Consciousness is the property of life in the zoological world. It means to be aware of the environment. Simple awareness is presently supplemented by reactions to the things of which the organism becomes aware. From that stage of biological evolution, there begins the growth of the nervous system to serve as the means of inter-relations between the organism and its environment. The growth culminates in the formation of the brain which, physiologically, is called the mind. So, mind is the highest expression of the property of life called consciousness, and thought, that of reaction to simple awareness. The mind becomes conscious of the environment, the radius of which gradually expands until entire nature is embraced. It being consciousness of a law-governed system, human mind is necessarily rational in essence.

In other words, the intellectual and spiritual life of the primitive man was conditioned by the elemental instinct of reason. It is an instinct, because it is a product of pre-human biological evolution. "The very beasts associate the idea of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience; they could hardly survive for a day if they ceased to do so." (James Fraser, *The Golden Bough*). In his later works, Darwin had shown that every aspect of the mental constitution of man could be referred back to animal mentality. A whole succession of anthropologists and historians of culture subsequently developed the idea. Robert Briffault, for example, wrote in 1927 that "a scientific psychology has become possible since the fact has been apprehended that the human mind is built upon a foundation of primal impulses common to all forms of life, of instincts similar to those which shape animal behaviour."

Conceptual thought distinguishes the mind of the

savage from that of the anthropoid ape. But let it be repeated that even then there is little anatomical or morphological difference. Conceptual thought depends on language. So, it can be said that man is fully differentiated from his animal ancestry only when he coins words for expressing definite ideas. But from this it does not follow that memory, some very primitive ability of associating things and events, and the habit of expressing emotions through behaviour, are altogether absent in lower animals. Indeed, they do communicate feelings through articulate sounds. Koehler's experiments with chimpanzees are the most instructive in this connection. He came to the conclusion that they had "a high degree of intelligence" enabling them to solve practical problems. But their thought and the resulting action are dependent entirely on stimuli from objects in their field of vision.* The step from that mental state to the human mind capable of conceptual thought is long. The causal chain of mental evolution, however, is not broken. Memory is the ultimate basis of conceptual thought, and animals do possess memory. That is evident from their observable behaviour. Language enables the savage to attach labels to the mental equipments inherited from the animal ancestry, and consequently it becomes easier for him to remember past experiences and differentiate one object of experience from another. The result is the origin of conceptual thought—thinking stimulated by mental images.

An insight into the biological substrata of the mental and emotional life of the *homo sapiens* thus compels a rejection of the time-honoured dictum that human nature is to believe. The scientific basis of this tendentious doctrine, which served the purpose of bolstering up the

* My long and fairly systematic observation of animal behaviour, particularly of cats, warrants disagreement with the view that animals are altogether incapable of what can be called conceptual thought. Rudiments of that human capacity are clearly discernible in them. Their behaviour is often determined by the memory of things not present in their field of vision.

irrationalism of revealed religion at the cost of reason, is an uncritical acceptance of the evidence of the superstitions of the savage, which survived the infancy and adolescence of the race, and are found still lingering in civilised society. The venerable doctrine about the constant of human nature can be differently stated: Man is naturally superstitious. Superstition being the result of ignorance, the corollary to the doctrine would be the proposition that ignorance is the natural state of man. Differently formulated, we have the traditional saying "ignorance is bliss".

Anthropology and critical history of culture have traced the superstitions of the savage to his instinctive rationality,—nothing comes out of nothing, everything is caused by something else. The idea was far from being as clear as that in the mind of the savage. Therefore, it must be called instinctive; it was still a matter of biological mechanism, determined by the latter's causal connection with the cosmos of the physical Universe. In other words, instinctive rationality was a vague feeling on the part of the primitive man; and elemental feelings are automatic biological reactions. Instinctive rationality rules out belief in anything supernatural. Man being a part of nature, as long as he clings to the mother's breast, his mind cannot possibly conceive of anything outside nature. The idea of God as well as of anything supernatural is entirely absent in the mind of the savage. Researches into the origin of civilisation led Lubbock, for instance, to the conclusion that "atheism" was the characteristic feature of the mentality of the primitive man, "understanding by this term not a denial of the existence of a deity, but an absence of any definite idea of the subject." (John Lubbock, Lord Avebury, *The Origin of Civilisation*). The same authority is more explicit in another place. "The lowest races have no religion; when what may perhaps be in a sense called religion first appears, it differs essentially from ours; it is an affair of this world, not of the next; the deities are mortal,

not immortal, a part, not authors, of nature." Again, "Even among the higher races, we find that the words now denoting supernatural things betray in almost all, if not all, cases an earlier physical meaning." (Ibid.) This opinion, endorsed by other authorities like Tylor and Fraser, is based on data gathered in course of extensive and painstaking scientific researches among primitive tribes in different parts of the world.

The residue of humanness, therefore, is the biological heritage of reason. To put the same thing differently, human nature is not to believe, but to struggle for freedom and search for truth, the latter aspect manifesting itself in *homo sapiens*. The distinction is fundamental. Belief in supernatural beings or mysterious metaphysical forces would make submission to the object of belief the essence of human nature. If that was the case, man would have never emerged from the state of savagery. Because, as soon as the biological form belonging to the human species became a thinking being, mind and thought entered into the process of organic evolution as its determining factors. Having grown out of the background of the law-governed physical Universe, they are rational categories ; therefore, the entire subsequent process of man's intellectual and emotional development is also rational.

Before man's imagination populated nature with gods and hit upon the practice of propitiating them with prayers and sacrifices, the savage believed that he could obtain similar results by magic. "Magic rose before religion in the evolution of our race, and man essayed to bend nature to his wishes by the sheer force of spells and enchantments before he strove to coax and mollify a coy, capricious or irascible deity by the soft insinuation of prayer and sacrifice." (James Frazer, *The Golden Bough*). Frazer has shown that there is a close analogy between the magical and the scientific conceptions of the world. Both assume a succession of events according to immutable laws, the operation of which can be

foreseen, and, therefore, events predicted or anticipated. "It (magic) assumes that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. Thus, its fundamental conception is identical with that of modern science ; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature. The magician does not doubt that the same causes will always produce the same effects." (Ibid.) Magic, thus, is antagonistic to faith, even of the natural religion, which allows gods to regulate the operation of natural phenomena according to the wishes of the supplicating man. Yet, there was a time when magic and natural religion were closely associated, proving that the latter was also an expression of rationality inherent in human nature, "a device of human reason".

Both magic and natural religion assumed, one explicitly and the other by implication, that man can have the power to free himself from the domination of the ruthless forces of nature by controlling them either directly through spells and incantations, or indirectly by propitiating the gods who were conceived as enormously more powerful men. When experience exposed the limitations of the terrestrial magician's power, the savage looked up to celestial ones—the gods of the natural religion. They were not conceived as superhuman immortal beings ; they were parts of nature, being originators and controllers of its various phenomena. They represented the ideal of man—personifications of power and freedom, power as the means to freedom.

Animism is supposed to prove that the primitive man instinctively believes in supernatural forces. The defenders of this view hold that animism was antecedent to magic, being the origin of religion. Their whole argument centres around the term "anima" which, they maintain, was conceived by the savage as something immaterial, spiritual. The notion of an immaterial soul, which eventually came to be a cardinal dogma of religion, is said to have originated in

animism. The controversy about the priority of animism or magic is anthropologically important ; philosophically, it is immaterial. The case of those who hold that it is human nature to believe does not improve even if priority is conceded to animism.

The doctrine of soul, indeed, originated in animism ; in that sense, the root of religion may be traced to the philosophy of the savage who believed that all actions and reactions in nature were purposeful. But the anima was not something separate from the body ; it was a "vaporous materiality", identified with breath. There is abundant philological evidence to that effect. In all the old languages—Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, Roman, Slavonic, Arabic—the words for soul or spirit etymologically mean "breath". Now, breath is a property of the body ; animism thus placed soul in the body. "It is one thing to regard an object as having anthropological consciousness, and another to believe that consciousness is a distinct power capable of quitting it or of surviving its destruction or of existing independently. The human spirit is not necessarily believed to enter upon a life after death, still less is the spirit of the animal." (Carveth Read, *Man and His Superstitions*). The word anima means life. The soul of animism clearly was a biological notion. It was not a matter of belief, but result of experience. Savages hold the animistic doctrine of soul "on the very evidence of their senses interpreted on the biological principle which seems to them most reasonable." (Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*). Tylor, therefore, speaks of the "logic of the savage". On all competent authority, animism was also an expression of the rationality of the primitive man. The fact that it contained the germ of religion only proves that the latter also is essentially rational.

If the prejudices of animism did not place their sanctions outside nature, natural religion was the rational effort of the barbarian to explain the phenomena of nature

and his experience thereof. Had the notion of a creator or an almighty God or a cosmic force been current in the dawn of civilisation, then the barbarian would not feel the necessity to search for the cause of such natural phenomena as rain, storm, movements of the stars etc.,—a search which led to his inventing the gods of natural religion. The search was an expression of his innate rationality ; everything must have a cause. The gods were conceived as great magicians who could make nature bend before their will, and magicians were men who knew the laws of nature, and that knowledge gave them the power of divination.

Natural religions were theoretical systems “devised by human reason, without supernatural aid or revelation.” (Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*). A similar view was held many centuries earlier by Thomas Aquinas. “Some religious truths are attainable by the unaided exercise of human reason, while others require the disclosure of supernatural revelation before they could be known.” This doctrine was preached by mediaeval theologians with the object of reconciling Christianity with the natural religion of the pagans. But incidentally it admitted that simple deism was a rational cult as against the mysticism of the revealed religion.

Having reached the conclusion that the age of religion was preceded by the age of magic, Frazer takes up the investigation of the cause which induced mankind to turn its mind in another direction, and identifies it with the urge for a truer theory of nature and a more fruitful method of turning her resources to account. “Men for the first time recognised their inability to manipulate at pleasure certain natural forces which hitherto they had believed to be completely within their control.... Thus cut adrift from his ancient moorings and left to toss on a troubled sea of doubts and uncertainty, our primitive philosopher must have been sadly perplexed.... If the great world went on its way without the help of him or his fellows, it must surely be

because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its course and brought about all the varied series of events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own magic." (James Frazer, *The Golden Bough*).

The still lingering belief that the sense of morality is intimately associated with religion, is not borne out by historical research. The savage, with no notion of God, has a strong sense of good and bad. With him it is instinctive; that is to say, his sense of morality is not prompted by any inner voice, nor is it dictated by the fear of God. Morality, therefore, is also essentially rational. The fashionable expression—"law of the jungle"—only betrays human conceit. There are rules of conduct even among higher animals. Those rules go into the composition of human instincts. They are part of man's biological heritage—the constant of human nature. In man, they express themselves as the sense of morality. One knows from experience what is good for him and what is bad for him. Therefrom he generalises that what is good for him is good for all like himself, and what is bad for him is also bad for all. That is the origin of morality.

Modern historical research has revealed that philosophy is older than religion, if superstitions of the savage, such as fetishism, magic and animism, and also the spurious piety of the barbarian, who propitiated the gods of natural religion for selfish motives, are not counted as religion. This fact proves that human nature is essentially rational, because rationalism is the guiding principle of philosophical thought. The earliest philosophies were the first attempts of human intelligence to explain natural phenomena in physical terms without assuming supernatural agencies causing them. The point of departure of those attempts was the belief that nature was a rational, law-governed, system. That belief was possible because the human mind, not yet confused by metaphysical speculations, nor lured by religious imagina-

tions, could function in its native posture—in tune with nature. The relation between philosophy and religion, between reason and faith, can be clearly traced in the history of the western world. Science as a free enquiry into nature, and philosophy as a rational plan for attaining the ideal of “good life” developed to a high level in ancient Greece, centuries before the rise of Christianity. Natural religions, which preceded scientific enquiry and philosophical thought, were pseudo-theological systems, also devised by human reason. Their theology was spurious, because the gods of natural religion were made by men, after their own image, and lived in nature.

The ancient history of the other countries of old civilisations is still to be reconstructed. But even now there is enough reliable evidence indicating that religion in the strict sense was a later development there also. In India, the Vedic age of natural religion was followed by a period of rational enquiries, fragmentarily recorded in the Upanishads. Out of them rose the systems of philosophy. Hindu religion as expounded in Vedanta and Gita was a later development. The sequence is not clear, with a good deal of overlapping and many long gaps, because Hinduism is not a revealed religion. In China, there was no religion until Buddhism in a degenerated form came from India. Of the two currents of thought in ancient China, Confucianism was rational and Taoism naturalist.

In the present stage of world history, pending the composition of a universal history, the evolution of thought in the western world has to be taken as the general pattern. More than six hundred years before the rise of Christianity, there developed in Greece an intellectual life which laid the spiritual foundation of modern civilisation. Full of vigour, it survived the onslaught of an organised religion which completely dominated European mind for more than a thousand years. Ancient Greek thought was rationalist, and consequently the earliest philosophy was materialism.

“Long before the rise of the philosophers, a freer and more enlightened conception of the Universe had spread amongst the higher ranks of society.” (Lange, *History of Materialism*).

A galaxy of bold thinkers from Thales gave various explanations of the Universe without going outside nature. Their common point of departure was that “nothing is without a cause”. Anaxagoras, for instance, spoke of the “world-forming Reason.” After more than two-thousand years, that early prophet of rationalism inspired the leaders of the French Revolution, to the extent that ultimately Robespierre made a goddess of Reason. Diogenes of Apollonia declared that the world was regulated by reason and identified it with air. Leukippos thought that the “logos” was nothing but the mechanical law which guided the movement of atoms. The ideas of the earlier philosophers were summarised by the founder of physics, Democritus, who held that the postulate of the absolute necessity of all things was the condition for the study of nature and any rational knowledge of nature. Empedocles regarded rationality as an eternal property of the elements. The founder of the Eleatic school, Xenophanes, was also a rationalist.

Socrates was not alone to drink the cup of poison. Even Aristotle, who later on became the patron-saint of Christian theology, had to flee from Athens to escape a similar fate. All the works of Protagoras were burnt, and he also escaped the wrath of the priesthood of natural religion by fleeing. Anaxagoras was arrested, but managed to run away and save himself. Diogenes was persecuted as an atheist. Yet, the wisdom of the first philosophers survived not only decayed natural religion, but the powerful onslaught of Christianity. Christian theology accepting the authority of the atheist Aristotle was a revenge of nature.

Because of a multitude of definitions, or of the absence of rational ones, the concepts of freedom and truth are

dismissed by practical men as objects of metaphysical speculation. Yet, the quest for freedom was the incentive which differentiated the human species from its biological background. It is the most basic human urge, though most of the time it remains buried deep under the surface of consciousness. Indeed, the incentive itself is a biological heritage. Of course, in the context of the pre-human process of organic evolution, the incentive for freedom has a physical connotation. It expresses itself in the struggle for existence. To live is to survive the deadly impacts of the forces of nature.* To live, organisms must not only free themselves from the stranglehold of inanimate nature, but struggle also against other manifestations of life itself. Therefore, every success in the biological struggle for existence can be called a conquest of freedom.

It seems to be more difficult to trace the highly philosophical and ethical concept of truth in the biological essence of human nature. Is it not a purely metaphysical category? If it were, then, it could have nothing to do with human nature, which is physically determined, biological evolution being a process embedded in the physical Universe. But before the appearance of *homo sapiens*, who could philosophise, populate nature with supernatural beings, imagine a metaphysical cosmic force or will, and conceive of ethical values, it was not all a spiritual void. The psyche is said to be the repository of residues antedating *homo sapiens*. The psyche, however, is not a mystic entity serving as the link between the mortal man and the immortal world-spirit. It is the subconscious part of the mind—a biological heritage, the storehouse of experiences of the primitive man as well as of his vertebrate animal ancestors. The psyche is not a mystic entity, because, as the subject of the science of psychology, it can be reduced to physico-chemical constitu-

* "The meaning of cultural progress is in a conflict between Eros and Death, between the Life-instinct and the Instinct of Destruction. This conflict is the essential import of life, and cultural progress is consequently to be described as the struggle for the existence of mankind." (Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and Its Discontents*).

ents, with which philosophy can build the bridge across the gulf between physics and psychology. The psyche, in other words, is the umbilical chord which binds man, with all his spiritual attributes, to Mother Nature—the physical world. All metaphysical concepts and ethical values, conceived and created by *homo sapiens*, are physically determined; the psyche is a daughter of the Mother Earth.

Truth, therefore, is not a metaphysical concept. It is a matter of human experience. It is a matter of fact. Truth is correspondence with objective reality—the relation between two objects of experience. Therefore, it is the content of knowledge. The old saying "Knowledge is power" is not an empty phrase. It summarises the lesson of the entire human experience. The biological struggle for existence was a blind urge; man's struggle for freedom from the tyranny of the forces of nature was guided by his knowledge of nature. The one became successful in proportion to the increase of the latter. The biological heritage of the quest of freedom created already in the savage the urge for knowledge which gave him power to carry on the struggle against the forces of nature. The search for truth, therefore, is intimately associated with the quest of freedom as the essence of human nature.

EDITORIAL NOTES

While the Communists are gleefully hailing the triumph of revolution which they believe to be just round the corner, and Socialists and Liberals are pinning their hope on the U. S. A. rushing to rescue distressed Europe before it is too late, the stark reality facing the civilised world is the grim perspective of a complete breakdown. For the moment, odds are heavily against any peaceful settlement, and events are moving in a rapidly accelerated tempo towards a fierce clash between two giants, each claiming the credit of being the champion of democracy and freedom. Any large-scale revolutionary upheaval, such as appears to be imminent in two important countries of Europe, will most probably precipitate the impending clash and thus hasten the catastrophe threatening modern civilisation.

Similar calamities, though none nearly of an equal dimension, occurred also in the past. But never before was the consciousness of the coming misfortune so very acute in the mind of so many people. That fact makes the present crisis all the more tragic. Helplessness and pessimism are as widespread as the premonition of the dreadful future which has cast its ominous shadow athwart the pestilential present. Philosophers, who do not take side in the clash of ideologies, gloomily predict the coming of a new dark age, and sit back in their chairs to watch the dreadful drama unfold itself, as it were with the ruthless fatality of the Greek tragedy. Disillusioned revolutionaries turned didactic poets advise the disinterested elite to build oases of culture and intellectual freedom, obviously assuming that the civilised world has already turned into a desert. Artists, who refuse to be regimented, would cultivate monadist individualism or wallow in the murk of surrealist decadence.

Yet, the situation is not so very desperate ; the battle for justice, tolerance, goodwill, orderly progress and peace is

not yet irretrievably lost. Given the widespread consciousness of the threatening calamity, there is no reason why it could not be avoided if there was a sufficiently strong will to do so. Modern civilisation has produced not only the atom bomb and other instruments of wholesale destruction and mass massacre, which are at the disposal of those who are blinded by the lust for power. Its positive achievements—spread of education, higher level of culture, disappearance of parochialism, relatively greater freedom of thought—are capable of putting up a stronger resistance to a possible breakdown than in the past. An appeal to reason issued by men and women painfully conscious of the impending calamity may not go unheeded. The qualities which are bound to prompt response to such an appeal must be cultivated. Why should the masses of the civilised mankind be left at the mercy of demagogues and desperadoes to be hypnotised in an emotional regimentation with the promise of a utopia ?

There is room for an alternative leadership—not in the struggle for power, but to place before the tortured and tormented mankind a new vision of hope which does not lay on the other side of an ocean of blood and tears, but could be reached peacefully, through mutual trust, cooperation and goodwill. The modern civilisation and the cultural heritage of the past would not be worth saving if they had not blessed our time with a large number of men and women fully qualified and capable to take in hand the destiny of mankind and lead it out of the greatest crisis of its history. Of course, one cannot be sure ; but certainly it is an effort worth making.

The article of Jules Monnerot, reproduced (in translation) from the Paris review "NEF" (Nouvelle Equipe Francaise) graphically describes the nature of the problem and indicates an approach ; it is also a challenge for all who attach any value to the cultural achievements of modern civilisation, and are distressed by the perspective of their

being destroyed in an insane scramble for totalitarian power. M. Monnerot thinks that Europe is confronted with the choice between Socialism and freedom and pleads for a synthesis between the two. However desirable that might be, democratic Socialism, which would not sacrifice the relative freedom of the present for an uncertain future, seems to be a broken reed, a forlorn hope ; it is fighting a losing battle against the triumphal march of dictatorial Communism through the devastation and despair of a whole continent.

Experience has created doubt about the socialist solution, though it is still believed by many to be the panacea for all the evils of the capitalist order. Socialist leaders are discredited before their dwindling followers because they seem to lack the courage to act up to their professed theory. Essentially, there is no difference between Socialism and Communism. The only distinction is that the Communists act according to the logical implication of the Marxist doctrine of class struggle, whereas the Socialists do not. Yet, the latter do not have the intellectual honesty and moral courage to discard a false faith which they still share with the Communists. The result is that dictatorial Communism is steadily driving the democratic Socialists to the wall, in the struggle for the leadership of the working class. The Socialist position is really contradictory ; the self-same party cannot be the champion of the interests of one particular class and also of democracy. Democratic Socialism, in a sense, therefore, is a contradiction in terms. Hence it is losing ground to Communism ever since the latter appeared on the European scene thirty years ago boldly advocating dictatorship as against democracy. The advance of triumphant Communism right up to the heart of Europe and its deep infiltration of other countries have placed the alternatives in the sharpest relief. It is not a choice between Socialism and freedom ; nor is it the problem of making a synthesis of the two desirable things. Is freedom

possible? That is the question which challenges the ingenuity of political theorists, economic planners and social architects.

The exploitation of man by man must stop ; economic inequalities must go ; social democracy must replace the formal political democracy. These are common demands of all who are anxious to see the civilised world come out of the post-war crisis. But the crisis is much too deep-rooted to be overcome by these highly desirable revolutionary measures. It is not merely a question of construction. It is a cultural crisis which has almost overwhelmed the sense of human values. What is needed is nothing less than a psychological revolution and moral regeneration. The core of the problem is that the end has been lost in a conflict of means for attaining it. What is, after all, involved in this controversy about democracy, dictatorship, Socialism, Communism? The choice of one or the other of these roads must be determined by a convincing answer to the question : Will it lead to the goal? In this case, all roads do not lead to Rome. The question would be pointless unless the goal was remembered. It is all but forgotten. The idea of freedom has fallen into disgrace ; the means—democracy, dictatorship, Socialism, Communism, according to taste—have become the end. Hence, all the intellectual confusion and moral chaos ; none can judge whether it is a progress backwards or forwards. There is no standard to measure how near the faithful are to the promised land.

Consequently, formal parliamentarism can claim to be the climax of democratic freedom, brazen dictatorship pretend to be the highest form of democracy ; regimentation be glorified as voluntary collectivism, the totalitarian autocrat be hailed as the people's tribune, State Capitalism pass as Socialism, and industrial feudalism as Communism. If the Communists are frankly contemptuous of the concept of freedom, which they dismiss as an "empty abstraction", the Socialists, though professing the ideal, throw it overboard by thinking in terms of collective class interests.

The ideal of freedom has been forgotten in the frenzy of collectivism. It can be approximated only individually. The number of individuals capable of appreciating freedom as the highest value is the measure of the progress any community has made towards the goal. Collectivism demands eclipse of the individual, and consequently is antagonistic to freedom, because except as a matter of individual experience freedom is really an abstract ideal. The history of the contemporary world shows that freedom of nations or classes may mean just the opposite for the majority of individuals composing the collectivity. The waning appreciation of the value of freedom is the core of the crisis of modern civilisation. That deplorable fact makes regimentation possible and enables demagogues to become dictators.

Having described the crisis as a psycho-pathological state of the multitude, M. Monnerot traces its root to the rise of Nationalism. That is an interesting point of view. It is realised by few that there is little to choose between Nationalism, Socialism and Communism, all being cults of the imaginary god of a collective ego. Otherwise, Hitler's National-Socialism could not have such a spectacular sweep. And nationalist degeneration of Communism is the most remarkable phenomenon of contemporary history. While the concept of freedom was confused and eclipsed by the rise of collectivism of one variety or another, democracy failed to outgrow its formalism and consequently stultified and discredited itself. Periodical counting of heads came to be the essence of democracy. That practice was suicidal for democracy itself. It encouraged demagoguery as the most effective method of catching votes. By that token, Mussolini and Hitler were the most successful democrats. Fascism indeed could not succeed except with the support of the masses. Where, then, is the distinction between formal democracy and dictatorship—Fascist or Communist?

It is thus a hopeless moral and spiritual confusion which cannot be ended even by the most drastic political

and economic measures. As a matter of fact, such measures, either from the Left or from the Right, only lead to still greater regimentation, at the cost of the last remaining vestiges of liberty. Current clichés, such as democracy, Socialism, Communism, have all become spurious coins. If civilised humanity is to come out of the gravest moral and spiritual crisis of its entire history, it must again be inspired with the ideal of freedom, which is neither an abstract concept nor a metaphysical category, but a biological heritage. Quest for freedom and search for truth are the essence of human existence. Defence of these basic human values should again become the incentive for all social and intellectual efforts.

Overcoming the present crisis, civilised mankind will open a new chapter in its history. A new age requires a new philosophy, based on a revaluation of old values, to encourage resistance to the creeping paralysis of pessimism and to light up the path into the darkness of the future. One symptom of the crisis is religious atavism on the part of some among those who are frightened by its possible consequences. That tendency might be detected also in M. Monnerot's historically correct observation that mass hysteria, incited by politicians, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary alike, is not a recent phenomenon, that man was merged in the crowd, idolised as the infallible, incorruptible and all-powerful masses, ever since the days when the Cross was replaced by National Flags. The observation is historically correct inasmuch as Nationalism was the earliest of modern collectivist cults. But is it not equally true that there is a religious fervour in the frenzy of flag-waving, whether the sacred rag be multicoloured or red? Conventionally, the Cross has lost its moral connotation and become the symbol of submissiveness. It can no longer serve the purpose of the resurrection of man. That is equally true for all religions. In an atmosphere of religious revivalism, modern dictatorship would easily acquire divine

sanction like the mediaeval monarchy. Of course, the suggestion is not to revive the old-fashioned religion based on ignorance and superstition. The plea is for a moral invigoration of modern civilisation and culture. That certainly is the crying need of the day. But a morality which cannot do without some mystic, extra-intellectual sanction will be a broken reed. We need a secular ethics with rational and humanist sanction. On the other hand, the resurrection of man should not mean relapse into utilitarian individualism.

The modern society cannot do without collective efforts. But they should be voluntary efforts of men and women conscious of their individuality, jealous of their liberty, integrated into a collectivity which is neither a mechanised monster nor a mere crowd. Economic planning to increase production and ensure equitable distribution, efficient political administration, radical readjustment of social relations—all these measures, essential for making the benefits of modern civilisation equally available to all, should be taken, always keeping in mind that they are but means to an end. The purpose of collective endeavour should be to help the unfolding of individual potentialities. Rationalist humanism can be expected to enable the ingenuity of the bold, even though a few in the beginning, to exorcise the nightmare of a possible breakdown of modern civilisation under the impact of a mad scramble for totalitarian power.

BOOK REVIEWS

MARXIAN ECONOMICS

THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT by Paul M. Sweezy, Dennis Dobson Ltd., 18s.

The book bears the subtitle, "Principles of Marxian Political Economy", and it is to a defensive exposition of Marxian Political Economy that the book is mainly devoted. The author has the advantage of close acquaintance with 'classical' as well as 'Marxian' economics. This added to his remarkable critical faculty, a mind that feels equally at home in the world of abstractions and the world of concrete reality, and a talent for clear exposition makes his book an important contribution to the study of economic theories of Marx. It has justly been described by Maurice Dobb, one of the foremost exponents of Marxian economics in our time, as "a standard work in its field". Apart from its value as an illuminating exposition of Marx's economic thoughts, the book is of special interest because, while mainly expository in nature, it abounds in originality of thought and throws up occasionally daring speculations. The originality of exposition—as in the statement of theories of 'crises' or of the nature of fascism—and the boldness of speculation—as in the reflections on co-existence of capitalism and socialism—make the book delightfully provoking.

The book falls into four parts. The first part is devoted to an exposition of Marx's theory of value and concept of 'surplus value'; the second is a study of the process of accumulation of capital; the third deals with theories of crises, the factors that lie behind the phenomena of recurrent depressions in a capitalist economy; the fourth is an investigation into a number of problems of exceptional interest, such as, the development

of monopoly, the growth of imperialism and fascism, the prospect of 'reformism' and the future of socialism. The logic of this order of treatment is quite obvious. It is interesting to note that the logical order of the unfolding of the theme of the book is, as is usual, broadly the reverse of the psychological order of our interests. Psychologically, our primary interest lies in eliminating crisis and building up a prosperous society: fascism, 'reformism' of the Keynesian variety, socialism of the Marxian conception, all appear in this context as suggested solutions of the problem of crisis, and it is their adequacy as solutions of the problem that is of primary practical interest to the economist. The urgent desire for an escape from crisis drives us to seek the causes of crisis. The enquiry into 'fascism', 'reformism' and 'socialism' is psychologically prior but logically (and therefore in the order adopted in the book) posterior to investigation into causes of crisis.

Sweezy finds the basic cause of crisis in a "disproportionality between the growth of demand for consumption goods and the growth of capacity to produce consumption goods." By the "growth of capacity to produce consumption goods" is meant the growth of the stock of capital capable of turning out consumption goods. Crisis develops because the growth of the stock of capital proceeds for a time at a rate faster than is compatible with the growth of the capacity of the people to purchase consumption goods. Once we accept that the cause of crisis lies in the relative rapidity of the growth of the stock of capital, we have, for the sake of further analysis, to fall back upon a study of the process of the growth or accumulation of capital. Hence, investigation into the theories of crisis is logically preceded by a study of the process of accumulation of capital. Capital, however, is formed through the investment and reinvestment of surplus value. Surplus value appears, therefore, as the

inevitable starting point in any study of crisis under capitalism.

Regarding 'surplus value' it is necessary to point out that, while the emergence of a surplus in the sense of an excess of productive capacity over what is immediately consumed by the community is an essential requisite for the formation and accumulation of capital, the statement that all surplus is due to 'labour' is a highly questionable proposition. The support or opposition derives from social sympathies rather than from analysis of the objective economic process. The objective economic situation merely reveals that a number of factors co-operating together turn out a certain total produce. In many cases, it is also possible to work out what can be 'imputed' to the 'marginal' unit of a particular factor in a given occupation. It is to be noted that it is not strictly permissible to speak of what the marginal unit of a particular factor 'produces' by itself ; it is only permissible to speak of what can be 'imputed' to the marginal unit provided we accept a certain principle of imputation. This principle of imputation deserves acceptance not because it commands moral validity, but because it is a useful instrument for analysing the way in which remuneration of different factors is actually fixed and allocation of resources among different occupations is decided under the system of individualistic capitalism. It is useless to raise the question how much of a total produce has been turned out by a single factor participating in the joint process of production : the search for a principle of such apportionment is an impossible adventure on the economic plane.

It is necessary to introduce here a special pointer. To criticise the crudity of any statement making labour the source of all surplus value is not to defend any such form of income as 'rent' derived from land. It is merely to point out that if rent enjoyed by private landlords is to be abolished, the case for abolition must build itself not on

contentions of the type that land is barren or produces no surplus—an obviously incorrect statement—but on considerations of social welfare, of justice as well as economic progress. It is necessary to bear in mind that a proper scheme of distribution need not have any simple relationship to the relative shares of the social wealth produced by different social groups, even if such shares were ascertainable. The idea that it need have any such relationship arises from obsession with the ethics of private property. Orthodox economists suffered, naturally enough, from such obsession. They first deluded themselves that what is 'imputed' to any particular factor is 'produced' by it, and next persuaded themselves that what is 'produced' by a factor, and no more, is morally due to it as remuneration. Sweezy justly denounces this "subtle use of the productivity theory as a standard of desirability." It remains only to add that Marxists themselves are also guilty of a similar perverted use of "productivity theory" as "a standard of desirability." They state that all surplus value is produced by labour, and they derive from this the conclusion that labour should secure the whole of this surplus. The taking away of this surplus by the capitalist constitutes 'exploitation' because the surplus is due to labour, and it is due to labour because it is produced by labour. Here we find the irony of the infiltration of the ethics of private property in Marxian consciousness. Once it is realised that the moral case for a higher remuneration for labour stands independently of the theory which represents surplus value as the product of labour, the enthusiasm felt by the Marxists for this particular theory may wane. So long, however, as the ethics of private property pervades the sentiments of large sections of people, this theory will not lose its worth as a weapon of socialist agitation.

It may be thought by many Marxists that their peculiar conception of the nature of the origin of surplus value is essential for the Marxian theory of capitalist crisis. This is

not, however, the case. What really enters into the Marxian theory of crisis is not the *origin* of surplus value, which is quite untraceable, but the effects of the particular manner of distribution of wealth under capitalism and of the behaviour of the capitalist with regard to the wealth he secures.

The behaviour of the capitalist with regard to his wealth, his persistent accumulation of capital, has received a treatment in the Marxian economics which differs radically from the orthodox treatment of the subject. According to orthodox theory, "it is painful for the capitalist to 'abstain' from consumption in order to accumulate, and hence interest on capital is to be looked upon as the necessary reward for such abstinence. Against this Marx takes the position that to accumulate capital is a positive end and has 'pleasures' attached to it quite as much as consumption does". It is impossible to deny a large measure of truth in the Marxian contention. Accumulation of wealth is a positive passion in the miser, and every capitalist has something of the miser's worship of money in him. To the capitalist the rate of interest is important not so much because it will bring him future means of consumption (as the waiting theory implies) as because it will increasingly add to his accumulated stock of capital which brings power and prestige and has a romance of its own. Sweezy might have added that at any particular time the complex of rates of profit to which capitalists have got accustomed determines their 'normal' expectations, and if they cease to invest or curtail investment when profit falls below this 'normal', it is only because they believe that 'normal' rates will return in not too distant future so that it may be worth while to wait until channels of more fruitful investment open out again. If rates of profit fall permanently below what has so long been regarded as normal, investors will get accustomed to the new rates and carry on the game of investment under the new less favourable terms.

It may be contended that the representation of accumulation as an end in itself leaves unanswered the question why, at any particular time, investment limits itself to a particular volume and does not exceed that volume. There is not much destructive force behind this contention, because though the Marxist representation of 'accumulation' does not provide any immediate answer to the question posed above, it is by no means inconsistent with an adequate answer to that question. It is wrong to suppose that, if accumulation is an end in itself, there can be no limitation on the volume of investment. The volume of investment will tend to stop at that point where the rate of profit expected from the marginal dose of investment is just equal to the current rate of interest; extension of investment beyond this point will only offer the prospect of a loss on balance, and such loss will not be embraced, if only because it cannot help the process of accumulation of private capital. If the question is raised how the rate of interest is determined, reference will have to be made to categories like 'liquidity', 'preference' which, unlike 'abstinence', command a lively significance in the context of that complex environment composed of monetary and banking institutions and the habits and policies connected with them which govern the rate of interest in an advanced capitalist economy.

Unlike theories connected with 'abstinence', the Marxist emphasis on accumulation as an end in itself has not been rendered obsolete by institutional developments within the framework of capitalism. It has further the great advantage that it brings into prominence the driving force behind the 'motion' of the capitalist economy. It throws light on external imperialist expansion as well as on internal crisis in capitalist economy.

It is not an accident that Marx laid emphasis on the drive for accumulation while orthodox economists emphasised 'abstinence.' Maurice Dobb points out how "political

economy and the controversies which beset it have meaning as answers to certain questions", and the questions posed by Marx differ widely from those posed by the orthodox economists. Leaving aside analysis of motives behind Marxist and orthodox approaches to economic problems, it is possible to state on a theoretical plane that, while Marx was primarily interested in discovering the 'law of motion' of capitalism, the dynamics of capitalist economy, orthodox economists were engaged in the study of the conditions of 'equilibrium' of the economic system. The crowning point of the orthodox approach, with its passion for 'equilibrium', is the conception of the 'static state' which runs on year in and year out in the same channels and without change. Such a conception is the inevitable outcome of any prolonged attempt to find out the conditions of general equilibrium of supplies and demands in different lines of production throughout the economy. Whatever the theoretical elegance of such a conception, it suffers from the vital deficiency that it involves ; in Sweezy's words, "abstraction from what is most essential in the capitalist, namely, his concern to expand his capital." The capitalist gives effect to this concern "by converting a portion of his surplus value into additional capital. His augmented capital then enables him to appropriate still more surplus value, which he in turn converts into additional capital, and so this constitutes the driving force of capitalist development." The orthodox economists, in their preoccupation with capital, are naturally led to ignore this driving force—the most dynamic factor in the system, while Marx, in his pursuit of the 'law of motion', is naturally led to attach to this factor the highest significance.

Sweezy distinguishes between accumulation and concentration of capital, meaning by accumulation growth of the volume of capital without reference to the point whether such growth is accompanied by increasing concentration or distribution of ownership. It is common

knowledge that under capitalism accumulation of capital is, in fact, accompanied by growing concentration of control over capital. This process of concentration is explained by Sweezy with remarkable ability which reaches at times (e.g., in his discussion of the 'role of the banks') heights of what may perhaps be described as originality.

One comes across the most interesting chapters of Sweezy's book as one approaches the end of it. After venturing the opinion that the basic cause of recurring or chronic depression in capitalist economy lies in the tendency to 'under-consumption', the author points out certain forces which counteract this tendency. Among these counteracting forces the most important is 'state expenditure.' At this stage, the author raises the question that, if the drift to economic stagnation can be successfully countered by deliberate expenditure undertaken by the state, "why must we assume that unemployment, insecurity, sharper class and international conflict are in prospect for capitalism?" "Why not on the contrary a 'managed' capitalist society, maintaining economic prosperity through Government action?" Here, clearly enough, Sweezy is preparing the ground for a critical estimate of the Keynesian programme of perpetual full employment under 'managed' capitalism. The Keynesian programme does not find favour with Sweezy not because of any flaw in its 'economic logic'—which he holds to be perfectly valid—but because of its faulty assumption that "the state in capitalist society can be made to function in the interests of society as a whole." Sweezy points out that the Keynesian programme can be carried out only if a party dedicated to reform and free from capitalist influence can seize the reality, as distinct from the semblance, of political power. The rise to power of a political party of this type is "conceivable only in an abstract world from which the permeating power of capital has been banished." Sweezy seems to think that the 'reformist party' (which is substantially akin to all 'Social Democratic' parties devoted to 'gradualist socia-

lism') is bound to meet with the same amount of resistance as a party of revolutionary socialists, that with its tactics it will be impossible for it to overcome this resistance, and, finally, that if it could actually gain sufficient force to wrench power from the capitalist class, it would be meaningless to stop short of thoroughgoing socialism. The Keynesians will hardly feel persuaded by this train of arguments. They will, as anticipated by the author himself, dismiss as wildly exaggerated the account that a programme for 'managed capitalism' will meet with the same vehemence of opposition as a plan for full fledged socialism. They will even feel inclined to hope that a section of enlightened capitalists may accept their programme in the belief that 'managed capitalism' is to-day the only alternative to the complete collapse of capitalism. The Keynesians will, further, find nothing in Sweezy's arguments to shake their belief that the order they advocate is superior to doctrinaire socialism in so far as it unites the prospect of prosperity with what Keynes calls 'the advantages of individualism'. They will, in short, support the programme for 'managed capitalism' as both intrinsically superior to full-fledged socialism and tactically more expedient.

Whatever may be said of the Keynesian programme, the trend of events in recent times in countries ranging from China to Czechoslovakia seems to indicate that in most countries of the world progressive movement in the present phase of its evolution ought to build itself on the basis of a programme which attracts not only the traditionally glorified proletariat, or even proletariat and the peasantry taken together, but also the progressive section of the middle class along with the workers and the peasants. A programme for 'dictatorship of the proletariat' is possibly inferior, strategically as well as intrinsically, to what may be described as 'democratic socialism'.

Sweezy devotes the last few passages of his book to speculation regarding the manner in which events may

unfold themselves in future. Events, as they have occurred since these passages were written, do not exhibit any special tendency to confirm the author's predictions. It is, however, proper to withhold criticism on this account in view of the fact that Sweezy is reported to have expressed the opinion that had he the leisure to do so, he would himself rewrite to-day the relevant passages. It may be added in conclusion that despite their failure to derive corroboration from the actual development of events, Sweezy's speculations remain stimulating and provoke thought in a useful direction.

Amlankusum Datta

ANGUISHED ART

THE AGE OF REASON, THE FLIES, and IN CAMERA by Jean-Paul Sartre.

Sartre emerged on the literary scene with a bang. More than that he set a fashion. But Sartre is also the leader of the school of a new philosophy—the philosophy of Existentialism which has aroused very great interest within these years. This philosophy is supposed to offer a solution of our problems and resolve the basic crisis of our age. Incidentally, the more sober opinion seems to regard this philosophy as a symptom rather than as the solution of the present crisis. Sartre, presumably because of his fervent faith in his philosophy, projects it into his literary creations. And, probably, that accounts for the unfulfilled greatness which his works under review represent.

It is seldom that a genuine work of art is created on the basis of a precisely laid down philosophy or, for the matter of that, any deliberately developed formula. The result is artifice not art. Slogan becomes the soul of literature. The Sartre fashion has an added difficulty in this respect. It comes up against a very serious handicap—a neutralising force—inherent in the philosophy that is sought to be presented through art. The Existentialist philosophy

would seem to recommend that 'man is the maker of himself' and has to take that responsibility. The characters of Existentialist work will be often heard saying that they must be free, they must decide for themselves, and men must be restored 'their sense of human dignity' and the like. But that is what *seems*. It is neither here nor there. For one thing, these sentiments do not seem to have the same value for the Existentialist as we commonly associate with them. Secondly, the motive power, the *primum mobile* of the Existentialist pattern of life is ANGST i.e. anxiety, sometimes translated as *anguish* with anxiety at its root. If man does not feel that 'Angst', he cannot do anything. If he will work out his salvation, the 'Angst' is indispensable. So the 'Angst' comes to be cherished as the value of values. As it becomes the most "cherished value" it ceases to be a means that it once was. It becomes an end displacing the original end. So, if by any chance the original end comes to be attained, what will be left for man to have his 'Angst' about? He suddenly finds the ground slipping from under his feet because his most cherished value is gone. There is one way: he can have his 'Angst' about his lost 'Angst' and approach his success with a sense of grievous loss. Cries Orestes, the hero of *The Flies* :

I am free, Electra. Freedom has crashed down on me
like a thunderbolt.

Orestes has worked out his own freedom and is about to free his people, the citizens of Argos. But he cannot enjoy this freedom; he cannot bear it except as a burden :

Orestes—I have done *my* deed, Electra, and that deed was good. I shall bear it on my shoulders as a carrier at a ferry carries the traveller to the farther bank. And when I have brought it to the farther bank I shall take stock of it. The heavier it is to carry, the better pleased I shall be; for *that burden is my freedom*.

Being in that state of mind he cannot impart it except as a message of despair :

Zeus—What do you propose to do ?

Ores.—The folk of Argos are my folk. I must open their eyes.

Zeus—Poor People ! Your gift to them* will be a sad one ; of loneliness and shame....

Ores.—Why, since it is their lot, should I deny them the despair I have in me ?

Zeus—What will they make of it ?

Ores.—What they choose. They're free ; *and human life begins on the far side of despair.*

Not only that a work constructed on the Existentialist thesis must always be a message of despair : what is more is that it will often strike at the aesthetic integrity of the artist by forcing him to manipulate things at the cost of the logical and natural development of the character and event. Perhaps, its success will consist in rearing up a race of neurotic characters. And if in any measure life were a reproduction of art, there will be unhealthy repercussions. Already the Existentialist works are being described as "disturbing". Perhaps, "disintegrating" is the word.

Sartre has a powerful manner and a hold on his material but he could not save his works from the weakness inherent in the practice he has favoured. But for his philosophical preoccupations, these will be great works, sound psychologically and profound in their message. We find them great works in ruin. One will also see in them, particularly in *The Flies* and *The Age of Reason*, the Existentialist philosopher sitting on the throat of the psychologist who has come all the way through Freud, Karen Horney and Dr. Fromm, and who could possibly give us a few tips.

The Age of Reason is the first part of a trilogy to be called *The Road to Freedom*. It is, therefore, difficult to say what the author has in his mind. Perhaps, the

judgment has to be deferred till the entire scheme as it might be developed in the two volumes to follow is available. But of the present three works, *The Age of Reason*, so far as it goes, is the most disappointing and intellectually atrocious. It is 'a lot of fuss for nothing', to borrow the hero's words. A sense of the crisis—a poignant fact of contemporary life—is, no doubt, to be felt as one goes through these pages, but it is crowded out by so many silly little things which are the stock-in-trade of any cheap work of fiction. An interest in the search of the solution is aroused when Mathieu, the hero, who is in a crisis, is chided by his brother Jacques for dodging the fact that he has attained the age of reason. But the statement is soon modified: "Perhaps I am doing you an injustice; perhaps you haven't in fact reached the age of reason..." and further mystified by the addition: "...it's really a moral age." It is difficult to say what exactly Jacques meant. Yet it did stimulate an interest, as if something was coming. But all that vanishes as you leave Jacques, never to return. Only at the tail end, Mathieu, after reviewing the tumult and finding it 'a lot of fuss for nothing', declares to himself: "It's true, it's absolutely true; I have attained the age of reason." There is an obvious regret in the admission which would suggest a regression to the comforts of unreason, if not the irrational. For the rest, it is very much like the apotheosis of the trivial.

The motive behind *In Camera* appears very obscure. Three characters, one man and two women, find themselves in hell. The hell has none of its publicised instruments of torture. It simply consists in their having to stay in one room eternally whether they like it or not. For the most part they forget that they are dead, divested of their humanity. They behave as if they were still on earth. In fact, it all looks like a piece of the world they have left behind. The world had an advantage—there one could die or get killed. • Not so in hell: "Knives, poison, ropes—all

useless. So here we are, for ever." Nevertheless, the hell seems to be easier to reconcile with than the earth, for when they finally realise their exact position, the curtain falls with Gracin saying : "Well, well, let's go on with it....". It is difficult to say on what Sartre wants to direct our attention. But one can never be sure what an Existentialist really means when he says something, for the words with him do not have quite the same meaning they have for us. The speech for him is not so much a medium of expression or communication as a way of experience and has, therefore, the obscurity of a highly subjective experience.

The Flies is a powerful play but the power is like the desert air. Here Sartre adapts an old story for his purpose. He uses it successfully. Agamemnon's wife and her paramour murdered him on the former's return from the Trojan war. The two have since ruled the city of Argos and placed its people in a peculiar kind of slavery. They are in perpetual mourning, oppressed by a sense of guilt and sin and always wearing black, but every now and then lifting their gowns in public to reveal their moral scars, perhaps, to show that the core is essentially sound. This indulgence in public confession of their sins is a 'national pastime' in which the ruler and the ruled alike participate. Between their present degraded, oppressed, slaves' life and normal and natural human existence stand their superstition, black fears and imbecility resulting from their ignorance. Some one has to break their delusion and make them see that they are free, that they need not be slaves. Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, returns to Argos and after meeting his sister Electra decides to do the job. Zeus, the God of gods, himself intervenes to prevent Orestes from his contemplated move. Orestes stays man, and refuses to be persuaded or intimidated by God. He retorts :

It's right to stamp you out, like the foul brute you are, and to free the people of Argos from your evil

influence. It is right to restore to them their sense of human dignity.

Brave words indeed. At the end of a long argument, Zeus makes the confession :

Well, Orestes, all this was foreknown. In the fullness of time man was to come, to announce my decline. And you are that man, it seems...

Earlier, Zeus has shared a highly significant divine secret with Aegistheus who was now failing as an instrument of the divine will which consists in keeping man ignorant and, therefore, slave :

Once freedom lights its beacon in man's heart, the gods are powerless against him. It's a matter between man and man, and it is for other men and for them only to let him go his gait or throttle him.

Orestes accomplishes his mission and walks out of the life of the 'folk of Argos' who were his own folk with the message : "Try to reshape your lives. All here is new, all must begin anew." Orestes has shattered their delusion, brought them the knowledge of their freedom when he says "farewell" to them. Orestes would thus appear as the type of disinterested, moral man, a bit overdrawn, who liquidates the gloom around, brings the light of freedom, paying the price himself—for he must—by taking the Furies on him. That would suggest that Sartre has sounded the depths of the matter so vital to contemporary life. What is to be done, how it is to be done and who can do it—all these questions would appear to be fairly adequately answered without violence to the aesthetic excellence of the work. That, however, is the potentiality strangled. For, throughout the play freedom is shown as a matter for dread and horror, "a barren boon", something that "isolates you from the fold, means exile". It is not only Zeus who so represents freedom, but Orestes himself, the greatest protagonist of freedom, so accepts it.

One may hazard a guess that, if Sartre could have

suspended his Existentialism for a while, the particular strain to which reference has been made above would invest the theme with more substance and give greater coherence. For, such a strain will indicate the challenge of freedom to the creative genius of man, a challenge to him to face, overcome and canalise the fear of the responsibilities of freedom, because that is as great a threat to freedom as the Furies of Zeus. But here it is not fear ; it is despair that determines the strain. So there is no creative challenge but an invitation to escape. The way Orestes himself, the great fighter for freedom, faces his freedom is "the thing". He receives it as "a thunderbolt" crashing on him, carries it as a "burden", and passes it on as "despair". It is true that he fights for freedom, pays the price of it in his own person and in his own life. But the fact remains that he fails to appreciate what is freedom. His approach is sentimental rather than rational. Orestes could not be otherwise, for his creator must fulfil himself through him. He may be strong enough for Zeus, not for Sartre.

R. L. Nigam

MARXIST UTOPIA

PERMANENT REVOLUTION by Leon Trotzky ; Gupta, Rahman and Gupta, Calcutta, Rs. 5/8.

This is the first Indian edition of a book, written in 1929 and published in America the next year, about a theoretical controversy which even already then had lost all practical significance. To read it to-day is like chewing the stale cuds of others who are no longer there to enjoy the pastime.

After Lenin died, there was for several years a fierce struggle amongst his lieutenants for the supreme leadership of the Russian Communist Party. The struggle for power was carried on behind the facade of a theoretical controversy. The issue was the theory of Permanent Revolution formulated by Trotzky as far back as 1905. After his fall,

Trotsky summarised his case in a pamphlet. Later on, he added a longish introduction and a preface to the American edition, both of which are included in this book. These latter together with the final chapter in which the "Fundamental Theses" are set forth, only are still readable. The main text of nine chapters was Trotsky's reply to an article by Radek criticising the theory of Permanent Revolution. The theory itself was not expounded therein. Trotsky's contention was that he was the victim of a conspiracy, and his theory had been falsified and vulgarised. The main text of the book records the bickerings and sophistries of a sordid struggle for gaining the control of the Communist Party. Therefore it has not the least historical value, and can interest only a very limited circle of readers. For general readers interested in the history of the Russian Revolution and also in the Marxist political doctrines and economic theories with reference thereto, it will be worthwhile to read the two introductory chapters and the concluding one containing the "Fundamental Theses".

The circumstances under which the pamphlet was written, as described by Trotsky, show that the "theoretical struggle" for defending the legacy of Lenin had sunk to the lowest depth of unscrupulousness and rank opportunism. Exiled to a small town in Central Asia, Trotsky planned a literary onslaught against "the image and crown of the epoch of ideological reaction". That is how he described Zinoviev's treatise on *Leninism* and Stalin's work on the *Problems of Leninism*. "These theoretical fruits of epigonism are equally unbearable: a reading of Zinoviev's *Leninism* is like choking on fluffy cotton, while Stalin's *Problems* arouse the physical feeling of a throat filled with chopped up bristles". Believing himself to be the only apostle of the true faith, Trotsky came to the conclusion that "the resurrection of Marxism, and consequently of Leninist thought in the party, is unthinkable without a polemical annihilation of the epigones, without a merciless theoretical

execution of the apparatus-executioners." Before he could proceed any further, there was a defection in his own camp. Radek was a leader of the Trotzkyist opposition, and as such had been expelled from the party. Suddenly, an article by him on the contrast between the theory of Permanent Revolution and Leninism was widely circulated throughout the country. At first, Trotzky wanted to ignore Radek's article. But letters from friends led him to the conclusion that "for a more intimate circle of persons who are capable of thinking independently and not upon command and have conscientiously studied Marxism, Radek's work is more dangerous than the official literature—just as opportunism in politics is all the more dangerous the more veiled it appears and the greater the personal prominence that covers it." That was the inducement for Trotzky to write the main text of the book under review.

It was rather a scathing criticism of Radek's opportunism to turn against his friends and associates for gaining official favour than an exposition of the theory of Permanent Revolution. Trotzky was naturally bitter against Radek, and the latter's behaviour made him apprehensive of others belonging to the "more intimate circle of persons", that is, some more of his associates, also deserting to the official camp. The pamphlet thus being written to reinforce the conviction of a small circle of persons, deals with experiences which had no general application and was written in a language which could only repel non-partisan and disinterested readers.

The controversy was an old story raked up to serve the purpose of struggle for leadership inside the party. It was not a *bona fide* theoretical dispute ; it was a facade to hide a sordid motive. "Political grounds for it, there were none ; for it was a question of differences of opinion which long ago belonged to the past. Psychological grounds, on the contrary, there were many." Trotzky's contention was that, according to the theory of Permanent Revolution,

he alone together with Lenin advocated capture of power by the proletariat in 1917, while all the other "old Bolsheviks failed to stand up under the test." On that record, he believed himself to be the only worthy successor of Lenin. His rivals opened the campaign against him in order to hide their own shameful past. That was the psychological ground for reviving an old controversy. In order to prove this contention, Trotzky went in the minutest details into the history of the months between the February rising and the October Revolution, when all but himself faltered. Although his version is nearer to the truth, the history of those critical months has been distorted and falsified by both sides to the controversy.

Trotzky gave two reasons for this practice on the part of his opponents: firstly, to turn against Marxism, and secondly, to justify National-Socialism. "Since Lenin was taken ill, the struggle against Trotzkyism was invented and organised as a personal struggle against Trotzky, and developed into a struggle against Marxism. The vicious baiting of the Permanent Revolution came up only as the preparation of the ground for the theory of the revolution in one country, that is, for National-Socialism of the latest type." Significantly enough, Trotzky disowned "Trotzkyism" which, according to him, was a mere bogey. That was a strange position to take. One would naturally wonder what then was the controversy about. From Trotzky's side, the answer is simple. He maintained that he was the only champion of pure Marxism; therefore, the fight against him was a fight against Marxism. Indeed, he argued that even the theory of the Permanent Revolution was not the issue. "By themselves, these new social roots of the struggle against 'Trotzkyism' do not prove anything either for or against the correctness of the theory of Permanent Revolution." Why then did he write a book supposed to be on that subject? He explains: "Without an understanding of these hidden roots, the struggle must always

bear a barren academic character." The whole controversy consisted in accusations and counter-accusations ; there was no serious theoretical issue involved ; neither side had a positive case ; therefore it is of no historical interest for general readers.

The theory of Permanent Revolution, however, is still of interest, because it is a straight-forward statement of the principles of Marxist political practice. The Communists still profess those principles theoretically, although in practice they have deviated from them everywhere. They would not learn from experience. The unity of theory and practice is one of their dogmas ; yet experience has demonstrated that their theory cannot be practised. But that is not the point of Trotzky's criticism ; he castigates the Russian Communist Party and the Communist International for deviating from the pure theory. Trotzky did not show why Socialism in one country was not possible. His contention was that it was theoretically prohibited, because, if Socialism was established in one country, others might peacefully follow the example ; in that case, there would be no need of a world revolution, and the Communist International would become "the frontier-guard of the Soviet Union".

Trotzky claims that he alone, thanks to the theory of Permanent Revolution, advocated the Russian proletariat capturing power in October 1917. At the same time, he maintains that Socialism cannot be built in one country ; that it is indeed prohibited as antagonistic to world revolution. What then should the Russian proletariat have done after capturing power under the leadership of Trotzky ? That is the crucial question which Trotzky never faced during the whole controversy. It is remarkable how he evaded the central issue. By way of stating the fundamental difference between him and his opponents, in the very beginning of the preface to the American edition of the book, he writes : The Left Opposition (Trotzkyists) advocat-

ed "economic entrenchment of the proletarian dictatorship in one country until further victories of the international proletarian revolution"; the Stalinist leadership favoured "the course towards the construction of an isolated national socialist society". This evidently is a difference without a distinction. How could the proletariat in power entrench themselves economically except through socialist reconstruction of society? If that basic task of the revolution was put off indefinitely, what would the proletariat in power do? What was the sense of capturing power? Evidently, the theory of Permanent Revolution induced Trotzky to advocate utopian action in 1917; and since utopia could never be reached, the post-revolutionary development did not follow Trotzky's *a priori* scheme, he had to find a scape-goat. But the joke of the whole story is that Trotzky would have quietly forgotten the pet theory of his adolescence, and acted exactly as Stalin did (because there was no alternative), had the mantle of Lenin fallen on his broad shoulders. Curiously enough, in a book written to prove that the theory of Permanent Revolution enabled him to make the correct prognosis in every crisis of history, Trotzky admits that even in 1905 he was mistaken, and that in 1928, "imposed political leisure" afforded him the opportunity to revise the old theory. But then Radek's treachery threw him off the balance, and he raked up the old controversy about a theory he disowned.

Trotsky was defeated in the struggle for power in the party; but he went down fighting for the pure faith of Marxism. The theory of Permanent Revolution is the quintessence of political Marxism. However fascinating as a theory, it could not be put into practice. That was the objective reason for Trotsky's defeat. After the revolution, Trotsky did not defend the theory theoretically, but pragmatically. Complaining against the charge that with his conception of Permanent Revolution Trotsky denied the legitimacy of the October Revolution, he claimed that

"it was precisely on the basis of this conception that the writer of these lines foretold the inevitability of the October Revolution thirteen years before it took place." But the happening of the proletarian revolution in Russia in October 1917 could not be foretold ; as a matter of fact, according to the Marxist dogmatic view of historical development, it should not have taken place when it actually did. In that sense, the October Revolution *was* illegitimate. It took place not because Trotzky had foretold it, but because of an unforeseen combination of circumstances. It was as likely as not ; there was no inevitability about it. Having taken place, not according to the theory of Permanent Revolution, but fortuitously, its subsequent development could not fall in the *a priori* Marxist pattern. Trotzky's quarrel was thus with post-revolutionary history, which was made not according to an immutable theory, but pragmatically. He admitted that his opponents had to labour under objective difficulties which compelled them to steer the course they did.

"The weakness of Soviet economy, besides the backwardness inherited from the past, lies in its present post-revolutionary isolation, that is, in its inability to gain access to the resources of capitalist economy." How was that handicap to be removed ? Recognising the painful fact that the interval between the two stages of the world revolution had become longer than theoretically anticipated, Trotzky nevertheless would not allow Russia to build up an economic system on the basis of her own resources because that would mean construction of an "isolated national socialist society". But the proletarian dictatorship could be economically entrenched, as recommended by Trotzky himself, in no other manner. It is true that Stalin's doctrine of Socialism in one country placed Russia on the road to National-Socialism. It is, however not true, as Trotzky maintained, that Stalin advanced the doctrine in 1924 encouraged by the "rapid economic success". For one thing,

Trotsky could not say that he anticipated the successes of the New Economic Policy introduced in 1921. He opposed Lenin on that question, and advocated continuation of War Communism. The theory of Permanent Revolution demanded liquidation of the peasantry, while the New Economic Policy was a concession to them. Secondly, after 1924, Trotsky and later on Zinoviev and other Old Bolsheviks, accused Stalin of transforming the Communist Party into a peasants' party, because he made greater concessions to the peasantry than contemplated originally in the New Economic Policy. Finally, the real reason of Stalin's falling back upon the possibility of building Socialism in one country was the defeat of the second German Revolution in 1923. With that defeat, the hopes of world revolution receded to a distant future. But even then, the Soviet regime could be entrenched by pursuing the New Economic Policy. In that case, the perspective would be a democratic development, gradually replacing proletarian dictatorship. The mistake or misfortune was to deviate from that Leninist path; and Stalin was compelled to take that fateful step in order to retain the leadership of the party in the face of the powerful opposition of the "unprincipled alliance" of the Old Bolsheviks with Trotsky.

If Soviet economy under Stalin developed towards National-Socialism, that is because, as State Capitalism, Socialism cannot be anything else. But even at the end of 1930, Trotsky would not see the fallacies of Marxism, and believed that the world revolution was just round the corner. He had always been a doctrinaire visionary. During the last years of his life, he lived in a world of his imagination, completely ignoring the actual world which refused to fit into the Marxist scheme of revolution. He died a bitter and disappointed man, but not yet disillusioned. He needed the illusion to carry him through the last years of his life, which were indeed tragic.

PLEASANT PICTURES

CULTURAL LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION by S. I. Vavilov and others ; International Publishing House, Calcutta, Rs. 4/8/-

MY EXPERIENCES IN SOVIET RUSSIA by Dr. Meghnad Saha ; Bookman, Calcutta, Rs. 5/-

Of late a good number of books on Russia are being published in this country. Except the out and out communist propaganda literature, they all serve the purpose of publicity, like the stuff issued by the government of other countries to attract travellers, in this case, "fellow-travellers." Meant to be informative, they are neither analytical nor critical studies, but mere description of what is happening in Russia. The first of the two latest such books under review is an official publication which naturally presents the most pleasant picture of things. The second is written by an Indian, an eminent scientist, as a traveller's diary recording the superficial experiences of a conducted tour. It is embellished with many photos, maps and statistical graphs, obviously supplied by the Soviet Publicity Bureau. Dr. Saha, who went to Russia in 1945, on the occasion of the 220th anniversary of the Academy of Science, incidentally mentions "my friend Dr. P. L. Kapitza", but does not say if he actually saw the latter or what was his position at that time. It is rumoured that Kapitza did not feel quite free in Russia and wanted to return to Cambridge where he had done most of his scientific work, and that he was not allowed to leave the country. It is not known what happened to him thereafter. If Dr. Saha enquired about his friend, he might have been able to enlighten the world about Kapitza's present position and thus allay a good deal of anxiety about the fate of the eminent physicist. Evidently, Dr. Saha saw what he was shown and heard what he was told and was duly impressed. Nevertheless, there are some significant passages in the book, such as "Comrade Lenin has taken the place of Jesus Christ, Comrade Stalin that

of St. Paul"; "I did not see any foreign (news) paper in Moscow and Leningrad during my stay."

The other book is more ambitious, being "the work of some of the leading authorities in the different branches of the Soviet culture." It contains chapters on education, science, literature, stage, cinema, music and sport - all descriptive, quantitative appreciation, which hardly enables the reader to have any idea of the cultural conditions of a country. The pleasant pictures of the various departments of life presented by official spokesmen, however, do not remove the misgiving caused by recent reports about the cultural atmosphere of contemporary Russia. The title of the book, therefore, is a misnomer.

Simultaneously with the publication of books like those under review, the world is shocked by reports of a rigid regimentation of cultural life in Russia which, since the "great patriotic war", seems to have come more and more under the domination of a jingoist nationalism. Nor are these reports malicious anti-Soviet propaganda. They are well-founded. For instance, at the end of September, the Central Council of Soviet Trade-Unions issued a decree to stimulate "Soviet patriotism". Denouncing in the strongest possible terms "the decaying and degraded Western culture", the decree deploras that "a certain part of the intelligentsia is characterised by an unworthy adulation and servility towards things foreign". The campaign of "the purification of Soviet culture", inaugurated a year ago with the purge of a group of Leningrad poets, has become more sweeping. Picasso, for instance, has been excommunicated in Communist Russia, as he was in Nazi Germany. Russian denunciation of the "putrefying Western (modern) culture" sounds so very much like Goebbels' fulminations. After Picasso, Matisse has also been tabooed. The new "masters" who paint the pictures of Lenin and Stalin are applauded. "Naturalism" is to be replaced by "Socialist Realism",

which is defined by Fadeyev, Secretary of the Writers Union, as "the celebration of the new human being of our age" - Koestler's Twentieth Century Neanderthaler. Soviet writers are enjoined to produce "morally improving" novels as of late Victorian England. The Nazis declared that the Germans were the Herrenvolk; the Russian Communist literature must insist upon the supremacy of the "Soviet man and woman", "magnify the glory of their motherland".

History is rewritten with this purpose; cinematography is also harnessed. Not only Tzarist Generals like Suvorov and Kututzov have become heroes of the Soviet Union; Ivan the Terrible is canonised as the Patron-Saint of Soviet patriotism. Eisenstein's talents are drafted to dramatise cinematographically the story of "the great Unifier of Russia." All these and many other facts may indicate the cultural pattern of Soviet Russia; but a revivalist and nationalist jingoism can hardly be passed on as a new culture. If Communism can build a new and higher culture, it must do so on the foundation of what is denounced as "decaying Western culture". To spurn that human heritage is to relapse into barbarism.

Any book on the cultural life in the Soviet Union should throw light on this crucial aspect of the problem. The book under review is very disappointing in that sense. It only depicts pleasant pictures to hide ugly realities.

BENGALI LITERATURE

BANGLA SAHITYER KATHA (About Bengali Literature)
by Dr. Srikumar Banerjee, Saraswati Library, Cal., Rs. 6/8.

The book is a collection of thirteen essays by an eminent Bengali literary critic in whom scholarship is leavened by taste and discrimination and made socially shareable thanks to an easy, even if sometimes pedestrian, style of treatment. Dr. Banerjee has nothing of the literary high-

brow. He is rarely esoteric or ambiguous, avoids the lure of aphoristic finish and is never ingenious in the small way. And on the whole, though not very profound or startlingly original, the essays are certainly remarkable for ease, competence and clarity. And at least one of the essays (on "Vidyapati") is highly suggestive of a line of approach which may, if pursued, open a new understanding of the basic trends in the history of Bengali literature.

Of the thirteen essays, two deal with the general theme of literary form while the rest are critical studies in some major phases in Bengali literature. Of the first two, the one on "Folk-lore" (Rupa-katha) is an attempt at interpretation of the social and psychological bearings of that particular literary *genre*. The other on "The Nature of the Novel and the Method of its Criticism" is a resume of the discussion which Dr. Banerjee had opened in his earlier work on the Main Currents of Bengali Fiction. It is significant that though most of his studies are concerned with Bengali literature, Dr. Banerjee has been for many years a teacher of English literature in the University of Calcutta. His valuation is rarely parochial ; his appreciation is remarkably catholic without being vague.

The eleven essays on Bengali literature, taken together, offer a critical and selective survey of some of the chief landmarks in the history of Bengali literature—Vidyapati, Chandidas, Bankimchandra, Rabindranath, Saratchandra, the origin of the prose style in Bengali literature, and the nature and perspective of Bengali Novel. It is of course not a history of literature ; it is not intended to be so. It is, however, a suggestive introduction to any critical history of Bengali literature, which work still remains to be attempted. Dr. Dinesh Sen's *History* is a pioneer work, although, with all its errors of commission and omission, it still remains a classic. Its method, however, was uncertain ; its technique of evaluation rather primitive ; and many of its hypothesis and conclusions are outdated by researches in recent years.

Mr. Sukumar Sen's *History*, though recently published and imposing in bulk and recommended by the University, is disappointingly uncritical—deficient in perspective, shockingly crude in its aesthetic valuation and not always well-informed in its presentation of data. Dr. Banerjee's essays, though not a history, indicate a new and promising approach to the study of Bengali literary tradition.

The most valuable and well written essay in this collection, the first one on "Vidyapati", indicates a simultaneous appraisal from three different points of view of the same poet converging into a fairly comprehensive estimate of his poetry. Dr. Banerjee brings out with a profusion of illustrative material three distinctive features of Vidyapati's work : his urban wit, his social realism and the openness and catholicity of his religious outlook. The pointing out of the first of the above features is, I believe, the most significant from the point of view of literary criticism. I am tempted to suggest that the life history of a literary tradition can possibly be traced from Vidyapati to Iswargupta with Mukundaram, Bharatchandra and Dasarathi Ray as major landmarks in the process—a tradition comparable to that of "metaphysical wit" in English poetry, and distantly resembling (though with different trends and variations) the line of development and decay in French poetry from Racine to Laforgue. This tradition sometimes ran parallel to, some times coalesced with, and sometimes dissociated from or outright contradicted the other tradition of lyric flow and melopoeic singlemindedness which is generally considered to be the main tradition of Bengali poetry. The precarious balance of lyric grace, urban wit, and intellectual curiosity and precision of a mature mind seems to have broken down even before Bharatchandra. With him, wit became ingenious and hard, lost the lyric flow and developed a brilliant and brittle surface, and the process of dissociation between intellect and emotion, logopoeia and melopoeia, which had already started, reached a definitive culmination. This,

however, is a suggestion for which Dr. Banerjee's essay cannot be held responsible ; although I am inclined to think that if his analysis of Vidyapati's style is extended to cover the subsequent periods, the above suggestion may not appear altogether irrelevant.

Among the other essays, the fairly elaborate study of the new Chandidas manuscript discovered by Harekrishna Sahityaratna suggests a fresh approach to the controversy about the identity of that great poet. Scholiasts are prone to forget that linguistic study without literary discrimination is rarely competent to speak with certitude on essentially literary problems ; and it is encouraging to find that Dr. Banerjee combines aesthetic test with the textual in offering a probable solution of the Chandidas problem.

The remaining essays are studies in what may be generally described as "Modern" Bengali Literature. It begins with Bankim and closes with Saratchandra. Four of these essays deal with Tagore - one on "Tagore and Shelly," and the others on his plays, his poems in prose and his last poems. The essay on Bankimchandra is somewhat disappointing. Dr. Banerjee is skating on thin ice when he casually mentions the conflict in Bankim's outlook. The basic conflict of modern history, and particularly of modern Indian history, is between nationalism and humanism, and almost all the mighty figures and movements in that history experienced that conflict. Between reason and authority, science and fetishism, cosmopolitanism and geographical loyalty, freedom and totalitarian principles, any compromise verges precipitously on a catastrophe. Bankim, Vivekananda, Gandhi, Premchand, Tagore and Saratchandra - had all to face this issue and either grow or degenerate in the process of responding to it. That aspect of Indian history, however, still remains to be investigated, and it is a pity that Dr. Banerjee would not choose to consider this phenomenon as clearly evidenced in Bengali literature.

S. N. R.

PERIODICALS

SYNTHESES, International Monthly, Editor, Jean Stadtsbaeder, 76 rue Antoine Dansaert, Bruxelles, Vol. II, Nos. 3 to 6.

Four numbers of this Belgian magazine have reached us since we reviewed it last ; there are too many excellent articles on various essential subjects to give an exhaustive idea of the contents. No. 3 contains a contribution by our editor, a translation of the booklet "New Humanism" (Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta, Rs. 2/-). In the same number appears an article on "Morality and Politics", another on "Machiavelli and Machiavellism" and one on "Psychic Hygiene in the Fight against War". No. 4 contains "Reflexions on Personalism" by Emmanuel Mounier ; an article on "Modern Poetry of the Return of the Prodigal", another "The Anti-Commissard : A new orientation of British conscience" ; yet another on Arthur Koestler and the Leftist Exiles. No. 5 brings a contribution by V. Larock on the "Integral Humanism of M. Maritain" ; No. 6 has a kind of symposium on the Rights of Man and their philosophical connotation and "Reflexions on Biological Evolution".

It is encouraging to find others in other parts of the world preoccupied with the same problems as we are and engaged in the pursuit of their solution with a similar purpose : a free society of developed individual human beings, free to unfold their potentialities without encroaching on the same freedom of others. It is remarkable, however, how many of the finest minds in Europe, in the recoil from the present immoral and irrational state of affairs, are trying to revitalise Christianity as the only source and sanction of a moral order, instead of recognising the fact that the ethical values of Christianity (as of all religions) have failed to prevail in the modern world because what it needs is a sanction for morality derived not from faith but from knowledge. However, scholarly believers have done much pioneering for the advance of science and human knowledge in the past, and the discussions

carried on in *Syntheses* in the spirit of an earnest search for truth may contribute more to a rational and therefore moral order of things than the fanatic atheists who make new gods of other abstractions with all the vices of orthodox religious institutions—Inquisition, heresy-hunting, self-immolation and promises of bliss in an ever receding future as distant as the great Beyond or the Seventh Heaven.

ESPRIT, Monthly, "Journal of Several Voices", Editor, Emmanuel Mounier, 27 rue Jacob, Paris VI, Vol. 15, Nos. 6 to 9.

While several voices may find a forum in this predominantly literary French magazine, started at the critical time of inter-war Europe in 1930, it has clearly one mind. The editor is the propounder of what he has called "Personalism", on which he has written several books. He finds the term first with the French 19th century philosopher Renouvier, and in his present interpretation it represents a point of view which recognises the debacle of Liberalism as well as the danger of totalitarianism and the inadequacy of formal democracy. It stands for a "humanist Socialism", but is not to be the creed of one particular party. It is visualised as a kind of regenerating ferment in the socialist movement, including its communist wing. It appreciates certain aspects of Marxism, particularly Marx's early writings on the dehumanising effects of capitalism, but is critical of the Marxist underestimation of human values, of the inner life of man. Its object is an "authentic and effective Socialism integrating the humanist values of Christian civilisation." Again we observe the refuge in Christianity. But this attitude is not in fact religious. In the search for an effective sanction of ethical values and a moral order, these sensitive minds stop short of the logical consequences of modern science, which allows us to find that sanction in the world of physical reality without recourse to metaphysical assumptions.

Emmanuel Mounier is however a discreet propagandist.

The four issues of *Esprit* under review deal with a wide range of other subjects, from memories of Nazi occupation and the resistance movement, to music, poetry, colonialism and Justice ; there are two special numbers with contributions from and on America and Germany, and extensive chronicles on current events in the political and cultural life of France. It appears that *Esprit* is critical of the dictatorial tendencies of General de Gaulle, and there is a valiant defence by the editor of the right of a poet of obscenities to write his stuff although he himself disapproves of it.

There exists an *Esprit* circle of literateurs and other intellectuals, which meets regularly and holds annual conferences—one of the “oases” of modern civilisation.

LA PENSEE, Founder, Paul Langevin, 24 rue Racine, Paris VI, Nos. 12, 13.

No. 12 of this “Review of Modern Rationalism” *in memoriam* of Paul Langevin, containing besides article about him, some of his own writings, notably a contribution on “Mechanistic and Dialectic Materialism”. No. 13 begins with an article by S. Vavilov, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, on “Soviet Science” which, according to him, means not just science in the Soviet Union, but something more. In the second article, Marcel Willard writes on “Our Freedom”. In neo-Marxist simplification, he states that one cannot defend freedom as such, there is not just one freedom, but a just freedom and an unjust freedom, the freedom of the exploiters and the freedom of the exploited. Incontrovertible, but shallow, worn-out platform phrases, which make one impatient because nobody needs convincing on that score any longer. But what about freedom under Socialism, where no capitalists exist ? What about the freedom of the individual in a society free from exploiters ? What about freedom in planned society, the need of which none denies ? These real and crucial

problems of freedom are not even raised at all in this communist "philosophical" propaganda organ. Instead, M. Willard tells us what OUR Freedom is: "It is the freedom of the people, it is French freedom, which defends our independence and our security against foreign influence (sic!) and subjection. It is *also* individual and social freedom..." (Italics ours).

E. R.

LA REVOLUTION PROLETARIENNE, Revolutionary Syndicalist Monthly, 14 rue de Tracy, Paris; New Series, Nos. 4, 5-6 & 7.

Since we received it last time, three more issues of this paper (July to October, 1947) have been received by us. It appears that even Syndicalism is becoming alive to the new developments in human history. It is a pity that ideological purity still stands in the way of a comprehensive new orientation of this political movement; instead, there is a regrettable drift towards the ultra-proletarianism of Trotsky. The July issue begins with a review of Kravchenko's *I Choose Liberty* by "a Russian heretic". The book has become quite well known as one of the latest expressions of disillusionment with and defection from the Soviet State by its erstwhile builders. Further evidence of Communist ruthlessness is sought to be provided in a note on the "Assassination of Andreu Nin by the G. P. U. in Spain". It is interesting to note however that Syndicalists have turned their attention to the problem of education and its relation to working class politics; in these three issues there are three interesting notes on Syndicalism in the teaching profession by Hagnauer and Bouet. The most significant political articles in these issues, however, are about the socialist experiment in Britain: "Ten years of Labour Government" by Roger P., and "The English Crisis" by Robert Louzon. I also learnt much from Monate's informative study in comparison of "Pelloutier and Briand" in the August-September double number.

THE WIND AND THE RAIN, Quarterly Magazine ; Editor. N. Braybrooke, 15 Newton Court, Vol. IV, Nos. 1 & 2, 1947.

We had occasion to write in some detail about the general outlook of this quarterly in our last issue. The two issues received since then have deepened our appreciation although we find no reason to modify our critical observations on the editorial point of view. The summer issue contains among other things a critically appreciative essay on Keynes by Peter Drucker ; a neo-Thomistic restatement of the theory of judgment by D. Hawkins, and a not-too-satisfactory analysis of Keats as a "Sensation Extravert" by W. Witcutt. In the autumn issue are a sympathetic summarisation of Niebuhr's book, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* by M. Fraenkel ; a study in contrast of Melville and Hawthorne by Ronald Mason, and a valuable note on "Recent Classical Studies" by W. F. Jackson Knight. There are also some book reviews among which those of Russell's *History of Philosophy* and Darbellay's *Le Poète et la Connaissance Poétique* may be especially mentioned.

LONGMAN'S MISCELLANY, No. 4 ; Longmans Green & Co., 17, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta ; Rs. 3/-.

The present collection is the fourth and last in a series which has already earned a name for variety, discrimination and quality among similar publications in this country and abroad. Most of the contributors are Indian and all of them are living and contemporary. While no editorial names are mentioned, the impress of scrupulous supervision and selective arrangement cannot be missed. The production is fastidious without being fussy, distinguished and never loud.

The two finest contributions in this issue are from Mr. Vijayatunga and Mr. Kim Christen. Mr. Vijayatunga has a crisp, satiny style and his observations are witty, pointed and mature. I have read his other essays before and find the present one to be one of his best. Of course, he is

not profound ; his voyage does not prompt such disturbing chains of thought as one finds, for example, in Spender's observations during an air-tour in Western Europe. Vijayatinga, it appears, has Aldous Huxley for his model. Kim Christen, on the other hand, is intuitively inclined. One may or may not take his anthropological excursions seriously. But the unpremeditated gladness that some times falls upon one—the gladness of a cool sunny winter noon in a harvest field in the tropics, or among the falling needles in a pine forest aflame in the setting sun—that gladness Mr. Christen most certainly communicates with a convincing immediacy. Apart from these two essays, there are also three very remarkable poems by Mr. Sudhindranath Datta, translated by himself. In its original Bengali version, the "Camel-Bird" is probably the most well-known of Mr. Datta's poems, and is also one of his best. Mr. Datta is largely responsible for introducing the "metaphysical trend" in modern Bengali poetry, or rather, for re-establishing that trend via inter-war European symbolists. The three poems, selected and translated by him for this collection, are illustrative of that trend, which distinguishes Bengali poetry in the thirties from that of the preceding romantic age.

S. N. R.

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW

- Rudolf Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, Rocker Publications Committee, Los Angeles, \$ 3.50.
- Rudolf Rocker, *Anarcho-Syndicalism*, Modern Publishers, Indore, Rs. 3/-
- Pierre-Jean Proudhon, *General Idea of Revolution in 19th Century*, Freedom Press, London, 5 s.
- Hiren Mukherjee, *Under Marx's Banner*, Purabi Publishers, Calcutta, Rs. 3/-
- Benimadhab Barua, *Asoka and his Inscriptions*, New Age Publishers, Calcutta, Rs. 15/-
- Priyaranjan Sen, *Western Influence in Bengali Literature*, Saraswaty Library, Cal., Rs. 8/-
- S. Sengupta, *Saratchandra, Man & Artist*, „ Rs. 5/-
- Kazi Abdul Odood, *Goethe (in Bengali) Vol. I*, General Printers, Calcutta ; Vol. II, Bharat Sahitya Bhaban, Calcutta.
- H. Selsam, *What is Philosophy*, Modern Publishers, Cal. Rs. 2/8/-
- M. Bhadury & S. Chatterjee, *The Art of Hindu Dance*, S. K. Chatterjee, Calcutta, Rs. 6/-

In Coming Issues

MECHANISTIC AND DIALECTIC MATERIALISM

By Paul Langevin

MORALITY AND POLITICAL PRACTICE

By Philip Spratt

MAURYA AND SUNGA ART

By Prof. Dr. Nihar Ranjan Ray,
Calcutta University

HOMER AND VALMIKI

By Prof. Dr. Kenny,
Siddhartha College, Bombay

SARTRE, MALRAUX AND DE GAULLE

By Andie Brissaud

ECONOMIC PLANNING AND FREEDOM

By Prof. G. D. Parikh,
Fellow, Bombay University

THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE

By Prof. Dr. A. Dasgupta,
Benares University

Edited by M. N. Roy. Printed by Debsaran Das Gupta from Stripati Press
14 D. L. Roy Street, and Published by Debsaran Das Gupta
from 15 Bankim Chatterjee Street Calcutta 12

THE HUMANIST WAY

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO ENQUIRY AND LEARNING
(Formerly, *The Marxian Way*)

Editor : M. N. Roy

Vol. IV, No. 3

1950

CONTENTS

PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP	GOETHE AS PHILOSOPHER
BERTRAM D. WOLFE	SCIENCE AND THE SOVIET STATE
DR. DAKSHINA RANJAN SHASTRI	CĀRVĀKA PHILOSOPHY
M. N. ROY	PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM
EDITORIAL NOTES	
BOOKS REVIEWED	VEDANTA FOR THE WESTERN WORLD by Christopher Isherwood, Aldous Huxley & others ... THE OPENING OF AN ERA : 1848 edited by Francois Fejto ... MARX : HIS TIME AND OURS by Rudolf Schlesinger ... THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM by R. L. Carew Hant ... HUMANISM AS A PHILOSOPHY by Corliss Lamont ... CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY by Herbert Butterfield ... EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY by Robert Davies ... UNIVERSITY AND THEIR PROBLEMS by S. R. Dongerkerky .. EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING by K. G. Saiyidain

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15, BANKIM CHATTERJEE STREET,
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PRICE :	India ...	Rs. 3/-	per copy
	Foreign ...	4s or 75 cent	..
YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION	India ...	Rs. 10/-	
	Foreign ...	20s or \$ 3 00	
AGENT IN AMERICA	Stechert-Hafner Inc. 37, East 10th Street, New York 3 N. Y.		
AGENT IN U K	Luzac & Company Ltd., 46, Great Russel Street London W C 1		

THE HUMANIST WAY

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO ENQUIRY & LEARNING

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RENAISSANCE PUBLISHERS LTD.
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GOETHE AS PHILOSOPHER

Paul Arthur Schilpp

In the minds of too many people the notion seems to be abroad that literature and philosophy, so far from being vitally related to each other, are in fact opposites. Men of letters are supposed to be writers who have a genius for expressing in beautiful, if not always in poetic, language the characteristic thoughts and events of individual and social life to the enjoyment of the widest possible circle of readers. Philosophers, on the other hand, are generally conceived of as a people who say or write what they have to say in the most clumsy technical language to the utter dismay of everyone except those esoteric few who themselves are initiates into the dark secrets of the philosophic profession.

I should like to claim that, despite all general opinions to the contrary and despite any number of specific historical and even contemporary instances to the contrary, philosophy and *belles lettres* are not necessarily opposed to each other. Rather they are—or, at their best at any rate ought to be—two aspects of the same pursuit—of the pursuit, namely, to find the truths of life and to express the same in both the most adequate and the most beautiful possible fashion for the benefit of such as care to be guided or inspired by the discoveries of others.

When it is realised, then, that the literary achievements of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe offer perhaps the most outstanding example of this matchless pursuit which can be found in the contemporary world, it is no wonder that the entire world is joining with Germany in 1919 in honouring the memory of this creative intellectual and aesthetic giant. That he is far and above Germany's greatest poet no one

has questioned or is likely to deny. That he must rank alongside of Homer, Virgil, Dante and Shakespeare among the world's greatest poetic seers is also quite generally admitted. That he expresses what is noblest and best in the particular character of the German people has also often been stressed. But that his character and vision were much broader than merely nationally Germanic is also very evident; the genius of a Goethe could not be hemmed in by the boundaries of any one country or nation. It is the broadly and deeply *human* that he represents, whether it be in his own life or in the expression of life which he has accomplished in such immortal fashion in his works.

Yet the *philosopher* Goethe has too generally been overlooked. The reason for this is quite obvious, of course. Goethe the poet has so completely captivated the thought and imagination of cultural reader and critic alike that Goethe the philosopher seldom has had a chance even to be noticed. Goethe the thinker, in fact, has had to stand back of Goethe the imaginative creator. Yet Goethe was a philosopher in perhaps the most significant sense of the word.

Perhaps this statement can, initially, best be justified by a brief characterization of the philosopher. A philosopher is a person who has a fairly comprehensive world-view and who is quite conscious of what his *Weltanschauung* is; he will have achieved his world-view, moreover, as the result of mature and critical reflection upon experience. So far from implying by this that the philosopher must never change his *Weltanschauung*, I should rather insist that most of the world's greatest philosophers underwent one or more rather decisive changes in their world-view. For, despite the need for coherence and for a unifying point of view, the philosopher is also, of all human beings, the one who most generally realises that no question has—as yet—finally been settled. The philosopher, that is to say, is *always seeking*, but hardly ever certain that he has fully arrived or attained.

Most of them would, in fact, question the very possibility of man *ever* being able to arrive at any finalities.

If this be so, who could be found to represent this endless Faustian quest more adequately than the one literary artist who, by his own version of the Faust saga, has done more to bring Faust and his eternal quest back into the consciousness of the modern world than any other thinker or man of letters?

It is true, if to be a philosopher would imply to concern one's self *exclusively* with purely technical problems of philosophy and to occupy one's self *solely* with the creation of a completely coherent and logically air-tight philosophical system, then Goethe could—frankly—*not* be considered as a philosopher. For no one was, as we shall see, farther from such occupation than was Goethe. It must be admitted, moreover, that such is still too often the generally accepted but entirely too one-sided and narrow a conception of philosophy. Goethe himself does, in fact, not hesitate to place himself with reference to philosophy thus considered. "For philosophy in the strictest sense of the word I have no feeling." Again: "I have always kept myself free from philosophy; the view-point of sound common sense has been mine also." And once more: "At any rate I have as much philosophy as I need till my blessed end; in reality I need none at all,"*

Far better, however, than these, superficially considered, disparaging remarks concerning purely technical philosophy do the following sentences from Goethe's famous letter to Jakobi of November 23rd, 1801, portray to us his real attitude towards the whole realm of philosophy. Here he wrote:

You can also easily imagine how I stand towards philosophy. When it concerns itself primarily with (divisive) distinctions I cannot well get on with it, and I may well say: it has sometimes

* The direct quotations from Goethe, given here in English, are translated from the original by the present writer.

hurt me in that it disturbed my natural ways ; when it unites, or rather when it enhances and confirms our original impressions that we are one with nature, and transforms this impression into a deep calm intuitive vision in whose everlasting *synkrisis* and *diakrisis* we sense a divine life, even though to lead such a life may not be granted us,—then I welcome philosophy.

In other words, Goethe has little or no use for philosophy as critical analysis; but he has supreme faith in philosophy as the search for synthesis and harmony, since only through its synthetic character can it really express life which is, after all, a totality, a wholeness. His letter to Fichte, acknowledging the receipt of a copy of the latter's *Wissenschaftslehre*, dated June 24, 1794, brings out the way in which Goethe always felt himself at one and the same time both repelled and attracted by philosophy and philosophers. In it he wrote: "So far as I am concerned, I will owe you the deepest gratitude if you will finally reconcile me with philosophers; with them I have never been able to dispense and yet have never been able to reconcile myself with them either."

The fact of the case is, of more than of almost anything else Goethe was convinced of the fundamental unity of all life. But life, to be understood, had primarily to be *lived*, rather than talked about or even thought about.

Indeed, no one, he tells us, can (really) talk about what he has not experienced: "Everything we express is a confession of faith." How utterly true this was of himself he has given us in his own words. "In all my poetry I have never shammed," he wrote. "What I have not lived through, what has not moved me to the quick, I have never uttered in verse or prose." It is, obviously, this very fact which makes Goethe's productions such marvellous mirrors of self-revelation. On this point Robertson wrote: "Goethe was a type of literary man hitherto unrepresented among the leading writers of the world's literature; he was a poet whose supreme

greatness lay in his subjectivity by far the larger part of his work is the immediate reflex of his feelings and experiences." In *Dichtung und Wahrheit* Goethe himself calls attention to this same fact as follows :

Thus began that tendency, from which through all my life I have not been able to depart, namely to transform into a picture, into a poem everything which delighted or tormented or otherwise occupied me, and thus to settle it for myself in order both to correct my concepts of external things and also to calm myself inwardly about them.

His poetry, dramas, and novels thus were literally the mirror of his soul. Even yet to read Goethe is to know the *auton.*

For a mind which was in the habit of exposing itself as a totality at almost any moment it was only natural that Goethe should be found ever and again to be turning against the would-be synthesizers and analysts. Against the former he directs these interesting lines, which at the same time show the importance he assigned to life and to its conquest:

"Just continue in your fashion
To spin your web across the world !
I, in my own living circle
Know how to win life itself."

And concerning the mere analysts he complains: "Much we would know much better, if we did not want to know it so precisely." It is, perhaps, not necessary to dwell on the far reaching significance of this pithy saying; at least not for people acquainted with recent philosophy; for it might very well be claimed that Henri Bergson has built a complete system of philosophy upon it.

Yet such sentiments must *not* be interpreted to mean that Goethe had neither understanding for nor appreciation of the necessity and value of theory. Far from it. Rather he was acute enough in his own analysis of human life and thought to realise that "in every attentive look into the world we are already theorising." Only six months

before his death he writes to Schultz: "I am grateful to the critical and idealistic philosophy that it has directed my attention to myself; that is an enormous gain." But even thirty-five years earlier, when he had only recently become acquainted with the Kantian Critical philosophy, he wrote to Jakobi in October 1796 as follows:

You would no longer find me to be such a stiff realist ; it brings me great advantage that I have become somewhat more acquainted with the other types of thinking, which, though they cannot become my own, I nevertheless need very much indeed for practical use as a supplement for my one-sidedness.

Expressions such as these show clearly that Goethe felt himself indebted to the great philosophic theories of his age, even though he was, even in this realm, entirely too independent a thinker to accept or swallow anything ready-made and whole.

It would, in fact, be quite easy to trace the definite influence which even technical philosophers—such, as for example, Spinoza and Kant (to mention only two among the greatest ones)—exerted upon the intellectual development of Goethe. With reference to both of these philosophers we have numerous expressions from Goethe's own pen to vouch for the reality and great impact of these influences. Spinoza's influence appears to have been greater in Goethe's younger years, although it is quite clear that Goethe never completely escaped from the spell which the great God-intoxicated Grinder of Lenses early had cast over him. The mystical pantheism of Spinoza most admirably fitted into the temperament of the great Bard of Weimar. Spinoza's thought gave the ever seeking and searching mind of Goethe the basis for a religion which had need neither for creed nor for dogma, just as Leibnitz was probably the philosophical mind who had helped Goethe to his faith in the divine mission of human life.

If it cannot be said that Kant's influence upon Goethe was as great as was that of Spinoza, this is certainly not

surprising. The rationally analytical mind of Kant was far removed from the warm pulsating life of Goethe. Yet Goethe did not, with a gesture of supercilious superiority, close his mind to the Critical Philosophy. Rather, he seems to have worked hard, in his later years, to try to understand the Kantian position. What is more : he gladly accepted the tutelage of the ten years younger Schiller in this task. The best proof of the importance which Goethe saw in the Kantian philosophy is, of course, to be found in Goethe's own essay on "*Einwirkung der Neueren Philosophie*," written in 1817. It is true, the essay shows perhaps more misunderstanding of the Kantian position than it shows real comprehension. And it is also true that Goethe almost always changes Kant's doctrines so that, in their re-statement by Goethe, they appear more Goethean than Kantian. But the fact remains that Goethe made very serious attempts to understand and to come to terms with the Critical Philosophy. If he did not succeed as much as the more technical philosopher might wish he had, let us remember that the genius of Goethe was never able to touch anything without transforming it. Whatever he absorbed from others he changed until, by the creative power of his mind, the absorbed material appeared much more natively Goethean than borrowed. Even the great Sage of Königsberg could not escape this fate at the hands of Goethe.

We must leave this part of our discussion, but not without two more remarks from Goethe which, coming out of the heart of his two most important works, viz., out of *Wilhelm Meister* and *Faust* respectively, summarise Goethe's point of view far more pointedly as well as beautifully than anything a commentator or critic could add. "Meaning," he tells us in the former, "enlarges, but paralyzes; the act animates, but restricts." ("Der Sinn erweitert, aber laehmt; die Tat belebt, aber beschraenkt.") And *Faust* breaks out into the endlessly quoted, but never to be forgotten lines :

"Grey, my dear friend, is all our theory
And only green the golden tree of life."

The one hunger and passionate drive which dominates this great spirit more than any other is his striving for knowledge and understanding of the world and of life; the striving which has, after all, been the distinctly *philosophical* urge since men have been philosophers. But no sooner does one state this fact about Goethe than one comes to realise, as must already have become apparent, that he certainly does not choose to satisfy this hunger in the most generally accepted fashion. Ask Newton how to come to know the world and he will tell you: go and observe, measure and observe some more, and when you have reached your final conclusion check it with more observation! Ask Darwin how best to know life and he will be found to reply likewise: observe life in all its manifestations and aspects! And natural scientists all too generally are still apt to insist that "science begins and ends in observation"; implying by this assertion also that the only ultimately valid and real knowledge is *scientific* knowledge. It is hardly necessary to point out that Goethe would not and could not agree with such a sentiment. (I am inclined to think, moreover, that the word "sentiment" is especially wisely chosen in this connection. For, it appears to me that such a point of view is based much more on *sentiments* aroused by the habitual use of a certain method of procedure than either upon rational argument or upon empirical demonstrability.) Natural science, Goethe saw over 150 years ago—four generations before Einstein!—dissects, divides, separates, tears apart, and breaks up everything it touches; whereas it is of the very nature of the things which are thus broken up and dissected to be distinct unitary totalities. The art of measurement, which is one of the major and most essential of scientific procedures, can only observe and describe the *quantitative conditions* of behavior; whereas Goethe insists that real knowledge and understanding is concerned with the actual *forces* themselves whose *operational form* can only

be *directly experienced* by the organism. No amount of *merely quantitative analysis*, therefore, can give us information concerning the very aspects of life and of the universe which are of the *greatest* significance and meaning for us. Thus natural science can only arrive at the abstractly formulated "laws" which, however, completely exclude the actually originally given and experienced "phenomenon." Science, then, so far from telling us the truth about anything, falsifies more than it explains. For, in the final analysis, neither life nor the universe can ever be *explained*, anyway; at best your partial explanations succeed only in explaining the problem *away*, not in solving it. For knowledge and understanding do not come with a look from the outside, but only from first-hand, direct, personal, living experience. There is only one way of understanding life and that is by *living*.

The scientific mind of today's twentieth century will be tempted to relegate such ideas to the limbo of a by-gone unscientific age. And one would, indeed, be inclined to take such un-modern notions with more than just a grain of salt, even when coming from such a great mind as that of Goethe, were it not for the well known and indisputable fact that Goethe himself was a scientist of no mean reputation or accomplishment. For example, Goethe was quite a biologist; a field in which he made several outstanding discoveries such as those of the interosseal maxillary bone and the law of the metamorphosis of plants and of animal morphology. It has been said of Goethe that, "as no other of his contemporaries he possessed that type of scientific mind which, in the 19th century, made for progress; he was Darwin's predecessor by virtue of his enunciation of what has now become one of the commonplaces of natural science—organic evolution."*

Goethe came to the discovery of organic evolution because of his realisation of the fact that the specific steps in the

* John George Robertson, in the article referred to in footnote I above; p. 187,

evolution of organisms rest largely upon the principle of polarity, the original phenomenon of all natural living processes, namely the eternal alternation between expansion and contraction. But biology was not the only science in which Goethe was thoroughly at home. In physics also he made a real contribution by his theory of colors. These scientific achievements of Goethe show beyond the shadow of any possible doubt that his attitude towards natural science cannot be assigned to any supposed ignorance of this field.

Yet Goethe definitely rebels against the idea of considering nature as a system. Here is the way he puts it :

"Natural system : a contradictory expression. Nature has no system ; she has, 'she is life and the result of an unknown center and (extending) to an unknowable limit. Observation of nature, therefore, is endless, whether one proceeds by division into the most minute or by following the trail of totality in breadth and height."

Science, therefore, Goethe claims, is largely a human means of easing man's natural astonishment and wonder in the midst of the ever present "Riddle of the Universe," to use Haeckel's famous phrase. Nature, in other words, becomes meaningful in its actual operation, in the activity and interplay of its forces as they can be witnessed in the specific phenomenon. And man, according to Goethe, needs a mediator not merely in matters of religious faith but also in research: to point him to the eternal in the (passing) phenomenon. We find this idea perhaps best expressed near the beginning of Goethe's treatise entitled, "Attempt at a Meteorology," where he says: "The true, identical with the divine, can never directly be known by us: we behold it only as by reflection, by example, through symbols in individual and related phenomena; we become aware of it as incomprehensible life and yet cannot renounce the desire to comprehend it nontheless." Goethe admits that the senses as well as carefully practiced rational judgment can grasp the actual operation in its purest and simplest form, namely as the original total phenomenon, But beyond this the senses

and reason cannot go. And, prophetic of Einstein's much later remark to the effect that "the most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible," Goethe lauds it as "the greatest fortune of the thinking man to have divined the comprehensible and calmly to revere the incomprehensible." For behind every and all phenomena Goethe sees the inexplicable. And he gives this advice to the investigator: "One should not seek anything behind the phenomena. They themselves are the instruction." Beyond them the mind of man can not go. "The highest which man can reach is wonder, and when the original phenomenon causes him to wonder, let him be satisfied!" Even though it is obviously the poet who speaks here, it is by no means self-evident that the philosopher does not speak here also. For, to Goethe even "all philosophy of nature remains only anthropomorphism, i. e., man, one with himself, imparts to everything which he is not, this same unity, draws it with him into himself, makes it one with himself.... ..Things (themselves) are infinite."

Obviously quite in line with this point of view are Goethe's disparaging remarks concerning both scientific hypotheses and theories. "Hypotheses," he tells us, "are lullabies by which the teacher lulls his students to sleep." And "theories are usually the result of the excessive haste of an impatient mind, which would gladly be rid of phenomena and therefore slips in pictures, concepts, yes often nothing but words, in place of the phenomena." This way of putting the matter shows Goethe's own impatience with such methods of procedure. On the other hand, however, it is to be kept in mind that Goethe was by no means advising the usual lazy man's solutions of all problems, namely the so-called "golden middle road." So far from finding truth in the middle between opposing opinions or theories, Goethe expressly states: "In the middle remains the problem perhaps inscrutable, perhaps accessible." Anyway, "man is not born to solve the problems of the universe, but rather to search for the nature of the problem and after that

to keep himself within the limits of the comprehensible." And, after all, the stream of life is infinitely different, far beyond the capacity of one man to fathom ultimately. Here we recognise the famous Goethean characteristics of resignation and renunciation asserting themselves. Yet even these characteristics—however much Goethe may have made of them—were never carried by him to such a degree that the quest itself would become either useless or no longer fascinating. Nor does it mean, on the other hand, that Goethe is turning opportunist and is merely accomodating himself to any one's or every one's point of view. Goethe at no time attempted to be "all things to all men." But, in view of the endless differentiations and infinite aspects of actual life and experience he does find it practically necessary to be all things *to himself*. This we find most eloquently expressed in a passage of his litter to Jakobi, dated January 6, 1813, as follows :

"As for myself, because of the numerous aspects of my being, I can not be satisfied with a single mode of thought : as a poet and artist I am a polytheist ; as an investigator of nature I am a pantheist ; and I am the one as decidedly as I am the other. If I required a God for myself as a moral personality, I should already be provided therewith also. Celestial and terrestrial things constitute a world of such vastness that only the organs of all beings together can comprehend it."

Moreover, two years earlier, on January 22, 1811, he had written to Reinhardt as follows :

"All of the possible opinions do, after all, go through our head bye and bye, partly historically, partly productively.....the various ways of thinking are grounded in the differences among men and a thoroughly uniform conviction is impossible for just that reason. Once one knows on which side one stands, and where on that side one stands, one has already done quite enough ; for then one is calm within and fair towards others."

It is perfectly clear from these remarks that, for Goethe, the peculiar position of the individual is by no means the only position. Rather, the principle of individual variation and the existing variety of human opinions is not merely

recognized as an existential fact but as a happy circumstance as well. For, "only all men (together) know nature, only humanity as a whole lives truly humanly." Thus even knowledge, real knowledge, for Goethe, is a *social* achievement. And this more than a century before John Dewey or George Herbert Mead!

At the same time it would be a serious mistake if, from this fact, one were to jump to the conclusion that Goethe was a worshipper of the masses or of the mob. As a matter of fact, Goethe has no faith whatsoever in the ancient maxim, *vox populi, vox dei*. In fact, it is precisely in the very passage from which we have just quoted that he makes this quite clear, when he goes on to say:

"No matter how I place myself, I see in many famous axioms only the expressions of an individuality, and the very thing which is most universally recognised as true is usually only a prejudice of the mob, which latter lives under certain temporal conditions and which may therefore just as well be looked upon as an individual."

In fact, Goethe goes even so far as to use the wretched condition of the masses of men as an excuse for the absurdities of philosophers. Under date of February 2, 1821, he wrote to von Mueller: "If men *en masse* were not so miserable, the philosophers would not find it necessary by contrast to be so absurd." Superficially considered this remark may produce more mirth than light. Yet a little serious consideration of it may prove it to contain more than just a grain of truth. By way of a (perhaps overly) simple example, is it not possible to surmise that a philosophy of mechanistic materialism might never have arisen had it not been for the preceding philosophy of equally onesided and unbalanced absolute or subjective idealism? And even a philosophy of absolute idealism may itself have partly been the result of the crudely native realism of the unthinking and uncritical masses. In other words, philosophy is perhaps as often a *reaction against* as it may be the dignified expression of

the life and opinions of the day. Moreover, even philosophy can probably not escape the universal operation of the law of the pendulum. The pendulum of public opinion, having swung too far in one direction, the philosophic reaction is not very likely to stop, on the return swing, nicely and balancedly in the middle. Rather, it is most likely to swing to the opposite extreme, thus accounting for its so-called "absurdity." I am, of course, quite aware of the fact that the very *aim* of philosophy is to achieve a "balanced view of life", instead of an extreme or onesided one. But I submit that, in order to make this very balance possible, it is sometimes absolutely necessary first to achieve the opposite extreme of any momentarily existing *status quo*. Balance, in other words, in a moving world, is rarely achieved by reaching a standstill, but by the action and reaction of opposing forces, by the natural (even though perhaps at times absurd) swing of the pendulum.

But, back to Goethe. Although the *whole* truth can be had *only by all* men combined, the individual can achieve his own individual truth. And, according to Goethe, every man has his own individual truth, and the validity of his truth is to be determined by the application of the following criterion: "Only what is fertile is true." A pragmatic assertion three-quarters of a century before the first (American) pragmatists! True, by "fertile" or "fruitful" (*fruchtbar* in the original German) Goethe did not mean merely external advantage or even the mere extension of our knowledge of facts; but neither did the founders of (American) pragmatism. (The attempt to make them say this is nothing more than the setting up of a strawman on the part of the opponents of pragmatism.) Goethe means by it our own inner development by arousing the previously slumbering forces of our mind to free activity. Only thus can our inner consciousness be organically expanded and developed. The person who grasps truth in this fashion—so Goethe informs us—has not merely grown somewhat himself, but has aided

in clarifying his own life and by doing so is brought closer to the deity. For this reason even error may, under certain circumstances, be a furtherer of truth; it may be the necessary detour, without which a certain portion of our personality might never have been aroused to activity and life.

It is this last fact which gives to Goethe's views of man such an eternal freshness and vitality. Man, like the universe itself, is an eternal problem and riddle for Goethe.

"Man's life, in this regard, is like a poem
It has beginning, has an end,
And yet is not a whole."

Sentiments such as these have caused Goethe to be accused, even by such a close friend as Schiller, of being satirical in his attitude towards man. When one dips deeper into Goethe's views, however, it is easy to discover the fact that it is not satire but eternal wonder on Goethe's part which produces that initial effect on the reader. For, although Goethe is thoroughly appreciative of the light which the capacity for rational judgment throws upon man's path, he is constantly aware that this light sheds its beams just far enough ahead upon the path to keep one—under favourable other conditions—on the road. For the most part Goethe finds man driven more by a certain inexplicable "demon" from within than by the application of the light of reason. Goethe felt himself "demon possessed" no less than Socrates had done over two thousand years before Goethe. (In neither instance, of course, does the word "demon" have any particularly moral or otherwise evaluative connotation.) It is felt to be a mysterious inner driving force which, according to Goethe, determines a man's ultimate peculiar personality and decisions more than any other characteristics. It is the drive which necessitates activity, the burning fire within which will not let a man rest.

Yet this is, perhaps, the greatest possession—alas!, in *both* senses of this word "possession"—of man. It urges him

eternally on and on and forces him thus more and more to become most truly himself. The *Faust*, Goethe's incomparably greatest masterpiece, develops this tremendous theme to the highest perfection. It has rightly been called "The Song of Songs of Activity." In its graphic description of Faust as the man who eternally stands between God and the devil, it depicts the typically Goethean conception of the fundamental human problematic. The principle of polarity is as fundamental in man as it is in nature. In fact, nature and man are ultimately continuous parts of a continuous whole and must not artificially be separated. Two souls live in man's breast, of which the one always tightly clings to the earth, whereas the other is eternally striving beyond everything merely earthy. In the eternal conflict between these opposing forces within his own nature Faust himself finds it impossible ever to say to the moment: "remain!" He has to be up and doing. The idea of *activity* runs through the whole drama from the remark in the Prologue that "man's activity all too easily may flag" to the words in the closing chorus coming to us from the great Beyond to which Faust's soul has gone:

"The evanescent
Becomes here an event;
The indescribable
Here it is done."

The task of life for Faust is to purify his activity. For the drive to action may be increased, on the one hand, to insolent presumptuousness, or it may, on the other, run cut in the sand. The content and object of activity becomes, therefore, of great importance. Faust's only holy writ begins with the words: "*Im Anfang war die Tat!*" ("In the beginning was the act!") Restlessly striving, it becomes Faust's life-long task to reach "new spheres of pure activity." Even the idea of committing suicide is still freighted with this notion. Because, "If I stand still I am a slave."

The whole aim of Mephistopheles is to drag Faust through life, keeping this very Faustian restless activity endlessly going

in order to tire him out at last. Only thus can he win and Faust lose his bet. Each experience of Faust's life is thus consummated in active deeds. But neither activity in the world of sense (the Gretchen tragedy) nor unification with embodied aesthetic harmony (in the Helena tragedy) can satisfy his restless spirit. At the same time, even after having turned from both of these, Faust's spirit is far from defeated. "*Dieser Erdenkreis gewahrt noch Raum zu grossen Thaten*," ("This earthly globe still affords room to great and mighty deeds."), he cries, and with it enters upon the experiences and activities of the ruler tragedy. "*Die That ist alles!*" ("The deed is everything!") In harmony with this sentiment Faust throws himself into the activities contained in the service of culture and of society. But here too the overflow of his restless striving causes him for the third time to entangle himself with heinous guilt. And so it is that in none of the fields of his activity has he been able to find rest or satisfaction; it looks, therefore, as if Mephistopheles were to lose his bet.

Yet it is precisely when the endless Faustian quest seems to have withstood every temptation with which Mephistopheles has tried to capture him and to tire him out—it is just then that Faust comes to a double realisation which, although it is completely in line with the achievement of an "ever purer activity," on the other hand causes him to lose his bet to Mephistopheles and thus to bring about—in harmony with the original contract—his death. He realises, first of all, that to be truly human implies freeing yourself from all magic and from all desire to be a superman, and instead to achieve purely by your own strength and by your own truest (human) nature. And his second and equally important realisation is the insight that "to be a man" is to be one with many other men. The last and highest achievement, therefore, would be, in purely human strength and activity.

* "To many millions let me furnish soil
 Tho not secure, yet free to active toil
 "Yes! to this that I hold with firm persiste
 The last result of wisdom stamps it true-;

He only earns his freedom and existence,
 Who daily conquers them anew.
 Thus here, by dangers girt, shall glide away
 Of childhood, manhood, age, the vigorous day :
 And such a throng I fain would see—
 Stand on free soil among a people free. •

Not security, but free activity ! Freedom and even existence itself, not a gift, but a daily renewed conquest and achievement ! A throng of people active from childhood to old age, but doing their work as free men on free soil ! In such commitment to social activity for the welfare and good of millions, but no longer doing it simply *for* them or *to* them, but *with* them, in this he finally finds the highest and only lasting aspiration and satisfaction of his soul.

"Then to the fleeting moment I could say :
 Remain a while, though art so fair !
 In proud fore-feeling of such lofty bliss
 I now enjoy the highest moment—this.

No sooner are the words over his lips, than—reminded of the similar words of his contract with Mephistopheles—he falls dead to the ground. But just before this final denouement Faust justifies himself in this sentiment by pointing out that he has created something lasting, something which goes way beyond the individual personality and in which yet, *just because* he himself is its creator, his own individuality will forever be preserved. This is the significant meaning of his famous lines :

"The traces of my earthly being
 In aeons cannot perish : they are there !"

Not his fame is imperishable, but the deeds themselves. For it is the deed which can never again be lost and which reaches way beyond the individual personality. It is the consciousness through his perishable ego to have achieved something super-personal and imperishable. It is *that* he desires to preserve. And with this desire he has achieved the highest purification of his nature, but with it also he has lost his bet—and dies. He had achieved—finally—humanity in his own right. But the

happy realisation of this fact causes him to lose the magic contract—naturally. To become an active man in the midst of active men, and to help them to achieve freedom and life on a free soil, this is the final purifying striving and activity. As Goethe expressed it in one sentence in the *Pandora*: “Des cchten Mannes wahre-Feier ist die Tat.” (“The crowning glory of the real man is the deed.”) Or again, as we find it in Faust’s own admonition to himself when he ponders the fact of his great dependence on heredity:

“Wnat from your fathers you’ve inherited,
Earn first in order that you might own it.”

But, neither for Faust nor—apparently—for *Faust’s* creator is this the end. The activity of an active personality cannot thus abruptly be cut off. Goethe writes:

“The conviction of our continued existence springs for me out of the very concept of activity; for when I am restlessly at work to my very end, nature is duty-bound to assign to me another form of existence, when the present form no longer is able to maintain my spirit.”

Thus Goethe says to men: as long as you *want* to be active, you can depend upon your own immortality; for activity is the innermost essence of your truest existence; and activity is indestructible as long as you are actively striving. You *shall* be active: therefore it must be *possible* to be active, even when all outward conditions have basically changed.

Here, then, we have, in some sense comparable to Kant’s similar formulation, an ethical foundation for the belief in *immortality*. The sense of obligation *demand*s it; and what nature demands she must grant. Therefore, because it *must* be so, it *is* so (says Goethe). With Kant also Goethe shares the former’s denial of all eudaimonistic reasons for immortality. Not the desire or need for happiness, nor even the demand of a “practical reason,” but the necessity of continuous activity guarantees the truly active person’s immortality. Immortality, for Goethe, therefore, is more an achievement than it is a gift. Only the actively striving person can expect further opportunity

for self-expressive activity after death. But for such active personalities, Goethe insists, death simply cannot be the end. If we can only call this a *conditional immortality*, so be it. For this is all that can definitely be asserted as Goethe's point of view on this subject ; and the idea itself is certainly immortalised in the *Faust*. It turns out, in the end, to be the crowning consummation of this "Song of Songs of Activity."

The *Faust* is, of course, poetry supreme. Yet, even such a brief characterisation of Goethe's masterpiece as has been possible within the compass of this discussion cannot but leave us with a clear recognition of the fact that underneath this tremendous drama and running all through it there is to be found a *philosophy* in the sense of a broad, but nevertheless quite definite, *Weltanschauung*. There is here a fundamental sense of the meaning and purpose of human life, a grappling with the problem of "good and evil," and a definite attempt to relate man to his surrounding physical and social universe. True enough, Goethe never deals with these problems in the abstract ; but they remain philosophical problems nonetheless, no matter how they are treated. And when they are treated with such a basically unifying idea and at the same time with such an all-inclusive sweep as we find in the *Faust*, it would seem to me to be a mere *Streit um des Kaisers Bart* to dispute the right to call the creator of this drama of human life a *philosopher*. One may rightfully challenge either the basic convictions, or the reasoning process, or the final conclusions of this Goethean *Weltanschauung*, or two of these, or even all three. But one cannot deny the fact that it is or contains a philosophical world-view, no less unified or significant because it happens also to be great poetry.

All of this has had to be purely fragmentary. It has been just as impossible to exhaust any one of the specific points raised as it has been impossible to raise more than a relatively small number of aspects of Goethe's thinking which show him as the philosopher. (There has, for example, been no space even so much as to mention Goethe's educational

philosophy as found in his other great masterpiece, the *Wilhelm Meister*.) But enough, I trust, has been brought out to prove the primary contention of this discussion, namely that Goethe was, after all, a philosopher in perhaps the highest and most significant sense of the word: he increasingly developed a rational and comprehensive *Weltanschauung* which, in its inclusive character and tremendous reach, in its apparent lack of dogmatism yet equally apparent deep convictions, in its eternal Faustian quest and ceaseless activity, in its glorification of the individual and his rights and its accompanying goal of broad and universal social service—in all of these aspects has proved perhaps to be the single greatest and universally understood highway upon which the modern world has walked out of the later renaissance and out of the extreme worship of reason of the late eighteenth century into the world of the more distinctly contemporary spirit and culture. Moreover, in his profound *human* insights Goethe still leads the way; he is still a modern among moderns, and a seer of the first magnitude. Many of his insights have not merely the earmark of genius but that of 'eternal' truth (if the word 'eternal' may be used in a *relative* way without self-contradiction).

I doubt, therefore, whether, even two-hundred years after his birth, it is possible to do greater honour to this universal genius than was done him by his own fatherland's greatest momentary enemy, when Napoleon met Goethe at Erfurt and the great Corsican greeted Germany's "first citizen" with the memorable words: *Voilà un homme!* For greater than the philosopher or even the poet Goethe was **THE MAN** Goethe. *Voilà un homme!*

SCIENCE AND THE SOVIET STATE

Bertram D. Wolfe

If the Man-from-Mars, or from that scarcely less remote planet, the Western World, had wandered into the 1948 Summer Congress of the Lenin All-Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences to listen to the "discussion" on genetics, he would never have imagined that he was at a scientific congress at all. There was only one report, "On the Situation in Biological Science,"¹ and only one reporter, who chaired the sessions, had the first word and the last. The "sessions" had the air of a political mass meeting with a touch of Roman gladiatorial circus. The forty-six members of the Academy present were drowned in a turbulent sea of over "700 practical workers from the agricultural research institutes, biology teachers, agronomists, zootechnicians, economists", political commissars and "dialectical materialist philosophers." The members of the Academy were not there to discuss their experiments, present their papers, submit their difficult and subtle specialties to the judgment of their peers. Indeed, there were no papers presented, no breaking up of the general sessions into special subsections for the consideration of specialties—only eight days of target practice with Trofim D. Lysenko as the number one sharpshooter, and all Russia's most distinguished geneticists as targets.

Throughout this singular "genetics discussion" there were outbursts of stormy applause, raucous laughter, hoots, catcalls, sinister threats, and a constant hail of abuse for the more important members of the Academy. Geneticists who tried to remain silent were provoked and taunted for their "cowardice." Those who sought to speak on their difficult technical

¹*The Situation in Biological Science: Proceedings of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Complete Stenographic Report.* International Publishers, 1949

specialties, genes, chromosomes, diploids, polyploids, pure strains and hybrids, before an unprepared audience, were heckled, interrupted, silenced by a storm of ignorant jests and coarse epithets. Those who, faces white with fear, sought to "confess their errors," were mocked for the "belated" and "inadequate" nature of their confessions. As they heard the work of a lifetime ridiculed and called into question, a few tried to explain some fragment or save some remnant. They were heckled more cruelly than the others. The epithets might not all seem like insults to the Man-from-Mars, but they were genuine cusswords in the murky twilight-world in which Soviet science is now fighting its last, dim, losing battle for scientific freedom. These scientists, themselves convinced communists and dialectical materialists whose only ambition had been to excel in their field, to serve science and their people, heard themselves called "idealists" (which, in the land of dialectical materialism made the State Faith, is not a compliment but the master cussword). They were called "metaphysicians," "adherents of clerical reaction,"² "Mendelist-Weismannist-Morganist scholastics," "men alien to the world outlook of the Soviet people," "unpatriotic fly-breeders," "formal geneticists, cognitively effete and practically sterile," "wagers of an unseemly struggle against Soviet science," "Menshevik idealists in philosophy and science," "rotten liberals," "corrupters of the scientific student youth," "adherents of reactionary-bourgeois racist theories," "debasers of Darwinism," "propagators of the harmful, hostile myth of the international unity of science," "servile worshippers of alien, hostile, enemy, reactionary bourgeois science," "enemies of the progress of Soviet science and the Soviet people."

II

The director of this orchestration of abuse was Trofim

²"Unfortunately for the reputation of genetics in the Soviet Union, there have been two clerics, Malthus and Mendel, who have played important parts in developing its theoretical ideas." Hudson and Richens: *The New Genetics in the Soviet Union*, published by the Imperial Bureau of Plant Breeding of Cambridge University, 1946.

D. Lysenko, a thin, broad-shouldered man of peasant origin, with the Order of Lenin on his breast, a protruding, active "Adam's apple," blazing, slightly asymmetrical eyes lit with a fanatical gleam of triumph. He stood there supremely confident, for as he repeatedly hinted to his appreciative claque and to the cringing veteran scientists, behind his assault stood "the Party of Lenin-Stalin and Comrade Stalin personally." If they doubted it, there was the Order of Lenin on his breast, the two Stalin First Prizes for Achievement in Science, and the pages of *Pravda*, which reported these speeches and epithets as if genetics had become a popular sporting event, or *Pravda* a scientific journal for genetical specialists.

Moreover, the Party had been moving Lysenko steadily upward into positions of power : Vice Chairman of the Supreme Soviet ; since 1938 President of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences ; since 1940, Director of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences ; and henceforth, wielder of the unseeing shears that can cut a lifetime scientist off from scientific work, or even cut the thread of life itself.

This singular figure first appeared in Soviet biology in the early '30's. We get revealing close-ups of Lysenko in that stage of his career from the fact that he was interviewed and his work investigated by two foreign scientists, both so sympathetic to the Soviet Union and so impressed by its work in the field of genetics that one visited its laboratories and the other went to live and work in them.

Dr. S. C. Harland, aging and highly esteemed British geneticist, has this to say of his interview :

I found him completely ignorant of the elementary principles of genetics and plant physiology. Having worked on genetics and plant-breeding for some thirty-five years, I can honestly say that to talk to Lysenko was like trying to explain the differential calculus to a man who did not know his twelve times table.³

³ *Russia Puts the Clock Back*, by John Langdon-Davies, with foreword by Sir Henry Dale, Gollancz, 1949.

Dr. H. J. Muller, Nobel Prize winner in genetics for his ground-breaking work in producing mutations in the genes of fruit-flies by X-ray irradiation, honored by the Soviet Union by an appointment as Senior Geneticist at the Institute of Genetics of Moscow for four years (1933-37) and by membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, has this to say of Lysenko :

In 1935 genetics had reached a very high state of advancement in the U.S.S.R., and many eminent scientists were working in it. The Soviet Communist Party, unable to find a single reputable scientist willing to take part in its attack on genetics, began systematically to build up in that year the reputation of an alleged "geneticist," a peasant-turned-plant-breeder named Trofim Lysenko, who had achieved some dubious success in applying, by trial-and-error proceedings an early American discovery about pre-treating of seeds in order to influence the time of maturation of certain crops. Lysenko's writings on theoretical lines are the merest drivel. He obviously fails to comprehend either what a controlled experiment is, or the established principle of genetics.⁴

The interpreter at the interview between Dr. Harland and the future dictator in Russian biology, was Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov, at that time head of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and of the Genetics Institute, and famous throughout the world for his researches on the geographical centers of origin and the genetical evolution of the most important cultivated grains. Dr. Harland, finally throwing up his hands in despair, said to Vavilov : "Will you ask Citizen Lysenko, to answer my question with a 'yes' or a 'no,' if such a fine distinction is possible in the language he speaks." Vavilov smiled protectively and shook his head :

"Lysenko is one of the 'angry species.' All progress in this world has been made by angry men, so let him go on working. He may find out how to grow bananas in Moscow. He does no harm, and some day may do some good."

⁴"The Destruction of Science in the U.S.S.R." By H.J. Muller. *Saturday Review of Literature*, Dec. 4 and 11, 1948; *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, December, 1948.

There are still no bananas growing in Moscow, but Lysenko has hounded Vavilov out of genetics. He has displaced Vavilov as Director of the Genetics Institute and as President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences. In 1939 he made Vavilov chief target of his attacks. In answer, Vavilov praised, as well he might, the practical and theoretical achievements of Soviet experimental biology; but he urged also the international interdependence and unity of world science, and pleaded that Soviet biology should not deny itself the privilege of learning from other lands. This brave defence of the internationalism of science (once a basic belief of communism, and indeed of all civilised men), sealed Vavilov's fate. He was befouled in the press. His posts were taken from him. Before the Nazi-Soviet Pact he was pronounced a "propagator of Nazi racist theories," and after the Stalin-Hitler Pact he was sent to the Siberian Arctic as a "British spy" (he was an honorary member of the British Royal Academy of Sciences), where he died under circumstances which the Soviet government refuses to clarify on inquiry from his foreign colleagues. To Vavilov's own brother, Sergei, has been given the painful and shameful task of delivering lyrical public addresses praising the "thoughtful care which the Soviet government and Comrade Stalin personally show for Soviet science and Soviet scientists." No less interesting is it to note that Lysenko's own brother, Pavel D. Lysenko, leading fuel and coke chemist, has fled from the "sheltering care of the Soviet government and Comrade Stalin personally," and now resides (since the summer of 1949) in America.

III

The purpose of Lysenko's address at the 1948 Summer Congress was to put an end to a theoretical controversy that had been raging for more than a decade, and to consummate a purge of all remaining experimental geneticists. Ever since 1931, when scientists had been ordered to give up their long-range investigations in favour of "work of immediate practical application," and to coordinate all their work into the framework

of the five-year plans, all of Russia's leading geneticists, and they were among the world's best, have been under steadily increasing fire. In 1933, geneticists Chetverikov, Ferry, Ephroimson, and Levitsky had disappeared from their laboratories to turn up later in forced labour camps. In 1936, Agol followed, and the impressive Medico-Genetical Institute was dissolved. All through the following decade, the casualty rate among Russian geneticists, and, along with that, the moral casualty rate (renunciation of doctrines, abandonment of experiments, forced confessions of "scientific and philosophical guilt") remained high. Yet, as a body, these devoted scientists continued their dedication to their difficult and complicated experiments and to scientific truth as they found it in their laboratories. And the Soviet government, a little distrustful of anything which could not readily be comprehended by the "greatest genius, scholar-scientist of all lands and all times" and could not readily be settled by ukase or politburo resolution, nevertheless, saw how much the world esteemed these men and their work, and continued to "tolerate" it, and to recognise by that tolerance that truth is a modest and elusive maiden that cannot always be taken by shock troops or storm attacks.

Not until 1939 did the geneticists of the entire world become aware of the fateful drama that was being enacted in Soviet science. In 1936, they had chosen Vavilov to preside over a congress of the geneticists of the world, which was to have been held in Moscow. But Moscow had suddenly cancelled the invitations, without explanation. After repeated postponements, it was set at last for Edinburgh for the summer of 1939. Papers by Vavilov and fifty other Russian scientists were received, yet, at the last moment, they did not appear. Vavilov's chair, as president, remained dramatically vacant throughout the sessions. Along with the fifty Russians, six out of twelve German experts had been "unable to attend."

IV

Even from his new vantage point as President of the

Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Lysenko proved unable to convince the serious scientists who made up the majority of the Academy members. The Party began to pack the Academy with a whole detachment of new members to outvote the old, if they could not outtalk them. Yet the real leaders of Soviet genetical experiment, though they could be bullied and "outvoted," still felt that no quotation from Marx or Engels or Michurin or Stalin, could quite take the place of experimental evidence and theoretical reasoning. No mere vote could convince them that Lysenko understood the genetical experiments he so brashly attacked. Nor convince them that, in experiments involving "artificial pollenisation of a castrated plant (to cite one instance), for their careful conveying of a single pollen grain of a single pure strain, and their washing of hand and glove and apparatus with alcohol before the next pollen grain was handled, one could substitute a mass of mixed and unpedigreed pollen grains, letting the female organ of the plant or its ovule "select" by "love marriage" (*brak po lyubvi*) "the best spermatozoid from the mixture which will produce the best adapted offspring." Nor that heredity could be usefully or scientifically defined as "the property of a living body to require definite conditions for its life and development and to respond in a definite way to definite conditions." Or that variation or mutation could be induced in offspring of a plant or animal at will by subjecting it "to external conditions which, to one extent or another, do not correspond to the natural requirements of the given organic form."⁵

The science of genetics, they knew, was very young, no older than the years of the present century. But they were not disposed to deprive their laboratories or their land of its growing body of important, ever more exact and refined, and overwhelmingly verified and verifiable conclusions concerning the chromosome and gene as the specialised substance that

⁵ *The Situation in Biological Science*, T. D. Lysenko and Others, pp. 35-37 and 122.

decisively determines hereditary characters, and mutations in the genes and chromosomes as the primary cause of variation from heredity. Nor to accept the dogma that the will of a fanatical plant-breeder, or the enactment of laws of Nature by an ignorant Politburo, could automatically make it possible to control heredity by ukase and "Bolshevik-tempo plan" in any desired direction, by some uncontrolled, undefined, and scientifically unverifiable changes in the environment, or random mixtures of impure strains, depending on the passion and wisdom of the ovum or spermatozoon to take the place of the intelligence and planful care of the experimenter.

V

It is impossible in a single article to do more than suggest some of the differences that have arisen in a field as technical as that of genetics, but the above examples, crude and strange as they sound, are actually taken from Lysenko's propositions and are not unrepresentative of the "theories" and methods which Lysenko has been advancing to replace the whole body of careful experiment and close reasoning by the geneticists of many lands, including those of the Soviet Union, a body of experiment and reasoning which has been growing steadily since Darwin first tried to put the rule-of-thumb methods and superstitions of plant and animal breeders on a scientific basis, since Mendel first made his experiments with the hereditary results of mating round and wrinkled peas, since Weismann first postulated the useful division into soma and chromosome, and since Morgan and others first began their famous experiments on the heredity of such easily and swiftly reproducing organisms as fruit flies.

Some other of Lysenko's views which are rejected by the geneticists of all lands may be schematically stated as follows :

1. Lamarck was right as against Darwin.
2. There is no special hereditary substance (chromosomes with their genes), but the whole plant or animal, by "assimilation and dissimilation" of its "external and internal environment" determines the character of the offspring. The

breeder has only to change the environment or assimilation slightly and he can produce variations or new species at will.

3. Hereditary changes in plants can be determined at will by grafting, the graft being able to change the heredity of the stock or the stock of the graft, according to which is made the "mentor".

4. At the present stage of genetical knowledge, "chance" and "fortuity" can be completely expelled from mutation or variation, and hereditary changes can be introduced, decreed, "planned" or "directed" in any direction desired by the breeder. Whoever does not recognise this is "asking favours from nature" instead of giving her orders. He is a bourgeois, reactionary, fascist, metaphysical, scholastic, foreign-minded element, agent of the enemies of the Soviet Union, saboteur and wrecker of Soviet agriculture. Whoever wants to work on these slow and difficult and painstaking genetical experiments is by that fact committing treason to Soviet agriculture and the Soviet people.

5. Statistics and mathematical reasoning are inapplicable in biological problems. (This last is particularly interesting since England's leading mathematical genetical expert, J. B. S. Haldane, as a scientist has helped develop the refining techniques of mathematics for the analysis of genetical experiments; but as Chairman of the Editorial Board of the *Daily Worker* he tries to defend Lysenko and deceive the British public as to the issues in the program against Soviet science. In England he can still thus serve the Communist party and the *Daily Worker* without giving up his mathematical genetics, but in Russia he would long ago have disappeared in the purges.)

6. The heredity of a plant or animal is but the accumulated assimilation of its past environment through many generations. The "conservatism" of the plant or animal (Lysenko's word for the tendency of offspring to resemble their parents) can easily be "shattered" by changes in the environment, and the new characters thus inculcated will breed true. "It is possible to force any form of plant or animal to change more quickly and in the direction desirable to man" (Emphasis by Lysenko.)

There is not one of the above assumptions, and Lysenko makes many more like them, which would be accepted by the geneticists of the other lands, or was freely accepted by those of Russia. All of them require precise definition, and could

easily be tested under conditions of scientific freedom, by the devising of a critical or crucial experiment with proper controls, and all of them could easily be proved, indeed have been proved, to be : a) too sweeping ; b) meaningless for both theory and practice ; or c) arrant nonsense—or all three at once. The interested reader can further study the issues involved, insofar as they are biological and not political, by reading the balanced scientific summary of Lysenko's views in Hudson and Rich : *The New Genetics in the Soviet Union*, or more polemical statements of the controversy for laymen in Langdon-Davis : *Russia Puts the Clock Back* ; Julian Huxley : *Heredity East and West* ; Conway Zirkle (Editor) : *The Death of a Science in Russia*. The latest bibliography on the subject is Morris C. Leikind : *The Genetics Controversy in the U.S.S.R.* (American Genetic Association.)

VI

The Summer Congress of 1948 was the hour of Lysenko's triumph. For in his possession that July day was a secret weapon, more powerful in Russia than the atomic bomb. In his opening address he hinted at it ominously :

So far I as President of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences have been wanting in the strength and ability to make proper use of my official position to create the conditions for the more extensive development of the Michurinite trend . . . and to restrict the scholastics and metaphysics of the opposite trend . . . We Michurinites must frankly admit that we have hitherto proved unable to make the most of the splendid possibilities created in our country by our party and the government for the complete exposure of Morganist metaphysics in its entirety, an importation from foreign reactionary enemy biology. It is now up to the Academy, to which a large number of Michurinites have just been appointed, to tackle this task . . .

Now that genetics had joined the Party, as the reader will note, it had developed its "ites" and its "isms," its unexamined dogmas, its orthodoxy and its heresy, its loyalties and its treasons, its political promotions and purges. Even as Stalin professed to inherit the mantle of Marx, Engels and Lenin, so

Lysenko professes an apostolic succession from Timiryazev, Williams, and Michurin, hence the term, Michurinites. (Michurin was the "Soviet Luther Burbank," another man with a "green thumb," an ardent plant-breeder who, like our Burbank had his hits and misses without ever getting to understand very much of the theoretical problems of the new science of genetics which is just beginning to reduce the thousand-years-old rule-of-thumb plant and animal breeding to a systematic, experimental science.) And just as Stalin has made a hate-word out of the names of his opponents—"Trotskyite-Zinovievite-Bukharinite-diversionist-wrecker-agent spy"—so the Michurinite-Lysenkoites now speak with "class hatred" and "nationalistic indignation" of the "unpatriotic fly-breeder, hostile, alien, reactionary, capitalist, Mendelite-Morganite-Weisman-nite genetics."

But it was not this abuse which was new or sent the chill of fear down the spines of the Russian scientists. It was the dread hint contained in the words, "Party, Government, and Comrade Stalin personally." Yet the majority of the geneticists still held their tongues or tried to avoid head-on collision or moral suicide, still believing that surely the government which they had served so loyally would not altogether abandon its uneasy neutrality before the issues of the laboratory.

Still cheated of his public triumph, Lysenko began his closing speech by hurling his secret weapon :

Before I pass to my concluding remarks, I consider it my duty to state the following. The question is asked in one of the notes handed up to me : What is the attitude of the Central Committee of the Party towards my report ? I answer : *The Central Committee of the Party has examined my report and approved it.*

At this point, Pravda reports :

With one impulse, all present rose to their feet and gave a stormy, prolonged ovation in honour of the Central Committee of the Party of Lenin-Stalin, in honour of the wise leader and teacher of the Soviet people, the greatest scientist of our epoch, Comrade Stalin.

And among those who had ^{to}perforce to rise to their feet and cheer with all their might were those who had just heard the sentence of doom and knew that their work had ended and all the issues of all the genetics experiments in all the laboratories of the world had been settled by a simple vote of a group of tough, ignorant politicians.

Now began the surrenders and desertions and self-humiliations, for now there was no longer any crevice in which science might hide in this totally coordinated society. Yet, as sometimes a dying bull rises to its forelegs and makes one more desperate thrust at the triumphant matador, so there was one more thrill reserved for these spectators of the gladiatorial death pangs. Old Nemchinov, Director of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, rose to his feet :

"Comrades, not being a biologist, I did not intend to speak I observe that there is no unity among our scientists on certain questions and I personally as director of the Timiryazev Academy see nothing bad in this. (*Commotion in the hall*).

"Both tendencies are allowed to teach at my Academy I have said, and I repeat it now that the chromosome theory of heredity has become part of the golden treasury of human knowledge, and I continue to hold that view."

A voice : "But you are not a biologist, how can you judge?"

"I am not a biologist, but I am in a position to verify this theory from the viewpoint of the science in which I do my research, namely, statistics. (*Commotion.*)

"And it also conforms to my ideas, but that is not the point."

Voice : "How is it not the point?"

"Let it be the point. I must then declare that I do not share the viewpoint of the comrades who assert that chromosomes have nothing to do with the mechanisms of heredity."
(*Commotion*)

Voice : "There are no such mechanisms."

"You think there are no mechanisms. But this mechanism can not only be seen, it can be stained and defined."

Voice : "Stains and statistics!"

"... I bear the moral and political responsibility for the line of the Timiryazev Academy... I consider it right, and as long as I am Director I will continue to pursue it... It is impermissible, in my opinion, to dismiss Professor Zhebrak who is a serious scientist... The course on genetics should present the views of Academician Lysenko, and the principles of the chromosome theory of heredity should likewise not be kept from the students..."

Thus in the nine pages of the stenogram devoted to the remarks of the venerable Nemchinov, every other paragraph is devoted to taunts, commotion, laughter, "a voice," known or unknown, of bullies sure they are playing the winning side. *Pravda* grimly commented:

The declarations of Comrades Zhukovsky, Alikhyan and Polyakov [three who "repented"] showed that in the minds of a number of yesterday's adherents of the Mendelite-Morganite tendency, a deep transformation was beginning... On such a background the position of such participants as V. S. Nemchinov exhibited themselves as especially unseemly (*nepriglyadni*).

It is not hard to conjecture what this brave man's fate will be.

VII

Purges in the Soviet Union invariably have the character of a chain reaction. Slowly the purge has been spreading in an ever widening wave, to the Institute of Cytology, Histology and Embryology, the Institute of Evolutionary Morphology, the Institute of Plant Physiology, the Direction of the Botanical Gardens... next to medicine. Then to the general Academy of Sciences, and each of the national academies. Next physicists went under fire, then economists, statisticians, mathematicians. Then the purge widened into a general onslaught on the very idea that there is an international community of science, until this land of erstwhile internationalism proclaimed the parochial nationalism of the human spirit and a mad isolationist chauvinism in every field: in culture and thought, in music and art, in drama and movies and circus and criticism and philology...

And each field, each group, each academy, as it began to suffer a purge, was forced at that very moment to write a hymn of thanksgiving and praise to the source of the evil, such as is unparalleled in the whole history of sycophancy, whether in the Tsarist empire or that of the mad Emperor Caligula.

The Academy of Sciences turns to You, our beloved Leader [*you* is capitalised as if they were referring to a deity, and the word for Leader is *Vozhd*, correlate of *Fuehrer* and *Duce*] with heartfelt gratitude for the attention and help which you are daily showing to Soviet science and the Soviet scientist. . . .

Glory to the Leader of the Soviet people, the coryphaeus of Advanced science, the Great Stalin ! . . .

We promise You, our beloved Leader, to correct in the shortest time the errors we have permitted, to reconstruct the whole of our scientific work . . . to struggle for Bolshevik partyness (*partinost*) in medicine, to root out the enemy, bourgeois ideology and blind servility before foreignness (*inostranshchina*) in our midst. . . ⁶

These two strange words, "partyness" and "foreignness," bring us to the heart of the attack by Soviet politicians on Soviet and on human thought. Modern science has been made possible by 1) freedom of inquiry ; 2) the agreed use of terms and of a general logical language capable of being tested anywhere by critical experiment, rather than being settled by appeal to authority, *argumentum ad hominem* or *opinionem* or *creditum* or non-logical emotion ; 3) the unity of science as a worldwide body of knowledge, based on international interchange and the recognition that every achievement is a cumulative growth built upon countless contributions by men in many lands. All three foundations have here been dynamited. Even if Lysenko were correct in all his biological claims and fantasies, still the decision of the issues by the Politburo or "Comrade Stalin personally" would be fatal to the further flourishing of science, for the dispute does not concern

⁶The three paragraphs above are taken respectively from the addresses of the All-Union Academy, the Lithuanian Academy and the All-Union Academy of Medical Sciences.

genes and chromosomes but the very functioning of the human spirit.

Twice in our generation have we watched an authoritarian state making this effort to "coordinate" all science into its totalitarian politics. In both cases there was a demand that science abandon its objectivity and specialised methods and "join the party," suiting methods, investigations, and conclusions to the requirements and dogmas of a police state. Both states set party commissars over scientists, or made cranks and pliable scientific politicians into the directors of scientific institutions. Both showed a profound incomprehension and suspicion of pure theoretical science, of the pursuit of truth for its own sake, wherever it might lead. Genetics, too, was a particular target of the Nazis because its free pursuit was incompatible with the state-dogma of the master race. In Russia it became a target because a Lysenko had convinced the all-powerful, all-directing and all-meddling, but not all-wise Politburo, and Comrade Stalin personally, that the "conservatism" of plant and animal heredity could be "shattered" according to plan or command, by quick, easy, simple, and carelessly random changes in the environment.

Both Hitler and Stalin have made the mistake of believing that pure theoretical science has no great practical significance in the immediate power struggles that are their central preoccupation. Yet even this scientific pursuit of truth for its own sake and not for the state's or the Leader's, often has startling practical results. It was the banished Einstein with his mass-energy conversion formula who called the attention of Roosevelt to what had been done in Germany and elsewhere in atomic research. And this country "happened" at the moment to have most of the world's best theoretical physicists in that remote and speculative field, among them Bohr, Fermi, Bethe, Szilard, von Neumann, victims of totalitarian persecution. Thus did the most "pure and remote," the most lonely "metaphysical and alien-Jewish" pursuit of truth for its own sake prove to have the most decisive "practical results."

So, too, when the Politburo and Stalin personally discovered "alien, hostile, diversionist wrecking in astronomy," (*Izvestia*, December 16, 1937), the galactic systems may have seemed infinitely remote from practical consequences for the total state and its power plans. Yet science itself was delivered a staggering blow in those purges.

Biology, because its by-products are vegetable and animal and industrial materials, obviously touches practical matters more closely. Stalin, who is now an authority on all things and whose authority in all things is unlimited, is convinced that Lysenko's get-rich-quick methods will deliver the goods. In vain did Vavilov, in 1939, warn that American genetics had produced a superior corn hybrid which enabled the American corn farmer to lead the world and which the Soviet Union would do well to imitate. That patriotic defense of American genetics for Russia's sake was the very heart of his crime.

Under such circumstances, the talents of the thinker must yield to those of the parrot, science wither into dogma and die of lack of intellectual freedom and theoretical courage. The new authoritarian religion of untouchable dogmas which are prior to investigation; the official state philosophy-religion to which all research must conform; the intuitive infallibility in all fields he cares to turn to on the part of *Vozhd* or Leader; the decision of subtle and difficult questions by a group of bureaucrat-politicians or a single absolute ruler; the purge of all those who would learn from, teach to, communicate with the scientists of other lands—these things in the long run must corrode the giant of brass until its feet crumble into dust. For in our modern world, even the power-purposes of great states can not in the long run be served except where the state knows enough to limit its interference and leave the human spirit free to seek the truth.

CARVAKA PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Dakshina Ranjan Shastri

It is well known to the students of Indian Philosophy that the original Sutra works of Carvaka Philosophy are now lost to us. It is also known that it is not always safe to rely exclusively for a certain doctrine or way of thought on its presentation by its avowed opponents. Opponents are seldom found to be free from prejudices and personal predilections, the absence of which is necessary for studying a problem dispassionately and for examining it on its own merits. Purva paksas or the opponent views are almost invariably presented in an inadequate and unsympathetic manner so that no sound judgment as to their proper philosophical worth can be easily formed. For this obvious reason the study of a system from its perverted presentation by its opponents has to be supplemented by method of sympathetic introspection.

The study of the Carvaka philosophy should, therefore, be attempted on the broad basis of sympathetic appreciation. We must always be prepared to distinguish between what a certain thinker says of himself and what others unfavourably disposed towards him attribute to him. For this obvious reason, utmost attempt is to be made to collect fragments of actual statements of the founders and propounders of Carvaka view. We have a vast and curious medley of utterances in the subsequent literature which were inspired by a spirit of positive hatred and depreciation. The views of the opponents are, therefore, to be studied in the light of consistency with the spirit of the fragments yet preserved of the actual words used by the earliest champions of the system.

It is not enough to know what views a particular thinker holds. We should try, if we have to build up a system of thought, to trace these views to a rational basis amenable to the understanding of man.

Among the ancient champions of the system the names of the following may be mentioned :—(i) Bṛhaspatilaukya of the Rig Veda ; (ii) The Lokayātikas, the Bārhaspatyas and Cārvākas ; (iii) Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of gods of the Epics and the Purānas ; (iv) Bṛhaspati, the author of the Sutra work on Cārvāka philosophy (mentioned and referred to by scholars like Mādhavācāryya) ; (v) Pāyāsi and (vi) Ajita Kesa Kambalin (mentioned and referred to in old Jain and Buddhistic works) ; (vii) Purandara (mentioned by scholars like Sāntarakṣita) ; and (viii) Bhaguri (mentioned by Patanjali, the author of Mahābhāṣya).

Probably, in its first stage the Cārvāka school was a mere tendency of opposition. Svabhāvavāda or Naturalism was next incorporated into it. Scattered accounts of Svabhāvavāda which was the most important doctrine connected with Indian Materialism in the early age, are available in very ancient literature. In its third stage, probably, an extreme form of Hedonism formed the most important feature of this school. In this stage this school preached—“Eat, drink and be merry for to-morrow we may die.” The reaction to this extreme form of licentiousness was detrimental to the vitality of this school. It began to recoil towards spiritualism. In its fourth stage, it probably came to be at one with the Buddhists and Jains, the Gotamakas, the Sramanas, the Tittias or Tirthankaras in opposing the Vedicists and got the common designation Nāstika. The school is popularly known as Bārhaspatya, Lōkāyata, Cārvāka or Nāstika. The main tenets of the school recorded in old and new, ancient and later, Brahmanical, Buddhistic and Jaina works are—(1) the Svabhāvavāda or Uchedavāda (Annihilationism harmoniously combined with Naturalism) ; (2) the Dehātmavāda or the theory of the identification of the self with human body, senses, vital force and mind ; (3) Pratyakṣaika Pramānavāda or denial of all evidences except perception, probability and partial inference; (4) Vedāpauruṣeyatva Khandana or the rejection of the doctrine of revelation of the Vedas and of authority as a source of

knowledge and revolt against Vedic study and performance of sacrifices ; (5) Sukhavāda or Hedonism—pleasure, the sole end of life's activities; (6) Rājā or the king as the supreme lord present in his corporeal form ; (7) Bhūta Chatuṣṭayavāda and Bhūta Chaitanyavāda or the theory of the origin of intelligence from the chemical mixture of four elements and the rejection of Akāśa as an element ; and (8) Rejection of God, Rebirth, Retribution and other world. This shows that the materialists had their own (1) Metaphysics, and Cosmology, (2) Epistemology, (3) Religious, Social and Political views, and (4) and Ethics.

Metaphysics and Cosmology.

In reply to the 'why' of an event the materialists of India deny the principle of causality and assert the supremacy of the inherent nature of a thing. This is known as Svabhāva vāda. It was the most important doctrine connected with Indian materialism in the early age. Scattered accounts of this doctrine are available in ancient literature. Sitānka, Bhaṭṭotpala, Mādhava and others speak of this doctrine as the view of the Cārvāka. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasamgraha* speaks of two kinds of Svabhāvavāda—(1) Extreme and (2) Moderate. The extreme form of Svabhāvavāda repudiates the possibility of discovering the cause of a thing at the very outset of enquiry and sets up in explanation of the why of an event or product the doctrine of Svabhāva. The moderate form of Svabhāvavāda allows causal analysis as possible within certain limits, but not to be carried very far. At the last stage, however, where no adequate explanation is forthcoming, an appeal must be made to the inherent nature of a thing which is Svabhāva.

The rejection of the causal principle forms the most important feature of the extreme form of Svabhāvavāda. Neither perception nor inference is an evidence in support of its existence. For, mere perception of two events is not sufficient to establish a causal relation between them. To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the character of a

true cause it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability and relevancy involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at. Inference itself having no evidentiary value can not be a means to the ascertainment of causality.

The moderate view maintains that even the doctrine of causality fails to explain the ultimate principles; it is then simpler to assume at the very start that causes known or unknown are all superfluous. Varieties and inequalities remain after all unexplained facts, and no amount of analysis will ever furnish us with the right solution. The only reasonable conclusion, therefore, in such cases, is to say that it is the nature of the thing to happen at such and such a time and that is all. The only law here is the law of Svabhāva.

The Doctrine of the Four Elements

The Cārvākas believed that Ākāśa was not an element at all; it was a void, an absence of Ābarana. Only the four elements in their atomic condition were held to be the basic principles in creation. The external world, the sense organs as well as the physical organisms were supposed to be the products of these primordial types of matter. But how this production comes to be possible is a question left unexplained. All kinds of causes, known or unknown, being rejected, and the guidance of an Eternal Intelligence being regarded as superfluous, the materialist is left with the only alternative open to him, viz. to say that this production results from the fortuitious concourse of the blind constitutive particles of matter. Nothing further can be said on this head. It would be illegitimate, so it is urged, to demand an explanation where no explanation can be given.

To the materialists life and consciousness are practically equivalent, and are both believed to originate from matter. Sentience and the phenomena of mental life are material properties and need not imply a distinct immaterial substance as the self. It is admittedly true that consciousness is not observed to inhere in the particles of matter, either severally or even collectively, but this is no argument against the

fact that when these particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner not yet scientifically explicable they are found to show signs of life. This particular collection of the atoms results in the formation of the organism. This is the self.

That consciousness is a function of the body may be proved by a process of logical demonstration, e. g. by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference (*Anvaya & Vyatireka.*) Thus we find by observation, and there is no instance to the contrary, that for the manifestation of consciousness body is an inalienable factor, and that discarnate consciousness is not possible. This shows that between organisms and consciousness there exists some necessary bond, viz. that of causality. And universal experience as expressed in judgments like "I feel hot, I feel tired" seems to vouch for the truth of this view. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But it would not be so were not the body the substrate of consciousness. Apart from this there is another proof in favour of the causal relation between matter and consciousness. This is afforded by the description in medical literature of the properties of particular preparations of food and drink conducive to the development of the intellectual powers.

The following objections are raised by the opponents against the theory of Dehātmavāda or the indentification of the body with the self :

(I) First, since the body is declared to be the agent of all actions it should, on grounds of logical consistency, be held morally responsible for their natural consequences. But this is scarcely possible. (a) The particles which go to the formation of the body are always in a state of flux, so that the body which performs an action at one moment does no longer persist at the next to feel its reaction. (b) And even if this incessant fluctuation be not admitted, it is nevertheless undeniable that the body suffers change : the

bodies in two different periods of life are different from each other, for otherwise they could not have different sizes. The appearance of a different size implies that the former size is destroyed which is possible only when the subject in which it resides (*Purbasarira*) is also destroyed. (II) Secondly, the material theory is incompetent to account for the facts of memory and recognition (*Smṛiti & Pratyabhijñā*) Necessity of thought demands that memory and the original experience (*Anubhava*) which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject, but this identity of reference would not be possible if the subject were not fundamentally an unchangeable unity.

To these alleged objections the Cārvāka replies that they are more apparent than real. For the second difficulty may be easily got over by supposing that the traces (*Samskāra*) left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted (*Samkrāma*) from the prior moment to the succeeding moment, i.e., from the material cause down to its direct product.

As to how this may be possible one may consider, the Cārvāka says, the analogous instance of the transference of of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. Here the only condition observed to be necessary is the presence of a relation between the two objects. And between a cause and its effect—the case under consideration—such a relation does undoubtedly exist. The unity of reference may also be ensured by the admission that the impressions, though transferrable, do pertain to, i. e. are preserved and revived (reproduced) in, a single line or causal series.

As regards the first point, the position of the Cārvāka prevents him from recognising its cogency as an objection. An inveterate foe of the doctrine of Adīḥsta, he finds no justice, natural or moral, in the government of the universe, so that the very question of the necessity of logically unifying *karma* with its *phala* does not appear to him as a problem calling for solution. Bhoga—the experience of pleasure and

pain—is not determined by a previous *karma*, but comes by chance over which there is no control. This being so, the subjective unity sought for to explain the synthesis of cause and effect needs hardly a ground for establishment,

But even if it were needed we could find it in the unity of the organism. Recognition testifies to the identity of the body through all its changing states; and this recognition can not be pronounced false as in the case of nails pared and renewed, for there is no chance here, as in the example cited, of the body being once destroyed and then substituted by a fresh one of a similar kind. The fact of recognition which is brought forward as subversive of the alleged momentariness of an object appearing one in consciousness is fatal also to the mutability of the organism.

Besides the above, there are three more views of the materialist school according as the self is identified with (1) the sense organs, with (2) the principle of life, or with (3) mind.

The advocates of the first view set forth that the senses are really the intra-organic conscious agents. This view is based on the fact that consciousness and bodily movements follow from the initiation of the senses and that the judgments expressed in "I am blind" showing the identity of the self with the sense organs are universally accepted as valid.

The second view consists in maintaining that as the senses depend for existence and operation on the vital principle this principle itself is really the source of intelligence. The fact that the presence and absence of the senses involve the origin and non-origin of knowledge does not necessarily point to their agency; the fact may be equally explained on the hypothesis of their instrumentation. Moreover, if agency were to be assigned to the senses there would ensure an insurmountable difficulty in consequence of the absence of organs about the origin of action. Again, the question arises which of the senses is the agent—each of them severally or all combined? In the former case, is the agency simultaneous or successive? Now it is absurd to think that the agency belongs

to all the senses indifferently, for the object of one sense never becomes cognisable to another and the senses are never known to work concurrently in producing an effect. The alternative of simultaneity is of course out of the question. As to the remaining contention that each of the senses may be an agent in succession, the reply is : if each of these be an absolutely independent agent, as asserted, it is likely that in case of conflicting movements due to varied resolutions the balance of the whole bodily organism should be upset, but this is never known to happen. But if the senses were subservient in their function to the guidance of a Superior Entity it would be reasonable to hold this latter to be the true self rather than the senses. This Entity is Prāna, the principle of persistence during sleep and wakeful condition alike.

Finally we may mention the view which claims that consciousness is a quality of the mind. The other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense-knowledge, but it is mind alone that introduces into such knowledge the element of determinateness. For this reason as well as because it controls by virtue of its power of volition the outer organs and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be absent, the mind is the true self.

Epistemology

The Cārvāka admits that perception is the only way of gaining right knowledge of things. Inference is not a valid proof in, as much as the universal and necessary relation on which it is based can not be discovered. In other words, it is practically impossible and logically incongruous to ascend, merely by a process of multiplication of individual instances, from limited sense experience to a knowledge of universal truths. Bare enumeration of facts, however far it may be carried, hardly suffices to arrive at the element of Necessity involved in generalisations. Perception is unable to establish the truth of Induction. For though perception may tell us that this particular A is related to this particular B, this knowledge would hardly justify its extension in the form of "All A's are related

to B's". What right have we, with the limited faculties at our command, to jump into the unknown and assert a categorical universal proposition? Moreover, the assertion of such a proposition would presuppose the elimination of all accidental factors. But how is the absence of these factors to be made known? Perception would not avail where these are by nature supersensuous, and the validity of inference as a proof has been already controverted. There would thus cling an abiding suspicion, not removable by any means accessible to man, as to the truth of every universal judgment.

Thus, according to the Cārvāka, perception being the only criterion of existence whatever is not perceived is held to have no existence at all. This view naturally is open to scepticism. But for practical purposes probability alone is sufficient. Thus at the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the probability of fire and not of its certainty and this is enough for all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume the existence of distinct kind of a evidence, called Inference.

Religion

Adṛṣṭa or even the principle of physical causality being denied, it is idle to argue that God is the moral governor of the world adjusting the *karmas* of the Jivas, or that He is the universal agent—the author of the contingent phenomena. And to one to whom the Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility it is equally vain to attempt showing that from them the existence of an Omniscient spirit could be inferred. And, last but not least, Inference itself is denied. The senses do not confessedly reach Him and verbal testimony falls under the category of Inference. There is no means of ascertaining therefore that an all knowing, all powerful spirit exists. Nature and not God is the watch word of the school. The various phenomena of the world are produced spontaneously from the nature of things and there is no supernatural creator—God. if there be a God all knowing, compassionate and of fruitful speech, why does He not by using a single word

of form, nor by inference, since there can be no universal proposition or example, God having been presupposed to be a single or unitary existence. The Ārvaaka system of philosophy differs from those who maintain that God metes out the fruits of good and evil actions. That God is the judge does not stand to reason, because in that case partiality and cruelty on the part of God will be indispensable. If God visits us with the evil consequences of our sins, He becomes our enemy for nothing. Therefore it is better not to have a God than to have a cruel or partial God who is our enemy. There is no such thing as God the Supreme author and Governor of the world, but the only God is the earthly king, the ruler of a state, the arbitrator of right and wrong in society.

The Lokāyata System does not accept the authority of the Vedas, the Purānas and the Smṛitis ; it also rejects all the distinctions of caste and creed. The blood of the red hue runs through the veins of a Brāhmin as well as of a Chandāla. Their appearances are not different.

Ethics

Almost all the philosophical schools in India are pessimists. They hold with Buddha that evil is the very essence of existence, that this world is a vale of tears and there is nowhere true peace and secure happiness. But the materialists are optimistic. They do not hold the view that the world is full of misery. Let us enjoy pleasure and pleasure alone, for pleasure is the only thing which is true and good. The only reasonable end of man is enjoyment. But we see that pleasure is never pure, never free from pain. How then can pleasure be the highest end of life ? To this the reply of the materialists is that because there is pain and because pleasure is mixed with pain should we therefore reject our life ? Sould we fling away sheaves of paddy, rich with the finest whitegrains, because they are covered with husk and dust ? 'Pleasure is the good'—is the cry of nature. The animals know no other principle of action than pleasure. The children are sensitive to pleasure only. The grown up man, the apparently

grave and sober, all seek and pursue pleasure; the virtuous man enjoys pleasure in the cultivation of virtue and even those who refute that pleasure is the object of desire, find pleasure in such refutation. Therefore pleasure is the highest good or *summum bonum* of human life. We can not say that sensual pleasure can not be called the end of man as it is always mixed with a kind of pain. Because, it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with the scales and bones and having taken as many as he wants, desists. It is not therefore, for us, through fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it, nor do they refuse to set cooking pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast. Should we refrain from plucking lotuses as there are thorns in them? Shall we not take fish because there are spines and scales? Should we exclude rice from our meal for the trouble it will give in husking? Who will not soothe his mind and body in ambrosial moon-light, though there are spots in the moon? Shall we not enjoy the pleasant breeze of summer, because there is slight dust in it? Shall we abstain from sowing in a ploughed land watered by rain, lest the water on its surface should become muddy? Why shall we not prepare food for fear of beggars?

Unmixed happiness is not available in this world; yet we cannot overlook the least of it. In worldly life we laugh at the weal of our dear ones and weep in their woes. If the laughing face of a son or the lustre of a delightful daughter can impart to us celestial happiness, why will not their death or some fatal disease find us overwhelmed with grief? If the presence of a beloved wife makes a heaven of this earth, her departure will surely leave us in eternal darkness. Thus

what gives you pleasure now may cause your pain another time. We cannot totally get rid of mischief even when we have no tie of affection in this wide world. The heart of a man who has none to call his own in this populous world, is but depressed, full of misery and dry as a desert. He must not be a common man, who even in such conditions can maintain peace of mind. But even a man who is quite aloof from all social ties cannot escape occasional mishaps, viz., disease and accidents. The sudden attack of an ailment can make a total change in our happy state of affairs. And health takes away pleasure with it. The loveliness of moonlit night, the cool breeze of day break, the beauty and scent of flowers, the melodious songs of sweet birds—none of these can please a man when he is not in health. You may remain jolly even without a friend, but bodily pain is sure to render you feeble and restless. Besides, we are in terrible distress by occasional appearance of cyclone and thunderstorm, sudden attack of a ferocious animal, or the undesirable occurrence of famine, drought or deluge. Still we must say that this world of ours is not full of mischiefs. True, there is sorrow everywhere ; in king's palaces and beggar's huts, in the high souls of the learned and the superstitious minds of the illiterate, in the beautiful mansions of the rich and the dark caves of the sages. Sleep in your house or walk outside, enter the temple or hide in the forest, run to the burial place or wherever you like,—nowhere will you escape misery and pain. Still we must say that the amount of pleasure in this world is greater than that of pain. If such be not the case, why do people so earnestly desire to live and become frightened at the name of death ? Tell them to renounce this world, and they will at once exhibit their utter reluctance. For, how is it possible to bid adieu to this pleasant world which is the abode of joys and luxuries ? How delicate are the green leaves of the spring, and how lovely is the rose ! Is not the sunshine a glorious thing ?

If sorrows were more frequent than delight, men would have escaped misery by suicide. Most men are unwilling to

die ; and hence it is evident that in human life pleasure has a larger sphere of influence than pain.

It is also to be remembered that happiness is at its best only when experienced by contrast with misery; and hence, it may be said that existence of mischief in the world has a certain necessity. Blessings of rest can be fully enjoyed only after hard labour. The ever healthy man cannot comprehend the ease and comfort of having a sound body and a sound mind. If you are to receive full satisfaction in your diet, first suffer from hunger. The more you sustain the agony of thirst, the greater will be your delight in drinking cold water. You fear a dreadful night with heavy rainfall and a terrific thunderstorm, when the dark and dense clouds have covered the whole sky, and all the trees and houses have been blown away by the furious wind. But after such long hours, when the sun with celestial beauty appears again in the eastern horizon will he not look more pleasant than ever? The same thing happens when two lovers meet after long separation. What pleases you now will be disgusting after constant use. Even a palatable food cannot but bring satiety if we are to take it daily. Variety of taste is needed ; pungent, astringent and bitter flavours should be interchanged with sweet .

With these arguments the Cārvākas have tried to show that pleasure and not pain is the very essence of existence, that this world is not a vale of tears, that we should equally embrace pleasure and pain, sorrow and happiness, peace and troubles. Life according to the Cārvākas therefore, is essentially worth living. Scientific researches have not yet been successful in proving the existence of a soul different from the body.

PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM

M. N. Roy.

The problem raised by the new Quantum Theory is how to reconcile the concept of causal relations with the observed uncertainty of electronic movements. Heisenberg states the position as follows :

“The resolution of the paradoxes of atomic physics can be accomplished only by further renunciation of old and cherished ideas. Most important of these is the idea that natural phenomena obey exact laws—the principle of causality. In fact, our ordinary description of nature, and the idea of exact law, rest on the assumption that it is possible to observe the phenomena without appreciably influencing them. To coordinate a definite cause to a definite effect has sense only when both can be observed without introducing a foreign element disturbing their inter-relation. The law of causality, because of its very nature, can only be defined for isolated systems, and in atomic physics even approximately isolated systems cannot be observed.....Second among the requirements traditionally imposed upon physical theory is that it must explain all phenomena as relations between objects existing in space and time. Now, as a geometric or kinematic description of a process implies observation, it follows that such a description of atomic processes necessarily precludes the exact validity of the law of causality.....The situation is clearly reflected in the theory which has been developed. There exists a body of exact mathematical laws, but these cannot be interpreted as expressing simple relationships between objects existing in space and time. The observable predictions of this theory can be approximately described in such terms, but not uniquely—the wave and corpuscular pictures both possess the same approximate validity.” (Heisenberg, *The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory* pp. 62-64).

Though in the beginning the statement appears to be a frontal attack upon causality, its significance evidently is far from being so very iconoclastic.

The light used for observing electrons disturbs their movement. We want to fix the position of an electron at a given moment. But as soon as the light-ray employed for the purpose impinges on it, the electron is knocked off its position. As Eddington puts it, an electron is never there where it is observed. A better way of putting it would be : an electron is never there where it should be to oblige us, for our convenience. But why do we expect it to be at the place it is not ? The method of studying electronic movement is not purely empirical ; therefore, its epistemological result cannot be invalidated by a purely empirical difficulty such as the disturbance of the object of observation by the instrument used for the purpose. The fact that a thermometer always disturbs the temperature it measures does not reduce the reliability of the result. Why should a similar methodological difficulty in the case of observing electronic movement be considered to have far-reaching epistemological (and even ontological) significance ?

As a matter of fact, the difficulty of observation, from which the Principle of Uncertainty is reduced, is rather ideal than actually experienced. We seldom focus a powerful ultra-microscope on one single electron and observe it being knocked off. The difficulty is realised theoretically. But the fact is that our knowledge of sub-atomic processes is not empirical ; it is mathematical—deductive ; and causal relations underlying those processes can be mathematically formulated. As Heisenberg tells us, "there exists a body of *exact* mathematical laws" which hold good for quantum phenomena. What then is the difficulty ? Causal relations of sub-atomic entities could not be mathematically stated if they did not exist physically. Conversely, quantum processes would not conform with mathematically formulated laws if these were not deduced from empirical data.

The difficulty is that the mathematically formulated laws of Quantum Physics cannot be interpreted as "expressing simple relationships between objects existing in space and time ;" in other words, the mathematical laws of atomic physics do not meet the requirement "traditionally imposed upon a physical theory, that it must explain all phenomena as relations between objects existing in space and time." The Theory of Relativity enables us to dispense with this requirement, which loses all force when it is known that space and time are not independent meta-physical categories but dimensions of matter, functions of the physical being.

Phenomena cannot be explained as relations between objects existing in space and time because *objects do not exist in space and time*. The difficulty, which in reality is a deeper insight into the structure of things, is not felt so acutely in large-scale phenomena because there the old method of description in terms of space and time can be *formally* retained. In dealing with microcosmic phenomena, even a formal distinction between material bodies and "empty" space is not possible. At the foundation of its structure, matter is much more evenly distributed than in the world of large-scale physical phenomena. Consequently, there it is actually found to be coincident with space ; in other words, space, even as a formal conventional methodological category, disappears. The concept of location in space thus becomes meaningless. Time being interwoven with space, the concept of duration also becomes equally meaningless. In such a situation, relations naturally cease to be spatial and temporal ; they become functional, and therefore can be described only in mathematical terms - as relations between sets of variables which for the technique of mathematical reasoning can be regarded as mere symbols. But the technique apart, symbols do symbolise something. So, the purest mathematical laws describe physical relations. In a state of flux, relations are reversible ; therefore, *logically*, they are called mathematical instead of causal relations. But in the last analysis, the distinction is rather verbal than real. **The relation is physical ; that is the point.**

The next question is : Does the mathematical description of functional relations rule out causality ? The mathematical laws of Quantum physics are exact laws. Exact, in what sense ? Prediction is the acid test of the exactitude of any physical law. There would be no sense in the statement that the mathematical laws of Quantum Physics exactly describe functional relations of microcosmic phenomena, unless they were experimentally verifiable. Otherwise, how could we assert that the description is exact ? That is, it corresponds with the state of the situation described ? They are verifiable ; but predictions, if made in terms of space and time, can be only approximately true. In other words, they can be made only statistically, as matters of probability. That is the basis of the assertion that "atomic processes necessarily preclude the exact validity of the laws of causality." Causal relation is there; only, in the absence of discrete particles of matter, it cannot be traced as connecting isolated things or events.

The electron marks the border-line between two states of matter—the differentiated, and the all-pervading flux. In the former, where the electron appears as a particle systems can be logically isolated, and relations stated causally in terms of space and time. Each electron can be studied as an isolated system. In the latter case, the electron is a group of concentric waves on the sea of vibratory radiation (energy), and as such can be anywhere at any moment. That is to say, space and time lose significance. Physical space is identical with the extension of material bodies, and is measured by the distance between them. Physical time is the integration of intervals between successive stages of material bodies. When bodies and intervals disappear, any particular region of the continuous flux of electric vibration is regarded as a "field of probability". Wave-mechanics describes the field in terms of pure mathematics. The mathematical laws deduced from such abstract entities, as vectors and potentials of the field, connect the two states of matter over the border-line drawn by the dual composition of the electron. An electron on this side of the line cannot be connected with any particular point of the field on the other

side, because there is no particular point. The electron may be occupying the whole space (to use the term formally) at any moment. Therefore, the relation over the border-line can be traced only statistically, in terms of probability. The laws of wave-mechanics predict at which point of a definite region an electron, which may be spread over the whole region, is most likely to appear. This prediction is possible because there is necessary relation between the two states of the electron. This fact cannot be obscured by the impossibility of defining the relation exactly in terms of cause and effect. The necessity of the relation is demonstrated by the fact that every time an electron appears on the boundary line, it is exactly the same physical entity—quantitatively as well as qualitatively. And this invariance indicates that the world on the other side of the border-line is not a chaos. It is a flux of primordial undifferentiated matter, with its own laws.

In a sense, those laws are not causal laws. For, they do not connect events in a process of becoming, but describe the functions of being. This is, however, a purely abstract distinction. Absolute being can have no function. And inasmuch as it is not absolute, being is becoming. Being, which does not involve becoming, is pure nothing. Primordial being, therefore, is not timeless, that is to say, static. It is pregnant with the germs of becoming. Time implies change; change is intrinsic in relation; and causality is the most fundamental form of intrinsic relation. Conversely, intrinsic relation is causal, because it involves necessity and identity, which are the essence of causal relation. In order to differentiate itself into the articulate processes of becoming, the primordial being is constantly undergoing preliminary internal changes. These may be mathematically described as functions. But mathematically described functions provide the ground for physical predictions, no matter how exact, because one set of them can be derived from another. This would not be possible if there was no necessary connection between the structural changes of the field described as functions. So, the mathematical laws of Quantum Physics are causal.

laws. That is understood; otherwise, wave-mechanics would be a meaningless conception.

A mechanical system is a system governed by its own laws; it is self-determined, its own legislator. And causality lies at the bottom of the idea of law. Physical laws are invariant relations. Only necessary relations are really invariant. Necessity results from underlying identity; and identity is the essence of causality. So, where there are laws, there is causality. If sub-atomic phenomena can be described by exact mathematical laws they cannot be indeterminate. Indeterminacy and law are mutually exclusive conceptions. Uncertainty is not indeterminacy. Therefore, it does not prove absence of causality. On the contrary, wave-mechanics, notwithstanding its statistical method, implicitly bears testimony for causal relations in the sub-atomic electronic processes. And philosophy must find out what is implicit in the theories and methods of particular sciences.

Since electrons, because of their peculiar structure, can not be studied as isolated systems, physical processes involving them must be explained in terms of the law of the crowd, instead of the law of the individual. The laws of Quantum Physics are statistical. They do not trace particular effects to particular causes. They connect one state of continuous existence (field) with another. Probability is the law of the crowd. It is collective causality. Each movement of everybody in a crowd is determined by the collective movement of the crowd. Therefore, it is not possible to say that such a step on the part of an individual will be necessarily followed by another of a definite nature. But, on the other hand, the trend of the collective movement of the crowd is determined by the tendency of its individual constituents. It is not possible to predict where one particular electron will be at a moment, even of very near future. Because, in the interval, it may cease to be a particle; and if a particle occupies the indicated position at the predicted moment, it cannot be identified with the one about which the prediction was made. For all we know, it may be a different electron, or it

may be the same. But there is no uncertainty about a stream of electrons. How is that possible, if electrons are really lawless individuals? The statistical laws of the crowd testify to the determinateness of individual movements. The impossibility of tracing whole paths of each individual singly does not obscure this logical connection. Probability mathematically proves the existence of causality where it cannot be traced empirically.

As a matter of fact, as long as electrons are treated as particles, the statistical method is no more negative of strict causality than when it was employed in classical physics. The kinetic theory of heat, for example, is statistical. Such a fundamental law as the Second Law of Thermo-Dynamics is also a statistical law. In short, statistical method is not an innovation; and it has always been regarded as providing a sound logical foundation for determinism. There is no reason to assume that it forfeits the logical validity in Quantum Physics. Heisenberg's Quantum statistics actually give as full an explanation of the problem of spectroscopy as given by the classical and strictly determinist theory; indeed, a better one, as closer examination proves.

There is thus no question of the conception of the cosmos having been replaced by that of a chaos of arbitrary miracles. Even the fundamental laws of wave-mechanics, that is, the treatment of electrons as waves, can be stated in Lagrangian equations used for the strict causal laws of classical physics. They were in fact originally so stated by Schroedinger on the analogy of the wave theory of light. Yet, Schroedinger's laws are statistical. Later on, it was shown by Born that Schroedinger's equations could be interpreted as describing "a field of probability", instead of charge-density obeying the mechanical laws of the classical electrodynamics. Probability, however, has a continuously variable numerical value and therefore fits better in the scheme of a differential equation. Schroedinger accepted the probabilistic interpretation of his law. But the fact remains that it is a causal law; and this fact clearly indicates that the

concepts of causality and probability are not mutually exclusive, but essentially complementary. The self-same relation, which is an ontological category, is differently described in different situations. Probability is the law of causality statistically traced.

If causal relations were really absent in sub-atomic processes described by wave-mechanics, then the fundamental law of wave-propagation could not be formulated as Schroedinger originally did. It cannot be explained away by conventionalism. If the law is a mere covention, then it is an extraordinary coincidence that either interpretation of it should be experimentally found to correspond with the same physical process. Then, one need not be so rigorously realistic in formulating a conventional law. In the original form, the law assumed some "elementary indefinables" (the field scalar), which appear as symbols representing variables in the probabilistic interpretation. The new interpretation emphasises the empirical basis of the law. The subject of treatment is certain processes. These can be described as strictly causal if some *a priori* assumption is made about their physical structure. To be rigidly empirical, or more correctly, logical, the law should be interpreted as describing the probability of definite physical occurrences. Obviously, the distinction is logical, methodological; not ontological.

Probability is not a denial of causality; it is the statistical method of stating collective causal relations. The word probability itself indicates the nature of the concept it stands for. The Latin root, *probare*, means to prove. Probability proves causal relations. When the evidence is overwhelming, or it is believed to be so, at any rate, one event is judged to be the effect of another. Such relatively conclusive evidence is available only in the case of isolated processes, that is to say, where contingent factors can be disregarded as irrelevant. The degree of the certainty of judgment is the less, the greater the number of factors involved in the particular process. When the number is

so very large as to defy counting, that is, verging on infinity, except in the symbolic terms of pure mathematics, no strictly causal judgment can be made. Nevertheless, the implication of the alternative statistical judgment is that there is more proof in favour of, than against, causal relation. This is the position in cases of the barest probability, where it is just a little more than half. Usually, statistical judgments are based upon the highest degree of probability. So, the real difference between strictly causal and statistical judgments is quantitative, not qualitative. When we say that such and such a result is the most likely to follow a transaction involving a multiplicity of factors, we simply admit the impossibility of treating each of the factors separately. But the very fact that one result is judged to be more likely than others implies tacit recognition of necessity involved in the whole transaction. Unless the factors were inter-connected, and consequently mutually influenced, no such judgment would be possible. And mutually influenced factors are causally connected. It is evident how statistical judgments presuppose causal relation, how probability proves causality.

Philosophically, the principle of causality means that the alternative of the teleological notion of order is not chaos. The physical Universe is a system governed by laws inherent in itself. The question essentially is: Does probability imply lawlessness? It does not. Probability itself is law. So, philosophically, the concept of causality would not be affected in the least, should all laws of science turn out to be statistical.

The fundamental idea is that of law. It is immaterial how the laws are discovered, described and demonstrated. As a matter of fact, statistical demonstration is more conclusive, because it leaves no room for doubt about general validity. And demonstration distinguishes discovery from invention proves that laws of science are not arbitrary conventions, but objective realities.

The philosophical consequence of Quantum Physics as regards the principle of causality, therefore, is to be finally

determined by the answer to the question : Do microcosmic phenomena reveal a state of chaos ? There is no ambiguity about the answer. It is clearly and categorically in the negative. Quantum Physics depicts a mechanistic picture of the world in terms of waves instead of particles ; indeed, both are retained in the new picture.

The next question is : Does the impossibility of ascertaining efficient causes of microcosmic phenomena, that is to say, of connecting isolated events as cause and effect, warrant any revival of the teleological explanation of the regularity of physical processes ? The answer, again, is decisively in the negative. The very concept of probability precludes predestination which is the essence of the teleological view. Predestination is absolute negation of freedom ; prediction of events in terms of probability, on the contrary, represents recognition of the reality of emergent factors. Every single event throughout the entire history of the physical Universe is not determined by the initial condition. The whole process is governed by laws ; but the development is towards a greater and greater complexity. The laws themselves, being inherent in the process, are modified in course of the development. The physical Universe is not a gigantic clock. It is a self-contained, self-operative, self-adjusting, *growth*. At any given moment, it is qualitatively more than in the past. Emergent physical values influence its operation. At each given moment, it is a self-determined system, but is never predetermined by the initial condition, nor is any one state completely determined by the next-preceding in point of time. That is the essence of physical determinism. Modern physical research reveals this essence more clearly than ever.

Scientific predictions prove the determinateness of physical processes. The view that the physical Universe is ultimately undetermined is contradicated by the history of science. The advocates of this view cannot explain the actually observed, experimentally tested, pragmatically established, evidence for determinism. The evidence is given by the whole history of scientific development. If physical processes

were not determined, that is to say, if there were no law about them, no scientific discovery could ever be possible. It is no explanation to say that the so-called exact laws of science are laws of average. The point is that *they are laws*; and the idea of law presupposes invariant relations. In a chaos, there can be no law whatsoever. For the establishment of the principle of determinism, it is utterly irrelevant that relations described as laws may not be always and everywhere traced between single individual entities. The fact is that the determinateness of physical processes is proved by predictions. It is immaterial if the laws which make the predictions possible are not exact, but laws of average.

The history of science does not leave any room for *reasonably* doubting the determinateness of large-scale processes. Now, all these processes can be analysed down to electronic movements. If these were really undetermined, no prediction could be made about physical events even with any degree of probability. Anything may happen any time. We should not be surprised if one evening the sun, instead of sinking below the western horizon, started moving upwards. The sun never indicates the slightest inclination to such eccentricity. On the contrary, repeatedly it is eclipsed exactly at the time and place predicted years ahead. A definite quantity of hydrogen mixed with a definite quantity of oxygen never goes up in a flame; the mixture is always a liquid substance called water. A ball shot out of a gun never flies backwards over the head of the gunner. It always follows a path through the space, the curvature and length of which are predicted with mathematical exactitude. No natural phenomenon is more uncertain than weather. Even that is predicted more or less approximately. Briefly, throughout the entire expanse of the Universe accessible to scientific survey, not a single physical process is ever found to behave erratically, as everything should if electronic movement were undetermined.

The conclusion is obvious. Unless we are prepared to discard scientific knowledge and rationalist thought as illusions,

it cannot be logically denied that microcosmic processes are also determined, although laws governing them cannot be formulated in the form of the exact laws of classical physics. But now we know that all physical laws, in the last analysis, are statistical laws. They are exact only in the abstract sense, in relation to isolated processes. This realisation of the fact that exact laws of science are exact only in the limited, relative sense, however, does not provide any ground for questioning the objective validity of scientific knowledge. Whether gravitation, for example, is an exact law or a law of average, the fact remains that heavenly bodies move according to it ; that is to say, their movements are determined. Therefore, the statistical form of the laws of Quantum Mechanics does not warrant the assumption that microcosmic processes are indeterminate. Nor is it a matter of argument. The decisive test is prediction. The question is : Are predictions possible on the basis of the laws of Quantum Physics ? Are predictions about microcosmic processes as approximately verified as in the case of large-scale physical phenomena ? The answer is positive. It may not be always ascertained where a single electron will be in the next moment ; but it can be predicted with a very high degree of probability—almost approximating certainty—what will happen to a large collection of these elusive entities. In the face of this experimental fact, it is sheer fantasy to talk of indeterminism of electronic movements.

The development of wave-mechanics, on the basis of the new Quantum Theory, places the principle of uncertainty in the proper perspective. The uncertainty is about single electrons, and even then it is rather epistemological than ontological. Wave-mechanics presupposes determinateness of sub-atomic processes. Determinism and the mechanistic explanation of nature go hand in hand. Indeterminacy precludes mechanistic explanation. If sub-atomic processes were really indeterminate, the new Quantum Theory could not provide the basis for a new mechanistic explanation of physical processes in terms of waves,

Electronic movements are determined. Otherwise, the mathematical law of probability would not be applicable to them. Even the physicists who would dismiss determinism as an illusion, admit that the illusion results from the fact that all physical processes are aggregates of electrons which collectively demonstrate an orderliness. The argument advanced to explain away the proved determinateness of large-scale phenomena itself amounts to an admission of determinism, even where it is supposed to be absent, namely, in the sub-atomic world. How could any aggregate of intrinsically chaotic entities ever possess any degree of orderliness collectively? Indeed, why do they form aggregates at all? Knowing no law, they should each go in its own way of absolute freedom. The very fact that they are found in aggregates proves that they are not absolutely free. They are bound by space. They form aggregates because space sets a limit to the freedom of their movement. And space, as we know now, is not a fathomless metaphysical void, but a function of matter. It follows, then, that electrons form aggregates because they are compelled to do so by some property of their own being. In other words, the "spatial limitation" of their hypothetically absolute freedom is a limitation inherent in themselves. And their empirical reality results from this limitedness. Electrons are actually experienced only as aggregates. Inasmuch as these aggregates are orderly processes, even on the average, electrons are subject to determinism. Their individual determinateness cannot be proved because they are never actually experienced as isolated entities.

Really, the principle of uncertainty is not empirically derived. It is purely logical, a theoretical assumption. It is theoretically known what sort of light will make an electron visible through an ultra-microscope. It is further known that that light is such as will impinge on an electron only to knock it off. The principle of uncertainty is deduced from these theoretical facts. Obviously, it is epistemological. Because of their extreme smallness, single electrons cannot

be observed. Instruments necessary for the purpose only disturb them, rendering accurate deduction impossible. State the problem this way, as it really is, and the solution is readily found in the application of the scientific method to approach the unknown, in this case, uncertainly known, from the known. Here we must go by the principle of the method. For, in a way, the inductive process is reversed; the properties of the particular are deduced from the observation of the general; and therefore, the laws must be formulated statistically. In such a situation, assertion of exactness, even in the relative sense, would be dogmatic. It is a matter of exact knowledge that collectively electrons do demonstrate orderliness. They obey statistical laws. This is sufficient reason to assume that electronic movements are ontologically determinate, as distinct from *determined*. Determinateness is intrinsic. Determinedness, on the contrary, implicitly presupposes an external agency.

The opposite approach to the problem, which leads to the denial of determinism, is neither scientific nor rational. Indeterminateness of single electrons is assumed, disregarding the empirical fact against the logical validity of such assumptions. Then it is asserted that, as aggregates of electrons, physical processes cannot be determined. If they appear to be so, that is an illusion!

Whatever might be the opinion of philosophising physicists and metaphysicians, for science, determinism has never been a question. Science has always been determinist. Scientific philosophy accepted the empirically demonstrated principle of physical determinism. That was the position until some philosophising physicists of our time came out with the startling assertion that physical science was no longer committed to the principle of determinism. The assertion was said to be justified by the development of the new Quantum Theory. A critical examination of the discoveries of atomic physics reveals that the profound revolution in the concept of causality brought about by it (and also by the Theory of Relativity to a still greater degree) does not mean that

the Universe is a chaos. Mechanistic cosmology stands firmer than ever. Physical determinism is the fundamental principle of mechanistic cosmology. Classical physics established the principle empirically—through the realistic method of observation and experiment. It has not been shaken by modern physical research.

The concept of causal relations has been revolutionised

being to exercise sovereignty everywhere, with equal absoluteness, unaffected by the circumstances of the particular region. Causal relation in nature as conceived by classical physics was implicitly of a metaphysical nature. Modern physical research shows that it is a physical function, and as such is necessarily determined by the structure and distribution of matter. That is a profoundly revolutionary discovery, which however is only an extension of the principle of Relativity to the concept of causal relations. Absolute causality goes; and with it must go the lingering faith in the final Cause. Absolute causality goes, and precisely for that reason physical determinism is reinforced. The physical Universe, including the organic as well as the inorganic world, the living as well as inanimate beings, including men with their brain and mind, is determined by itself, because its laws have no metaphysical validity, because laws of nature are nothing more mysterious than generalised statements of principles inherent in the process of becoming. The empirical principle of physical determinism is that all natural processes (physical, physiological, psychological) take place of necessity on their respective backgrounds of identity. There is no arbitrariness in nature, nor is the order of things of any super-natural origin.

Determinism means that the world is a movement which knows no stoppage and permits of no reversal. It is a process of becoming. The law of causality realises itself in

the process. It is an ontological, existential, category, because it is the fundamental property of being, namely, the ability to become. Causal relation is not uniform throughout the Universe, neither spatially nor temporally. It is modified by the structure and organisation of things related. But it pervades the entire Universe, because it is an inter-related system. To say that the world is an inter-related system of causal processes is only a different way of stating that it is not a chaos. Modern physical research does not disprove this fact. It cannot, because the objective reality of this fact is the foundation of science itself. The concept of causality remains a category of rationalist thought. Its rejection would mean a relapse into the belief in magic and miracles. That would be the burial of philosophy as well as of science.

EDITORIAL NOTES

There is hardly any difference of expert opinion about Goethe's place in the history of literature. He is counted among the greatest poets of all ages. But he was more than a poet. His restless genius went beyond the limits of imaginative literature, to conquer an important place also in the field of science and philosophy. His contribution to science, being concrete, as all scientific contributions must be to be so regarded, can be easily evaluated. It was not only to scientific thought, but also to experimental science. The significance of his contribution to the theory of organic evolution can be judged by the fact that he was the founder of a new branch of biology and coined the term "morphology." The concept revolutionised the science of life, and heralded the discoveries of Darwin.

But it is very difficult to fix Goethe's position in the field of philosophy. His philosophical views, in so far as they can be disentangled from poetry, lend themselves to different interpretations. His activist humanism seems to be in tune with Marxist Materialism, which subordinates thought to action and declares that the function of philosophy is not to explain the world, but to remake it, at the same time, as proclaimed by young Faust, it sounds very much like the ominous voice of the Wotan of Nazi Myth—"eternally dissatisfied, eternally striving, eternally becoming" (Alfred Rosenberg, "The Myth of the 20th Century"). As a matter of fact, young Faust was the hero of the "Sturm und Drang" German romanticism, which was claimed by the Nazis as their tradition. The young Faust exclaimed: "Let us hurl ourselves into time's dynamic sweep"; again, "Let us appease burning passions". Faust is autobiographical poetry. Age and experience satiated and sobered Goethe's youthful passions. Yet, the old Faust lamented that he had never lived.

Although it is doubtful whether poetry is a suitable medium for the expression of systematic rationalist thought, many great philosophers have tended to be poets. Notwithstanding his antipathy for poetry, even Plato is classed among poets. The inclusion of beauty in the trinity of supreme values inevitably causes the confusion of philosophy and poetry at a certain point. No system-builder could or would leave aesthetics out of his world. The practice ignored the wisdom of Plato's warning; he would not allow poets in the Republic of philosophers because the former were sure to introduce irrationalism.

The enchant of many modern philosophers to worship at the temple of the goddess in their trinity may be traced to Goethe. But Goethe was primarily a poet. With him, philosophy was incidental. Philosophers cannot, should not, follow him. They are bound to be disloyal to their matronly muse, if they allow themselves to be fascinated overmuch by the eternal youth of the elusive maiden of beauty. Not a few of modern philosophers have been so enticed. Some of them may have earned their niches in the pantheon of poets; but as philosophers, all have failed, because they did what Plato prohibited. It is not an appeal to the authority of the Sage of Athens; it is only a recognition of the force of his argument.

Emotion, even on the plane of passion, is an essential ingredient of human life; it may be the central pivot of a certain type of personality. But if it is allowed to tamper with the rigour of reason, philosophical thought, though expressed through superb literary forms, as in the case of Goethe, is bound to confuse and mislead instead of promoting the search for objective reality and truth. The qualifying term objective is used to differentiate between what is called the artistic creation out of imagination and the contribution of the rational mind to the knowledge of truth and reality.

Goethe is also the source of inspiration for poets and artists who tried to philosophise on the ground that theirs was the unitary view of the world. Some of them did stimulate philosophical thoughts; but none reached the serenity

of the philosopher. Their muse must be worshipped with passion—the more intense and unbridled, the greater the poet. The few who succeeded in keeping a balance between poetry and philosophy of nature, moved to the direction of a mystic pantheism. Schiller was the foremost. He was a Kantian; but, in his philosophy the mechanism of the uncreated essence is replaced by hymn to the beauty of the Universe, in which evil contributes to the harmony of the whole; like shades in painting and discords in great music.

Goethe is generally recognised as a great poet who was also a philosopher; and, on the other hand, as an unorthodox but great philosopher who thought poetically. That is a contradiction in terms, which must be borne in mind when judging Goethe as a philosopher.

Goethe did not preach a philosophy. But his writings record the development of a view of life, as distinct from metaphysics or the rationalist philosophy of nature. Goethe's philosophy of life was like a beautiful castle built in the air. It was the sublime creation of a great poet—out of his imagination. It has been said that Goethe's supreme greatness is his uncompromising subjectivity. His works were the vehicle for expressing the feelings of a man — a great man, indeed, but nonetheless a man. Can the experience of one man's life have a universal value? This question can be affirmatively replied only on the ground that Goethe was the archetypal man — the most perfect, personification of the spirit of the Renaissance. But at the same time, as a man, he could not altogether be above the influence of history. He represented the purest expression of the spirit of the Renaissance as it came to Germany. The *Aufklärung* was a complex and self-contradictory outburst of human genius. It tried to harmonise the influence of the Enlightenment as well as of the Renaissance with native tradition of the Reformation. Kant was the most successful philosopher of the *Aufklärung* and as a philosopher, Goethe was a Kantian, as Cassirer has shown (*Rousseau, Kant and Goethe*).

On the other hand, Goethe's dislike for Newton reflected the spirit of the scholastic rationalism of Germany. It was

not satisfied with a God who had really nothing to do; at the same time, it could not do without the idea of a God—the World Spirit. Already in Albertus Magnus, scholastic rationalism tended towards pantheism; and the Prince of Scholasticism was also a pioneer of experimental science. There is the German parentage of Goethe's philosophy, which also bore the imprint of Renaissance paganism and the naturalism of the Enlightenment. The resulting philosophy of life was bound to be unstable, because it was not deduced from an appropriate metaphysics and a philosophy of nature. Life may be the flower of creation; but it is a negligible excrescence of the cosmic mechanism. No unitary view of nature, therefore, can be really so and a reliable guide for life, which does not embrace the totality of the lifeless world. That was the defect of Goethe's philosophy.

Goethe was a humanist; but his Humanism was not integral. It was subjective, to the extent of being ego-centric. Therefore, self-culture was its cardinal article of faith. It has been said that his life was the greatest work of Goethe. If he really believed that he had created his life out of nothing, he was a poor philosopher. His literary works were created out of imagination; but not his life. Many other things than the poet's insatiable love of life went into its making.

Goethe admittedly accepted the basic ideas of Spinoza's philosophy. They are: regularity of all that happens; unity of all that exists; and identity of spirit and nature. As a scientist, Goethe tried to work out the first idea, although he ridiculed the mechanistic naturalism of the French Encyclopedists. The second and third consistently developed, lead either to materialist (physical) monism or to pantheism. Goethe emphatically rejected the former line of thought. His reaction to "the bible of the 18th century naturalism" (Holbach's "System of Nature") has been made memorable by repeated quotation. Yet, therein lies the most reliable clue to Goethe's philosophy. Therefore, the most pointed passages may be recapitulated: "It appeared to us so, dark so cimerian, so death like...that we took a hearty dislike to all

philosophy, and specially to metaphysics, and remained in the dislike; we threw ourselves into living knowledge, experience, creation and poetising—with all the more liveliness and passion.”

This memorable, unambiguous declaration should preclude all speculation about Goethe's philosophy. He emphatically disowned that he had any. Nevertheless, he did have a distinctive attitude to life, a view of life as an integral part of nature. Only he failed to see that living nature was a part, an insignificant part, of the lifeless cosmic scheme. No unitary view of nature can be really so, and at the same time avoid getting bogged in the morass of pantheist mysticism, unless it is identical with a monistic view of the physical Universe. However much one may “poetise” about life, a unitary view cannot ignore the vast cosmic background of living nature; and except in the context of a rationalist explanation of the totality of the physical Universe, a philosophy of nature and life cannot be really humanist. Because, such a circumscribed view keeps man's origin shrouded in mystery, and logically subordinates him to the super-human. One does not talk of God so often as a mere manner of speech or poetic extravagance. It expresses the feeling (perhaps lurking in the subconscious mind) of the need of a faith in something beyond apprehension as well as comprehension.

The integral view of the world surveys infinity. There, analytical reasoning fails; quantitative statement of experience becomes impossible. But reason does not give way to intuition or creative imagination. At that point, science merges into philosophy. Goethe thought it was poetry, and disputed the capacity of mathematical reasoning to fathom the depths of living nature. Since his time, mathematics has developed the theory of probability as the method of conceptually measuring infinity.

Although the poetic arrogance of the cult of self-development denied it, Goethe inherited the unitary view of nature from the Encyclopedists; and the philosophical significance of this view, when held uncritically with poetic vision, was pointed out by one of the scientists in whose footsteps Goethe

walked. "I know well that for certain minds behind this theory of analogies there may lurk, at least confusedly, another very old theory which, long ago refuted, has been sought out again by some Germans in order to favour the pantheistic theory which they call the philosophy of nature." (Cuvier)

Evidently, the reference was to Goethe, although the cap will fit Schiller and other smaller lights equally well. That is a correct judgment of Goethe's philosophy. Only one point remains to be clarified: Is pantheism a philosophy? And that is the crucial point. The one, in the last analysis, is rationalisation of faith, or poetising of rationalism, as in the case of Goethe; while the other is an attempt to explain being and becoming in the light of the totality of positive knowledge of the world; it makes no room for fantasy; it does not live in a world created out of the imagination of the philosophising poet or the poetising philosopher.

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The communist attitude to science, as it is represented by the practice in Soviet Russia, is reminiscent of the Goethean view that human creativeness can defy the laws of nature. The poet, however, lived long enough to realise that genius consisted in obeying laws (of nature). The Russian "remakers of nature" will also be sobered down by experience. Meanwhile, they have provoked a controversy which is vitiated by passion and prejudice on either side.

Subordination of scientific research to party discipline and to prostrate scientific theories on the procrustean bed of a dogmatic philosophy are highly objectionable. But the pragmatic view of truth and utilitarian approach to scientific research are not confined to communist Russia. Scientists throughout the world were naturally scandalised by the declaration "that the most important principle in science is the party principle" (*Pravda*). But democratic States, particularly those which have adopted the higher democratic principle of planned social reconstruction, are acting essentially according to the resolution of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science—"to reconstruct research work in biology and turn

biological sciences into a powerful weapon for modifying living nature in the interests of building a communist society". The difference is of degree; it depends on the pattern of the desired social reconstruction. A planned social reconstruction presupposes a single purpose in all human endeavour. Only, one need not be a fatalistic believer in the teleological trend of technology; there, human will and human creativeness can and must assert themselves. Otherwise, civilisation will be a world of robots—slaves driven by slaves.

From the strictly scientific point of view, all this uproarious condemnation of the regimentation and degradation of science in Soviet Russia is beside the point. What is condemned in Russia is practised in other countries, in a lesser degree. Not only actually in the midst of war, but in its preparation, scientific research has to do the bidding of the State. Otherwise, the civilised world would not be tormented by the nightmare of destruction by atom bombs and even more powerfully devilish results of scientific research.

On the level of a discussion of scientific theory, the Lysenko controversy is only a recrudescence of the famous Bateson-Pearson quarrel: the dispute between Mendelian mutationists and biometricians. The roots of the controversy go still deeper in the history of the theory of evolution, and can be traced in the conflicting dual hypothesis of Darwin: automatic natural selection of variations which are already given, and cumulative inheritance of acquired characters. In course of time, particularly since the development of genetics, biological research tended to discard the latter hypothesis. But at the same time, neo-Darwinism was opposed by a revised statement of the Lamarckian theory of evolution. While so far the evidence in support of natural selection appears to be overwhelming, without laying himself open to the charge of dogmatism one cannot say that the issue is settled, that the final truth about the secret of life has been discovered.

The point of dispute is Lysenko's definition of heredity—"the effect of the concentration of the action of external

conditions assimilated by the organism in a series of preceding generations". If the extravagant assertions in support of this definition are set aside, it may not be so very repugnant to evolutionary genetics, as it appears to be. Lysenko makes the original Lamarckian assertion that heredity is influenced by the accumulated effects of environments; in other words, acquired characteristics are inherited. The opposing view, which he claims to reject, explains the manner in which organisms change their inherited characteristics in many generations.

The crucial concept is of change; it is common to both the opposing views, which thus have something important in common. And the orthodox theory does not deny that the influence of environments has a place in the process of change which is the essence of evolution. It holds that environments do not influence heredity *directly*, but through the long complicated process of natural selection. Nature selects the most adaptable variation; but how could variations be caused, if the physical foundation of heredity—the self-producing units of living matter called gens—was unshakable? And without the appearance of an infinite number of variations, there would be no selection and no evolution; life would petrify. It is entirely against the spirit of scientific research to reject or ignore facts because they do not fit into a particular theory. But on the other hand, it is evident that all the facts have not yet been found to explain fully the phenomenon of change—the appearance of variations. It is no more in tune with the spirit of science to take anything as simply given. When more will be known, the difference between the two views will most probably close up.

A considerable advance has actually been made already to that direction. Lysenko shocked the scientific world by his theory of "shattering" or "shaking" the foundations of heredity. But years ago, Muller had demonstrated that mutations, which naturally cause reshuffling of the gens, could be artificially caused. Even natural mutations are no longer regarded

as inexplicable phenomena—sudden jumps disturbing the orderliness of natural processes. It has been observed that, in the process of self-reproduction, one string of gens becoming two, the new is not always an exact replica of the old; it contains new gens which produce new traits and these are inherited. This appearance of novelty is called mutation. Therefore, mutation most probably is the mechanism of the cumulative effects of the influence of environments becoming a factor of heredity, another stone in the physical foundation of heredity.

If it is dogmatically asserted that man's development is entirely at the mercy of the gens, Lysenko's condemnation of the neo-Mendelian theory as "fatalistic" can not be dismissed as unscientific. There are enough experimental data showing that mutations are not spontaneous (uncaused), uncontrollable and unpredictable. The gens can be artificially rearranged. Apart from Muller's experiments with X-ray, inheritance of acquired characteristics has been demonstrated in laboratories by others. The process appears to be discontinuous, because it is not direct. Natural selection is the mechanism of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. If the self-reproducing units of living matter were precluded from picking up new potentialities on the way, to enrich heredity, evolution would be a meaningless term. How could then new species originate?

Finally, the fact that the Mendelian theory of heredity has been used to buttress the doctrine of racial superiority cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Other branches of science have proved that this doctrine is groundless. So, there is a discrepancy between the findings of two branches of science. Since scientific research deals with objective facts, the discrepancy suggests that one or the other of the two branches has not yet found all the relevant facts. This suggestion gives the impetus for further enquiry, which will result in a greater enrichment of knowledge. That is how science makes progress.

Scientific research must not be subjected to political considerations or conform with ideological bias. But, at the same time, it does not take place in a social vacuum, It

is one of the various expressions of man's urge for freedom. Therefore, the crucial test of the correctness of any scientific theory is philosophical—does it contribute to man's spiritual freedom? In other words, is science serving the purpose of increasing man's power (over nature) to gain greater freedom? Whenever a scientific theory, however much sound it may appear from the technical point of view, tends to serve the opposite purpose, its correctness must be doubted not to favour a counter-dogmatism, but to carry on further research with the object of discovering the truth.

If the Russians are committing the error of backing up a scientific theory by the considerations of social reconstruction and the corresponding ideology, their opponents are equally mistaken when they mix up a scientific dispute with political propaganda. The scientific attitude should be to show that the philosophical implication of the particular theory does not serve the purpose of social reaction.

BOOK REVIEWS

MODERN MEN IN SEARCH OF GOD

VEDANTA FOR THE WESTERN WORLD by Christopher Isherwood, Aldous Huxley, Gerald Heard and others; Allen & Unwin, London ; 16/8d.

On the jacket, the publishers introduce this book as the work of a group of intellectuals who have found a faith and a belief in themselves. They claim to have rejected the dogma of all religions, but admit to have found their faith in a philosophy based on the Vedas. The Introduction by Isherwood begins with the assertion that "Vedanta is the philosophy of the Vedas." So, after all, the new faith of a group of modern intellectuals in search of God is not found in themselves, but in the dogmas of a religion. If one admits the claim that the Vedas contain revealed truth and inspired wisdom, he can not reject the scriptures of other religions as dogmas. Revelation is the sanction of all religions, and that common source of them all is beyond the reach of rational understanding. Therefore, it is dogmatic to make a special case of Hinduism, be it of the Vedas or of the Vedanta or of the Gita. Isherwood himself concedes that "the Vedanta philosophy is the least common denominator of all religious belief."

Gerald Heard, who is a more straight-forward religious revivalist than sophisticated intellectuals like Isherwood and Aldous Huxley, gives the correct definition of Vedanta. It is "the scientific approach to religion". The definition is historically wrong; neither the author of the Gita (not the legendary Krishna) nor Sankara had the ghost of an idea of scientific approach. In their time, that is to say, in the pre-scientific days of the history of human thought, it was not yet necessary to rationalise religion, which, as the expression of primitive rationalism, satisfied man's native

curiosity about the cause of the world of phenomena. But Heard's definition of Vedanta is correct in the sense that it exposes its absurdity: to rationalise the irrational is an absurd attempt. In modern times, religion can hold its ground as a challenge to rationalism ; it is irrationalism *par excellence*.

Heard gives away the case of the modern spiritualist brotherhood still further when he admits that their acceptance of Vedanta is an explicable psychological phenomenon. "There is a vast mass of people who, whether their intelligences are able to grasp the arguments of mechanistic science or not, are possessed of wills which are determined not to accept a doctrine which maintains that their lives are futile, that their existences mean nothing and that the spirit has no significance." A philosophy which does not run down the knowledge of truth does not take such a pessimistic view of life, although it does differ about the conception of spirit. However, the point is that Heard admits that the rejection of scientific knowledge is a matter of predisposition. None can open the eyes of people who do not want to see and revel in their wilful blindness.

The psychological trait stands out clearly when Isherwood maintains that Gita does not preach war. To agree with him, one has to believe that faith can not only move mountains, but change the accepted meaning of words.

A regiment of Swamis, those Indian apostles of revivalism, bring up the rear of the Quixotic modern western intellectuals marching to demolish the defences of human freedom which are built upon the unshakable foundation of knowledge. One of them lays down that self-surrender is the condition for the realisation of the unity with God. If some morbid modern intellectuals were prepared to pay the price for a hallucination, not many would follow them in the search of God. The book is a portent and a warning.

HUNDRED YEARS AGO

THE OPENING OF AN ERA : 1848—A Historical Symposium, with an Introduction by A. J. P. Taylor, edited by Francois Fejto ; Allan Wingate, London ; 21/-.

Composed of eighteen chapters, each dealing with the revolutionary movement in one country, and written by competent historians, this book is a useful historical treatise. The quality of such a collective work is bound to be uneven. But on the whole, a high level of scholarship is maintained. The Introduction by A. J. P. Taylor and the main essay and concluding chapter by the editor are of particular interest. The editor's rather comprehensive survey of "Europe on the Eve of the Revolution" not only provides the background for the chapters dealing with events in individual countries, but sounds the key-note, so to say.

The significance of the book, however, is that it compels the thoughtful reader to see that revolutionaries of our time are pursuing the same utopia as moved their forerunners a hundred years ago. A vivid recollection of the experiences of that time may still teach a lesson which will be very salutary even today. This book may serve that purpose. The excellent Introduction by A. J. P. Taylor is particularly valuable in this respect.

The eighteenth century rationalists had supposed that mankind would attain universal happiness if traditional beliefs were abandoned and traditional authorities overthrown. In 1848, the Liberals shirked the problem of authority, but the Radicals were more daring. They found a substitute for tradition in their belief in the people ; in some countries, loyalty to the nation substituted for loyalty to kings. The revolutionaries of 1848 found a substitute for the hereditary governing class in themselves. By democracy, they did not mean the rule of the majority, they meant rather the rule of the discontented. The theoretical justification for this outlook was provided by Marx. Since democracy and the socialist movement were synonymous, only those who desired Socialism were "the

people." Democracy could thus be turned into the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the dictatorship was not really to be exercised even by those working men who accepted the theories of Marx. The workers were to be led by the Communists. "Since the Communists in 1848 consisted of Marx and Engels, this was a satisfactory conclusion for Communists ever since. The radical theorists were led inevitably from belief in the people to belief in themselves, and so to advocacy of authoritarian government."

In the concluding chapter, the editor tries to discover the reasons for the defeat of the revolutions of 1848. He agrees with John Stuart Mill that revolution was defeated because the bulk of the people were not prepared to accept it. Yet he seems to be lulled by Proudhon's optimism: "We democratic socialists are still the party of the future". On the whole Fejto's conclusion is rather influenced by the Marxist doctrine of class conflict than following the sound ideas outlined in Taylor's Introduction. Such divergence of opinion is inevitable in a symposium. If the Marxist note of Fejto's conclusion drowns the sober voice of the historian, raised in the Introduction, the usefulness of the of the book may be impaired.

LOYAL CRITICISM

MARX: HIS TIME AND OURS by Rudolf Schlesinger ;
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London ; 30/-.

The title of this learned treatise is rather misleading. It is not about Marx, but about Marxism—a critical appreciation of the doctrines of Karl Marx with reference to the social conditions and intellectual atmosphere of the middle nineteenth century and also in the context of those of contemporary history. But it is not a comparative study ; it is an attempt to prove that there are certain positive elements in Marxism which are as valid today as they were one hundred years ago. The author's thesis is that, purged of its utopian tendencies, Marxism is as valid today

as at the time of the prophet. The contrary view seems to be more correct. Experience has exposed the fallacies of Scientific Socialism ; but Marxism can still inspire progressive thought and revolutionary action, because of its passionate advocacy of social justice.

Notwithstanding the basic defect of missing the moral significance of Marxism, Dr. Schlesinger's painstaking study is very useful. The chapter on the philosophical sources of Marxism is scholarly, although there are some strange lapses, such as bracketing Robert Owen with Hegel. The thesis of the chapter is that Marx was a Hegelian in metaphysics, but rejected the master's political philosophy. The thesis is based on the argument that Hegelian metaphysics, being a part of the German classical philosophy, was progressive, while the concluding part of the Hegelian system was reactionary, because it reflected the political reaction of the post-Napoleonic period. The thesis is untenable, logically as well as historically.

The chapter on Thought and Society is written to refute the charge that Marxism denies the power of ideas. But it corroborates the charge by belabouring the point that Marxism attaches great importance to ideology. On the basic issue of the origin of ideas, the author takes up the orthodox Marxist position : ideas are determined by social conditions, but stimulate action to change them. Ideas are confounded with ideals. In course of this very important discussion, reference is made to one of the most absurd theories of Marxist historicism : that the German classical philosophy was a substitute for the political revolution which did not take place in Germany because of the backwardness of the bourgeoisie. Dr. Schlesinger very correctly argues that, if that description of the German classical philosophy is accepted, "the Marxist himself is bound to ask whether, in view of this backwardness, German philosophy could produce methodological foundations for the theory of the progressive movement in countries much more advanced than was early nineteenth century Germany." The Marxist Dr. Schlesinger tries to answer the question and misinterprets

the history of philosophy in the vain attempt. The suggestion is that the Hegelian system as a whole did not have any logical coherence; its earlier part was determined by the impact of the French Revolution and therefore progressive, while the latter—philosophy of law and the theory of State—reflected the interest of the reactionary German ruling class. With this arbitrary theory that there were two Hegels, Dr. Schlesinger refutes his repudiation of the charge that Marxism denies the importance of ideas in history. The fact is that Hegelian philosophy is a logically rounded up system, as any other system of thought is. The whole of it is either progressive or reactionary. Marx did not understand that; therefore he turned out to be a bad Hegelian; his loyal critic Dr. Schlesinger follows in the footsteps of the master.

In the concluding chapter, the author recovers his balance and makes some significant observations which are useful for a correct evaluation of Marxism as a system of sociological thought. "Marxism is no more original than the Aristotelian system, that other synthesis, which succeeded in transferring to a civilisation to come the achievements of a passing epoch." Reminding the faithful that "Marx, a son of the nineteenth century, was bound to generalise" from the realities of his time, Dr. Schlesinger asks them to be true to their faith that human thought is conditioned by the actual structure of human society. But he proceeds to fortify his faith by the declaration that, notwithstanding the weakness of its internal logic, Marxism is as relevant to-day as in the time of Marx. In the opening chapter, he dismisses the view that "despite its contribution to the progress of thought, (Marxism) has followed the rest of the Victorian output into obsolescence". But the four hundred pages of scholastic learning fail to prove the contention that twentieth century sociology can not do without the findings of Marx any more than modern physics can repudiate Newton. That exactly is the evil genius of modern sociology; it pretends to be critical and

independent, but cannot do without the authority of Marx, though without acknowledging the indebtedness.

Dr. Schlesinger also rejects the view that Bolshevism is of the Marxist ancestry, that all the fundamental tenets of Bolshevism have their origin in the theories of Marx. Thus, by implication, he maintains that Lenin and Stalin and their millions of followers are imposters. This is an old quarrel between the Social-Democrats and the Communists. It bears a striking resemblance to the disputations of the mediaeval Schoolmen. But at the same time, Dr. Schlesinger holds that the social transformation taking place in consequence of the October Revolution in Russia was foretold by Marx. Holding this view, he must, of course, oppose the contention of the ex-communist Alfred Rosenberg that, "just because it fits the twentieth century Russian pattern, Marxism does not fit the fundamentally different pattern of present Western civilisation." Yet, it cannot be denied that there is a good deal of empirical truth in this contention.

Having rejected all alternative interpretations of Marxism, Dr. Schlesinger offers his as the thesis of the book: "An investigation may concentrate upon the modifications of the Marxist system made by the further evolution of the social formation investigated by Marx, including attempts at the realisation of his system. Such an approach involves inherent criticism of Marx's original system, but takes the continuing relevance of that system for granted; it is based not upon the finality of Marx's system, but rather on his success in achieving a critical synthesis of all the relevant material available in his day, which enabled him to overcome the limitations of that material."

It is all rather obscure. A new interpretation as opposed to all others ought to be more intelligible and convincing. The matter is not improved by argumentations set forth elaborately in more than four-hundred pages. The obscurity is perhaps due, to a great extent, to the Germanisms of the language. A freer translation might do the author greater justice. As it is, the book is full of sentences which do not

convey any meaning, not to mention conviction, to readers incapable of imagining what might have been the original German text.

However, on the whole, this work of scholarship is valuable for the mass of reference material presented to prove a thesis which is not very convincing.

A FORMIDABLE CREED

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM by R.N. Carew Hunt ; Geoffrey Bles, London ; 12/6d.

This critical study of the historical and ideological development of Communism from Marx to Stalin bears the subtitle "An Introduction". A careful and objective study carried on for several years is presented with the modest subtitle because the author pleads for "a serious attempt to understand this formidable creed". An attempt "to present it fairly and objectively" leads to the conclusion: "Marxism must be taken seriously, and there is a grave danger of underrating it. It is not to be refuted by attributing to its exponents positions which they have never adopted."

That is a sound and sensible voice, which ought to get a hearing when the world is flooded with anti-communist literature of purely propagandist nature. The propaganda offensive has so far failed to make any appreciable breach in the communist phalanx. Armed offensive on the plea of resistance does not hold out any greater promise. The fight against Communism would not succeed unless the defenders of liberty realised that the deceptive appeal of this formidable cult is made to mass despair. It is further to be realised that discredited parliamentary democracy and the economics of free enterprise inspire no hope. So long as anti-communism will be the defence of a lost cause, it will make no headway.

The author of this book does go to the root of the trouble; but his diagnosis is doubtful; consequently, he prescribes a remedy which is not new. Indeed, it has been

tried unsuccessfully. He traces the origin of Communism in the spiritual vacuum created by the breakdown of religion as a result of the secularisation of thought. The opinion is historically true, to some extent; and that only proves that Communism was originally based upon a philosophy which proclaimed the spiritual liberation of man. Communism, in that sense, can be combatted only with a reactionary purpose. The remedy prescribed by the author is rejection of the rationalist humanist view of life; that is to say, to blast the very foundation of modern civilisation and democratic culture. What, then, is the difference between Communism and Anti-Communism? The former also decries "bourgeois culture". If salvation is sought in 'faith, that also is offered by Communism. As a matter of fact, Communism sways the masses, which is the source of its strength, by fomenting the atavism of falling back on blind faith. The role of Communism today is analogous to that of Islam in the earlier centuries of its history. The decayed Roman order was pulled down by the fanatical fury of a faith. The older faith of the idolatry of Byzantine Christianity could offer no resistance.

The loss of faith in himself as an individual compels man to merge himself in the masses, and the latter can be incited into a destructive fury by communist demagogy. The only way to strike at the root of Communism, in so far as it has degenerated into a fanatical faith, should suggest itself to the dispassionately thinking mind. It is the resurrection of the rationalist humanist view of life. The author recommends the rejection of this view. He argues that Marxism was based upon the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of Man; therefore, "it is not likely to be effectively challenged by one which starts from the same principles." The suggestion is that the survival of modern democratic culture is conditional upon the destruction of its foundation! If we were asked to choose between Communism and return to the spiritual slavery of mediaevalism, at least a few would not make the wrong choice. The choice would be between volun-

tary slavery and the danger of an imposed servitude. If man can regain faith in himself, in the latter case he will have the chance to resist, with a forlorn hope that he may succeed ; and that appears to be the hope for mankind to-day.

RELIGION & HISTORIOLOGY

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY by Herbert Butterfield ; George Bell and Sons Ltd., London ; 7s. 6d.

The author of this book is a devout Christian and a professor of Modern History. This is as uncomfortable a position for an author as it can be. One has to contend with a vast and formidable scholarship that holds history as a science and considers human history as a part of natural history. And one has also to consult one's own inclination which would be to look upon history as a Providentially ordained sequence of events. Prof. Butterfield makes his choice and presents it with all the force and plausibility that his wide learning and ability can lend it.

At the start history was very much of philosophy and this can be seen from the fact that its Greek root means search for knowledge. History, thus, began as an inquiry into social events and their causes. This spirit of inquiry was, however, replaced by religion which made it out as workings of Providence. A bold reassertion of the secular view of history takes places with Vico. Vico explained history as "humanity creating itself" and thereby laid the foundations of modern historiology. He may be said to have "humanised" history. He has been hailed as "one of the historians of humanity". Since then this humanist philosophy of history has been steadily, though slowly, gaining ground. This view of history leads, naturally, to a criticism of religion. If history is "humanity creating itself" and can be rationally explained, what happens to a large number of events in which history and religion are both mixed up. The divine element in them comes under serious suspicion. And, thanks to the workings of human

mind these suspicions will not stay where they arise and may well extend to the entire religion in question. The problem for the protagonists of religion is obvious—a divinisation of history. For if the whole history is providential order, the dualism disappears and the doubts are easily dissipated.

Prof. Butterfield meets this situation in a very remarkable way. He points out that religious (Christian) thought is "inextricably involved in historical thought". The story of Jesus himself is thus involved. On the one hand there is the fulfilment of "things to which the Old Testament had so often pointed" and on the other "His life, His teaching and His personality are the subject of a historical narrative which knits itself into the story of the Roman Empire". Christianity itself is a historical religion, i. e., "it presents us with religious doctrines which are at the same time historical events or historical interpretations." The attitude that one would take in such a case will depend upon one's general view of life. Prof. Butterfield naturally takes a religious view of things. He takes the line, therefore, that, "the fact that Christianity comes down to us as an historical religion. is bound to provide certain bearings for the interpretation of the whole drama of human life on this earth. "But once the historical process is taken as proceeding from God, there arises the need of explaining the evil, the misery and unhappiness that form part of history. Here the doctrine of man's sinfulness comes in very handy and all such troublesome things can be seen as the Divine Judgment working itself out through historical process. Prof. Butterfield heavily underlines man's sinfulness. One has to realise that "all men are sinners". "The gravitational pull in history", according to him, "is the sinfulness of man." He summarily dismisses all the doctrines of the 'glib prophets' which suggest an optimistic and happy view of human nature. He asks us to have no faith in man. He laments that "one of the greatest deficiencies of our time is the failure of the imagination or the intellect to bring home to itself the portentous character of human sin". And a little further on he adds: "All the horrors that can occur

over the length and breadth of European continent have ultimately to be presented to our mind as the sign and the consequence of the general problem of human sin." He is so far forth impressed with this "portentious character of human sin" that he finds it manifesting itself in the ecclesiastical history. Like Ruskin he makes a distinction between religion and ecclesiasticism and in the latter he finds represented a large measure of human sinfulness. Christian religion has to be saved at the sacrifice of Christian ecclesiasts. The much lacerated humanity of to-day has an imperious need of some succour, some message of hope and faith in itself. They would deserve congratulations who can fulfil their need of it from Prof. Butterfield's analysis and meaning of history. After such serious damnation of our souls it is hardly a comfort to be told, as we are told, that we are "subordinate *only* to the glory of God". It is rather to be wondered that the dope still works !

R. L. Nigam.

A PHILOSOPHER'S TESTAMENT

HUMANISM AS A PHILOSOPHY by Corliss Lamont ;
The Philosophical Library, New York ; \$ 3. 75.

The author himself describes the book as "a philosopher's testament." "In it", he says, "I have tried to describe in clear and simple terms the fully rounded philosophy of life that I call Humanism." After a few sentences he adds : "In my treatment I have aimed at conciseness and have written what is essentially an introduction to the Humanist philosophy." A perusal of the book shows it to be as much as the author says of it. An introduction opens the way to fuller intimacy and therefrom a fuller understanding. Lamont's book does the same in respect of Humanist philosophy. There are many omissions which to interested readers would appear fundamental. The author is conscious of them. Nevertheless, the broad features of the Humanist view of life are clearly and simply stated and should prove helpful in promoting that outlook.

The author clearly rejects all supernaturalism and transcendentalism and affirms this life, "this-earthly experiences and relationships" as the cardinal facts. He stresses the fact that Humanism is essentially a philosophy and not a religion as some would have it. The stress is salutary. He has traced the roots of Humanism in the hoary past and discovered its "affiliations" with the developments in the present. For this purpose he has made a searching study of Literature and Art, Sciences and the various philosophies. Thus, Lamont's Humanism is integral in the sense that it integrates the various humanist elements that he thus discovers into this "testament". There are, according to him, different kinds of Humanists. It may be admitted that amongst the Humanists their would be shades and slants. And yet, the credentials of some of his humanists may not bear a close scrutiny. In so far as a person has humanitarian tendencies he may be termed a humanist. But humanitarianism is not Humanism. A person may be humanitarian while holding beliefs which are the very antithesis of the Humanist principles.

Humanists would be in general agreement with Lamont's eight point formulation of Humanist philosophy. But some doubts are bound to be felt when one comes to their detailed explanation. The most crucial and the most serious problem with which Humanism has to contend is the problem of ethics and its sanction. In the chapter, "The Affirmation of Life", Lamont pleads for a secular ethics, grounding it in "this-earthly experiences and relationships." That is a great improvement on other brands of ethics. But he makes *social good* the "supreme ethical goal". He points out that this cannot be proved like a mathematical proposition but has rather to be taken as a "sweeping ethical *assumption*" as important in its field, as the scientific assumption of the Uniformity of Nature". He would not mind "the personal sacrifices that may be entailed" by devotion to "collective well-being". Without in any way suggesting that one should not work, or sacrifice, for the good of the rest of one's fellow beings, it may be pointed out that this emphasis on "social good" and

"collective being" is rather misplaced. The tragedy of our times is that the individual has been pushed into utter insignificance and completely submerged in the collectivity whether it be state, nation or class, and all in the name of the social good. Lamont seems to rationalise this position. Here is a very significant statement :

"The individual under whatever sky and and no matter what his work or where he stands on the ladder of achievement, infuses his life with meaning through his devotion and contribution to the larger social good. The vast complexities and impersonal functioning of modern society have led to a feeling of insignificance and impotence on the part of the millions of people.....The average man has a deep-seated need of assurance that his activities are of some social usefulness and importance."

In the present complicated and enormous structure of society the individual has become helpless and atomised. He has to be restored to the position of his proper dignity. Once again, it is not intended to minimise the importance and value of altruism. What is suggested is that social or collective well-being is the complicated function of individual well-being, that "man is the measure of all things." Of course, individual, on his part, has to realise that his happiness and well-being is conditional on the happiness and well-being of his neighbour. Perhaps, the difference between this point of view and that of Lamont is merely verbal. But one would like to be sure on such matters of vital importance. He himself seems to see the danger when he proceeds to add that "Humanism does not for a moment imply that *any* social goal which evokes loyalty in an individual is worthwhile, because then, for example, Fascist loyalty to an evil cause will have to be considered a good...."

Perhaps, such differences at the initial stage are quite natural. However, his broad formulations—that the ultimate reality is matter (or better to say, physical), that there is only this-natural order and there is no supernatural or non-natural order, that man is a part of this natural order, that he can make his destiny, that reason can be depended

upon for intelligent, purposeful human action, that morality flows from this-life, that science can guide the proper ordering of human affairs and cooperative living—are all sound and should be acceptable to all Humanists. But, since, Humanism as a philosophy has to place man in the centre of Universe the Humanist philosophy must undertake, with the help of science, an explanation of man himself. Once man understands himself and his place in nature and realises that he is the maker of his own destiny, he can start with confidence the rebuilding of society and usher in a truly Humanist order of co-operative living in which every individual instead of being lost in the “intractableness of institutions” will attain to his maximum fulfilment.

R. L. Nigam

PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION

EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY by Robert A. Davies ;
Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. New York ; \$ 3.00.

UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR PROBLEMS by S. R.
Dongerkerly ; Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay ; Rs. 6/-.

EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
by K. G. Saiyidain ; Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay ; Rs. 3/12/-.

Saying that education is one and indivisible is like spelling man with a capital “M” and leaving most of the problem unbroached. The fundamental problem of education is very much the same as the fundamental problem of human organisation. To put into the words of Mr. Davies, it is the problem of the adjustment of “classroom standards” with “pupil differences.” The human child is an individual who lives and grows in organised society. It has to be taught “to take life in its stride”; it has to be placed in “vital contacts with daily experience”; its powers of thought and decision have to be developed. “The goal of education is to make truth emotionally satisfying in order that the individual may experience gratification from increased knowledge instead of the dissatisfying frustration of conflict between highly emotional beliefs and factual accuracy.”

"Children are neither good nor bad by nature. Their behaviour is labelled good or bad according to their success in making adjustments that receive the approval of those who deal with them." The child is rational, it has a "reason" for everything it does. Learning is a "psychological situation" as well as a physical phenomenon and the purpose of education is—"safeguarding the growth of the child". Its mental attitudes are very largely formed by the reception its physical appearance gets in the world and by the satisfaction or frustration of its basic life-urges. Character is made up of "permanent attitudes regarding security in the adult world".

Thus education brings up the social demand for the rights of health and security for all. It is a more fundamental problem than equality of opportunities artificially created by doling out of scholarships. Statistics show that children placed in orphanages tend to have their I. Q. diminished; negroes moving from Southern to Northern cities have their intelligence increased; "children from homes of superior socio-economic levels tend to have higher I. Q. levels than those from homes of inferior levels."

Apart from health and security, freedom is the keystone of education; the dictum that "the child should be taught how to think and not what to think" is restated as acceptable to "American conception of democracy". The incentive for education, in its turn, is "play" and not "vocational interest" as some have suggested. Play as the expression of "their natural desire for activity" is "an important aid to their social development". From play and hobbies qualities of responsibility, resourcefulness, initiative, "mechanical ability", "research training" are developed which form the bases of character and vocation.

The above is a review of education from the aspect of the integral, individual, human child. There are other aspects. Types and grades are determined by the heights and varieties of human skills and talents. Mr. Dongerkery in *Universities and Their Problems* deals with education at its highest in all its richness and breadth. His book is a

valuable collation of views and facts of University education all over the world. A convinced academician, he pleads for a purely cultural type of university education, criticising the "temptation to dabble in technical as contrasted with professional education" "which are best handled by their appropriate agencies." He abhors the disintegration of the American system under which universities have degenerated into conglomerates of technical and cultural institutes. Freedom for the universities is the keynote when he deplors the official domination of universities in France and control by industrial and commercial interests of the American and Russian universities.

However, Mr. Dongerkery fails to satisfy the critical reader when he comes to concrete suggestions. He sins against his accepted ideal of freedom by asserting university domination over secondary education. By accepting Flexner's view that "the difference between secondary education and university education is the difference between maturity and immaturity", he denies the richness and variety of human talents and lays the foundation of the very conglomerate of the academic and the technical which he abhors. Moreover, the "problem of numbers" which fills the colleges with unfit and unwanted students is, to a very large extent, the result of lumping secondary education with the higher through a misinterpretation of the ideal of the oneness and indivisibility of education.

Again, Mr. Dongerkery throws away the baby with the bath water when he regrets the progress of university education "from culture to science, from science to technology". He also defeats the main ideals of freedom when he admits cultural regimentation by pleading for the development of regional universities as the "best nurseries of national culture". On the other hand, when, as a means to avoiding official domination through grants in aid, he suggests representation on the supreme controlling bodies of universities, of political and commercial interests, he falls into the trap with a naivette unexpected of such a thorough and scholarly academician.

Mr. Saiyidain, in *Eduction for International Understanding* is wholeheartedly in favour of education with a purpose. He is as insistent on giving a "bias" to education as Mr. Davies is careful to avoid "indoctrination". Education is to be a "race against catastrophe" for which the powerful agencies of the press, the platform, the stage, the screen, the radio, the school are to be fully mobilised. A "psychological revolution" will be implemented to create the "mentality for peace". But that Mr. Saiyidain himself is in need of such a revolution is exposed by the fact of his hitching his wagon to the time-discredited horses of the old religions of the world and allowing patriotism its niche "provided it does not stand in the way of international understanding".

Propaganda for peace will be made through the U.N.E.S.C.O. under the auspices of which many of these lectures have been delivered. The schools will pursue the ideal by teaching history as the "Story of Man". But the proposed Story of Man is not an objective account of the common peoples of the different lands but a "sympathetic" study of the lives of the great men of different countries. The reason adduced for this queer distortion of history is that otherwise the children of the "bright areas" reading about the appalling conditions prevailing in the "dark areas" may develop an undesirable attitude of contemptuous superiority. But that this easy way of concealing skeletons in cupboards will also help opportunists in countries like India with a great mission to sell outside and an inside of starvation and ignorance to hide, is overlooked by the author who is otherwise, quick to utter words of caution against vested interests of money and power. It is all the more unfortunate that this mistake is committed by one who depends so much on the diffusion of culture, in forms of popular arts and crafts, amongst the common people for the purpose of international understanding.

Kalyani Karlekar

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